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ABSTRACT Is the European Union emerging as a global foreign and security actor? Has the EU developed the necessary tools to deal with the security agenda in the European continent? Is the rapidly evolving European Security and Defence Policy an efficient framework for the Petersberg tasks in the 21st century? What is the role that Turkey play / could play in this context? The proposed article aims to present, with a historical and analytical perspective, the main issues concerning the participation of Turkey in the ESDP, in particular in relation to the institutional mechanisms, the decision making and decision shaping procedures, the relations with NATO and the military capabilities. In other words, the article is built around the question of the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreements between the EU and NATO and the special position of Turkey between these two organisations. In that respect, the present working paper analyses the factors that explain how, why and with what aims has the EU developed a specific policy towards Turkey concerning its participation in ESDP missions and structures.

GARNET CONFERENCE

THE EUROPEAN UNION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Brussels, 24-26 April 2008

Work under construction. Comments most welcome, but please do not use, quote or distribute it.

Miguel MEDINA ABELLAN

PhD candidate

Centre of International Studies

University of Cambridge

mama4@cam.ac.uk

COMPETING VISIONS OF EUROPEAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

MAKING. TURKEY, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO

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INTRODUCTION

The status of non-EU European North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Members within the European

Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) decision-making framework is one of the thorniest issues in the

development of this policy1. In this regard, the understanding of the Turkish position in relation to ESDP and

the wrangling that ended with the European Council decisions in Copenhagen (December 2002) are vital

issues to analyse the dynamics of the ESDP project and the relation with NATO. Turkey has followed a hard

line position concerning the development of the ESDP, position that reflects other aspects of the bilateral

relations with the EU, exactly in the same way that the EU has been strict and sometimes inflexible with

Turkey. Turkey has based its objections concerning ESDP on its privileged relations with NATO (and the

United States) and on its disputes with Greece and Cyprus. For its part, the EU has been reluctant to offer

Turkey a more accurate status inside ESDP for institutional-political reasons and for the specific character of

Turkey as a foreign and security actor. The EU has been struggling to reach consensus on common security

and defence policies over the last years, and its relations with NATO and transatlantic affairs in general are

uncertain. Adding Turkey to this mix makes the situation even more complex for the EU. Yet multiple

questions are open: Would Turkey’s participation enhance or weaken the ESDP endeavour? Can the EU

deliver a credible ESDP without Turkey? Would it be useful for Turkey?2.

The purpose of the present paper is to sketch out, with a historical and analytical perspective, the main

issues concerning the participation of Turkey in ESDP, in particular in relation to the institutional mechanisms,

the decision making and decision shaping procedures, the relations with NATO and the military capabilities.

In other words, the paper focuses around the question of the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreements between the EU and

NATO and the special position of Turkey in this context. This piece of work starts by presenting the

particularity of the Turkish case inside the European security architecture and the main problems of the

bilateral relations with the EU: the unique geopolitical position of Turkey, its status inside ESDP, its relations

with NATO, and the current situation. The second section touches upon the centre of the EU – Turkey

security concerns: the Berlin Plus agreements. This will be the central section of the paper, since it analyses

the most important aspect of Turkish participation in ESDP. Finally, the third section briefly introduces the

participation of Turkey in the ESDP missions and deals with the possible Turkish contribution to security and

stability in Europe. It addresses the capabilities that Turkey has offered and might supply in the future for

ESDP purposes, including both military and non military inputs. Some partial conclusions close the present

document.

1 Tocci, Nathalie / Houben, Marc, ‘Accommodating Turkey in ESDP’, in CEPS Policy Briefs No 5, May 2001, p 1 2 Wood, Steve / Quaisser, Wolfgang, ‘Turkey’s Road to the EU: Political Dynamics, Strategic Context and Implications for Europe’, in European Foreign Affairs Review, Volume 10, 2005, p 170

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1. TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY. BETWEEN NATO AND ESDP

The EU accession process and the involvement in ESDP has left Turkey with the dilemma of how to reconcile

its internal and external policy challenges3. It is arguable that Turkey has been hesitant to align itself to the

EU positions on issues which it feels touch its vital foreign policy and security interests, in particular regarding

its geographical neighbourhood4. Hence, Turkey has demonstrated that it is willing to impose restrictions on

NATO-EU cooperation when it believes its interests are at stake5. Turkish officials, not surprisingly, see

Turkey maintaining a strong Atlanticist position within NATO and the EU. They insist that Ankara, even being

a member of the EU, would maintain a strong strategic defence relationship with the US, arguing that security

concerns would not allow Turkey to take an EU-only position at the expense of NATO6. What are the most

sensitive issues for Turkey? What factors explain Turkey’s position concerning ESDP and NATO?.

The first and most important issue to consider in relation to Turkey’s foreign policy is its NATO membership.

The discourse of the Turkish authorities has combined support for the strengthening of ESDP with the claim

that transatlantic links should remain central. Turkey has been traditionally reluctant in its support of the

building of a European defence independent of NATO7. Turkey is a geographically a Eurasian country,

Islamic by faith but officially secular, and broadly European in outlook and aspiration8. The peculiar

geographical situation of Turkey has conditioned its own political and historical development, clearly affecting

its domestic and foreign policies. In short, Turkey is a Muslim country integrated in the European structures of

security and defence, and at the same time is part of the West political, economic and social organisations9.

In the traditional sense, while Turkey’s geography has predetermined its security discourses and foreign

policy, it has also been able to separate its foreign policy towards the West, which is largely driven by its

NATO membership, from its regional relations, particularly with the Middle East. In fact, Turkey’s membership

3 Aybet, Gülnuer, ‘Turkey and the EU After the First year of Negotiations: Reconciling Internal and External Policy Challenges’, in Security Dialogue, 2006, 37, p 529 4 Neuwahl, Nanette, ‘Turkish EU Accession and EU Foreign Policy’, in Collegium, College of Europe Publications, n31, Spring 2005, p 5 5 Abramowitz, Morton / Burt, Richard (co-chairs), ‘Turkey on the threshold: Europe’s Decision and US Interests’, in Atlantic Council of the United States, Policy Paper, August 2004, p 18 6 Abramowitz / Burt, op.cit., p 22 7 Soler, Eduard, ‘Turkey’s Potential (and Controversial) Contribution to the global ‘Actorness’ of the EU, in Atesoglu Guney, Nursin (ed), Contentious issues of security and the Future of Turkey, Ashgate, London, 2007, p 39 8 Park, William, ‘The Security Dimensions of EU-Turkey Relations, in Lake, Michael (ed), The EU and Turkey. A Glittering Prize or a Milestone?, The Federal Trust, London, 2005, p 127 9 Durán, Marién; De Cueto, Carlos,’Seguridad en Turquía: ¿transición o modelo propio?’, in AFKAR, Ideas, Num 13, Primavera 2007, p 29

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to NATO has shaped, and to a specific degree constituted, its perception of the West in general and Europe

in particular10.

