common grace, theonomy, and the civic good

8/3/2019 Common Grace, Theonomy, And the Civic Good

1/34

07/35(2000): 205-237

Common Grace, Theonomy;and Civic Good:

The Temptations of Calvinist Politics

(Reflections on the Third Point ofthe CRC Kalamazoo Synod, 1924)

John Bolt

Concerning the performance of so-called civic righteousness by the unre-

generate, the Synod declares that according to Scripture and Confession the

unregenerate, though incapable of any saving good (Canons of Dordt,

/IV, 4) can perform such civic good. This is evident from the quoted

Scripture passages and from the Canons of Dordt, and IV, 4, and the

Belgic Confession, where it is taught that God, without renewing the heart,

exercises such influence upon man that he is enabled to perform civic good;

while it is evident from the quoted declarations of Reformed writers of the

most flourishing period of Reformed theology, that our Reformed fathers

from of old have championed this view.

(The "Third Point" ofthe 1924 Christian Reformed Church

synodical pronouncement on Common Grace.)

Calvinism is noted forbeing a decidedly political kind of Christianity.1

To the

degree that it is permissible to speak of a "central motif' of Calvinism, it would

have to be a distincdy political metaphor, the sovereigntyofGod, along with its

concrete biblical expression, the kingdom ofGod. In the words of AbrahamKuyper, "the dominating principle [of Calvinism] was not, soteriologically, jus

tification byfaith, but, in the widest sense cosmologically, the Soverdgnty ofthe

Tnune Godoverthe whole Cosmos, in all its spheres and kingdoms, visible and invis

ible."2

In addition, the Protestant doctrine ofChristian vocation came to par

ticularly political consequences in Calvinism. According to Calvin, "no one

ought to doubt that civil authorityis a calling, not only holy and lawful before

God, but also the most sacred and by farthe most honorable ofall callings in


2/34

CALVIN THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

the whole life of mortal man."3

As Calvin thought, so his followers in the Low

Countries, Great Britain, and in the American Colonies acted.

Linking divine sovereignty with issues of political sovereignty is not without

its considerable risks, as the history of Calvinist politics from Calvin's Geneva to

Cromwell's England to twentieth-century South Africa has demonstrated.

4

After appealing to the historic example of Calvinism in support for his passion

for a "world-formative" Christianity, Nicholas Wolterstorff qualifies his enthu

siasm for Calvinism by noting "one exception": "that most insufferable of all

human beings, the triumphalist Calvinist, the one who believes that the revo

lution instituting the holy commonwealth has already occurred and that his or

her task is now simply to keep it in place. Of these triumphalist Calvinista the

United States and Holland have both had their share. South Africa today [in

1983,jb] provides them in their purest form."5

It would not, however, be fair to the Calvinist political tradition to call atten

tion only to its theocratic and triumphalist tendencies and postures. For one

thing, as Abraham Kuyper was never tired of pointing out, Calvinism and

Calvinists played a major role in the world development of political liberty.6

Furthermore, in the case of Calvin and Kuyper both, a notion of common

grace tempers the theocratic impulse. Both are opposed to the idea that divine

revelation alone can establish legitimate civil authority; both acknowledge the

legitimacy of governments other than those patterned after Mosaic theocratic

law. In his discussion of Old Testament law and the laws of nations Calvinbecomes somewhat argumentative:

I would have preferred to pass over this matter in utter silence if I were not

aware that here many dangerously go astray. For there are some who deny

that a commonwealth is duly framed which neglects the political system of

Moses, and is ruled by the common laws of nations. Let other men consider

3John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion , ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles

(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), 4.20.4.

4As Ronald Wells has noted: ' The tendency to promote one's own view by 'law' has always been

a dangerous part of Calvinism: one sees Calvinists in power as triumphal and dictatorial. Whether

in Calvin's Geneva, Knox's Edinburgh, Cromwell's London and Dublin, Winthrop's Boston, or in

our own time Vorster's Pretoria and Paisley's Belfast, Calvinists in power have wielded that power

oppressively." (In R.W. Ruegsegger, ed., Reflections on Francis Schaeffer[Grand Rapids: Zondervan,

1986]. Cited by John Coffey, "How Evangelicals Shouldn't Think About Politics," The Evangelical

Quarterly 69, no.l [January 1997]: 46-47).

5Wolterstorff, UntilJustice and Peace Embrace, 21.

6


3/34

COMMON GRACE, THEONOMY, AND CIVIC GOOD

how perilous and seditious this notion is; it will be enough for me to have

proved it false and foolish.7

Kuyper is equally firm in his repudiation of any church-dominated theocracy.

In one of his first editorials as editor of the daily newspaper, De Standaard,

Kuyper stated his principle of the state's independence from any church interference in categorical language: "We absolutely deny the church the right to

establish political principles that would bind the state."8 Kuyper explicidy repu

diates all theocracies. "We do not desire," he writes in Ons Program (Our

Program), the original 1879 platform for the Antirevolutionary Party, "that

Reformed Churches receive the power to dictate to the civil authorities how

they must apply the Word of God to the political arena." He adds: "In a plural

istic society (lit. "mixed society"; "gemengde gemeenschap"), not only do we not

desire such a theocracy but rather we oppose it with all our might." 9 The civil

authorities must permit the church an opportunity publicly to express her

"feelings" (gevoelen) about important civic matters but this right is a right ofper-

suasion only and must never become a legal right (juresuo) to dictate public pol

icy. Kuyper adduces two reasons for this position:

1. Theocracy leads to tyranny and national corruption (volksbederf).

2. The church lacks the competence to determine specific public policy.10

Even afier his Antirevolutionary Party had obtained and held power in The

Netherlands, Kuyper's revised political platform of 1916, the two-volume

Antirevolutionaire Staatkunde, remained firm in its opposition to "theocracy."11

The eleventh section of chapter 8 ("Sovereignty") has the subtitle "No

Theocracy," and Kuyper begins it with a reference to Lon Duguit's Trait de

Droit Constitutionel where Kuyper's own view is characterized as a "Doctnne

thocratique" and contrasted with Duguit's own liberal view, a "Doctrne dmocra

tique.'"12

Kuyper responds to this characterization by acknowledging that on the

face of it there is no objection to referring to the neo-Calvinist, antirevolution

ary view of authority as "theocratic." After all, Kuyper notes that he and his

political movement, along with all Reformed Christians, do believe that "all, that is all power... rests in God and in God alone. In all spheres of life,

7Calvin, Institutes, 4.20.14.

8Cited in James W. Skillen and Rockne M. McCarthy, PoliticalOrderandthe PluralStructure of

Society, vol. 2, Emory University Studies in Law andReligion, gen. ed. John WitteJr. (Atlanta: Scholars

Press, 1991), 237.

9Abraham Kuyper, Ons Program, 2d ed. (Amsterdam: J. H. Kruyt, 1880), 46.

10Ibid


4/34


including politics, all human authority is nothing more than instrumental of

divine authority." Nonetheless, Kuyper judges the oft-repeated charge of theoc

racy against Christian political activism to be an unhistorical anachronism. In

a broad sense one could refer to the ancient kingdoms of the east as theocra

cies where affairs of state were decided by the divine guidance given by priest

craft through signs, oracles, and augury. More precisely, however, Kuyper avers

that the term theocracy should be reserved for that specific, historical instance

of Old Testament Israel and the direct, revealed rule of God over his people.

That period is over, done: "Even in Israel it no longer exists." Attempts, there

fore, to apply Old Testament, Israelite law directiy to the rule of modern states,

are utterly misguided. Kuyper admits here that, "unfortunately, many Calvinists

have frequently been guilty of precisely such a move," and that is for him only

an additional reason why the term theocracy is simply unusable for Christian

political activism in the modern world.

Theonomy and Co mm on Grace: A Connection?

What I have referred to as the tempering influence of common grace on the

theocratic impulseacknowledging the legitimacy of "the common laws of

nations"is precisely what is denied by advocates of theocracy (or theon

omy) .13

Thus, Rousasjohn Rushdoony in his Institutes of BiblicalLaw, the Magna

Carta of Christian Reconstruction, judges Calvin's statement, cited above, to be

"heretical nonsense" and evidence that Calvin's "classical humanism gainedascendancy at this point."

