common agricultural policy jan fidrmuc brunel university
TRANSCRIPT
Common Agricultural Policy
Jan Fidrmuc
Brunel University
CAP CAP started as simple price support policy in
1962. Motivation: to support rural areas and farmers
and to ensure European countries produced enough food locally
EU was net importer of food so it could support prices by imposing a tariff (‘variable levy’).
At present, CAP accounts for close to 1/2 of EU budget
EU now is net exporter of agricultural products and most CAP expenditure is on subsidies to farmers
Simple price support with tariff
Q
priceHomeSupply
HomeDemand
Zf Cf
Price floor
Pw
Z CQ
priceHomeSupply
HomeDemand
Zf Cf
Price floor (Pw+T, or Pw’+T’)
Pw
Pw’
T’ T
Z C
Imports (with floor)
Imports (without price floor)
BA
C1 C2
pss
Welfare Effects Consumer surplus falls by
A+ C1+C2+B Producer surplus rises by A In addition, the EU as a
whole gains tariff revenue (not shown here)
Q
priceHomeSupply
HomeDemand
Zf Cf
Price floor
Pw
Z C
BA
C1 C2
Q
priceFamily farm supply curve
Q
price
Total supply curve
Q
priceCommercial farm supply curve
Pw
Pw+TAsmall Abig
Atotal
Zsmall Zbig Ztotal
B
Distributional Implications
Large and more efficient farms tend to gain more from CAP than small inefficient farms
Most of the gains accrue to those who are already rich
Farm size distribution in 1987 Very skewed ownership:
Biggest 7% of farmers owned ½ of the land. Smallest 50% of farmers owned only 7% of the land.
Farm size class (hectares)
Number of farms (millions)
Number of farms as share of total
Share of EU12 farm land in size class
Average farm size (hectares)
1 to 5 3.411 49.2% 7.1% 2.4
5 to 10 1.163 16.8% 7.1% 7.0
10 to 20 0.936 13.5% 11.5% 14.1
20 to 50 0.946 13.7% 25.7% 31.2
over 50 0.473 6.8% 48.6% 117.6
total 6.929 100% 115 (mill.ha) 16.5
CAP Problems: Supply
‘Green revolution’: technological improvements in agriculture
Agricultural output increased rapidly, faster than consumption
EU went from being a net importer of agricultural products to producing more than in needed
Solution 1: EU buys surplus output and ‘stores’ it Solution 2: Surplus output is exported; this requires
subsidies since the EU price floor exceeds the world price dumping
Q
price
ZfCf
Price floor
Pw
S’
HomeSupply
HomeDemand
EU purchase
Q
price
Price floorBA
C1 C2
S1
HomeDemand
S2 S4S3
p1
ss
p3
ss
p2
ss
p4
ssa b c d e
CAP Problems: Oversupply EU switches from being net importer to net
exporter in most agricultural products.
-20000
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
1961
1966
1971
1976
1981
1986
1991
1996
2001-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Production (1,000 tons) Export-Imports (1,000 tons)
Area Harvested (1,000 ha.) Yield (tons/ha.), right scale
-40 -20 0 20 40 60
Wheat
Sugar
Beef
Pork
Poultry
Butter
Cheese
1967-70
1996-99
CAP Problems: World market impact EU is a major food buyer.
World MD shifts in (EU does not import food)
Some of EU surplus output is dumped on world market: world MS shifts out
CAP protection and dumping depresses prices on world markets. This harms non-EU food
exporters/producers.Worldimports
price
pwo
pw’
pw”
MD (no CAP)
MD (CAP)
MS (no dumping)
MS (with dumping)
X” X’ Xo
CAP Problems: Budget Buying and storing or dumping food increasingly expensive. EU no longer imports agricultural products no tariff revenue.
€0.0€1.0€2.0€3.0€4.0€5.0€6.0€7.0€8.0€9.0
€10.0
1961
1964
1967
1970
1973
1976
Mill
ion
euro
s
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
Total CAP cost (mill.euros)
CAP's budget share (right scale)
€10
€15
€20
€25
€30
€35
€40
€45
1979
1982
1985
1988
1991
1994
1997
2000
Mill
ion
euro
s
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
Total CAP cost (mill.euros)
CAP's budget share (right scale)
Other CAP Problems Most of money goes to big farms Small farmers continue to exit farming (see graph) Nostalgia: family farms disappear Pollution Animal welfare
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1 to 5 5 to 10 10 to 20 20 to 50 over 50 All farms
Change in number of EU10farms, 1970-1987
Solution: Decoupling
Subsidies paid regardless of production World price allowed to prevail: supply falls and
consumption rises Welfare effect
Consumers gain: a+b Farmers lose: -(a+b+c) Budgetary savings: b+c+d Net effect: b+d
Oversupply eliminated Farmers may need to be compensated for their
losses
Solution: Decoupling
Q
price
World Price
EU supply, S1
EUdemand
EU demand
ab
ZZ’
Price Floor
World Price + T
dc
surplus
CAP Reforms Supply control attempts:
1980s, experimentation with ad hoc supply ‘controls’ to discourage production.
Generally failed; technological progress & high guaranteed prices overwhelmed supply controls.
1992: MacSharry Reforms: Basic idea: CUT PRICES to near world-price level &
COMPENSATE farmers with direct payments. Worked well.
June 2003 Reforms Implementation 2004-2007. Similar to MacSharry reforms in spirit.
CAP Today
Two pillar structure:1. Direct payments and price support2. Rural Development
2007-2013: increasing role of second pillar Single Payment Scheme
Based on historical payments in EU15 Money per hectare in new member states with amount limited
by national ceilings Areas covered by second pillar:
Quality incentives and support to meet standards and covering of animal welfare cost, technical advice
Improving agricultural competitiveness, sustainable land management, improving quality of life in rural areas
Farm incomes & CAP inequity
Reformed CAP support still goes mostly to big farmers. payments intended to compensate, so inequity continued.
Half the payments to 5% of farms (the largest). Half the farms (smallest) get only 4% of payments. Recent studies show that only about half of these
payments go to farmers. Rest to non-farming landowners and suppliers of agricultural
inputs (seed, fertilisers, agri-chemicals, etc.) See: “Who Finances the Queen’s CAP payments?” http://shop.ceps.be/BookDetail.php?item_id=1285
CAP supports inequity