competing nonprofit organizations also collaborate

Competing Nonprofit Organizations Also

Collaborate A h York, Esther Zychlinski

Cooperation among voluntary organizations is examined from the perspective of an Israeli project in which local voluntary organizations formed a joint forum. An analysis of question- nairesfilled in by members of nine such bodies (“roundtables”) shows that cooperation among voluntary organizations may be functional in nature and not necessarily based on common goals. The degree of independence of the organizations did not affect their cooperation, but it injluenced the way they looked on the “convenor” (external change agent), who played an important role in the process of interorganizational cooperation. The au- thors show that competition and cooperation are not mutualZy exclusive among voluntary organizations.

HIS article examines the phenomenon of cooperation and collaboration among voluntary organizations in an attempt to T answer the question, Why do voluntary organizations coop-

erate with one another even though they may be in competition for resources?

The Israeli Voluntary Center (IVC) was set up in 1972 by the Israeli government to promote and coordinate voluntary activity In 1985, IVC and the American Joint Distribution Committee (AJDC) decided to set up a joint project to develop local bodies (“roundtables”) to encourage and coordinate voluntary activity at the municipal level in cooperation with the municipal social services departments.

A national steering committee was set up to monitor and control the project. Its members included representatives of the two funding partners (IVC and AJDC), a mayor representing the Local Authority Center (a semigovernment body including heads of all the local authorities in Israel), representatives of three national voluntary organizations, the director of the Volunteer Unit in the Ministry of Social Welfare, and an academic as chairperson.

I5 NONPROFIT MANAGEMENT & LEADERSHIP, vol. 7, no. 1, Fall 1996 Q Jossey-Bass Publishers

16 YORK, ZYCHLINSKI

The idea of local coordination of voluntary activity was

not new

After initial problems in finding and keeping a suitable national organizer, the project was properly launched in the summer of 1987, and five local roundtables were set up, two in cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants and three in smaller towns. The national organizer’s role was to advise and guide the organizations and to help them plan local and national training programs.

Of course, the idea of local coordination of voluntary activity was not new; several towns and cities in Israel had set up coordinating committees in the past, but these tended to be umbrella associations, representing the voluntary organizations alone, with no place for the municipality even as a convenor. During the 1950s and 1960s, when voluntarism was considered to be amateurism and not suitable for the new state (Eisenstadt, 1956), neither side was interested in cooperation between voluntary organizations and government. By now this attitude has more or less vanished (Herlitz, 1977), and, as the roundtables developed and became known, representatives of these local umbrella organizations turned to IVC and requested help.

At this time, the project is a recognized program of IVC, AJDC having withdrawn once its initiating objectives were achieved, and the whole operation is gradually expanding as new towns join (there are now more than twenty roundtables). The typical roundtable consists of all or most of the voluntary organizations in the town (at least the largest and the most formalized in their development). An executive committee of between five and sixteen members, each representing a different organization, elects a chairperson, and a municipal employee, generally the social worker coordinating volunteers in the social services department, acts as “convenor.” The executive committee meets monthly and its agenda includes coordination of activities (for example, fundraising), discussion of and cooperation on joint enterprises (for example, training programs, volunteer recruitment, and public recognition of volunteers), and, in general, action as a local lobby for voluntarism and volunteers.

Cooperation Among Voluntary Organizations Cooperation, according to classical organization theory, is a devel- opmental process in which direct interaction takes place between two or more interested parties in order to advance a joint goal or to solve a joint problem that is too complicated for any of the parties to achieve or to solve on its own (Levine and White, 1961; Litwak and Hylton, 1962; Akinbode and Clark, 1976; Davidson, 1976; Schmidt and Kochan, 1977; Hall and others, 1977; Gray, 1985; McCann and Gray, 1986). Efficient cooperation enables organizations to preserve their independence while working with others on mutually selected subjects (Litwak and Hylton, 1962; McCann and Gray, 1986).

Cooperation is not without its price. First, there may be a cer- tain loss of organizational independence caused by the necessity to consider the interests and needs of other partners. Second, each orga-

C O M P E T I N G N O N P R O F I T O R G A N I Z A T I O N S A L S O COLLABORATE 17

nization opens itself up to inspection by its partners, for every organization will want to ensure that the others are living up to their obligations. Third, the maintenance and upkeep of the cooperation may demand too much from the partners, particularly as their number increases and the time scale lengthens (O’Toole, 1983; Weiss, 1987; Jones and Pustay, 1988).