14For Rushdoony the choice is categorical: biblical

law as the common law of nations orapostate rebellion against God and his law:

Neither positive law nor natural law can reflect more than the sin and apos

tasy of man: revealedfawisthe need and privilege of Christian society. It is the

only means whereby man can fulfil his creation mandate of exercising

dominion under God. Apart from revealed law, man cannot claim to be

under God but only in rebellion against God.15

Thus, according to Rushdoony, unbelievers could not be said to do works of"civic good" since "neither positive nor natural law can reflect more than the

sin and apostasy of man." With this understanding there could be no "com

mon grace" defense of the third point. Does this mean that theonomists deny

the doctrine of common grace? We shall see later.

Opponents of theocratic and theonomist positions do single out the doc

trine of common grace as the focal point of disagreement. Meredith Kline, for

13I use the terms interchangeably; theocracy is the more traditional term used to describe the

position that Old Testament law must be the law for any godly nation, while theonomy is the pre


5/34


example, insists that in the New Testament era all theocratic impulses need to

be resisted. "For though [the Christian church's] invisible government is theo

cratic with Christ sitting on David's throne in the heavens and ruling over it, yet

itsvisible organization, in particular as it is related to civil powers, is so designed

that it takes a place of only common privilege along with other religious institu

tions within the framework ofcommon grace"16

So, then, the logic seems rather

clear: Those who reject theonomy actually ally themselves with the doctrine of

common grace, particularly the positive ability of unbelievers to do civic good

apart from revealed law. In this view it is not necessary for a nation to be ruled

in direct accordance with Old Testament theocratic law for Christians to con

sider its structure of law to be legitimate and even regarded in a positive light.

As we have seen in the case of Rushdoony, it is precisely at this point that theon-

omists find fault with Calvin's repudiation of the exclusivelytheocratic ideal

and acceptance ofthe "common laws ofnations."At the same time, a denial ofcommon grace would seem logically to compel

someone into the theonomist camp (or, alternatively, the Anabaptist camp)

particularly with respect to the third point of the 1924 CRC Synod of

Kalamazoo's pronouncement on "civic righteousness": "Concerning the per

formance of so-called civic righteousness by the unregenerate, the Synod

declares that according to Scripture and Confession the unregenerate, though

incapable of any saving good (Canons of Dort, /IV, 3), can perform such

civic good." What happens when one denies that the unregenerate are capableof performing acts of civic righteousness? It seems logical to conclude that

some affirmation that unbelievers are capable ofa certain civil righteousness is

necessary, in a participatory democracy at least, for a Christian believer to

acknowledge the legitimacy ofa state that is clearly not Christian, not explicitly

in accord with God's law. A Christian could only be loyal to such a regime to the

extent that its acts are externally, at least, in conformity with divine law. If a

regime is wholly evil in all its acts, is there any option for the Christian believer

other than the Apostle Peter's, "We must obey God rather than men" (Acts

5:29) ? By the same token, ifone denies that unbelievers are capable of any civicrighteousness at all, it seems logical to conclude that full acceptance of a civil

orderwould be possible only ifthe magistracy were composed of believers who

ruled by the light of divine revelation; that is to say, a theocracy. Concretely,

then, if the reasoning reflected above is correct, one would expect that the

Protestant Reformed Churches, and their theological tradition from Herman

Hoeksema on, would have profound sympathies for the theonomist position.

That is the issue we shall consider in the remainder of this article.


6/34


Herman Ho eksema and Civil Authority: Th e Flag Controversy

That Hoeksema's denial of the doctrine of common grace might have led

him to deny the legitimacy of a civil regime that was not explicitly Christian is

suggested by an interesting public episode in the early years of his ministry.

After three years of ministry in his first charge, the Fourteenth Street ChristianReformed Church of Holland, Michigan, Hoeksema asked that a recently

placed American flag be removed from the church sanctuary during worship.17

The date was February 10, 1918. Three days later, the HollandDaily Sentinel o

February 13,1918, carried a front-page article that claimed the following: "Rev.

H. Hoeksema, pastor of the 14th Street Christian Reformed Church, believes

that the American flag has no place in a church and that the national anthem

should not be sung there" (81). This news item and Hoeksema's public justifi

cation ofhis position created a major fuss in the town with back-and-forth let

ters to the editor as well as counteractions by churches and even the president

of Hope College, G.J. Diekema. President Diekema was quoted in the Sentinel

"If at this crisis we spend our time in theological hair-splitting instead of

patriotic devotion we are near to treason," declared the Honorable Garret

J. Diekema in the course of a thrilling address in Winants Chapel Friday

morning. The remark, which obviously was directed at the Rev. H.

Hoeksema, pastor of the Fourteenth Street Christian Reformed Church,

was greeted with a loud and prolonged applause by the large audience pres

ent to witness the unveiling of the Hope Service Flag.After a beautiful eulogy on the Stars and Stripes, Mr. Diekema said, "If the

flag stands for all that is pure and noble and good, it is worthy of being

unfurled in any building on the face of the earth. The very portals of heaven

would welcome such an emblem. (83)

Similarly, the pastor of Hope Reformed Church, the Reverend P. P. Cheff,

insisted that "it is not only not wrong to display the flag in church and to sing

the national anthems there, but in times of national stress like these it is a pos

itive duty" (82).The national crisis of course was World War I and "feelings of national patri

otism were running explosively high all over the country" (89). In fact,

Gertrude Hoeksema recounts a story of her father-in-law's refusing "to preach

under the American flag in the Christian Reformed Church ofPella" (Iowa).

She also notes here that "the resident minister in the nearby town of Peoria had

also refused to have the flag in his church for the same reasons that Pastor

Hoeksema had refused. His church burned to the ground" (89). Returning to

Holland, Hoeksema, exercising his American constitutional second amend-


7/34


ment rights, purchased and carried a gun for personal protection (89).

According to his daughter- in-law this was in response to a warning that "several

men were 'laying' for him, ready to tar and feather him." She continues, "One

evening, walking home from a late consistory meeting, tired, but alert for dan

ger, he spotted figures crouched in the dark hedge of bushes he had to pass. He

stopped, looked at the bushes and announced, have a gun, and I will use it."

The "patriotic" vigilantes "backed down and disappeared into the dark night"

(89).

What theologically was behind Hoeksema's opposition toflags in church

during worship services? Did he object to patriotism as a violation of the

Christian's love for Christ and citizenship in the kingdom of heaven? Did the

denier ofcommon grace and the capacity of unbelievers to do civil good repu

diate Christian allegiance to a civil authority that was not explicitly and consis

tently Christian? Hoeksema in fact began his answer in the HollandSentinelbyprofessing his allegiance to his adopted country and reacted strongly to the

"gossip . . . that I was pro-German." He suggested that thanks to ecclesiastical

differences "the wish was father to the thought" and insisted that his opponents

were "hopelessly mistaken" in calling his position "one of approximate trea

son." It was unfair, so he wrote, "to present matters in such a light as if a certain

college [Hope] and a certain church [the RCA] had a monopoly of[sic] patri

otism." Hoeksema concluded, "true we are not as wild in our enthusiasm, and

while warmly loyal we manage to keep our head cool; neither do we advertiseour patriotism quite as much as some; but you must remember that we cannot

all stand in the limelight of politics, and thus in spite of all these facts it is very

well possible to be fully as loyal and truly patriotic at every opportunity."

Hoeksema signed his letter, "Hoping, Mr. Editor, that I may continue my talk,

I am gratefully yours for our country" (84).

That Hoeksema had no tendency to deny the duty of Christians to love their

country and obey the government is equally clear in his foundational state

ment giving the reason for the removal ofthe flag from the Fourteenth Street

CRC in the first place. The issue for him was the catholicity ofthe church:

The church as an institution as the manifestation of Christ's body on earth

is universal in character; hence that church as an institution cannot raise

the national flag norsing the national hymns. As Christian citizens the mem

bers of the church, however, are duty bound to be loyal to their country, to

go when their country calls, in obedience to the government. But the flags

should be raised from the home, on the streets, and on all public and

Christian school buildings. Anyone who is pro-German in our time has no

right to the name Calvinist and is a rebel and traitor to his government. (82)

In trying to explain his position to the Holland public in his Sentinel writing,


8/34


loyalty to the United States of America. He had done this, he says, "not because

I felt obliged to do so, not because I love the sentimental, but to inspire my

opponents with a little confidence, that I am not as criminal and treacherous

as they at first seemed to think. I enjoy a good fight any time, but I also want

them to enjoy it. But that was hardly possible as long as they looked upon their

opponent as a traitor" (85). His purpose in writing, he adds, was "not to convert

my opponents to Calvinism. If that was the object I had in view I would write in

a different way. But that would be a hopeless task. In order to see the beauty of

the Calvinistic truth one must be able to do some straight thinking." And then

the coup de grce : "And therefore, I do not aim so high" (85).

