Compensation and Remediation Policy at the Polluted An-Shun Plant Site:

Towards Collaborative Governance

Peter J. Robertson* School of Policy, Planning, and Development

University of Southern California Los Angeles, CA, USA

and

Yungnane Yang Department of Political Science

College of Social Sciences National Cheng Kung University

Tainan, Taiwan, R.O.C

April, 2011

* This research was supported by the Center for Humanities and Social Sciences at National Cheng Kung University, where this author held a position of Visiting Associate Researcher during the preparation of this manuscript.

2

Compensation and Remediation Policy at the Polluted An-Shun Plant Site: Towards Collaborative Governance

Abstract

This paper focuses on the processes through which two policy decisions were made pertaining to the pollution at the former site of the An-Shun plant in Tainan, Taiwan. In particular, the analysis addresses the extent to which these processes reflected the principles of collaborative governance. Collaborative governance is first described in terms of three ideal characteristics that differentiate them from more traditional modes and mechanisms for making policy decisions. We then provide details regarding the An-Shun plant case, including characteristics of the affected communities and the stakeholders involved in the decision processes. Drawing on this case, as well as collaborative governance research more generally, we identify a number of “pitfalls” that can get in the way of developing systems and processes that approximate the ideal features identified in the first part of the paper. The final section then outlines implications for public managers who wish to take a proactive role in establishing effective collaborative governance mechanisms, especially in contexts where they are not supported by broader cultural and/or institutional forces.

3

Compensation and Remediation Policy at the Polluted An-Shun Plant Site: Towards Collaborative Governance

In 1981, high levels of toxic pollutants were found in a reservoir near the An-Shun

plant in Tainan, Taiwan, as well as in fish from the reservoir that local citizens were

catching to eat and/or sell. The following year, Taiwan’s central government shut down

the plant for what they indicated were economic reasons. Twenty years later, research

indicated that citizens in the communities closest to the plant property had higher dioxin

rates in their blood than people in other parts of Taiwan, and further suggested that higher

dioxin levels were correlated with higher cancer rates. In 2004, Taiwan’s Environmental

Protection Agency identified the property as a pollution remediation cite, and the following

year the Executive Yuan passed a bill to set aside NT$1.3 billion for a period of five

consecutive years to compensate victims of dioxin pollution. Taiwan’s highest

administrative court subsequently ruled that the owner of the property – the China

Development Petroleum Company (CPDC) – was the responsible party and thus had to pay

both the compensation costs and the remediation costs. CPDC’s Board of Trustees set

aside NT$1.65 billion over 20 years for remediation of the plant site, and their remediation

plan was approved by Tainan’s Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) in 2008.

Citizens from the affected communities were given an opportunity to participate in

meetings with government officials and CPDC representatives to discuss how the

compensation money should be utilized and what the remediation plan should entail. Since

these pollution policy decision processes involved actors from the public and private

sectors as well as those representing civil society, they provided an ideal context for the

use of collaborative governance as a mechanism for reaching agreement among the various

4

stakeholders. The notion of collaborative governance has been receiving considerable

attention in the public administration literature recently (Ansell & Gash, 2008; O’Leary,

Gerard, & Bingham, 20061), reflecting its growing use in various arenas to develop and/or

implement policies that take into account the diverse interests with a stake in the decision.

In Taiwan, the process of democratization over the last twenty years has resulted in greater

public pressure on the government to establish mechanisms for citizens to participate in

public decisions such as those pertaining to environmental management (Tang, Tang, & Lo,

2005). In this context, recent research has investigated public involvement and cross-

sectoral collaboration in various policy arenas (Chen, 2011; K. Lee, 2003; T. Lee, 2010;

Tang & Tang, 2006; Yang, 2010c).2 However, the practice has not yet diffused widely, such

that cultural and institutional support for its use is still relatively limited.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the policy-making processes pertaining to

the An-Shun plant case from a collaborative governance perspective, to better understand

the challenges involved in establishing such systems and thus to extract some lessons

regarding steps public managers can take to help develop and maintain them. In the first

part of the paper, we briefly describe collaborative governance systems in terms of three

ideal characteristics that differentiate them from more traditional modes and mechanisms

for making policy decisions. We then provide more detail regarding the An-Shun plant

case, including characteristics of the affected communities and the stakeholders involved in

the decision processes. Drawing on this case, as well as collaborative governance research

more generally, we identify a number of “pitfalls” that can get in the way of developing

systems and processes that approximate the ideal features identified in the first section.

The final part of the paper then outlines implications for public managers who wish to take

5

a proactive role in establishing effective collaborative governance mechanisms, especially

in contexts where they are not supported by broader cultural and/or institutional forces.

The Potential of Collaborative Governance

Collaborative governance refers to a group of interdependent stakeholders, usually

from multiple sectors, who work together to develop and/or implement policies to address

a complex, multi-faceted problem or situation (Robertson & Choi, forthcoming). The

concept includes a wide variety of specific multi-stakeholder arrangements utilized to

address a broad array of policy issues. Despite variations in the specific structures and

processes actually used in these diverse contexts, literature on this topic (e.g., Ansell &

Gash, 2008; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Huxham, 2003; Mandell & Keast, 2007;

McGuire, 2006; Thomson & Perry, 2006) suggests a number of normative features that help

to define this new institutional form. In essence, collaborative governance is idealized as

an egalitarian decision process in which stakeholders utilize a deliberative process in an

effort to reach consensus on a mutually satisfactory solution. While actual use of such

systems may readily fall short of achieving these ideals, the value of collaborative

governance as a new institutional arrangement likely depends on the extent to which this

potential is realized.

