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COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE INEFFICIENCY IN KHAYELITSHA AND A BREAKDOWN IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE

COMMUNITY AND POLICE IN KHAYELITSHA PHASE ONE

Major General Peter Jacobs

Date: 28 March 2014 Source: Pages 6007-6355 of Commission t ranscr ipt

ON RESUMPTION ON: (at 09:00) COMMISSIONER: Good morning, General Jacobs. Welcome to the Commission. Are there any document issues we need to deal with f i rst, Advocate Masuku? How are we doing on the var ious documents that we’re requir ing? MR MASUKU: I d id receive that emai l yesterday and I have forwarded i t to – and he is deal ing with i t . COMMISSIONER: Okay, a lr ight . I t wi l l be very helpfu l i f we could get these during the course of the weekend, part icular ly because some of them are very re levant to witnesses who wi l l be appearing on Monday a nd Tuesday. MR MASUKU: Okay. We wi l l do that . COMMISSIONER: Okay. Thank you very much indeed. General Jacobs, as I say, you're very welcome to the proceedings of the Commission. You're aware, of course, that the proceedings are in publ ic and that you r test imony may be made publ ic both through the media and through the report of the Commission, and you have no object ion to that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I am aware of that , thank you. COMMISSIONER: Good. And you don’t have an object ion to that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I have no object ion at a l l . COMMISSIONER: Good. Do you have any object ion to taking the oath? PETER ANTHONY JACOBS: (Sworn states) COMMISSIONER: Thank you very much. Advocate Masuku. EXAMINATION BY MR MASUKU: Thank you. General Jacobs, you are th e deputy provincia l commissioner responsib le for operat ional services in the Western Cape. Is that correct? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Advocate Masuku, good morning. My ro le, Commissioners, my ro le has changed since January. Since January I am now the provincia l head of cr ime inte l l igence. So but unt i l 31 s t of December I was the deputy provincia l commissioner for operat ional services, f rom Apri l 2012 t i l l December 2013. COMMISSIONER: So th is changed from 1 January, d id i t? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja. COMMISSIONER: Okay. Thank you. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Thank you. MR MASUKU: And in your statement you say that you are responsib le for ensuring a proact ive and responsive pol ice service at both stat ion and provincia l level . Can you perhaps expla in that a b i t more? MR PIKOLI: Excuse me. Since your appointment as now also as the head of cr ime inte l l igence in the province, your test imony wi l l – you wi l l be able to speak

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to both operat ional issues as wel l as cr ime inte l l igence, I suppose? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I t ’s a b i t of a . . . ( intervent ion). MR PIKOLI: We don’t have any other person f rom cr ime inte l l igence. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I am. But I th ink, Commissioner, I th ink you would understand that I am relat ively new there and obviously I am in the phase where we’re busy with a rev iew to understand al l of those th ings. And I haven’t necessari ly had the br ief to necessari ly comment on those th ings. But where they are generic I wi l l be able to comment, but where they're specif ic about the organisat ional matters i t depends on the – f rom issue to issue whether I wi l l be able to or not. But I wi l l , as I under oath indicated, I wi l l te l l a l l t ruth that I am able to te l l . Thank you. MR MASUKU: Is that consistent with inte l l igence work? Okay. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Can you repeat the quest ion for me please? MR MASUKU: No, no. The quest ion I asked, General , is that you say that you were responsib le – pr ior to being provincia l head of inte l l igence you were responsib le for a proact ive and responsive pol ice service at both stat ion and provincia l level . Can you expand a bi t on that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Thank you, Commissioners. My ro le as the deputy for operat ional services ef fect ively meant that I would be responsib le for vis ib le pol ic ing, that means al l pol ice personnel in uniform. There are 1 50 pol ice stat ions that is organised col lect ively in 25 clusters. Also, for a l l other specia l ised uniformed personnel in the form of publ ic order pol ice and specia l task force, nat ional intervent ion, those specia l ised units that is cal led in f rom t ime to t ime. And also responsib le for the area of 10111, a l l the cal l centres and pol ice emergency services l ike the dog unit and those th ings. MR MASUKU: General , we discussed a mind map in which we – and you made a proposal on how you wish to deal with the is sues that you need to test i fy on today. I want to take you back to 2003. In 2003 what ro le d id you play in Khayel i tsha? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Thank you, Commissioner. I th ink i t may be important just to indicate I have been, as you indicated, the Khayel i tsha – I have been – I was appointed in Khayel i tsha in 2003 as the – I came there to be the stat ion commissioner of Khayel i tsha; which means so since f rom 2003 t i l l now i t ’s a fa ir ly long journey, i t ’s 11 years in my involvement in var ious levels in Khayel i tsha, so i t ’s been a journey. And I indicated that for me there 's essent ia l ly three phases in the Khayel i tsha is, 2003, the t ime when I arr ived, I arr ived there in November; then f rom end of 2003, 2004 t i l l about 2009, I mean, I lef t in 2006 but there 's a ph ase for me in Khayel i tsha, look, at 2004 t i l l 2009, and then f rom 2009, 2010 t i l l current in terms of the dif ferent phases in the way I understand the Khayel i tsha journey and the process. I came there to be the stat ion commissioner of Khayel i tsha. I came in i t ia l ly as the act ing stat ion commissioner in 2003 November and I became the stat ion commissioner I th ink Apri l 2004. MR MASUKU: And can you describe what you found in Khayel i tsha when you – but perhaps – in fact , I ’m a bi t c lumsy in asking th is quest i on. But I want to ask you f i rst ly to te l l the Commission what your exper ience is and what your background is, so that we know who is giv ing evidence on such weighty issues of pol ic ing.

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MAJ GEN JACOBS: Thank you. As indicated, before I came to Khayel i tsh a I was in border pol ic ing, I was the nat ional head of a irports and seaport pol ice, before that I worked in border pol ice, here I worked with specia l operat ions. I was responsib le for the informat ion management in one of our, what we cal led at that t ime that specia l operat ion that dealt wi th the urban terror, I was responsib le for the informat ion management sect ion of that . Before that I worked in detect ives, I was in the organised cr ime sect ion of detect ives and then before that I was in inte l l igence; so I 'm back home, as i t were, as in the inte l l igence area. And then obviously i t ’s in 2004 – I mean since 2006 I became the provincia l head of pol ice emergency services. I then moved to become the provincia l head of f i rearm, l iquor and second -hand goods. From there I became the head of the provincia l coordinat ion centre known as the command centre; I th ink you're a l l – more popular ly known as the . . . ( indist inct) . And then in 2012 I was promoted, Apri l , to become the deputy. MR MASUKU: Thanks. Now . . . ( in tervent ion). COMMISSIONER: May I just ask. So just how does the provincia l structure work? So there 's a provincia l commissioner and there are a ser ies of deputy provincia l commissioners, provincia l head of ops as you’ve described; and what are the others? MAJ GEN JACOBS: There 's provincia l commissioner and unt i l January there were meant to be six deput ies, which i t was then – i t ’s meant in terms of the nat ional structure i t ’s going to be reduced to three; which is k ind of the reason why I a lso moved lateral ly to a structure . . . ( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: So there were six deput ies unt i l January and that would have operat ions? MAJ GEN JACOBS: And human resources, f inance and support , detect ives, the Hawks. COMMISSIONER: Detect ives, the Hawks. Okay, ja? MAJ GEN JACOBS: And the DPCI, which is the Hawks, and I don’t know what the – I can' t recal l now of fhand the sixth one. COMMISSIONER: That ’s f ine. And now the three are? MAJ GEN JACOBS: And the three would be operat ional services, i t would be support services and HR. Now the detect ives and that is st i l l there but we’re systemical ly moving to the nat ional implementat ion. So now there's four deput ies. COMMISSIONER: So you would have ef fect ively two, support services and HR, in what – i f you th ink – I a lways tend to th ink that SAPS are divided real ly into three, cr ime prevent ion, cr ime investigat ion and support services? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Eventual ly, Commissioner, i t ’s intended to be – to merge the support services into one, but i t ’s systemic mov ement. At nat ional of f ice that has already happened. COMMISSIONER: And so operat ional services would include both prevent ion and invest igat ion? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja. COMMISSIONER: So under that head are now are both detect ives and Vispol? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes, correct . COMMISSIONER: At deputy provincia l commissioner level? MAJ GEN JACOBS: At deputy provincia l level . COMMISSIONER: And below that there would be a head of detect ives and a head of Vispol?

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MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja. And then the inte l l igence wi l l a lso report eventual ly into that . COMMISSIONER: Okay. So that would be a three - legged report into operat ional services? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes. COMMISSIONER: And then there would support services and HR separately again? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja. Unt i l , I th ink the issue of the DPCI, when that is resolved, whether they're going to be in the pol ice or out of the pol ice, then that matter wi l l – I th ink that ’s where we’re going. COMMISSIONER: Okay. Thank you. MAJ GEN JACOBS: And then I – sorry, you asked the quest ion. Below – under vis ib le pol ic ing, under the sect ion – the deputy operat ional service i t wi l l be vis ib le pol ic ing, the person that ’s responsib le for pol icy and standards on vis ib le pol ic ing, and that br igadier, i t ’s a brigadier level , would be res ponsible for a l l the pol icy and standards on the one hand, secondly, the emergency services sect ion, 10111, the specia l ised dog unit , the mounted unit , those units. Then we have f i rearm, l iquor and second -hand goods that fa l ls under that br igadier of what we cal l in our language a provincial head. So you have a deputy, the next level is a provincia l head. COMMISSIONER: . . . ( Indist inct – of f microphone). MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja, he’s a lso now act ing deputy for detect ives unt i l that is moved away. Then the second part under vis ib le pol ic ing is operat ional services, which is the specia l ised uniform teams, publ ic order pol ic ing, the tact ical response teams, the publ ic order pol ice, the specia l task force. So they're responsib le for that. The th ird is provincia l coordinat ion centre, known as the command centre. That would have the 24 -hours ops centre, i t would have the . . . ( indist inct) sect ion, the technical downloading of CCTV footage, cel lphones, a l l the technical issues that you use for – e lectr ic evidence, ev ident ia l matters that you use, and would be responsib le for operat ional coordination. Where there 's marches and events happening, they ensure that those th ings are planned; l ike the Jazz Fest ival typical ly, the operat ional p lan for that fest ival they would coordinate and integrate al l the forces to ensure that there 's coordinat ion in that event and the plan is a l igned. So that ’s under the area of operat ional service. Thank you. COMMISSIONER: Thank you. MAJ GEN JACOBS: The fourth part would be the clust er commanders however reports d irect ly to the deputy on behalf of the provincia l commissioner. COMMISSIONER: So the cluster commander reports to the deputy . . . ( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: Operat ional services. COMMISSIONER: … provincia l commissioner, operat ional services? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja. COMMISSIONER: Right . Thank you. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Thank you. MR PIKOLI: So you have 25 cluster commanders? MAJ GEN JACOBS: 25 cluster commanders. MR PIKOLI: They al l report to the .. .( intervent ion)? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja, 25. Current ly 24 because we have merged two clusters

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in the inter im, but 25 on structure st i l l . MR PIKOLI: POPS is the old r iot squad, coming f rom the old school? MAJ GEN JACOBS: They're very much dif ferent f rom – but I understand in terms of what you're t rying to descr ibe, yes, Commissioner. MR PIKOLI: Okay. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja. We hope they're substant ively d if ferent . MR MASUKU: Okay. Now can you perhaps take us through that journey that you were describ ing earl ier on, which real ly is not – is a journey, or you're ref lect ing on how Khayel i tsha looked l ike and how i t progressed and you are doing so in re lat ion to the core responsib i l i t ies that you have in the operat ional services? Can you take us through that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Thank you, thank you, Commissioners. I th ink 2003 when I – I th ink when we arr ived there, I th ink the . . . ( indist inct) environment in Khayel i tsha was to a large extent – I th ink there was one real mal l and that ’s the Site B mal l . Makhaza Mal l was st i l l being kind of part ly developed. General in the area there was a mix of formal and informal, predominant ly informal; a lot of shacks everywhere, uncontro l led shebeen environment. Very interest ing enough, a very act ive community involvement with the CPF, a very act ive community in a l l spheres of community act iv i ty, a very h ighly organised, h ighly structured community. The involvement at that t ime with DOCS was early in i ts development but growing. From 2004 to 2009, I am sure you – and I have heard it being asked, P OS; we as the pol ice then launched the POS strategy. MR MASUKU: Sorry. The POS strategy, what is that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I t ’s the people or ientate sustainable strategy, which was the pol ice part . DOCS launched the POPS strategy, which is speci f ical ly the ir specif ic strategy, in l ine – and they wri te up in their report , we can make that avai lable, i t ’s an old strategy document of DOCS, where they – and it ’s their th ing about publ ic community part ic ipat ion and publ ic – that is their … And th ird of the t r ipod is the urban renewal programme. So those tr ipods meant to operate together to develop a part icular intervent ion. So for that f ive years . . . ( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: Just to pause there. The urban renewal programme was a strategy of who? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Of the president ia l programme that was launched earl ier, as indicated, and .. . ( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: In the State of the Nat ion Address? MAJ GEN JACOBS: But people, I th ink General Burger correct ly refers to the president ia l projects. I t wasn’t necessari ly a president ia l pol ice stat ion, president ia l programme for the two pol ice – the two geographic areas in the Western Cape, Mitchel ls Pla in and Khayel i tsha. So with in that was supposed to be meant that departments p lay their ro le. And so in that t ime DOCS played their ro le in that we had those part icular th ings. From our s ide was a part icular, speci f ic set of intervent ions in that per iod. 2003, just before I arr ived, about a month before that , 40 new constables came, 40. And that ’s an important th ing. By Apri l , May, i f not mistaken, 2004 153 new constables came; I remember i t , wi th except ion, one however was sent back to Schoemansdrif t , a young whi le lady f rom a rural area. I th ink her father was worr ied, he came to s i t there, he was there for three days in a row si t t ing and watching her coming to work in th is funny area. Then I

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th ink he approached the MEC and she was then transferred. I think her surname was Botha. So we ended up with 152. Now what was interest ing about that story , I th ink my col league, Advocate Sidaki , would remember; I used to walk them because when they had to do their in-service t ra in ing at the pol ice stat ion. So we negot iated with the schools, in the school hol idays and in the af ternoons that they do their t r a in ing in the schools. So they would walk a l l 150 in -between areas, so i t was kind of our pr ide. So i t means for that per iod eventual ly we had close to 100 – c lose to 200 new people that arr ived. That was signi f icant intervent ion in terms of deal ing with the backlog, the issue of backlog, personnel backlog. 2005 we formed two new pol ice stat ions. Now they were f rom the – correct ly so, they were f rom the exis t ing bui ld ings that there were. Harare had the out l ine of a pol ice stat ion, smal l , but the out – i t had cel ls, i t had a CSC, i t had al l of those th ings. L ingelethu West, I remember the deputy provincia l commissioner at the t ime with the provincia l commissioner and they al l came to vis i t me one night. We went to vis i t – we went around the stat ions and they looked at th is satel l i te, ‘but is th is a satel l i te ’ , ‘no man, we can convert th is into a pol ice stat ion, we can just make a structural arrangement to put cel ls, let them take their cel ls somewhere else, but for now’. So that became the … But the purpose was to set up. With that , when you form new pol ice stat ions you get capacity, you get – because every pol ice stat ion must have management capacity. So you have – you can br ing in of f icers, you can br ing in leadership and you can hone in on management, hone in on managing a smal ler geographic area and i t ’s no more th is b ig monster. So that was an important intervent ion. Then the th ird s igni f icant intervent ion was to develop the f i rst in the country operat ions room. I th ink i t ’s known in the doc uments as an operat ions centre, but l i tera l ly an operat ions centre. Now what we had at the t ime, we had a very act ive Department of Community Safety with their Bambanani projects. Every evening, weekends especia l ly, we had 150, 200 people doing foot beat with us. We had our people there and we could, you know, do those kinds … We had – at that point Metro Pol ice was very act ive, they were st i l l k ind of c i ty pol ice moving over to Metro Pol ice, they were also very act ive. So we had a number of forces at any given t ime. And then we had 100 people working, f rom these 150 students when they were done, in cr ime prevent ion; 25 working at a t ime. And on the weekend they merged into two 50, working in addit ion too. So we had a lot of vehic les. And then you make basic mistakes, you over -respond to one complaint and you under-respond to another complaint . So part of the idea was we – in the ops room we created eight , s ix to eight key complaints that we looked at ; 22 -alpha, in other words, a murder in progress, 23, 24, robbery in progress, suspicions persons; the kind that you … Then so the complaints never came to, i f I may, Commissioner, i t never came to those cr ime prevent ion vehic les. A complaint automat ical ly goes to a vehicle. I t ’s cal led in, the cal l c entre captures i t , i t transmits i t , i t goes to a vehic le. What the ops room does, i t p icks up on those six complaints and i t captures that , absorbs that and when there 's members there i t has a secondary

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vehicle, an addit ional vehic le to respond, in order to get a faster response. So that was … And then i t over t ime in that per iod developed to where – so we can also have a place, a board, a view at a glance at any given t ime. Even now you go to Khayel i tsha at a given t ime you wi l l see how many vehicles a re deployed in the area who’s working, who is coming on, what t ime, what overt ime group. So i t helped, i t created … So i t ’s the f i rst in the country that led eventual ly to the establ ishment of the provincia l operat ions centre. I t has now become kind of a footpr int , a standard, a lmost an instruct ion, for al l c lusters; they must set up ops rooms, but i t started here. So for us f rom the pol ic ing side we were qui te happy with the growth and the progress we were making. We got resources, we were operat ional ly act ive and we worked. We had – and we st i l l – we do – I mean, i t ’s a p lace where you work 16, 18 hours a day; Khayel i tsha is that p lace. And i t ’s a p lace of very, very good people. The other part was DOCS. We had a very vibrant Departmen t of Community Safety, vibrant. And somet imes we would have to te l l them … But they would be very act ive in everyth ing on Bambanani, t ra in ing the people, act ive recrui t ing, having community outreach programmes. And that was a key part of … And then you have in that same t ime KDF developed. So you had a KDF that was growing and developing and being – you know, in terms of the urban renewal they were the community arm of the urban renewal. So they were fa ir ly act ive and structured. I know the German Ba nk came in as part of a sponsor to look at i t and KDF played a key ro le in coordinat ing al l of us. So that was kind of … But having said that , the bui l t environment was changing very s lowly. 2009 however, I think we – 9, 10, Department of Community Safe ty stopped their ro le, their Bambanani project completely. And then we have in ef fect – and withdrawing al l the funds. And ef fect ively you had a demobi l isat ion of that mobi l isat ion that we had before. I remember every – when the Bambananis they had these – they were given these huge torches, huge torch that you plug in and i t lasts for a lmost l ike f ive days, a huge one l ike th is. You get th ick jackets that you could work with in the area and there would be – fest ive season there would be people at the beaches. Here at the beach, Commissioners, we would have 50 people working on the beach in these jackets as part of – in addit ion to the pol ice. That stopped f rom 2009. MR MASUKU: Why was i t stopped? MAJ GEN JACOBS: That I th ink maybe DOCS must answer. But i t ’s got to – I don’t know, i f I – maybe later on in my test imony we can ta lk too. But I th ink i t ’s because i t was done by the previous team that was in governing, but i t stopped. Al l we know, i t ended up stopping. We – and i t stopped unt i l 2012, where they brought in – there was no funding provided. 2012 they brought in the EPP. But we wi l l ta lk to that at a later t ime, i f I may. MR PIKOLI : Can I just interpose there. There are two quest ions I want to ask you re lat ing to f i rst ly POS. What were the main pi l lars of POS inasfar as the mobi l izat ion of the community was concerned? And secondly, when you – and I a lso want you to tel l us what the main

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features of the Bambanani programme were and your assessment of whether that – the stopping of the p rogramme was a – you cal l i t a demobi l isat ion of community involvement, whether that was a mistake. Basical ly that ’s what I 'm putt ing as blunt ly as that . MAJ GEN JACOBS: Thank you. In terms of POS, POS essent ia l ly had three key elements to i t . The f i rs t one was pr ior i t isat ion of Khayel i tsha or rather, the f ive stat ions that contr ibuted the most ser ious and vio lent cr ime in the province. I t was Mitchel ls Pla in, Nyanga, Gugulethu, Kui ls River at the t ime was a big – and Khayel i tsha. And that – the second part is to resource those places with the personnel that is required as per the RAG; which then happened in a l l of those stat ions essent ia l ly ostensib ly. And then the th ird was the geographic segmentat ion of that area into smal ler pol ic ing precincts. M itchel ls Pla in took sl ight ly s lower, but we have now Lentegeur Pol ice Stat ion that ’s coming f rom – that came f rom that . We had Gugu – Nyanga, Phi l ippi East Pol ice Stat ion was formed f rom the breakaway. Gugulethu remained the same. Kui ls River broke up i nto Mfuleni and Klein Vle i and Khayel i tsha into Khayel i tsha and – I mean, Khayel i tsha, L ingelethu and Harare. So that was kind of the key issue. And then obviously through that process gett ing management there, set t ing up obviously – and I th ink at the provincia l level was the br inging of senior managers to operat ional level . So that to a large extent that a lso … In l ine with that was that senior managers – whereas before you had big areas that was responsib le for b ig regions almost, Khayel i tsha was par t of the east metropole that stretched Malmesbury, I th ink Malmesbury, or end of At lant is r ight unt i l Spine Road, Khayel i tsha unt i l the Helderberg; that was the area of f ice with one major -general with three br igadiers responsib le for a l l that area. So the POS was also then to make i t in to smal ler manageable components so that we could get senior managers at ground level to coordinate. So i t became the zones then and the zones was formed and that t ranslated later to a nat ional structure in the clusters. So that ’s k ind of the .. . ( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: That ’s how i t worked. You know, one of the repeated issues that has come before the Commission is the value of addit ional pol ice stat ions. We know that there is at least a commitment to establ ishing a further pol ice stat ion in Makhaza. One of the th ings that has been said is that , part icular ly in the current c l imate of re lat ive stabi l isat ion and zero -growth in SAPS, that i t ’s l ike ly that what wi l l happen is largely just moving exist ing members around . So the idea that you wi l l get an inf lux of new leaders and of new members to a new pol ice stat ion is not certa in. What are your comments on that? What 's your thought about that; in the l ight of what you said, that the value under POS of actual ly break ing down enormous areas into more focused precincts? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Thank you, Commissioner. I th ink i f one’s – i f I can answer i t s l ight ly d i f ferently. I f one’s concern is about stats, then you wouldn’ t want to do that ; because you would worry about p eople coming to report more. The advantage however of doing that , even your resources remain the same, i t ’s essent ia l ly having – reaching the community bet ter, having more contact p laces but with not just a contact pol ice stat ion that can close whenever resources are avai lable or not .

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With a pol ice stat ion i t has to be open, the 24/7 one. There is a management structure that must be put in p lace, there is certa in registers that must be put in p lace for which people must account. In a satel l i te you don’t necessari ly have the same th ing. So there is that advantage and what that does is that people have a shorter p lace to walk to. COMMISSIONER: Wel l that, I have to say, seems to be a service response to the quest ion; that , in other words, i t makes i t bet t er for the people on the ground . . . ( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ult imately. COMMISSIONER: … to be able to get there. Which certa in ly is what we have seen, given the distance of Makhaza f rom Harare. I mean, one of the other geographical issues is how these three pol ice stat ions in many senses are actual ly c lustered quite c lose together; L ingelethu West, Harare, pret ty c lose to each other, and Harare in many way is on the very edge of the precinct i t ’s serving. And I imagine that’s a h istor ical real i t y; you describe how you went around trying to f ind a place to put a pol ice stat ion. But, you know, in the best of a l l possib le worlds th is is not where you would be locat ing these pol ice stat ions? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink I wi l l general agree with that po int, Commissioner. However, i t ’s important to a lso note as part of that process of the journey I out l ined, at the t ime Enkanini wasn’t there. Enkanini formed l i teral ly on the 28 t h of December 2005. I were st i l l there; I remember I was with MEC Ramatlaka ne at the t ime, we were at the beach, the fest ive season, and we heard there is a group of people – I remember a person with a b lack Mercedes dropping of f mater ia l and br inging people there. So we went there and we found there were about 10 shacks in the bush. That was the start of Enkanini . That is probably now 15% of Khayel i tsha in terms of populat ion and density and people. So Enkanini wasn’t there. RR was cleared before because of the water log. I t ’s actual ly part of a reservoir ; i t was cleared, i t reoccupied. Kuyasa was a sl iver. Kuyasa is now a boat area where people f rom Nyanga, I th ink General Molo reported on that , Mfuleni moved so Kuyasa is now the … Ndlovin i was l i teral ly four rows of shacks along a dangerous area, but four rows of shacks. I t now goes unt i l Swartk l ip. Ndlovin i was a small area. So a sizeable – so that is . . . ( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: That ’s r ight . I mean, a l l around the wal ls actual ly you wi l l see we’ve got maps of Khayel i tsha as i t ’s grown; so we’ve got, you know, ‘98, ‘99, 2000. And you're r ight that the eastern edge of Khayel i tsha is very much a more recent phenomenon. But real ly what I was putt ing to you is that, you know, Harare in many ways is not at the centre of i ts precinct . And simi lar ly Si te C is qui te far f rom Site B, and I understand that there had been conversat ions over the years about establ ishing a separate pol ice stat ion in Si te C. Where is that at th is stage? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink i t ’s a l l – we had planned at the t ime, as part of the strategy, to have f ive pol ice stat ions. And as you would see, we had formed the other two but those were on land we had and faci l i t ies we had. Now i f you're going to p lace yoursel f on the nat ional l is t and get yoursel f that , that ’s k ind of the one chal lenge. But I know that in Makhaza we had – I went to meet with the provincia l commissioner with the City manager, I th ink i t ’s Ngoqi, at the t ime. And we

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agreed next to Makhaza there was land, i t was not yet a l located but there was land avai lable. We agreed on that . But now that process of – then Ngoqi lef t the City and new people came in. And that was shelved and i t never got on the nat ional l is t of land. So that was Makhaza. Site C is Si te C. I t ’s a smal l area, there is no – unless people have to be evicted f rom there to get – there 's no avai lable land in Si te C. And the only avai lable land is probably on a school yard. So th is was our chal lenge; that is another nat ional department. So we have always agreed that Si te C has to be … Si te C is probably – fo r me i t ’s a lways been the most d if f icul t area. I would, in my deployment, standardly put – i f we put three vehic les somewhere else in a l l – the whole of Khayel i tsha, I would put another three in Si te C. Si te C is that area that requires … DT, Taiwan, th at section of Si te C, i t ’s a – i t requires pol ic ing; but vehic les doesn’t help, you need foot beat. So that is the path of the period. So that was POS in my long-winded quest ion to answer your quest ion. The Bambanani project had then speci f ic outreach … They had four key pi l lars, community mobi l isat ion / engagement, and an area they cal l publ ic engagement. They had capacity -bui ld ing of structures of community and structures through the – and working with, i f there were SANCOs in the area they wi l l assist and t ra in SANCO, they wi l l work with those areas. Fourth, they have the monitor ing of securi ty structures. The pol ice, Metro Pol ice, Traf f ic, i f they were label led watchers they would monitor and oversee. And the fourth part is a mobi l isat ion – a publ ic communicat ion mobi l isat ion campaign, where they would campaign. And they had projects l ike HOOC, ‘Hands Off Our Chi ldren’ campaign, where they issued such round rubber bands with HOOC on them. And they issued that and went into schools and every k id had – and i t was, i f I may say so, i t was a sexy th ing to have; people wanted i t . Everybody wanted i t because, you know, i t ’s th is th ing that you wanted to have. And people carr ied i t , you know, on chains here. And the HOOC campaign was a fa ir ly b ig cam paign. And they had a lot of those – and they had – they led the Bambanani community imbizos ; la ter i t became imbizos , but the Bambanani meet ings, publ ic meet ings. They led that . We are obl iged to do i t , but they l i tera l ly d id i t everywhere. And in tha t way – and they had the fest ive season campaign that was led by the Department of Community Safety. So that was the project . And that created, f rom our pol ic ing thrust and our structure and our organisat ion there, act ive part ic ipat ion with the urban ren ewal in i t ia t ive that we knew was underway, together created that thrust of a surge to change. I th ink that ’s – yes. MR MASUKU: And th is mobi l isat ion, d id i t have an impact on the prevent ion of cr ime? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Oh certa in ly. I t def in i te ly – i f I can put i t a b i t …. Khayel i tsha, you might be shocked, but Khayel i tsha Pol ice Stat ion had its own mortuary. The stat ion commissioner before me te l ls – because at that t ime pr ior to us get t ing the 200 people he was struggl ing, a very good stat ion – wi th resources. And he te l ls the story qui te act ively about, the only way he was going to get help, when Minister Tshwete came he took him to vis i t in the cel ls and the bodies were lying in the cel ls, in the passages. And Minister Tshwete was

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obviously shocked, saw th is, and instructed … So we bui l t – a mortuary was bui l t , a temporary mortuary, in the pol ice stat ion with a mortuary van. That was the nature of Khayel i tsha, that people were dying here through murders. That ’s why our inquests, our backlog, is so h igh, because there was that k ind of socia l fabr ic; murder as a result of l iquor and arguments in large numbers. So that was the feature at the t ime. And we saw, through th is intervent ion, a def in i te systemat ic containment of that ; not a dramat ic reduct ion, a containment and a management of the other categories that goes f rom there. And I th ink that was the key and what was important, and that communit ies were now on the streets together in partnership. So i t k ind of worked to br ing at least – because with cr ime, cr ime does not necessari ly go down, anything below 4%, fast . Anything that goes down in those numbers or goes up beyond those numbers, i t wi l l te l l you there 's something that we must look at . Numbers that go down so fast is normal ly a chal lenge we look at . Because i t ’s a socia l phenomena, i t ’s a – so you have to systemical ly look at … We thought that is an important … So yes, there was a stabi l isat ion of i t and a stabi l is ing of the area and improvement. so what you wi l l f ind also, Commissioners, in certa in categories of cr imes you found an increase, and our interpretat ion was in the report ing of i t ; the assault gbh, the assault common, even robberies. Because you had – people had places to go to now. We had more vans in the area, we had more – and that led to those th ings, and we found a stabi l isat ion in the area, whereas before you would see Khayel i tsha would be a high murder zone. So i t stabi l ised. There was reduct ions and i t stabi l ised fa ir ly, and over t ime i t stabi l ised. I th ink the re is a b i t of a chal lenge now that i t ’s going sl ight ly up again. COMMISSIONER: Wel l I am just looking at the murder f igures, because we know that murder f igures are not – can' t be f iddled wi th general ly; they are the most re l iable, so the cr ime stat ist ic ians te l l us. And if you look at the picture, in 2003 / 2004 there were 358 murders, i t c l imbed in 2004 / 2005 to 344, 410 in 2005 / 2006, 430 in 2006 / 2007. So real ly very – a b ig increase. Then there was a signi f icant drop -of f ; 2007 / 2008, 2008 / 2009. And then is sort of stabi l ised and then i t increased a bi t and now i t ’s dropping again. I t ’s now back more or less at the level i t was in 2003, st i l l d ist inct ly below that real peak in 2004 / 2005 / 2006 and a drop -of f thereafter. I mean, what 's you r explanat ion? This is – i t is not – i t doesn’t mirror cr ime stat ist ics e lsewhere. I f there was clear ly a ser ious pol ic ing . . . ( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: Chal lenge. COMMISSIONER: Ja, chal lenge, but a lso an intervent ion you described, I mean 200 new constables, a ser ious at tempt at ro l l ing out pol ic ing. And so how do you f i t th is – what do you say about th is murder pat tern? And I am perfect ly happy to give i t to you i f you would l ike to have a look at i t . But basical ly you can see that i t was, you know, i t shot up in 2005 / 2006 / 2007 and then shot down and then sort of stabi l ised for a whi le. How do you pi t that against your evidence on what pol ic ing impact had had? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink the important issue was, we – I th ink there was a dist inct – there were two th ings for us that we – and we did indicate as part of the chal lenge of the t ime, that yes, we had addit ional resources and we thought

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that with – and we were mobi l is ing a lot more. I t ’s a lso about c leaning up the other tartar, and i t ’s a b i t of a d if f icul t th ing to admit . We had the problem, th is whole dynamic of murder being a re l iable stat ist ic. Dead bodies are re l iable stat ist ics. So in that murder f igure we had to look at what was – how were th ings registered before. So part o f what we did was spending a lot more t ime about understanding … And you would see also in that period we had a dramat ic re look at the inquest f igures, what was happening in the inquest dockets. We had an inquest team in the container with the prosecutor , working speci f ical ly on the inquests. So a lot of inquests were convert ing to murder. COMMISSIONER: Do you th ink that in fact the earl ier f igures, the 2003 / 2004, may not have been as re l iable; they may have been not reported as murders when they actual ly were murders? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja. COMMISSIONER: So you're not necessari ly seeing a hike, but in fact i t may – or put i t th is way, not as big a h ike as i t looks? MAJ GEN JACOBS: In our sense i t def in i te ly was. I f you look at the volumes of – f rom the reports we’ve seen earl ier, the people we’ve seen earl ier, the volumes of bodies that there were. I th ink General Burger was also in here when he indicated he was – he came to work here for a period and I remember he indicated he came and he did roadblocks in the area. And he would te l l that there was Nyalas that were coming up and going in to p ick up eight to 10 bodies at a t ime, going out, taking away eight to 10 bodies at a t ime. So part of that process was to c lean up that as wel l , to be able to . . . ( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: But was that most ly cr ime related to a lcohol; there weren’t pol i t ical angles to that cr ime, there weren’t – i t was most ly about a lcohol abuse and f ight ing, was i t? MAJ GEN JACOBS: As far as we understand that, but I ca nnot with certa inty say that there … But I th ink that the area was pol i t ical ly fa ir ly stabi l ised at the t ime. There was not much – because when I arr ived there was not much that k ind of pol i t ical intent ion that could have led to that dynamic. But i t was a lot of socia l fabr ic k ind of cr ime. I th ink that was the kind of area as wel l . So we found what we cal led a correct ion and a bet ter report ing. And so you f ind for that t ime across the board there was a correct ion. And then we found by 2007, 2008, 2009 a stabil isat ion and a drop. And then now we’re f inding again there 's an up and that’s what we’re k ind of looking at; why that is so, what are the factors there. COMMISSIONER: Well whi le we’re on that . I mean, one of the th ings you have ta lked about in re lat ion to Bambanani is the l ink between Bambanani and SANCO. And one of the th ings that Br igadier Mlenga said was that he thought that maybe one of the issues in Khayel i tsha was in re lat ion to a var iety of sort of , I suppose, contestat ions was the ef f ect of the decl ine in the inf luence of SANCO, that i t created a more – a less uniformed community, a less cohesive community, and that that may have been an issue. Have you got thoughts on that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Commissioner, i t ’s a – I am not exact ly sure – I mean . . . ( indist inct) fu l ly agree, but I don’t necessari ly d isagree with that . Al l I know is , th is area was – had a strong community structure, network; street

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commit tees meet ing of ten and al l of those th ings. I t was then supported and butt ressed, the securi ty angle was supported. We had – because neighbourhood watches could come f rom there in a far more structured way. There is now, what I am aware of , there 's been a decl ine in i ts inf luence in the area. But whether that is a reason for why there is now not community structure, I can' t say with certa inty. But certa in ly they were a logical st ructure you would work wi th because they had a footpr int in the area. The churches we worked with c losely because they have a footpr int. So we worked with a ny community. Any pol iceman who is worth h is sal t working in that area, you wi l l look at where – who is act ive in the area and you engage them. In the CBD the businesses are sponsoring ci ty improvement d istr icts, so the pol ice works with them. I f there were structures l ike that here we wi l l work with where there is act ive … So as our – when the TAC was in the t ime very act ive here I worked very c losely with them. They would come march to the pol ice stat ion and I would direct them where to march to, because we didn’ t do that cr ime that day, we directed them to where. So with Socia l Just ice Coal i t ion f rom since we, you know, I started to engage on th is Commission, we started to get an extent of their footpr int in the area and we’re work ing with them fair ly c losely; the Free Gender network we’re working with. Where people have a footpr int in an area we wi l l … If you're going to bui ld community engagement you must work with who is there. So I th ink that ’s k ind of what we’re saying. COMMISSIONER: Thank you, thank you. Advocate Masuku. MR MASUKU: And i f we go back to the Bambanani programme, you said that at some point i t was stopped and essent ia l ly that demobi l ised the community mobi l isat ion that had taken place previously. How did th is demobi l isat ion af fect sector pol ic ing, patro ls, informat ion f lows f rom the community? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink there are two th ings to i t , and even now i t ’s even worse. Because you had a CPF that was funded that could set up – remember CPFs are meant to be independent community structures, set up law but independent f rom the pol ice. So the moment they … And l ike most people, i f you contro l the purse str ings you contro l . So kind of that was the issue. We are compel led to give a CPF an of f ice. That ’s by – to give space and of f ice space, telephone l ines; thereafter stat ionery, te lephones, other te lephones, you know, a l l of those – set t ing up networks. That would be what the CPF must organise. Now i f you – and the moment that funding stopped, for whatever the reason might be, when i t stopped that capacity, f i rst ly, went down. The abi l i ty to do community in i t ia t ives went down. The neighbourhood watches were – for example, on the big weekends, Easter weekend is coming, we would know we would have 150 neighbourhood watches and they would be working the whole period and there would be late -night – there wi l l be big pots of soup, cof fee, ro l ls, a l l of those th ings, for people to – that work. The pol icemen would come, they would have their own food; here you have people working through the night coming back. And we would have them in b ig t rucks, going and dropping in areas, p icking them up, you know, that k ind. So now those were the areas. Then so – and also the in i t iat ives they were able to do, their campaigns