What does Hoeksema see as the grounds or reason for a Christian accepting

the legitimate authority ofcivil government, even a non-Christian one? 'This,

that we as Calvinistic people always obey our government, and that for God's

sake." Hoeksema adds that his journalist debating opponent, "the Rev. Cheffmakes a sad mistake if he separates this true obedience for God's sake from the

true feeling of loyalty. The love of country, Mr. Cheff, is not a higher principle

nor is it the source of nobler feelings than the love of God, is it?" Hoeksema

concludes by insisting that obedience "for God's sake" is not detached from

genuine heartfelt love of country: "And if I state that I obey for God's sake, I do

not at all mean to say that this obedience is a cold, objective duty, imposed from

without, but at the same time a truly living principle, inspiring me to be always

loyal, as long as the Word of God allows" (85-86).

Hoeksema's last volley in this war of words made a crucial distinction with a

surprising twist in the tale (86-87). Hoeksema first restates the principle under

lying his action concerning the flag in church:

And the impression is given by them, that I would object to raising a flag in

the church building. Now those that have understood it in that sense have

not taken great pains to read my statement, for even as it appeared in the

Sentinel it could never create that impression. . . . I plainly stated that the

church as such is universal in character, and that as such the church raises no

flag, and as such it sings no national anthems Is that building universal?

He goes on to introduce an interesting and important qualifier by defining the

church as a people and not a building :

But let me help you out of the dilemma. The church is not a building but the

church is the people of God as a whole, united in Christ as their Head as

members of his body. And when the people as such do not meet in the

church building, there is no church there.

This leads to the interesting "twist":

And, therefore, Mr. Cheff, we do not at all object to displaying the flag in the

h h b ildi I k t i t t h I d th t t t t


9/34


And yet, I maintain that the church as such never raises a flag. The church

and state are separate.

Hoeksema concludes with a review of the church's essential nature:

And this church with that One Life, One Faith, One Hope, One Love, One

Confession is absolutely one. In that spiritual body of our Lord Jesus Christthere is no bondman or freeman, there is no Jew or Greek. They are all one

in Christ Jesus. And, therefore, that church as such has no flag

The political implications of this confession that the lordship of Christ is uni

versal does not eliminate love of country but it must subordinate such love and

relativize it. The Christian's real and final citizenship is to another country, a

heavenly one:

When as such they confess their King, they witness to the name of Jesus

Christ alone. When as such they sing of their country, they sing of the citythat hath foundations, of the heavenly Jerusalem, and the kingdom that is

to come. And, therefore, though we have no objections against raising a flag

in the church building on many occasions, we do refuse to raise it as a spiri

tual people of God in Christ Jesus, assembled for worship

Allegiance to both church and country does imply a willingness to give one's

all. "Surely our country is in danger .. . . But the church is in danger too. And if

I am fully prepared to give my life for the country, I am no less prepared to do

the same for the truth of the Word of God."Hoeksema's involvement in the Holland "flag controversy" is significant

because it offers a clear-cut test case for the proposition that a denial of

Kalamazoo's third point on civic righteousness logically leads one to a theo

cratic or theonomic political stance. Our review of the polemics in this contro

versy shows that Hoeksema himself did not draw this conclusion. He fully

affirmed his patriotic love for the nation whose flag he had removed from

church services. Or, is the answer still ambiguous? Does his principle, "inspir

ing me to be always loyal, as long as the WordofGod allows (86, emphasis added),

leave him with a theocratic loophole? To get a more complete picture we need

to consider the argumentspro and con surrounding the third point in the

1920s. Did either the proponents or opponents of the third point on civic righ

teousness ever bring up the theocratic issues, positively or negatively?

Is Th eocr acy/ Theono my the Point of the Th ir d Point?

There is one possible indirect allusion to a theocratic tendency in

Hoeksema's own "catechism" on common grace and the three points, initiallypublished in his The ProtestantReformed Churches in America18

and recently repub-


10/34


lished in Ready to Give an Answer: A Catechism ofReformed Distinctives.19

Question

and answer 9 of the section, 'The Third Point and Its Implications," reads as fol

lows:

Q. What are the implications of the third point?

A. The first implication is a separation of the spiritual and moral or the spiritual and natural, a separation of the first and second tables of the law.

20

This responsein a discussion about the Calvinistunderstanding ofcivic righ

teousness, no lessdirects us to Calvin's own understanding of the magistrate's

responsibility with respect to the two tables of the law.21

According to Calvin,

both Scripture and secular writers agree "that no government can be happily

established unless piety is the first concern; and that those laws are preposter

ous which neglect God's right and provide only for men." Scriptural and

Christian history demonstrate the truth of this according to Calvin and "thisproves the folly of those who would neglect the concern for God and would

give attention only to rendering justice among men. As if God appointed rulers

in his name to decide earthly controversies but overlooked what was of greater

importancethat he himself should be purely worshiped according to the pre

scription of his law." Thus, Calvin summarizes the duty and responsibility of

civil authority as follows:

Civil government has as its appointed end, so long as we live among men, to

cherish and protect the outward worship of God, to defend sound doctrine

of piety and the position of the church, to adjust our life to the society of

men, to form our social behavior to civil righteousness, to reconcile us with

one another, and to promote general peace and tranquility."22

19Herman Hoeksema and Herman Hanko, Ready to Give an Answer: A Catechism of Reformed

Distinctives (Grandville, Mich.: Reformed Free Publishing, 1997), 35-201. This volume contains

Hoeksema's own "catechism" on common grace along with a historical introduction and parallel cat

echism by Herman Hanko on developments within the Protestant Reformed Churches in the 1950s.

20Ibid., 128; Hoeksema, The ProtestantReformedChurches, 380.

21In Calvin, Institutes ofthe Christian Religion, 4.20.9; citations in the paragraph that follows are

from the McNeill/Battles edition of the Institutes.

22Calvin, Institutes, 4.20.2. Here it must also be noted that Calvin's theocratic impulse that the

magistrate has a civic responsibility with respect to the first table of the law does not lead him to the

strict theonomist position that only a civil authority that fully adheres to the divinely revealed law

of Moses can be considered legitimate:

For the statement of some, that the law of God given through Moses is dishonored when it isabrogated and new laws preferred to it, is utterly vain. For others are not preferred to it when

they are more approved, not by a simple comparison, but with respect to the condition of times,


11/34


It would seem reasonable, therefore, to conclude that for a Calvinist whose pri

mary critique of the third point is that it separates the first and second table of

the law, that such a person would follow Calvin in his theocratic concern about

the magistrate's task. However, that is not where the debate about the third

point was focused, at least not directly.

Professor Louis Berkhof in his apologia for Kalamazoo's common grace state

ment, The Three Points in Every RespectReformed,22, does not even mention the

issue of theocracy/ theonomy in his discussion of the third point. Instead, for

him, the issue has to do with maintaining the doctrine of total depravity. He

begins with the observations from experience and the testimony of Reformed

theologians of the past that unbelievers do in fact perform acts that externally,

at least, appear to us to be deeds of which God approves. Berkhof cites Calvin's

commentary on Mark10:21: "He (God) is said to love the political virtues; not

that they are meritorious of salvation or of grace, butthatthey have reference to anendofwhich he approves^ According to Berkhof, these deeds of civic righteous

ness must be explained "by an influence of God exercised on human beings

without renewing their hearts." If humans were left to their own devices, so

contends Berkhof, "they would not perform any civic righteousness. It is rather

thanks to the bridle by which God restrains humans as well as the general

action of the Spirit on human understanding, will and conscience." At stake,

according to Berkhof, is the doctrine of total depravity. "If we deny the action

of God's general grace then we necessarily come to the conclusion that humanbeings perform such acts of civic righteousness out of their own strength." The

punch line here: 'Then we certainly run into danger of denying the doctrine

of total depravity."25

In sum, "the reality of civic righteousness cannot be denied

without closing one's eyes to the reality of life itself; the Reformed tradition

attributes this to the action of God's common grace."26

For Hoeksema, too, the issue is maintaining the integrity of the doctrine of

total depravity. In his "catechism" on the third point he writes, 'The second

implication of the third point is that there is conflict between the doctrine of

total depravity and the actual working out and application of this truth." The

Christian Reformed Church, so Hoeksema alleges, admits the doctrine of total

depravity "in the abstract and as a matter of their confession . . . [but] in prac

tical life it professes it to be wholly different. In this life, with respect to the

things and spheres of this world, there is nowhere a totally depraved man,

according to them."27

Plainly put, Hoeksema's main objection against the third

23L. Berkhof, DeDriePunten in AlleDeelen Gereformeerd(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1925).