First, collaborative governance strives to be egalitarian in the sense that

stakeholders have equal opportunity for their interests to be represented in the process

and for their preferences to influence the decisions made. One implication here is that

minority interests, i.e., those stakeholders with less power and/or not well-organized,

should explicitly be included in the process. Furthermore, all opinions and perspectives

should be considered equally important, so that the process is not dominated by those with

6

the most power (Fung & Wright, 2001). From a practical perspective, egalitarian respect

for the input provided by all stakeholders helps to improve the diversity of information

available to the decision-makers (Booher & Innes, 2002) and thus the quality of the

decisions they make (Beierle & Konisky, 2001). The inclusive, egalitarian nature of

collaborative governance can promote further realization of the ideals of democracy

(Leach, 2006), with more people involved in meaningful public decision-making on issues

that matter to them most.

Second, collaborative governance is intended to be a deliberative process, with

participants sharing their knowledge and information openly and considering all

information available before reaching a collective conclusion. Effective deliberation entails

a dialogue among participants (Cooper, Bryer, & Meek, 2006) through which mutual

understanding can emerge when participants listen empathically to one another’s concerns

in order to probe their underlying beliefs and worldviews (Roberts, 2002). Individual and

collective learning can be enhanced through deliberation, as the broad range of interests

and perspectives are clarified (Healey, 1996) and stakeholders develop a better

understanding of what others really care about and why. Furthermore, the

interdependencies among stakeholders can be clarified, helping to shift their focus to the

larger system in which they are interconnected (Bouwen & Taillieu, 2004). The openness,

transparency, and constructive dialogue of collaborative governance help to build trust and

develop social capital among participants, opening the possibility of identifying or

developing solutions that respond to their concerns and priorities.

Third, the goal in collaborative governance is to reach consensus among all relevant

stakeholders about how to address the policy issue. Consensus does not necessarily

7

require unanimity regarding the best course of action, rather that all participants indicate

their willingness to support and go along with the proposal even if it is not their preferred

alternative and/or they are not in full agreement with it (Schein, 1999). The struggle to

achieve consensus pushes stakeholders to conceive of the situation in win-win terms,

rather than maintaining a zero-sum orientation that undermines the effectiveness of the

collaborative process. Consensus is also a key factor for effective implementation of the

decisions made (Thomson & Perry, 2006). The effort to identify mutually-acceptable

solutions leads to greater support for these decisions, with stakeholders then more willing

to take responsibility for implementation and/or voluntary monitoring of the process

(Booher, 2004). The increased legitimacy of the process and its outcomes may even help to

build public trust in the efficacy of government. In addition to these benefits, consensus

may be the only viable way of making a decision when conflicting stakeholders have

relatively equal power and realize that only through consensus-based decision-making can

they hope to resolve the stalemate (Ansell & Gash, 2008).

To assess the extent to which these three qualities were reflected in the decision

processes used to develop the compensation and remediation policies pertaining to the An-

Shun plant site, we draw on the knowledge gained through many years of engagement in

and research on these processes. In particular, the first author has been involved with this

case since 2006,3 after government officials and CPDC managers had started meeting with

community members to determine how to allocate the money set aside for their

compensation. In addition to information gained through first-hand participant

observation in relevant meetings, interviews were conducted between 2006 and 2008 with

numerous stakeholders including leaders of the affected communities, central and local

8

government officials, CPDC officers, the environmentalist who brought the pollution

problem to the attention of the public, a medical doctor who provided health care services

to community members, and other university researchers (e.g., from the Institute of

Environmental Health, the Department of Environmental Engineering, and the Department

of Political Science at National Cheng Kung University). Furthermore, a survey

questionnaire was developed and administered to 301 members of the three affected

townships (proportionate to their total population) in the spring of 2008. Finally, second

hand data including newspaper accounts and other reports provided additional

information about important events taking place a number of years ago. Specific findings

from this research have been reported elsewhere (Lee, Yang, & Tung, 2009; Sun, Tsai, Shih,

& Lin, 2009; Yang, 2007; 2008; 2010a; 2010b; 2011). In the next section, we synthesize

this information to provide a more detailed summary of the specifics of this case.

The An-Shun Plant Case

The An-Shun plant, located in the An-Nan district of Tainan, Taiwan, was originally

established by a Japanese company and in the early 1940s began producing hydrochloric

acid, caustic soda, liquid chlorine, and poison gas.4 Wastewater containing mercury, which

was used as a catalyst in the production process, was dumped into a reservoir on the plant

property. After World War II, with Taiwan under the control of the Chinese Nationalist

government, the plant became part of a state-owned company (the Taiwan Alkali Industrial

Corporation). In the 1960s, the plant started making products using pentachlorophenol

(PCP), and by the early 1970s it was Asia’s biggest producer of the pesticide

dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT). In the mid-1960s, the plant was bought out by

another state-owned enterprise, the Chinese Petroleum Corporation (CPC). Operations at

9

the plant were discontinued around 1980, with the government announcing in 1982 that

this decision was due to economic factors. The following year, the plant property was

made part of a CPC subsidiary, the China Petrochemical Development Corporation (CPDC).

CPDC was privatized in 1994.

Investigations by the provincial government’s Agency for Prevention of Water

Pollution in 1981 revealed that there was a high level of mercury in the An-Shun plant

reservoir, with many of the fish in the reservoir toxic from the mercury poisoning. While

this information may have been a factor in the government’s decision to close the plant the

following year, there was no acknowledgement of this fact nor were any actions taken to

either prevent the spread of pollution or the consumption of water products grown in the

contaminated areas (Lee et al., 2009). Additional research in 1995 found high dioxin levels

in the mud at the bottom of the reservoir, and in 2001 blood tests of members of the

communities near the plant property revealed higher levels of dioxin in their blood than in

that of citizens in other parts of Taiwan. Dioxin is a carcinogen contained in PCP that, with

excessive exposure, can cause birth defects, diabetes, immune system abnormalities, and

other health problems. It is frequently assumed, although not confirmed through research,

that the cancer rates in these polluted communities are higher than the national average.