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they were able to do that needed money, was no more there. In the fest ive season there was an amount of money that people were paid, a st ipend, to be at the beach. So as i t af fect the sector pol ic ing; i f you're in an area l ike Site C and you had 100 neighbourhood watches and on certa in b ig weekends they would be working, you know, people would be out there, jackets wi l l be there, you know, there wi l l be … In fact, DOCS also had three kombis, i f I remember, that would come and pick people up f rom … Because we spoke to them about i t ; in the in i t ial per iod they had everybody there, then we would have to take out van to go and pick up people. Then i t means the van can' t at tend a complaint . So they brought in part of that funding, that they had kombis that would pi ck people up at the dif ferent areas, br ing them to the centra l point , the mobi l is ing point , then go distr ibute them. Because otherwise we had to put them in the big t rucks and herd them f rom place to p lace. So that became also part of the … So your mobi l isat ion in a sector became more and more. So that is the ef fect of i t . When you start to – which means the CPF ef fect ively at i ts . . . ( indist inct) with the structures became less and less in i ts abi l i ty. Now yes, i t ’s a voluntary organisat ion that were supposed to be mobi l ised, but these are local community members f rom a poor, a very poor community, that have no other resources. Invariably they are not working. How do they get … For example, some of the – even now you f ind the community CPF, the chairperson, Mr Mgxaj i , is invi ted by the Department of Community Safety to go to a workshop somewhere. I f we don’t take him he doesn’t get there. I f i t ’s not a workshop that ’s l inked to the pol ice we can' t take him because he’s not direct ly l inked. So how does he get there, i f there 's no funding? So those became chal lenges that we current ly s i t (wi th), I sat with them two months ago with the Department of Community Safety to resolve th is issue. I t was a big th ing in the provincia l CPF. They were invi te d to attend the Department of Health on a matter; because we’re not a l lowed to take them because i t ’s not l inked to our d irect work, so now who must take them, and they don’t have funding? So that is pract ical ly how you demobi l ise. COMMISSIONER: Just expla in to me why you are not a l lowed to take them? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Because in terms of – you can only t ransport a person if you can direct ly l ink i t to SAPS, as SAPS work. COMMISSIONER: And what about the fact that CPFs were set up in terms of the Pol ice Act? MAJ GEN JACOBS: That ’s why DOCS has speci f ical ly – the secretar iat nat ional ly and Department of Community Safety has that ro le, to set up that. That ’s why funding was created, put in p lace, for that to happen. And that is part of the chal lenges that has never been kind of pract ical ly resolved. COMMISSIONER: I mean, one of the problems is that in fact the Pol ice Act is si lent on th is; isn’t i t? I t sets up CPFs in terms of the Pol ice Act but actual ly doesn’t deal with how they should be funded; th e Pol ice Act i tself is s i lent . Am I r ight? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink that is – I th ink there is a matter on that . But I th ink i t ’s part of how – what the secretar iat is meant to do f rom that , to interpret that and set up the re levant regulat ions. Now wha t we know is, we are governed by a specif ic f ramework, f inancia l f ramework, and th is is the f ramework with in

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which we can spend. And we do, we take people to – and we – but i t becomes a chal lenge if you must take people to an area that ’s far away and i t ’s not necessari ly l inked direct ly to a meet ing that you have set up. COMMISSIONER: But, you know, . . .( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: I f people get in jured in that , there 's – you know, then how do we explain the person that is in jured in our vehic le; is th e state l iable, is i t not l iable? I f i t ’s our meet ing that we in i t iated, yes. So those became . . . ( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: I don’t want to argue the sort of legal issues with you. But real ly what I am putt ing to you is that in some senses what has happened here is created by a structural faul t in the legis lat ive f ramework; and that is that even i f you look at the – wel l certa in ly i f you look at the Pol ice Act , i t is s i lent , you know, the Const i tut ion doesn’t help you. I t does ta lk about a secretar i at. But I am just pul l ing up the legis lat ion for the secretar iat ; but my recol lect ion is that even there we have got a gap and that gap gets f i l led by, to some extent, contestat ion between SAPS and DOCS, but i t ’s unhelpful i f there isn’ t in fact a legis la t ive f ramework making i t c lear what the answer i t . And, I mean, I just wondered what SAPS’ view is on that? Because clear ly f rom what you’ve said, CPFs are extremely important to the community partnership that SAPS want to have. So what do you think the answer should be? That i t should come through DOCS and the presumably DOCS must have some – DOCS has to have some – there has got to be some legis lat ive f ramework; and what 's your answer on the legis lat ive f ramework f rom a SAPS perspect ive? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink i t ’s a chal lenging quest ion, Commissioner. I t ’s got to do with a lot more pol icy matters that are beyond my standard . . . ( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: I understand that. But you have been very persuasive, i f I may say, on the importance of co mmunity pol ic ing partnerships. And i t is important that we don’t let pol i t ical contestat ion derai l important community pol ic ing partnerships. And what I wanted to know is, what do you th ink about i t? I know i t ’s a pol icy quest ion. But i t a lso comes down to th is issue of independence; that i t ’s qui te hard, you do want the CPF to be able to be independent, but i t seems to me that i t ’s also a partner with SAPS and that to some extent may not be a bad idea for SAPS to actual ly say, th is is how CPFs should b e funded. I t ’s not immediately c lear to me why SAPS shouldn’ t fund the CPFs in our const i tut ional f ramework and in the SAPS f ramework. MAJ GEN JACOBS: You see . . . ( intervent ion). MR PIKOLI : Before you answer, General . On the same issue, the stopping of the funding by DOCS, and Mr Mgxaj i a lso spoke on th is issue yesterday and you are br inging i t up again. On the face of i t , i t seems to be a reversal of whatever gains that were won, you know, in the f ight against cr ime. But the problem I have is that th is seems to have stopped in 2009 and in 2014 you don’t seem to be able to resolve th is issue. What is the problem? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Can I – I th ink – thank you. Maybe I can f i rst deal with Commissioner O’Regan and then Commissioner Pikol i . I th ink, as in dicated, i t ’s a pol icy d i lemma of sorts that we have. And I th ink that goes to the point made by General Molo yesterday about the nat ional cr ime prevent ion strategy; i t ’s not

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just located with in the pol ice … Here you have created a structure by law that must independent ly mobi l ise communit ies, one; two, i t must monitor that we are in l ine, we don’t vio late the communit ies in which we work; so i t does that as wel l , and i t works in partnership. But for that community to be safe there is a number of other factors that must be in p lace; the environmental design, the bui l t environment must be properly done. HOOC, Hands Off Our Chi ldren campaign, that would involve socia l development and educat ion would be part of that . So if there 's a school safety programme that deals with Hands Off Our Chi ldren, for example, then the funding must come f rom dif ferent centres to deal with that . So i t ’s a k ind of a set t ing up a … In terms of the national cr ime prevent ion programme, whether – and that ’s the quest ion that you would be asked, is whether there is an inf rastructure that ’s created to oversee that the nat ional cr ime prevent ion is – or to dr ive the implementat ion of the nat ional cr ime prevent ion through the var ious departments. And that ’s why we are si t t ing here tod ay, a breakdown in re lat ions between … But whereas i t ’s – the heart of the matter l ies with a l l the players that ’s involved, that must bui ld the environment with in which kids can go to school, ensure that there 's adequate socia l support and that we play our ro le as the pol ice. So we’re s i t t ing at the heart of the matter. And if I may, with correct ion say – with respect say, we’re deal ing with a s l iver of the heart of the matter. COMMISSIONER: The advantage of s l ivers is that you of ten go – you real ly see what 's happening on the ground. MAJ GEN JACOBS: That ’s t rue. COMMISSIONER: I f you tend to look at b ig p icture stuf f , people of ten get lost . And one of the th ings about s i t t ing here in Khayel i tsha is, one is not forget t ing the people which one should not. And that ’s why, i t is a pol icy quest ion, but i t ’s a pol icy quest ion to which th inking about the people is real ly important. And I th ink I would be interested to hear what your response to my col league’s quest ion is, because actual ly that goes r ight to the heart of i t . MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink there 's a – and I th ink maybe if I could just go to … I th ink the issue is a lso to say that I th ink the Commission has an important , in that extent important for us, ro le to p lay in that we get to hear th is det ai l , th is kind of … So we’re not necessari ly object ing to the need for i t . But I th ink on the quest ion of Commissioner Pikol i ’s matter. They have in t roduced a new system and I know there 's indicat ions that we, the pol ice, have signed-off . We don’t – i t ’s not our money. The problem is that people must complete a form, a report , for every vis i t then you can get up to I th ink i t ’s 25 000 or 30 000. But what that means, i t ef fect ively converts a community structure that is a number of th ings into one th ing. And if you come in an area l ike Khayel i tsha where i f there 's hal f of the people are not necessari ly able to wri te the report in that format, then i t ’s not – so 100 words, 300 words, 200 words. So that becomes a problem. Why i t was stopped, i t ’s one of those terra ins that as an of f ic ia l I can' t necessari ly enter in to because then I enter into that dynamic of what happens between who governs at what t ime. But there 's a d ist inct factor there, and it

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stopped at a very d ist inct t ime. I t started in 2 012 again with th is expanded programme against th is very str ict formula. So I chaired the provincia l CPF, wel l not chaired, I was a member of the board; i t was chaired by – and th is d iscussion came up. What you f ind, areas where people part ic ipated they got money, but they si t in the pol ice stat ion the whole day; they si t there. You f ind a woman si t t ing there on a chair in the corner and she monitors how many people are coming in and how we – and they compi le the report . And then she goes and then they compi le, then they do that. They go into the cel ls. Now technical ly these are people who haven’t yet – some of them haven’t appeared in court , they have certa in r ights accrued to them. Now they can only monitor the cel ls i f they have certa in – we approve to certa in condit ions. Now we agree, normal ly we agree the chairperson and the secretary vis i ts the cel ls. Now however they're not the ones doing the reports, so somebody else comes. Now we must work out that arrangement; do they go in the cel ls, how do they do that . So that becomes a whole area. So that was the problem. So i t ef fect ively, i t d id for us, demobi l ise because what i t does, the net ef fect of that is turning the CPF only to a monitor ing tool that only works when i t gets – when i t submits reports, otherwise i t doesn’t . COMMISSIONER: You see, i t seems to me that , I mean, we need to know what the ro le of a CPF is in the community, f i rst ly. Secondly, one needs to recognise that there is a room and there is a need for monitor ing and oversigh t . And again, a lot of – I th ink what is being i l lustrated here is that these issues are st i l l not c lear at a pol icy level . I mean, what is your sense as to how – i f you don’t think i t should be the CPFs that do monitor ing and oversight – and you know, to me keeping an eye on cel ls is an important th ing because that ’s when the state is exercis ing i ts power to take people’s l iberty away. Who should be doing that , i f i t ’s not CPFs? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Chairperson, I – we’re not – the CPF, one of i ts funct ions is oversight . I am not saying i t ’s not i t ’s . . . ( indist inct) funct ion, but i t ’s not i t ’s only funct ion. COMMISSIONER: You know, here again one of the quest ions is, can you do oversight and partnership? MAJ GEN JACOBS: That is an interest ing quest ion. I t ’s a – but i t ’s – you see, I th ink i f we’re strong and the way – I have always known Khayel i tsha to have strong community representat ives. And i t ’s about the abi l i ty and the capacity of the people that are here, and therefore other government department s, the structures, the community -based structures here, the SANCOs, the Socia l Just ice Coal i t ion, the Free Genders, i f they become more act ive in the CPF. We have been engaging some of the structures to say why, the CPF is there, i t is – you can monitor us, you can be involved, you can run – work with us in the campaign, you can make us better. But the CPF was always viewed as that other structure and we wi l l work on the side of i t . But i t ’s not a state structure, i t ’s a structure – i t ’s wri t ten by law in order to ensure that we are compel led to partner with the community and that they can monitor us. That ’s, in my understanding, why i t was wr i t ten into law, to compel us, because we might – as of f ic ia ls we might tend to be cold and distant in the nature of the regulat ions we have. And CPF – the way i t ’s wri t ten into the law, i t ’s meant for that to force us to be together.

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So if more structures become involved in the CPF we wi l l get – we wi l l become more vibrant. That ’s our view and that ’s why they must p lay a ro le of monitor ing, mobi l is ing communit ies, taking charge of the areas; we are one of the ro le-players. There is a concept – i f I may? There 's a concept known, and I th ink UCT professors were here, developed by Professor Cl i f ford Shearing on noda l governance. And they apply i t to securi ty, where they say the pol ice are but one player in the provis ion of safety and securi ty for a community, and not even the ro le-player. That – the lead ro le -player is to be negot iated with engagements. And that ’s an important k ind of ro le. And that ’s – we’re saying we’re not the only ro le -player and we’re not necessari ly the lead ro le -p layer, we are the ro le-player. So and the moment that comes in we start saying that together we wi l l del iver on a community to m ake i t safe. We play a cr i t ical ro le, but together we do i t . And that ’s k ind of why we – and that’s why we are – I mean, I would f ind myself ta lk ing to Socia l Just ice, to a l l the NGOs, to a l l the CBOs, to a l l the structures, because they are there. I t d oesn’t mean that we’re necessari ly happy f r iends, but we ta lk because we have to work together. This th ing can never be done alone. And then al l government departments, I chaired in my ro le prov jo int , the provincia l jo int structure, which is the operat i onal leg that deals with safety and securi ty across government departments. And we – you wi l l see, i t wi l l be in there that we insist they must p lay their ro le. And so are the issues that are there. So government, interdepartmental ly we must p lay our ro le and with communit ies we must ensure communit ies are adequately mobi l ised to p lay a ro le. COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Advocate Masuku. MR MASUKU: You know, the issue of a legis lat ive or a gap in the legis lat ion on the issue of funding, i f the Commission were to come to the conclusion that that is in fact a problem because i t has stunted the abi l i ty of CPFs to p lay a meaningful ro le or to in fact be encouraged to grow, you would not be opposed to a recommendat ion that suggests a focused legis lat ive interve nt ion in terms of which CPFs are properly funded and properly supported, r ight? MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, not at a l l . In fact , we would – we can' t f ind for the Commission, but we would th ink that would be an important area to resolve that matter fa ir ly c lear ly . MR MASUKU: Thank you. COMMISSIONER: Just whi le we have been ta lk ing, I have looked back at the civi l ian pol ice secretar iat legis lat ion, because i t doesn’t f i l l th is gap. What is your understanding of what i ts ro le is, the secretar iat? I mean, I know i t ’s new so we’re st i l l a l i t t le b i t in b lank page and the secretary has indicated that she is wi l l ing to come if we ask her. But I just wondered f rom an operat ional SAPS leader perspect ive, what do you see at the value -add that the secretar iat wi l l br ing? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I must say, I am inf luenced by the experience I have had of the Department of Community Safety before. So the secretar iat is a lso, i f I understand the structure correct ly, the body that is overseeing and managing the pol ic ies of Department of Community Safety. So the Department of Community Safety, as I said, is a lso to an extent a

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secretar iat s imi lar to … So the kind of work we have seen under the Bambanani strategy for me is what I see the secretar iat could p lay i ts ro le. I t has a p ol icy ro le, yes, but i t has th is – i t should have that interface, a community engagement interface and a capacitat ion of community structures, and maybe addit ional ly have the ro le to dr ive that other government departments p lay their ro le. That ’s k ind of where we – i f that happens we wi l l – I th ink you wi l l l i tera l ly have to l ive out a nat ional cr ime prevent ion strategy. I f we are the hard end implementat ion arm, the other matters that is both sof t but heavy must be carr ied. And i t ’s not carr ied anywhere . We have had the experience of the DOCS having done that ro le and we’ve seen the posi t ive ro le that they could have played. At the ta i l end where we are, where we worked, we could feel the posi t iveness of that . That ’s what we want to in real terms feel . MR MASUKU: Okay. Now can you take us to phase – to the phase af ter Bambanani and the community mobi l isat ion that had fol lowed there? And I wi l l te l l you why we focused a l i t t le more on the community – on your community mobi l isat ion strategy, because there are complaints which we – which the Commission heard regarding vis ib le pol ic ing; most of the cr ime could be prevented if pol ice were vis ib le. And I would l ike you to respond to that when you deal with your th ird – wi th your second phase of post Bambanani per iod, to look at – to address i t in l ight of the complaint that there is a weak vis ib le pol ic ing strategy by the pol ice, the consequence of which, people’s l ives are exposed to cr iminals unnecessari ly. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Thank you. I f I can – I th ink the matter, Commissioners, the matter of vis ib i l i ty; I th ink we would agree vis ib i l i ty is important, i t ’s a key element. But i t is not necessari ly a lways so that cr ime, a l l cr imes, are necessari ly resul t – can be prevented through vis ib le pol ic ing. I f you are – i f you put your b lue l ight on here now i t won' t be seen. I f you put i t on at 4 o 'c lock in the morning i t wi l l be seen at least for a period. But in TR, i f you put the blue l ight on Mew Way, that is next to TR, you won' t see the blue l ight , you won' t see the vis ib i l i ty . TR is that stretch that goes here on the – i f you go towards – out of the area, the lef t -hand side, that area. So that means so your vis ib i l i ty and in the normal … So vis ib i l i ty is more than just a vehic le. So the vehicula r model of . . . ( indist inct) , then there 's people on the street , foot beat. But we used to every weekend send in s ix people into BM Block, when BM Block was one of our b iggest areas. I have been on two of those incidents where we’re walking BM Block; BM Block is not geographical ly b ig but i t ’s dense, when Green Block was st i l l l inked to – BM was st i l l l inked to Green Point at the t ime. When we came out we found two bodies, as we were walking, s ix people in the smal l geographic but dense area. So there 's a lot more required in … That ’s where the bui l t environment is key. So part of the th ings we insisted then was to – you wi l l see at the back of BM Block by Frans, that sect ion as you come in past the big hal l on the lef t , i f you go on Frans is the f i rst sect ion, BM is the second. At the back there is now a road of sorts been bul ldozed out. That was our insistence, because we couldn’ t get in there. We l i teral ly had to carry the body f rom inside; because remember we had the mortuary van,

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so we had to carry the body f rom out there in our – with no … So to be able to get in we had to l i tera l ly … So that happened at the t ime. So vis ib i l i ty remained a problem. So when we had very act ive community structures we could send in 100 people, you know, go in to BM, and that to a large extent … But i t was st i l l a dif f icul ty in that there were – the area was st i l l – i t wasn’t designed, i t sprung up. And that has kind of remained the chal lenge that we have. Even in BM in the depth of winter that road, that makeshi f t road, we can' t drive i t because i t hasn’t been stabi l ised. We went to RR now in July, I was the act ing provincia l commissioner at the t ime and we went to vis i t four, when i t was ra in ing so badly, four areas. RR, hal f of the houses were fu l l of water. And then people went to the street to protest , understandably so. So al l of our members spent t ime there to c lear up the road, to a l low the road to operate. So that ’s k ind of the dif f icul t per iod of – I mean di f f icul t th ing of that per iod. So at that f ive-year, s ix-year period there was a lot of community involvement but we could ta lk. I know, having met the mayor at the t ime, we spoke about SST, some of the areas, and they came in and they put some areas there. But i t st i l l needed long -term changes to i t . So i t was an important per iod and vis ib i l i ty p layed a ro le but i t p layed i ts ro les that i t could. I t needed, and i t st i l l today needs, other ro le -players to enable us. COMMISSIONER: One of the quest ions that I have, having l istened to a l l of th is evidence, is how SAPS makes a decis ion between i ts resourcing of Vispol, vis ib le pol ic ing, and detect ives? Because f i rst ly, i f you th ink about the ro le the detect ives play, the idea that perpetrators part icular ly of serious contact cr imes, which is what w e’re seeing here in Khayel i tsha, that ’s the nature of cr ime here, apprehension and convict ion of such perpetrators is very important to vict ims of cr ime and to the community in terms of making people feel safe. I wi l l be candid, that what we have seen abo ut detect ive work is that a l though there is some very f ine detect ive work being done, in the vast major i ty of cases detect ives are completely overburdened and i t ’s a lmost impossib le to do that . Now that ’s a resourcing al locat ion decis ion. What are the factors that decide – and you know, we’ve been through the THRR, etcetera, but the big quest ion is, how do you decide how much of your resources are going to be detect ives and how much are going to be Vispol; given al l the dif f icul t ies you have indicated wit h Vispol and the fact that actual ly one of the th ings which wi l l real ly convince communit ies that SAPS makes a di f ference is when perpetrators are apprehended and convicted. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink that is a very interest ing quest ion. I mean, a typical ly good detect ive, we had a case here where we – that we coordinated f rom the provincia l of f ice just to – because th is guy commit ted many murders, Phindi le Mhlobo. He was convicted, I th ink the Judge President sat , convicted on f ive murders and something l i ke 20 other – young, 21-year o ld. Those detect ives, we had to take them out for a year, three detect ives, to work exclusively. And of course now they had to do al l the evidence, appear once the court was – i t was high court , they had to be there, p ick up witnesses, do al l of that . They were out a good detect ive and his docket is in court , he’s out of c irculat ion for … I f i t ’s a regional court i t wi l l be three months, a h igh court can go up to s ix months; in the case of Thomas Geweld, three years.

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They don’t go back to their stat ions, to their components unt i l they're back. So that ’s k ind of the dif f icul ty, so there is that . But there 's cases reported. So i t ’s a d i f f icul t dynamic. I f you – i f we are able to get – wi th vis ib i l i ty and community mobi l isat ion and the bui l t environment reduce the cr ime, the detect ive load, the new number of dockets coming in is less and they can work on the backlog. So that ’s k ind of the one th ing. As you improve your detect ive – your convict ion rate, perpetrators stay i n. So that ’s a lso the other chal lenge. So I th ink i t ’s a d i f f icul t quest ion; I don’t have a stra ight answer to you, to be honest, Commissioner. COMMISSIONER: Wel l I mean, at the minute SAPS decides we want sector pol ic ing, and as I understand i t , Vispol actual ly dr ives certa in ly the pr imary al locat ion in i t ia l ly. You're going to have sector pol ic ing, you're going to have shi f ts, you're going to have – i f you have any pol ice stat ion i t means you're going to have 60 people at that police stat ion because yo u can' t run a pol ice stat ion with vis ib le pol ic ing 24/7 without 60 people, and then sort of detect ives get tacked on the end. Is that an unfair view? I mean, because i t does to me to be a very b ig quest ion and I 'm just – i t ’s not c lear to me how SAPS answered i t . MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink i t ’s an interest ing perspect ive. I have never real ly thought of i t that way, that i t ’s an – I am not exact ly sure how I could answer that . Detect ives are an important part of our job. But there 's – and I can add a th ird angle to i t ; convict ion. We must – there is th is cal l for – to get – we must convict people who commit a cr ime. The chal lenge we’re s i t t ing with in Khayel i tsha now, the people we convicted are out now, af ter e ight to 10 years they're out . And they are now number gangs, they’ve become number gangs in pr ison. And these were young people. And I remember, I had a group of 16 that was my l ist of people, that I knew i f they are in our areas are quiet . They – half of them were arrested, the others were ki l led. But some of them are out now. Nicknames is Masanda, Shoes, Speed; they are out . But now they are – they were 24, 25, they are now 32. Unless they have reformed … If they are not they're pr ison gangs, they're now – they're not – they don’t have the energy to run and chase in the streets so they wi l l do other … So that ’s the chal lenge we’re f inding. In an area here that we’re beginning to f ind with th is normal cr iminal gangs that are – that has a short l i fespan in Khayel i tsha, three, four years, a re now being sustained beyond that because i t ’s being infused with an experienced cr iminal that keeps them going and reorganises their way of doing th ings. So that ’s a lso an angle too about how we must deal wi th those issues. So i t ’s vis ib le pol ic ing, i t ’s good detect ives, but a lso understanding that how do we work on th is other terra in. Because at some point , i f we’re sending people to prison knowing there 's problems there, what are we set t ing up for ourselves. Those are just – thank you. COMMISSIONER: Advocate Masuku. MR MASUKU: Yes, thanks. So you're going to move us into the OPUS period. From POS you went on to OPUS. What was – what were the main pi l lars of OPUS and why did you move to that programme? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink OPUS, i t stands for opt imal performance and ut i l isat ion. Now i t is – f i rst ly most strategies, we have one cr ime prevent ion strategy, nat ional cr ime prevent ion. W ith in that we have provincia l specif ic

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design. Now OPUS – I mean, POS was that . But as I said, the four key thrusts in the strategy was redistr ibut ion of – or d istr ibut ion of resources to areas, f ragment ing big areas into smal ler areas, taking the clusters, making – set t ing up smal ler management uni ts and focusing on those f ive pol ice precincts. Those pol ice precincts now became 12 pol ice precincts. So there no more the f ive, so that k ind has … The resources were al located, the stat ions were formed, there were no more area of f ices, they worked zones and clusters . . . ( indist inct) . So that was kind of the one. So the strategy as they go general ly has now reached i ts point . I t ’s now … And I mean, you say but how do we do what we must do and where must be focus on. Now we then did three key th ings to . . . ( indist inct) provincia l ly there is a cap on the resources we wi l l get . We are the only province, two – or one of three provinces wi th personnel shortages. Ours is a maximum of 1 000, 1 500; that ’s the max of shortages. We’ve got 600 now. So in the next intake we wi l l have the number of a l located resources as is budgeted for. So we then have to say with what we have, what – how do we work with what we have more ef fect ively; how do we begin to bui ld on the partnerships that is there; how do we begin to insist that the other stakeholders must p lay their ro le. So that is the second area. And then th ird is begin to ident ify again those stat ions that are contr ibut ing in the cr ime area a part icular percentage. Now we said 50%; so you would have heard us speaking about Project 21 – sorry, 23, then 31, and not then but and 6. So i t was speci f ical ly at the t ime when we formed in 2012 the 23 stat ions contr ibuted 51% of our ser ious cr ime. By the end of that year we looked at i t as we were working with them, 33 of them now; meaning so the contr ibut ion of the individual stat ions were reducing. But i t spread – 50% now spread to 33 stat ions. So that ’s k ind of the … So we can focus on the ones that – so we can begin so we can begin to have an impact. But we – now therein l ies our … So obviously – and i t wi l l take – we also understand, l ike with POS, i t takes a longer period for i t to have an ef fect . And the fourth part is to deal with what we def ined as the organised cr ime elements which needed a lot more intervent ion deal ing with … Because on average a group of three people who rob once, they get the taste of i t , they could ostensib ly commit 20 robberies over a period. So that is an organised cr ime group that we must start to … So we started working with the stat ions to ident ify groups and ident ify then how we … So i t ’s a process. So to go beyond just the vis ib le pol ic ing part , beyond just carrying the docket load, that you actual ly have detect ives that must carry less dockets but focused dockets. So that was the di f ference. So i t was opt imal ut i l isat ion of what we have, one. And then the last part is bui ld ing the partnerships. And that means – so you would have seen us in the press, in the var ious – where we act ively engage in even now about what departments must do, what other government departments must do. We are saying that government must p lay their ro le. We have played our role, we have resourced; there 's departments that must come to the party. Taxi vio lence, and MEC Carl is le that ’s leaving now wi l l say that we are robust, he ment ioned we are a robust partner. Because people are being shot in taxis because of the taxi regulat ions; the non -regulat ion and non-enforcement of

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– and compl iance in the industry, so i f – and people get shot because they're compet ing in a market that is not contro l led and regul ated. So that was the other part . Opt imal performance, meaning go and see where – which department must p lay their ro le in certa in areas. In the gang terra in there is – DOCS 2008, Commissioners, s igned a gang strategy document 2008. In there, page 33, our ro le is def ined; page 28, their ro le and the rest of departments ro le is def ined. There has never been a meet ing. In there there 's a management structure, the IMC – the MMC, the management monitor ing commit tee, led by the MEC and the HOD. They have never cal led a meet ing in the f ive years. And that gang strategy speaks to d if ferent e lements. I t was compi led by them, i t was never repudiated, never changed, never a l tered. In fact , in 2011 – 2010 they made a presentat ion f rom that; so i t ’s st i l l part . They were supposed to last year October have a meet ing to review the gang strategy, i t was cancel led; which means i t ’s st i l l the of f ic ia l document. Therein every ro le – we’re the only one that ’s of f ic ia l ly p laying our ro le. And that ’s what the POS is about, that we – I mean, the OPUS is about; the ro le of d i f ferent government departments. One, what do we do with what we have, which stat ions are contr ibut ing. I think therein l ies – and bui ld the community partnerships. I th ink that ’s – so that ’s the – was the dif ference between the one strategy and the others and the one that we’re taking forward. And we bel ieve i t has to take t ime to have i ts impact and we have to spend our t ime being vibrant with in the department, l ike we are here. We are act ive h ere, we’re part ic ipat ing, because these are important forums where we can make sure that everybody can hear our message. COMMISSIONER: Would I be r ight in th inking though that there isn’ t a sharp contradict ion between POS and OPUS, they're basical ly – i t ’s dif ferences of focus, i t may be a cont inuat ion, but there 's no contradict ions? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Def in i te ly not . They are a further development of the one; i t ’s a lmost the stages in development. COMMISSIONER: Right . MAJ GEN JACOBS: Therefore I spoke – I def ined i t as the journey . . . ( indist inct) . For me, i t ’s 11 years into i t and Khayel i tsha is st i l l in our b lood, i t ’s in our – i t ’s in the way we do, the way we work. I know the members, I went to see them the other day, good members that ’s – and I asked them, but they're saying th is about you. They said but , you know, they're not ta lk ing to us; we can take them – when they work with us at n ight we wi l l te l l them, because there 's good people. COMMISSIONER: Thank you. MR MASUKU: Now one of the problems, and I th ink the Commission would want to hear about, your abi l i ty to detect weakness in the stat ions and to respond appropriate ly to those stat ions. What do you have in p lace f rom the provincia l – at the provincia l level that enables you to detect weakn ess in a part icular area and to intervene appropriate ly? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Thank you. I f I may, I 'm just get t ing my – my documents is a bi t … I th ink the key areas is, there 's a number of organisat ional systems that we have, f i rst ly. We f i rst – on the st ructural format you would have seen the agenda i tems of a l l the clusters and the CCCF. We had formed – my of f ice, I in fact compi led that agenda.

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So that certa in i tems that is recurring is i tems that we wanted to make sure is constant ly addressed. Domes t ic vio lence you wi l l see on the agenda; i t ’s a lways coming up. In order to ensure – self -vis i ts. So we have even worked out a formula that on average a cell must be vis i ted over a 24 -hour period 28 t imes. But for us to be ef fect ive i t could go 22 t imes . You know, so those are some of the – those are the f rameworks that we put formal ly there. Then we have the PCCF, which is quarter ly. For the 30 – for the specif ic stat ions we ident if ied we had the mini PCCF, which is for them only, and every two weeks we would meet with them. I and my of f ice had set – had had sessions with each of these af fected stat ions. So that ’s the other part. Then we have a standby process which has been in the pol ice for years, where we have standby that is led by a major -general . I am on standby th is week, for example. So for that week I have about 20 -odd provincia l staf f and other – that goes around to stat ions, to not the standard inspect ion, go do operat ional vis i ts to see that there is compl iance, that there 's work being done, that the gr ids … Now the other part is, we have set up the operat ional centre. Al l the gr id – the gr id, in our language is, a deployment spreadsheet that says so many people wi l l work today, they wi l l work across the fo l lowing areas with so many vehicles. MR MASUKU: Sorry, what does the – the acronym GRID, what does i t stand for? MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, i t ’s a gr id. Because i t ’s l ined l ike a gr id, l ike spreadsheet. MR MASUKU: Oh, I see. MAJ GEN JACOBS : I t ’s pol ice language for gr id, we cal l i t grid. So our operat ional gr id, i t ’s compi led, every stat ion must have one, every c luster; i t ’s kept in the ops room. Three th ings are kept in the ops room; the deployment gr id, the on-duty registers, the SAP 15 as you would know, and then the important , the CPA, the cr ime threat and the Criminal Procedure Act, the pattern analysis that must be there. We have that at the province as wel l . So we can see – so when we go out to vis i t in the standby vis i ts we go to – and we choose areas that we vis i t . So th at is an area. So that report then comes back. We compi le a weekly standby report , s ince 2012 we compi led a weekly standby report , which is a very th ick document, very detai led. From – in there typical ly you would have members’ misconduct for the – that we picked up. So that immediately General Burger would get that report . Besides the stat ions must report – the standby report has – he has to immediately – we complete i t on Sunday, we work Sunday 12 to 12 in the midday. So i t ’s compi led by 9 o 'c lock t he evening, 10 o’c lock the evening i t ’s done. Monday morning in the operations meet ing we have that ; that is the f i rst … That agenda is a lso standardly worked out. So you wi l l have the standby report , the inte l l igence overview, so to see – to p ick up f rom those systems. Then we have the ops room, the provincia l command centre or the operat ional room provincia l ly. That has dai ly deployment schedules for every stat ion, and we capture i t on a spreadsheet that captures i t per month. We introduced that in 2011. So for every c luster, how many vehicles are in that c luster. And we have f i les where i t ’s kept and i t ’s an Excel spreadsheet that is kept. I can . . . ( indist inct) show just to incubate one of those examples of how we – i t ’s our

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dai ly deployment spreadsheet. Then we have obviously now with the – and then we have sessions with the part icular – where there 's chal lenges that come up we have part icular sessions with the clusters or the stat ions, Commissioners. The other monitoring instrument is, we have got technical systems. I heard here people say we’ve got – our technology is a problem. I beg to d if fer s l ight ly, i f I may. We have got a very good CAS system. And the human factor comes in, i f people don’t capture properly. I th ink that might be the issue and we have to deal with that . From the CAS – the CAS is our base document, i t ’s the cr ime administrat ion system. I f you capture everyth ing on the case there on the CAS you wi l l be able to draw a lot more; that ’s the one. We have an OPAM (?), the operational management system where al l operat ions – where if you have worked al l operat ions in the stat ion. Typical ly L ingelethu, I just had somebody check th is morning, has got – L ingelethu, February, March now 2014 on the OPAM. So al l the operat ional work they have done for the scheduled operat ions are captured there. So we can draw that . COMMISSIONER: Again that would be largely v is ib le pol ic ing, cr ime prevent ion operat ions? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Vis ib le pol ic ing. COMMISSIONER: Would i t a lso include sector, or is that just assumed? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja, i t ’s the sector, a l l the deployment i f they are specia l . COMMISSIONER: Okay. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I f they want to register a specia l operat ion, l ike we registered the 16 Days of Act ivism, we registered a 16 Days of Act ivism operat ion, so al l work we do on domest ic vio lence and … Now for us in the 16 days we worked on domest ic vio lence, because most of the th ings happen. So al l of the act ivi ty with in the stat ions are captured on that th ing. So Parl iament uses that now where i f they want to draw anything, even so much so they pointed out recent ly that when we had drug seizures they say but, there 's no scale in the pol ice stat ion, how do we know that numbers are correct. So we have to now make sure that we ha ve cal ibrated scales to ensure – so that the amount of drugs we seize … Because they have the report; i f they accept our report that becomes the nat ional f igure, the accepted f igure. So that ’s OPAM. Then we have AVLs, the automated vehic le locat ion syst em, which is a t racker. So al l vehic les now, i t should be about 96% or so of our vehic les – in other words, a l l vehic les at the t ime when i t was implemented that was less than 30 000 km – no, less than 50 000, i t was insta l led. Every new vehicle now befo re i t ’s issued it ’s insta l led with the AVL. So what we do at the command centre, one of our people there, he t racks – i f there is a complaint , a ser ious complaint , somewhere – and, Commissioner, yoursel f you say people complain ing that we were not there, we didn’ t respond; al l we do, we look at – we bi tmap that incident. I f i t ’s captured correct ly and i t has the geo-map captured you can br ing i t up. You pul l up the vehic les who were on duty in that stat ion, the AVLs, and you superimpose i t and you can se e. And i t ’s l i tera l ly l ive, i t has – because i t works on the mainf rame i t uploads every f ive minutes; so you have every f ive minutes data. And we are able to point out – there was an incident in Mfuleni where a chi ld was knocked by a pol ice car and they said we drove down the road; when we checked the member drove 12. So we could l i teral ly see that i t wasn’t – i t was – unfortunately the chi ld ran into the road and because of the size of the