12/34


point is that it is "Pelagian."28

It is an open question whether Hoeksema here

conflates the distinction between total depravity and absolute depravity.29

This

is the charge that Berkhof addresses when he responds to Hoeksema's accusa

tion that the third point is Arminian, or even Pelagian in its denial of total

depravity. In Berkhofs judgment, "the doctrine of total depravity as under

stood in the Reformed tradition does not maintain that human beings are as

corrupt as they can possibly be and thus incapable without the regenerating

work of the Holy Spirit to perform deeds that are externally judged 'good,'

those deeds we call 'civic righteousness.'"30

For both sides in the CRC common grace controversy of the 1920s, the issue

was total depravity. Opponents to common grace theology were convinced that

it meant a denial of total depravity. Supporters of the doctrine, on the other

hand, were motivated by the same concern and tried to protect the notion of

depravity by distinguishing two different operations of the Holy Spirit onhuman beings. Saving grace regenerated the hearts of believers and made

them capable of genuine good works. The defenders of common grace wanted

to explain the existence of what appears externally and materially to be "good

works" on the part of unbelievers. This phenomenon, they insisted, is not to be

credited to human effort but to the common or general work of the Holy Spirit

that "influences" unbelievers toward such externally "good" acts without regen

erating them. Berkhof notes that at the same time it is necessary to acknowl

edge that "from a different perspective this civic good remains sinful. Itcertainly is not good in the full sense of the word but only a relative good."

Berkhof suggests as an analogy "shriveled fruit that one sometimes finds on

plants and trees that are cut off from their roots."31

The focus is not on the qual-

28Ibid., 134; this is the twentieth question and answer of Hoeksema's "catechism" on the third

point.

^See Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1939), 246-47 for the distinction. Hoeksema does equivocate on the distinction in his Dogmatics. He grants the distinction

but redefines it as follows: "By absolute depravity must be meant that the matter is settled, that

there is no salvation for the sinner, that he is fallen so deeply that he can never be saved. But the

absoluteness of the fall certainly has nothing to do with the totality of depravity... . From the point

of view of God's counsel it must certainly be said that the reprobate are not only totally but also

absolutely depraved" {ReformedDogmatics [Grand Rapids: Reformed Free Publishing Association,

1966], 252-53.).

30Berkhof, De Drie Punten, 54.

31Ibid., 53. That this crucial distinction was clear to Hoeksema himself is evident in the twenty-

fourth question and answer of his "catechism" on the third point:

Q What is the real teaching of the third point?


13/34


ity of the person ("is he or is he not totally depraved?) but on the kinds of deeds

performed by persons who are indisputably depraved sinners. As Berkhof

describes it: "At a certain level God's will is done, though not as his will or because

he so wills it" A distinction that must be and has been made by Reformed the

ologians according to Berkhof is that "the unregenerate do God's will in a

material sense but are not formally obedient. Unbelievers do God's will mate

rially not because God commands it but out of a certain inclination remaining

even after the fall toward that which is polite, healthy, and just. Other reasons

are fear of the authorities placed over people, or pure self-interest that is seen

as compatible with the interests of society." Berkhof concludes: "Even the best

deeds of the unregenerate are formally, with respect to the way in which they

are performed, wholly sinful."32

It is exactly here that Hoeksema brings up what must have seemed to his

opponents to be a remarkable objection coming from him. The "fourth implication in the third point" according to Hoeksema is "that properly the good

work of the natural man is the good work of the Holy Spirit without it being the

work of the natural man at all. The Spirit of God so influences the corrupt

nature of the unregenerated man, that in his case the evil tree brings forth

good fruit."33

What happens in effect is that "the sinner . . . with a heart full of

hatred against God [still] performs that which is pleasing in the sight of God.

The Spirit forces, compels the operations of that wicked nature to go in the

right direction, even as the helmsman forces a vessel to sail against the wind."

34

Because "the Spirit then, compels man to do good works wholly contrary to the

intents of his own heart," Hoeksema concludes that "the moral character of

man is destroyed, his responsibility is denied, and a theory of moral determin

ism is presented as Reformed doctrine!"35

Hoeksema literally finds this unbe

lievable: "It may be impossible to conceive of so monstrous a thing, but it is

emphatically the teaching of the third point."36

We shall need to consider Hoeksema's charge later in this article but for

now there remains one more angle from which we need to consider the theon-

omy/common grace link. Earlier in this article37 we noted that the logic of

Though he gets the distinction right, Hoeksema's conclusion is wrong. It would be more accu

rate to say that "the natural man does certain deeds of civic righteousness even though he is totally

depraved."

32Ibid.

33Hoeksema and Hanko, Ready to Give an Answer, 130; question and answer 14.

^Ibid.

35Ibid., 133.

36


14/34


denying common grace would seem to lead one naturally into the theonomist

campor, alternatively, the Anabaptist camp. There is a formal similarity

between the theonomist and Anabaptist point ofview here: the world's present

governmental structures are evil "powers" to be repudiated by Christ's follow

ers who are subject to the uncommon law ofGod (either Old Testament theo

cratic law in the case of theonomists or, in the case of Anabaptism, the new law

ofChrist) .39

I call attention to this similarity because on this formal level, at

least, it was alleged by his opponents that Hoeksema's denial ofcommon grace

was functionally Anabaptist, an espousal ofworld-flight Christianity. This par

ticular charge was led by Hoeksema's arch foe in the Christian Reformed

Church, the Reverend Jan Karel Van Baalen. In his brochure, The Denialof

Common Grace: ReformedorAnabaptist?,40

Van Baalen judges the common grace

controversy to be "the most important struggle faced by the [CRC] " because it

is the "conflict between Calvinism and Anabaptism."41

Van Baalen cites a number of Reformed authorities

42as evidence for the proposition that a denial of

common grace leads inevitably to Anabaptist world-flight. He also cites the

opening sentence in the foreword of Kuyper's three-volume Gemeene Gratie.

'There is no greater damage that has been done to the Reformed principle

(GereformeerdeBeginsel) than the unsatisfactory development ofthe doctrine of

common grace."43

While Van Baalen acknowledges that there is an important

difference between Hoeksema's and the Anabaptist doctrine of grace, he still

insists: "Nonetheless, both have this in common, that they know of only one

grace and consequentiyjudge the world in its totality [because] they can see no

good in it."44

In their response to Van Baalen, Hoeksema and Danhof45

categorically deny

the accusations and challenge Van Baalen to find even one place in theirwrit

ing where such world-flight is advocated. Hoeksema and Danhofinsist that they

distinguish a positive sense ofthe word worldas "nature" from the negative bib-

38Though the keymaterialdifference must not be forgotten. Theologically Anabaptism subor

dinates nature to grace; on this question theonomists are thoroughly Reformed in theirview that

grace restores nature.

39It would be an interesting exercise to reread a classic Anabaptist political theology such as

John Howard Yoder's ThePolitics ofJesus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972) substituting theonomic

principles in place ofYoder's Sermon on the Mount ethics.

^J. Van Baalen, De LoocheningderGemeene Gratie: GereformeerdofDoopersch? (Grand Rapids:

Eerdmans-Sevensma, 1922).

41

Ibid., 9.42

Calvin, Bavinck, Hodge, Kuyper, Warfield.


15/34


lical sense of Vor ld" as that which is in enmity against God. Their opponents ,

they say, will look in vain for evidence in their writing that calls for Christians to

abstain from participating in civil institutions, accepting roles in civil govern

ment, or refusing to accept the responsibility of military service.46

Instead, so

they contend, their own view is exactly the opposite of Anabaptism. In good

Kuyperian fashion they advocate Christian involvement, distinctively as Chris

tians in every sphere of life:

The brother must know that this simply is not our perspective at all. In fact

we hold to exactly the opposite view. We precisely do not want to escape

from the world. Rather it is exactly our goal not to forsake any terrain oflife.

We instead call on God's people to be engaged in all of life. We only desire

that God's people, his covenant people, neither forsake or deny God in any

area. In every sphere God's people are called to live by grace, out of the sin

gle grace by which they are engrafted into Christ and love God by keepinghis commandments.