Three communities located near the An-Shun plant property – the Hsiengong, Luer,

and Sihcao townships – were most directly affected by the pollution. While part of Tainan

city, these three townships are in a relatively rural area, located near wetlands that have

been incorporated into the recently established Taijiang National Park, which was created

in an effort to protect the indigenous plants and wildlife in that area. The residents of these

communities are relatively old, with higher poverty levels and lower educational

10

attainment than other districts in the city. Because these are poor communities, residents

have readily relied on fish from the polluted waters near the plant as either a source of food

for themselves or as a source of income by selling them in the open market. As a result,

dissemination of the information that the fish are toxic constituted a significant risk to their

ability to provide for themselves and their families.

As media reports brought more public attention to the matter, the Taiwan central

government’s Environmental Protection Agency identified the An-Shun plant property as a

pollution remediation cite in 2004. Furthermore, in response to protests by community

members and environmentalists as well as a request from the Tainan city government, the

central government decided in 2005 to set aside a total of NT$1.3 billion (about US$40

million at the time) to provide compensation to the victims of the dioxin pollution for five

years. However, the highest administrative court in Taiwan ruled in 2007 that CPDC was

responsible for the pollution and thus had to pay both the compensation costs and the

remediation costs. As a result, the CPDC Board of Trustees allocated NT$1.65 billion

(about US$50 million) over 20 years to pay for the costs of cleaning up the plant site, and

CPDC prepared a plan for how they would address the remediation task. Their original

plan was approved by Tainan’s Environmental Protection Bureau in 2008, but the Bureau

refused to approve changes to the plan subsequently proposed by CPDC.

Given this brief summary of the particulars of this case, it is useful to explicitly

identify the relevant stakeholders who could or should have been participants in a process

of collaborative governance through which to determine how the funds allocated for

compensation and remediation should be spent. From the public sector, there were

stakeholders both in the central government of Taiwan and in the local government of

11

Tainan. Central government stakeholders include primarily the President of Taiwan, the

Ministry of Economic Affairs, and the Environmental Protection Agency, although other

government entities such as the Agricultural Council and the Control Yuan5 also have

information, expertise, and/or authority relevant to the situation. Key actors at the local

government level include the Mayor of Tainan, the Environmental Protection Bureau, and

the Department of Social Work, with other units such as Public Health and Urban Planning

also having some vested interest in the policy-making process and outcomes. From the

private sector, CPDC is clearly the most important stakeholder, but the media also play a

key role in disseminating information and shaping public opinion about the situation.

Stakeholders representing civil society include citizens from the affected communities as

well as a number of local researchers and activists who have helped to collect relevant data,

increase public awareness, and influence the policy decisions.

Two separate decisions in this case afforded an opportunity for stakeholders from

the public and private sectors to work with those from civil society to determine the best

course of action to implement. First was the compensation decision, which was driven to a

considerable extent by the involvement of grassroots actors in the decision process.

Research by an environmental health scientist at a local university established that local

residents had high rates of dioxin in their blood, and another local environmentalist was

very proactive about using the media to disseminate this information so as to generate

public and government interest in the matter. Despite a lack of initial responsiveness to

these efforts, local citizens finally acknowledged that their health was in danger and

became willing to work to push the government to actively deal with the pollution problem.

In response to the media attention and public pressure, local government officials

12

eventually took up the cause as well. The mayor of Tainan promised to make the issue a

major focus of his administration, and thus he organized a team of staff members,

legislators, and environmentalists to explain the An-Shun plant situation to central

government officials in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Department of Health, and Council

of Agriculture. Since local government did not have the capacity (i.e., resources or

expertise) to address the problem, they convinced the central government to cover the

costs of compensation, and a NT$1.3 billion budget for this purpose was officially passed in

July of 2005.6

The amount of compensation money approved by the central government was not

based on any assessment of the needs of the polluted communities or calculation of the

dollar amount that would be required to adequately compensate those who had been

adversely affected by the pollution. Instead, the figure of NT$1.3 billion was set by the

central government, most likely based on a previous case of pollution by CPC in which the

company was required by the central government to compensate community members

affected by pollution in another township in southern Taiwan. In other words, the central

government made a quick decision, in just a couple of weeks, with very little information as

to whether the amount approved would be too much or too little to provide appropriate

levels of compensation for the members of the three communities.

Given the total amount budgeted to compensate the community members, the next

step was to determine how this money should be allocated. In essence, it was necessary to

decide who should receive compensation money, and how much they should be given.

These decisions required a long process of communication and interaction with citizens

from the contaminated communities, which was coordinated by the commissioner of

13

Tainan’s Environmental Protection Bureau but involved input from a variety of city

government departments such as the Bureaus of Health, Social Work, Environmental

Engineering, and Education. Ultimately, it was decided that compensation would be based

on household registration records rather than actual residence in one of the communities.

As a result, some citizens who didn’t live in the community were eligible for compensation

because their households were registered there, and others who did live there were not

eligible because their households were not officially registered there.7 This was one factor

that led to some complaints that the compensation scheme was not entirely fair.

A further decision was made to provide higher levels of compensation to community

members suffering from more significant consequences of the pollution. All registered

residents of the three affected townships were entitled to receive a monthly cash payment

of NT$1814 (about US$60) per person for five years. However, those with a blood dioxin

level higher than 64 pg-TEQ/g lipid8 were allocated NT$3000 (about US$100) per month,

and those who had become physically or mentally handicapped or seriously ill because of

the pollution were awarded NT$15,840 (about US$530) per month. These monthly

payments were intended to pay for the continuing medical treatment of various illnesses,

including cancer, as well as for social welfare and living expenses (Tainan City Government,

2007a). Finally, relatives of people who had died as a result of the pollution were entitled

to a one-time compensation payment of as much as NT$ 200,000 (about US$6670).