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chi ld … So that could assist us. And where members was involved in i l legal incidents, the vehic le t racker located them there, they had to expla in why they were there outside of their precinct . So those are the monitor ing instruments that we have that enable us. And the CPF; that we must engage the CPF. I mean, I s i t on the – I used to s i t on the provincia l CPF and they are act ive cluster chairpersons, they wi l l te l l you what you are not doing and what you are doing. And that stat ion commissioner – there is one now that says the stat ion commissioner is corrupt and we must invest igate. I t eventual ly proved not to be t rue, but we have to invest igate. So, you know, they are very powerfu l people. So that ’s the other monitor ing instrument. MR PIKOLI: Are these gadgets a lways funct ional? Because that ’s the t ruck. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I t should a lways be. The only reason when i t ’s not , i f i t ’s gone in to the garage for some service. And i t happened in some incidents we’ve seen, i f they take out the battery i t d isconnects, then i t must be physical ly … Then i t ’s more of a … I t depends now i f the manager is able to p ick i t up. Now you can pick up – i f you go through your AVLs every day, the AVLs are monitored, the clusters, and they're pr inted every day for the stat ions. There is a l i t t le red beep that comes up if you ar e tampering with the vehic le. At any t ime if you're tampering with one of the power instruments, i t tampers (s ic). So at the garage i f i t ’s tampered the vehic le is booked out to the garage, so that explains i tself . So i t should general ly work. I f i t ’s not working then i t ’s something that we should constant ly … And that ’s – l ike most th ings, i f you take your eye of f the bal l on i t , i t goes skew and we have to a lways keep i t . I t ’s a constant monitor ing, i t ’s a l ive – our operat ions are a l ive management systems. I t can' t be cold, i t has to be l ive, i t has to . . . ( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: And is that managed f rom head of f ice or is – the AVL, or is that managed provincia l ly? MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, at the cluster. COMMISSIONER: At the cluster. MAJ GEN JACOBS: The cluster has i t . The stat ion commissioner, i f he is t ra ined on the AVL, can capture i t . But general ly i t ’s c luster, every c luster has people t ra ined. My of f ice has went to every c luster and we have tra ined people; i t ’s a lways l ike that . COMMISSIONER: The actual management and operat ion of i t is in Pretoria? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Pretor ia, the management of i t . I t ’s l inked to the mainf rame. COMMISSIONER: I mean, there 's no doubt that these administrat ion systems are important . But what has struck us, the comments that you may have heard about technology are mot about the access to technology of ordinary members and of detect ives. The fact that – and there is an enormous manual captur ing of data of a var iety of sorts, whether i t ’s occurrence books. Take domest ic vio lence, the fact that one domest ic vio lence incident is recorded in a pocketbook, in the occurrence book, in the two DB registers, you know. So there 's a lot of having to wri te th ing down. And i t does seem as if that is something that could be automated and faci l i tated f rom an IT point of view. But we also have been struck by, for example, you know, given these re lat ively h igh- tech IT intervent ions, the fact that most members don’t have

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access to emai l . You know, and that commun icat ion with members is st i l l through an informat ion book. Now i t ’s not that th is is so much a cr i t ic ism, because I , you know, have been not long out of the Department of Just ice and I know that these th ings take t ime and we’re st i l l looking at managing c ases in the Department of Just ice electronical ly and of course that would make a huge di f ference. But just as to whether SAPS is real ly th inking about the benef its that the informat ion revolut ion of fers to pol ic ing on the ground? MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, I th ink there is that . We are a huge organisat ion and that ’s – we have more – I th ink we have the most PCs, desktop PCs, than anywhere in Af r ica. So we are a huge organisat ion. I t requires that we have – i t requires a major, probably – and I th ink that ’s a l ready on the cards, Parl iament has reported, our mainf rame system. We are a securi ty structure, which means everyth ing must go through our mainf rame system. And so that ’s the chal lenge. I f we put – the AVLs, because we have to put on al l our vehic les on the AVLs i t meant that that had a drag on the system. So and every – because i t ’s a pol ice th ing we can' t have that th ing monitored by a pr ivate company that can see where our vehic les are, that can become … So that ’s part of the chal lenge; i t is so. I mean, in the CSC we – essent ia l ly there 's 22 registers in the CSC that we have to … But the law was wr i t ten up, l ike the Domest ic Vio lence Act says there must be the fo l lowing with the regulat ions that fo l low on there, and we are duty-bound to implement i t . So because i t depends on which parl iamentar ian comes; i f th is one is focusing on th is matter, they want registers that they . . . ( indist inct) . So we have 24 – 22 registers there and we go through. So i t takes i t on average – and i t does – i t is an issue, i t takes on average for the shif t commander, you would have seen on your vis i ts, h is head is down; he looks – in i t ia l ly for the f i rst part of h is shif t and then the last part of h is shif t , he looks down because he is complet ing registers. Then he is a ble to assist with the other … Then before he leaves he has to hand over the register. But that is something we cannot avoid, because there 's money there, there 's f i rearms, there 's evidence. Because otherwise we get accused of not handing over the evidence properly. So and we do have a 24 -hour evidence centre in the CSC where i t ’s kept for 24 hours, then i t goes to the SAP 13, our evidence log. So that register must be kept, must be handed over for chain of evidence. So i t ’s a problem that might be i l lustrated but i t k ind of has to be that way. Unless electronical ly over t ime we can develop a way to do i t , scanning; i t might work. But then I th ink once our mainf rame is upgraded we should see that we can tag a lot more systems onto i t . The e-docket, I think, is part of that process; a l though i t ’s k ind of in i ts early days, i t is an at tempt at that , both to prevent i t f rom being lost and also f rom i t being electronical ly captured. But i t ’s a work – I would say i t ’s – our IT matters is a work in progress, maybe very s lowly but progress nonetheless. MR MASUKU: On the issue of – on another issue. In paragraph 12 of your statement you say,

“SAPS has a pol icy to enl ist community volunteers to assist with pol ic ing in the form of reservists. However, s ince 2010 a morator ium has been placed on new reservists unt i l the introduct ion of a completely

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new reservist pol icy. Furthermore, s ince 2012 the reservists pol icy decl ined signi f icant ly for two reasons …”

And then you set out those reasons. The f i rst one i s, “Al l reservists s ince 2012 had to undergo a street survival cert i f icat ion process which consists of a physical f i tness assessment.”

I am sure i t ’s c lose to the Durban incident, you remember the incident where a number of people died whi le they were run ning. Was that the simi lar recrui tment exercise? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Thank you. I th ink one th ing we wi l l say, that our reservis t numbers did decl ine. But in our view, and i t ’s a view . . . ( indist inct) , the pol icy change was a necessary one and i t led to … The reservist numbers increased dramat ical ly when funding became – when people were start ing to be paid for being reservists. So i t went against the whole – large numbers, 2008 / 2009 as part of the World Cup preparat ion th is issue was introduced and peop le introduced numbers. And people jo ined for no other reason but to be paid. That was the one th ing. Secondly, we are – so that was stopped because i t goes against – then we’re not a voluntary organisat ion, organisat ion of volunteers, community voluntee rs, so that was … And i t was kind of became a big problem. People were just br inging in people by numbers. Two, i f you are a pol ice of f ic ia l – in terms of the Firearms Control Act , a pr ivate c i t izen, inst i tut ions and government inst i tut ions have to adhe re to certa in condit ions of the Firearms Control Act . That means physical f i tness, you must do the legal pr incip les and shoot ing. In the pol ice – so that ’s essent ia l ly what i t entai ls; for each di f ferent category of f i rearm l icenses issued or competency issues, they have th is cr i ter ia. In the state for us, the defence force, the nat ional inte l l igence – the state securi ty agency, have a part icular cr i ter ia set up and we developed our cr i ter ia. So every member who has a f i rearm by us must undergo that t ra in ing; which means – so that is – which means you must wri te the legal exams and the legal pr incip les. You must undergo the physical f i tness assessment that you're able to competent ly handle yoursel f , one, handle yoursel f wi th a f i rearm, handle a suspect with yoursel f wi th a f i rearm, and three, that you must be able to understand the pr incip les of the handl ing of f i rearms. So now you have a si tuat ion where people – which was the problem f rom 2008 t i l l about, what 's i t – 2008 / 2009 t i l l about 2012 that i t was stopped. You had people in uniform and yoursel f , Commissioners, you would see the person standing there and something is happening but he is not competent, he is not t ra ined, he’s not qual i f ied but he’s in our uniform. When al l the complaints that you are get t ing here are saying we are inef f ic ient , we’re ignored, we drove, we didn’ t – th is was a person in our uniform who potent ia l ly could have been a reservist that was not necessari ly meet ing his requirements. People – we were f inding people were di sarmed when conf ronted by people with f i rearms. So our view is, i f you're going to wear the uniform of the pol ice you must adhere to the requirements of the pol ice. And that ’s k ind of real ly what i t was. Otherwise we must – I don’t know what the al terna t ive is. A reservist is mos then a fu l l member on duty with a cap, with h is uniform, with bul letproof, a l l of that . Then everybody else would expect h im to be act ing l ike a fu l ly - t ra ined

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pol ice of f ic ia l . And therein that ’s why that matter was brought in . So to put in the – the cr i ter ia was put in that issue. I th ink the th ird e lement was the issue of a person must be working. We did f ind – now those who are reservists now and have passed al l of that, they are in, but new reservists … Because we found people at the pol ice stat ion seven days a week, cert i fying, doing – in the pol ice uniform. General ly i t could be a good th ing, but there were some other pract ises that we could – we were worr ied that we were beginning to detect ; that there was abuse of power possib ly, there was al l of those th ings. So therefore the idea was in terms of – that was the not ion of why to . . . ( indist inct) preferably people who are employed. So they're l i tera l ly making t ime and they are not – they have other sources of income. When they're working their 16 a month they're actual ly there in that 16 hours. So that was the idea around why i t was … MR MASUKU: And did the new pol icy af fect , for example, the – d id i t af fect the capacity of the pol ice in some way? Because i t seem s to me that there may wel l – wi th no reservists coming in, you potent ia l ly lost a number of bodies that could have been playing a ro le as reservis ts. Did i t af fect the qual i ty of pol ic ing that Khayel i tsha people would be ent i t led to have? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink that there certa in ly was a lack – there was a reduct ion in the vis ib i l i ty. Part of what – we haven’t evaluated that, whether i t ’s affected our capacity. We would – now that the pol icy is approved we would urgent ly look at – we wi l l urgent ly work on – at retra ining the people who were there, the people who didn’ t make i t , and to ensure that those th ings are in place. Some of the people who – I mean, and some of the pract ical problems we had in i t was people – i t was the language of the tests. S o we now have, you know, made i t , you know, a language, I mean, of a l l the … So that was easier. We’re doing pre - t ra in ing so that people can understand the Act bet ter, they do al l of that legal pr incip les to ensure that that is faci l i tated. But i t would have af fected our numbers therefore, the number of people we have on the street; certa in ly that would have an ef fect. We cannot say that – because the morator ium lasted for about four years. So yes, in terms of volumes and vis ib i l i ty i t d id about … The chal lenge has always been, the reservists that we’ve had played – the major i ty of them played a good ro le. Now when they didn’ t make the – there was a problem. MR MASUKU: Okay. MAJ GEN JACOBS: But so in terms of their abi l i ty to handle f i rearms i t was a chal lenge. So i t ’s a d if f icul t th ing to answer stra ight . MR MASUKU: I am going to ask you three quest ions which – and, honourable Chair , that would be – those are the last three quest ions I am going to ask. COMMISSIONER: Thank you. MR MASUKU: And I wi l l ask al l of them at one t ime and you can just respond to them once. The f i rst one re lates to the ro le of crime inte l l igence in cr ime prevent – in the crime prevent ion. There has been a suggest ion that you – the Khayel i tsha stat ions may wel l have very poor inte l l igence and therefore are unable to ident ify hotspots that communit ies are point ing out. The second one related to that is real ly the quest ion of your informers and how informers – the lack of recrui tment re lat ing to informers has stunted your – I mean, the abi l i ty of the SAPS to properly p lan on how to prevent cr ime.

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And the th ird one is real ly something that you of fered, which I want to of fer to the Commissioners. I t re lates to the existence of a provincia l operat ion centre. The General gene rously indicated that he would faci l i tate a vis i t by the Commission to that operat ion centre. Because that centre is where everyth ing happens. And perhaps some of the answers he has given would be seen l ive in act ion, you know, t racking of cars, t racking of – just the way they operate. And then I th ink that ’s an of fer which the Commission may wel l want to take up. COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Advocate Masuku. Advocate Pikol i and I wi l l d iscuss that over the tea adjournment. But perhaps we might hear f rom the General on the other issues in the meant ime. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Thank you, thank you, Commissioners. I mean, we have – as you say, we have a given amount – number of resources. So we would have to deploy that in the most ef fect ive and the most strategi c way. And one of the key ro les that ’s p layed to assist with that is cr ime inte l l igence. But before we have cr ime inte l l igence we have with in the stat ions CIOs, which is cr ime informat ion of f icers, that captures al l the – a l l the cr ime incidents is correct ly captured and i t ’s in correct there, we wi l l be able to – when you pul l i t of f wi l l be able to give you a pat tern, a pattern analysis. I mean, that could be done quickly, to give you a pat tern analysis, one. Two, you would also be able to then – f rom there a hotspot determinat ion could be done. So that ’s k ind of – so that ’s what the stat ion’s cr ime informat ion of f icer can do. I t ’s h ighly going to be a problem if they're not able to. Then i t ’s – and then I would l ike to t rack where they didn’ t give – they wouldn’ t – they – you know, because the stat ion commissioner must then use them, because how they're deployed. Fortunately I know a lot of the areas wel l , so when we f ind there 's no vehic le in Si te C, DD sect ion, on a Fr iday night there 's a problem ; because that hotspot is known for everybody. So cr ime inte l l igence ro le is then – we’ve got to a s izeable capacity here. Virtual ly Khayel i tsha and Nyanga clusters have got the biggest cr ime in te l l igence capacit ies of a l l . I t ’s in l ine with what we dev eloped in POS, local for them capacity. That is a capacity of people to col lect . But cr ime inte l l igence … Because of the nature of our work, we must recrui t informers not just – a detect ive also recrui ts informers, a pol iceman on the van also recrui ts, an inte l l igence of f icer recrui ts somebody that is located close to a cr iminal target or a group of cr iminals that ’s going to … So his ro le is substant ively d i f ferent ; there 's a qual i tat ive dif ference. So he’s not – and people – so people ask no, they wan t cr ime inte l l igence, they want informat ion. That is what the CIO must do, that is what the Vispol pol ice … Me, I am a vis ib le pol ic ing member; I forget , I ’m now with cr ime in te l l igence. I know my area, I know i t wel l . I know where the patterns are and I know who the suspects are. In the war room, in the command centre, we have sheets and sheets of pat terns of categories of cr imes that have happened, robberies, that we distr ibute; people that have been – you know, that are wanted and al l of those th ings. So that ’s avai lable. The cr ime inte l l igence of f icer ’s job is to ident ify syndicates at d if ferent layers. You get precinct level syndicates that is … And not even that, sector – some of the gangs, they are eight , 10 strong, and they can only operate in

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Makhaza, they know only Makhaza, and they rob there, they do there. So for that you need a part icular k ind of group of person to be able to get c lose by to be able to … But even that is di f ferent . I f you go to a group – I can ment ion a typical example. The Brit ish Tobacco robberies that has happened of late, we had a big number, we reported that , a b ig number in the province. As we started to . . . ( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: These truck robberies of c igaret te . . .( intervent ion)? MAJ GEN JACOBS: The truck hi jackings. A big – i t suddenly increased when they started to decentra l ise and they went d irect to customers. So they had people with a half a mi l l ion worth of c igaret tes dr iving in the area and del iver ing at a spaza shop and we had an escalat ion . And we started at the command centre. Interest ing enough, we found that of the suspects, we arrested 148, 111 came f rom Khayel i tsha, but a l though they – only 36 were commit ted in Khayel i tsha. So that is the inte l l igence ro le and that ’s why we took som e of the detect ives here because – for the 36 cases but a lso i t ’s h is suspects that are l iv ing here; they were f rom Site C, they were f rom town. They're appearing now ei ther way in the next two weeks, a l l of them. We have already gone through high court – the court , regional court , and they al l were placed – and they're a l l going to be placed in one tr ia l , because we could show l inks between dif ferent people; one robbed here and then he robbed with th is one and then he robbed again with th is one. So we c ould – 100 – I th ink we commit ted about easi ly 280 cases, this group, about – there were 350. So that would typical ly be what an inte l l igence operat ive would be doing, is to col lect inte l l igence on groups that ’s not – and i t ’s not tomorrow he must get in format ion, i t wi l l take him two months to get in, to work there, to develop enough coverage, and that ’s why i t ’s not a response that we get. So but we have a capacity here, then we have a provincia l capacity, then we have a nat ional capacity. And i t ta kes t ime, i t ’s not something that we say i t ’s easy. And we have to make sure that we operate careful ly so we don’t vio late the r ights of people. So that ’s – so everyth ing has to be careful . So that ’s the ro le of inte l l igence in th is … So i t p lays an important part. So in the big inte l l igence, in the big cr imes, l ike in the case of – and I th ink there was a key ro le ment ioned yesterday and I agree with Colonel Harr i , we could have done better on assist ing in the pattern of the ser ia l k i l ler, doing the p rof i le and begin to work on prof i l ing people with simi lar patterns and then assisted with … So i t ’s stuf f that we’re learning. I t wasn’t an area that – h istor ical ly in te l l igence don’t normal ly work in ident ifying single suspects. But we have a ro le to p lay i f we see that the cut , the impact, is so high of that s ingle individual that we – you know, and there 's other systems that we have; we should play a ro le. And we have met, because she ra ised those issues we have met now and that ’s something we’re busy set t ing up, about how do we have a – how can we assist them with the prof i l ing and then begin to look at , you know, ident ifying possib le people early on. And obviously i t depends on how good we communicate, to what extent does the docket analysis … So what cr ime inte l l igence does, further to the question; we do regular docket analysis to look at not so much the progress of the docket but to look at

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the content of the docket to be able to p ick up patterns, pat terns and trends, and to see if in there there are suspects we can begin to work on that is cross -cut t ing; which is how we arrested th is 111, 112 Khayel i tsha suspects. But i t takes t ime. And that ’s why the integrat ion between cr ime prevent ion – because the command centre fa l ls under vis ib le pol ic in g and cr ime inte l l igence is separate and there has to be that integrat ion. And that ’s why we have an inte l l igence of f icer that ’s meant to s i t there, to be able to p ick up on the patterns and be able to assist . So that ’s my … So having said that , informers are a core part of our business and we do – i t ’s something that we – now we are now looking – I met the day before yesterday with a l l the cluster commanders to deal with specif ical ly that . I t ’s about every detect ive should have an informer, recrui t one every quarter. And we’re not doing i t enough because … And I th ink there is something there, because I th ink we could do better there. And that ’s something that we … Because that informer, i f he’s recrui ted well , wi l l assist your invest igat ion. Obvio usly he wi l l guide you to who the suspect is, you must bui ld the evidence f rom a detect ive point . A sector manager, i f he works in an area, he might not register the person as an informer, has what we cal l contact persons. I f I go to there by x, y, z, that area, you wi l l f ind SST and SST, the sector manager, there . . .( indist inct) wi l l te l l you now the people he is ta lk ing to and where he gets … So they have got a lot of … But the people are community people. I f I speak to any of the Socia l Just ice Coal i t ion people or the Free Gender people now they wi l l give me informat ion but they don’t want to be on our books; because they are not – they wi l l te l l you stra ight , we are not your informers, but we’re giving you because we – as a c i t izen. So we don’t necessari ly have a reduced access to informat ion, we have very low informers registered in our books. But i t doesn’t mean we can grow th is more – we cannot grow i t more. We bel ieve i t should be grown more. Because for me now in the inte l l igence environment th is is a potent ia l base that I can work f rom going forward. So i t has that interest. But every pol ice of f ic ia l worth h is sal t has a number of contact people in the area. And part of what we did when we spoke to the cluster commanders the other day was for us to explore why those contact persons are not being registered. Is i t genuinely – or is i t because we are not making enough ef fort to register them. So I th ink those are some of the issues. So yes, informers are an important part , but we’re expec t ing sector managers to work with communit ies without them being necessari ly informers. But they be – they are community – they are act ive ci t izens that are provid ing us with informat ion, and there 's a lot of that . I th ink that ’s the … As we develop – the street commit tees, when they were st i l l very vibrant here was that . Thank you. MR MASUKU: Thanks. Yes, I wi l l – I am going to – that – those are the quest ions that I wanted to ask. And I wi l l pursue some of them in reply. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MASUKU COMMISSIONER: Alr ight . Wel l thank you very much indeed. We wi l l take a break now f rom ten past e leven t i l l twenty -f ive past e leven. And then – so we wi l l adjourn now and reconvene at twenty -f ive past e leven. Thank you. COMMISSION ADJOURNS: (at 11:10)

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ON RESUMPTION: (at 11:25) PETER ANTHONY JACOBS: (suo) COMMISSIONER: And Mr Hathorn is going to go ahead. MR HATHORN: Thank you, Commissioner. COMMISSIONER: Please go ahead. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATHORN: Thank you, Commissioner. General Jacobs, I act on behalf of act ivist organisat ions. And you have spoken at length about your experience and qual i f icat ions as a pol ice of f icer. But as far as my cl ients are concerned, the most important and impressive part of your credent ia ls have not bee n dealt wi th and are not on record. And I would l ike you to conf i rm that you come out of an act ivist background, you were in the UDF, you were in . . . ( indist inct) , you were in the ANC underground and you were part of the mi l i tary wing of the ANC. Is that correct? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I conf i rm that . MR HATHORN: I would l ike to move on to an issue which has cropped up several t imes in the course of the Commission hearings and we have had very l i t t le in the way of c lear answers or guidance as to how i t ’s been dealt wi th; and that ’s the report that was produced in the name of the late General Shabalala by the nat ional inspectorate in August 2012. And we heard f rom Brigadier van Zyl that th is was a fact - f inding report that was produced for the benef it of the nat ional commissioner. But we understand and assume that i t was also ra ised with the provincia l – was also made avai lable to the provincia l management in the Western Cape. Is that correct? MAJ GEN JACOBS: That is correct , yes. MR HATHORN: Can you te l l us when i t was discussed by the provincia l management? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I t ’s a very – Commissioner, that ’s a very speci f ic quest ion. I can' t give that date. But i f I remember correct ly, i t came out in late 2012, i f I 'm not mistaken. MR HATHORN : No, i t ’s dated August – I th ink i t ’s the 8 t h of August 2012. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja. So and then I th ink i t came to us qui te a whi le af ter that , so i f I 'm not mistaken; but yes. MR HATHORN: So i t was in the second half of 2012 i t came to the provincia l management team. Is that correct? MAJ GEN JACOBS: That is correct . MR HATHORN: And who would have discussed i t amongst the provincia l management team; who would have been part of that d iscussion? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink what we were – I th ink i f I – as I say, I can' t specif ical ly remember now. I t ’s a very speci f ic quest ion of a specif ic date. But i t would typical ly have been the deputy, where he would have discussed i t wi th the provincia l commissioner and then we were given obviously the report and where we had to obviously study the report . MR HATHORN: And what came out of that d iscussion? What – sorry. As I understand i t , i t would have been the provincia l commissioner and the deputy commissioners would have been part of that d iscussion, would have been part o f the provincia l management team that considered the report . Is that correct? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes, i t ’s correct . MR HATHORN: And what came out of that d iscussion? What decis ions were

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taken in re lat ion to the problems ident i f ied in the report? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink there are two th ings. Obviously we had to – i t was – i t ’s a nat ional inspectorate report , so we had to respond to that report , to the nat ional inspectorate. We were now … So that was then 0 would have been coordinated in the of f ice of General Jephta, the OO. So that would be the one issue. And then I th ink f rom there, the further e lement was to look at the detai l of each of those areas, that these are issues around the cases that was ident if ied. The cases in i t ia l ly – i t ’s obviously in i t ia l ly there were, i f I 'm not mistaken, n ine case studies that was part of i t and we looked at that , we looked at the detai l of those case studies and what that was … And I know specif ical ly the detect ives were tasked to fo l low up on those issues, the f in dings that were there. Yes, that was … MR HATHORN: So who amongst the provincia l management team would have been tasked with the fo l lowing up on the specif ic cases? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes. MR HATHORN: Who? Which individual amongst . . . ( intervent ion)? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I t would be – at that t ime i t was obviously General Jephta as the coordinator of that and then General Matope, the deputy that is no – he is current ly of f , but – and then they would have tasked General Molo on i t , on the – because i t mainly dealt wi th cr iminal cases that were – in terms of how i t was dealt wi th and the fo l low up and the issues around. MR PIKOLI: What do you mean by ‘of f ’ , that he’s of f? MAJ GEN JACOBS: He’s on suspension current ly. MR PIKOLI: He has been suspended? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja. MR PIKOLI: Why? MAJ GEN JACOBS: There 's a departmental vio lat ion and a – I th ink there 's – ja , departmental vio lat ion, and current ly that t r ia l is on. MR HATHORN: General , there were problems there. I can understand why the individual cases would have been fo l lowed up on, that were ment ioned. And there were problems with the detect ives that would also require fo l low up. But there were broader problems, issues re lat ing to absenteeism, d iscip l ine, the CPFs, the morale at the stat ion, sector pol ic ing; a range of d i f ferent problems were ident if ied. And what measures were taken by the provincia l management to address those broader problems, apart f rom the detect ive issues? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Can I specif ical ly – I th ink on the areas where I can ta lk to; I th ink there were specif ic intervent ions dealt wi th measures. One, the report , amongst other th ings, found that there was the act ive part ic ipat ion of the CPF, how act ive they were in some of the – that issue. And we did through the provincia l CPF, the CPF board, we had sent the CPF board – yes, I 'm sure Mr Loonat came to test i fy about that , one of the tasks that he was – he was also then tasked to come here to come and look at some of – how they can develop that capacity speci f ical ly, again re -establ ish the CPF to make sure that the CPF is, you know, is again – i f that is found. So that was the issue. We have seen – s ince then we have seen re -elect ions on some of the CPF, we have seen the stabi l isat ion in those areas. On the issue of sector pol ic ing; I th ink the report makes a comment about sector pol ic ing and vehicles. We – and if you read the sector pol ic ing pol icy,

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the nat ional instruct ion of 2013 and of 2009, i t never – that is never referred to as a formal – as a pol icy. I t has never been – i t was an at tempt at get t ing a part icular model formulated, p i loted, i t d idn’ t necessari ly – i t couldn’ t necessary pract ical ly be implemented, that two vehicles per sector. So that is not the instruct ions on i t . And we responded to that ef fect , that there is no instruct ions that says there must be two vehicles per sector. What we rather indicated, i t says Sect ion – given that i t ’s the 2009 one, the Sect ion 4, that ta lks about – Sect ion 4(1)(b) of the 2009 says resources, “ th is includes the” – i t only says,

“The fo l lowing factors must be taken into account when determining sector boundaries. This includes the avai lable human and other resources at the pol ice stat ion to address the pol ic ing needs of the sector.”

That ’s 2009; the later 2013 one goes s l ight ly a b i t more into i t , but i t st i l l has the same kind of out l ine. I wi l l just quickly go to i t . I t says,

“The re l ief commander of a shif t …” That is, sorry, 3 of 2013, the instruct ion Sect ion 4(7)(a), (b) and (c).

“The re l ief commander must, subjec t to the direct ion of the stat ion commissioner at the pol ice stat ion br ief and post operat ional members in the demarcated sector, debrief operat ional members af ter every shif t . ”

So that ’s k ind of what i t says to – so there 's no – but i t says – what i t c learly says, i t ’s demarcat ing the area. So we have done that . And we took issue with the fact that there 's th is not ion of two vehicles per sectors, because i t ’s nowhere wri t ten and i t was not implementable. Because that would mean, i f you take KLM sect ion , which is one of the sectors, i f you put down two vehicles there, that ’s r ight members at a given t ime. So for that sector e ight members at a given t ime, or rather, sorry, four members at a given t ime and you wi l l – and you work i t over a period, you're going to get a volume that you're not going to be able to sustain. So that was the issue. I t was implemented at a t ime when we had lots of reservists, but i t was based on a premise that was not founded on sol id ground when i t was tested here and i t could – found to be not correct . MR HATHORN: So for purposes of Khayel i tsha, the nat ional instruct ion with regard to sector pol ic ing was just not feasib le? MAJ GEN JACOBS: No. General ly the nat ional instruct ion doesn’t say that at al l , how many vehicles must be – i t doesn’t say i t at a l l , there 's no … COMMISSIONER: On th is; one of the issues that has come before the Commission came both out of – wel l part icular ly out of the examinat ion of the SAPS 15 by General School ing, was that there are – there appears to be one person in a vehic le, and I understand that ’s not compl iant with SAPS prescr ipts. That ’s certa in ly what the SAPS 15 disclosed. When th is put to stat ion commanders, stat ion commanders also seem to th ink that that was improper and suggested that a l though the SAPS 15s, many of which we have seen, showed that there was only one member in a vehic le at the t ime, suggested that i t had been f i l led up by somebody f rom ei ther the CSC or somebody was drawn in. But that ’s not ref lected in the SAPS 15. Is th at a matter one should be concerned about? MAJ GEN JACOBS: . . . ( Indist inct – of f microphone) Commissioner. That is

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def in i te ly not a pol icy. In fact , i t goes against our pol ice safety instruct ions, one. COMMISSIONER: I mean, i t ’s coupled also with eviden ce we have had of people saying that there was a vehic le with only one pol ice of f icer in i t . Now we know that person may not have actual ly been doing sector patro l l ing at the t ime, but i t seems to f i t in with some of the evidence we have heard, that i t do es happen. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I t would be – i f i t is i t would be extremely improper, one. We wouldn’t encourage i t ; i t does not happen. What does happen though is that the shif t commander or at the t ime when we have a specia l operat ion and you know the target there is h igh vis ib i l i ty a long a part icular taxi route, for example, then you park f ive, s ix vehic les with one member in the vehic le in c lose proximity for show of force. And that’s more of a tact ical arrangement. The standard is two members per vehicle, because it ’s bui l t in to another instruct ion of ours about pol ice safety; that you operate in tandem, you operate together, you get out of the cars together, you move together. And our members who got shot, got shot when they get out of the car a lone and the other one si ts in the car. So kind of that ’s part of … So we wouldn’ t want to … If i t ’s happened … You see, the 15, Commissioner, is a – the 15, when they wri te up the vehic le – the dr iver, they write . . . ( indist inct) 56 dr iver. I t ’s more to i l l ustrate who is the person responsib le for that vehic le. So if there was an accident later or an al legat ion of th is vehic le, we know who the dr iver was because his name is at tached to part icular vehic le. So that ’s what we . . . ( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: My understanding is that ’s not what the SAP 15 is. I may be wrong, but my understanding is that i t ’s actual ly a record of who is on duty on a shi f t and where they have been al located. And so i t ’s not a case of just putt ing in the dr iver; i t ’s a case of saying we’ve got x -many people who have reported for duty and th is is where they're going. MAJ GEN JACOBS: And then they would put in their sector and then they put the dr ive – the vehic le that is at tached to i t and then normal ly the dr iver in that case. So i t ’s . . . ( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: But I mean, is i t or is i t not a staf f management tool? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes. COMMISSIONER: And in order to determine who is on shi f t? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja, that ’s def in i te ly But i t ’s become – we have started to use i t to t rack who is working in the sector, who is working, how many on duty; a l l of those th ings. So i t is a management tool that is used for avai labi l i ty, for – la ter on that same th ing must be used to capture whether a person is on duty, performance, salary. Later on that ’s the one evidence we use to determine if you were on duty, i f your f i rearm was used somewhere, were you on duty, d id you book on. So .. . ( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: I t ’s your key human resource guide for decid ing who is on duty at a given moment? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja, i t is . COMMISSIONER: So i t shouldn’ t just be the dr iver ’s name that ’s there, i t should be the dr iver and the passenger. MAJ GEN JACOBS: In that i t should be? COMMISSIONER: Yes. MAJ GEN JACOBS : Ja, I …

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MR HATHORN: General , would there be minutes avai lable of th is meet ing at which the provincia l management d iscussed the Shabalala report? MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, no. As deput ies we have every Tuesday and every Thursday a meeting with the provincia l commissioner where issues are discussed, a range of issues, and we don’t necessari ly keep minutes of those meet ings, we don’t . We discuss and then people get tasked to fo l low up on certa in matters; f rom there a part icular person is al located to do that , to coordinate the report and to … So that is there. MR HATHORN: So is there no formal record of who gets a l located tasks at those meet ings? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Not specif ical ly. Because if i t ’s in your l ine funct ion i t automat ical ly would be … In th is case, the inspec torate reports fa l ls with in the OO; so the l ine funct ion person takes i t and then that ’s the responsib i l i ty. I t ’s not … Unless we change completely, in th is case no, General , you are not – you won' t do th is report , that one, then that one comes with a le t ter. But i f i t ’s your l ine funct ion you take i t ; l ike operat ional matters was my l ine funct ion and I must take i t . So i t ’s as c lear as that . MR HATHORN: But isn’ t there a ser ious danger of issues sl ipping through the cracks and there not being fo l low u p of decis ions taken at these meet ings i f there is no wri t ten record of the decisions taken? MAJ GEN JACOBS: No. But I mean, those are kind of smal l management decis ions. I am not sure i f i t ’s k ind of common pract ise that every – where al l managers come together, the core management, that every record is kept. We have the formal meet ings on these matters. We have that formal meet ings on Monday, the operat ional meet ing, and Friday mornings at 7 o 'c lock, Fr iday morning 7 o 'c lock, we have the provincia l heads meet ing where al l the provincia l heads, support and operat ional heads si t and we go through al l … Those two are our of f ic ia l record where al l th ings are kept. I f the inspectorate . . . ( indist inct) i t would be in there, there would be records of those. But otherwise we meet then every morning quickly for a half an hour about … So in one of those meet ings those th ings were discussed. I would f ind i t st range that we wi l l keep, on every t ime we come together, a record of … That would not go to the . . . ( indist inct) core of what we – of the management team. MR HATHORN: No, I appreciate that . But what I f ind strange is that a matter of such importance as the Shabalala report would not make i t on to the agenda of your formal Monday meet ing and a record can be taken of the decis ions made in respect of that report . MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink you – we have given – I th ink the quest ion is, there is a report on i t , there 's a response to i t , there would be … So I am not sure, Commissioner, what you want me to say on th is matter; I real ly don’t know. MR HATHORN: No. I am just putt ing i t to you that – I am not going to take it any further, but I am putt ing i t to you that I f ind i t st range that there is no formal record that exists apparent ly of decis ions made by th e provincia l management team in respect of a matter of such importance as the Shabalala report . COMMISSIONER: In that regard I should say that we have never seen any response to the Shabalala task team report that was prepared by the province even i f such was prepared and requested .. . ( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink i t wi l l be taken up with our legal services that that

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report would be … I th ink i t ’s important to say I hear the comment you make. I can' t comment on the fact that you f ind i t st rang e. That ’s unfortunately how you f ind i t . COMMISSIONER: I t perhaps would be a l i t t le less strange i f there was in fact a report . But we just haven’t seen i t . MAJ GEN JACOBS: Okay. COMMISSIONER: So perhaps, Advocate Masuku, you could make sure that we do see any provincia l response to the Shabalala task team report which has been of centra l importance in th is Commission’s invest igat ions. And i f there was such a response by the provincia l leadership of SAPS, which would not be at a l l surpr is ing, we would l ike to see i t . MR MASUKU: Yes, we wi l l fo l low that up and see what there is. COMMISSIONER: Thank you. MR HATHORN: General , on the 21 s t of November 2012, so that was over three months af ter the Shabalala report had been f inal ised, the Socia l Just ice Coal i t ion met with General Ndlovu and the stat ion commanders of the three Khayel i tsha stat ions. And Mr Bregman f rom the SJC who at tended that meet ing ra ised the issue of the Shabalala report . And he was amazed to hear that the cluster commander and i t appeared to h im also the stat ion commanders were not aware of the report . Can you comet on that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja, I have heard that that was commented on here. I mean, I am just fo l lowing up to see why that was so. Because al l I can indicate, I th ink that would have been an oversight at that t ime. I th ink a few months later the report was avai lable. MR HATHORN: So you're saying that i t would have been af ter that that the issues ra ised in the report were taken up with the cluster and the stat ion commanders? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink the – what we did do, I know, def in i te ly f rom my of f ice, we fo l lowed up on the al legat ions that was made about sector pol ic ing, vis ib le pol ic ing, General Molo’s of f ice and then General Matope worked on the specif ic l ine funct ion elements to be able to see on that report . Remember, i t is a report that was meant for the provincia l commissioner’s attent ion, i t was actual ly for the national commissioner. The report then was issued, then we got i t at a certa in t ime. I can' t recal l when we got i t . So i t was a nat ional commissioner’s report , i t was not necessari ly a report that must go to the stat ion commissioners. From that issues out of that wi l l be dealt wi th with the stat ion commissioners. But the report was addressed to the nat ional commissioner for the nat ional commissioner. We then got the report and the response in that way. So that ’s why they wouldn’ t necessari ly get i t , just in terms of our protocol. I t ’s a nat ional commissioner’s report , i t doesn’t necessari ly go to anybody else. MR HATHORN: I understand that . But there were . . . ( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: The content of which – i f you're saying the content of which they did not know about, I am bi t surpr ised because the inspect ions was dealt wi th in thei r area. So and the fact that Mr Bregman says that , i t is something I would have to – probably wi l l have to conf i rm that he says – that is now what he is saying to you. But i t would be strange, because the inspect ion – inspectorate came there to see them about the issues that was ra ised by them, knowing the inspectorate would compi le the report ; and they suddenly wouldn’ t know. That ’s why I say