Beyond the NATO stance, Turkey’s position concerning the development of ESDP is also explained by two

subsequent factors. First, we must mention Ankara’s mistrust over some European countries. Turkey's veto

threat over ESDP's use of NATO assets and capabilities was not simply driven by what the civilian-military

establishment deemed as European broken promises. These simply served to create the legal context

through which Turkey articulated its claims. What laid behind these claims was Turkey's fundamental mistrust

of the Union, and its strong preference for NATO, in which it was a full member. Second, despite Greece’s

apparent support for Turkish candidacy since 1999, its rationale in the ESDP dispute alerted the rest of MS,

given the fact that at the same time it has adopted a very intransigent attitude towards the resolution of the

ESDP conflicts between the EU, NATO and Turkey. The Turkish exclusion syndrome, on the one hand, and

the defensive Greek stance, on the other, went some way to explaining why the agreement reached in

December 2002 was only possible due to long and tense negotiations11, intensive diplomatic meetings and

reciprocal concessions.

2. TURKEY AS A PECULIAR ESDP ASSOCIATE: THE BERLIN PLUS AGREEMENTS

After having presented a brief overview of Turkey’s foreign policy, it is convenient to further work on the most

important aspect concerning Turkey and ESDP: the Berlin Plus arrangements. Let’s refresh our memory.

Berlin Plus meant a strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in the areas of crisis management,

conflict prevention and humanitarian missions. The agreements set out the mechanisms by which the EU

could have ‘assured access’ to NATO operational capabilities planning, ‘presumption of availability’ to NATO

capabilities and common assets, and a European command inside NATO for EU-led operations12.

During the last years of the century the awkward mechanism of the Berlin Plus arrangements proved

unsatisfactory in several ways. Nonetheless, the most important problem remained unsolved for some years,

in other words the relationship of the ESDP with NATO and the EU access to NATO’s planning capabilities,

assets and command. It is precisely in this operational part of the Berlin Plus agreement where the Turkish

10 Oymen, Omur, ‘The Place of Turkey in European Security and Defence Identity’, in Nas, Çigdem; Dartan, Muzaffer, The European Union Enlargement Process and Turkey, Marmara University European Community Institute, Istanbul, 2002, p 292 11 Soler, op.cit., p 41 12 Ojanen, Hanna, ‘The EU and NATO: Two Competing Models for a Common Defence Policy’, in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 44, Num 1, p 69

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issue was more visible. Turkey therefore used its membership of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to block

the Berlin Plus process until an agreement was reached. This was a double-edged sword since, at the same

time as it stopped EU plans to mount military missions before it was autonomously equipped to do so, it also

gave an incentive to the EU to precipitate its move towards total autonomy from NATO13.

2.1. Turkey and the development of ESDP

Yet Ankara’s initial reaction to ESDP and the institutional set up was fierce, inspired both by an assumption

that the EU was seeking to challenge NATO as Europe’s hard security actor and by the consequence that

Turkey would thereby be excluded from a key component of Europe’s emerging security architecture14.

Ankara’s security culture, its national and nationalistic sensitivities, and its mistrust of the EU led it to the

conclusion that the ESDP represented a wilful determination to marginalise NATO and exclude non-EU

members15. The main problem was a dispute over the EU’s links to NATO, and more precisely on the

involvement of non-EU European members of NATO in the ESDP. Nor was this simply because of its

perpetual problem with Greece: Turkey understandably feared that ESDP developments represented

quantum lead towards an EU on its borders with a powerful foreign and defence policy in which it would not

be able to participate for the foreseeable future16.

In addition, Turkey feared that a EU force could potentially operate on its areas of interests, hence without

having the right to decide or intervene. Turkey was concerned about ESDP but, from the very beginning, it

wanted to participate. The fact that Turkey was not likely to join the EU by that time did not make the

negotiations easier. These fears of exclusion pushed Turkey to veto several times any agreement that would

give the EU ‘assured access’ to NATO military assets and planning capabilities. Concerning Ankara’s

relations with Athens, Turkey approached Greece from an instrumental perspective. The more the EU

behaved receptively to Turkey’s membership, the greater Turkey’s conciliatory steps towards Greece17.

Turkey, between NATO and ESDP, was the crucial problem of the implementation of the Berlin Plus acquis.

The discrepancy was clear. In a few words, Turkey had a certain position within the WEU18, allowing it to

broker power. Turkey was promised during the Washington summit that the EU should build on existing

13 Howorth (2003), op.cit., p 9 Howorth, Jolyon, ‘Saint-Malo Plus Five: An Interim Assessment of the ESDP’, in Notre Europe Policy Papers, N 7, November 2003, p 9 14 Park, op.cit., p 134 15 Park, op.cit., p 134 16 Hill, Christopher, ‘The EU’s Capacity for Conflict Prevention’, in European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol 6, 2001, p 321 17 Oguzlu Tarik, ‘The Latest Turkish-Greek Détente: Instrumentalist Play for EU Membership, or Long-Term Institutionalist Cooperation?, in Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 17, Number 2, July 2004, pp 348 18 Turkey and other non-EU European allies were invited to become Associated Partners in June 1992, status which meant in practice a full membership

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consultation arrangements between NATO and WEU19. But ESDP development since then has proved to be

different…

The ‘mutual sense of mistrust’ that has characterised the bilateral relations was clear during the Cologne and

Helsinki summits: the decision to grant Turkey official candidacy status was largely due to the potential

benefits of Turkey’s inclusion into the ESDP and the costs of its exclusion20. The link to NATO was all the

more necessary for it was commonly assumed that the EU would hardly be able (or perhaps willing) to

undertake on its own military operations at the ‘high end’ of the Petersberg tasks, incorporated by the

Amsterdam Treaty (Article 17.2 TEU)21. It was unpractical and even counterproductive –both operationally

and in terms of available resources- to end up having a dual set of military planning structures, one for NATO

and one for the ESDP22.

