compilation of digests - i judiciary one column

7/28/2019 Compilation of Digests - I Judiciary One Column

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I1 LOPEZ V ROXAS (1966)

FACTS

Lopez and Roxas were the candidates for VP in the 1965 elections. Lopez won the election. Roxas appealed his

lost before the PET. The Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) was created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law that

There shall be one independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal, which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to

the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the Vice-president elect of the Philippines. In effect, a

losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez assailed the law and he sought to enjoin Roxas and thePET from proceeding with the case. Lopez averred that the PET is unconstitutional for it was not provided for in the

constitution. Also, since the PET is composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten members of the SC any decision of

the PET cannot be validly appealed before the SC or that there may be conflict that may arise once a PET decision is

appealed before the SC.

ISSUE

Whether or not the PET is a valid body.

HELD

The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793 merely added the courts jurisdiction

and such could be validly legislated by Congress. It merely conferred upon the SC additional functions i.e., the functions

of the PET. This is valid because the determining of election contests is essentially judicial.

DOCTRINE

Pursuant to the Constitution, the Judicial Power shall be vested in one SC and in such inferior courts as may be

established by law

This provision vests in the judicial branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but

the judicial power under our political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or all of said power, except, only, so

much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to judge all contests relating to the election,

returns and qualifications of members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives, which is vested by the

fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively.Judicial power is the authority to settle justifiable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and

demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. The proper exercise of said

authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such enforceable and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for

violations thereof; and (2) determining the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the

first instance and/or on appeal. For this reason, the Constitution ordains that Congress shall have the power to define,

prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental law.


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I2. Lansang v. Garcia (1971)

FACTS

In August 21, 1971 the Miting de Avance of the Liberal Party at Plaza Miranda was bombed by two hand

grenades leading to the death of several LP candidates and the wounding of countless other civilians. The bombing of the

LP campaign rally was preceded by numerous other bombings and other acts of violence allegedly perpetrated by

members of the New Peoples army and its allied organization. Two days later, then President Marcos issued

Proclamation No. 889, dated August 21, 1971, reading as follows:

WHEREAS, on the basis of carefully evaluated information, it is definitely established that lawless elements in the

country, which are moved by common or similar ideological conviction, design and goal and enjoying the active moral

and material support of a foreign power and being guided and directed by a well trained, determined and ruthless group of

men and taking advantage of our constitutional liberties to promote and attain their ends, have entered into a conspiracy

and have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of actually staging, undertaking and

waging an armed insurrection and rebellion in order to forcibly seize political power in this country, overthrow the duly

constituted government, and supplant our existing political social, economic and legal order with an entirely new one

whose form of government, whose system of laws, whose conception of God and religion, whose notion of individual

rights and family relations, and whose political, social and economic precepts are based on the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist

teachings and beliefs;

WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting in concert through front organizations that are seemingly innocent and

harmless, have continuously and systematically strengthened and broadened their memberships through sustained andcareful recruiting and enlistment of new adherents from among our peasantry, laborers, professionals, intellectuals,

students, and mass media personnel, and through such sustained and careful recruitment and enlistment have succeeded in

infiltrating almost every segment of our society in their ceaseless determination to erode and weaken the political, social,

economic and moral foundations of our existing government and to influence many peasant, labor, professional,

intellectual, student and mass media organizations to commit acts of violence and depredations against our duly

constituted authorities, against the members of our law enforcement agencies, and worst of all, against the peaceful

members of our society;

WHEREAS, these lawless elements have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the

security of the State, the latest manifestation of which has been the dastardly attack on the Liberal Party rally in Manila on

August 21, 1971, which has resulted in the death and serious injury of scores of persons; WHEREAS, public safety

requires that immediate and effective action be taken in order to maintain peace and order, secure the safety of the people

and preserve the authority of the State; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines,

by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby suspend

the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for the persons presently detained, as well as others who may be hereafter

similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them in

furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith.

ISSUE

Whether or not the suspension of writ of habeas corpus is constitutional.

HELD

Petition dismissed. Proclamation No. 889 is constitutional.

DOCTRINE

The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this case where the SC

declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be established. Accordingly, hearings were

conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information

was divulged by the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after

satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the

government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold the suspension of the privilege of the

Writ of Habeas Corpus.