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that would be an opin ion ra ised by Mr Bregman. COMMISSIONER: Can I just fo l low up here for my own clar i ty. My understanding was th is was done in July 2012. The next inspect ions done by provincia l inspectorate were done in September 2013, so 14 months later. So i t wasn’t a case of we’ve got th is report , th is looks worrying, let ’s do an inspect ion; that d idn’ t seem to happen. Moreover, i t ’s not c lear to me what the management reason would be for not sharing with the stat ion commander, who at the end of the day is responsib le for ensuring service del ivery at the stat ion, that there has been th is report of mater ia l shortcomings. And every s ingle stat ion commander came before th is – and branch commander came before th is Commission and said they hadn’t seen it unt i l they were preparing for l i t igat ion – preparing to give evidence in th is Commission. So that ’s now, I don’t know when the preparat ions took place, but I assume i t would be November, December 2013. Why would that be? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Wel l what I can certa in ly say is that the content of what was found and the concerns ra ised was discussed with them. In fact , we have had sessions on deal ing with the content of what was discussed. The report in i tsel f was not made avai lable; that I can agree, because i t ’s not our report to give, i t ’s the nat ional commissioner’s report . But . . . ( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: Please, you know, forgive me; that just seems to be an extremely strange response. I mean, I am al l for courtesy, I real ly do bel ieve in i t . But the idea that you wouldn’ t give a document that is drawn up with chapter and verse of problems to the very person whose responsib i l i ty i t is to get r id of those problems for protocol reasons, I just can' t understand that . MAJ GEN JACOBS: Commissioner, I understand the concerns, the way i t ’s put and i t comes across. What I know we dealt wi th is under both stat ion s – I mean, were part – two of the stat ions were at least part of 31 and part of 23. In that we had a programme developed that looked at – especia l ly in the 31, Project 31, that looked at speci f ic p i l lars, operat ional p i l lars, that dealt wi th those issues exact ly f rom the detect ives to management in the cel ls, sector pol ic ing, the detai ls of sector pol ic ing. So we’re deal ing with correct ing the content of the report . I t ’s important to understand … And that ’s k ind of a b ig chal lenge, i f I may, Commissioner, come to th is issue. The inspect ion report is our report in the pol ice. I f ind i t – i f I may comment on – may I comment. Somehow I 'm f inding it st range, I have sat here for the last few days; i t looks l ike our report is being used to hammer us about our internal mechanisms, about stuf f that we set up, about our own th ings. Part of what we do, that inspect ion report is meant as a . . . ( indist inct) and they ident if ied problems against what was said. We go on and we operat ional ize the content of that in my l ine funct ion and go and work with the re levant stat ions. Now in th is case there are 31 stat ions. I f we take – and we worked with them on the detai l . I t ’s not meant as a hammering rod to knock them but i t ’s meant as a development tool to progress f ro m there. And that for me is the issue. And every – I have been l istening for the last few days about . . . ( intervent ion). MR PIKOLI: Sorry, General . MAJ GEN JACOBS: Sorry. MR PIKOLI: The funct ion of th is Commission is not to hammer anybody. We

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are t rying to f ind solut ions to the problems. I th ink i t ’s an unfortunate choice of words. And then just to take i t forward. Were you surpr ised by the problems ident if ied in the Shabalala report? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes and no. To the extent of some of the areas that I have commented on, sector pol ic ing, their f indings, I was surpr ised at why they came, because there 's no pol icy document that says that . On some of the complaints was worrying, some of the complaints we didn’ t dealt wi th – that we didn’ t deal with. And surpr ised on some of the areas that we – that was patent and clear that required us to fo l low up on. And I thought that the issue. So on al l the areas there 's a yes and no. Some areas where we could see … And also when I gave the process of the journey I knew where we came f rom. And so that there 's for me a systemic progression in the way we’re improving. But – and then there 's periods when we just – when we make – we act badly, we do not do our work wel l . And those areas were ident if ied and th at ’s why the inspect ion report … So can I f i rst ly say that I wi thdraw the words on hammering; I agree i t ’s not appropriate. But the point I am making is, these are our instruments that we developed for ourselves. And I was kind of l is tening, and if I ma y comment, i f we did not do these inspect ion reports, k ind of I wonder what other evidence would be … These are our own th ings about ourselves that we do and that we work on and correct and ident ify. So when there is no record of supposedly we didn’ t giv e i t to th is person, i t is my responsib i l i ty to work with them. We have got in the 31, of which two of the stat ions are there, and we’ve got specif ic p i l lars ident if ied, e ight of them, in which we worked with them on speci f ic and ident ify the … And there 's p lans, operat ional p lans, in the 2013 f inancia l year where they were working on those th ings, on the speci f ic content of i t and i t had to be dealt wi th. So the inspect ion reports are th ings for us that guides, that te l ls us where … On top of i t we do, as I indicated – i t was asked by counsel what are our management instruments. We have standby vis i ts, we have operat ional vis i ts , we put that into the standby report and i t works as part of the cycle. So yes, the report is there and the report is qui te a heavy report but i t ’s not … I want to say that i t is our report about ourselves and that we are constant ly working on that . Al l the other inspect ion reports, i t ’s about us. I f there was a report , Commissioner, as you indicated, s ix months later, the members I ’m sure would have to ld you, the of f icers, they feel somet imes they are being inspected to death. Because they come – Khayel i tsha people say they want to work here but they just don’t want to be a pr ior i ty stat ion anymore because every week we are here. They don’t a lways somet imes get t ime just to breathe because we’re here, we’re here monitoring and they say hey, no. When two of the stat ions went of f the 23 stat ions, Project 23, they said the only re l ief they have is the fact that they don’t hav e to see us every week. And that ’s k ind of the … But th is is the management instruments that we have, of which the Commission – the inspectorate report is that instrument, one of those – but i t ’s not the only instrument. And I would want to say th is, Commissioner, i t is being made out to be – because there 's no – every – th is, we didn’ t respond to that and that thing; we are therefore ignoring our own. We’re not . We as – I myself , even as the

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deputy, went to the stat ions, met with them, went to fo l low up on some … I went myself to the Free Gender workshop that they had when they addressed some of these issues. We went there, General Jephta and I , to go and l isten to the issues that they were ra is ing about how we’re deal ing with i t . In fact, I worked – when TAC – when I was here in Khayel i tsha with TAC on some of the murder cases that came up and we worked in a very tough, dif f icul t , but a vibrant re lat ionship in order to get i t . So i t ’s in our interest to deal with some of these issues. We wouldn’ t be ignoring them; why would we? Because i t ’s our own report about ourselves. MR HATHORN: General , i f I can respond to that. I th ink that your inspectorate needs to be commended because very of ten they do an excel lent job in ident ifying the key weaknesses, as i t appears to me as a layperson, in the funct ioning of the stat ions. But the problem with the inspect ion reports is that the weaknesses in the three stat ions that we’re deal ing with, the same problems seem to crop up year af ter year, report af ter report . And what I would l ike to put to you as the real issue is the fa i lure to address the weaknesses that are consistent ly and repeatedly ident if ied in those inspect ion reports. I t ’s a matter of implementat ion, addressing the problem rather than ident ify ing i t . Ident ifying is general ly wel l done, the addressing the weaknesses doesn’t seem to happen; or i f i t does happen i t ’s not that ef fect ive. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I wouldn’ t necessari ly agree with that , because that ’s why we do regular inspect ions. L ike I said, we set up dif ferent th ings. Now as I indicated about the agenda that we have and our minutes as you would ref lect; the standard agenda, I th ink I even have one here hopeful ly, I wi l l see now i f I can – in these documents i f I have one here to i l lust rate the kind of … And i t ’s covers exact ly the content of what is generally coming out of the inspect ion reports. And therefore you wi l l see – I a lso heard the Commissioners asking about why does th is matter keep on coming up on the minutes. I t ’s because we placed i t there as a standard i tem so that we can always address those issues. And the inspect ion report , even if we look at the format, there 's a standard generic format. And yes, issues come up, and if i t ’s the same people and we pick that up … In the domest ic vio lence work, for example, we would be able to c lear ly say, and we’ve got spreadsheets to that ef fect, to show the work we have done on that . In fact, in th is province we are – at some point Parl iament ra ised i t ; you would recal l about two years ago Parl iament ra ised the issue that the Western Cape has got the highest defaul ters in the pol ice on the Domest ic Vio lence Act. I t is because we charge our people, we discip l inary act – we act against them discip l inary. So that consequent ly i t ’s captured on the system; so ours are higher. And i t comes because of th is th ing. We have a dedicated team of people working on domest ic vio lence. So they go in and they do correct ion and they do fo l low up on those th ings, and that is there. So I wouldn’ t agree i t ’s a constant … Yes, we – and I must say, we – i t ’s a work in progress, there 's cont inuous … But I know f rom where we come; we have gone a long way. We’re not there yet in terms of get t ing – as to be … Because Khayel i tsha is not Constantia; Khayel i tsha doesn’t have a Prince Drive where we can f ind – we have to – our energy is spent on f inding

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addresses, f inding funny roads, f inding, you know, names that we can't – that is not there, f inding the green container that we must respond to. And that ’s k ind of the key and cr i t ical issue I wanted to convey. Let me say th is in no uncerta in terms. No, I don’t agree with the not ion that we are – i t ’s just a constant, there 's never improvement. There has been improvement, as I have out l ined, and i t ’s co nt inuously improving. But we are not completely out of the woods yet and that ’s what we would accept. We’re working on that and that ’s why we have the inspect ion capacity, that ’s why our inspect ions is in p lace, that ’s why we have the team that is there working on these th ings, that ’s why we have th is d if ferent layers. MR HATHORN: General , I th ink we must agree to d isagree on that . But I need to move forward, and I want to ask you about the September 2013 reports. Now there were – i t was a cluster – i t was a Project 6 inspect ion, as I understand i t , and the reports that we have been given for the inspect ions of the three stat ions are qui te s imi lar in many respects. And the f i rst paragraph of a l l reports says,

“ In pursuance of the provincia l inspectorate annual p lan and standing order G6, an inspect ion assessment was conducted at the above stat ions …”

That ’s the six stat ions, “… on the instruct ion of the DPC operat ional of f icer, Western Cape.”

Are you famil iar with these – I assume that you're famil iar with these inspect ions that were . . . ( intervent ion)? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I just had to get a document. Can you just repeat yoursel f? Sorry. MR HATHORN: Are you famil iar with the inspect ions that were conducted at the three stat ions in September 2013 as par t of Project 6? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I am, yes. MR HATHORN: What t r iggered these inspect ions? What – where did they come f rom? What – who took the decis ion and what was the reason for the decis ion? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink there 's essent ia l ly two. There 's a standard cycle to i t , one. But there 's a lso the fact that we then began to – I ’d say so a few months before that looked at , you know, the introduct ion of Project 6. And part of that , when you do that you stand . . . ( indist inct) of ident i fying even more stat ions to – part icular stat ions to focus on more intensely. And what was di f ferent f rom th is one is that i t dealt wi th the whole comprehensive … Normal ly l ike in 31, i t dealt wi th the operat ional parts, stat ions and the operat ional arms of that. Here a l l the funct ions, the support funct ions, the detect ives, the operat ional funct ions were … So that inspect ion report was also meant to look at those kind of – the hol ist ic p icture. And consequent ly we compi led f rom there a review of where we are, you know , of those stat ions, what we’ve done and those th ings and the in tervent ions, d if ferent intervent ions we have done. MR HATHORN: Because i t seemed to be a very intensive intervent ion, as I understood i t . There were inspect ions in September, then in at leas t two of the stat ions again fo l low up inspect ions in October to check whether there had been any improvement in the posi t ion, and then a further fo l low up again in January. So i t was far more intensive than the run of the mi l l annual inspect ions to my mind. Would you agree with that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja, I would agree with that . MR HATHORN: And can I come back to the quest ion that I asked you as to who

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took the decis ion to have th is Project 6 inspect ion? Where did that decis ion come f rom? MAJ GEN JACOBS: That was again f rom the senior management, senior management led by the provincia l commissioner, so the deput ies and the provincia l commissioner. MR HATHORN: So where would th is – th is decis ion would have been taken by the provincia l commissioner and i n what forum? In a meet ing with the . . . ( intervent ion)? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I t was – we announced i t in the operat ional meet ing on a Monday; I don’t know the date. But as indicated, i t was resolved. Now there was – I th ink that was my answer to the quest ion . MR HATHORN: And how were the six stat ions identi f ied? Were they poorly performing stat ions or what was the reason for choosing those six stat ions? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink of the – i f we look at the – on the issues of both issues of cr ime, percentage contr ibut ion to cr ime, one. On the other hand, the f indings of the report , and the fact , you know, the f inding of the Shabalala report on those issues. There are other factors that we picked up in our standard operat ion. We then decided now Khayel i tsha a s Khayel i tsha on – amongst other th ings because the issue has been ra ided the way i t d id. Nyanga is in fact for us, i f I may say, for us i t ’s the biggest – b igger problem. We have in our 31 stat ions – in Project 23, for example, we had Nyanga plus one se ctor, Browns Farm. Browns Farm contr ibutes, i t ’s an open meet ing but i t contr ibutes a lot of murders. Think of a number, add more; i t ’s that … So for us i t was a part icular area. So Nyanga is a part icular set of – I mean, a part icular area with Gugulethu and Phi l ippi East . They might be – l ike Khayel i tsha they might be separate but they're actual ly a c lose l inked area with Khayel i tsha. And that ’s why we chose Khayel i tsha because of i t ’s very – the nature of the area and the fact that we have to deal w i th some of the issues that was ra ised and Nyanga. So that ’s where the six stat ions come f rom. MR HATHORN: So I 'm just not c lear in my mind. Was i t part of the annual cycle of provincia l inspect ions that i t was decided to do th is or was i t because of these part icular s ix poor performing stat ions? MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, because of th is – remember we had an annual cycle, one; but secondly, a lso because when we decided to go forces on the six stat ions part of that focus is you do an – part of that instrument, you do an inspect ion to see where you are, what do you have, what must you work on and al l of those th ings, and to see if the stuf f that was dealt wi th then, you know, we can actual ly – there 's improvement. And then each of the – on that – based on the f inding, one, and two, a lso on the dif ferent own l ine funct ions you work on a programme. And kind of that ’s the programme that we … These are, for example, some of our – the intervent ions we have on those th ings. MR HATHORN: When would th is decis ion have been taken, General? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Where would i t have been taken? MR HATHORN: When? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I can' t exact ly recal l , but I th ink i t was in about, i f I 'm not mistaken, about May last year, i f I 'm not mistaken. But I … MR HATHORN: And again the same quest ion as earl ier; would there be minutes

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avai lable of the decis ion? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Not with the – the minutes would be avai lable of the – where i t was announced at the operat ional meet ing on a Monday. That would be avai lable. As I indicated to you, senior managers we come together, we agree, we see these are the – as we’re monitor ing matters we resolve we should focus on th is more, these six stat ions. Then i t comes to the meet ing and i t ’s announced there. That ’s the way we do i t . MR HATHORN: Because i t ’s apparent f rom the reports themselves that i t ’s c lear that with regard to the three Khayel i tsha stat ions there is a strong awareness of the pending commission of inquiry. For example, in paragraph 3.3 of the Harare September 2013 report i t says,

“Notwithstanding the fact that the stat ion is aware of a commission of inquiry pending, they st i l l fa i l to keep proper records of their day -to-day funct ions.”

So i t seems to me that a possib le inference of th is is that th is intensive inspect ion of the three Khayel i tsha stat ions and the three other stat ions ident if ied was done for a purpose of t rying to c lean up your act before the commission of inquiry starts hearing i ts evidence and present a more defensib le posi t ion with regard to the act ivi t ies of the three stat ions. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I t would – i f I may, Commissioner, i f we see th is as an adversaria l process then i t would be seen l ike that . But i f we see th is as a part of the development of a proper process then i t wouldn’ t be seen as that . We must take the commission of inquiry ser iously. We cannot not take i t ser iously. So if i t ’s adversaria l , then i t ’s to c lean up their act, then they look nice, that ’s not what we’re about. This is a ser ious matter. And I th ink i t was ra ised, the fact tha t i t was – went to a l l levels of court , the court has made a decis ion. We must appropriate ly respond; we can' t very wel l not have responded. So i t ’s not a bad th ing that we did, in my – I would submit. MR HATHORN: No, I would agree with that. And if I had been in the provincia l management I th ink we would have probably done the same th ing. I t ’s an understandable response. But I th ink one needs to be stra ight forward about i t . I f i t was part of the process that was prompted by the commission of inquiry then there 's no need to conceal that. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Agreed. MR HATHORN: Now there were several important f indings that were made in these reports. And I see that I 'm using up my t ime quite rapid ly, so I 'm going to just deal with these very br ief ly. But in a l l three stat ions in September 2013 i t was stated that,

“ I t ’s important that the provincia l management take ser ious act ion against the repeated non-compl iance with regard to fa i l ing to comply with instruct ions in respect of dockets.”

MAJ GEN JACOBS: And that is the detect ive funct ion, as I th ink that was dealt wi th yesterday. I can speak for my l ine funct ion. MR HATHORN: I am af ra id I ran out of t ime with regard to General Molo yesterday af ternoon. So you might be feel ing the side ef fects of that . COMMISSIONER: Let me just put my worr ies to you about detect ives. I know that i t may not be your l ine funct ion at the minute but I know you’ve had experience in th is area. And what we see is detect ives carrying an extraordinari ly heavy load, 150, 180, 200 dockets, not of shopl i f t ing or thef t of a cel lphone on a t rain, but of murder, rape, assault gbh, aggravated robbery; you

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know, very, very ser ious cr imes. And i t real ly re lates direct ly to the point that Advocate Hathorn has put to you, which is the fa i lure to d iscip l ine detect ives for not observing brought -forward dates, for not get t ing dockets to court and so on. And what at least one branch commander said is, I don’t want to d iscip l ine my good member who is working extremely hard on 20 or 30 d ockets and has done real ly wel l on that and surely has overlooked 120 dockets in which he or she should have deal with brought -forward dates or whatever. I t would just be unfair , I just feel i t ’s unfair , because the burden is so heavy on th is member that they couldn’ t possib ly do al l 150 and comply with a l l the necessary prescr ipts. I t ’s a sort of – what 's actual ly happening is some sort of informal system of t r iage, some sort of informal saying I 'm going to work on these 20 or 30, I cannot possib ly do 150, and maybe working extremely wel l on that 20 or 30. Now the reason I am putt ing i t to you in your capacity as a provincia l leader of SAPS is, that seems to me to be a very legi t imate response of the branch commander. I t does seem unfair to load a detec t ive with so much work that no person could possib ly do i t . The detect ive does some very good work, messes up on some th ings, and then you say I 'm just not going to d iscip l ine that detect ive; because although technical ly in terms of every SAPS rule I ough t to, i t would be unreasonable of me to t reat that detect ive that way. And I just wonder what your comment is on that? You must have seen th is. I bet i t happens in Nyanga as wel l? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Can I . . . ( intervent ion)? COMMISSIONER: And do we need a system of t r iage? Do we need to say you’ve got 150 dockets, i t ’s tough for the community but we’re going to say – we’re going to p ick out 20 or 30 and you're going to work on those, and when and if we get more resources we might work on some more? But i t seems that we’re put t ing people in a vice and i t ’s a very d i f f icul t p lace to be. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I t ’s a complex quest ion in terms of what … I may not respond on the last point; I don’t know how to respond to the issue of whether we do or not a l locate and how people al locate their desk. 150 dockets is a lot . That ’s what I th ink we wi l l have to – we have to accept that , i t ’s a lot . I t requires – i t ’s a – i f i t ’s 10 murders he would struggle. So I th ink that ’s the issue. But I worry, i t ’s the same mat ter of the informer issue and the same matter with th is th ing of d iscip l ine. There is the quest ion of formal registers and whether you have contact people who gives you informat ion and your sources of – the same here; how you engage in d iscip l ine, how you engage. And so you wi l l f ind that i t wi l l be, in the major i ty of i t , d if f icul t to prove registers of a person being discip l ined. I know today, th is morning when I went to my of f ice at quarter past s ix I d iscip l ined a member there, you know, for coming t here, being at a p lace with the broken jeans, for example. I t ’s not in terms of our c loth – our conduct, clothes, . . . ( indist inct) go home. But that would be in no register anywhere. I t ’s about managing people, constant ly managing them, working with them , taking them through a process of correct ing behaviour. And then now – then you go to the issue of on certa in matters you go into warnings, verbal, and al l that . And even in the verbal, i t ’s not recorded anywhere. I t ’s in h is d iary and your d iary, and in six months i t ’s out of the

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process; so i t wi l l never be … And that ’s k ind of the system as wel l . COMMISSIONER: That ’s exact ly – you could be the branch commander who said exact ly the same th ing. And personal ly I don’t have a di f f icul ty with that ; I th ink that makes a lot of sense. Human being management is much more about a re lat ionship than what you wr i te down on paper. But the dif ferent problem is the one I am putt ing to you, which is that your ent i re system of d iscip l ine fa l ls apart i f the burden that you are placing on individual pol ice of f icers is such that they cannot do their job properly. Then th is becomes a whole problem of why do we have discip l ine at a l l and then i t ’s select ive discip l ine. And I th ink that ’s what we are seeing with stat i on commanders not want ing to d iscip l ine people because they th ink in some fundamental way i t ’s unfair . Then you have a bad member who doesn’t do anything at a l l and you do discip l ine them. I t actual ly undermines your management tools and the process of human resource management when you overburden people so you couldn’ t expect them to do their job properly. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Like I say, Commissioner, i t ’s in the area of detect ives. I th ink was kind of extensively dealt wi th. I th ink just I th ink on a mat ter of – as General Molo indicated, the docket goes to court. I f the docket is not archived i t comes back. I t must – i t ’s archived on the name of the member. Now there 's a design problem here, i f I . . . ( indist inct) . I f we register 100 dockets th is weekend, 50 goes to court , the court – there 's a lot of court of f ic ia ls here, people who act in courts, whether they're prosecutors, judges or they are advocates in court . The court can only – Khayel i tsha has only got 12 courts, no eight – n ine courts, sorry, with the regional court , n ine. As i t appears on Monday morning, the 50 people that must appear, there is another 50 that must come for second appearance. So the prosecutors – I had a prosecutor here who spoke here; I cal led her in to her deputy’s of f ice for the very same reason, to say but you are withdrawing cases for reasons that is f l imsy. I f they're withdrawn we must take the docket. So the docket is archived on our name because i t ’s not c losed, i t can' t go to the storeroom; so i t ’s on the member’s name. So there 's a design problem about – we have bui l t three pol ice stat ions. We are recording cases every month. And substant ively the court in this area have remained the same; they haven’t grown proport ionately, more prosecutors that could take on more cases. I went to –I mustn’t cal l h is name, he keeps on being cal led up, he worked here unfortunately, Advocate Sidaki . We used to go into h is of f ice and say but why, what 's happening with the cases here. Same, he used to come the same, what 's happen ing with the cases on your s ide. I t has to be a l ive process. But i f the cr i ter ia … Because remember, Commissioners, i f I may; success of the prosecutor is determined by dockets on ro l l . So what is your incent ive; i t ’s to get i t of f the ro l l . So your percentage is h igher, your percentage success rate is h igher. So everything, f rom f i rearms here, we don’t vi r tual ly get convict ions on f irearms here because we must f i rst prove i t ’s a f i rearm. Then a bal l is t ic expert must come and conf i rm that ’s an … We only have so many experts. So we get an average, every week we get six to e ight f i rearms. That over t ime … So there 's a problem. So the member si ts with a lot of dockets and the withdrawals or refer back to, withdrawal f rom

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court , is back with h is name unt i l i t ’s resolved and then he has to wait for th is report and he wants that report to come in. So there 's a – I am not so sure i f i t then leads to an issue of d iscip l in ing. I t ’s about how is the system designed. COMMISSIONER: I t is t rue that of the 150 dockets, which I th ink is where you're going, qui te a – there must be some that are court -ready and actual ly in the court process and just going back and forth to court as d ates come, and therefore don’t need a huge amount of work other than gett ing wi tnesses to court . I t doesn’t – or certa in ly nothing that I ’ve seen numerical ly suggests that anything other than by and large these detect ives are carrying a burden that no detect ive , no matter how experienced , how resourced, how ef f ic ient , could deal with. And I worry what that means for human resource management. But the other point you make , which is a lso a point that we have invest igated, is the intersect ion between SAPS measurement tools and DOJ measurement tools or NPA measurement to ols. And what we understood f rom Colonel Vermeulen the other day was that in fact SAPS has changed one of i ts measures of performance to match i t to the NPA measure of performance so that you're looking at – I th ink i t ’s 10% of detect ives are now on f inal ised cases; exact ly the same measure in DOJ. But i t doesn’t remove what you're saying which of course probably happens in every legal system where , you know, the prosecutors don’t want to take on dockets that aren’ t ready for prosecut ion and pol ice want to to get them off their desks and in to the court i f possib le. That goes with the turf , I think. MAJ GEN JACOBS: And i t ’s about that cr i ter ia for when i t ’s ready . There wi l l be where i t gets . . .( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: Yes. MAJ GEN JACOBS: We even had to introduce a detect ive court coordinator to c lean, even before. And then f rom there we have to now … So we had to – I mean, I had .. . ( indist inct) them before , are you a contro l prosecutor , because you're doing – you now take everyth ing of f the ro le. So and I ’m saying is the problem … So you wi l l – where does the docket u l t imately … W e produce the docket , we send i t . I f they don’t want i t we have to take i t back and that ’s the nature of where the chal lenge is. And we wi l l a lways si t wi th that backlog . So I would agree with the idea that we’ve got heavy caseloads . But I think i t ’s got to be located somewhere in the way the whole system is designed along the l ine. COMMISSIONER: Okay. MAJ GEN JACOBS: And even in the magistrates and the judge, they are too few for the number of cases we are able to br ing through so that you – invariably you don’t get a case l ike Pretor ius (s ic) that comes on the court ro le so fast . Typical ly a murder case wi l l take you longer than a year to get i t real ly running i f you have … So that ’s k ind of the problem . So you take long for th ings to get through the system. Thanks. MR HATHORN: General , you have worked in the past with the TAC, you're now working with the Socia l Just ice Coal i t ion . You're obviously int imately famil iar with Khayel i tsha and the bui l t environment in Khayel i tsha. I ’d l ike to ask you a two -pronged quest ion. First ly , how does th is environment af fect cr ime in Khayel i tsha, and secondly, what measures would

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you recommend being taken to address the def ic iencies in the bui l t environment? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink there’s – i t ’s substant ively an un-bui l t environment ; I th ink that is part of the biggest chal lenge that we have . And i t ’s – for us the socia l fabr ic cr ime, rape of women, a s izable percentage , even the murder of Lorna Mlofana was in the publ ic to i let , was in the to i let, that – where she had to go f rom the place of where she was to th is p lace and then she was murdered there. The same issues; what we’re saying is , people have to go out of their homes, out to use the to i let . Where there’s a bui l t to i let , f lush, assuming i t ’s a f lush, that … But i f i t ’s not there they have to go out into a f ie ld to do that , or with these new potty-pot ty (s ic) system, a lso st i l l go out. So immediately in an informal set t lement where there’s no l ights , where there’s no nothing , th is does – th is creates a few problems. First ly, now vict ims are 2 o’clock at night in – even in Constant ia , a person who walks around in Prince Drive , in that beaut ifu l st reet , that b ig one with the l ights there, i f you walk around 2 o’clock at n ight you probably could have some stranger accost you. I f you come there to B – to RR Sect ion or to Taiwan, you get out there 2 o’clock in the morning in that dark area, you’re going to have problems , and that is how cr ime is l inked to the … Now that ’s a b ig one . The person – now you’re s i t t ing in the shack , i t ’s cold, they have a f i re there so you open the door , now the wind comes in , people start to argue . Our b iggest cr ime, our b iggest socia l contact cr ime , socia l fabr ic , is in winter when people – when you think that people would be indoors. But because of their environment is so – people are congested in the shacks, in the area, we f ind that people are – there 's f ights between int imate partners, f ights between people , neighbours, because you don’t want to go too far so you use the to i let here and then that becomes . . So the kind of cr ime that you get is l inked to the bui l t environment. Then they put up – they say that there 's cameras that they’re ta lk ing about . But they’ve al lowed – in Si te B there’s a camera f rom our pol ice stat ion that looks at the mal l . But because law enforcement is not enforcing the law here, there 's two, three containers in f ront of our – opposite our pol ice stat ion that immediately b locks … So al l we see f rom the camera now is that . But – because there’s no law enforcement capacity that deals with those issues. A camera comes with a package, there must be l ights, one ; two, there must be – i t must have a clear l ine of s ight and i t must record . I f one of those elements are gone in that package the camera system doesn’t work and t hat ’s why you have that problem, that you have – even i f they say they’ve put in – that problem. Secondly, house numbers . I don’t know i f you’ve walked in the area . The people of the area has got a way – I saw, Commissioner , the DOCS representat ive who spoke about names for the area . I was intr igued by the l is t of names that he have ; I have got a completely d if ferent l is t of names for the same area. So I don’t know how that works . And people wi l l te l l you … I know in Si te C, I speak about i t a lot because i t ’s out there, there’s a green container where we meet the vict im of any complaint , then we walk in with them. We won’t f ind the place if we don’t meet them at the green container , the one if you come of f Mew Way and you go to the r ight , that green container.

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You meet them there , f rom wherever where they come, then you – especia l ly on Taiwan, DT, Taiwan, the sect ion around, you meet them there and then you walk in with them, otherwise you won’t f ind the i r house. And that ’s the nature… So the envi ronment is l ike that . Then, I mean, you get the informal spaza shops. People are al lowed to have – I was just looking at Green Point ; there’s two – there 's a word – can I say th is , Commissioner. There’s two Green Points in Cape Town; the Green Point where the stadium is and the Green Point here, and they're not the same th ing. They share the name, they're unfortunate in that they share the same name but that ’s i t . In Green Point – why I ment ion th is example ; in Green Point there was a – one of these big branded compan ies wanted to open a shop there . There was a big uproar f rom the ci ty , f rom the of f ic ia ls , that p lace couldn’ t be – i t would have brought lots of investment there ; couldn’ t because they didn’ t meet th is requirement, that requirement . I can go to Green Point now and open a spaza shop there without there being regulat ion , without there being anything , even i f there’s … So now you open – somebody opens a shisa nyama p lace here, somebody opens one next to h im over the same market ; you get f ights. They’re both unregulated , they’re f ight ing over the … So there’s no contro l and regulat ion over the opening of spaza shops, the opening of informal businesses. So they mushroom and they do … So that we have – you wi l l see how cr ime – Commissioner, I th ink you opened the cr ime earl ier . Our robberies for the last four years went l ike th is, and i t coincides with the prol i ferat ion of spaza shops, the opening of spaza shops. Because you’re s i t t ing on average – a spaza shop on average has got R2 500 to R3 000 in the spaza shop at any given t ime, with property – not property but goods, commodit ies of another 3 000 to 4 000. So if you’re a street robber and you could get k i l led by a community that responds to you, you go to the spaza shop where people are l iving in the spaza shop and they are there . So what happens, they kick open the door of the spaza shop at n ight or when i t operates . Some of these spaza shops, you knock on the door , i t opens; the same with the shebeens environment. You have – and I can say th is , Commissioner ; we have the new Western Cape Liquor Act that was introduced in Apri l 2012 now makes the threshold for us to prove a shebeen. There’s a number of factors , but to prove the person is a shebeen 150 l i t res, which is 14.4 cases essent ia l ly , i f you look at i t there’s about 150; so i t ’s about th is h igh. So if I go to a house – even Makro, i ts computer programme is now working on 14.6 . So i f you buy l iquor and i ts 14. – more than 14.6 they stop you, you must br ing your l iquor l icense. So now our abi l i ty to pro ve a shebeen, is running a shebeen, no matter what happens there’s three , four factors the persecutor looks at , but he had less than 150 l i t res. I ’m not going to argue in court over something l ike th is . So our abi l i ty to deal – our deal ing cases have dropped l ike th is, so the prol i ferat ion of shebeens … So al l the person buys, he buys 100 cases , he shares, he puts i t at f ive d i f ferent p laces, so he has at any given t ime – even if you f ind people dr inking there, you f ind money there , you can’t because the L iquor Act … We presented i t to the cabinet ; they have real ised i t was an oversight . But i t led to – i t ’s st i l l busy with the review. I t led to an escalat ion of that cr ime.