From Turkey’s point of view, this offer fell short of the status it had enjoyed in WEU and also of what it had

expected and called for since NATO’s Berlin Plus statement. For Ankara the ambiguity arose from the

wording of the Cologne summit, according to which the Union takes measures to guarantee that all

participants in an EU-led operation enjoy the same rights concerning the conduct of the operation ‘without

prejudice to the principle of autonomy of decision of the EU, namely the right of the Council to examine and

decide on questions of principle and of policy’. Accordingly, Turkey decided in 2000 to use its decision-

making powers in NATO to hold up the conclusion of NATO-EU arrangements to implement Berlin Plus until

there should be some clarification and improvement of its own position. It insisted on the fact that all

participants in ESDP were in principle equal, but only after the Council invited them to take part, and on the

NATO’s prerogative to have the right to first refusal on the launching of an operation. This formal blockage

was to last for two years and in practice also delayed the start of any ad hoc EU military operation with NATO

support, although it did not prevent the EU’s proceeding to build up its own ESDP structures and capabilities.

Continuous efforts were made by the NATO Secretary General, the EU High Representative and some

Member States to clear the way for a solution addressing Turkey’s need for reassurance over operations

affecting its interests, as well as issues of its own participation.

The final breakthrough came at the end of 2001 in a context of significant movement in Turkey’s general

relationship with the European institutions. The solution was finally found, but not before the presentation in

December of a joint UK-US-Turkish document, known as the Ankara Document, which had excluded the

Eastern Mediterranean from the ESDP. The document, without ever mentioning Turkey explicitly (as

19 Tocci, op.cit., p 6 20 Müftüler-Bac, Meltem, ‘Turkey’s Role in the EU’s Security and Foreign Policies’, in Security Dialogue, Vol31, Nº4, p 489 ‘ 21 Missiroli, Antonio,‘EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP’,in Security Dialogue, 2003, 33, p9 22 Missiroli (2003), op.cit., p 10

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demanded by Greece), assured that, whatever the crisis, the ESDP would never be directed against an ally

and would always respect the obligations of EU member states vis-à-vis NATO members23. The document

included a reverse clause (i.e. if an EU member is concerned, NATO assets cannot be used either – read

Turkey). In short, the document involved EU guarantees to Turkey on both non-aggression and

consultation24. It has never been released publicly, and it is believed to provide Turkey with the assurances it

sought regarding ESDP and to informally assuage Ankara’s concerns regarding the Rapid Reaction Force

(RRF) operations in areas vital to Turkish interests25. On the whole, the document appeared to be a viable

basis for a final deal. There remained a few grey areas –especially the interpretation of ‘geographic proximity’

and the boundaries between political and military control of a given operation- but these were probably

inevitable, even indispensable, elements of the constructive ambiguity that often drives policy formulation at

the multilateral level26.

The Ankara deal meant that Turkey would withdraw its veto over the crisis management capacities of the EU

(given the impossibility of ‘assured’ access to NATO assets. On practical terms, Turkey took this decision

only after the EU had guaranteed Ankara that its military task force would not intervene anywhere near the

Turkish geopolitical sphere of influence. In return, Turkey gave up the right to have a say in the operation

decisions of the force27. The provisions of the Ankara Document of December 2001 did not satisfy Greece,

which was worried about the fact that Turkey had been given too much power and, consequently, Turkey

could prevent the ESDP to be used in order to defend Greek interests.

The agreement was to be accepted as an official document at the Laeken summit, after the NATO’s Defence

Ministers meeting, in December 2001. Surprisingly, it was not approved by the EU, since Greece did not

permit its endorsement28. The document was rejected by Greece for both procedural reasons (due to the

extra-institutional procedure which was followed) and substantive reasons (ESDP fundamental principles,

such as EU-NATO equality, decision-making autonomy and non discrimination were breached). The Ankara

document was seen by Greece to go beyond the provisions agreed in Nice. The ‘participation issue’ (in other

words, the way in which the non-EU European NATO allies participate in ESDP and the conduct of the

missions) was, therefore, unresolved29.

23 Haine, Jean-Yves, ‘ESDP: An Overview’, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2004, p 3 24 Howorth, Jolyon, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, 2007, p 169 25 Dinella, Harry, ‘The Growing Influence of Brussels on Turkish Policy’, in Woodrow Wilson International Center, Documents and Papers, February 2002, p 2 26 Missiroli (2003), op.cit., p 22 27Müller, Gisela, ‘The New CFSP and ESDP Decision-Making System of the European Union’, in European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol 7, 2002, p 280 28 Oymen, op. cit., p 328 29 Embassy of Greece to the United States, European Security and Defence Policy. Inception and Historic Course, 2005

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Finally, the Greeks agreed to lift their veto on EU access to NATO assets during the Brussels European

Council, held in October 2002, reaching a consensus on the Nice provisions concerning the involvement of

non-EU European Allies30. According to the new arrangement, Cyprus remained outside the area of

responsibility of the EU’s RRF, while Turkey lifted its veto on the EU’s assured access to NATO assets.

Behaving this way, Turkey wanted to demonstrate that its intentions were not to contribute to further intra-

Alliance divisions but to make sure that the EU’s evolving security structure developed in close cooperation

with NATO and that the process of Turkey’s accession to be accelerated31.

The text, as reformed during the Brussels summit, provided the basis for the final compromise signed in

December 2002. American pressure, the Copenhagen decision on enlargement and particularly the rise to

power of Erdogan’s government cleared the way, after over three years of negotiations, for the approval of

the Nice provisions on Berlin Plus. It is important to point out that a crucial factor of the agreement was the

new Turkish Government. Instead of using Turkey’s influence in NATO as a means to extract concessions

from the EU –as the previous Government had done- the executive led by Erdogan adopted the opposite

approach, namely using that influence to solve the Berlin Plus problem and show goodwill from the EU on the

accession issue32.