47

The accusation of world-flight does not apply to them as deniers of the doc

trine of common grace, claim Hoeksema and Danhof. "When one considers

'world' as nature, then it is clear that we do not separate nature and grace but

desire rather to live everywhere out of grace."48

"Worldly" vocations are the

Christian's clear responsibility as citizens of the kingdom of God:

In business and trade, in science and art, in state and society, the citizens of

the kingdom may never default on their duties in order to withdraw into thenarrow confines of the church as such. Then we would have to leave the

world itself while it is our calling to remain in its midst.49

Hoeksema's and Danhof s response to Van Baalen must be taken at face

value: They emphatically repudiate the Anabaptist understanding of nature

and grace and its practical consequence, world-flight. At this point, however, we

must also take note of another important practical consequence at stake for

Hoeksema and Danhof in their denial of common grace. They insist that the

Reformed worldview values natural life fully as the proper terrain for Christianvocation. At they same time they insist with equal passion on an absolute

antithesis between believers and unbelievers in these natural spheres. They dis

avow the position of Abraham Kuyper who, so they say, "in addition to the

absolute antithesis in the spiritual realm also sought cooperation in the natural

realms of state, society, are [sic], and science, etc." According to Hoeksema and

Danhof, "Kuyper sought and believed that he had found in the doctrine of

common grace a basis for communal cooperation in the realm of natural life


16/34


between believers and unbelievers: God's gracious inward working in the heart

of the natural, unregenerate sinner so that he becomes capable of doing posi

tive good for God."50

It is this practical blurring of the antithesis that Hoeksema

and Danhof reject so vehemently. In Hoeksema's words, the result of this blur

ring is "the world that is professed to be in darkness is magically flooded with

light by the wonder of common grace. . . . Practically, the difference between

the righteous and the unrighteous is wiped out There is a good deal of har

mony between righteousness and unrighteousness."51

Stated in different words,

Hoeksema judges that the use of common grace to establish cooperative links

between believers and unbelievers in the natural realm "creates a sphere of

transition, a domain where righteousness and unrighteousness, Christ and

Belial, may have fellowship and love the same life." The end result of all this, so

he believes, is that believers 'Svili be swallowed up by the world."52

Since this positionfull affirmation of natural life with believers antithetically opposed to unbelievers in all their natural vocationsis very similar to

that of the theonomists, we are left with some ambiguity in terms of the relation

between the denial of common grace and theonomy. The fact that the issue of

theonomy/theocracy does not surface explicitly in the debates about the third

point and because Hoeksema clearly repudiates the accusation of Anabaptist

world flight, it might seem that we have an answer to the question of our sub

head: "No, theocracy/theonomy is notthe point of the third point." However,

since Hoeksema's radically antithetical posture with respect to all social, cul

tural, and political vocation parallels that of theonomists, we must reserve final

judgment here and seek a definite answer elsewhere.53

Does the denial of com

mon grace lead one to embrace a theonomic posture in political life? At this

point it is not perfectly clear.

Antithetical Theonomists and Common Grace

Let us now consider the converse question, do committed theonomists who

insist that biblical law is the necessary foundation of all national law deny thedoctrine of common grace? It would be hard to find a more committed anti

thetical theonomist than Gary North.54

In fact, North even vigorously disagrees

with his father-in-law Rushdoony on the existence of "Christian elements" in

the founding of the American Constitutional experiment in ordered liberty.55

50H. Hoeksema and H. Danhof, Langs ZuivereBanen (Kalamazoo: Dalm Printing, n.d.), 71-72.

51Hoeksema and Hanko, Ready to Give an Answer, 131.

52Ibid., 131-32.

53See the later section in this article "Eschatology Is the Point "


17/34


Rushdoony recognizes certain 'judicial continuities" between the Christian

political tradition and the American Constitution.56

North categorically dis

agrees: "It did not. It represented a fundamental break from Christianity."57

In

North's view the ratification of the Constitution represented the creation of a

new covenantto replace the Christian covenant of colonial times. The new

Constitution was declaration of independence from God. Whereas the

Declaration of Independence had been a "halfway national covenant" with the

deistic God of Newton joined in covenantal partnership with the biblical God,

the Constitutional Convention "declared the corporate People as the sole and

exclusive suzerain god of the nation" and created "an apostate national

covenant." North concludes: "In short: new covenant, newgod"58 This has impor

tant practical consequences in North's judgment. Whereas "Rushdoony still

believes that a restoration of Constitutional order is the best strategy for

Christian Reconstruction in the United States,"59 North continues to insist ona Christian theocracy modeled on Old Testament case law. The choice is cate

gorical for North: biblical, covenantal law oridolatry and rebellion. The most

repeated phrase in PoliticalPolytheism is: 'There is no neutrality."

North thus explicitly extends to the political realm, and more concretely to

American government, the same antithetical posture that Hoeksema took

toward human moral-civil conduct in general in his opposition to the third

point. We concluded earlier in this article that Hoeksema's denial of common

grace did not lead him to an explicitly theonomist position and that the relationbetween such a denial and the theocratic viewpoint was ambiguous.

60We now

consider the converse question: Does Gary North's antithetical theonomist

stance lead him to a denial of common grace? We do have a clear answer to this

question since North explicitly deals with the Christian Reformed debate on

common grace in one of his books.61

The answer is surprising, even startling.

North's book, Dominion andCommon Grace, in his own words, "is basically a

refutation of Professor Cornelius Van Til's book, Common Grace andthe Gospel,

a compilation of his essays on common grace."

62

North's judgment is not kind:

56See R.J. Rushdoony, This IndependentRepublic (Nutley, N.J.: Craig, 1964), especially chapter 4,

"Sovereignty."

57North, Political Polytheism, 683.

58Ibid., 492.

59Ibid., 683.

^See above, pp. 213, 220.

61Gary North, Dominion andCommon Grace: The Biblical Basis ofProgress (Tyler, Tex: Institute for

Christian Economics, 1987).


18/34


"It is without question the worst book he ever wrote."63

Not only does Van Til

ask the wrong questions, his focus on philosophical questions "steers him away

from the key issue" which, North contends, is history and/or eschatology.64

In a

nutshell, North judges that 'Van Til's stubborn Dutchmanship is rock-hard"

here so that "he will not budge" on his amillennialism. Van Til is, furthermore,

an "undecfaredamillennialist who builds his whole theory of common grace in

terms of his hidden eschatology, probably never realizing the extent to which

his seemingly philosophical exposition is in fact structured by his assumptions

concerning eschatology."65

Where does North then stand among the participants in the common grace

debate? North agrees with Hoeksema and Dutch Reformed theologian Klaas

Schilder and against Van Til66

that it is incorrect to speak of any kind offavorof

God to the reprobate. In particular, he finds Hoeksema's critique of the first

point ("well-meant gospel offer") to be on target. At the same time North doesnot repudiate the term common gracebutaccepts it. North affirms a doctrine of

common grace only by redefining it through a distinction between common

grace and "favor." North understands common grace as the bestowal of gifts (or

even favors) toward the unregenerate, but he insists that this bestowal is not a

demonstration of God's favor, by which he clearly means divine "approval."

"God's common grace implies no favor to the lost in history."67

In fact, and this

is the startling conviction, North insists that "God's common grace can be said

to extend even to Satan."68

North criticizes Van Til for distinguishing "favor to

mankind in general in history from favor to creatures in general in history."

According to North, Van Til makes this distinction in order "to preserve his dis

tinction between favor to mankind and no favor to Satan."69

North disagrees:

God does bestow favors (not favor!) on Satan.

How does one respond to North's remarkable disjunction between com

mon grace and common favor, affirming the former and repudiating the lat

ter? As North sees it, the Christian Reformed position, taken at the 1924

Kalamazoo Synod, identifies common grace with common favor and affirms

both. Hoeksema also identifies the two and rejects both grace and favor, while

he [North] properly distinguishes them, accepting common grace but reject-

63Ibid.

^Ibid., 14-15.

65Ibid., 15.

66On the difference between Van Til on one side and Hoeksema/Schilder on the other, North

writes: "When you face both Herman Hoeksema and Klaas Schilder in theological debate, you had


19/34


ing common favor. Does this linguistic curiosity ("common grace without

favor") really make any sense at all? What are we to do with the following

remarkable statement from North?

Satan's forces, both demonic and human, receive unmerited gifts from God.

Christ died for the whole created world (John 3:16), including Satan. He didnot die in order that the offer of salvation be made to Satan. No such offer

is ever made. The offer of eternal life goes only to men.70

The straightforward proposition contained in the citation just above is truly

startling, even (deliberately?) shocking: "Christ died for the whole created

world, including Satan." What is gained by such a provocative proposition?