Three organizational characteristics have been found relevant to organizational cooperation: mutual dependence, organizational domain, and organizational resources (Davidson, 1976). Mutual dependence stems from a lack of resources and may be an essential ingredient of cooperation, as the stakeholders realize that a limita- tion of power by each of them is necessary to achieve a common goal (Levine and White, 1961; Litwak and Hylton, 1962; Davidson, 1976; Cook, 1977; McCann and Gray, 1986). Organizational domain consists of the specific goals that an organization seeks to achieve and the specific means it uses to achieve those goals. To reach cooperation, the organizations involved must set boundaries on their domains (Levine and White, 1961; Akinbode and Clark, 1976). As stated above, a primary cause of cooperation is a lack of organizational resources, and thus organizational cooperation is a form of exchange among the stakeholders (Levine and White, 1961; Akin- bode and Clark, 1976; Schmidt and Kochan, 1977).

The greater part of the literature reviewed above is not concerned with voluntary organizations and, as Wilson (1992, p. 249) pointed out, there is “virtually no empirical research on interorganizational cooperation in the voluntary sector.” However, in the last few years, more interest has been shown in the managerial and organizational strategies of voluntary organizations. Mulford and Mulford (1980) defined three types of interorganizational relations: conflict (competition), cooperation, and a mixture of the two. Selsky (19911, analyzing what he called a fractionated organizational community, viewed organizational behavior slightly differently: He described an individual approach (basically competitive), a segmental approach (limited cooperation), and a common approach (full cooperation). Butler and Wilson (1990, pp. 34-35) considered competition and cooperation as “two broad polar opposites of strategy” and defined the task environment of voluntary organizations as consisting of “suppliers of raw materials” (givers or volunteers), “commensals” (other voluntary organizations), and “receivers” (clients helped). In this article, we restrict our scope to cooperation with commensals, that is, relations among representatives of voluntary organizations.

Competition may be seen as ideologically correct, a reflection of the “enterprise culture” and market economics (Rose-Ackerman, 1990; Kramer, 1990; Wilson, 1992), and various competitive strategies are described in the voluntary association literature (Butler and Wilson, 1990; Cornforth and Hooker, 1990; Kramer, 1990; Young, 1990). However, cooperative strategies may make more sense and, indeed, may mirror the for-profit sector no less accurately (Wilson,

Efficient cooperation

enables organiru tions

to preserve their independence while worhing with others on

mutually selected subjects

18 YORK, Z Y C H L I N S K I

In the last few years, more

interest has been shown in the

managerial and organizational strategies of

voluntary organizations

1992). Cooperative strategies include co-option of members of other organizations, contracting for services with other organizations, and coalescing in joint ventures (Thompson, 1967; Butler and Wilson, 1990). Mulford and Mulford (1980) viewed cooperation as part of a resource dependence model in which resource exchange is essential, and their research showed that voluntary organizations characterized by innovation and with a history of previous joint programs are most likely to favor cooperative relationships with other voluntary organizations. Leat, Smolka, and Unell (1981, p. 541, trying to understand why voluntary organizations join cooperative councils, found that “tradition and reciprocity were the most widely accepted reasons for membership.”

If we accept that cooperation and competition are opposite poles of a continuum, then there must logically be a possibility of a mixture of the two (Butler and Wilson, 1990). Mulford and Mulford (1980) found this phenomenon of “mixed interorganizational relations” in the voluntary organizations they studied, and they pointed out that it is likely to stem, inter alia, from joint programs! Butler and Wilson (1990) identified organizations they called “competitive co- operators” (high both on commensal cooperation and output competition) and “output co-operators” (high both on input efficiency and client cooperation). Kramer (1990) identified increasing cooperation on advocacy, on the one hand, with more competition on fundraising, staff recruitment, and publicity, on the other.

In summary, the theoretical framework underlining this article is that while voluntary organizations may prefer to cooperate with one another, this does not prevent their competing among themselves. Cooperation may be limited or “segmental” or it may be mixed with elements of competition. Indeed, pure cooperation on all topics and at all times may be illusory. The research described in this article sheds more light on how voluntary organizations cooperate among themselves, why they do so, and why the cooperation may appear to be mixed.

Research Questions and Hypotheses Is there a difference between an agreement to cooperate among the representatives of more independent organizations (that is, those more able to acquire their needed resources) and an agreement among those of less independent organizations? According to the theories of Levine and White (1961) and Mulford and Mulford (19801, the hypothesis should be that organizations will cooperate more as they are less independent. However, it may be that an element of self-confidence is relevant here: The more an organization feels itself firm and established, so will it be more willing to cooperate with others in order to increase its power and to preserve it in a form of “imperialism.” According to the findings of Leat, Smolka, and Unell (1981), neither hypothesis will be supported, for independence is irrelevant to cooperation.