The Copenhagen summit concluded the two-year dispute concerning Turkey’s participation in ESDP and was

possible thanks to the Ankara and Brussels documents. The agreement ensured that Cyprus and Malta, as

countries that were not included in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), would not be included as possible

locations for ESDP activities and operations. However, while an agreement was reached, it remained unclear

what Turkey’s substantive input in ESDP would be. More specifically, the project would assess the possible

cooperation between Turkey and the EU in concrete regions in the Wider Europe and its neighbourhood

where Turkey has special interests, namely the Caucasus, the Middle East, the Black Sea and the Caspian

region33. There were also sensitive concerns over military aspects of the Greek-Turkish relationship in

general, as well as the Cypriot conflict in particular. It was agreed that the EU would in no circumstances use

its military against a NATO ally and that NATO would in no circumstances act against the EU, and it also

included agreements on intensive consultation procedures between the non-EU NATO members and the

Political and Security Committee (PSC)34.

30 Melin, Mikael, ‘Turkey and the West. A Strategic Partnership for Security’, in L’Islam et l’Europe, College of Europe, Bruges, June 2003, p 10 31 Oguzlu, op.cit., p 297 32 Missiroli, Antonio, ‘Turkish Delights? A Response to Bilgin’, in Security Dialogue, 2003, 34, p 351 33 CEPS, Turkey in European Monitor, op.cit., p 17 34 Howorth (2007), op.cit., p 186

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The bargaining process that lasted for two years evidenced the linkage between the EU bid, a solution for the

Cyprus division and the clearing of the last remaining obstacles to the development of the ESDP35. Not

surprisingly, at the same time that the Member States agreed this solution, the EU and NATO reached a

compromise that permitted EU to use NATO capabilities36 and signed a strategic partnership between the two

organisations in the field of crisis management on 16 December 2002. After the approval by the NAC, the

EU and NATO issued a Declaration on ESDP37, a landmark document which paved the way for the effective

implementation of the Berlin Plus agreement. The bilateral framework for permanent relations is based on a

basic feature: when NATO as a whole is not engaged, the EU, in undertaking an operation, will choose

whether or not to have recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. The Declaration not only reaffirmed the EU

assured access to NATO’s planning capabilities for its own military operations, but also laid down the political

principles of the strategic partnership38. It is worth mentioning that the Declaration39 stated that ‘the EU is

ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European members of NATO within ESDP, implementing

the relevant Nice arrangements’ and that ‘NATO is supporting ESDP in accordance with the relevance

Washington Summit decisions’. Turkey felt satisfied for the wording, as Greece did.

The concrete approval of the Berlin Plus arrangements took place on 17 March 2003, providing the basis for

permanent NATO-EU cooperation in crisis management by allowing EU access to NATO's collective assets

and capabilities for EU-led operations40. The end of the blockade over Berlin Plus opened the way to the

launch of ESDP military operations in 2003, and on 31 March 2003 the EU-led operation Concordia took over

the responsibilities of the NATO-led mission, Operation Allied Harmony, in Macedonia In line with Berlin Plus

arrangements, NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) was appointed as

Operation Commander of this first ever EU-led military peacekeeping mission. NATO supported the EU on

strategic, operational and tactical planning. An EU-Operation Headquarters (OHQ) was set-up at NATO’s

35 Dokos, Thanos, ‘Turkey and ESDP. Seminar Report’, in SIPRI, International Conference, 20 September 2004, p 5 36 EU – Turkey Relations Dossier, Analysis Section, Observatory of European Foreign Policy, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, EUTR 6/2003, p 6/9 37 European Union / North Atlantic Treaty Association, EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP, Brussels, 16 December 2002, Document S0240/02 38 These are: effective mutual consultation, dialogue and transparency; equality and due regard for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and NATO; respect for the interests of the EU and NATO members states; respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organisations 39 North Atlantic Treaty Association, NATO-EU: A strategic partnership, to be found in http://www.nato.int 40 They consist of the following major elements a NATO-EU Security Agreement (which covers the exchange of classified information under reciprocal security protection rules); assured EU access to NATO's planning capabilities for actual use in the military planning of EU-led crisis management operations; presumed availability of NATO capabilities and common assets, such as communication units and headquarters for EU-led crisis management operations; procedures for release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities; terms of reference for NATO’s Deputy SACEUR - who in principle will be the operation commander of an EU-led operation under Berlin Plus and European command options for NATO; NATO-EU consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led crisis management operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities; incorporation within NATO's long-established defence planning system, of the military needs and capabilities that may be required for EU-led military operations, thereby ensuring the availability of well-equipped forces trained for either NATO-led or EU-led operations

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Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, to assist the Operation

Commander. These dual NATO-EU posts guaranteed the linkage between the EU’s and NATO’s operational

chain of command, and therefore made possible the effective development of a EU autonomous mission.

In three months, between December 2002 and March 2003, Turkey underwent the most extraordinary

reversal in its foreign relations41. On 1 March 2003 a resolution was brought to the Turkish parliament by the

ruling AKP government to allow the temporary deployment of 62,000 US troops on Turkish soil. The

deployment and transit through Turkey would have allowed a second-front attack against Iraq. By a few

votes, the motion failed to pass through Parliament and the US troops were re-routed to Kuwait42. Yet, on the

eve of the Anglo-American strike, Turkish defence plans were the subject of a heated debate in the NATO;

several EU countries were of the view that the act of Turkey represented an implicit acceptance of the

American position. At the same time, Turkey’s AKP government and the US administration were negotiating a

compensation package which Ankara would receive if it allowed allied American and British soldiers to use

the Turkish soil. However, when this proposal was presented to the Turkish Parliament, it was rejected in

spite of governmental support. This obliged the US to change its initial plans and led to the deterioration the

preferential Turkish-American partnership43.

It was in a specific political situation –‘EU-ization of ESDP, factual suppression of the WEU, latent

transatlantic tensions over the ESDP, but also qualified acceptance of Turkey as a candidate to join the EU-

that Ankara repositioned itself. It stepped up its military engagement in European security, by actively

participating in the Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (K-FOR) and by committing an additional sizeable force to

the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG)44.