How does North explain it, particularly the clearly implied universalism of the

proposition?71

According to North, the basic principle of universal common

grace is continuity : continued existence for Satan and the ungodly is what com

mon grace is all about. In that way Christ is the Savior of all people:72

Christ is indeed the savior of all people prior to the day of judgment (1 Tim.

4:10). Christ sustains the whole universe (Col. 1:17). Without Him, no living

thing could survive. He grants to his creatures such gifts as time, law, order,

power, and knowledge. He grants all these gifts to Satan and his rebellious

hosts. The answer to the question, "Does God show His grace and mercy to

all creation, including Satan?" is emphatically yes. Satan is given time and

power to do his evil work. To the next question, "Does this mean that God

in some way demonstrates an attitude of favor toward Satan?" the answer isemphatically no. God is no more favorable toward Satan and his demons

than he is to Satan's human followers. But this does not mean that He does

not bestow gifts upon themgifts that they in no way deserve.73

We need now briefly to examine North's understanding of the mechanism

by which common grace is administered by God. The key structure is covenant,

a structure that North believes is rooted in the very nature of human beings as

they form governments. In his discussion of the American Constitution North

points to the inescapable structural elements that parallel the biblical covenanttreaties.

74When the Framers penned the Constitution they hadto deal with the

key features of the biblical covenant model since these elements "are

70Ibid., 43.

71There is a temptation among many "common grace" Reformed people, particularly those

who have been captured by the cosmic scope of Kuyperian neo-Calvinism, to argue from Christ's

universal Lordship over all creation to the conclusion that everything (by which is usually meant all

human cultural practices) is "redeemable."


20/34


inescapable concepts for every covenant institution." North adds: "In adopting

this . . . model, the Framers were being faithful to something written by God

into man's mind and his covenantal institutions."75

North thus distinguishes

between the structure of covenant, which is universal to all government, and the

direction of a specific covenant.76

A covenant is a relationship under sanction

and obedient covenant-keepers receive blessings while disobedient covenant-

breakers are cursed. To the extent that even the reprobate externally keep the

legal requirements of the covenant, they are blessed. And the corollary is also

true: When Christians fail to live covenantally in accord with biblical law, they

will be temporally cursed. North draws the contrast starkly:

The law of God is the primary tool of dominion that God offers to all men,

irrespective of their personal faith. He gives the Holy Spirit to his people, but

if his people refuse for a season to honor the terms of the covenant, while

God-rejecting men willingly adopt the external terms of the covenant, thenthe latter will prosper externally.

77

Thus, history itself demonstrates the validity of biblical law by revealing the

"cause-and-effect relationship between national external conformity to God's

lawand external blessing." Furthermore, the problem with the church today in

North's view is that "it does not believe in God's sanctions in history. In Old

Testament times, yes, but not in New Testament times."78

North's antithetical theonomist convictions lead him to what seems like a

counterintuitive if not contradictory position: Affirming both the clear line ofdemarcation between the regenerate and the unregenerate, also in sociopolit

ical life, and the doctrine of common grace interpreted as "grace without

favor." This position has the effect of intensifying the conflict between the City

of God and the City of Man. In fact, though he affirms common grace, North

is particularly dismissive of any form of political pluralism that seeks some form

of "common ground" between Christians and non-Christians, calling this posi

tion "halfway covenant" thinking.79

On this important point Hoeksema and

North are in full agreement.80

The common ground, pluralist position is, in

North's judgment, inherently instable. Two religious positions are vying for

hegemony and for that reason religious and cultural war is unavoidable. As the

75Ibid.

76The specific terminology I am using here does not come from North himself but from Albert

M. Wolters, Creation Regained: Biblical Basis for a Reformational Worldview (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,

1985), ch. 5.

77North, Political Polytheism, 636; the example that North uses here is "the reversal of economicpower between Japan and the United States, 1945-1988" where the Japanese "adopted the

P hi f h i A i " (ibid )


21/34


"sharpening and hardening" of history takes place conflict is inevitable. In

North's words:

Let me put it bluntly: as covenant-keepers andcovenant breakers become more co

sistentin thoughtand life, pluralism will be shotto pieces in an ideological (and pe

haps even literal) crossfire. Pluralism is an arrangement based on a temporaryreligious and ideological cease-fire. When this cease-fire ends, pluralism also

ends. So will the appeal of its ideology.81

We have taken this tour through North's theology to demonstrate that his

theonomist stance does not lead him to repudiate the doctrine or even the spe

cific language of common grace. Here we discover a possible converse parallel

with Hoeksema whose denial of common grace did not lead to a clear and

explicit embrace of theonomy. In fact, a case could be made that North and

Hoeksema in their understanding of the antithesis in human culture and his

tory are far more alike than either is to Cornelius Van Til or to the Christian

Reformed position taken at the Synod of Kalamazoo. Is there then a clear bone

of contention between North and Hoeksema, between committed theonomists

and the consistent deniers of common grace?

Eschatology Is the Point: Theonomy and Postmillennialism

We have already indirecdy answered the immediately preceding question

when we considered North's refutation of Van Til. According to North the "keyissue" is history and/or eschatology.^ The fundamental error in Van Til's doc

trine of common grace, judges North, is his "undeclared millennialism."83

A

recent exchange in the pages of the StandardBearer, the magazine of the

Protestant Reformed Churches, between editor David Engelsma and Gary

North, also focused on the link between theonomy and postmillennial escha

tology.84

There is no space in this article to enter into all the components of this

debate. I shall focus on one important part of a response by the Reverend

Norman Jones to Engelsma's original 'Jewish Dreams" editorial.85

Jones begins by protesting the "very strong attack against those who have

held to a victorious Church of Christ in the world" and then addresses

Engelsma's citation of the condemnation of postmillennialism by the Second

Helvetic Confession (1566). The very title of Engelsma's editorial, 'Jewish

81Ibid., 227.

82North, Dominion andCommon Grace, 14-15; see note 65 above.

83

Ibid.84

Editor Engelsma opened the exchange with an editorial, "Jewish Dreams," StandardBearer


22/34


Dreams," was borrowed from that confession. Here is the passage that

Engelsma cited:

We further condemn Jewish dreams that there will be a golden age on earth

before the Day of Judgment , and that the pious, having subdued all their

godless enemies, will possess all the kingdoms of the earth. For evangelicaltruth in Matt., chs. 24 and 25, and Luke, ch. 18, and apostolic teaching in II

Thess., ch. 2, and II Tim., chs. 3 and 4, present something quite different.86

Jones responds to this citation of the Second Helvetica by calling attention to

another chapter (30) of the same confession where the task of the magistrate

is outlined in theocratic/theonomic terms. Paralleling the point of view in

Article 36 of the Belgic Confession, this article describes the magistrate's task as

one of defending the Church of God, rooting out idolatry, and suppressing

heretics. In Jones's words, the Second Helvetica "certainly teaches a so-called

theonomic ethic for civil government. Could it be," he queries, "that the

author, Heinrich Bullinger, actually believed that civil government could be

Christian in its theology and ethicswhich is what a 'postmill' prays for (Ps.

2:6-9; Is. 2:1-4; Micah 4:1-8; Matt. 28:18-20)?"87

We need not belabor die point here: Theonomists do link their public the

ology with a postmillennial eschatology. The question of which onetheonomy

or postmillennialismhas the priority of conviction is a classic example of the

proverbial "chicken or egg" riddle. As Calvin noted about the knowledge of God

and the knowledge of man, "which one precedes and brings forth the other isnot easy to discern."

88Perhaps that question is less important than the simple

fact of linkage. Theonomists attack their critics, particularly amillennialists, for

holding to what they consider to be a defeatist eschatology.89

Amillennialism is

"pessimillennialism." But, is this linkage obvious and necessary?

86Engelsma, 'Jewish Dreams," 173. It is rather puzzling that Jones questions the legitimacy of

Engelsma's citation. He writes: "If, indeed the Second Helvetica condemns a post-millennial escha

tology, as you maintain (you do not cite the reference of your quote from the Confession. . . ").

Engelsma's reference was given clearly: (chap. 11, in Reformed Confessions ofthe Sixteenth Century, ed.