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COMMISSIONER: What was the minimum quant i ty before? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I t was – there was . . . ( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: I t ’s a presumpt ion, is i t? . . . (Talk ing simultaneously) presumpt ion? MAJ GEN JACOBS: A presumpt ion. COMMISSIONER: And what – you can' t – i t was any amount , was i t? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Any amount. You just had to prove – you had to show the person had a place where money was col lected, you had to show there was signs of th ings being sold, and the place was – you could see the place was – people were gathering and you had evidence of more than one t ime people gather ing. So those th ings together could – the old 167 . . . ( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: Establ ish an i l legal shebeen, ja. MAJ GEN JACOBS: The old 167 of the L iquor Act was then changed to set a specif ic cr i ter ia for 150 l i t res . So the whole environment is designed to make i t – or un-designed to make i t d if f icul t , extremely d i f f icul t , for us to do our work , to do our work. So now we are expected to – they say there 's – people are drunk everywhere, they are drunk . But you have the chal lenge is , they come f rom th is p lace that we know is a shebeen; so now you pick up drunk people . In terms of a court case pointed out in Northern Cape , the h igh court pointed out that you can’t just arrest a person because he’s drunk , he must be seen to be drunk and unruly. So now we can’t – so now we know we must go for the shebeen, but we can’t prove a shebeen because of the 150 l i t res. So a number of – so we’ve taken away our Bambanani projects , we’ve put in str ingent measures to prove shebeens and we can’t arrest drunken people. So the whole socia l fabr ic phenomena of cr ime becomes very d i f f icul t . But we are pol ic ing st i l l . We f ind ways around i t , we f ind – we have seized 42 000 l i t res a lready here in Khayel i tsha for the last two years . But we know i t ’s going to go back because the prosecutor wi l l refuse to prosecute, then we must give i t back. Fortunately af ter s ix months we – i f i t ’s beer i t can’ t be used , so they can’t have i t . But other than that , we must give i t back. So we seized – we ’ve got a whole store of 350 000 l i t res of l iquor , our evidence store. I f the Commission want to vis i t that , you wi l l a lso be than welcome; 350, where al l our l iquor is. But a s izable percentage under the new Act we have to give back . So that ’s k ind of the . . . ( interve nt ion). COMMISSIONER: Does that answer your quest ion , Mr Hathorn, at the r isk of …(laughter). MR HATHORN: Commissioner , i f I may be permitted one more quest ion? COMMISSIONER: One more, yes. Perhaps we could ask the General to have one more br ief answer. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I wi l l , I wi l l . MR HATHORN: General , I had been hoping to d iscuss the issues around vigi lant ism in Khayel i tsha with you in some detai l , but I ’ l l t ry and sum i t up in one quest ion . And that is that we’ve been surpr ised , the stat ion commanders have come and test i f ied about vigi lant ism and there have been two th ings that have been surpr is ing to us . And that is , f i rst ly , their lack of c lear understanding of the causes of the vigi lante vio lence in Khayel i tsha. There seems to be shortcoming of inte l l igence in that regard . And secondly, the absence of a broad overal l st rategy for deal ing with i t . I t seems to be done on an ad hoc basis, stat ion by stat ion ; one

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stat ion commander wi l l adopt certain measures and i t might be dif ferent in another stat ion. And i t seems to us that i t ’s an appropriate issue , i t ’s a suf f ic ient ly important issue, for there to be a broad general strategy formulated at provincia l level and appl ied coherent ly at a l l the stat ions where vig i lant ism is a problem. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Thank you. I t ’s again a d if f icul t th ing , because that . . . ( indist inct) , in our law i t ’s not necessari ly def ined, there’s murder , so that ’s kind of … So we only know i t af ter we have done a ful l invest igat ion . You can get a person that … There 's l ike typical s igns of a cr ime scene , where people say i ts Bundu Court or vigi lant ism. And the Bundu Court in i tself , the concept Bundu Court , suggests there was a hearing , people sat … So that ’s l ike not spontaneous , i t would be – so that would be a big chal lenge if that i s the case; that ’s where in te l l igence would come in. MAJ GEN JACOBS: But general ly the overt major i ty of the places that is here on Khayel i tsha . . . ( indist inct) 68, i f I have – i f my recol lect ion is correct , were al l d irect in react ion to an incident . A robbery, a robber makes a mistake , he fa l ls or he’s a lone and the vict im of the robbery is –can be able to respond, and that ’s k ind of been … So i t ’s been a part icular d if f icul ty. For us the core response , I don’t th ink we need a strategy, is to get our community in mobil isat ions and community structures , back at the level at which we had them. Because then those people of the community there in the sector, the street committees , would be able to absorb and be part of th is progressive structure system. They absorb – arrest the person but br ing us in . But because, as I indicated earl ier , we have demobi l ised the community structures to the extent that the networks we had in the streets, where there was Bambananis, are not there anymore, they’ve been completely demobi l ised. People are reacting now in their part icular ways to what they see . So the strategy for me is not to deal with th is cr ime , i t ’s to look at how we can rebui ld community structures in d if ferent ways . I f i t doesn’t come via the issue of re … And we’re working wi th the CPF now to f ind ways in which to get structures back. I work now with Socia l Just ice Coal i t ion; l ike on th is one scene , about a year ago, there was a robbery but the robber got shot by the shop owner . We got cal led by Socia l Just ice people , I came out , I dealt wi th one group of people , they dealt wi th the other group and we were able to quickly deal with that issue. But that speaks to how structures must work together , that i f there wasn’t a cal l they could make or i f there wasn’t – they knew they're part of th is process, then the cal l wouldn’ t have been made. And that ’s what we’re saying ; i f we bui ld through the Department of Community Safety, the dif ferent government departments and ourselves, bui ld the organisat ions in the community and the NGOs become part of that bui ld , then there wouldn’ t be a need … Then i f there’s individuals who respond to that the community wi l l be able to demobi l ise them, l ike happened on that n ight , on that Saturday night, when Welcome, I don’t know i f he’s here, was able to help us to quickly – in fact he was – we helped him, in that he was a mobi l iser and quickly be able to assist and we could quickly sort out the responsib i l i t ies . Whilst the uniformed pol ice and detect ives were deal ing with the cr ime

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scenes, the two cr ime scenes , we could deal with those issues . And that for me is the key to k ind of how the partnerships must work. The vibrant CPF that is supported with funding, with structures on the ground, with NGOs, CBOs and other organisat ions working, then that ’s how in my view you deal with vigi lant ism. Because even the robber knows in that area everybody is organised there, he wi l l be caught, you know, then even a robbery won’t even happen before the incident happens. That ’s my – I hope that was short enough, Commissioner. MR HATHORN: Thank you, Commissioners. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATHORN COMMISSIONER: Mr Osborne. Mr Osborne, what I think we’ l l do is we’ l l take – i f you can go unt i l you're f in ished and then we’ l l take the lunch adjournment and then we’ l l le t Ms Bawa put quest ions. So we had al located you, I th ink, half an hour; so i f you could do i t and then we’ l l take the lunch adjournment? CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR OSBORNE: Thank you, Madam Commissioner . Major General , good af ternoon to you. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Af ternoon. MR OSBORNE: One of the themes that ’s run throughout your test imony has been the consequences of the, I th ink you cal l i t the demobi l isat ion of Bambanani; you say that Bambanani was very act ive in 2005, I th ink you used the word vibrant. I t provided large torches , I th ink you said , for ef fect ively neighbourhood watches and , for example , there were beach patro ls. Do I recol lect your test imony earl ier th is morning correct ly? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes. But i f I may just add that i t wasn’t so much about the – i t was about creat ing the f ramework for – through a funding system to enable the CPF to work ef fect ively and support ing the development of the neighbourhood watches dr iven by tha t . MR OSBORNE: Now I th ink what you have said e i ther d irect ly or you have impl ied is that in some measure the scourge of vigi lant ism may have been a result of what you cal l the demobi l isat ion with the withdrawal of Bambanani. Is that correct? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Sorry, I ’ve been – sorry, repeat that . MR OSBORNE: I thought I heard you say that the scourge of vigi lant ism may in some sense have been att r ibutable to the withdrawal or the demobi l isat ion of Bambanani. Is that correct? MAJ GEN JACOBS: No. Wha t I ’m saying is that in the absence of vibrant community structures and community capacity there, there would – the space for that to develop. So if you have demobi l ised community structures that was l inked to the CPF, you had to – i t can be at least a contr ibutor , that there was an absence of strong structures on the ground that can bui ld – which in that t ime … And not just because with the funding ; because DOCS played a ro le that is far more broadened and bigger . . .( indist inct) and they played their ro le in imbizos , massive number of imbizos and got people part of i t , and they were wearing T-shir ts . . .( intervent ion). MR OSBORNE: Major General , we’re going to get into that subject matter in a moment . Can I say th is to you ; we’ve seen a number of reports coming out f rom SAPS over the recent years . Could you point me perhaps to anywhere or any SAPS report that has noted , perhaps with appropriate a larm , the consequences of the withdrawal or the demobi l isat ion of Bambanani? I haven’t seen any such.

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Could you point me to any such? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Commissioner , can I – i f I may. I don’t th ink i t ’s the responsib i l i ty of us . They – what we’re saying is , i t is – i t ’s the DOCS ’ decis ion, DOCS monitor the pol ice . We don’t necessar i ly do that . We have ra ised the issue regular ly in the meet ings , even unt i l when I became the deputy , about the funding for CPFs. There’s been discussions when they had looked at th is other programme they’ve got , the expanded partnership programme , and we’ve had – ra ised a number of issues with that . And that ’s where we’ve ra ised out concerns and the net ef fect of that . MR OSBORNE: Again we’ l l get back to that , Major General . So your test imony is that you’re not aware of anywhere that DOCS has , in i ts many, many reports, expressed alarm or d isapproval about the rather ser ious consequences of Bambanani withdrawal? I haven’t seen that anywhere. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Okay, I hear you. Al l I can – I can indicate to you we’ve ra ised that concerns a number of t imes ; that ’s what I have . . . ( ta lk ing simultaneously) . MR OSBORNE: Only oral ly? Oral ly only? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes. So the – I don’t know what . . .( indist inct) . Thank you. MR OSBORNE: Now to go to the reasons for the ending of the Bambanani programme. As you may wel l know, Doctor Lawrence test i f ied earl ier in the course of th is Commission and he test i f ied as to the nature of the Bambanani programme and the reason for i ts withdrawal. And he test i f ied , i f I may te l l you , I don’t th ink you were present, I th ink he said – wel l I can te l l you that he said , and th is is at t ranscr ipt 1 638, that two audits were conducted of the Bambanani programme and th is is in 2009 / 2010 and they revealed a signi f icant amount of corrupt ion , in part icular double -dipping, in the st ipends. And that real ly the Bambanani programme had become more of a job creat ion programme than an ef fect ive part of community cr ime prevent ion. Are you – wel l could I ask you to comment on that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Can I – I th ink I wi l l comment . I th ink i t is an important f inding that is made. But my chal lenge wi l l st i l l be, the essence of what that – whether you cal l i t by any other name , that programme had an outreach, had a reach and a capacity to mobi l ise communit ies. I f there was problems in the way that i t was managed then that must be addressed. But you don’t go and unbundle a structure that was out – that was partnering with us and because they found those issues , and not replace i t for three years, four years with any al ternat ive; one. MR OSBORNE: Yes. MAJ GEN JACOBS: But i t ’s very – i f I may say, Commissioner , i ts – I don’t know i f I can . I t ’s very – Doctor Lawrence at the t ime was the head – was the DG for the province when Bambanani was here, which means he was accountable. He became then the HOD of the Department of Community Safety. So i t would then be under h is watch. I f those th ings were there , i f i t was said , then the correct ive measures should have been taken before that. MR OSBORNE: Well in fact, i f I may interrupted you. In fact he test i f ied that correct ive measures were taken. You speak , I th ink, te l l ing me of the need to cont inue with that outreach by any other name . And in fact Doctor Lawrence test i f ied at some length that in fact Bambanani was cont inued under a d if ferent

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name. First of a l l there was a school safety programme – there is a school safety programme which features a st ipend; the school safety of f icers are t ra ined by DOCS. There are 70 volunteers in 20 high schools. The programme has been funded with an annual budget of 10 mi l l ion . And that there is now accountabi l i ty for the school safety volunteers by vi r tue of the fact that under a memorandum of agreement between the provincia l department of educat io n and DOCS, SGBs are rendered responsib le for regular reports on the doings and the ef f icacy of school safety of f icers. Now that would count perhaps as the kind of correct ive measures that you might th ink appropriate in the l ight of the shortfa l l of Bambanani? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Can I – I mean, that – I ’m entering to – we have a danger of enter ing into your departmental matters for me to comment on . But al l I can say is , the net ef fect for that per iod was – the school safety project programme wi l l be one of those issues, as you indicated, but the net ef fect and i t ’s the impact on the ground here in th is area that we’re now t alking about, is vi r tual ly zero in terms of i ts abi l i ty . Bambanani was more than just a d if ferent – a number of separate programmes; i t was three, four p i l la rs that had mobi l ised the areas, the community structures . . . ( intervent ion). MR OSBORNE: Major General , we’re going to … MAJ GEN JACOBS: … that was not present . MR OSBORNE: I f I may . . . ( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: And I want to test i fy to th is , to say that as a partner that had that capacity before in the f ight against cr ime, that capacity has been absent and i t st i l l is . Now whether i t is being argued that i t ’s in th is form, i t is not ref lected. And the CPF chair yesterday argued the same th ing; in the way they were supposed to be the lead agents of that community outreach . . .( ta lk ing simultaneously). MR OSBORNE: Major General , yet you have – you're able to of fer nothing by way of wri t ing or reports which indicate . . . ( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: I can’ t hear you . MR OSBORNE: I ’m sorry . You’re not able to point to anything in wri t ing f rom SAPS in any of i ts reports which point to the grave consequences of the withdrawal of Bambanani. That has been your test imony. There has also been test imony from Doctor Lawrence that indeed Bambanani was withdrawn f rom the t ra ins and f rom the platforms because the ra i lway pol ice were re instated . Now would you l ike to comment on that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes, correct ly so; the ra i lway poli ce were re instated . But the Bambanani had far more – the ra i lway pol ice , their precinct is the ra i lway stat ion and specif ical ly the t ra in. What the Bambanani people did was specif ical ly, thanks, a lso dealt wi th the whole area, the reach, the area coming to – in to the area. They would be part of the community accompaniment project , were they accompany – one Bambanani person wi l l be walking with a community , groups of people, coming to work – going to work in the morning and in the evening ; that was part of the programme. MR OSBORNE: Can I – you correct ly say, Major General , that Bambanani was more than just schools . Let me tel l you about other th ings or other aspects test i f ied to by Doctor Lawrence. Are you aware of DOCS’ Chrysal is youth

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development programme which is funded to the tune of R15 mi l l ion by DOCS? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I am aware of that programme, yes. MR OSBORNE: Would you be able to comment on the suggest ion that i t ’s useful in i ts own way, much as Bambanani was? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink i t ’s an important programme , Chrysal is. I th ink that in i ts own r ight … But l ike I said , i t is the col lect ive programme that we experience, that we had here . So that ’s an important programme . And I th ink i f I want to comment on i t , i t would appear as i f I am cr i t icis ing that programme. They reach youth across the whole province and the part icular youth , and I th ink that is a very important programme. They’ve got good people there . So I can’t comment and make i t – compare i t in the same way. I t however does not compare to th is . When I say i t does not compare, I am not cr i t ic is ing Chrysal is, I am saying in terms of the net ef fect on the ground ; that is what I ’m ta lk ing about. MR OSBORNE: Can I point you to something else . And of course, DOCS ent ire ly concurs with your v iew that community pol ic ing is absolute ly core. So let me point you to something else that does involve the community , another DOCS programme, which is i t is youth , safety and re l igious programme, where under DOCS cooperates with 18 dif ferent organisat ions in Khayel i tsha to provide for youth t ra in ing for cr ime awareness programmes . Are you aware of that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I ’m not aware of th is programme . But I know you have a – no, I can’ t recal l . A re l igious programme, what? MR OSBORNE: I t features – i t ’s cal led the youth , safety and re l igion programme . . . ( ta lking simultaneously) . MAJ GEN JACOBS: That would be – I must say, that would be strange to me . I am the person responsib le for our pol ic ing outreach . I t ’s the f i rst t ime I hear that part , the re l igious part of the programme, I must say , the f i rst t ime. MR OSBORNE: You might want to look into that , Major General . I don’t th ink i t ’s a – I don’t th ink i t ’s controversia l that i t exists. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Okay. MR OSBORNE: Now are you aware of what approximately the annual budget for the Western Cape SAPS is? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes. I don’t have i t now , but yes. MR OSBORNE: Would you take a stab at i t , so to speak? MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, I wouldn’t , I wouldn’ t . I don’t know i t now . But maybe, I don’t i f you want to ask the quest ion direct ly , Commissioner? MR OSBORNE: The answer, so I ’m to ld is , 8 b i l l ion, R8 bi l l ion, that SAPS has al located to i ts budget for the Western Cape alone. Now do you have – perhaps th is an unfair quest ion , so let me put th is to you , so to speak. DOCS ’ budget for the Western Cape in tota l is less than R400 mi l l ion, which is less than 1/20 t h of SAPS’ budget in the Western Cape. Could you accept that i t may fa ir ly be said that DOCS’ budget – and by the way, that 460 mi l l ion includes t raf f ic. Would i t be fa ir to say that DOCS’ budget , for the kind of programmes about which we’re ta lk ing , is a minute f ract ion of that avai lable to SAPS? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Commissioner , i t ’s a very strange comparison , I must say, because i t is not completely – in my view i t wouldn’ t be re levant; because the Department of Community Safety has a specif ic ro le . So we’re ta lk ing about their mandate and their ro le. We have a specif ic – we put – we have got 150 pol ice stat ions , we put –

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populate every police stat ion , we do detect ives , we do al l of … So our ro le is about creat ing vis ib i l i ty , doing – invest igat ing cr ime, doing al l of th is. Their ro le specif ical ly , as you indicated, is – for one of those ro les is community engagement in order to ensure there 's community development in the f ie ld of safety and securi ty . So to compare our budget to theirs , i t ’s comparing two completely d if ferent th ings and want ing us to come to something. I t ’s n ot – i t has no comparat ive re levance about the ro le of – I don’t know if , about the ro le that we’re say ing here … The community structures were funded that worked with us in our partnership . I t stopped funding and it stopped the funding for three to four – for four years. I t re introduced that part icular model which the advocate says he wi l l la ter on br ing in . But on the ground where we’re s i t t ing here the ef fect is potent ia l ly that break down in re lat ionships between – in communit ies where they can be involved in the mobi l isat ion against cr ime. That is the area that I … So I have di f f icul ty to answer the quest ion how our budget … Yes, we have more because we are doing di f ferent th ings and o ur th ings are meant to be dif ferent . MR OSBORNE: Yes. Major General , could I take you then to the community pol ice forums. And you test i f ied , i f I recal l , that DOCS is not working properly with CPFs. First of a l l , are you aware that in fact 32 CPF prog rammes are being funded in L ingelethu West by the DOCS? Are you aware of that funding? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Sorry, which funding? MR OSBORNE: 32 CPF programmes in L ingelethu West are being funded by DOCS under the extended partnership programme . Are you aware of that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: 32 projects? No, I th ink maybe – I th ink – are you saying that the funding is being used by – they are using th is where they complete the reports? MR OSBORNE: 32 dif ferent CPF programmes are being funded ; not 32 CPFs themselves, but 32 programmes are being funded by D OCS. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink that ’s a completely new one . I don’t know about that . I th ink you wi l l have to present me with that detai l . But I th ink the – I must say, i t has also – I don’t know that ; i f you can get me that indicat ion. And I th ink the point I said was not that they’re not working with CPFs , I ’m saying they changed the nature of their working re lat ionship with CPFs. MR OSBORNE: Now you’re aware then – wel l le t me take you back one step, i f I may, Major General . You spoke earl ier of the ro le of DOCS and I think you spoke of the ro le of DOCS in faci l i tat ing community involvement. In your understanding, what are the other ro les of DOCS aside f rom that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: You have a ro le , as indicated, faci l i tat ing community mobi l isat ion, you have the responsib i l i ty for monitor ing, you have a response – monitor ing both the pol ice and al l the safety securi ty structures , you have a ro le of communicat ing, the communicat ion campaign to – on community safety. MR OSBORNE: Yes. Now are you aware – le t me just say th is . Under Sect ion 206 of the Const i tut ion i t uses the word ‘monitor ing ’ and ‘oversight ’ with respect to the SAPS act iv i ty in the Western Cape. There’s been much test imony and much discussion, I ’m sure you’re aware of i t , that in 2010 DOCS was to ld by SAPS, f i rst ly, that i t must ra ise any complaints about SAPS through a single nodal point with in SAPS, and secondly, that i t may no longer make unannounced vis i ts to pol ice stat ions. Are you aware of that change in the regime in 2010?

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MAJ GEN JACOBS: I know of the f i rst one, and I th ink the second one re lates specif ical ly where some DOCS off ic ia l has wanted to go to inspect the dockets. Now those dockets , i t was Advocate Gerber that wanted to – the former prosecutor , that wanted to inspect dockets and went to court to inspect dockets ; he had access to dockets and we they stopped that . We said there wi l l be a formal process . Those dockets in – those are dockets that are l inked to cases and that ro le has to be – i f i t has to happen i t has to be centra l ly funct ioned , so we don’t tomorrow get a s i tuat ion in a court where a person who shouldn’ t have access to a docket in a cr iminal procedure has access to a docket . So that was the specif ic – i t was specif ical ly l inked to that and i t happened in a number of cases and we had to cal l in on that. And except the – the other one was, yes, in order for us to have better administrat ion, we say i f there’s complaints send i t to the – i t wi l l go to … And we have responded, we have – General Jephta ’s of f ice have set up a nodal point for both 101 complaints , which is our formal system, and complaints f rom DOCS and for IPID, ICD / IPID complaints to a centra l point . So we could, s ince 2012 about August or so , September, we could begin to get a far more centra l ised picture of the complaints that are coming in f rom our monitor ing agent and f rom the other people that give reports, even Parl iament. MR OSBORNE: Major General , I was interested in one of your comments earl ier about the funct ion ing of CPFs. And I th ink you ment ioned that the procedure or the pract ice under which members of CPFs would inspect the condit ions under which detainees were being held was terminated. And ar is ing out of that my quest ion is th is . I f you say that unannounced vis i ts to – or i f SAPS says that unannounced vis i ts to pol ice stat ions must stop , secondly, we’re going to keep the CPFs out of the holding cel ls , you essent ia l ly get , I th ink, the rather unfortunate situat ion where SAPS, and th is doesn’t apply only to the hold ing cel ls , i t appl ies general ly , SAPS is essent ia l ly monitor ing i tsel f . Is that not a larming to you or should i t not be alarming to us f rom the point of view of oversight ing and – oversight and monitor ing? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Commissioner , with respect , I d id not say that the CPF cannot monitor the cel ls. W e said we wanted to be sure that we at the t ime also made certa in funct ion that is in the CPF , the of f ice bearers, certa in of f ice bearers, would be – so we can – could contro l who they were, a l l of those th ings. I t a lso had to do with securi ty i tsel f , what is brought in into the cel ls , how we contro l those th ings. But they're st i l l monitor ing, CPF are st i l l monitor ing , but we said certa in of f ice bearers that we know – and most of – I know in Khayel i tsha we had then already the community l ia ison of f icer was the person that would – that would be his job. You had somebody else that would be respon sib le for d if ferent th ings. So i t never said no . And with DOCS we didn’ t say that they can’t , we said – because DOCS do inspect . A l l we wanted to know is that – and i t was in react ion to dockets being taken irregular ly at some magis trates court . . . ( intervent ion). MR OSBORNE: Major General , i f I may interrupt you; I only have very l imited t ime. Can I get back to what I was actual ly asking. MAJ GEN JACOBS: But … MR OSBORNE: I was asking, not so much the dockets , but the – I th ink a number of witnesses or i t has been acknowledged that there’s something

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perhaps problematic in requir ing that DOCS may not make unannounced vis i ts to pol ice stat ions. Can you acknowledge that that may be problemat ic i f one ta lks in terms of independent oversight and monitor ing? MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, I cannot acknowledge that because I th ink there’s a chal lenge there. As I say, the background of th is, the context of that , as far as I can recal l , is th is th ing of going in and col lect ing dockets at p laces. And we found the dockets there and we had to ask the DPP to send a n ote that Advocate Gerber is no more a prosecutor and he’s not – and that speci f ical ly was a very speci f ic th ing , that access was given to the dockets at the courts that was i rregular. MR OSBORNE: I f . . . ( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: Lawyers were beginning to complain about those th ings and ourselves. So that was the issue about that . I do not know about the other matters that is being referred to ; I cannot comment on it . MR OSBORNE: Major General , may I move on then . Doctor Lawrence, who ant ic ipated much of what we’re ta lk ing about today , said that in the same way as there were severe account ing problems, account ing and report ing funct ions – problems, I ’m sorry, with respect to Bambanani, that the same issue has ar isen with respect to the CPFs. That they have been problems of the misuse of funds by CPFs , that the l ines of accountabi l i ty have not been funct ioning. And i t ’s for that very reason that Sect ion 5 of the Community Safety Act , which as you now know – as you know is in ef fect , provides both for systemic funding of CPFs by DOCS and a concomitant DOCS requirement of report ing f inancia l reports and accountabi l i ty at the CPF level . Would you acknowledge that that may in some sense be an improvement over the pr ior order? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Your quest ion was very long. MR OSBORNE: Sorry. I assume you are aware of the fact that under Sect ion 5 of the Community Safety Act there’s an elaborate funding and account ing protocol with respect to CPFs . Are you aware of that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I ’m aware of the new programme about funding. MR OSBORNE: Last ly as to CPFs; Mr Loonat , who test i f ied a l i t t le ear l ier , who at one stage – s ince removed, at one stage was chair of the provincia l community pol ice fo rums, he test i f ied as to a 2012 Easter Weekend patro l ; and th is is at page 14, 15 of h is – of the transcr ipt . And what he said, and th is conf i rms mater ia l that appears in var ious DOCS reports , that in those si tuat ions where there was an ef fort by DOCS to work together with the CPFs, there were these successful Easter Weekend patro ls . But he ment ioned, and again th is is conf i rmed by what DOCS says, is that the presence of SAPS people , he says, dwindled over the course of the weekend unt i l by the end of the weekend ef fect ively you had the si tuat ion where patro ls were being conducted without the accom paniment of SAPS. Is that not contrary to the impression that you created in your test imony th is morning? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I know – I 'm aware of that report made by Mr Loonat. I – we checked on that one ; we cannot conf i rm – we can conf i rm there was a weekend period operat ion and i t was on part icular per iods , i t was the Easter Weekend, we had people deployed , we were there , we were present when the deployments happened. So I am – we – the issue was discussed in the – i f I recal l correct ly , in the provincia l CPF board meet ing where th is was ra ised and we contested that , that

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we wouldn’t – why would we have a – what would be – these are our very partners and besides, we wouldn’ t let people just patro l a lone. MR OSBORNE: What I – le t me take you back to something else . 21 October 2010, th is is an earl ier i terat ion of the Easter Weekend patro ls , and there’s a DOCS report not ing a lack of cooperat ion f rom SAPS when neighbourhood watches conduct foot patro ls and general poor service del ivery f rom SAPS. Did – you say that you contested what Mr Loonat had to say. Did you contest ever the repeated reports f rom DOCS survey indicat ing non -cooperat ion, inef f ic iency on behalf of SAPS? Was there ever a response in wri t ing f rom SAPS to that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: To – you're saying ever a response in wri t ing to? MR OSBORNE: To the var ious DOCS reports , and th is happens to be re levant to the Easter Weekend patro l , not ing a lack of cooperat ion between SAPS and neighbourhood watches. And the fact that i t ’s ef fect ively, neighbourhood watches when they request pol ice escort are ef fect ively denied that. That appears in a DOCS report to which I ’ve referred you. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I would respectfu l ly submit that I th ink you are reaching ; because he’s using one report of a 2010 report and saying therefore mult iple matters are ra ised ; un less he presents that . And I may say, with respect, Commissioner , we were given a set of quest ions by DOCS for which I have prepared. A number of stuf f that ’s being submitted here is now say ing there’s evidence as to i l lustrates a pat tern . Now in the absence of those th ings being presented to me here so I can see that or have t ime to actual ly look a t i t , i t ’s unfair . There was 24 quest ions that was asked for. That one was not there . We ’ve answered them and I ’ve answered them, we’ve got them here typed up to give , i f needs be. So i t ’s k ind of a b i t of a … But I would – I mean, I would – but I don ’ t – I would l ike to see the evidence of the other reports. We do in our of f ice, not in my of f ice specif ical ly, in the of f ice of that nodal point , we respond to a l l of their complaints and i t ’s very d i l igent ly dealt wi th by the of f ice of General Jephta, and there’s a response to a l l of those complaints , and therefore we wanted the nodal point for complaints to be structured through there. MR OSBORNE: Major General , you asked for the documents . I am running out of t ime, but let me hand you just one of the documents, i f I may, and I ’m going to ask you to comment on what is said. Now I ask you th is quest ion in connect ion with what you have said in you report – in your statement , I 'm sorry, about the early warning funct ion, t he early warning funct ion of your of f ice, whose purpose, I presume f rom i ts name, is to ant ic ipate cr ime trends and to at tempt to deal with them. Now let me point you , i f I may, to page 5 of what I ’ve just handled you – handed you. This is a safety audit on Khayel i tsha Pol ice Stat ion dated 30 March 2009, and I give you one of the older reports precisely because I want to d ispel any impression . . . ( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: Roman 5 or normal 5? MR OSBORNE: No, forgive me. This would be .. . ( intervent ion) . MAJ GEN JACOBS: Numerica l 5? MR OSBORNE: … numerical 5 . I t ’s perhaps halfway in to th is bundle. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja, I ’ve got i t . Is the heading ‘Khayel i tsha Sector 1, S i te C ’?

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MR OSBORNE: Yes. I want to d ispel the not ion that DOCS became sensit ive to the problem of community just ice late in the game. And I want to suggest to you that i t ’s surpr is ing that your early warning system wasn’t able to take into account the warnings that DOCS was giving you as far back as 2009. Now I ask you to look to the f i rst paragraph on that page 5. The prevalence of cr ime in Sector C1 is very h igh, people are exposed to a l l sorts of cr imes, etcetera, and then the last sentence ,

“The current cr ime levels are such that communit ies are reminiscent …” I th ink that probably means nostalgic ,

“… of the old days where community just ice was meted out by taxi owners, which was highly appreciated and commended. ”

I ask you in l ight of that , when was i t that SAPS f i rst became aware of the scourge, the emerging scourge of vigi lant ism , and where could we f ind in SAPS reports before the Shabalala report some indicat ion of SAPS ’ sensi t ivi ty to th is emerging? And I repeat , I ask you that specif ical ly because you said that part of your funct ion is to supervise an early warning system. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Okay. Thank you, Commissioner . Can I maybe just – i f we can just resolve certa in terms. For us when we made – and I th ink in my response – we can maybe just c irculate copies again, ear ly warnings in our response. I understand that that ’s used in d if ferent terms. When we say early warning i t ’s speci f ical ly l inked to informat ion dr iven about incidents. So we have an early warning, there is taxi vio lence is going to happen in that area, then you have an early warning system to act ivate a l l our operat ion responses. The early warning mechanisms they're ta lk ing about is used in normal d isaster management , about t r iggering patterns. So I understand where that concern would come in. What we – when we speak about that … So when I refer to early warning system i t was meant to incidents that is about to happen or incidents, and then we develop a mechanism to act ivate a l l the ro le -players to deal with i t . So that ’s is the issue. What he is ta lk ing about is specif ical ly about p icking up the patterns . Now at th is report , I see i t ’s a 2009 report , at that point we don’t have – I don’t have a recol lect ion that that was in a part icular . . . ( indist inct) . I t was earl ier , i t stopped for a whi le and then i t … And you can see th is is a lso the period , the Bambanani per iod. So I mean, there’s st i l l concerns and I th ink people were – that th is report comes f rom that t ime when the communit ies were a lot more act ive , and that was a very good report , I can see. The vigi lante issues coming up again 2011 / 2012, that you can pick up. Now I know in – there was part icular matters dealt wi th in terms of deal ing with deployment or deployment in those areas . Because, as I indicated , there the pattern is not so much that there’s a structured group of people that are ki l l ing vict ims, i t ’s a spontaneous matter. Now that speaks to how, as I test i f ied earl ier , about how we are organising and mobi l is ing people to take responsib i l i ty col lect ively for community safety. So that ’s the issue to i t . So our early warning would pick up incidents that is going to happen or informat ion about a n incident , a h it on somebody, and we sent people in then . . . ( intervent ion) . MR OSBORNE: Major General , I understand that . I f I may just go on to the ro le of informers, because I th ink th is is very important. You spoke at – you spoke about the importance of informers and I th ink you did acknowledge that there

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had been perhaps an unfortunate dearth of the use of informers . Now I have a document here which says that the budget for 2011 / 2012 for informers was R52 500, of which R200 was used , and that the budget in the period 2012 / 2013, th is is the tota l budget , was 23 500, and that as of October 2013 there was only four registered informers in Khayel i tsha. And I ’m making reference now to an agreed statement of facts , dated 17 March or revised 17 March 2014 , which as I understand i t , was agreed as between at least SAPS and the evidence leaders. May I hand th is document up for your reference? MS BAWA: I must make a point of correct ion . That was a report specif ical ly in re lat ion to the Harare Pol ice Stat ion and not for the enti re Khayel i tsha police. I t doesn’t re late to al l three pol ice stat ions ; each stat ion has i ts own budget and the other budgets were ref lected in di f ferent ways. MR OSBORNE: Alr ight . Thank you for that c lar if icat ion . Bearing that in mind, and I take you to paragraph 32 , i f I may, Major General , can you expla in . . . ( intervent ion)? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Who – can I ask, sorry, who compi led th is report? COMMISSIONER: Put together in advance of the evidence of Colonel Rabol iba, i f I recal l correct ly, between the evidence leaders , Ms Bawa, and I ’m not sure i f i t was . . . ( intervent ion) . MAJ GEN JACOBS: Oh, the evidence leaders? COMMISSIONER: Ja. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Oh, okay. COMMISSIONER: And i t was in order to t ry to save some t ime with the evidence that he was going to lead. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Okay, that ’s f ine . I t ’s the f i rst t ime I see i t a lso. COMMISSIONER: I understand that . MR OSBORNE: So my quest ion is , four registered informers as of October 2013 in Harare and the use of R200 for informers in the period 2011 / 2012. Could you comment on that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: As I indicated , I th ink i t ’s def in i te ly under-usage. I think we could accept that , we could be . . . ( intervent ion). MR OSBORNE: Well that ’s an understatement , i f I may, Major General . Spending R200 is not under-usage; ef fect ively the use of informers has col lapsed, has i t not? MAJ GEN JACOBS: But can I indicate th is , Commissioner , i f I may. I indicated earl ier – oh my apologies for that, as I indicated earl ier , that informers – there 's both informers and there’s contact persons . And i t is – I indicated that is a chal lenge about how – about registrat ion , one, but also, two, about get t ing people to convert – get t ing more informat ion systems in p lace in communit ies. And i t goes back to the point I ra ised earl ier about i f you don’t have a – i f the community is not mobi l ised the ir abi l i ty to come forward and provide you with in format ion is chal lenged. But i t ’s something that we would indicate that there’s a considerable need to improve on. I d id indicate that ear l ier I met with a l l the – in my new role with the cluster commanders about how to develop that capacity further in o rder for us to improve on our abil i ty to access more informat ion. So we wi l l concede. MR OSBORNE: Major General , another aspect of the .. . ( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: Mr Osborne, I just want to point out that you are now wel l over your t ime. Are we down to the last quest ion?

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MR OSBORNE: May I take th is as the last quest ion? COMMISSIONER: You may. MR OSBORNE: Another aspect of the systemic under -resourcing, not only in the f i l l ing of . . . ( indist inct) of of f ic ia l establ ishment , a lso informers , but then as to reservists. You spoke a l i t t le b i t about the morator ium on the appointment of reservists ; you gave a couple of reasons . But one I th ink you ment ioned was that there was a problem, for example , with f i rearms tra in ing amongst reservists . Do you recal l saying that ear l ier? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes. MR OSBORNE: Now I am aware, and I am sure you are , that many, many reservists are used in support ro les , not even in uniform and certain ly not wearing or not carry ing f i rearms. Why is i t that reservist s could not continue to be used at least in that capacity? That would certa in ly take pressure of f the operat ional force , would i t not? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink that ’s a good point , Commissioner . I t is just in those areas however we’ve – reservists are not general ly used in those environments . I t is most ly we use them – we don’t even use the reservists as detect ives, we use them predominantly in our vis ib le pol i cing environment. I t ’s an area, I th ink, i f i t ’s a suggest ion which I haven’t heard before , i t ’s a suggest ion that we could explore. MR OSBORNE: Wel l i t ’s not a suggest ion . My informat ion is that in fact that ’s an important ro le or i t has been an important ro le of reservists , is precisely back of f ice support . I t ’s not a suggest ion so much as a quest ion as to why the uniform wearing and the f i rearm carrying . . . ( indist inct) to which you refer should apply to support staf f . MAJ GEN JACOBS: You see, the predominant – I hear that . I don’t know that is general ly used in the support environment. Because it ’s a lso a problem; i f i t ’s support environment I can just begin to th ink of access to personnel f i les, you know, a l l of those kinds of matte rs that is a problem that is got to do with … But i t ’s a matter that – i t ’s a – I in my experience haven’t real ly seen that being act ive. We are using a lot of community volunteers in our vict im support rooms, we’re doing … But they're not necessari ly reservists. So that is where – so in the support environment i t ’s an area we could explore. MR OSBORNE: Alr ight . Thank you, Major General . I have nothing else. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR OSBORNE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Mr Osborne. I t is now twenty-f ive past one and we wi l l take a lunch adjournment unt i l quarter past two. So you may now stand down for the minute, General . Thank you very much. We wi l l adjourn. COMMISSION ADJOURNS: (at 13:25) ON RESUMPTION: (at 14:30) PETER ANTHONY JACOBS: (s.u.o. ) CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS BAWA: Maybe – I ’d l ike to start wi th f i rst pr incip les, and a good place to start is maybe the Const i tut ion that recognises that there’s effect ively one pol ice force in th is country, and that the objects of the Pol ice Service are to prevent, combat and invest igate cr ime, to maintain publ ic order, to protect and secure the residents in the Republ ic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law. And I don’t th ink you’ l l quibble much i f I say that i t ’s those Const i tut ional val ues that form the basis upon which the SAPS Act fo l lows, and everyth ing that the

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pol ice does subsequent to that is informed by, essentia l ly, Sect ion 205 of the Const i tut ion. Do you agree? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I agree. MS BAWA: And then what we have fo l lowing on that, on a more local ised level af ter we’ve put the more formal legis lat ion aside, we have Nat ional p lans and then we have Provincia l p lans, and even our Provincia l p lans are underscored by the vis ion and the mission of SAPS and the pr incip les of Bath o Pele and that – I have the 2012/2013 Provincia l Performance plan here, where Gen Lamoer says in terms that:

“The reduct ion in cr ime and the vis ion to make al l communit ies of the Western Cape feel safe wi l l be our main focus.”

