GlobalPoliticsCollectiveSecurityandPeaceKeepingOperationsShuhei Kurizaki

School of Political Science and EconomicsWaseda University

Security Policy

Security Policy

Competitive Security

Competitive Security

ArmamentArmament

AllianceAlliance

PreemptionPreemption

Cooperative Security

Cooperative Security

Security Community

Security Community

Collective Security

Collective Security

Confidence Building

Confidence Building

CollectiveSecurityasSecurityPolicy

WhatisCollectiveSecurity?•Institutiontopromotemultilateralcooperationforthemaintenanceofpeaceandstability•Cancollectivesecuritycausepeace?•Examples?• LeagueofNations• UnitedNations• OrganizationofAmericanStates• AfricanUnion• OCSE

CollectiveSecurity

CharacteristicsofCollectiveSecurity•Aggressionagainstonestatedeemedasaggressionagainstallthemembers•Allmembersareobligedtoaidthevictimstateintheeventofaggression•Presumescommoninterestinthepreventionofaggression•Goal:Deterpotentialaggressors• Carryoutpunitivesanctionsagainstaggression• PeacefulchangeoftheSQ,notpreventionofchallengeagainsttheSQ

CollectiveSecurity

ObjectivesandFunctions1.Preventthreatsagainstint’lpeaceandstability• Crediblemechanism(Self‐enforcing,subgameperfect)• Mechanismtomake“forcefulchangeoftheSQ”notincentivecompatible• Punitiveactionsagainstaggression• PeacefulchangeintheSQ2.Institutionstopromoteinternationalcooperation• Sameasalliance

CollectiveSecurity CommonInterestandPotentialAdversary•Alliance presumescommoninterestagainstpotential(common)adversary•CS presumescommoninterestsin“peaceandstability”ofthesystem⇒ NospecificpotentialadversaryGoals•Alliance istoimprovebargainingpower⇒Extractconcessionsthroughenhanceddeterrence•CS istopromotepeacefulmeansandavoidforce⇒ProvideamechanismforchangingtheSQ

Alliance:SimilaritiesandDifferences

ProcedureandProtocol(SameasinDeterrence)1.Useorthreatofforcebyaggressor2.Determineathreatto“Int’lpeaceandstability”3.Requestmemberstosanctionagainstaggressor• Economicand/ormilitarysanctions

CollectiveSecurity

InstitutionalmechanismattheUN•SecurityCouncil 15countries• Permanent5andvetopower• Righttodeterminethethreatandsanctions• SCresolutionbindsallthememberstates

CollectiveSecurityandtheUnitedNations

Designedtoovercomecollectiveactionproblems• Collectivesecurityasapublicgood• Collectivesecurityasacollectiveaction• PrivateincentivesagainstprovisionofthegoodSolution:SecurityCouncilandVetoPowerPrivilegetosmallgrouptoprovide⇒ Privilegetoasmallgroupandincentivetoprovidethepublicgood⇒ Sideeffect:SCblocksresolutions

ColdWarPoliticsandtheineffectiveness

Examples:VetoDeadlock•ChineseinvasionintoTibet (1950)： Callformilitaryinterventionwasvetoed.•DarfurMassacreinSudan: CallforeconomicsanctionsagainstSudanblockedbyChina

IneffectiveCollectiveSecuritythroughtheUN UNinvokedcollectivesecurityonlytwice (underspecialcircumstances)KoreanWar(1950)• ConflictofInterestduetotheColdWar(N.KoreaasaSovietally)• Resolution83passed• USSRboycottedtheSCduetotheTaiwanquestionPersianGulfWar(1991)• EndoftheColdWarandtheNewWorldOrder• Resolution678passed• IraqasaSovietallybutdétentewiththeWest

IneffectiveCollectiveSecuritythroughtheUN

CollectiveSecurityandtheUnitedNations

Type of Sanctions against Threats to Peace1.Peace enforcement

• Korean War (1950); Gulf War (1991)2.Peacekeeping

• Golan Heights and Cambodian MissionsChangingNatureofCollectiveSecurity•Originallydesignedforinterstateproblems•Recently,itaddressespoliticalviolenceandarmedconflictwithinastate•HumanitarianIntervention

PKOasUNactivity1.Keyinstrument:Institutionnotmilitarypower• Customarylaw• Institutionforint’lpeaceandstability• NotspecifiedintheUNCharter2.Goalistoensurecompliancewithpeaceagreement• Managetheriskincease‐fireagreement• ReplaceineffectiveUNcollectivesecurity• Requireacease‐fireagreement

UNPeaceKeepingOperations

• NodirectmentionofPKOinUNCharter• DagHammarskjold:Article6andahalf– Article6:Peacefulresolutionofconflict– Article7:Peaceenforcement• Fiveprinciples(norms)togovernPKO1. UNsanctions2. Consentofthebelligerents3. Neutralityandimpartiality4. Temporalsolution5. Non‐useofforce

FivePrinciplesforPKO CollaborationProblem• Peacewithcompliance=mutuallybeneficial• Fightingandultimatelydefeatingtheopponentimprovestheutility⇒ Incentiveforunilateraldefection⇒ Atypical“Prisoners’Dilemma”situation

OvercomingtheComplianceProblem

• Uncertainprospectforcomplyingwithcease‐fire⇒Hesitatetoentertheagreement• Cumulativemistrustagainsteachotherviafighting⇒ Overcomingthecommitmentproblemdifficult

Deployment•Placemonitoringtroopsandpeacekeepersinthebufferbetweenthebelligerents•Monitorcease‐fire,de‐mobilization•Prerequisite:cease‐fireagreementRationale:Asolutiontoacommitmentproblem.•Mutualdesireforcompliancedoesnotguaranteethecompliancewiththetruce⇒ Uncertaintyandmistrustontheopponent’swillingnessforcompliance⇒ Unilateraldefectionfromtheagreement

PKOanditsProblems PKO:asolutiontothecommitmentproblem•AcceptPKO:Signalastrongwillforcompliance•PKOgives“credibility”tothecommitmenttothecease‐fireagreementDirectimpactofPKO•ContributetothemaintenanceofpeaceIndirectimpactofPKO•Temporalcease‐firestillnurturemutualtrust•Helpstoovercomeuncertaintyandmistrust

OvercomingtheComplianceProblem

• PKOrarelyproducespeace‐agreement(treaty)• Managing“deadlock”– PKOisnotenvisionedtogenerateapeacetreaty– Vulnerabletopeacespoiler• ManycasesoffailedPKOdealingwithpoliticalviolencebynon‐stateactors

ProblemswithPKO ChangingenvironmentforPKO1.Moreintrastateconflictthaninterstateconflict2.Visibleshiftin1990sOld‐schoolPKO• Presumestheprinciplesofsovereigntyandnon‐intervention• Regionalconflictbynon‐stateactors• PKOcannotbedeployedExpansionofmissionsforPKO• AgendaforPeace”• Frompeace‐keepingtopeace‐building

IneffectivenessofOld‐SchoolPKO

PreventiveDiplomacyandPeace‐building1.ConflictmediationandRegimeChange2.Aidforrefugees:returntothehomecountryandadvocacyofhumanrights(Bosnia,Kosovo,EastTimor)• …andthecreationofa“peacezone”asanewmission3.Policeenforcement,economicrecovery,andelectionmonitoringinthepost‐conflictsocieties(Haiti,EastTimor,Nicaragua)Disarmament,Demobilization,Reintegration

ModernizingPKO