Arthur C. Cochrane [Westminster Press, 1966] ). Another English translation can be found in the

recently released sixth edition standard work on confessions and creeds, Philip Schaff, The Creeds

of Christendom, 6th ed., 3 vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998 [1931]), 3:831-909. (The English trans

lation was omitted in earlier editions.) The exact reference that the Rev. Mr. Jones had difficulty

finding is indeed in chapter 11 of the Second Helvetica as Engelsma had noted. It can be found on

p. 853 of Schaffs third volume (6th ed.). See also Engelsma's own response on this point, Standard

Bearer(March 1,1995), 271.

87

Engelsma, 'Jewish Dreams," 270.88

Calvin, Institutes, 1.1.1.


23/34


As Professor Engelsma points out in his response to the Rev. Mr. Jones, the

Second Helvetica (not to mention Calvin and the Belgic Confession ) do in fact

uncouple theocratic conviction from postmillennial 'Jewish dreams." Writes

Engelsma: "Fact is, one may hold this to be the calling of the state while recog-

nizing that the kingdom ofGodin the world is spintual, notcarnal, and thatthe condi

tion ofthe church in the last days will be tnbulation, not that of a 'golden age. ' It i

here that we have a critical dividing line. Though the denial of common grace

has a kinship with the theonomist tendency to see the external works of civic

righteousness by nonbelievers as works destined only for judgment and

destruction, this kinship is not strong enough to overcome the fundamental

disagreement about eschatology. The Protestant Reformed theological tradi

tion from Hoeksema on has stood resolutely opposed to all postmillennial

dreams and ambitions.91

It is worth pondering whether the strong commonal

ities on this point between the Protestant Reformed Churches and theChristian Reformed Church could not lead to fruitful reconsideration of

Kalamazoo's third point. There are other areas also where further discussion

might lead to an awareness of commonalities or at least shared difficulties. It is

to one of these that we now turn.

Anthropological Determinism and Defining the Good

The conclusion of this article will make some specific proposals toward a

reformulation of the matter dealt with in Kalamazoo's third point, particularlysince, in my judgment, there are significant areas of potential agreement on

the issue of "civic righteousness." As part of that task and goal, I shall first

address one of Hoeksema's chief objections to the theology undergirding the

third point, namely his charge of moral determinism.92

According to

Hoeksema, because the Holy Spirit is said to compel a man "to do good works

contrary to the intents of his own heart . . . the moral character of man is

destroyed, his responsibility is denied, and a theory of moral determinism is

presented as Reformed doctrine."93

In my judgment, Hoeksema's usual theo

logical acuity has failed him here.

For the point made by Kalamazoo's third point is virtually the same as

Hoeksema's own discussion of the doctrine of providence.94

Hoeksema is par-

^Engelsma, 'Jewish Dreams," 271.

91See, inter alia, Herman Hoeksema, ReformedDogmatics, 816-17; idem., "Defective Logic,"

StandardBearer(February 15,1929): 239; H. Hanko, 'The Danger of Post-Millennialism," Standard

Bearer (June 1, 1965): 402-5; idem., 'The Illusory Hope of Postmillennialism," StandardBearer


24/34


ticularly concerned to defend the Christian and Reformed doctrine of provi

dence from deistic notions of the absent watchmaker god. So he insists, "the

providence of God rules not only brute creation, but also the rational and

moral creature in all his deeds andactivity'(emphasis added). Since the concern

of Deism is to protect autonomous human moral behavior"Man is free: his

choice of will must remain independent"Deists insist that "even God cannot

interfere with this sovereignty of man." Against this notion Hoeksema rightly

protests that Scripture "knows nothing of a sovereign man or angel. It knows of

no sovereign moral creature apart from or next to God." The proper biblical

view, he contends, is that "the almighty and omnipresent power of God controls

his whole life and all his deeds." This clearly touches on human moral conduct.

"And even the heart of man, that center of his ethical life, is controlled by the

Lord." It is hard here to see how Hoeksema's notion of providential sovereignty

differs from the concerns of the third point or how he avoids becoming vulnerable to the charge of determinism himself. Hoeksema even employs the

language of causality, utilizing the traditional distinction between primary and

secondary causality. "God is not the author of sin. Man is the second cause; and

he works consciously andwillingly, and he commits sin because he loves it, while

God hates all evil. But that second cause is not sovereign, not even in his think

ing and willing, and not even when he sins" (emphasis added).

Professor Herman Hanko makes a similar point in an essay on Post

millennialism.95

One of his concerns is to correct the error of failing to distin

guish the distinct manner of Christ's rule over the wicked from that over the

righteous. 'There is a difference in the way Christ rules," he insists:

The difference is this: Christ rules over the wicked men and devils in such a

way, that while He remains the sovereign Lord, they serve Him against their

will. They rebel against Christ, fight against His rule and seek to destroy His

kingdom. They rage against God and Christ and seek to cast His yoke from

them. But all this wicked rebellion does not alter the fact that they are still so

many servants of Christ who can do nothing but what Christ works and what

God has eternally determined. Christ rules over them through their rebellionso that in their rebellion, even though they oppose His kingdom, they still

serve God's purpose.96

By contrast, Christ rules over his own people in a quite different way:

He rules over them in such away that they become the zi^mgsubjects of His

kingdom. He rules over them by changing their hearts, bending their wills,

redeeming and saving them so that they bow willingly before Him and

acknowledge Christ as their Lord. They are, through the rule of Christ in

their hearts, the loyal citizens of the kingdom, loyal soldiers of the cross.97


25/34


The goal of a virtuous and orderly society is thus achieved, in this scenario,

by God's providential limiting of sin's consequences and steering human evil

deeds in a direction that mitigates sin's worst consequences.98

But God's sover

eign action goes deeper than this according to Hoeksema. The hearts of evil

men are controlled by the Lord so that, limited in their own sovereignty, they

"serve him against their will" even when they sin. With this formulation it isalso difficult to maintain the notion of human moral freedom. Though it is

framed by a doctrine of decree and providence rather than in terms of com

mon grace, Hoeksema's formulation suffers from the same problem with

which he accuses the third point. His response is also similar: When faced with

a logical difficulty where an implication is drawn that is disagreeable to him, he

simply decfares his conviction about human moral responsibility.

The issue we are dealing with here gets even more cloudy since Hoeksema

is willing to go further in terms of the unregenerate doing certain deeds that atleast externally appear to be "good." In a discussion of Canons of Dort, III/IV,

4, Hoeksema notes that post-fall humanity is still "able to act rationally and

morally in relation to God and man."99

He righdy observes that the Kalamazoo

Synod in citing this passage in defense of common grace distorted matters by

omitting the nuanced negations of the second half of the article.100

Nonethe

less, Hoeksema does speak positively about the vestigial "natural light" in fallen

man. In a catechetical answer to the question, 'What is 'natural light'?"

Hoeksema describes it as follows:

It is the light of reason, through which man, even after the fall, is a rational-

moral being. The article speaks of "glimmerings" of this light remaining in

fallen man, because it does no longer shine in the original brightness that

characterized it in the state of righteousness. If man had not retained these

glimmerings he would not be able to act rationally and morally in relation

to God and man. He would not be responsible. He would be unable to sin;

for sin presupposes a rational being that knows what he oughtto do and is,

therefore, responsible. And he could not be subject to punishment, nor

would he be in a position to justify God in His righteous judgment. In the

98See also Hoeksema and Danhof, Langs Zuivere Banen, 79.

"Hoeksema and Hanko, Ready to Give an Answer, 138.