COMPETING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS ALSO COLLABORATE 19

Is there a d$erence between theforms of cooperation among representatives of organizations with similar organizational domains and the forms of cooperation among those with dissimilar domains? For example, will women’s organizations cooperate with one another differently from the way in which they cooperate with non-women’s organizations? The for-profit organization literature implies that organizations with similar domains should be more likely to cooperate with one another, for each has what the others need (Levine and White, 1961; Akinbode and Clark, 1976; Schmidt and Kochan, 1977; Gray, 1985; McCann and Gray, 1986).

To what extent will the degree to which the representatives of each organization view the other organizations us effective or ineffective influence their assent to cooperate with them? If cooperation is basically an element of exchange, economic or political, as organization theory states, then organizations should prefer cooperation with effective and successful partners. But if the element of imperialism is present, then perhaps an alliance with weak partners will be preferred.

To what extent does the convenor (an external change agent) influence the representatives of the organizations to participate actively in the roundtable? Most of the roundtables and the umbrella organizations have a professional change agent involved, generally a social worker employed by the local social services department. The convenor’s function is to enable the members to work effectively, to advise them, and to meet their express needs. Tropman (1972) and Davidson (1976) emphasized the importance of the convenor in councils concerned with coordination in the field of social welfare. Tropman found that most were social workers, whereas Leat, Smolka, and Unell (1981) found a variety of backgrounds and approaches to work. Stern and Gibelman (1990), updating Tropman, reported that executives of welfare councils are more likely to be those with expertise in management and fundraising than social workers with con- tent skills. Selsky (1991, p. 110) found that “a clearly identified development activist, either indigenous or imported, is important to the process.” Thus, it can be hypothesized that the participation of the organizations’ representatives will increase to the extent that the convenor’s role and functioning are approved by them.

Research Methods After a structured interview with the national organizer and prelim- inary discussions with the local convenors, we brought questionnaires to one of the meetings of nine local roundtables (of the eleven functioning at the time of the study in 1990). These surveys were filled in by those present, generally then and there. In all, forty-three representatives (out of sixty-three present at the meetings) filled in the questionnaires, but six of the questionnaires were not filled in properly and so the sample consists of thirty-seven (59 percent response rate). The low rate of response can be traced to an almost

WhiZe voZuntary organiza tions may prefer to cooperate with

one another, this does not prevent their competing

among themseZves

20 Y O R K , Z Y C H L I N S K I

The convenor’s function is to

enable the members to work

effectively, to advise them, and

to meet their express needs

total lack of responses by the representatives of two of the roundtables. There is no reason to assume that there were any substantive differences between those who filled in the questionnaires and those who did not. On-the-spot questionnaires may adversely affect the dedication with which they are filled in, though we can attest to the time and seriousness devoted to completion of the questionnaires at the meeting.

The questionnaire asked about the organizations represented, the interaction among them, the roundtables and their activities, and the role of the convenor. All of the questions were based on the literature; some of the questions were replicated from the survey instru- ments of Hall and others (1977), Schmidt and Kochan (19771, and York (1990). The questionnaire contained twenty-one fairly detailed questions. The research included two dependent and nine independent variables, as summarized in Table 1.

It is important to emphasize that the questionnaires were dis- tributed not to organizations but to organizational representatives at the meeting. All of the respondents were regular members of the roundtables and involved in their work and deliberations, and so the questionnaire was designed for them and their activities. The type of organization and sizes of the urban areas are summarized in Table 2.

Findings Our data are from a small number of respondents and so their generalizability is limited. But with the current state of the field and the paucity of empirical research in this area, it is possible to draw limited conclusions and to test hypotheses from the literature and previous research. The data for each hypothesis are examined in turn.

Organizational Independence As indicated in Table 3 , local groups were the least independent (financially and in ability to recruit members), and environmental and women’s groups were the most independent. The Pearson correlation between participation in the roundtable and independence is not significant (r = -.02, p = .44), and T-test data showed similar results (multivariate analysis was not indicated owing to the small sample). However, there is some evidence (see Table 4) supporting the hypothesis that the least independent organizations participate most. The order for participation in the roundtable (attendance at meetings and participation in deliberations) is almost the reverse of that for independence, although the findings are not significant.