In reaching these conclusions, there was some controversy regarding the appropriate

level of dioxin to serve as a threshold for receiving the larger monthly payment. While

many community members argued for a threshold of 32 pg, the task force charged with

making this decision – organized by the Tainan city government in April of 2007 and

14

comprised of environmental health experts from around Taiwan – felt that 64 pg was a

more appropriate standard. After the task force made its decision, the mayor proposed a

compromise of 48 pg at a community meeting attended by citizens and a member of the

task force, but the task force member insisted that the standard should not be lowered. On

one hand, no particular dioxin level serves as an ideal standard for evaluating the amount

of harm or damage experienced by a given individual, as there is considerable variation

across individuals in terms of the negative effects caused by a given dioxin level. On the

other hand, it was important to differentiate between levels of severity of the consequences

of the toxic pollution, and even though any specific dioxin level is a relatively arbitrary

threshold, no other solution seemed clearly superior or viable to this approach. Given the

different perspectives on the matter, though, this was another factor that led some people

to conclude that the compensation system was not as fair as it could have been.

The second important decision made in this case focused on the process of

remediation, i.e., the steps to be taken to try to reduce the level of pollution on the An-Shun

plant property and/or to mitigate its effects on the surrounding communities. Whereas

community members working with public officials exerted considerable influence on the

decisions pertaining to compensation for the effects of the pollution, decisions regarding

the remediation process were dominated by CPDC and other technical experts who took

responsibility for developing a plan to address this issue. There were certainly

opportunities for citizens and public officials to influence this plan, but in the end there was

less thorough discussion and evaluation of the viable options than there might have been.

One factor that served to inhibit citizen involvement in the process of planning for

site remediation was the technical nature of the problem and thus the lack of expertise on

15

their part to make meaningful contributions to a discussion of the best approaches to use.

CPDC contracted with an engineering consulting firm to help write the remediation plan,

and while these environmental engineers played a key role in developing the plan, their

focus was on the best technology and techniques to use rather than on the feelings and/or

attitudes of the members of the community. Whereas the abstract summarizing the plan

did mention the importance of community development, the plan had no further discussion

of the linkages between the techniques recommended and relevant community outcomes.

It is also reasonable to suggest that CPDC’s primary goal was to develop a

remediation plan that was feasible and expedient, such that they were reluctant to promote

community involvement that could easily have added more complex demands and

expectations into the planning process. Community members were not always invited to

planning meetings involving CPDC personnel and officials from Tainan’s EPB, some of

which were actually closed to the public with community members not allowed to attend.

Instead, citizens were given an opportunity to participate in the decision process only after

the local environmentalist and other community leaders criticized some problems they

identified in the plan being developed. In response to criticism of their role in the process,

CPDC officials held a community meeting to “sell” their remediation plan to the members of

the community. In other words, CPDC simply informed the citizens about their plan

instead of discussing it with them and/or listening to their ideas regarding what they

would do to help with the remediation task. CPDC offered a gift of rice to those who

attended this meeting, suggesting that they just wanted to get the support of the

community members rather than actually listening to what they had to say.

16

Whereas CPDC had primary responsibility for developing the remediation plan,

authority to approve the proposed plan rested with the Tainan city government. In

particular, its Environmental Protection Bureau organized a committee to review and

ultimately approve the plan, comprised of experts from different fields such as

environmental health, environmental engineering, chemistry, etc. Moreover, while the EPB

was charged with overseeing implementation of the plan, there was a lack of cooperation

among other government departments in this process even though the remediation efforts

had consequences in such areas as urban planning, environmental health, community

development, and the local ecology. Instead, other relevant departments were pursuing

their own programs in these areas without adequate integration of their activities.

Although the EPB did hold meetings in which community members were able to

participate, it is fair to say that neither the local nor the central government did much to

encourage their involvement until pressure from the media and community leaders forced

government officials to accept their participation. Despite this limited involvement, it

appears that input from the citizenry was not very important in terms of developing or

implementing the remediation plan. Likewise, the decision process was not very

transparent, as the public was not fully informed about the plans while they were under

consideration. More generally, the level of communication among government officials,

CPDC employees, and community members was relatively limited such that there was not a

lot of trust among these stakeholders as the process unfolded. In short, the quality of

interaction among these groups did not match the requirements for an effective system of

collaborative governance.

17

The Pitfalls of Collaborative Governance

An effort was made in the An-Shun plant case to involve key stakeholders in the

process of deciding how to distribute funds that had been allocated to compensate

community members and to remediate the polluted property. While the decisions to

allocate these funds, including the amounts budgeted, were made unilaterally by pertinent

central government authorities, the question of how to utilize the money was left up to the

relevant actors at the local level to address. For both issues, decisions were made based on

input from and interaction among government officials, company representatives,

community members, and other relevant individuals (activists and researchers). While the

context was thus amenable to the use of collaborative governance, neither decision process

fully reflected the ideal characteristics of being egalitarian, deliberative, and consensus-

oriented. In this section, we identify some of the pitfalls along the way that inhibited the

successful realization of these three features.

Three factors prevented these decision processes from being as egalitarian as they

might have been. The first – a common challenge facing those trying to utilize collaborative

governance – was the difficulty of getting citizens to be actively engaged in the process.

Advocates of citizen participation have long recognized that various costs or barriers

reduce the viability of citizens taking on a meaningful role in governmental decision-

making processes (Cooper, 1983; King, Feltey, & Susel, 1998). The fact that the residents of

the three affected townships were relatively old, poor, and uneducated further undermined

their confidence that they could make a valuable contribution to these processes. But

another significant factor was relevant in this case as well. In particular, some community

members wished to avoid the likely stigma associated with being a resident of a polluted

18

community. There were legitimate concerns that their property values would decrease,

that their livelihoods (e.g., selling fish from the area) would be disrupted, and even that

their children would have a harder time getting married (due to fears about health risks,

birth defects, etc.).9 The fear of being stigmatized constituted an important psychological

barrier that reduced some residents’ willingness to participate in the process.

A second factor mitigating the involvement and influence of the communities in

these decisions was the lack of relevant and legitimate community-based organizations

that could provide an institutional foundation for mobilizing citizen participation. In

general, the “third sector” is not as well developed in Taiwan as it is in the US and Europe,

such that there aren’t as many local nonprofit organizations that can advocate for the needs

and interests of local communities. One such organization did get involved in the

discussions regarding the allocation of the compensation funds, but some community

members questioned its legitimacy because it was not officially registered with the

government and thus not a “legal” organization.10 Furthermore, the elected community

leaders from the three affected townships chose not to participate in the organization –

which was initiated by a leader of one of the local temples – and thus it was unable to play a

meaningful role representing community members’ interests. In the absence of a stronger

institutional presence, citizens’ “voice” in the process was weaker than it would have been

with better organizational representation.