He goes on and introduces the Opus strategy to which you referred, he ta lks about the project consist ing of 23 pol ice stat ions and he effect ively in t roduces th is Performance plan. And th is Performance plan is the, let ’s put i t , the work plan for SAPS in an annual year. Would that be fa ir? MAJ GEN JACOBS: That would be correct . MS BAWA: Right. And f rom that , i f one takes i t a l i t t le b i t further down, we ask our Stat ion Commanders to then draf t performance plans which in some ways mirror what we expect f rom them in their performanc e agreements. Would you agree with that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I would agree with that . MS BAWA: Right. So that ’s sort -of our foundat ion of – our foundat ion that we work with when we look at pol ic ing at a stat ion level . And so that stat ion is informed by everyth ing that comes above i t , and because pol ic ing is an enormous task, i t is accompanied by Regulat ions, Nat ional Instruct ions, Provincia l instruct ions, c irculars, d irect ives at a l l levels, and al l of that together informs pol ic ing. Would you agree with t hat? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Correct . MS BAWA: Right. And if one looks at the vis ion and the mission of SAPS, then the core remains the prevent ion of cr ime and the invest igat ion of cr ime. Would you agree? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Repeat the last one. I f one looks at …? MS BAWA: One would say that the core object ives which a pol ice force seeks to achieve is to prevent cr ime, and where cr ime is committed, to invest igate that cr ime and ul t imately where cr iminals are found, that that leads to a successful prosecut ion. That ’s the gist of what we want f rom the pol ice force. Is that correct? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Correct . MS BAWA: In the most s implest of terms. I accept that there’s a myriad of other th ings that pol ice do, including socia l working and psychological servic es to the community, and changing f lat tyres for the publ ic – everyth ing is part and parcel . But our core funct ion is prevent ion and the detect ion of cr ime. You accept that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I accept i t . MS BAWA: Now, one of the pr incipal reasons for this Commission, and what underlay al l of these were complaints or u l t imately d issat isfact ion ar is ing f rom non-Governmental organisat ions about the ef f ic iency of pol ic ing in Khayel i tsha, and the dissat isfact ion in the manner in which matters which fa l l wi th in a pol ic ing mandate have been dealt wi th. And that led to th is establ ishment of the Commission to invest igate

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ef f ic iencies of pol ice and whether there is in fact a breakdown in the re lat ionships. And one of the things that the Commission did in the course of having obtained thousands of pages of documents f rom various organs of State, be i t SAPS, be i t the Province, be i t the City, and members of publ ic in Khayel i tsha, was to commission an independent survey so that we could gauge f rom an independent source and formulate i t in consultat ion with the people who were going to do the survey certa in quest ions so that we could get an indicat ion in the survey wel l , what ’s the take, what ’s the results going to be on the survey. And one of the things which arose f rom the survey was f indings of the community percept ion, which fundamental ly conf i rmed that the Khayel i tsha residents do not feel safe, and that 77% of the respondents in Khayel i tsha were interviewed in the Site B pol ic ing precinct indicated as such, 73.7% in L ingelethu West indicated as such, and 68.3% in Harare indicated as such. Now, we’re ta lk ing here about the people, a l l the people in Khayel i tsha who responded. Do you f ind that to be concerning?? MAJ GEN JACOBS: The f indings or the … MS BAWA: The high percentages of percept ion in people that they don’t fee safe. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink i f that ’s what you f ind – unfortunately, I haven’t seen that f inding at a l l . I haven’t seen that report, and I ’m not sure about where you say i t was conducted by an independent, I ’d l ike to i f I can get – so I can’t comment on the ( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: A copy has been provided to your lawyers qui te some t ime ago, but we can certa in ly make another copy avai lable for you. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Okay. COMMISSIONER: You know – you’ l l remember that , of course, th is was one of the recommendat ions made in General Tshabalala ’s task team report – the very last paragraph on that report suggested something l ike th is be done. MS BAWA: So, let ’s put aside for a moment that you haven’t seen the report or how the report was done. I t was certa in ly not quibbled with the f indings of the report – there was no issue taken when the people who conducted the survey on behalf of the Commission came to give evidence. Your legal representat ives had an opportuni ty to cross -examine them on the f indings. But the principal proposit ion I want to put to you is the high percentages of people, of the ordinary people in the streets in Khayel i tsha wh o on these surveys indicated that they did not feel safe. Are you – do you f ind that to be of concern? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I f the f indings could be – i f the f indings could be ver i f ied, then I would – i t would be something that would be concerning. MS BAWA: Now, i f I – i f I – the gist of how I understood your evidence today was that pol ic ing doesn’t take place in isolat ion. And I th ink in a l l the evidence that we’ve heard before the Commission today, there’s got to be a development of partnerships. Would you agree that that ’s what you’re putt ing forward to the Commission today? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I agree. I agree with that . MS BAWA: But notwithstanding partnerships, when i t comes to cr ime detect ion and cr ime prevent ion, the buck stops by SAPS. Would you agree with that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Crime detect ion, yes. Not necessari ly prevent ion. I f you’ve read the cr ime – Nat ional Crime Prevent ion Strategy, i t p lace the

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responsib i l i ty on everybody. We are responsib le for an element of the cr ime prevent ion, but i t ’s not – cr ime prevent ion is not necessari ly, a lone, is not the core responsib i l i ty of the pol ice. We’re responsib le in that component for the vis ib le deployment and inst i tut ing measures to assist in the cr ime prevent ion team. And that ’s what the Nat ional Cr ime Prevent ion Strategy very d ist inct ly out l ines. MS BAWA: But we must accept that the object ives of the Pol ice Service is to prevent cr ime, and the Const i tut ion t rumps the National Crime Prevent ion Strategy. The Strategy implements a methodology b y which cr ime prevent ion is implemented, but the obl igat ions, or the legal obl igat ions, of cr ime prevent ion vests with pol ice. MAJ GEN JACOBS: No. No, I th ink that might be the chal lenge. MS BAWA: I ’m not for a moment disput ing that i t ’s not something that can in pract ical terms – i t requires a – i t requires the person in the street to p lay their part in prevent ing cr ime. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I ’ve got to deal with, i f I may, you were saying that the buck stops there. That ’s not what I ’m – I ’m not necessari ly agreeing with that . I ’m saying we’ve got a very d ist inct ro le, but in the broader cr ime prevent ion as out l ined in the Crime Prevent ion Strategy, there’s a number of departments that together ought to create the – the buck stops with a l l of the departme nts out l ined in that . We play a s igni f icant ro le. As you out l ined, the ro le that we must p lay, that buck stops with us on our ro le. MS BAWA: Yes. I th ink we’re on agreement on that . Now, as operat ional services, you deal with a number of issues, and one of the th ings you highl ighted with us were other uni ts or other services.

And I want to ta lk to you about three specif ical ly; one is the publ ic or the pol ic ing, the not so in the past r iot squad that we’re certa in ly not equat ing – is that a permanent pol ice force, or is that force – is that uni t put together when publ ic order needs require i t? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I t is a permanent uni t . We do have capacit ies that we’ve created – we’ve t ra ined in the Province 2 900 people that ’s now being – a l l of them being retra ined, that ’s based at the stat ion as f irst responders. We did that in preparat ion for the World Cup, and they’re st i l l here, so they are the f i rst – invariably a local van are the f i rst to come across tyres burning or a crowd, so as the f i rst responders, i f they don’t handle the si tuat ion wrong, they don’t escalate i t , you know, by the way they handle i t , so we’ve t ra ined 2 900 people in that capacity. Then the publ ic order, depending on the si tuat ion and our reading of that s i tuat ion, we wi l l then, f rom the Ops Room escalate i t to the Command Centre that in turn wi l l despatch a team – ja . So they’re a permanent uni t wi th capacit ies with in stat ions to be able to deal with crowd contro l as a f i rst responder. MS BAWA: And that makes sense, because you wouldn’ t require a public order huge force to be or huge – ja , let ’s the word “ force” or “pol ice methods” , to be on hand in an event that ar ises. So you tra in your exist ing members and you then have them avai lable to deploy in the case of an emergenc y, as I understand. Now, what is the presence of th is publ ic or the pol ic ing in Khayel i tsha? MAJ GEN JACOBS: They work here – they’re based in the Province. We have got – we’ve got three units, l i tera l ly. The Cape Town unit , the uni t in the Boland,

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which is based in Paarl , and the unit in the Southern Cape, which is based in George. So those are the uni ts to deal – and they work on that base more for, for response t imes, to deal with the areas. One is based in the Cape Metropole, based at Faure here. They work f rom there, they deploy f rom there, and then there’s obviously grades of what th ings they get involved with. MS BAWA: So if there’s a publ ic order incident that ar ises in Khayel i tsha, that requires them then, the Khayel i tsha Ops Room, as I unde rstand i t , would elevate that to the Command Centre that ’s your ( indist inct) in Cape Town, and they would instruct the POP to come into Khayel i tsha. MAJ GEN JACOBS: That ’s correct . MS BAWA: Am I get t ing the system r ight here? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Sorry? MS BAWA: Am I get t ing the level of command r ight? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja. Ja. MS BAWA: Okay. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Unless there’s a pre – pre-approved or – pre-approved in much act ivi ty, or there’s an early warning about tomorrow there’s going to be a blocking, or whatever. Then they’ l l be deployed here. So they’ l l be here in ant ic ipat ion of that th ing. So they’re either an react ion tool or pre -deploys, based on early warning system. MS BAWA: And that ear ly warning system could work on two ways – ei ther a Stat ion Commander is aware of a march and he requests the POP unit to be of assistance, or there’s inte l l igence that comes through of i t and you deploy your force in ant ic ipat ion of an event happening. For example, i f you know that there’s a very controversia l matter that ’s going to be before the Magistrates’ Court in Khayel i tsha, and you ant ic ipate a crowd might be there. That would be an example in which you would ant ic ipate – that ’s your early warning s ign that you’re referr ing to. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes. MS BAWA: Am I … MAJ GEN JACOBS: Correct . MS BAWA: Okay. So that ’s your POP. So there’s no – there’s no regular presence in Khayel i tsha. Those are the kinds of ways in which they would be deployed in the area. MAJ GEN JACOBS: What we do have is, when the publ ic – when there’s – these days i t ’s not of ten, but general ly when they’re not deployed in pre -determined events, publ ic order incidents, they get deployed in these Project 6 stat ions.

So that ’s when they get – so in real i ty that would be over weekend, when there’s not – so they deal – and of late we’re beginning to see, because of th is problem with the Liquor Act people – and i t ’s d if f icul t to pol ice there, i t ’s become now so that af ter we close a shebeen the crowd, i f we close them late, the crowd is out on the street and the publ ic order pol ice is here to assist to deal with the crowd contro l s i tuat ions, because they’re drunk and vio lent , and start throwing stones. So a normal pol iceman wi l l react wrongful ly. So they’re deployed here as part of the general deployment, on the condit ion that they’re not – there’s no other events that – however, they could be cal led out to where there’s something else, a publ ic order incident. MS BAWA: And how many members do you have in your permanent POP unit?

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MAJ GEN JACOBS: In the Province …? MS BAWA: Or in the Cape unit , because the other two wouldn’ t b e of re levance to Khayel i tsha. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I t would be, i f I ’m not mistaken, 280. MS BAWA: That ’s your permanent force? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja, in the Cape unit . MS BAWA: Okay. MAJ GEN JACOBS: At Faure. MS BAWA: At Faure. Okay. Now, I ’m going to jump the gun because you brought up th is issue with l iquor. I t ’s real ly concerned me, looking at some of the cr imes, the CPF minutes, the Crime Combat ing Forum minutes, that there’s a very strong correlat ion between alco hol – a lcohol abuse and cr ime. Do you agree? In Khayel i tsha. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Def in i te ly. That ’s probably – I th ink the – ( indist inct) no stats here, but the Human Sciences Research Counci l have brought out data that f inds that, I think i t ’s c lose to 75% of a l l people murdered in the Province at some point had – well , were over the legal l imit. So that ’s k ind -of – i t is a b ig th ing. MS BAWA: And what a lso struck me, especia l ly wi th the evidence f rom the Stat ion Commanders, i t ’s recognised that there is a huge number of shebeens. Those are the ones that are i l legal ly operat ing in Khayel i tsha. In fact , in some of the minutes they record at some point even up to 250 i l legal shebeens in s imply the Harare alone, not even the ent i re Khayel i tsha. MAJ GEN JACOBS: A thousand. MS BAWA: Sorry? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Khayel i tsha has about 1 400. MS BAWA: I l legal shebeens. And i t has about – and I got the f igures f rom the Liquor Board – i t ’s got about 133 l icensed out lets. And when I got those f igures, I thought i n an area of 43 square ki lometres, even 133 l iquor out lets was a lot . I was to ld that we rather l icence them than leaving them unl icensed. Do you agree with that approach, that the l icensed out let is bet ter to regulate than an unl icensed out let? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I would agree. I th ink, f i rst ly, i t would operate with in the law. That ’s the one th ing. They stand to – there’s compl iance requirements that they would have. They could – i f they’re l icensed, they could get the big companies, SA Breweries and Coke and al l th is, sponsors their ‘ f r idges and al l of those th ings, so there’s a k ind -of – once they lose that , they lose – we’ve done a few examples where we’ve closed, under the old Act , you could c lose them for 14 days. I f you compi le a Sect ion 141 report , you close them for 14 days and they come back, how can we comply, how can we ensure – so, kind-of there is a not ion that i f you legal ise you can better monitor.

I mean, Mowbray has, in that smal l Mowbray area, has got 26 l icensed premises, so 43, even 100 in Khayel i tsha is not much. I th ink i f – i f you’re issuing l icences, I th ink then you wouldn’ t necessari ly have a problem with l icensing ( intervent ion). MS BAWA: Well , that ’s precisely what the CEO of the Liquor Board indicated to me. But what does – and the pol ice, in recognising the dangers of a lcohol, created a few years ago the FLASH unit to deal with f irearms, l iquor and second

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hand goods. And that was essent ia l ly a response to the new Firearm Control Act , the l iquor laws and then the Second h and Goods Act that came into ef fect. Am I correct? MAJ GEN JACOBS: You’re correct . MS BAWA: And under the pol ice system there is one FLASH member – or there’s meant to be one FLASH member – at every pol ice stat ion, who’s specif ical ly t ra ined to deal with the legis lat ion and to be the FLASH representat ive at the pol ice stat ion. Am I correct in that ( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: That ’s correct . MS BAWA: Understanding that ’s how i t operates? MAJ GEN JACOBS: The designated l iquor of f icer. MS BAWA: Ja. I th ink they cal l h im the DPO? MAJ GEN JACOBS: The DLO. DPO is the designated f i rearm – the f i rearm of f icer, but together they become a ( indist inct) designated second hand goods of f icer, so they fa l l under one component. MS BAWA: Do we have a plan to deal with these i l legal shebeens in Khayel i tsha? Because one sees in the stat ion Crime Combat ing Forums that there’s a str ict instruct ion that we – we have to inspect every month, we have to c lose X number. And somet imes the stat ist ic show that they ’ve c losed 90 shebeens in a week, but they spr ing open the fo l lowing week again, or they just re locate. And we conf iscate l iquor; next week the l iquor’s back.

We’re not get t ing to the core or the root which is going to reduce cr ime. How, may I ask you – where are we going with sort ing th is out , the core problem? MAJ GEN JACOBS: There’s, i f I may Commissioner, there’s two keys issues here. On the one hand the fact that we have a Department responsib le for l iquor, the Economic Affa irs. They have a sect ion responsib le for l iquor contro l . That is the core business, their core business. L ike, as part of th is Nat ional Crime Prevent ion Strategy, they’ve issued in the Province, we’ve got about 7 000 l icensed premises, they’ve 9 l iquor of f icers. Nine. We’ve got 150 – at every stat ion there’s a designated l iquor off icer. So, k ind-of i t ’s in the core business of – that ’s their responsib i l i ty. One. Two – the Liquor Act has made – the new Liquor Act has made it ( intervent ion). MS BAWA: You’re ta lk ing about the Provincia l Act , because I want to ( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja, the Provincia l Act . There’s the 2003 Act, which is the Nat ional L iquor Act , but the Liquor Act of , I th ink i t ’s 2010, the Western Cape Liquor Act , that is implemented in 2012, 1 s t Apri l , has got that compl icat ion of the threshold, the l iquor threshold. So you now have to – your burden of proof is considerably h igher. COMMISSIONER: Can I just query that . Was there – was there a rebuttable presumpt ion in the Nat ional L iquor Act? MAJ GEN JACOBS: In the previous Liquor Act . COMMISSIONER: There was a rebuttable presumpt ion. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja. There was – i t was more you – under Sect ion, I th ink i t ’s 167, of the old Act , you had to produce – you had to indica te three th ings, not necessari ly the volume. COMMISSIONER: And i t created a rebuttable presumpt ion. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I ’m not exact ly sure.

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COMMISSIONER: The reason why I ’m asking is that , wel l , certa in ly f rom a judic ia l perspect ive, rebutta l presumpt ions don’t general ly make i t more di f f icul t to prosecute; they make i t easier to prosecute. Now, i f the quantum of the rebuttable presumpt ion is var ied, i .e. under the old Act i t was – you had to have three bott les of beer, you know, three l i t res, and i t ’s now moved to 150 – then obviously i t makes i t harder. But i f what ’s happened is the creat ion of a rebuttable presumpt ion that d id not previously exis t , i t doesn’t fo l low to me, and you’d have to expla in to me why i t ’s harder to prosecute. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink that ’s part of our chal lenge, is that when we take th is to the Prosecutor, i t ’s invariably withdrawn, currently. COMMISSIONER: I t there is c i t ing … MAJ GEN JACOBS: I f there is c i t ing as i t ’s not – i t ’s less than 150 l i t res and that ’s k ind of – so we kind-of – we take i t out because i t a l lows us the weekend ( indist inct) knowing i f the person’s able to get to the l iquor store, then we go through a whole process and they must br ing the docket and, you know, a l l of that , and then we hand back the l iquor. And that goes on and on. We’re s i t t ing here with – I mean, that is a b ig chal lenge. COMMISSIONER: What I ’m trying to understand is, is th is a problem from the NPA and the Department of Just ice, or is i t a problem in the Act? I mean there should be no reason why you should have to re ly on a rebuttable presumpt ion. A rebuttable presumpt ion is there to faci l i tate the task of prosecut ion. You don’t have to use i t to prosecute, so can you pinpoint , in the l ight of that informat ion, whether the problem’s wi th the NPA or with the Act. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink i t ’s both. I th ink i t ’s a combinat ion – i t ’s with the Act i tsel f in that there’s that ; a lso, the Act has a second element a lso that i t has to be a designated pol ice of f ic ia l . In other words, a design ated l iquor of f icer, the one that has a cert i f icat ion that can – that can specif ical ly c lose an unl icensed or a l icensed premises, ne , for that per iod to act on them, which means so now in your cr ime prevent ion operat ion on a weekend, th is designated of f ic er, and you can only appoint one – two, maximum – in your stat ion, so those two together – so that ’s with the Act, wri t ten into the Act and the Regulat ions. The second part is the Prosecutors – there is a number of other factors you could possib ly consider, but they say, ja, we can consider that , but i t ’s not necessary to win your case. We’re going to have to argue in court over an issue of – and that becomes a chal lenge. That ’s an issue that we’re constant ly bat t l ing with. And therein l ies our chal lenge . And that ’s real ly the issue. But … COMMISSIONER: Am I r ight In understanding that in fact there wasn’t a rebuttable presumpt ion of quantum in the previous legis lat ion? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I can’ t necessari ly say. I ’m not so very c lued up with that kind of k ind of ( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: Well , we’ l l have a look at i t . Thank you. MS BAWA: There’s just one aspect on that, so you said there were two issues. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja. MS BAWA: Right . MAJ GEN JACOBS: The two issues is then given that , however. They st i l l have to operat ional ise, given our shortcomings. So part of our approach is – is – th is is a publ ic forum; normal ly we ta lk about our approaches in pr ivate forums. MS BAWA: We’l l te l l them to c lose their ears! MAJ GEN JACOBS: But i t ’s about understanding the value chain of the supply

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of shebeens. Now, ostensib ly, l icensed – what – in Khayel i tsha and in most shebeens, they have branded i tems. There’s vir tual ly no unbranded i tems or home brewed. So they’re get t ing th is stuf f f rom places that had them legal ly before.

So part of the approach is then to begin to look at who’s supplying, and that is l i tera l ly the – in terms of where we’re beginning to focus our at tent ion now. But i t is – we are hampered by th is not ion; the person buys less than 150 l i t res, he doesn’t have to prove – he doesn’t have to provide a l icence at the l icensed premises to show that he is a l icensed – the owner of a l iquor l icence.

But we normal ly – then what we normal ly do is, of late we began to look at deal ing with the l icensed premises, one, that are supplying, ident i fy who they are, and begin to ( indist inct) . Then we’ve ident if ied so much so that there is in the Province, in the Metropole at least , e ight or n ine key suppl iers that have become very r ich on supplying the shebeens.

So that ’s k ind -of the approach that would be – now, part of the chal lenge is a lso some of these places have two l icences; they’ve got the Western Cape Liquor Act , and they’ve got the Nat ional Act . The National Act speaks for the ( indist inct) suppl ier, the suppl ier beyond, I th ink, a threshold beyond a certa in amount.

So now, when you deal with th is person but you’re sel l ing to a person without a l icence, he br ings up the Western Cape Liquor Act to say, but 150 – we sel l – i f he’s above that , i t br ings out the other. So that becomes our chal lenge in that ; the person has both. So i t becomes a – and we’ve ra ised th is at the appropriate levels in order to c lean out that , that we can have – here there’s some places you’ l l see the Sun day in – Wale Street and Bree Street , there’s a l icensed premises that has – operat ing 24 hours, a lmost 24 hours there. Or rather 7 days a week. He’s got both the l icences now, the Western Cape l icence puts such part icular operat ing days, the Nat ional one does not necessari ly.

So those are some of the kind of operat ional chal lenges that you f ind. But the point we’re saying is, in our approach and our strategy you asked for we have but on the value of chain of l iquor, and we’re attacking dif ferent parts of the chain in order to deal with i t . There’s chal lenges to i t . Then we’ve got – we’ve got most of our operat ions in the six stat ions. On weekends i t ’s about shebeens. Because if you deal with shebeens, you deal with a signi f icant percentage of your ser io us and vio lent cr imes – murder, attempted murder, wi l l come f rom that. Then there’s a percentage that comes f rom robbery and hi jackings. So we have a l iquor of f icer working every weekend; he’s responsib le for the operat ions, prepares the operat ional p la n, prepares which shebeens we’re going to target, because on average 1 400 here, you can only real ist ical ly deal with shebeens at a certa in t ime. So what part of the th ings we do, we close shebeens, we have early set -ups. We close shebeens before 2. Cert a in shebeens. You know that what is the problem, he wi l l re -stock by 6. You come again, then you come by 9. However, i f you come by 11. we didn’ t c lose him by 2, you have a fu l l house. Now that is an hour. So tact ical ly in your operat ions you must stagg er so that your deployments look at those th ings. MS BAWA: And how many members do you need for any one of those operat ions?

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MAJ GEN JACOBS: Normal ly in a – I mean, for a shebeen, you standardly have four people operating together over – to deal with shebeens and to move f rom shebeen to shebeen. And they do dif ferent th ings. In the evening some of them merge, on weekend especia l ly. They merge – two groups or so merge, and then you plan together.

In a p lace l ike Khayel i tsha I know they wi l l take al l the people at a certa in t ime. We cal l i t a convoy, when I was here also. You put – by 2 o’c lock in the morning you put a l l the vehic les together and you convoy through the area, especia l ly you know what shebeen is l ikely to be open. Then you go there to go and do work.

I f you f ind less than 150 l i t res, i t ’s a chal lenge, but you have a house fu l l of drunk people, so now you must manage that . You can’t chase them into street ; you put them into danger. And you can’t arrest them because they’re in the premises. So – but i t ’s an ongoing constant operat ional focus, that’s what I ’m te l l ing you. MS BAWA: But i t seems, because I want to focus my quest ions on identi fying a problem and putt ing a proposit ion to you as a possib le recommendat ion or solut ion. So if one looks at your l icensing di lemma, you have distr ibut ion l icences under the Nat ional L iquor Act , and you have l icences to premises to sel l to the publ ic under the Provincia l Act . And one of the ways pol ic ing could be better regulated if , included in the Pro vincia l l icensing regime, they didn’ t of fer those l icences to people who held nat ional l icences. Is that how I understand what you’re saying to me? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Def in i te ly. Def in i te ly i t would help to c lean out. MS BAWA: Now, do you know how many inspectors the Nat ional Government has in respect of d istr ibut ion l icences? Because i t does seem that one would have to pol ice those distr ibute l iquor. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Very few. Very few. MS BAWA: Even less than the seven that the Province has? MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, I th ink s l ight ly more. They’ve recent ly appointed – no, not recent ly appointed; two or three years ago, a group. But they probably, for the Nat ional ro le, they have, they don’t – def in i te ly wouldn’ t have enough. That is my ( intervent ion). MS BAWA: Because, essent ia l ly, those distr ibut ion out lets would need to be inspected by these l iquor of f ic ia ls to ensure that they are not sel l ing l iquor to anybody who doesn’t have a val id l iquor l icence, i .e. a shebeen owner. Would that be my understanding? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Agreed. I would agree. MS BAWA: I t ’s only when they have those dual l icences that they get away with being able to do that . MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja. MS BAWA: Okay. Now, i f we move on to the TRT unit , that ’s the Tact ical Response uni t , which is actual ly based at the Khayel i tsha Cluster of f ices, is that correct? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja. Correct . MS BAWA: And they do have a presence in Khayel i tsha on a fa ir ly regular basis. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Every day, actual ly. MS BAWA: Okay. So they – they are what you might cal l as a force mult ip l ier

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to your stat ion personnel. Would I understand that correct ly? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes. MS BAWA: Okay. Over and above that , you have a Cluster Commander that ’s in Khayel i tsha. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes. MS BAWA: Now, your Khayel i tsha Cluster ’s been beset with d i f f icul t ies in the appointment of a permanent Cluster Commander. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Sorry? MS BAWA: You’ve been beset with d i f f icul t ies in the appointment of a permanent Cluster Commander. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I t ’s advert ised now. Final ly. I t ’s advert ised now. Yesterday. MS BAWA: How long is i t going to take to put somebody in p lace? Let me ask you, how long did i t take you to get i t advert ised? MAJ GEN JACOBS: That took a whi le. MS BAWA: What ’s a whi le? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Longer than six months. MS BAWA: Why is that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I don’t know, unfortunately. MS BAWA: I t seems that in the evidence before the Commission that is a perennial problem when i t comes to the advert is ing of posts. Would you – especia l ly senior posts, because you need to get approval f rom the Nat ional of f ice. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja. MS BAWA: Did you encounter that when you tr ied to f i l l senior Vispol posi t ions as wel l? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I t takes – there’s a standard – i t takes a whi le to be advert ised. Once it ’s advert ised, the process is fa ir ly fast to – i f in two weeks you – normal ly, advert ised, they’ l l have a two week deadl ine, then we have another month to do the short - l is t ing, interviews, and i f i t ’s that then there’s normal ly the fo l lowing month i t ’s ( indist inct) the process before. MS BAWA: And that would depend on when the person can a ctual ly take up the posi t ion as wel l . MAJ GEN JACOBS: No. The person who appl ied at that level , senior level , and they’ve appl ied, I could imagine i t ’s a promot ion, so you would have to take i t up. COMMISSIONER: We’ve been looking at the three pol ice sta t ions here in the Cluster, and I mean we real ly looked part icular ly at the posi t ions of Stat ion Commander, Branch Commander, and Cluster Commander. And of those ef fect ively seven posi t ions, three have been vacant for longer than twelve months in the period at which we’re looking, and i t seems to be a real problem.

And not only that ; the other th ing that we’ve seen is what might be cal led revolving door act ing appointment, when people are appointed to act for s ix months, n ine months, a year, and then they move on. And that real ly – when we put i t to your col league who was in HR, General Burger, he was saying that there is in fact a Nat ional guidel ine that th is should happen with in three months.

Well , i t ’s certa in ly not what we’ve seen here, and given tha t leadership is such an important factor in pol ice stat ions, i t is a concern, would you not agree? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink there is – there is delays in the advert is ing of the post . That one we can acknowledge. MS BAWA: Can I – can I deal with paragraph 12 of your Af f idavi t . You say

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that : “The Cluster Off icer has the responsib i l i ty to ensure that operat ional funct ions are in fact done in accordance with the sub -standing order.”

Now, one would then say that besides the Inspectorate that comes and inspects, your Cluster Command of f ice is your f i rst port of cal l outside your stat ion in re lat ion to oversight . MAJ GEN JACOBS: Correct . MS BAWA: Would you agree with that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I would agree. MS BAWA: And how – there would be an informal oversight , and then there would be a more formal oversight where they would into the pol ice stat ion and they would actual ly enter into the OB what they f ind. Is that the procedure? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Standardly, yes. I mean, they would be – I think the Cluster Commander – there’s a matr ix they must complete, what we cal l the performance matr ix. Every c luster has got so many vis i ts i t must do, so many dockets he must read. Al l of those part icular – I don’t have them this year, but there’s part icular th ings that they must complete that every – every period. I th ink i t ’s every quarter.

And so many dockets he must read, he must have at tended, he must have had – one of the condit ions is, i f there is an escape, for example, the Cluster Commander must h imself or h is of f ice must have at tended the cr ime scene, the escape scene, and compi le a report and intervent ion. Those are al l the stuf f that have to be done. There’s a set of th ings that Cluster Commands must do. MS BAWA: That ’s what I would have thought. But the Commission asked specif ical ly for any reports prepared by the Cluster Command relat ing to the three pol ice stat ions. And we were to ld there were nothing. MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, he didn’ t necessari ly wr i te to the po l ice stat ion. He compl ies the – i t ’s a – I th ink i t ’s a quarter ly report that comes to the Province. They’re about the number of vis i ts. We use that in h is – those reports to ensure that th is was wr i t ten, i t was developed by Nat ional, we pi loted in the W estern Cape, and that ’s standardly the responsib i l i ty that the Cluster have.

What they wi l l do, they would be correct ing and direct ing operat ion act ivi t ies and where there’s areas to be corrected. I f he does – i f he vis i ts a stat ion, he must – typical ly he must vis i t the stat ion and he must typical ly have made an OB entry to say that he or she was there, and th is is what they’ve found; they’ve found the fo l lowing people on duty because typical ly – assuming that you’re dr iving with your car, which maybe y ou must – you put in a c la im, the OB number wi l l ver i fy that number as oh, that ’s the one that is ( indist inct) .

Secondly, you’re at tending the stat ion, you’re vis i t ing and you’re f inding certa in issues. And ei ther th ings are going wel l , or they must corre ct them to make that in the OB. That is in the occurrence book. That is there for you. I f you vis i t the cel ls, you make a note in the cel l OB that you’ve – and then you’ve gone through the SAP 14. That ’s k ind -of what you … MS BAWA: I ’m going to say to that, what we did ask was for matters that were reported to the Province and not to the stat ion i tself . But i t was also interest ing in that in a l l the OB books that we sampled and we looked at , across the three stat ions, i f we found a dozen entr ies f rom any body in the Cluster Command, we found a lot .

And so the quest ion was ra ised by us as to what precisely is the ro le of a

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Cluster Commander in the context of – in the context at a l l , because we seem to see an extremely ef f ic ient oversight funct ion being performed by a Provincia l Inspectorate. MAJ GEN JACOBS: The ro le of Cluster Commander as – I mean, as indicated, is just … as I indicated to you earl ier, i t ’s very speci f ic. On the one hand he or she is the Provincia l Off icer at that local level , ne? Which means that person is in the coder and one. Two, coordinat ing – the Cluster stat ions except in Worcester are between three for standard ( indist inct). I t ’s between three and seven stat ions – i t depends on the size, about. MS BAWA: But let ’s look at the Khayel i tsha Cluster. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja. I t ’s a standard ( indist inct) . So – I ’m st i l l answering your quest ion, i f I may. And then they’ re responsib le for monitor ing operat ion act ivi t ies with in the stat ion, with in the Cluster. They are to ensure that st at ions are deploying that personnel correct ly and opt imal ly. So ei ther they are – and that wi l l be, i f they come there there’s only one person in the CSC and there’s f ive hands outside, they’ l l br ing some people in to assist with that , to ensure that – and then engage the Stat ion Commissioner about that. They are – they wi l l general ly provide guidance on the – on improving operat ional services with in that stat ion. And they wi l l do also – in that matr ix there’s a specif ic set of dut ies that they have to do , that wi l l inspect so many – the number of dockets, and I just – I neglected to br ing the l is t wi th, but we can provide that , a l is t of … MS BAWA: We have – we have the l ist . MAJ GEN JACOBS: Of so many dockets … MS BAWA: I t ’s been provided. MAJ GEN JACOBS: The number of stat ions, vis i ts, a l l of those must be done. MS BAWA: The simple point I ’m try ing to make is that f rom your posi t ion as head of operat ions, were you sat isf ied in l ight of the Inspectorate reports that were coming out f rom Province – and I take your point that those Inspectorate reports are precisely to h ighl ight d if f icul t ies and to provide the Stat ion Commander with a means to rect i fy some of these dif f icul t ies a long the way. You have th is Cluster in between the Provincia l Inspectorate and the stat ion, and i t begs the quest ion that i f the Provincia l Inspectorate were highl ight ing so many di f f icul t ies, what was your Cluster doing? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Remember, I th ink you did ra ise that – I th ink – specif ical ly I th ink there was – we acknowledged there was a period when there was a chal lenge when the Cluster Commander, a very good Cluster Command, General Ndlovu, was of f s ick. Right? Out of ( indist inct) , because she was genuinely of f s ick, and we had placed people there for temporary – because we didn’ t at the t ime have an idea of how sick she was unt i l we sent General Jaf ta through to go and see. And she came back with a grave report that she’s very, very s ick. At that point we were putt ing people there at short – a month, s ix weeks, so that – so that ( intervent ion). MS BAWA: But, you see, General , there’s Gen Ndlovu and the Cluster Command is made up of e ight very senior l ieutenant colonel upwards members. Now, notwithstanding the absence of a General or an act ing appointment, the only one where we have seen any evidence of provid ing a funct ion is ef fect ively Col Visser. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink that would be surpr is ing for me, because we have Col Kwintshi that is the Vispol head, and he was appointed sl ight ly at the t ime

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when she was, I th ink, just arr ived, and she lef t . Col Kwintshi , a very experienced Stat ion Commissioner, he’s f rom Khayel i tsha, and he was responsib le. I know he – I would see him of ten on making sure that there’s operat ional coordinat ion happening between the var ious s tat ions, and showing that the TRT is not e i ther ut i l ised only here or in other stat ions. So there’s that responsib i l i ty. Whether he now – and I th ink that would be a part icular oversight i f there’s no records in the OBs of these kinds of vis i ts, and he’s responsible for d irect ing operat ions in the Cluster. COMMISSIONER: And in th is regard, i t was surpr is ing to us to see an emai l f rom the Act ing Cluster Commander, the Khayel i tsha Cluster, on the 2 n d December 2013, wri t ing an urgent message to the Provinc ia l of f ice saying that in l ight of the enquir ies re lated to the Commission, that he needed to know what the ro les and responsib i l i t ies of the Cluster Commander was. In other words, he wasn’t sure what his job was on the 2 n d December. And he then got a response back f rom Col Vermeulen, out l in ing those. But i t d id seem to us that i t suggested that there is a lack of c lar i ty about – even to the very incumbents of the posi t ion as to what the posi t ion involves. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I haven’t – I haven’t seen that . MS BAWA: And I ’m alert ing you to i t , because i t seems that even the members of SAPS who test i f ied here ra ised two issues. One was that they didn’ t regard the Cluster Command as being properly resourced, and the other th ing was that i ts operat ional funct ions wasn’t yet completely def ined because i t was a new – i t was a fa ir ly new ent i ty. But the fa ir ly new ent i ty is four years, f ive years down the l ine. But I leave i t there and I move on. You, in your d irect evidence, ta lked about the early years in K hayel i tsha. When I ta lk about the early years, i t was your in i t ia l years in Khayel i tsha. And the – you straddled the period essent ia l ly f rom one pol ice stat ion to three pol ice stat ions, or the two satel l i tes being converted to independent standing pol ice stat ion. I d id wonder at some point , when you were Stat ion Commander of only the one stat ion, what was the staf f numbers on the combined – what was the level of staf f ing l ike? Can you give me an indicat ion how many members were here? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I f I ’m not mistaken, there was about 226, 230, about, at the stat ion. But the RAG was – i t wasn’t a RAG then, i t was – i t had another name – but the RAG, i t was meant to be 400. MS BAWA: When you take that 226 do you include the detect ives that were based at Harare and the personnel that was placed at L ingelethu West? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja MS BAWA: So between ( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: They were just si t t ing there. MS BAWA: They were just s i t t ing there. Okay. So between 2003 and 2013, we’ve seen an almost 200% increase in pol ice membership in Khayel i tsha, i f you take the greater Khayel i tsha, and we’ve seen three pol ice stat ions. And, as you explained, that was what the past strategy contemplated you doing. Right. But that br ings up the issue of the fourth pol ice stat ion, because i t seems that at the t ime when the decis ion on the Macassar pol ice stat ion wasn’t taken separately, because we’ve been provided with a report dated March 2004 to the then Provincia l Commissioner f rom the Project Leader, Pol ice Precinct Evaluat ion, a Capt L A de W it . And th is was a work study invest igat ion on the

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establ ishment of addit ional pol ic ing ent i t ies with in the Khayel i tsha pol ic ing precinct . And th is report actual ly goes towards looking at var ious opt ions, and ta lks about the f i f th precinct and the viabi l i ty of the f i f th precinct , the decis ion of the fourth precinct having already been taken. But what is interest ing is that on page 6 of th is report , is i t detai ls that the construct ion of the new pol ice stat ion for Macassar is pr ior i ty number 2 on the Western Cape pr ior i ty l is t . Capita l works take about 5 mi l l ion, 2004/2005, and for the Divis ional Commission, Logist ics pr ior i ty number 11 for the 2005/2006 f inancia l year. Do I assume that the number 11 is the Nat ional l is t , and the other one is the Provincia l l is t? So that ’s – that ’s what i t says there, r ight? And i t then goes on and i t says:

“ I t was the instruct ion of the Provincia l Commissi oner that addit ional pol ic ing ent i t ies be establ ished in Khayel i tsha in order to render a service capable of meet ing the chal lenge of improving the del ivery of publ ic services as prescr ibed in the Batho Pele white paper.”