2.2. ESDP Decision-making and decision-shaping mechanisms

During the three crucial years between 1999 and 2002, Turkey was the non-EU European allied with the

strongest sense of grievance. Turkish position after the Washington summit was clear. Onur Oymen, the then

Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, argued that ‘The underpinning concepts that emerged after

lengthy deliberations in Washington were that, on the one hand (and in accordance with the principles of

cooperation, complementarity and non-decoupling), NATO would support the EU’s efforts aimed at the

41 Robins, Philip, ‘Confusion at home, confusion abroad : Turkey between Copenhagen and Iraq’, in International Affairs, 79, 3 (2002), p 565 42 Emerson, Michael / Tocci, Nathalie, ‘Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead. Integrating EU and Turkey Foreign Policy’, in CEPS EU-Turkey Working Papers No1, August 2004, p 27 43 EU-Turkey Relations Dossier, op.cit., p 7/9 44 Tocci, op.cit., p 3

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establishment of ESDP and, on the other hand (and in line with the principles of inclusiveness and the

indivisibility of security), the EU would include non-EU European Allies in their project’45.

2.2.1 Turkish demands concerning ESDP

Turkey was disappointed with the fact that the Nice summit decisions diverted attention from the decisions

adopted in Washington and disregarded to a large extent the mechanisms in the Western European Union

(WEU) and those between the NATO and the WEU. This was particularly evident regarding the provisions

about the autonomous EU operations and the participation of non-EU European Allies46, given the necessity

of having a Council’s invitation and the consequent veto possibility of any MS. Ankara was concerned mainly

about the discrimination of non-EU members of NATO outside the EU47. Turkey’s basic expectation from

Brussels was the adoption of any necessary provision that would enable the participation of non-EU

European allies in EU operations (including preparation and planning, political control and strategic direction)

if the operation made use of NATO assets and capabilities or if these countries raised their concerns that the

envisaged operation was in their geographical proximity or might even have an effect on their own national

security interests48.

Herewith an important point that must be analysed concerning the Washington communiqué and the explicit

reference to the necessity to establish ‘the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European allies in EU-led

crisis response operations by building on existing consultation mechanisms between NATO and the WEU…’.

This was interpreted in different ways by Turkey and by the EU. Turkey took the clear view that NATO’s

position should be considered as a package, and that the realization of Berlin Plus was contingent on the

EU’s treating its non-EU Allied partners in the way that NATO had envisaged. According to the Turkish

Foreign Minister: “NATO Allies …have established the basis which takes into account our expectations for full

and equal participation of European Allies who are not, like Turkey, members of the EU, in the new structure

of the CESDP.” Turkey also made clear its expectation that the EU would respect mutatis mutandis ‘existing

arrangements within the WEU’.

Turkey was worried, from the beginning, about a basic question concerning ESDP: How do the non-EU

actors participate in this project? What is the institutional status of Turkey inside ESDP? The divergence of

Turkish and EU views on the participation of non-EU European countries of NATO in ESDP has its roots in

45 Oymen, Onur, ‘Turkey and the New Challenges to European Security’, in European Foreign Affairs Review, Guest Editorial, Vol 6, 2001, p 402 46 Oymen, op.cit., p 403 47 Howorth, (2007), op.cit., p 139 48 Oymen, op.cit., p 404

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the development processes of these two concepts, ESDI and ESDP49. As we saw, Turkey and the other

Associate Members had a privileged position as observers in the WEU. This status was certainly stronger

that that of the non-NATO countries, which were Observers. The Associate Members could participate fully in

the meetings of the Council, its working groups and subsidiary bodies, although on two conditions: their

participation should not prejudice the provisions laid down in Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, to

which they were not signatories; and a majority of MS may request that participation be restricted to Full

Members of the WEU50. In addition, Associate Members were associated to the WEU Planning Cell through

special arrangements and, by virtue of NATO membership, they were entitled to be consulted and informed

on WEU operations in which they were interested, and to be directly involved in the planning and preparation

of WEU operations in which NATO assets and capabilities were used, within the framework of the Common

Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept. This arrangement clearly was a part of the ESDI, as defined since 1994,

and considered all forces employed in a ‘WEU-led’ operation as separable but not separated –in terms of

status and substance- from those answerable to the Alliance51.

However, after the abolition of this organisation and the takeover by the EU, the possibility for Turkey to sit in

Council meetings was no longer given. The Council does not normally allow non-EU Members to sit at the

table and explain their vital interests before a decision is taken. The PSC does not allow non members

either52. Turkey also attempted to negotiate a seat at the EU’s defence and security table – in effect

membership of the new PSC. This was juridically non-negotiable. It seems that Turkey encourages a closer

and more continuous participation in ESDP along the lines of its former status in the WEU53. Turkey was

expecting to enjoy at least the same status inside ESDP and demanded the right to be included in the

ESDP’s decision-making structures. The EU’s response was that Turkey should be involved in the shaping of

decisions and the management of operations, when Turkish forces participate; but since Turkey is not a

member of the EU, it cannot claim the right to veto autonomous EU actions that do not involve Ankara54.

Although the EU instituted regular security and defence discussions between the PSC and the non-EU NATO

members, Turkey found this inadequate in three ways. First, it was widely recognized that most of the

scenarios for regional destabilization had their focus in South Eastern Europe – in Turkey’s “near abroad”.

Second, this was particularly significant, viewed from Ankara, in the context of the unresolved disputes

49 Terzi, Ozlem, ‘New Capabilities, Old Relationships: Emergent ESDP and EU-Turkish Relations’, in Southeast European Politics, Vol III, N 1, June 2002, p 45 50 Missiroli (2003), op.cit., p 11 51 Missiroli (2003), op.cit., p 11 52 Neuwahl, op.cit., p 6 53 Kramer, Heinz / Larrabee, Stephen / Ozel, Soli, ‘Turkey and the European Union’, in AIGCS Working Paper Series, Special Dossier, 2004, p 17 54 Grant, Charles, ‘A European View of ESDP’, in IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, 10 September 2001, p 2

13

between Turkey and Greece over Aegean airspace and territorial waters, and over the divided island of

Cyprus. Third, the matter was exacerbated by the EU’s long-standing reluctance to engage in discussions

over Turkish membership.