A third characteristic of these decisions that undermined community members’

influence was the importance of scientific, technical, and financial information in the

discussion of the issues and possible solutions. This is a common problem in issues dealing

with environmental management (Tang et al., 2005), with a common consequence that the

19

decision process is dominated by “experts” – typically from government agencies,

universities, and/or private businesses – with the knowledge and skills needed to

understand and manipulate that information. Despite a reasonable level of community

involvement in the compensation decision, a key, controversial decision (the blood dioxin

level required for a higher level of compensation) ultimately reflected the opinion of

environmental health experts, which ran counter to the wishes of the community members

and even a compromise proposed by the mayor. There was less participation by

community members in the remediation decision, which in turn made it easy for CPDC to

focus primarily on the technological and financial aspects of the plan with only cursory,

symbolic attention to cultural/historical concerns or community development needs. As

the dominant stakeholder in the process, CPDC gave the impression that they did not care

much about citizens’ ideas and perspectives.

In addition to being less egalitarian than would be ideal, the processes used to

determine how to distribute the compensation funds and remediate the polluted plant site

were not as deliberative as they could have been. In particular, there was inadequate

discussion of key aspects of these decisions: the amount set aside for compensation was

simply based on a previous case rather than a thorough analysis of the particular

circumstances involved in the An-Shun plant case or a well-developed plan regarding who

should be compensated how much and for what; and the committee charged with

reviewing the remediation plan merely approved CPDC’s proposal without much collective

assessment of its strengths and weaknesses. One factor undermining the deliberative

quality of the process was the relative lack of communication and coordination among the

various government officials with some level of responsibility for addressing the problems.

20

For example, once the decisions to fund the compensation and remediation plans were

made by the central government, no formal mechanisms (e.g., an intergovernmental task

force) were created to enable local public managers charged with implementing these

decisions to interact with relevant experts at the national level.

The deliberative quality of these processes was also hampered by a lack of

leadership and managerial capacity needed to develop and maintain the amount and type

of interaction that would enable stakeholders to identify viable options and evaluate their

likely effectiveness. In the absence of much if any experience with the kind of collaborative,

multi-stakeholder process being used to address these issues, Tainan city government

officials did not necessarily have the requisite knowledge and skills to create an

appropriate context or “space”11 in which effective dialog among the conflicting interests

could take place. Furthermore, especially with regards to the remediation plan, neither the

local nor the central government had the budget, personnel, or general capacity to work on

this task. Since it was their first time trying to address this kind of issue, they didn’t have

the necessary expertise to provide effective leadership or guidance on how best to move

forward. This is a common challenge for public officials in their early efforts to utilize

collaborative mechanisms, reflecting the reality that there is a learning curve associated

with developing the ability and capacity required to establish deliberative dynamics

(Imperial, 2005).

This lack of leadership was further reflected in the fact that no one took

responsibility for addressing key process issues that must be dealt with in order to create a

context within which effective deliberation can take place. These issues pertain to

important facets of interpersonal dynamics such as building trust, establishing legitimacy,

21

gaining commitment, developing shared understanding, managing conflicts, forging

agreements, planning, etc. (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bryson et al., 2006). As is common in

situations calling for the use of collaborative governance, there was some level of distrust

among key stakeholders, e.g., between CPDC and the government and between citizens and

both of these. Some government officials displayed a reluctance to provide important or

sensitive information necessary to understand the situation fully, and CPDC managers

acted as though they didn’t want to discuss their remediation plan with the community. In

the absence of anyone pushing to make sure that the process is open and transparent,

important information is available and readily shared, and stakeholders engage each other

in a meaningful dialogue, it is difficult to insure that a truly deliberative process will ensue.

Along with being less egalitarian and deliberative than would be ideal, there was

less effort to achieve a meaningful consensus on the compensation and remediation

decisions than there could have been. The challenge of reaching consensus in a

collaborative governance system reflects the fact that stakeholders typically have

conflicting interests, preferences, motivations, and/or goals that make it difficult to find

solutions that are satisfactory to all concerned. Satisfaction with a potential solution often

depends on the extent to which it is seen as fair, and participants in this case had different

ideas about what a fair compensation plan would be. Discussions of these fairness

concerns took up a considerable portion of the focus and energy in meetings involving

community members, but without any clear means of resolving the differences of opinion.

One key topic of contention was the determination of the blood dioxin level at which

citizens would become eligible for a higher level of compensation. Even though the mayor

proposed a compromise solution halfway between the two more extreme positions being

22

debated, eventually the higher level was selected as the threshold, leaving those who had

advocated for the lower level feeling like the decision was not really fair.

The ability to achieve consensus depends in part on the nature and strength of the

alliances and coalitions that exist among conflicting stakeholders. These in turn are likely

to reflect a mix of personal, professional, and political relationships that influence patterns

of support and resistance among the specific individuals engaged in the decision process.

Yet the nature of those relationships is not always explicit, such that the basis for potential

alliances is not always clear. For example, the mayor of Tainan who approached the central

government to ask for compensation money was friends with the president of Taiwan,

which likely facilitated the process of getting approval for that request. A professor

involved in the deliberations was affiliated with a research center that had received

funding from CPDC, leaving others suspicious as to the objectivity of his participation.

Likewise, a top manager from Tainan’s Environmental Protection Bureau was a former

student of that same professor, further complicating the nature of his involvement. Other

conflicts over who should and shouldn’t be involved in the process reflected additional

concerns about loyalties and levels of influence. In short, ambiguity regarding who is

aligned with whom can increase distrust among participants, and the subtleties of their

relationships can exacerbate the complexity of trying to reach consensus.