I t then, and I ’m reading f rom page 12: “At that point a work study invest igat ion perta in ing to the personnel structure for a new pol ice stat ion in Macassar had been conducted in July 2002. I t was approved by the Deputy Provincia l Commissioner and, however, to ensure a hol ist ic approach, t he Macassar pol ic ing area was once again incorporated into the [ intervent ion] invest igat ion.”

So i t was against that background that Macassar was included. And i t then says on page 23 in re lat ion to the Macassar pol ice stat ion, a s i te was ident if ied and approved. I t says the construct ion was pr ior i ty number 2 and pr ior i ty number 11. I t repeats that . I t then says that – i t proposes that the Harare pol ice stat ion pol ices the proposed Macassar pol ic ing precinct unt i l such t ime as the Macassar pol ice stat ion is fu l ly operat ional, and that the resources al located to the proposed Macassar pol ice stat ion be ut i l ised at Harare for the durat ion of th is period. I t further says that :

“Upon complet ion of a new of f ice block at the Khayel i tsha Site B pol ice stat ion, th is wi l l a l leviate the ent i re accommodat ion cr is is experienced by the Site B pol ice stat ion. The re lat ionship between the community and SAPS would then improve as a result of a more effect ive pol ic ing service being rendered.”

And f inal ly – ja . That ’s a repeat. So th is report contemplates that happens. Now, how did Macassar s l ip f rom number 2 on the pol ic ing pr ior i ty l is t? Because between 2004 to now several other pol ice stat ions in the Province was bui l t . MAJ GEN JACOBS: As I ’ve indicated before, both Macassar and Site C and the problem of land. There was no land avai lable. They ment ion there, and it comes f rom, I know, a d iscussion and a meet ing we held with the Provincia l Commissioner, myself and the mayor and Mgoqi to see if we can – Wallace Mgoqi – i f we can ident ify a k ind -of agreement about a p lot of land next to the shopping mal l in Macassar. However, that land was never technical ly put to us an explanat ion, so that was wri t ten into the plan. I t was, however, not yet – that had to happen, the contract arrangements had to happen. We were not the authorised people to

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engage in such a discussion. We engaged in i t , ident if ied i t , hopeful ly, and t ransferred now our service needs to Publ ic Works that must – and I th ink in that process there was a change of administrat ion. MS BAWA: We understand that th is is a negot iat ion between Publ ic Works in order to get the land for your pol ice stat ion. So your evidence is that, whi lst you contemplated Macassar being a pr ior i ty, i t kept on sl ipping because you did n’t have land avai lable in Macassar for i t to be bui l t , notwithstanding that under what you saw, the – Mgoqi as City Manager, there was an understanding with the City that land would be provided. I understand – and you say that af ter he lef t the City Manager, what was i t? The land wasn’t provided? The City reneged on i t , or i t just d idn’ t mater ia l ise? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I can’ t – but I just know between him leaving and the fact that i t had to go to Nat ional Publ ic Works to enter into – or Publ ic Works – to enter that d iscussion, that i t never mater ia l ised and the land was used. That p lace is now – somebody else has bui l t on there. So – so that is – i t is land that we ident if ied and we saw i t there. We thought i t was the ideal p lace in terms of where, and we went there. But i t was earmarked, i t would appear, later on for something else. COMMISSIONER: What’s been bui l t on there? Do you know? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Sorry? COMMISSIONER: What has been bui l t on that p iece of land? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink i t ’s an extension of the mal l . COMMISSIONER: An extension of the mal l . MAJ GEN JACOBS: Of the mal l in that part of ( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: And when was that? Do you know? MAJ GEN JACOBS: The t ime of our d iscussion was in 2004, but that extension of the mal l , i t ’s probably about three, four years ago. I t ’s far – the Mal l is now far b igger. That was the – i t ’s next to – next to – s l ight ly at the back of the mal l . That ’s where we ident if ied, there. MS BAWA: Do you know when the current s i te became avai lable? MAJ GEN JACOBS: What s i te? MS BAWA: The current s i te that you’re contemplat ing bui ld ing the Macassar pol ice stat ion. MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, I don’t know now about that land. MS BAWA: But I a lso want to say to you that in a report prepared by the Provincia l Commissioner Petros in March 2010, he also contemplates that addit ional pol ice stat ions wi l l be bui l t in Macassar. And, in fact he says that , and in a report which is then reported by the Cape Times, that before the end of the f inancia l year Mitchel l ’s P la in and Khayel i tsha would have more pol ice stat ions and another seven ( indist inct) would be establ ished across the Province. Khayel i tsha would be the pol ice stat ion at Macassar, whi le Mitchel l ’s Pla in now with two pol ice stat ions in Delf t and next to the Mitchell ’s Pla in court would get another two stat ions. So – and then the f inal point that I want to make is that – so that ’s what Petros says in a report in – Commissioner Petros says in a report in March 2010. Provincia l Commissioner Lamoer in h is Af f i davi t before the High Court in 2012 says:

“To address the issue of l imited resources, two further pol ice stat ions wi l l be establ ished in Khayel i tsha with in the next two to three years. First Macassar police stat ion wi l l be constructed in 2014.”

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Now, here you have a community that ’s bat t l ing with a cr ime problem, and for the last 12 years i t has been ant ic ipated that there would be a fourth pol ice stat ion in Macassar. One has to delve very deeply into a l l the documents to understand that there are pract ical reasons why i t ’s not done, that the Nat ional Commissioner has certa in obl igat ions, that there’s budgetary constra ints, that the pol ice stat ion is a huge proposit ion to do, but nobody goes and te l ls the community th is. They keep on being to ld next year, th is year, the fo l lowing year. I t ’s qui te evident f rom the evidence we’ve gotten f rom Brig Fick that i t ’s not even going to be able to happen th is year. I ’m saying that – I ’m putt ing the proposit ion to you because that doesn’t go down wel l in bui ld ing re lat ionships with in the community. Do you have any comment? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink only of the one issue of not having contact with the community. We’ve had imbizos where we’ve had, in the areas, in, as you ment ioned, Mitchel l ’s Pla in, there was imbizos and here in Khayel i tsha, in Macassar. MS BAWA: With respect, Gen Jacobs, I ’m not saying you don’t have a communicat ion with i t . But i f I look at the imbizos that was held in 2012/2013, at those very imbizos the community was to ld that the pol ice stat ion is co ming in 2014. MAJ GEN JACOBS: But I ’m saying – that ’s part of what I – my response is merely to say that, in terms of – there has been a feedback, and i t would be understandable that there’s the fact that i t ’s taken long to bui ld the pol ice stat ions, both get land and then put i t on the Nat ional l is t . So that is an understandable f rustrat ion. MS BAWA: But my point is, a l l of that is not re layed to the community. I can understand i t as a ( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, but I indicated – with respect, I ’ve indicated that in our imbizos we have indicated – but people ra ise – the imbizos is not a one direct ional. People ta lk. They say, but you’ve promised, and we said, yes, we did, and expla ined where the problem was . I remember I was at two once when we went, before I lef t , one upwards and there came again when – as in when you’re Provincia l you at tend where people ask about – even in Si te C. They ask, when are our pol ice stat ion – we say no, th is is what we’re struggl ing with. In Si te C, even today we don’t have land. There’s no land there. I t ’s probably unl ikely to be there because there’s just no space. I f i t ’s going to be, i t ’s going to be at the edge of the area, that ’s not going to be able to service, l ike Har are is now, on the edge of the area. So I would say that . MS BAWA: Have you considered a satel l i te in Si te C? Which wouldn’ t take up the – given the dif f icul ty – i t only struck me earl ier because you ident if ied Site C as being part icular ly problemat ic, w i thout land for a pol ice stat ion. But i t does seem that , in l ight of what you said, that i t warrants some pol ice presence. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes. I mean, we’ve had a satel l i te there for a whi le.

The problem is with the satel l i tes in that when you have a fu l l pol ice stat ion, resources are al located in l ine with that fu l l pol ice stat ion. I f you have a satel l i te you’re taking f rom the exist ing and you’re put t ing vehic le – members that would have been on a vehic le being in a bui ld ing now. And then you have a p roblem of patro l l ing in the area. That ’s the chal lenge always with a satel l i te.

People want – many communit ies ask for satel l i te, but a satel l i te

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ef fect ively takes eight people. You must have a minimum of two people being present in the satel l i te. That ’s e ight people out of c irculat ion for only – you don’t have cel ls there, you don’t have a – that satel l i te is merely a contact point.

You won’t have the CAS system to CAS the dockets, you’ l l te l l them tomorrow, they must come tomorrow for a new number, of you’ l l sms them the number. So those are some of the chal lenges of satel l i tes. I t ’s a b i t of a chal lenge in the way that satel l i te works. We’ve been doing – doing – set t ing up a number of satel l i tes, but i t generates that problem. I f on the day the peo ple who are supposed to be deployed in a cr ime f ight ing operat ion in the area, they’re now si t t ing in the satel l i tes. So that ’s in terms of our resource capacity. So a fu l ly f ledged pol ice stat ion, i t means resources wi l l be al located, there’ l l be – that ’s the dif ference with a pol ice stat ion and a satel l i te. MS BAWA: You also addressed the past strategy, the Opus strategy, the Project 6 strategy, and you touched on the President ia l stat ion. Can I f i rst check with you, has that come and gone, the issue of a President ia l stat ion? MAJ GEN JACOBS: L ike I said, there was never real ly – I th ink Gen Burger indicate that , that there was never real ly a Presidentia l stat ion. There was a President ia l area. Now, at that point we had, in our understanding, we had met a lot of the requirements in terms of set t ing up capacity. The two pol ice stat ions that we ident if ied would have been the idea to say we’ve resourced i t in terms of the urban upgrades and urban renewal, we’ve resourced f rom our perspect ive. But the area st i l l remains a President ia l area in that that renewal, i t ’s a work in progress, and very s lowly at that , but i t ’s a – so i t hasn’t completely reached the object ive. MS BAWA: So, as i t ’s part of th is President ia l area, i t remains – i t should st i l l be the ( indist inct) of that which President ia l areas get, f rom al l Departments, not s imply SAPS. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes. That ’s our understanding. MS BAWA: And that should st i l l be ongoing unt i l such t ime as the problems that was in i t ia l ly ident if ied are overcome. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes. MS BAWA: Is that your understanding as wel l? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes, i t is . MS BAWA: Okay. Now, when we look at Khayel i tsha as an area and we break i t down into three pol ic ing precincts, one of the th ings that struck me – and I don’t want to take you to the whole debate over grant RAG and actual RAG and the theoret ical human resources percept ion, because we’ve had that evidence f rom some of your col leagues – but the bottom l ine of what i t a l l comes to is that i f you look at the number of pol ice members, and I ’m ta lk ing about your SAPS personnel, not your c leaners and your gardeners and your support staf f , and you correlate that to the populat ion in al l o f the three precincts, then you f ind that Khayel i tsha is not bet ter of f , or i t ’s worse of f than a number of your other areas in the Western Cape, despite the cr ime chal lenges that have been ident if ied in Khayel i tsha How does one expla in that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: The issue is a lways at the t ime the only avai lable stat ist ics we had was the census of the t ime. The census data that has now been ra ised because avai lable 2012. So we had planned, as far as I understand, on the – that populat ion f igure and, one, to Khayel i tsha in terms of i ts formal vote environment hasn’t

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substant ively grown, but the informal sprawl ing has ef fect ively exploded to an extent that we’ve never had – l ike I said, for what we planned, we never had Nkanini , and Ndlovin i has gone to Swartk l ip. So for that – and that is going to remain a chal lenge for us unt i l the area is – there’s a very c lear structure for development for the area, and a plan with the ant ic ipat ion of the projected – there, for example, there’s no current urban plan, fu l l urban plan, for Khayel i tsha. There’s urban renewal, but there’re urban renewal lodes, and not a fu l l p lan to say th is is the area i t is projected there is going to be a mi l l ion f ive people here in th is date, and these are the bui ld ing and the bui l t environment layout, and we can plan accordingly. We’ve la id out on what we had. And that is the problem. MS BAWA: Can I – can I understand your answer to be, because we didn’t have up-to-date stat ist ics f igures, Khayel i tsha was disadvantaged in the sense that i t got less pol icemen than some of the other more urban areas where the pol ice is actual ly more correlat ive to the populat ion, so to speak – is that how I understand i t? Because I want ( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: No. I ’m saying something dif ferent. I ’m saying is, f i rst ly, we did br ing, as you’ve in your quest ions and almost in evidence indicate, that we had a 200% increase in what we had. So i t ’s important to understand i t in that context , that we have resourced i t considerably f rom where i t was, admit t edly f rom a very low basis. But we have.

However, part of that is important to contextual ise, is the context of what was avai lable, one. Two – the absence of a c lear p lan for the area that says a planning f ramework for the area, to say th is is the popul at ion, th is is where th ings wi l l develop. The Commissioner had asked, the Commissioner regular ly asked, why is Harare bui l t in that part?

I f we asked at the way the current development ’s going, i f we’re both in Macassar in the land that ( indist inct) , woul d that be at the r ight p lace? Because that ’s part of – Gen Molo indicated yesterday when the precincts are planned, the pol ice is never factored into i t .

I don’t recal l one area, except in the former suburbs, where the area is planned and the pol ice stat ion is p lanned in a strategic p lace. We’ve never been involved in i t where in any of the Coloured and Afr ican townships we scrounge for land, then we f ind a pocket of land there and then we bui ld the pol ice stat ion there. MS BAWA: Can we l imited th is maybe to human resources, because if I look at the same report I referred you to earl ier, then i t est imated the populat ion in Khayel i tsha to be 349 227 on the basis of the Stats South Af r ica, re lease date of 23 July 2003, and the Stat ion Managers est imate the populat ion to be approximately 850. The report then goes on and says we’re going to accept the Stats South Af r ica f igures as being far more accurate. Now, i f one looks at what the experts before the Commission have indicated, that in 2013 est imates, or th e most recent est imates that we get, is that there’s about 420 000 people in Khayel i tsha. So in the populat ion growth, put t ing aside whether the Stats South Af r ica was r ight in 2003 or not , on the in format ion avai lable to SAPS, there’s only been a 70 000 growth in Khayel i tsha in the last twelve years, which makes you th ink that Stats South Af r ica was wrong in 2003. But i t was ( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: Or they’re wrong now.

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MS BAWA: Well , now we’re pret ty sure they’re not wrong now, because i t is conf irmed by a var iety of d if ferent sources, including yourselves, by the way. So, in which case, f rom the data avai lable at SAPS, having used the Stats South Af r ica data, when you planned th ings ten years ago to what you have now, i t can’ t be based on a sudden explosion on populat ion that we have such an in iqui tous pol ice to populat ion rat io between pol ic ing precincts in Khayel i tsha and that in other comparable, or in the more urban areas. Let me give you an example; you’ve got Claremont that ’s got on e is to 281, but you’ve got Harare that ’s got one is to 1 702, and I ’m now using the pol ice personnel to populat ion f igures because f rom the evidence that was given f rom Col Vermeulen the latest stat ist ics which show a f igure of one is to 903 includes our support staf f and our c leaners, etc. And so how do we actual ly deal with that, because we start our members off at a d isadvantage, don’t you th ink? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I just want to see if I ’ve got the same – is that the – the populat ion rat io, is that Br ig Hei lbron presented here? MS BAWA: Yes. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Is that that f igure? MS BAWA: Ja. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Okay. I ’ l l just see ( intervent ion). MS BAWA: I can pass them on to i f you’d l ike to have a look at them. Here’s two – there were two that was granted. Let me just – I can f ind i t easi ly, so I ’m going to just – the one’s got Harare in there, and the other one is there. MAJ GEN JACOBS: This is the one that , remember, I th ink we admitted th is was an incorrect calculat ion. MS BAWA: No, no. Wel l , ( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: This is the one that was signed, and I th ink there was a lot of matter in the press about i t and this is the incorrect calculat ion. There is one submitted by – but no, but there was a mistake made in th is calculat ion. MS BAWA: I ’ve g iven both to you, and Brig Hei lbron’s of f ice is – they’re two di f ferent ones. Brig Hei lbron’s of f ice is responsib le for compi l ing them, and he expla ined the nature of the error. I t wasn’t as much an error as in a di f ferent methodology that was adopted. The one calculates onl y actual pol ice, vis ib le and detect ives, and the other one calculates everybody at the pol ice stat ion. Now, that ’s the dif ference in the two reports. And if you take Harare, for instances, on both f igures, you come to a tota l of 192. So the rat io f igure in the last column is actual employees under the SAPS Act, and i t doesn’t include your PSA members. The other schedule, which is the la t ter corrected schedule, includes your PSA members and your support members. And he, I understand, actual ly prepared tho se schedules, and that was the explanat ion he provided to us. MAJ GEN JACOBS: So in terms of what RAG, you say in terms of the rat ios Harare seems to be the one that ’s qui te … MS BAWA: Yes. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Substant ively ( in tervent ion). MS BAWA: But not only Harare. Khayel i tsha as wel l . L ingelethu West is a l i t t le b i t bet ter in i ts urban ( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, i t ’s not only – there’s Belhar, the rat io is at 750. Delf t is at 668. And so you go. There’s a number of others with Kraaifontein,

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Durbanvi l le at 501, and so on, in the – complete in the tota l arrangement so that , yes, i t ’s h igh, Harare is ( intervent ion). MS BAWA: 1 709. MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, in terms of – no, th is is the incorrect one. MS BAWA: Wel l , we can ( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: I ’m giv ing you the one that you were – we’re ta lk ing about. MS BAWA: Okay, wel l , le t ’s ta lk about that . Harare’s one to 903. MAJ GEN JACOBS: 903. MS BAWA: Yes. MAJ GEN JACOBS: So in terms of that one, i t ’s substant ively h igher than the others. As we indicated, remember, there was a specif ic movement. Most of the growth in Khayel i tsha were in the bui l t environment, where there were houses bui l t , and the informal set t lements movement was in Harare. So – and the movement then was, that ’s the area where there was vacant land. Nkanini , Ndlovin i , the rest of Kuyasa, as I indicated, is there, is in Harare precinct .

So that ’s why you see th is. And you’ l l see th is spike would probably over t ime – I don’t have i t here now, but I can almost with certa i nty say the spike is the last three to four years. MS BAWA: But then we have th is very scient i f ical ly determined methodology adopted, where you get these cr i t ical need assessments, you get th is theoret ical , you get th is granted, and then your actual . And our evidence has been that we take into account as a f i rst stage the si tuat ion on the ground when we make these calculat ions. And we do th is every January. So what I can’t understand is, i f we do th is every January, how do we then end up with something that d if f icul t , or d if ferent? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I want to ( intervent ion). MS BAWA: Because i t af fects you – i t af fects your operat ional ly. I mean, do you not – le t ’s rephrase i t , because I don’t want to get into a human resource debate with you, i t ’s not you r ( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: But I ’m saying that – Chair , i f I may – I was here for the last few days. The quest ions are asked to every senior manager, and I ’m intr igued by why that is so, because are we saying because i t ’s been answered by that l ine manager? MS BAWA: No, no, no … MAJ GEN JACOBS: So I ( intervent ion). MS BAWA: I want to – I want to point out ( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: ( inaudible – part ies speaking simultaneously) what point are we making i f we’re a lways asking the same question to d if ferent managers, as i f to a lmost f ind that we’re contradict ing each other? And to me i t ’s ( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: No, I don’t th ink that – I don’t think that is the reason, General . But i f i t is correct that there is a deep -seated pattern of under -staf f ing the poorest , most cr ime-r idden and most vulnerable sect ions of our community, that ’s worrying. We wouldn’ t want to make that f ind ing as a Commission, unless we’ve given every s ingle senior pol ice of f icer that walks in f ront of us an opportuni ty to te l l us that that ’s wrong.

But as we look at these f igures, that’s what i t looks l ike. And i t looks l ike the error goes back to the THRR – as I put i t to Brig Rabie, the dif f icul ty is that there is under-valuing of exact ly what you’ve ta lked about, the environmental factors that pol ic ing in informat ion set t lements is under -valued.

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But i t ’s not only that , because i t h i ts the detect ives as wel l . So we real ly don’t want to make f indings unless they’re correct , and that’s

why i t ’s been put to you. And we would only be too delighted, qui te t ruthfu l ly, i f you could show us that there’s an error in th is, and if so, in th is understanding or th is interpretat ion of these events, and point to why there is an error. But i t ’s to give you an opportuni ty to te l l us there is an error, not because we’re t rying to catch you out or anything else. That is not the purpose of th is Commission, as my col league has already put to you. MS BAWA: Can I ( inaudible – part ies speaking simultaneously) another quest ion, and the reason why I ’m asking you this is because you head operat ions. The impact on your member when he has to pol ice 2 000 people as opposed to the impact on a member when he has to pol ice 200 people must be signi f icant ly d if ferent . So you must feel i t operat ional ly. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Can I – can I ( intervent ion). MS BAWA: Maybe I ’m being simpl ist ic. MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, no, I th ink – I th ink that there is a point that you have and I th ink, Commissioner, I wanted to make th is point . Not saying that we – I ’m just saying is that quest ions was answered, i t was ra ised here. What I factored in, and I said when I to ld the story, is that we – we have put resources here, we’re not yet – we’re not yet complete with th is; there’s st i l l gaps in the rank, and that is st i l l there. Now, I cannot even – I cannot compare or even – I rather would urge the Commission not to come to that f inding that there’s a purposeful at tempt to want to make i t d if ferent for ourselves to manipulate the f igures to not service the community. That can never be our ( intervent ion). COMMISSIONER: I can te l l you r ight now that we’re not looking at th is in the quest ion of mot ive. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Okay. COMMISSIONER: The real quest ion – I mean, the purpose of th is Commission, let me be quite f rank, is to look at a problem, a community has ra ised a set of concerns, very legi t imate, very per t inent concerns , and we’re just t rying to determine whether there is meri t in them and, i f there is meri t in them, what can be done in a spir i t of cooperat ion and partnership with SAPS, not in an adversaria l spir i t . MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, and I agree with that , Commissione r. The point I th ink I wanted to make, and I th ink and I would urge us to factor in the fact that we’ve planned, we’ve put resources here, and then there’s th is sprawl, a development of area that we never ant ic ipated. I even gave the date, 2005, i t ’s the 2 8 t h December, or in fact the 30 t h December specif ical ly when Nkanini was smal l , and now i t ’s a fu l l – a fu l l area. Probably Nkanini must have a fu l l pol ice stat ion in t ime, the size – i f i t could be developed, one. So you would have that part icular rat io – and the rat io i t would be, because i t ’s of where people have moved into. Now, i f there’s a – but I th ink that is our b ig chal lenge, and I must say that I have th is, Commissioner, and I want to say th is; we have – a few months ago Kirstenhof wrote us an e xtensive let ter f rom the CPF complain ing about their RAG, the unscient if ic nature of the RAG and how we’re advantaging other areas. They’re aware of the POS stat ions, and they say the POS stat ions are st i l l being advantaged. We had – we had stat ions in the Voortrekker bel t and the Main Road, Southern Suburbs, bel t , ra ised in big newspaper headl ines about that certa in

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areas are being advantaged with resources when we put 150 people here at one t ime, put a lot of the vehic les here. So that has happened, an d there was that complained. Now Belhar, with the numbers that they have there, are ra is ing the same complaint . Belhar, they’re complain ing about the small pol ice stat ion that they have. There’s no land, so we’re rent ing a house that we converted, and the y ra ised the same concern there.

Kirstenhof is – we’re in a house, a house in Kirstenhof, they’re ra is ing the same concerns there. They’re a suburb, a wealthy suburb, they’re ra is ing the same – so we have – and we have to struggle with what we have.

So we made big decis ions in the early years, and now we’re d istr ibut ing i t systemat ical ly to each ( indist inct) gets even with in my area, we are 200 short . In my new area, we’ve got 50 people now. So helpfu l ly that wi l l help with that – 52 people just arr ived. But in the big p icture of 600, they have to be distr ibuted. There’s another 800 that must go in in the next two years, and that must a lso be distr ibuted.

So about the calculat ion of the RAG, I cannot comment. MS BAWA: I want to stay away f rom the calculat ion of the RAG. I th ink we’ve covered that . But the point I ’m trying to make with you, obviously you place your stat ion at a d isadvantage i f your pol ice to populat ion rat ios are higher. Would you accept that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I t ’s d if f icul t – i t depends on the area. MS BAWA: That was the ( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: And i t ’s compounded if you operate in informal set t lements with no l ights, with no places to move, with no housing, with no numbers, with no – wi th to i lets that are outside, compounded by that. MS BAWA: We’re on the same page on that , so … Then let me ta ke you to the issue of reservists. As I understand i t , you establ ished a reserve pol ice service under Sect ion 48 of the SAPS Act. You had regulat ions – you had regulat ions that was in existence in 2002, and then you placed – you real ised that there needed to be changes made at the level , and you placed the morator ium on the further appointment of reservists in 2010, and then on 15 October 2013, you publ ished the amended Regulat ions – amendments to the exist ing Regulat ions. Is that the change in the pol icy on reservists that is contemplated, that which is the amendments to the Regulat ions? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I don’t understand the quest ion you’re asking precisely. MS BAWA: I d idn’ t see a changed reservist – le t ’s ask the f i rst quest ion. Has the morator ium been l i f ted? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink we’re now at the f inal phase. I t ’s st i l l not yet l i f ted. They were just – we had to make comments on th is new th ing that ’s in – I haven’t seen the Minister ’s f inal report , but i t ’s bound to be the same as – or not the same, with the new amendments that … MS BAWA: So the pol icy’s not ent i rely f inal ised? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Not yet . MS BAWA: Preceding the pol icy the Nat ional Minister has made amendments to the exist ing Regulat ions. Now, I want to ta lk to you for a minute about these new amendments made to the Regulat ions, because the Regulat ions now contemplate that in order – I ’m going to put a l l the stuf f that I want to in the Regulat ions to you, and then ask you to comment. First ly, to be a reservist , you must be a Sou th Af r ican ci t izen. You must

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be least 25 years – I actual ly have copies, i f i t ’ l l make l i fe easier, in the bundle. Mindful of the t ime, I just want to take you through i t , r ight? You must be at least 25 and below 40; you must complete the health quest ionnaire; you must be mental ly and physical ly f i t ; good and sound character; you have to f i t the psychometr ic prof i le , and I ’m reading f rom the f i rst page at F. Have matr ic or the equivalent ; you must be l i terate; your f ingerpr ints and DNA must be taken; you must undergo t ra in ing; you must take a prescr ibed oath, and you must understand that your services may be terminated at the age of 60. You must complete an assessment quest ionnaire, you must be vet ted and screened – and th is is the part that concerns me: you must be employed and provide proof of employment, you must have a f ixed resident ia l address, you mustn’ t have a cr iminal record or any cr iminal or Departmental cases pending against you, and you mustn’ t have a vis ib le tat too. Now, a l l of these requirements can be waived, but only by the Nat ional Commissioner, not even the Provincia l Commissioner, r ight? Now, you – you set very str ingent requirements for somebody to become a reservist in your Regulat ions. And then, in the next amendment, which is to Regulat ion 5, they ta lk about how the Nat ional Commissioner can cal l you up i f i t ’s necessary for the objects of pol ic ing, which is very broad, because i t refers back to the Const i tut ional provis ion, and when you so ordered you must come, and if you don’t come then you’re gui l ty of an of fence. I t ’s only when you’re so ordered that you get remunerated, r ight? And then under sub 4, which is 5, sub 4:

“An employer of a reservist who discharges such reservist , or changes his or her condit ions of servic e to the detr iment of such reservist on account of h im performing funct ions is gui l ty of an of fence and is, upon convict ion of such an of fence, l iable to a f ine or imprisonment.”

Now, f i rst ly, people have the most t ime on their hands to serve as reservists are possib ly people who are not employed. Secondly, i f I ’m employed and I can be cal led up at any t ime to the point of where i t ’s jeopardising my employment, I ’m certa in ly going to think twice of being a reservist . I want to put the brute proposit ion t o you: th is regime doesn’t help you to recrui t reservists, and I want your comment on that . MAJ GEN JACOBS: This is the soon to be reservist pol icy, I ’m a discip l ined pol ice of f icer, th is is the pol icy, and I wi l l implement th is pol icy. And having said that , I ’ve out l ined earl ier about why we needed to br ing in speci f ical ly str ingent condit ions to ensure, as we’ve been answered (sic ) quest ions today and in the last few weeks and maybe in the next month about our conduct, i t is understandable that our conduct wi l l be under scrut iny. I t wi l l be expected that the person who wears – who is, ident if ies h imself as a pol ice person, of f ic ia l ( intervent ion). MS BAWA: I have no dif f icul ty with the conduct requirements. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Has to – has to meet a l l o f our requirements. And one of those requirements is, and we’ve had experiences with some of these chal lenges, with people who are fu l l t ime at the pol ice stat ion and they have to – you know, there were chal lenges re lated to those things. And that was the requirements. MS BAWA: Can I maybe say that your f i rearms contro l requirement and being a

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good and proper person, a l l those requirements, I th ink you stand on. I t ’s some of the other requirements that are of concern. One of the other th ings that came up yesterday, you require your reservists to be physical ly f i t . You require your persons who come and are recrui ted into your pol ice force as being physical ly f i t . But in your actual performance evaluat ions, as we underst ood the evidence, there isn’ t a f i tness requirement. Do you not th ink, and for someone to put to you, do you not th ink that somewhere along the l ine in performance evaluat ions f rom an operat ional requirement, you do require a f i tness element to be taken into account? MAJ GEN JACOBS: There is – no, not necessari ly on your performance evaluat ion because i t has nothing to do with performance about your other competencies. So in your – there’s two sessions we undergo, i t ’s the street survival t ra in ing, which becomes part of your competency. So – but they’re st i l l f inal is ing now what the new competency is, but we in the Western Cape check every year that people are st i l l up to standard, that – which we go through that part icular procedure. The nat ional cr i te ria is st i l l being resolved; how many – how long wi l l i t take, three years or f ive years for people to be – but you, as part of your what we cal l our street survival course, which is an obstacle course, you know, a beep – beep run test , and other act ivi t i es, that becomes part of your assessment when you pass your – to deal with your f i rearm competency. That becomes – so i f you can wear a f i rearm, you must have – you must undergo those part icular incidents. So there is, so i t ’s not l inked to – your performance is l inked to your abi l i ty to carry a f irearm. That ’s what your – how i t was l inked. So the fact that i t might be l inked to performance is something I ’ve never real ly looked at i t . But l inked to performance I ’ve understood to be whether you’re product ive or not . That one puts a cr i ter ia for why you need a f irearm, otherwise i t doesn’t make i t in any other job people must be f i t . So in our case – the law doesn’t require that – in our case we – because you have a f i rearm, you need to be physical ly act i ve. I t requires a physical capabi l i ty and a test to that . MS BAWA: So you’re ef fect ively saying to me that every member who carr ies a f i rearm under the Firearms Control Act is regarded as f i t . MAJ GEN JACOBS: Well , i t meets a certa in requirement. There’re di f ferent levels of f i tness, but i t meets the requirement as prescribed. MS BAWA: I want ( intervent ion). MAJ GEN JACOBS: And that ’s why we have – we would have challenges current ly because people are not ma king f i tness, so we have f i tness assessments and we’re working on that and upgrading that so we can deal with that , wi th the issue, because otherwise with some of them we’re going to have to have competency ( indist inct) , and that ’s what i t would amount to. MS BAWA: But are we not bet ter of f as part of – maybe not performance, but as part of promot ion, requir ing a level of f i tness? And not leaving i t up to another regime under the Firearm Control Act to do that? Do we not then ensure f i tness up our level or ranks with in SAPS? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Not necessari ly, because isn’ t i t your - as you go up, in your version, that s imple rat io of operat ional versus desk and management ro le changes, so you’re probably more f i tness and operat ional readiness required in the lower level . As you go up there’s d i f ferent physical requirements, so that

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can’t real ly hold, for me. But, a l l I know is th is is our current – and i t seems to work because people have to – and we’re struggl ing with people who when they can’t make i t , the physical environment, they struggle and we have to work to get them f i t again. MS BAWA: Let me – I want to deal with you with four issues very quickly, because I ’m going to run out of t ime. One is gangs. You are probably famil iar with the art ic le tha t appeared last week where Major General Jeremy Veary who was head of the Operat ions Combat had to say about gangs in Khayel i tsha. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Mm. MS BAWA: Right? Do you agree with the sent iments expressed in that art ic le? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes. And I ’ve said that ear l ier in my test imony, that there is a problem with gangs, and there’s d if ferent k inds of gangs. MS BAWA: Do we have a strategy in p lace to deal with gangs in Khayel i tsha? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes. MS BAWA: When are we going to be implement ing i t? MAJ GEN JACOBS : I don’t understand. We have implemented i t a lready. There’s d if ferent k inds of gangs. There’s the gangs in Khayel i tsha, and that ’s what I th ink the art ic le was referr ing to. There’s – we cal l – there’s d i f ferent kinds of gangs, and some gangs have, on the Cape Flats, they’re second generat ional gangs. We’ve presented th is before. MS BAWA: We understand the Cape Flat scenario. MAJ GEN JACOBS: But I want to i l lustrate i t ( intervent ion). MS BAWA: Let ’s ta lk about the ( intervent io n). MAJ GEN JACOBS: I want to i l lustrate the dif ference, I want to i l lustrate and why we’re saying that we’ve implemented. There’s d if ferent – so some gangs have second generat ion already, l ike the Hart l ings (?) typical ly. Some gangs have been to pr ison. And then you get, l ike in the township and the rural areas, you get gangs that their l i fe span is three years and then they ei ther grow out of i t or they drop out. And there’s – and since we formed our Provincia l gang strategy, the pol ice one, the Provinc ia l Government one, a lso in 2008 has that strategy that refers even to the gangs here in the townships, specif ical ly refers to that .

Here our strategy is to deal with two levels. As indicated, i t ’s to, on the one hand, deal with these groups that are f igh t ing and through – within that i t ’s direct ly deal ing with on cases, but more important ly, deal with – work with communit ies, because they’re youngsters, they’re 14 to 18 years o ld. School k ids running with pangas, and there’re some brutal murders scenes we ’ve seen on some of the footage that we had here, where they’ve been involved. So i t ’s deal ing wi th communit ies in order to – for the communit ies to mobi l ise, to be able to take their k ids back, as opposed to – so that was the one. The other issue is to – that ’s why Gen Veary has had that interview as well , to intercede with these gangs being inf luenced by the pr ison guys coming out, the older guys, so that – because that wi l l become – that is the forerunner for the – what ’s happening at the Cape Flats, that they wi l l in f luence and they wi l l start to l ink with the Cape Flats gangs.

And the issue of T ik – T ik is a lready rearing i ts head in Khayel i tsha so that T ik, the cross-over with T ik and mandrax and the pr ison gangs wi l l convert the normal street gangs that has a three year l i fe span into a ten year, twenty year,

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and maybe an organised cr ime gang. So that is our strategy. So, as I indicated, we have one and we’re working

at d if ferent levels. But, l ike i t is , i t ’s the young boys coming f rom school, the next minute you see – at some point we’ve had a Nyala parked here next to the ra i lway stat ion where they normal ly f ight . Then half a k i lometre away there’s an open f ie ld, and there you see groups of them running, with pangas. When we come there, they run away. So we park the van. Now they’ve gone. When we move, they’re back. And that ’s TV, we go on YouTube, there’s a number of scenes l ike that , the pol ice come, we stand around, they go.