Organizational Domain The Pearson correlation between organizational domain and cooperation with other organizations (see Table 1) is significant (r = .32, p = .03). The correlation between cooperation and similar objectives is not significant (r = .24, p = .11), but that between cooperation and

C O M P E T I N G N O N P R O F I T O R G A N I Z A T I O N S ALSO COLLABORATE 21

Table 1. Dependent and Independent Variables Included in the Roundtable Research

Variables Measures

Dependent Participation

in roundtable

Cooperation with other organizations

Independent Independence

Organizational domain of organization

Convenor

Assessment of other

Contacts with other

Reasons for these contacts Importance of these

Manner of these contacts Communication with other organizations

organizations

organizations

contacts

Self-assessed regularity of attendance at meetings, self-assessed frequency of participation in discussion

organization (Hall and others, 1977) Assessment by respondent vis-a-vis every other

Financial stability and recruitment of new members (Litwak and Hylton, 1962)

Assessment by respondents of the domains of their own and others’ organizations: similarity of objectives and perception of competition

Assessment by respondents of the convenor’s involvement in stages of roundtables’ work (York, 1990)

Assessment of other organizations’ paid and voluntary staff, their performance and quality

Frequency of contacts with other organizations outside the roundtable meetings

Assessment by respondents Assessment by respondents

Description by respondents General assessment by respondents

Table 2. Distribution of Respondents by Type of Voluntary Organization and Size of City