Given this situation, Turkey would not, and could not, be expected to agree with the use of NATO assets by

the EU and to then allow the development of an effective ESDP, especially where its interests might be

directly affected, if it was not a EU member. Turkey, a country with a strong Atlanticist orientation in its

security policy, raised from the very beginning several concerns regarding the ESDP process, and it has

been the most important obstacle to overcome to undertake ESDP operations.

Turkey’s demands about ESDP can be classified into two categories: politico-institutional concerns with

respect to preserving the integrity of NATO and strengthening European security; and military concerns in

relation to protecting national interests55. From a political angle, we can mention two issues. Firstly, Turkey

raised the stakes in the EU-NATO negotiations by demanding (i) that the use of NATO assets be decided

only on a case-by-case basis; (ii) that, by virtue of its strategic position and role, Turkey be not simply ‘invited’

but rather entitled to take part in EU operations where the EU would not use NATO assets. and (iii) that it be

involved on equal footing in their operational planning56. Turkey seems to be still not satisfied with the current

situation and its status inside ESDP. It wants some kind of permanent seat inside ESDP, and not only when

the ESDP uses NATO assets and capabilities57.

From a military point of view, given its strategic and political importance during the Cold War and its special

position inside NATO, Turkey conceived the inception of an ESDP as a threat to NATO solidarity and

maintained that the development of military capabilities by the EU was a rival to NATO and was the first step

to a military integration that would diminish NATO’s influence58. For Turkey, NATO still is the primary

organisation for collective defence and security and it has also priority in crisis-management operations.

Accordingly, the formation of ESDP should develop in conformity with the principles of indivisibility of security

and preservation of the Atlantic link. Hence, Turkey was concerned with the fact that most of the possible

crises and conflicts might take place on its immediate neighbourhood, with the consequent impact on Turkey

national security.

55 Terzi, op.cit., p 53 56 Wood / Quaisser, op.cit., p169 57 Erguvenc, Sadi, ‘Turkey and/in the European Security and Defence Policy’, in Foreign Policy Institute, 20 November 2005, p 3 58 Terzi, op.cit., p 54

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2.2.2 European Union’s position

For its part, the EU has offered Turkey full participation in the decision-shaping process and the operational

planning, i.e. the day-to-day management of an EU-led operation. The EU is willing to engage in deep

consultation with Turkey in accordance to the provisions of the Berlin Plus agreements. In particular, the EU

draws a distinction between operations using NATO-assets, in which the non-EU NATO members would

participate automatically in preliminary discussions “if they so wish”, and EU-only operations when the

invitation to participate would be decided by the Council of Ministers of a case-by-case basis. It is also willing

to accept Turkey’s involvement in the operational planning stage, provided it assigns forces to the EU.

However, Turkey, as a non-EU member, has not been offered participation in decision-making. Turkey has

no say at the critical juncture in which the Council would decide on where, when and how to intervene59.

It is interesting to point out that the attitude of the EU, using Turkey’s assets in the building of the ESDP

military capabilities but excluding Turkey’s full participation in decision-making (as it was the case with the

WEU) seems contradictory. What factors explain this attitude? Is it because the EU does not foresee Turkey’s

membership in the future? Is it because of the reluctance of some MS to allow Turkey to fully participate in

ESDP? Is it because of the lack of a shared security culture between the EU and Turkey?60. All these are

essential questions when analysing Turkey’s participation in ESDP.

3. TURKEY’S CONTRIBUTION TO ESDP AND TO EUROPEAN SECURITY

Turkey has played an essential role in the security and defence framework of the West. It is a long-standing

member of NATO and other West supranational organisations (OECD since 1948, Council of Europe since

1949, OSCE since 1973) and thus an important contributor to European security. The Ankara’s strategy of

selling Turkey’s EU membership by stressing the country’s role as a security provider is neither new nor very

original. On the contrary, this strategy dully reflects the historical environment in which Turkish-Western

relations have unfolded. In fact, Turkey’s integration in NATO and other Western institutions was essentially

based on the geostrategic assets that the country could offer in the light of security concerns, especially with

regard to Soviet expansionism. Turkey’s policymakers have used a variety of means to ease their way into

59 Tocci, op.cit., p 5 60 Delcoigne, Georges, ‘New parameters of Turkish Security’, in Dartan; Nas, op.cit, p 333

15

the Union. As a part of this effort, they have sought to play the military/security card (geographical position

and military capability) to strengthen their own position61.

3.1 Turkey and the ESDP missions

One of the best instruments in creating confidence between the EU and Turkey, not only regarding ESDP

and the relationship with NATO, but also the bilateral relations, has been the implication of Ankara in ESDP

missions up to now, especially in the Balkans, and the notable assessment of this participation. This is a

positive indicator of a joint EU-Turkish effort for the long-term stabilisation of the area. Both Turkey and the

EU consider the Balkans a priority area and their security objectives are quite close. Turkey’s involvement

has shown not only how Turkey can contribute to a stronger and more autonomous ESDP, but it is also a

good indicator of the Europeanisation process of Turkish foreign policy62. Without Turkey’s conformity, the

current involvement of the EU’s in the Balkans would be far more complex. The EU assumption of

responsibilities was only possible once the agreement with Turkey has been concluded in December 2002 on

the use of NATO assets63. The EU had previously desired to take over NATO’s operation in Macedonia by

mid 2002, but it was not possible since it could not have access to NATO resources. Turkey’s European

credentials were clearly reinforced.