Ultimately, the likelihood of reaching consensus among stakeholders with diverse

interests depends at least in part on their willingness to look beyond their own narrow,

short-term self-interest and take a broader, longer-term perspective on the issues being

addressed. In the absence of any explicit attempts to get them to do otherwise, the

stakeholders in this case tended to focus on their own needs and desires with little

23

attention to the larger context in which these concerns were embedded. This was most

obvious in the remediation planning process, in which there was little participation by

community members who didn’t see it as directly relevant to their daily lives. With the

plan developed by CPDC and approved after a cursory review by an expert committee

formed by the government, minimal involvement by the community meant that the

decision outcome was essentially the same as if it had been made by CPDC alone. In other

words, while the process may have resulted in a collective decision about how to proceed

with remediation, this outcome was a far cry from the kind of thoughtful, integrative

consensus solution that constitutes the true potential of collaborative governance.

Implications for Public Managers

Based on the pitfalls identified above, we conclude with some observations

regarding steps public managers can take to enhance the egalitarian, deliberative, and

consensus-oriented nature of the collaborative governance systems in which they are

engaged. These recommendations are driven by the particular issues in the An-Shun plant

case as discussed above, but we believe they are pertinent to many public managers in a

broad array of situations who are working with businesses and communities to address

important policy concerns. As a nascent phenomenon, lacking much institutional support

or institutionalization, collaborative governance is complex and challenging, with most

participants still at an early stage of the learning curve regarding how to work effectively in

these systems. Our intent here is to offer some thoughts about the role public managers

can and should play in this process to help insure its success.

Our first recommendation is that public managers, to promote an egalitarian

system, should proactively work to generate and maintain community and citizen

24

involvement in the decision process. This has been recognized as a key part of the public

manager’s role in the context of creating more collaborative governance systems and

processes (Bingham, Nabatchi, & O’Leary, 2005; Vigoda, 2002). At a minimum, this means

taking steps to reduce the “costs” of community members’ participation and thereby make

it easier for them to be engaged (King et al, 1998); for example, a local government agency

in Tainan sometimes sent a bus to take people to and from information sessions. If and

when possible, incentives should be utilized to motivate higher levels of participation.

When CPDC offered rice to citizens if they attended a meeting regarding the remediation

plan, the local government could have leveraged that offer – by allocating a small amount of

resources to the task of publicizing it – so as to increase attendance at the meeting. Local

government officials should also become familiar with relevant community-based

organizations and work with them to enhance citizen engagement in the process.

In the absence of strong citizen participation, it is important for public managers to

act as their advocates in the decision process. Reflecting the traditional notion of a public

servant, government officials involved in collaborative governance should see themselves

as acting on behalf of the public. While the concepts of the public, the public interest, and

responsiveness to the public are open to multiple interpretations (Frederickson, 1991;

Saltzstein, 1992), the basic point here is that public managers should take responsibility for

insuring that the interests of the general public are given serious consideration in

discussions of how to address the issue(s) at hand. A key implication is that they should

not simply align themselves with the business interests involved in the process, but should

instead work to prevent the most powerful stakeholders from dominating the process. For

example, when CPDC demonstrated some reluctance to communicate and interact with the

25

community members, representatives from the Tainan government could and should have

pushed them harder to do so.

There are a number of steps public managers can take to add value to the

deliberative quality of a collaborative governance system. A first recommendation here is

that one or more individuals should have explicit responsibility for leading or managing the

process, even to the point of having their performance evaluation depend on how well they

handle this task. Given bureaucratic job definitions, it is easy for involvement in a

collaboration to be viewed as of secondary importance compared to one’s primary job

responsibilities, such that insufficient time and attention are given to critical activities

necessary for creating structures and processes that enable deliberation. Those charged

with this task should make sure that appropriate groups (e.g., cross-functional and/or

inter-governmental teams) are organized to share information and develop an integrative

perspective on the issues and potential responses (Imperial, 205). They should also make

sure that neutral experts on relevant topics – whether public employees or from external

institutions – are included in the analysis of problems and potential solutions.

In meetings with diverse stakeholders, who typically have divergent interests, it is

very useful to include one or more individuals with group facilitation skills to help guide

the process (Bingham & O’Leary, 2006). It is possible to contract with external facilitators

for this purpose, but a better long-term strategy is to build these skills internally through

hiring and training. In the formative stage of a collaborative governance system, those

guiding and facilitating the process can use trust-building strategies to help overcome any

initial distrust among participants (Vangen & Huxham, 2003) and to develop shared vision

and values about how the deliberations should proceed. Participating public employees

26

should be proactive in sharing relevant information with citizens and educating them about

complex aspects of the situation (e.g., Tainan city government sponsored some training for

community members regarding health/environmental awareness). As the process unfolds,

it is critical to allocate sufficient time for the kind of thorough and meaningful discussions

that enable participants to understand and appreciate each other’s concerns and desires.

To improve the viability of reaching consensus through this deliberative process,

public managers engaged in collaborative governance should aim to maintain a focus on

the “big picture” and stakeholders’ shared long-term objectives (Mandell & Keast, 2007).

Given a tendency for participants to be preoccupied primarily with their narrow, short-

term self-interests, the difficulty in finding common ground can be mitigated by better

recognition of the interdependencies among their interests and goals. Furthermore, to

promote transparency in the process and reduce the probability of hidden agendas that can

distort the deliberations, public managers should take the initiative to help clarify the

nature of the past relationships among participants, explicitly identifying the personal,

professional, and political alliances that may serve to bias their perceptions and attitudes.

In short, a key role for those who wish to achieve collective agreement regarding how best

to address the problem at hand is to make sure that the process is open and honest and the

participants have a holistic understanding of the situation they face together.