100The article in its entirety reads as follows:

There remain, however, in man since the fall, the glimmerings of natural light, whereby he

retains some knowledge of God, of natural things, and of the differences between good and


26/34


light of these glimmerings, therefore, fallen man knows whathe oughtto do,

but is not morally able to do it. Knowledge is no virtue.101

Hoeksema makes a similar point in his answer about the Canons ' reference to

"natural things":

Natural things are the things of this world, things earthy, man himself andcreation about him, the different creatures in relation one to another and

to himself. In the light of this knowledge man, fallen man, is able to live his

present earthly life, such as it is. In this light he also develops the sciences

and discovers the hidden powers of creation and invents the wonders of the

modern world. He discovers numerous means whereby to enrich the life of

the world. Again, however, the question as to whether there remains in

fallen man any good, and whether he performs any good, is not answered by

the fact that he is able to live and to enlarge upon the scope of his earthly

life, but is determined by his relation to God. With all these means he doesnot improve, neither does he do any good. He merely subjects himself with

all these to the service of sin.102

Hoeksema attributes a high level ofknowledge of the good to the unbeliever:

Though the fallen man "loves sin and hates God [he] knows very well that God

is good, and also that it is good to serve him. He is not unaware of the patent

fact that sin leads to destruction." Knowing that the law of God is good and

beneficial, the fallen man "perceives very well that it is not goodfor him to com

mit adultery, to steal, and to murder." It is thus only because of a "fear of evilresults for him" that fallen man refrains from doing the evil that he loves and

wills. Hoeksema allows that fallen man "has a certain regard, for virtue, and

there is even a certain manifest attempt in his life and walk to be virtuous, to

maintain order in society, and to conduct himself orderly in his external

deportment." His conclusion: There is among fallen people "some regard for

virtue and good order and orderly development" but there is no "inward

virtue" and even though there be an appearance of external virtue, "he and all

the world are nevertheless dominated by sin and are rushing to judgment."103

The argument thus hangs entirely on a definition of "the good." For

Hoeksema the Heidelberg Catechism's understanding of good works is exclu

sive: Good works are "only those which proceed from a true faith, are per

formed according to the law of God, and to his glory; and not such as are

founded on our imaginations, or the institutions of men."104

The advocates of

common grace, on the other hand, affirm Hoeksema's point about total

depravity but are willing to use "good" in a penultimate sense, a lesser good for

101Hoeksema and Hanko Ready to Give an Answer 138 39


27/34


deeds that externally measure up to God's law and benefit humanity. In

Calvin's words, cited by Berkhof, "God is said to love the political virtues; not

that they are meritorious of salvation or of grace, but thatthey have reference to an

end ofwhich he approves."105 One wonders at this point whether it would not be

possible to arrive at a consensus position by reframing this idea in the cate

gories of providence and by speaking of deeds that "contribute to an end of

which God approves" rather than deeds that are "good." This possibility is

strengthened by the fact that Hoeksema actually does speakin bonumpartem of

civil righteousness:

And what then is civil righteousness? According to our view, the natural man

discerns the relationships, laws, rules of life and fellowship, etc., as they are

ordained by God. He sees their propriety and utility. And he adapts himself

to them for his own sake. If in this attempt he succeeds the result is an act

that shows an outward and formal resemblance to the laws of God. Then wehave civil righteousness, a regard for virtue and external deportment.

106

Reconsidering the Third Point

Our journey through the tangle of debate about civic righteousness has

been long and somewhat meandering. We have followed some trails that finally

led nowhere. Our basic concern was the question of whether there was an

inherent connection between the denial of common grace and a theonomic

point of view, particularly in the matter of civil righteousness. We have finallyarrived at the point where we can give a definitive answer: "No, there is no nec

essary and logical connection between theocracy/theonomy and the denial of

the third point of common grace." The lengthy journey we took, with all its

twists and turns to arrive at this destination, was necessary and valuable. Much

of the debate about common grace in general and the third point in particular

is characterized by a certain logical consequentialism: Since X holds view A, he

mustalso be guilty of holding view B. Both sides engaged in this kind of conse-

105Berkhof, DeDrie Punten, 52.

106Ibid., 128. In fairness to Hoeksema the remaining qualification in this quotation also must be

mentioned:

And if in this attempt he fails, as is frequently the case, civil righteousness disappears, and the

result is exactly the opposite. His fundamental error, however, is that he does not seek after

God, nor aim at Him and His glory, even in this regard for virtue and external deportment. On

the contrary, he seeks himself, both individually and in fellowship with other sinners and with

the whole world, and it is his purpose to maintain himself even in his sin over against God. And

this is sin. And in reality his work also has evil effects upon himself and his fellow creatures. For,


28/34


quentialism with the result that neither was able to take the other's affirma

tions and negations seriously. Hoeksema claimed that those who held to a doc

trine ofcommon grace thereby denied total depravity. His opponents denied

the charge and concluded the opposite: Because Hoeksema denies common

grace he does not take total depravity seriously enough. Examples of this sort

of back-and-forth consequentialism can be multiplied in this debate. Even the

original premise giving rise to this articlecould there be a link between deny

ing common grace and a theonomic public theology?was an example ofcon-

sequentialist logical deduction: Denial of the third point implies denial of the

legitimacy ofnon-Christian civil authority, which furthermore implies theon

omy. It was important to follow a number of such consequentialist leads that

eventually turned out to be dead ends in order to illustrate one of the impor

tant lessons of this survey: Be waryof drawing grand conclusions from deduc

tions, especially when those about whom you are drawing the inference deny it.

When A concludes that does not believe in total depravity because ofbelief

X but vigorouslydisputes the conclusion and may in fact even turn it back on

A, then a breakdown of definition and communication has taken place, and it

is time to stop and go back to the drawing board. The great tragedy ofthe com

mon grace debate in the 1920s and beyond is that positions were hardened in

concrete and parties formed that mutually excluded each other from commu

nion. I remain convinced that though there are significant differences between

the parties in the CRC's common grace debate, matters need not have come to

total division and separation. There must be room in the Christian andReformed camp for both Berkhof and Hoeksema. Let me here suggest a pos

sible framework and reformulation of Kalamazoo's third point that might not

fully satisfy either of the two sides but could be a position that both could live

with. The first step would be to remove the term gracefrom any discussion ofthe

ongoing vestiges of the image of God in fallen man and the gifts and virtues

associated with the image. Restricting the notion of grace to the soteriological

realm honors Hoeksema's concerns and would suggest that the expression

"good works" also be restricted to the Heidelberg Catechism's understanding

of"only those that proceed from a true faith." The material content of this issue

could then be placed in the doctrine of providence where it is free from all

confusion with soteriology. Both sides would then clearly affirm total depravity,

that even the best of human deeds are polluted with sin, and that apart from

saving grace no one willinglydoes good.

What happens when the matter ofcivil righteousness is framed by the doc

trine of providence? The emphasis then falls on God's creating, governing, and

sustaining work and the possibility of confusion with soteriological categories

is minimized. Thanks to God's providential care even fallen man, according tothe Canons ofDort continues to possess "glimmerings ofnatural light" so that


29/34


is not out ofcontrol, God brings it to his own conclusion and end. At this point

we need not explore the mechanism by which God accomplishes his purposes;

we need onlyto confess that however it is understood we must affirm both

God's ultimate sovereigntyandgenuine human moral responsibility. With that

briefsummary as background, here is a reformulation ofthe matter covered by

the third point:

Concerning the performance of so-called civic righteousness by the unre

generate, the Synod declares that the unregenerate are incapable of any sav

ing good (Canons ofDort, / IV, 3). We do acknowledge that God in his

providence does maintain all people as his image bearers who continue to

keep "glimmerings ofnatural light, wherebytheyretain some knowledge of

God, of natural things, and of the differences between good and evil, and

discover some regard for virtue, good order in society, and for maintaining

orderly external deportment." (Canons ofDort, /IV, 4). These deeds of

outward conformityto God's ordinances do not make unbelievers inwardly

virtuous or good before God; theyrender unbelievers inexcusable (Romans

1:20; Canons ofDort, /IV, 4). At the same time God's providential gov

erning and sustaining creation and humanitywithin the bounds of external

order is his universal gift to all people. Though under judgment, life in this

world is not hell. Christ is King!

This is onlya personal proposal and requires much more discussion between

the advocates and detractors ofcommon grace, but it is offered here as an illustrative demonstration that open and honest dialogue might have resulted in

greater agreement on the crucial points. Sadly, that did not happen in 1924; it's

not too late to make some attempt today.

Postscript: Determinism and Cooperation

The paragraphs that follow are an attempt theologically to reframe the issue

of divine influence on unregenerate people and the problem ofmoral deter

minism that Hoeksema so vigorouslyobjected to in the third point. I add themhere as a postscript because the point is tangential, and I did not wish to muddy

even more the already turbulent waters. The pneumatological argument that

follows here should not be identified with the preceding discussion; it is addi

tional reflection on a subpoint ofthat discussion. My starting point is to ask

that ifhuman evil deeds are underthe providential governance ofGod, why

would Hoeksema demurgiving God credit forrestraining evil deeds and pro

moting good deeds with the objection that such a view is a case ofmoral deter

minism?

Perhaps we get a clue from anotherand minor note in Hoeksema's treat

f h d i f id H k i hi i h "I


30/34


and "government." And now here is the point I wish to highlight: "Frequently,"

writes Hoeksema, "a third element is mentioned, that of cooperation. But this

is, strictly speaking, not necessary: for what is meant by cooperation is after all

nothing else that [ sic ] the preservation and government of God with regard

to the mora

common grace, theonomy, and the civic good

Documents