Turkey has participated in six operations undertaken by the EU, either under the Berlin Plus arrangements or

autonomously. In fact, in many operations Turkey has contributed more than most EU partners. Turkey is

making a significant contribution to EUFOR-ALTHEA, including to its civilian aspect. In total, its contribution to

EUFOR-ALTHEA comes to nearly 255 personnel. In this operation Turkey is currently the biggest non-EU

troop contributing country, and the third biggest contributor among a total of 34 countries. Furthermore,

Turkey has 4 police officers deployed to the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM). Ankara made

its forces also available to the two ESDP missions on Macedonia, CONCORDIA and PROXIMA. Turkey also

contributed with one police officer to the EU Police Mission in Kinshasa and participated in the EU’s EUFOR

RD Congo mission, aimed at assisting the UN in the DR Congo, with one Turkish C-130 aircraft and its crew

deployed in Gabon. Finally, Turkey plans to send one police officer to the EUPOL-COPPS Mission in

Palestine and is also considering participating in the EU Border Assistance Mission in Rafah/Palestine.

Moreover, Turkey decided to contribute 32 police officers to the ESDP police and rule of law mission in

Kosovo (EULEX-KOSOVO) once the operation stage starts.

61 Bilgin, Pinar, ‘The ‘Peculiarity’ of Turkey’s Position on EU-NATO Military/Security cooperation: A rejoinder to Missiroli, in Security Dialogue, 2003, 34, p 346 62 Soler, op.cit., p 42 63 Soler, op.cit., p 41

16

In addition to ESDP operations, Turkey has declared it would make important contributions to improve EU

capabilities under the Headline Goal 2010 and intends to take part in a Battle Group64. Concerning the

contributions to the Headline Goal 2010, Turkey argues that its possible contributions to EU-led operations

may be considered on a case-by-case basis, depending on the location and other circumstances of each

operation or mission. In this context, Turkey’s degree of participation in the decision-making processes of the

planning and implementation phase of such ESDP operations will also be taken into account65. In relation to

the Battle Groups, Turkey declared its readiness to contribute to them in November 2004. Turkey will provide

both troops and capabilities to the Italian led Battle Group which will be assigned to the EU for the second

half of 201066.

3. 2 Turkey and the wider European security architecture As we have seen, since the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty and the effective

implementation of ESDP, it is clear which types of military operations the EU can undertake: everything but

collective defence, which remains the prerogative of NATO, but including non article 5 operations at the high

end of the spectrum of high violence67. Furthermore, as stated by the Solana Document, ‘effective

multilateralism’ should be the guiding strategic principle of the ESDP. How to implement it? This entails an

important expeditionary military capacity as the ultimate instrument in the EU’s toolbox68. What could be

Turkey’s added value in this regard? In short, we can mention three possible contributions to the ESDP: its

military capabilities, its geostrategic position, and its foreign policy and its experience in military operations69.

Concerning the military capabilities, with its large expenditure and manpower, Turkey has the capacity to

contribute significantly to EU security and defence. It has the largest armed forces in Europe (more than

790.000 personnel) and spends proportionately more on defence (4’8% of its GDP) than any other European

member of NATO70. Turkey could provide the backbone to certain activities outside the traditional geographic

range of EU foreign policy and has pledged 4-5,000 troops to the RRF71.

64 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, internal document NATO-EU relations, March 2008 65 idem 66 Data concerning the participation of Turkey in ESDP missions facilitated by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, internal document European Security and Defence Identity/Policy (ESDI/P), March 2008 67 Biscop, Sven, ‘Able and Willing? Assessing the EU’s Capacity for Military Action’, in European Foreign Affairs Review, Volume 9, 2004, p 509 68 Biscop, op.cit, p 510 69 Müftüler-Bac, op.cit., p 490 70 Akcakoca, Amanda / Cameron, Fraser / Rhein, Eberhard, “Turkey – Ready for the EU?”, in European Policy Centre Issue Papers, No16, September 2004, p 10 71 Muller-Kraenner, Sascha / Gonul, Dilek, ‘Common European Security and Defence Policy and Turkey- Status and Perspectives’, in Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Join Conference of DGAP&MET, Berlin, May 2005, p 1

17

Turkey’s incorporation to the ESDP has made the HHG and the renewed HG more credible, given the Turkish

military contribution and the Turkish experience in multinational crisis management and humanitarian

operations, under the auspices of both NATO and the UN72. This experience has proved to be a reliable

asset for the EU.

Secondly, given its size and location, Turkey is likely to be an important foreign policy player in/for the EU73. It

is located in the intersection of three seas, it unites two continents, it occupies a very unique geopolitical

space and it has a privileged geostrategic position. It is difficult to define Turkey with a single adjective

regarding its geography, since it is located at the same time in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East,

the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea. This has had a clear consequence. Turkey’s

international relations have been traditionally multidimensional and global74, but on the other side its security

and defence policy has been firmly devoted to the relations with the West, in particular through its NATO

membership and its relations with the US.

The end of the Cold War changed the European security landscape and transformed Turkey’s role in this new

context. The initial considerations about the lost of Turkish geostrategic importance as a privileged allied of

the West, given the end of the blocks confrontation and the possible dilution of Turkish standing as NATO’s

South Eastern flank, proved to be erroneous. Turkey stands today in a vital geopolitical enclave not only for

European security, but also for world’s stability. This situation gives Turkey a peculiar configuration, since it

combines three elements that make this country unique: its geographic situation, its politico-institutional links

with the West and its character as the only Muslim democracy in the world. Turkey is still of strategic

importance for achieving Europe’s security interest. Ankara’s contribution is also visible regarding the

strategic objective, laid down by the European Security Strategy, to foster peace, security and development

in the regions adjacent to the EU. Indeed, the country is close to 21 of the 23 possible conflict areas and

crisis regions identified by NATO75. Given the general positive view that Turkey has in these countries, any

possible ESDP and/or CFSP action concerning these regions that had Turkey inside would be much more

credible and accepted. Turkey would provide regional leverage, geostrategic assets and credibility to the EU.