Of course, this alone will not guarantee that a consensus can be reached, as

inevitably there are real differences among the perspectives and objectives of the various

stakeholders involved in the deliberations. Thus, it is important for public managers to

promote the use of collaborative, “win-win” conflict resolution and problem solving

strategies (Andranovich, 1995; Bryson & Anderson, 2000; Gray, 1989; Susskind,

27

McKearnan, & Thomas-Larmer, 1999) that enable participants to transcend the more

common competitive dynamics and find creative solutions that enable all stakeholders to

feel like their most significant concerns are being addressed. In so doing, public managers

should pay explicit attention to the extent to which the process and outcomes are seen as

fair by the participants. In particular, they should make it clear that any businesses

engaged in the system are expected to focus not just on their “bottom line” concerns but

instead should reflect the principles of corporate social responsibility (Werther & Chandler,

2006) in which they also attend to the needs of the people and communities affected by

their actions. When stakeholders respect the validity of others’ ideas and interests, the

potential for achieving a consensual resolution of the problem is greatly increased.

Collaborative governance constitutes a valuable institutional innovation for

contemporary society to the extent that it enables multi-stakeholder decision processes

that are more egalitarian, deliberative, and consensus-oriented than the primary

governance mechanisms currently in use. The recommendations suggested above reflect

the premise that public managers shoulder most of the responsibility for creating those

conditions in the collaborative systems in which they are involved (McGuire, 2006); for

now, at least, it is not realistic to expect that community members or private sector

representatives would be willing and able to do so. It is clear from the literature that key to

the success of a collaborative governance system is effective management of the structures

and processes through which it is operationalized in any particular case (e.g., Ansell &

Gash, 2008; Bryson et al. 2006; Gunton & Day, 2003; McGuire, 2002; Milward & Provan,

2006; Rethemeyer & Hatmaker, 2008). It is our hope that the lessons derived from the An-

Shun plant case provide useful ideas for other public managers who are working with

28

community members and private sector actors to identify mutually-acceptable approaches

for addressing issues they confront together.

29

Footnotes

1. In 2006, Public Administration Review published a special issue on the topic of

collaborative public management, for which this paper is the introductory article.

2. Some of this research has been published in Chinese rather than English, e.g., Tang and

Cho (2007) and Tseng (2011). There has also been some investigation of collaborative

governance in a private sector context, e.g., Wu, Wu, and Lo (2004).

3. This research was supported by grants from Taiwan’s National Science Council, from

Tainan City’s Department of Social Work, and from National Cheng Kung University.

4. Japan had control of Taiwan from 1895 until the end of World War II in 1945.

5. The Control Yuan is one of five branches of government defined by Taiwan’s constitution,

the role of which is to serve as ombudsman for the government. Along with the executive,

legislative, and judicial branches, Taiwan also has an Examination Yuan that is responsible

for administering the civil service examination to aspirants for positions in Taiwan’s civil

service.

6. It is likely that these negotiations went smoothly in part because the mayor of Tainan

and the president of Taiwan at the time were close friends who belonged to the same

coalition within their party political party. In any case, as noted above, the government

ultimately did not have to spend that money since CPDC was held responsible for paying

the compensation costs.

7. Household registration is required by the Taiwanese government, such that everyone

has a registered address. This registration is necessary in order to vote in elections, and

provides proof of residence that is used for other purposes as well. However, there are

30

various circumstances in which a person may not be living in the same residence at which

s/he is registered, such that there is a mismatch between the two.

8. Essentially, this means 64 picograms of toxin per gram of lipid. A pecogram is one-

trillionth of a gram, and lipids are blood fats. TEQ means toxic equivalent and is a

standardized measure used to assess toxicity across various dioxins and dioxin-like

compounds.

9. In fact, residents of a fourth township affected by the toxic pollutants decided to forego

any compensation money so as to avoid the stigma of being associated with the pollution

problem.

10. This organization was the Self-Rescuing Association from Shan-Gon Community, which

was formed in 2005 but had it first formal membership meeting on March 8, 2008. There

were only about three key members operating the association, including participating in

important meetings at city hall.

11. The idea we have in mind here is similar to the Japanese concept of “ba” which Nonaka

and Konno (1998), in the context of organizational knowledge creation, defined as “a

shared space for emerging relationships…that can be physical, virtual, mental or any

combination” (p. 37).

31

References Andranovich, G. (1995). Achieving consensus in public decision making: Applying interest-based problem solving to the challenges of intergovernmental collaboration. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 31: 429-445. Ansell, C. and Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative governance in theory and practice. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18(4): 543-571. Beierle, T. C. and Konisky, D. M. (2001). What are we gaining from stakeholder involvement? Observations from environmental planning in the Great Lakes. Environment and Planning C, 19(4): 515-528. Bingham, L. B., Nabatchi, T., and O’Leary, R. (2005). The new governance: Practices and processes for stakeholder and citizen participation in the work of government. Public Administration Review, 65: 547-558. Bingham, L. B. and O’Leary, R. (2006). Conclusion: Parallel play, not collaboration: Missing questions, missing connections. Public Administration Review, 66(s1): 161-167. Booher, D. E. (2004). Collaborative governance practices and democracy. National Civic Review, 93(4): 32-46. Booher, D. E. and Innes, J. E. (2002). Network power in collaborative planning. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 21(3): 221-236. Bouwen, R. and Taillieu, T. (2004). Multi-party collaboration as social learning for interdependence: Developing relational knowing for sustainable natural resource management. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 14(3): 137-153. Bryson, J. M. and Anderson, S. R. (2000). Applying large-group interaction methods in the planning and implementation of major change efforts. Public Administration Review, 60: 143-162. Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., and Stone, M. M. (2006). The design and implementation of cross-sector collaborations: Propositions from the literature. Public Administration Review, 66(s1): 44-55. Chen, J. C. C. (2011). Is there any “cross-sector governance network” during the relief operation for typhoon Morak in Liukuei tribal? Paper presented at the International Conference on Governance and Citizenship in Asia: Paradigms and Practices, Hong Kong. Cooper, T. L. (1983). Citizen participation. In T. Lynch (ed.), Organization theory and management, 3-45. New York: Marcel Dekker.