So we’ve real ised that we need to work with the community more so t he community can take hold of the kids or their chi ldren. MS BAWA: But that s i tuat ion has been exist ing since – the f i rst reports that I see of that is when the – s ince 2009, the school gangs that have been f ight ing, have been ra ised in the SCCF meet ings. I mean, I was very surpr ised – the Cluster Commander who was there at the t ime had an exchange with me and not want ing to recognise them as gangs. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink there was that – there is that problem, and I want to state th is. There’s – somehow there’s a percept ional th ing that we’ve resolved that gangs in te rms of the Act. They’ re there. Even if they don’t commit a l l the – they commit – they’ve got a cr iminal economy; they st i l l commit cr imes together as a group. In terms of the POCA Act, Sect ion 4, they’re a gang. There was th is b ig debate for a few years about how the gangs were only groups. I t ’s gangs. MS BAWA: So that debate is now over. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I mean, the worst ( inaudible – part ies speaking simultaneously) is gangs. Hey? MS BAWA: That debate is now over. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja. There’s k ind of – we’ve resolved i t a whi le ago, but 2009 was another gang, i t was not the same – i t ’s Amavura, Amavato. Only the Vatos Lacos was here, there was is iNyugaNyuga (?), and there was two others. Before that you had – so you had di f ferent groups. The last th ree, four years, they – 20 Man is the one group that has now been sl ight ly longer that we’re worr ied about, that has stayed on for longer. And yet they’re not the one the publ ic is ta lk ing about. So we’re worr ied about the fact that they’ve gone underground. So that would be areas for us to look at. So my answer to your quest ion is, yes, we have a strategy, yes, we’re working on th is issue. They are ( indist inct) , and we’re working i t . That is our approach. MS BAWA: Let me ta lk to you about informers for the moment. I t ’s a problem. We understand that these people who assist you, they don’t want to be registered informers. I understand that you were now at meet ings for the stat ion or the cluster to deal with the problem. I have seen Cluster Forum meet ing minutes, I have seen Stat ion Forum meet ing minutes where the Stat ion Commander, the Cluster Forum Commander, urges the members and urges the Commanders to urge the members, you need to s ign up one informer a quarter. But that ef forts have been put in by the Commander. There needs to be a strategy to te l l them how they need to do i t , because i t ’s not happening. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I ’ve earl ier – I ’ve earl ier presented evidence to say that in th is new job, that is what I ’m now – we’ve started with that process now. I am –

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I can’ t say anything more ( intervent ion). MS BAWA: Can I make one suggest ion – I walked out here the other day, and I ’ve seen th is before – have you considered changing the name? If you come f rom the 80s and the 70s and you were an informer, i t didn’ t go down so wel l . MAJ GEN JACOBS: That is an interest ing point ! MS BAWA: I t was a point that was raised by a member of the publ ic. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja. People don’t want to be informers or impimpis or – i t ’s about – and I th ink i t ’s a good point . I t ’s a good suggest ion. I th ink i t wi l l go into … MS BAWA: I ’m going to credi t one of the residents of Khayel i tsha who said that to me. I t d idn’ t come f rom me. MAJ GEN JACOBS: A good point . MS BAWA: But i t seems that we need to fundamental ly change i t , because i t is your core view inte l l igence, and you’re not gett ing i t . Now, you said that Khayel i tsha and Nyanga had the biggest cr ime inte l l igence capacity. When Dr Josias cal led Gen Petros with the information on a ser ia l k i l ler, and he then contacted Gen Molo about i t at the t ime, was i t something that Crime Inte l l igence already knew about? Or was our Crime Inte l l igence not yet that sophist icatedly developed with the worms (?), etc, that we now have? MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, I th ink we were not – we were not tuned in to that one.

I test i f ied earl ier that i t is a d iscussion that we’ve started now with – based on what was presented, but what Col Harr i has approached us to out l ine, and she has very, very c lear arguments for why – because normal ly you wouldn’ t – i t never be that we do that, sexual of fences where Inte l l igence have normal ly come and col lected – because i t ’s normal ly a s ingle of fender, and that – but they very c lear ly out l ined the rat ionale and the reasons, and i t became apparent that the need for prof i l ing in a lot more better way across the board so the issue of – and i t became to look bigger – bet ter at the ( indist inct) .

So i t ’s a – i t ’s ear ly days in our development of th is issue, but i t ’s something tha t we are – we’ve been convinced about having to develop a capacity to support those units. MS BAWA: I want to draw something to your at tent ion that we picked up during our evidence with the Site B pol ice stat ion. We had the Stat ion Commander giving evidence f i rst , and I th ink the quest ion was asked in the nature of vio lent cr imes, what was your b iggest problem, and he ident if ied knives. We then had a Detect ive Commander later giving evidence, and the same quest ion was asked. And he ident if ied f i rearms. I leave the point s imply there, to say that when we need to work on our Inte l l igence in your new job. Vis ib le pol ic ing. Whilst the Nat ional Instruct ion does not specify two vehicles per sector, repeated Inspectorate reports have indicated dif f icul t ies with sector pol ic ing not s imply re lated to two vehicles in a sector.

And i t ident if ies a Provincia l c i rcular, the number’s 3/1/5/1, which is dated June 2007, which is a Provincia l instruct ion. And the Inspectorate reports, repeatedly h ighl ight non -compl iance of the Provincia l Inspectorate in addit ion to the Nat ional Instruct ion, and that the nature of the t ransgressions re late to simple th ings such as they don’t have cel lphones or – and when you look at the reasons for i t , they don’t have the batter ies or th ey don’t have the chargers, or the cel lphone’s in the safe at the pol ice stat ion.

Or one of the th ings which I thought was i t , the Inspectorate actual ly says

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that the area of Kuyasa as a sector in Harare is s imply too big as a sector. And that is h ighl ighted in one of the 2011 reports a lready.

And that sort -of goes noted and undetected and three years later we st i l l have Harare with the same sector in p lace. Can you comment on that , because – and let me make another point to you; I went through quite a number of the SAPS – when you look at the LKM driver, you have an LKM number dr iver and passenger. MAJ GEN JACOBS: KLM, not LKM. MS BAWA: Is i t KLM? Okay. I ’m sure i t ’s – okay, I won’t argue. But the SAP 15 specif ied dr iver, passenger vehic le, etc. And i n a number of the sectors you don’t have passenger speci f ied. So your logic te l ls you that the person who f i l ls out the form for one sector, and he specif ies the dr iver and the passenger and he f i l ls out on the exact same form, he puts in the dr iver and h e doesn’t specify the passenger, the most logical conclusion you can draw f rom that is that there isn ’ t a passenger. Would you agree with me on that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Conclude – logical conclusion …? MS BAWA: That there isn’ t a passenger. MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, no. MS BAWA: Why not? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Maybe – and I th ink I ’ve covered i t ear l ier with the Commissioner, I th ink i t would be negl igence, because i t should be that you – people wouldn’ t drive without – unless the person is, has got a specif ic ro le t o p lay in an operat ion and the ro le would be that they direct where the act ivi t ies, and they’re supposed to l ink up – they don’t deal with complaints, they don’t deal with – they l ink up the dif ferent vehic les, they vis i t d if ferent vehic les to see – then l ike a – l ike a – you get a Shif t Commander or a Warrant Off icer that would be the person that would go out to see that a l l the members are in their areas. So that person could be dr iving alone. But other than that , ( intervent ion). MS BAWA: We draw a dist inct ion between the sector manager who’s on duty to check, because that person is specif ied ent i re ly d i f ferent ly on the form. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I must say I ’ve answered the quest ion as far I could earl ier. I have no other way to answer i t . MS BAWA: But – no, no, no, I agree with you. But there’s many components to sector pol ic ing – sector pol ic ing creates your sub -sector forums, i t is your personnel who l ink up with your community, and f rom there your CPFs and your neighbourhood watches grow.

And those sector pol ic ing, we’ve had much evidence here, we’ve looked at the sector p lans, we’ve seen how problemat ic they were, and yesterday I asked the Commission’s administrator to just pop down – there’s a lways a good dif ference between the announced vis i t the Co mmission had and the unannounced vis i t of our administrator yesterday. So he goes into a l l three pol ice stat ions, and he asks for the sector pol ice detai ls to see whether they’re d isplayed in the community service centre. And th is is what he f inds in L ingelethu West:

“There was no separate contact detai ls d isplayed in the community service centre. The two of f icers who were at the CSC were very busy at tending to people and I would have had to wait for about ten minutes to get the chance to enquire, so I le f t . ”

So he didn’ t see any He comes to Khayel i tsha at about 4 o ’c lock: “The sector pol ice contact detai ls were not up in the CSC. I asked

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one of the of f icers to give i t to me; he went to the of f ice at the back to get the detai ls. I t took him f ive minut es to get them. He gave i t to me. I asked him why i t was not d isplayed in the CSC, which we al l understand needs to be a requirement. He repl ied that they never thought about that, that i t was a good idea and that I should wri te that suggest ions down and put in the suggest ion box. I then cal led al l the sectors. Al l of them but sector 2 answered with 10 seconds.”

Which is the same experience the Commissioner had. “The same of f icer, however, who answered for sector 3 a lso answered for sector 4. So we’ve had one vehic le who was out for sector 3 and sector 4. I come to Harare pol ice stat ion at about quarter past 6. There are no contact detai ls d isplayed in the Harare CSC.”

MAJ GEN JACOBS: But i f I may ( intervent ion). MS BAWA: Let me f in ish the story, and the n I ’ l l give you an opportuni ty to comment.

“There were about seven of f icers in the community service centre. None of them knew where the contact detai ls were. I asked why they didn’ t know the numbers, and was to ld that the SAPS members use speed dia l l ing systems and therefore do not have the detai ls. Af ter about three minutes, one of them remembered that the detai ls were put up at the far corner behind one of their own workstat ions, and she had to read the numbers for me because I could not see them where I was standing. I t ’s not easy even for the of f icers to see the numbers. She had to l i tera l ly walk away f rom the counter in order for her to see them. I cal led al l the numbers and al l of them answered with in ten seconds.”

So I want to say that our experience as the Commission has been that when we’ve cal led the sector cel l numbers, the pol ice of f icers have been out. The issue with Khayel i tsha was expla ined to us, which is why I don’t want to take you there. Brig Dladla expla ined to us why he does wh at he does, and he somet imes only has one pol ice vehic le over two sectors during the week, and how he doubles up on a weekend. And i t ’s part of h is strategy, taking into account a l l of that . So I wasn’t ra is ing i t as a cr i t ic ism, which is why I cut you sh ort in needing to expla in i t . We’ve had that explanat ion f rom him as to h is strategy on pol ic ing. And I thought that , having done the exercise previously, and having done it again, we need to say that there are good parts of sector pol ic ing, but there st i l l needs some work to be done. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Can I now say – I want to suggest a lso that there is – what i t says, the formula of – i t ’s a geographic breakdown of an area, with a sector manager and our engagement with the communit ies. The formula cannot be f ixed. We’re a lready now struggl ing with working, looking at th is concept of having cel lphones on the van, because with the cel lphone on the van, we’re not recording that cal l . So our 10111 cal l centre, that is the cal l centre that captures and records the number of cal ls. We’re not recording th is cal l . So for us those were kind of areas – so therefore to harp on – something

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that we’re looking at now, so most of the cel lphone numbers are in the Ops Room. So, one. Two, i f the cal l comes into the pol ic e stat ion, they want a sector, they go on radio with that sector van. I t is – that sector van is mainly for community people to cal l in . But we’ve got the person in the van, and we’ve go the Operat ions Room that coordinates that. But I hear the point tha t is being made, but i t ’s something that – i t ’s ( indist inct) , therefore there’s not a f ixed deployment model. We consciously have to work to looking at improving how do we improve the whole pol ic ing methods, and sector pol ic ing, what we know, i t ’s f ixed. There wi l l be sector managers, there wi l l be operat ional capacit ies there, and that we wi l l mobi le communit ies to get act ive in. That ’s a l l . MS BAWA: I have two issues. One deals with community pol ic ing, i f you’ l l give me some leeway. Ja. I th ink we – the gist of your evidence has been our community pol ic ing partnership deter iorated with the demise of the bambananis, as I understand. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes. MS BAWA: And – and because of that , we have had a di f f icul ty in – and in some way that might be a t t r ibuted to a reduct ion in our abi l i ty to communicate with the community, because that ’s been our point person with the community. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes. MS BAWA: And the bambanani project is a DOCS project , and their subst i tuted EPP project isn’ t necessari ly an adequate subst i tute for what previously had been in p lace. Is that , in a nutshel l , a fa ir assessment of your evidence? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes. Def in i tely. And even the programmes that was ment ioned, I thought about the programme that was ment ioned – the bambanani project got community members involved, and they’re most ly o lder people. I f your target is most ly youth in your youth programmes, you’re target ing, yes, youth- involved, youth at r isk of cr ime. But the community here that ’s involved in mobi l is ing and campaigning in keeping the streets safe, are older people. And so if you miss that part icular target necessari ly, so, yes, the key th ing is we get that – whatever, by any other name, i f we get that vibrancy going again, i t is the – there is – that – there l ies the key to community involvement. And Khayel i tsha has had a history in mobi l is ing the whole community, against something and for something. And that has been the history of Khayel i tsha. We can get that community back in i f we play our ro l es in the Departments, and we don’t demobi l ise structures. That is the essence of what I ’m saying. MS BAWA: There’s two issues I want to ra ise with you. We have heard, you test i f ied when Welcome cal ls you, you respond. Dr Josias test i f ied she has a direct l ine to Col Harr i , and she responds. Hanif Loonat said I had the cel l number for Gen Ndlovu, and when I u sed that l ine, I got a response. Funeka Soldaat f rom Free Gender indicated, i f I wanted something done, I ’ve got a f ree l ine to Col Visser. That ’s the senior pol ice management, making themselves avai lable to certa in members who’ve reached them.

The ordinary person in the street who’ve given statements or who’ve test i f ied before the Commission’s story is not the same. They ei ther have dif f icul t ies get t ing pol ice coming out to complaints, they have not been treated with d igni ty in a pol ice stat ion. The kind s of d if f icul t ies that have been experienced with dockets.

I want to make a point that there are certa in ly great in i t ia t ives that have

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been reached by very senior members with in SAPS to reach out to the community, but the evidence before the Commission is that – and I include Stat ion Commanders; let me not make i t wrong there. Br ig Dladla has an open door pol icy, and members have said, i f I p ick up the ‘phone and I speak to Brig Dladla, then I get i t .

This is not permeat ing down to the rank and f i le . And I ’m not suggest ing that the rank and f i le need to give out their cel l number, but the ordinary person is not being t reated in the same manner by the ordinary rank and f i le. And I ’d l ike your comment on that , because that might go a long way to bui ld relat ions better. MAJ GEN JACOBS: I don’t – I don’t agree with that point . The ordinary person, as you say, I don’t know i f the other people are more or less, but the ordinary person cal ls 10111. We send out our vehic les there to the houses. We at tend to the complaint . The number of cases that we’ve registered that you’ve indicated has gone up so alarmingly was made ei ther at the homes of people or they came to the pol ice stat ion and we’re help ing the ordinary people there. So, yes, on the number of cal ls th at come, we don’t necessari ly – a lways are able to respond to every person, but we do – the people come to the pol ice stat ions, to our three pol ice stat ions, to register. They come to our vans, they stop the vans in the middle of the road and they make a complaint and we record that complaint and we keep on radio code 8, a feedback, we’ve got a complaint on the street . This is the person – we’re going to fo l low up th is complaint quickly.

So we are avai lable, not as most th ings are, we’re not able to reach every person at every given t ime, but we reach quite a large number of people.

To therefore say that the ordinary people has not the same experience, I would take issue with that because I don’t th ink i t ’s correct .

There’s a percentage, and I th ink – I ’ve said f rom the start there’s considerable rope – scope for improvement, and we are working on that. But we are reaching – i t is the ordinary member that you are saying that is not – i t ’s actual ly the member that tonight , 2 o ’c lock, 3 o ’c lock, that wi l l be out there ( intervent ion) l ike tonight , Fr iday night , there’ l l be on average 24 complaints here in Harare pol ice stat ion with on, you know, suspic ious people and pol ice assistance required. That is what – and those members wi l l be there.

And I th ink we kind-of don’t necessari ly factor that in, that the members, the ordinary members, are busy doing patro ls. They’re taking complaints, they’re register ing the dockets. They’re making arrests. So that’s what they’re doing. MS BAWA: And so you’re saying that there’s – the evidence that the Commission has received of that service not being rendered is a skewed percept ion? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I ’m saying i t ’s certa in ly not giving the fu l l p icture of where we – of what – the members are avai lable. Because I am not o n the van. I ’m not on patro l out there, taking al l the complaints. Imagine I do that , that ’s why – one of the reasons why we’re re - looking at cel lphones. I f I ’m busy with a domest ic vio lence case in an area and I have to answer the ‘phone, how do I deal w i th that coming through? So these are some of the stuf f . We had a good idea in i t ia l ly but now we’re real is ing there’s chal lenges with that .

So – but I don’t have such a busy programme as with – every day, so when I get cal led f rom community structures – we make our numbers avai lable at a l l imbizos, the Provincia l Commissioner, the Deput ies, and the Cluster Commander

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and the Stat ion Commissioner. So people cal l us. That ’s why they people to make i t avai lable. MS BAWA: Do you chair the Joints? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I chair the Joints. MS BAWA: And as I understand, there City representat ion and Provincia l representat ions at the Joints. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Ja. MS BAWA: Can some of these di f f icul t ies which are clear ly evident intra -Governmental , Departmental ly, not be solved at the Joints? MAJ GEN JACOBS: We’ve t r ied. We’ve t r ied. We’ve ra ised these issues there in the – for example, the taxis issues now. We’ve ra ised the let ter about them, we’ve asked for responses. They haven’t responded. The City especia l ly haven’t responded. Provincia l Government responded, we’ve responded to that a lso. So we’ve ra ised issues as we’ve gone – we’ve gone – part icular ly on – so we’ve ra ised a number of areas, a l though specif ical ly about the Khayel i tsha area, not necessari ly we’ l l deal with the Provincia l , but there’s a local Joints here.

About e ight months ago, a pol icy came out where – a pol icy d irect ive that every Cluster must have a Cluster Joints. So there’s a Cluster Joints here, where Government Department – and they’re complain ing. The f i rst two meet ings, h igh level representat ion. Af ter that , c lerks are coming. Low level c lerks are coming to the Joints meet ings here.

So the Cluster, every Cluster Joints has to deal with the issues direct ly. At the Provincia l level we deal with the Provincia l matters that cuts across the areas. And i t ’s there, i t ’s an act ive one, and we f ight , and we have records there. MS BAWA: Do you not see Metro pol ic ing as being part of your force mult ip l iers to be ut i l is ing Khayel i tsha on your foot patro ls? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes. They have – I mean, in the t ime when we’re here and they were st i l l – I know there’s Commander Nsasa that ’s here. They are involved, but they’ve got very l imited capacity. MS BAWA: Wel l , as I understood – two more quest ions, promise. Wel l, then, I ’ l l have to leave that one and go to the last one. I want to ta lk to you about recommendat ions for a moment, r ight?

What c lear ly came out of your evidence was that there needed to be a resusci tat ion of inter -Governmental involvement to get community part ic ipat ion going, whether we cal l i t the bambanani or something. And the root of th is problem is funding.

I t ’s the CPFs who require actual funding and i t ’s DOCS or – wants a part icular funding model that u l t imately doesn’t resul t in them gett ing a qual i f ied audit on account of the funding, and that SAPS who sees their responsib i l i ty as provid ing an of f ice and set t ing up the CPFs, and the CPFs then need to establ ish themselves af terwards.

Now, whi lst th is inter -Governmental d isagreement proceeds as to who ul t imately is responsib le, the people are the most prejudiced by i t . How are we going to solve i t? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I th ink that – to ask that to – I mean, we’ve been – th is is part of the way of solving i t . MS BAWA: A partnership means a solut ion must come f rom everybody. MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, that ’s what I ’m saying. We’ve been trying, we’ve been

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ra is ing the issues there, and the CPF have ra ised their issues here. In the CPF board i t was ra ised that the funding model – as some people ref ra in – they’re not prepared to f i l l in forms to – not f i l l in forms; to report , to monitor the – f i l l in forms on monitor ing, was that i t would take al l their t ime for them to get – there should be dedicated areas, and we’ve reached a point that I ’m r aising i t here as a chal lenge – we wi l l obviously ta lk to them, we have our monthly meet ings with DOCS.

As senor management, Col Jaf ta is now taking on that responsib i l i ty, cont inues to meet with them, but i t ’s st i l l – i t ’s a problem. I f you’re going to ha ve that – but i t ’s more than just the funding. I t is about that whole col lect ive – that four, f ive- legged operat ions package that I ’ve spoken about earl ier, that col lect ively generates the vibrancy. That is absent, and that needs to be put in p lace. COMMISSIONER: ( inaudible – microphone of f ) . NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS BAWA MR PIKOLI: Just two issues. I ’m sure you’ l l recal l at the t ime of the Troika Princip le – just to ref resh your memory, the prosecut ion led inte l l igence -dr iven invest igat ions, and we know that the f i rst leg has fa l len of f . Now, do we st i l l have that appl icable, the second leg or the two legs, the quest ion of the inte l l igence -dr iven invest igat ions here in Khayel i tsha? Or perhaps one can argue that even that one perhaps is h indered by the environmental design of Khayel i tsha, as you have – no, I th ink as indicated ( inaudible – part ies speaking simultaneously). MAJ GEN JACOBS: The Inte l l igence, I th ink, as I indicated, we used the examples of the combinat ions of the syndicate that were invo lved in the business of the Bri t ish American Tobacco robberies, we’ve used that part icular – we’ve used – and we’ve coordinated f rom the ( indist inct) centra l ly, so with Inte l l igence and invest igat ing there’s good pol ic ing.

Phindi le Mhlobo, the person tha t was – k i l led three people on one weekend and eventual ly when we checked we were under the impression that we probably accused him – we charged him for, what, n ine murders – we convicted him on six and about 20 other robberies, and a combinat ion of Inte l l igence and invest igat ion.

But we’re get t ing now to that p lace where, as I indicated earl ier, that ident if icat ion of groups, cr iminal groups, gangs, we’ve already started with that , and that ’s why – and robbery groups in order for us to lead f rom Inte l l ig ence and then convert that to evidence for invest igat ion. MR PIKOLI: So, invest igat ions are not af fected by the physical design. MAJ GEN JACOBS: On those part icular matters, obviously i f they do i t , get t ing other evidence, their evidence, you know, people in informal set t lements and shacks, the dif f icul ty is a lways about whether the f ingerpr ints can l i f t and those kind of matters. So that would be evident ia l matters. But that would be the Inte l l igence of f icers must work in that environment. They must f ind ways – because now you’re working on groups of cr iminals that you must pursue. So i t ’s an ongoing process of development. MR PIKOLI: Okay. The last issue re lates to chapter 11 of our Consti tut ion, sect ion 1.9.7 (a) and (b). You know, as I was l istening here, you know, certa in concerns, you know, arose as to whether th is was being observed. Because we’ve had evidence of CPFs, whether i t ’s factu al or a percept ion, of some CPFs being pol i t ical ly a l igned, you know? And then in exchange you had with

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Advocate Osborne, you know, earl ier on the problems again of one ( indist inct) point for DOCS and also the quest ion of stopping unannounced vis i ts of inspect ion. Now, i f I am to remind you of sect ion 1.9.7.(a) and (b):

“Neither the securi ty services nor any of their members may, in the performance of their funct ions (a) prejudice a pol i t ical party interest that is legi t imate in terms of the Const i tut ion, or (b) further in a [ indist inct ] manner any interest of a poli t ical party.”

Are you sat isf ied that th is is being observed? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I ’m sat isf ied that is being observed, that we’re not in terfer ing – we’re not interfer ing in any or pursuing the in terest of any pol i t ical party. That one I can say for sure. MR PIKOLI: You’ve al layed my anxiety. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Mm? MR PIKOLI: You’ve al layed my anxiety. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes. Ja, I know why I would be – any evidence of that would be fabr icated. There’s no indicat ion here at a l l in Khayel i tsha that I know of where people would be pursuing pol i t ical agendas f rom the side of the pol ice. COMMISSIONER: I t ’s interest ing that you say that , because we have a lot of evidence that one of the issues here is over pol i t ic isat ion, not of the individual pol ice members, but of the whole community in – so Ms Mtwana, for example, who is a very experienced person working with neighbourhood watches, real ly does say that pol i t ics is get t ing in the way. And in fact i t a lso re lates to Brig Mlenga’s evidence, that a lot of the di f f icul t ies have actual ly ar isen since the decl ine in inf luence of Sanco. And – what ’s your comment on that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: As I indicated to Commissioner Pikol i , that I have no evidence of that and i t would be a worry i f they are poli t ical ly involved.

However, the CPF, people who become leaders there, are people wi th act ivist prof i les, strong people. They don’t come wi th nothing there. They come with h istory, they come with experience, they come – so i t cannot be that they are not necessari ly – but the CPFs have been fa ir ly, i t ’s my understanding, have been act ing fa ir ly – we saw Mr Mgxaj i here – fa ir ly independent ly and fa ir ly f i rm. He might have a history that ’s not necessary to that person. But – and ( indist inct) are community people and Khayel i tsha has a history of mobi l isat ion.

Now, whether that t ranslates to individual membership is another matter. But there’s a h istory of membership. So if they say i t ’s pol i t ical , i t may be pol i t ical to the extent is – we organise in th is area alone, not a pol i t ical party. Sanco does the ( indist inct) commit tees. Socia l Just ice Coal i t ion was also organising, so about pol i t ical or r ather organisat ional d i f ferences as opposed to party pol i t ical .

But that would be st i l l in the terra in outside of our – we work with the structures that are part of the CPF and al l other structures. We work with a l l of those structures. I meet with – even in my other job I meet with a l l pol i t ical part ies around – in the elect ions we wi l l meet with them now to ensure that there’s standards, yes, we wi l l do that , but we wi l l make a point that that is not – i t gets you involved in unnecessary stuf f . We have to answer so many quest ions on those issues, i t ’s not worth i t as wel l , and i t ’s i l legal, for that matter. COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Mr Masuku? MR MASUKU: Thank you, Chair . RE-EXAMINATION BY MR MASUKU:

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The – there were quest ions that you – that were d irected at you regarding the bambanani, your comments or your evidence on the bambanani programme, and you were referred to two audits which revealed that the programme had some corrupt ion in i t . You recal l that – those quest ions being asked? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Yes. MR MASUKU: First ly, are you aware of these audits? Were you aware of the audits that were conducted on bambanani? MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, I ’m not aware of that . MR MASUKU: Now, are you also – when th is bambanani programme was terminated, whether i t was terminated in name and then mushroomed in a d i f ferent – under a d if ferent name, were you consulted about any changes that took place in the – in the bambanani programme? MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, not at a l l . MR MASUKU: And if you had been consulted you – what would you have said to the – to DOCS if you had been asked about the value of bambanani, the bambanani programme in the community mobi l isat ion and pol ic ing? MAJ GEN JACOBS: First ly, I would have said bambanani had a good brand name. So as an operat ion, as a brand, i t was a good th ing, one. That, i f there’re problems in i t , they must repair and insulate the organisat ion and the programme in order to prevent i t f rom being ab used if i t ’s a l leged – and as i t ’s al leged.

But the tenets of i t , i f i t was to be shi f ted, that you in any t ransi t ion you don’t stop and unbundle and then you start af ter a whi le, because the community is not a tap that is opened and closed at any – i f you demobi l ise and they’re not act ive anymore, to get them back – one of the people came to me, i f I can use the same method, to say, here, here’s my neighbourhood watch stuf f , I was tra ined at Chrysal is in 2007. Here, but you know why – why have they stopped us? We need – th is is what we needed. We needed – and here’s i t , they say the st ipend is bad but we work 12 hours to do specif ic th ings over the fest ive season. I t happens – that ’s when th is person came to me now in the break. So I would have said tha t keep the structure, keep the format of i t , and keep the essence of what i t was about, a campaign and a strategy to mobi l ise and keep communit ies involved in the f ight against cr ime. And then, i f there’s chal lenges in i t , a l ter part icular th ings. We hav e pol ice stat ions where there might be corrupt ion. We don’t c lose the pol ice stat ion. We remove the person or we change – we insulate that part icular area and we rect i fy i t . But we keep i t essent ia l ly i f i t works. The chal lenge now would be what – there ’s nothing here, the people – everybody had i t on their names, Hook. The campaign, the sub -campaigns on at Hook. You can’t – i t ’s dead. Now Hook was th is campaign that every school chi ld had across the Cape Flats and i t went into – going into rural areas . I t ’s gone now. We would have to restart i t , re -campaign, and look how much mi leage and reputat ional capita l we had as a col lect ive Government.

So I would argue that we – we would have said systemat ic changes to i t in order to keep the essence going. MR MASUKU: And in fact are you aware i f the decis ion -makers consulted with the communit ies on the re -model l ing of th is community programme? MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, I ’m not aware. I don’t know. They’ve ra ised – they’ve ra ised in the CPF and there in the board meet ing their unhappiness. They came

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with the EPP programme, there were discussions with them, and i t was a long f ight about that , and about – even today in the CPF board meet ing i t ’s st i l l – i f i t ’s an agenda i tem i t ’s st i l l a d iscussion about how people are unhappy and al l of those th ings. MR MASUKU: And the schools safety programme, do you know i f that programme is d irected at deal ing with the issue of vigi lante k i l l ings or gangs – or what exact ly is i t d irected at? MAJ GEN JACOBS: The schools safety p rogramme as they have i t now is essent ia l ly a guarding programme where people are guarding the school. School safety, in i ts essence, what i t was meant to be with the Educat ion under the late Mari Mankani (?), when i t was developed.

We had chal lenges also with that. I t was meant to work on the school – work with the student bodies that are there, work with the school governing bodies, and look at how to make the school safe, both to target ( indist inct) the school as an inst i tut ion, to prevent i t f rom bein g broken into. But a lso to work with access and egress contro l on the schools. Also, an important part , Commissioner, is the schools here in the Western Cape – I don’t know in other Provinces – have big beaut ifu l land. For some years, the last f ive years about, we’ve not iced that they’ve made – they’ve given of f the land and they’ve made an inner fence around. They’ve almost given up – th is was supposed to be spaces for the schools. So – and those areas, now you’re having areas where there’s an inner co re of the school, and the kids only go to school and go – the school f ie lds are not being used, so i t ’s becoming areas for people to enter, the fences are not being maintained. So the comprehensive tact ics on school safety is not being implemented. There ’s guardings at school. Guards at school. That is the programme. MR MASUKU: And then you were to ld that the reason why bambanani was terminated, i t ’s because of corrupt ion and i t arose f rom these reports. Are you aware of any corrupt ion charges, or any c harges that were la id in terms of – in terms of which these – the issues of – re lat ing to corrupt ion with SAPS – is SAPS invest igat ing any charges by the Province on the issue of corrupt ion that arose f rom the bambanani project? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Commissioner, I ’ve never – as I indicated, we never, there’s never been a case come to my knowledge about corrupt ion being recorded and reported there, and therefore I ’m not aware of any invest igat ion in to corrupt ion, into the DOCS programme. MR MASUKU: In fact, i t was put to you later on that in fact bambanani was cont inued in another name. You recal l that? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I recal l that i t was put to me. MR MASUKU: What, in your understanding, does that actual ly mean? Do you know any new programme that mirrors exact ly the bambanani programme that you test i f ied to? MAJ GEN JACOBS: No, I know of nothing. The only th ing I know, i t was introduced in 2012, 2012/2013, is the programme, the new funding model that gets people to wri te a report to get money. I t ’s the only programme I know of . The other matters, the imbizos, that ’s what – the only th ing they’re doing now is the PNP, the pr ior i ty – the pol ic ing needs and pr ior i t ies, where communit ies are cal led to present their needs only, but i t is not the community meet ings, publ ic meet ings, where people are organised and mobi l ised as we

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know i t . MR MASUKU: Yes. MAJ GEN JACOBS: So there’s not a bambanani by any other name. MR MASUKU: Then there was – I ’m not sure whether I pronounce i t correct , but a – you were asked if you were aware of DOCS Crystal programme, am I correct? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Chrysal is. MR MASUKU: Cristens? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Chrysal is. MR MASUKU: Chrysal is programme. MAJ GEN JACOBS: No. That o ld programme there, i t ’s vibrant, but i t ’s an old programme. I t ’s been there when Mr W iley was the MEC. I t cont inued under Mrs Ramaklakal i . I t ’s cont inuing now. So i t ’s been there and i t ’s been target ing youth. I t targets youth at r isk. What they did in the ( indist inct) of bambanani, the neighbourhood watches went there to t ra in and al l of that. I t was al l – now i t ’s mainly a beaut iful ly run programme for youth. I th ink they do about 200 people at a t ime , young people, focusing on – but i t ’s part icular ly people selected, young people. I t ’s nothing got to do with – but i t ’s been there since about 2002 or ’01, I imagine. So i t ’s been there for a whole. COMMISSIONER: Ja. The informat ion is on that before th e Commission. MR MASUKU: Yes. Now, then you referred to 32 CPF projects that are funded by DOCS in L ingelethu, and you answer to the quest ion was that you don’t know – you don’t know of these projects, am I r ight? MAJ GEN JACOBS: I def in i te ly don’t know, but I – I mean, I ’m not aware of i t . MR MASUKU: And, I mean, I may be speaking under correct ion – the Stat ion Commander of L ingelethu, I don’t remember h im test i fying to 32 projects that were funded by DOCS. I don’t recall that , that there was such evid ence. MR OSBORNE: May I inter ject here. I f there’s any doubt as to the existence of these 32, could we have leave to put in mater ia l which would place beyond doubt that such programmes exist? COMMISSIONER: We wi l l mul l on that . I t is – we do know that L ingelethu West, because we got the schedules f rom DOCS as to who was being funded for what under EPP and Lingelethu West was being funded signi f icant ly. That I do recal l , and I do recal l the Chairperson of the Lingelethu West CPF indicat ing that they were receiv ing those funds. But, you know, i f we th ink i t ’s necessary, Mr Osborne, we’ l l le t you know. All of th is has been traversed in gruesome detai l , may I say, before the Commission already. MR OSBORNE: Thank you, Commissioner. MR MASUKU: And then I wou ld want to take you to the issue re lat ing to the task team report , the Tshabalala report . But the quest ion I real ly want to ask you is – re lates to the evidence that was given by van Zyl . I don’t know i f you were here when Brig van Zyl test i f ied. But one of the th ings he said was that th is was a document generated to inform the PC on the complaints that had been ra ised. MAJ GEN JACOBS: The Nat ional Commissioner. COMMISSIONER: The Nat ional Commissioner. MR MASUKU: Sorry, the Nat ional Commissioner, I be g your pardon. And that the idea was that once the Nat ional Commissioner received that report , she

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would then tr igger a second process which in fact she t r ied to with the establ ishment of the … MAJ GEN JACOBS: The task team. MR MASUKU: Yes. In terms of the process developed, and that would have been the second phase of the whole th ing.

But your evidence is that you did – you were aware of the complaints that had been given to the Provincia l Commissioner by the Nat ional Commissioner coming f rom the Western Cape. Right? MAJ GEN JACOBS: Mm. MR MASUKU: And that you were asked to deal with those complaints, and you did deal with them. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Mm. Yes, correct . COMMISSIONER: Mr Masuku, I ’m reluctant to cut you short , but my col league has a f l ight to catch. So if you could just real ly focus your crucia l quest ions, that would be helpfu l . MR MASUKU: Well , I thought I was focusing my crucia l quest ions, but … COMMISSIONER: No, I know, but … MR MASUKU: I have no – I have no further quest ions. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MASUKU COMMISSIONER: Well , why we’re just f in ishing on that task team report , i t would be very helpfu l to see the Provincia l response to the task team repo rt, which we did d iscuss earl ier in the day. But just as a reminder. MR MASUKU: Yes. COMMISSIONER: Are you – as I say, I d idn’ t mean to end with qui te such a bump, but i f you’re sure you’ve covered, that would be helpfu l . MR MASUKU: Yes, I ’m sure Advocate Pikol i lost most of the pr ivi leges to f ly on some jets, so I ’d rather he gets … COMMISSIONER: And i t ’s h is b ir thday tomorrow as wel l , so we certa in ly don’t want h im to miss the f l ight . MR MASUKU: No, no, no, I don’t have any quest ions for my witnes s. COMMISSIONER: Okay. Thanks very much, Advocate Masuku, and thank you very much indeed, General . I t ’s been very helpfu l to have your test imony before us. We’re very gratefu l for you to spend a fu l l day here – thank you. COMMISSIONER: We wi l l now adjourn. We’ l l reconvene at 9 o ’c lock on Monday morning. Thank you. MAJ GEN JACOBS: And I ’m excused? COMMISSIONER: You may stand down. You are excused, yes. MAJ GEN JACOBS: Thank you. COMMISSIONER: Yes. Thank you. WITNESS EXCUSED COMMISSION ADJOURNS TO 31 MARCH 2014 (at 16:35)