Finally, Turkey would provide credibility to the European initiatives in the Mediterranean and Middle East

given its privileged relations with different countries and international organisations. Its simultaneous

72 Tato Porto, Francisco Javier, ‘Impacto de Turquía en la Política de Seguridad y defensa de la Unión Europea’, in Turquía a las puertas de Europa, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, Cuadernos de Estrategia, 23 February 2006, p 90 73 Hughes, Kirsty, ‘Turkey and the European Union: just another enlargement?’, in Friends of Europe Working Paper, June 2004, p 27 74 Tato Porto, op.cit., p 66 75 Muller; Gonul, op.cit., p 4

18

membership to NATO, the OSCE, the OCDE, to forums as the Organization of the Islamic Conference and

the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and to initiatives as the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the

Southeast European Cooperation Initiative, the BLACKSEAFOR or the Temporary International Presence in

Hebron –at the request of Israel as well as of the National Authority Palestine-, situate Turkey as a valid

interlocutor before the majority of the countries in the EU’s wider neighbourhood76.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Some years after the official launch of the ESDP by the Cologne summit, the EU can argue that it possesses

a security and defence policy worthy of the name, and it has been able to overcome many of the important

obstacles it had faced over fifty years of European integration in the realm of foreign and security policy. Eight

years after the 1999 decisions, the EU has at its disposal the three necessary elements to develop an

effective ESDP: efficient decision-making mechanisms, capacity to undertake military and/or civilian

operations, and the necessary military capabilities and assets. The story of ESDP process has also been a

reactive one that developed in the context of a certain set of circumstances77. We can underline four

complementary explanations for the evolution of the ESDP in the last decade: the ‘EU-ism’ (ESDP as a

simple extension of CFSP, a spill over from other areas of integration/cooperation to the security and defence

realms); the agreement between Germany, France and Britain over ESDP, which could finally reach a

consensus among them; the setting up of effective and real military capabilities; and the ‘Balkan failures,

never again’ syndrome78.

The European decision to create an independent ESDP with connections to NATO and to rely sometimes on

its capacities is a crucial step forward. We can argue that the causes and timing of ESDP’s birth and

evolution suggest that it is indeed a response to US hegemony and to the new security landscape. Its limits

suggest it is not quite a balancing projects, but certainly an effort by Europeans, including many who

bandwagon in their NATO guise, to develop an alternative security supplier79. EDSP was in the doldrums for

some years, given that the work on capabilities designed to enable Europe to meet the goals set at Helsinki

76 Lorca, Alelandro (and others), ‘Perspectivas ante el inicio de las negociaciones de adhesión de Turquía a la Unión Europea’, in Real Instituto Elcano, Documento de Trabajo 5/2006, p 12 77 Treacher, Adrian, ‘From Civilian Power to Military Actor: The EU’s Resistible Transformation’, in European Foreign Affairs Review, Volume 9, 2004, p 50 78 Posen, Barry, ‘ESDP and the Structure of World Power’, in The International Spectator,1/2004, p 14 79 Posen, op.cit., p12

19

were so far producing unimpressive results80. ESDP was to face problems over capabilities but also was

ensnarled in a cat’s cradle of Greco-Turkish rivalries similar to those with which NATO has had to struggle for

decades81. Nonetheless, some problems remain, such as the regular relationship with NATO or the final

status of the non-EU countries that participate in ESDP.

Somewhere in between these last two dimensions lies a very special case, Turkey. The ESDP project has

entailed a process of rethinking the relationship between the EU and NATO, and here the ‘Turkish factor’

appears as crucial. Member of the Atlantic Alliance since 1952, official candidate to accede to the Union

since 1999, country participating in six ESDP military operations, and with a considerable amount of military

assets and capabilities, Turkey represents a unique challenge to ESDP. The problem of Turkey has been

explained by the fact that one of the parties had what it considered national interests at stake during the

negotiations between the EU and NATO, and therefore it decided to block for a long time the entire process82.

Could it happen again?

Concerning EU-Turkey-NATO relations, the most important issue is the Berlin Plus acquis, which in fact are

related to the necessity to make compatible the contributions of the EU and NATO to European and global

security, avoiding unnecessary duplications of money, forces and capabilities83. In short, Turkey wants more

participation in the foreign and security matters of the EU, full and equal participation in decision-making

processes of EU-led operations and on the usage of NATO assets in general84. Turkey has consistently been

not only a significant muscle for NATO but also one of its most prominent supporters. By the same token, it

has made or offered undeniable contributions to the EU’s capabilities. Most important, Turkey has regarded

pro-EU, pro-US and pro-NATO policies ultimately as mutually reinforcing85. In this regard, one question that

maybe Turkey has not asked itself is what would happen in the following situation: if, for example, the PSC

suggested to send intervention troops to a crisis region before the NAC becomes concerned with this issue,

how would it react? Would it accede to the use by the EU of NATO assets? Would it block it and ask for

NATO intervention? In the event of a Berlin Plus kind of operation, Turkey should be forced to define its first

security orientation and its institutional affinity. This possible situation reminds us that developments in

80 Hannay, David, ‘Strengthening Europe’s role in World Affairs: Foreign Policy, Security and Immigration’, in European Foreign Affairs Review, Guest Editorial, Volume 7, 2002, p 367 81 Hannay, op.cit., p 368 82 Howorth (2007), op.cit., p 161 83 Tato Porto, op.cit., p 90 84 Özkaragöz, op.cit., p 2 85 Akçapar, op.cit., p 140

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Turkey, in Europe and the wider international system will determine the evolution of EU-Turkey relations,

including ESDP86.

Given this awkward situation, nowadays the EU is suffering from a notorious contradiction: it has to value

participation of Turkey in ESDP as very positive, but to consider also that this country is sometimes seen as

not ‘European enough’ to accede to the Union. It would be dangerous for European security architecture to

opt for some kind of ‘EU/ESDP or nothing’ policy. Mutual consultation, use of NATO assets and division of

labour seem much more convenient and coherent for both ESDP and the Atlantic Alliance. For its part, the

risk that Turkey has taken is that by making EU-NATO military/security cooperation awkward, it ends up

antagonizing both the US Administration and the EU, finding itself politically isolated within NATO and fatally

weakening its case for EU membership87.

Some remaining questions for the future: Does Turkey share the EU’s analysis that describes Europe’s new

security environment as a result of numerous interwoven processes within political, economic and cultural

globalization with a strong focus on poverty and bad governance? Will Turkey sign up to the EU’s conclusion

that no country is capable of solving today’s complex problems alone? How many Ankaras is the EU going to

face?.

86 Tocci, Natalie, ‘Anchoring Turkey to Europe: the foreign policy challenges ahead’, in IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, 12 May 2003, p 1 87 Missiroli (2003), op.cit., p 19

21

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