32

Cooper, T. L., Bryer, T. A., and Meek, J. W. (2006). Citizen-centered collaborative public management. Public Administration Review, 66(s1): 76-88. Frederickson, G. H. (1991). Toward a theory of the public for public administration. Administration & Society, 22: 395-423. Fung, A. and Wright, E. O. (2001). Deepening democracy: Innovations in empowered local governance. Politics and Society, 29(1): 5-41. Gray, B. (1989). Collaborating: Finding common ground for multiparty problems. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Gunton, T. I. and Day, J. C. (2003). The theory and practice of collaborative planning in resource and environmental management. Environments, 31: 5-19. Healey, P. (1996). Consensus-building across difficult divisions: New approaches to collaborative strategy making. Planning Practice and Research, 11(2): 207-216. Huxham, C. (2003). Theorizing collaboration practice. Public Management Review, 5: 401-423. King, C. S., Feltey, K. M., and Susel, B. O. (1998). The question of participation: Toward authentic public participation in public administration. Public Administration Review, 58: 317-326. Leach, W. D. (2006). Collaborative public management and democracy: Evidence from western watershed partnerships. Public Administration Review, 66(s1): 100-110. Lee, K. C. (2003). Enhancing collaborative governance for natural area management: Some experiences from Taiwan. International Planning Studies, 8(1): 35-51. Lee, T. P. (2010). Collaborative mechanisms in environmental protection: The voluntary approach in China and Taiwan. Paper presented at the Public Administration Symposium on Reform in China, Hong Kong. Lee, T. P., Yang, Y., and Tung, C. H. (2009). Social welfare needs of residents in polluted areas: A case of dioxin pollution in southern Taiwan. Public Administration and Development, 29: 239-249. Mandell, M. and Keast, R. (2007). Evaluating network arrangements: Toward revised performance measures. Public Performance & Management Review, 30(4): 574-597. McGuire, M. (2002). Managing networks: Propositions on what managers do and why they do it. Public Administration Review, 62(5): 599-609.

33

McGuire, M. (2006). Collaborative public management: Assessing what we know and how we know it. Public Administration Review, 66(s1): 33-43. Milward, H. B. and Provan, K. G. (2006). A manager's guide to choosing and using collaborative networks. Arlington, VA: IBM Endowment for the Business of Government. Nonaka, I. and Konno, N. (1998). The concept of “ba”: Building a foundation for knowledge creation. California Management Review, 40(3): 40-54. O’Leary, R., Gerard, C., and Bingham, L. B. (2006). Introduction to the symposium on collaborative public management. Public Administration Review, 66(s1): 6-9. Rethemeyer, R. K. and Hatmaker, D. M. (2008). Network management reconsidered: An inquiry into management of network structures in public sector service provision. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18(4): 617-646. Roberts, N. C. (2002). Keeping public officials accountable through dialogue: Resolving the accountability paradox. Public Administration Review, 62(6): 658-669. Robertson, P. J. and Choi, T. (forthcoming). Deliberation, consensus, and stakeholder satisfaction: A simulation of collaborative governance. Public Management Review. Saltzstein, G. H. (1992). Bureaucratic responsiveness: Conceptual issues and current research. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2: 63-88. Schein, E. H. 1999. Process consultation revisited: Building the helping relationship. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Sun, M. T. W., Tsai, Y. T., Shih, M. C., and Lin, J. Y. W. (2009). Public participation and the concept of space in environmental governance : An application of PPGIS. Public Administration and Development, 29: 250-261. Susskind, L. E., McKearnan, S., and Thomas-Larner, J. (Eds.) (1999). The consensus building handbook: A comprehensive guide to reaching agreement. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Tang. C. P. and Cho, C. Y. (2007). Plural democracy, political inclusion, and policy responsiveness: The pollution of Taiwan Alkali Industrial Corp. Journal of Humanity and Society, 1: 10-39. Tang, C. P. and Tang, S. Y. (2006). Democratization and capacity building for environmental governance: Managing land subsidence in Taiwan. Environment and Planning A, 38(6): 1131-1147. Tang, S. Y., Tang, C. P., and Lo, C. W. H. (2005). Public participation and environmental impact assessment in mainland China and Taiwan: Political foundations of environmental management. Journal of Development Studies. 41(1): 1-32.

34

Thomson, A. M. and Perry, J. L. (2006). Collaboration processes: Inside the black box. Public Administration Review, 66(s1): 20-32. Tseng, K. C. (2011). The challenges confronting managers and their capacity-building: The perspective of collaborative governance. Journal of Civil Service, 3(1): 27-52. Vangen, S. and Huxham, C. (2003). Nurturing collaborative relations: Building trust in interorganizational collaboration. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 39: 5-31. Vigoda, E. (2002). From responsiveness to collaboration: Governance, citizens, and the next generation of public administration. Public Administration Review, 62: 527-540. Werther, W. B. and Chandler, D. B. (2006). Strategic corporate social responsibility: Stakeholders in a global environment. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Wu, W. Y., Wu, W. J., and Lo, Y. J. (2004). The impact of governance mechanisms on interfirm learning and relationship performance. Proceedings of the Asia Pacific Management Conference, 447-462. Yang, Y. (2007). The analysis of environmental policy formulation processes: The An-Shun company case. Paper presented at the First International Symposium on Democracy for the Sustainable Future: Multi-level Environmental Governance for the Sustainable Development, Kyoto. Yang, Y. (2008). Compensation policy and environmental justice: The An-Shun plant case. Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Conference, Chicago. Yang, Y. (2010a). Environmental policy for chemical pollution in Taiwan: The An-Shun plant case. In Y. Adachi (ed.), Environmental Government: Theory and Practice. Kyoto: Kyoto University. Yang, Y. (2010b). The remediation policy and citizen participation: The An-Shun plant case. Paper presented at the Annual National Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. Yang, Y. (2010c). The 9/21 earthquake in Taiwan: A local government disaster rescue system. Disasters, 34(1): 112-136. Yang, T. (2011). De-stigmatization of polluted communities: The An-Shun plant case. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the American Society for Public Administration, Baltimore.