City Size Women’s Service Local Fraternal Environmental Total

150,000 and over 3 5 4 2 2 16 30,000-150,000 6 4 5 4 2 21 Total 9 9 9 6 4 37

Table 3. Mean Scores on Index of Organizational Independence by Type of Organization

~~~

Type of Organizution Score

Environmental 41.73 Women’s 49.00 Fraternal 49.29 Service 50.23 Local 56.96

Note: F = 3.68, df= 4.31, p < .01. one-way analysis of variance; the lower the score, the higher the degree of independence.

22 YORK, ZYCHLINSKI

In our sampZe, organizations that competed

with one another were more likely to cooperate with

one another

Table 4. Mean Scores on Index of Participation in Roundtables by Type of Organization

Type of Organization Score

Environmental Women’s Fraternal Service Local

50.40 55.98 47.68 48.46 47.02

Note: F = 1.75, df= 4.29, p = .18 (not significant), one-way analysis of variance; the lower the score, the higher the degree of participation.

competition is significant (r = .29, p = .05). Thus, in our sample, organizations that competed with one another were more likely to cooperate with one another.

Perceived Effectiveness The Pearson correlation between cooperation and evaluation of the other organizations is significant (r = -.34, p = .04), but it is negative: The organizations in the roundtables cooperated more with one another the lower their evaluations of their partners’ effectiveness. Another significant finding (r = -.45, p = .Ol) is the negative correlation between evaluation of other organizations’ effectiveness and similarity of objectives: This negative evaluation became greater when the organizations had more similar domains.

Convenor The hypothesis that a more participative, nondirective convenor would encourage participation was not supported: The Pearson correlation is negative but not significant (r = -.14, p = .22). Some light may be shed on this finding by the significant negative correlation between perception of the convenor’s nondirectiveness and the independence rating of the organization (r = -.36, p = .02). The more independent the organization, the less its representative perceived the convenor as being nondirective and participative.

However, the perceived nondirectiveness of the convenor is significantly correlated with the frequency of contacts among the organizations (r = .47, p = .006) and with the perception of the importance of these contacts (r = .37, p = .03). Moreover, the convenor’s perceived nondirectiveness may have had an indirect effect on participation. The nondirectiveness of the convenor is significantly correlated with the frequency of formal and informal contacts among the organizations above and beyond the meetings of the roundtables (r = .46, p = .006) and the importance attached to these contacts (r = .37, p = .032). Since there are significant positive cor- relations between the extent to which representatives considered the contacts among them to be important and the perceived quality of


communication among the organizations (r = .48, p = .004), as well as the perceived cooperation among the organizations (r = .37, p = .018), it seems that contacts outside the meetings contributed to the goal of increased cooperation.

Discussion and Implications We understand well the limitations of our data. The sample is small, most of the data are subjective, and their generalizability may be limited. But in a field in which research is so scarce and empirical findings so few, the results of the study may point the way for others and provide guidelines for those interested in the relationships among voluntary organizations.

There is no clear, significant indication on the first research question: Do independent voluntary organizations participate more or less in cooperative ventures? There is no evidence from our study for the hypothesis that the more independent, self-confident organizations cooperate more, and only slight support for the counterhy- pothesis that less independent organizations cooperate more with others, presumably in order to increase their resources (Levine and White, 1961; Mulford and Mulford, 1980). Probably Leat, Smolka, and Unell(l981) are correct in their contention that there is no con- nection between independence and cooperation.

While this finding (or nonfinding) may not be very helpful for voluntary coordinators and convenors, it does, at least, show that any voluntary organization, however independent it is in means and resources, can be encouraged to cooperate with others. It is probably easier to convince the small, poor organizations of the common sense of cooperation, but it is not impossible to recruit the well-off, well-supported national giants.

Our data seem to indicate clearly that competition and cooperation are not mutually exclusive; perhaps the opposite is true. The voluntary organizations in the roundtables tended to cooperate more with other organizations in their domain, as prior research has shown for nonvoluntary organizations (Levine and White, 1961; Akinbode and Clark, 1976; Schmidt and Kochan, 1977; Gray, 1985; McCann and Gray, 1986). Moreover, the organizations that actually competed with one another were more likely to cooperate with one another, emphasizing the mixed interorganizational relations identified by Mulford and Mulford (1980) and the phenomena of “competitive co- operators” and “output co-operators” analyzed by Butler and Wilson (1990). Cooperation is not necessarily based on a similarity of objectives but instead may be functional and basically defensive in nature. Organizations cooperate segmentally with one another, as Kramer (1990) suggested, while still competingwith one another in other seg- ments of the field. Even extensive cooperation may serve the purpose of keeping the competitors under observation, learning from them and about them, and so may be more tactical in nature, not strategic.

There is no evidence from

our study for the hypothesis that

the more independent, se 2f-confident organizations

cooperate more

24 YORK, Z Y C H L I N S K I

The independent organizations are

not interested in having the

convenor support and encourage

the more dependent

organizations, for the strength of the latter wilt be at the expense of the weakening

of the former

Thus, the findings on perceived effectiveness are not surprising. Since cooperation among voluntary organizations is frequently underpinned by competition and characterized by field segmenta- tion, functional and defensive in nature, why should we expect high evaluations of the other organizations? And why should the nega- tiveness of the evaluations be so high? One explanation is that the cooperation is a result of negative evaluation: Organizations that compete with one another, particularly those that do not respect each other’s effectiveness, are more likely to seek cooperation for functional reasons. An alternative explanation is that cooperation among voluntary organizations leads to mutual negative evaluation: Famil- iarity breeds contempt! Neither explanation is supported by the literature or the present research data (which say nothing about cause and effect among the variables).

An alternative explanation was suggested by Hall and others (1977): Cooperation among organizations is based on formal agree- ments, and so any feelings toward partners are basically irrelevant. But why should there be a significant negative correlation between the variables? If Hall and his associates are correct, then the correlation between the variables should be nonsignificant.

The implications of this and the previous conclusion are clear: Do not seek mutual liking and trust among the organizations when recruiting for a cooperative venture like the roundtables, and do not use mutual liking and trust as a marketing tactic. Feelings of mistrust and even hostility may underlie cooperation (first explanation), or they may result from cooperation (second explanation). In any case, the convenor is ill-advised to deny them or to fight against them.

The fourth hypothesis, the importance of the convenor in the development process of cooperation (Selsky, 1991), seems to be supported by our data, but more indirectly than directly. The process of developing interorganizational cooperation is clearly political in nature: Organizations are likely to give up some of their power and to increase it in other ways. Thus, the independent organizations are not interested in having the convenor support and encourage the more dependent organizations, for the strength of the latter will be at the expense of the weakening of the former. The noncommittal nature of the correlation between perceived nondirectiveness of the convenor and participation is explained by two contrary forces: positive by the less independent organizations, and negative by the more independent ones; the two forces neutralize each other.

However, the convenor’s influence is clear in his or her indirect effect on organizational interrelationships. Even the independent organizations represented in our sample realized the importance of this effect, and so the convenor’s importance and influence are clearly indicated in this research, supporting previous studies (Mandell, 1988; Naftali, 1990; Selsky, 1991). Whether directly, with the less independent organizations, or indirectly, with the more independent Organizations, a nondirective, participatory profile will probably bring


the best results (York, 1990). The convenors in this research were mainly social workers with a community organization training. Clearly, the convenor needs professional skills, knowledge, values, and experience in this kind of work, and social workers, particularly community social workers, tend to excel in this area. Perhaps Stem and Gibelman (1990) are correct, and management and fundraising expertise are of prime importance, but these skills may not prove suf- ficient in the long run.

ALAN YORK is director of the School of Social Work at Bar-Ilan Univer- sity, Ramat-Gun, Israel. He was chair of the national steering committee for the Roundtables Project.

ESTHER ZYCHLINSKI is director of community work in the Department of Social Services, Hod Hasharon, Israel.

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