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I3 Tuason vs. Register of Deeds, Caloocan City

Facts:

Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired teachers who bought a land from their retirement benefits and

savings on August 26, 1965. The bought the land from Carmels Farm situated in Caloocan city. After 8 years, they found

out that they were no longer the owner of the land. On September 14, 1973, almost a year after Martial law, President

Ferdinand Marcos invoked his emergency powers and issued Proclamation No. 293 which invalidated the Tuasons

vendor, Carmel which had previously bought the land from the government and sold it to the public (one of which is the

land of the Tuasons.)

Said P.D. No. 293 made the Finding that Carmel farms Inc., failed to complete the payment of the price and thus

the title to the said land remains to the Government. Upon this judgment Mr. Marcos invalidated the titles of the Carmel

Farms and declared the members of the Malacanang homeowners association the present bona fide occupants of the lots.

On the strength of the PD register of deeds of Caloocan city caused the inscription the title of the Tuasons and

was declared as invalid and void ab initio and considered cancelled as against the government and the property described

herein is open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang homeowners association. Thus the Tuason filed

a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos Decree which deprived them their property in favour of a selected group and

they prayed that the register of deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory inscription of their title and that they be

compensated for the loss from the assurance fund.

Issue:

Whether or not the President has the power to cancel the certificate of titles by virtue of Presidential Decree No.

293.

Held:

The Decree obviously reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised a judicial function. He made a determination of facts and

applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. He adjudged it to be an

established fact that neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full payment of all

installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the

dwellings of the members of the Association stand.Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial power, such power

as everyone knows, is being vested in the Supreme court and such inferior courts as may be established by law. The

judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without the jurisdiction. The acts werecompletely alien to his office as Chief Executive and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he

had assumed as head of the Martial Law regime.


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I5 Sinaca v. Mula (1999)

FACTS:

This special case is instituted against the decision of the COMELEC in declaring as invalid the substitution ofCandidate for Mayor, Sinaca.

In the 1998 election for Mayor in Surigao Del Norte, the Party LAKAS had 2 wings, each having a candidate

for mayor. The Barbers Wing nominated Candoy and the Matugas Wing nominated Teodoro Sinaca.

Mula, a candidate of Vice-Mayor of Barbers Wing filed a disqualification case against Teodoro Sinaca

COMELEC disqualified Teodoro Sinaca because of his prior judgement of Bigamy.

Emmanuel Sinaca, petitioner herein, became the nominee of the Matugas Wing; Mula again, filed a

disqualification case against Emmanuel Sinaca in COMELEC. However, in this case, COMELEC dismissed the petition

since Emmanuel Sinaca was already proclaimed as the Mayor and THEREFORE THE CASE BECAME MOOT.

Mula filed for a motion for reconsideration stating that the signature in the nomination was insufficient since it is

only the signature of Matugas is present and there is a must to include the signature of Barbers since both of them weregiven the nomination power by LAKAS.

COMELEC disqualified Emmanuel Sinaca. The disqualification was not because of the lack of signature but He

was an independent candidate for councillor at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor as a substitute.Thus, he did not belong to the same political party as the substituted candidate member of LAKAS.

Emmanuel Sinaca filed a motion for reconsideration in the SC claiming there has been grave abuse of discretionon the part of COMELEC. He claims that his nomination as a substitute candidate is valid.

The law that governs substitute candidate is Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code and it provides that in caseswhere the original candidate dies, withdraws or has been disqualified after the last day of filing the certificate ofcandidacy, the political party can nominate a substitute candidate to replace the original. This means that the substitute

must come from the same political party and as being claimed by Mula, being an independent candidate, he clearly does

not belong to the same party.

New evidence was presented in the motion for reconsideration proving that he was a bona fide member of

LAKAS not only in the certificate of membership also by his certificate of candidacy stating that he belongs to LAKAS.

ISSUES:

WON Emmanuel Sinaca has the position to continue to be the Mayor for which he was proclaimed.

HELD:

YES. Decision of COMELEC is set aside and Emmanuel Sinaca can now validly take the seat as the Mayor of

Malimono, Surigao Del Norte.

DOCRTINE:

The fact that EMMANUEL was an independent candidate prior to his nomination is immaterial. What is more

significant is that he had previously withdrawn his certificate of candidacy as independent candidate for Sangguniangmember before he filed his certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate. By that time, he has already been recognizedto be a member of the Matugas Wing of LAKAS Party.

Even the fact that EMMANUEL only became a member of the LAKAS party after the disqualification ofTEODORO, will not affect the validity of the substitution. There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute which


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requires that a substitute candidate must have been a member of the party concerned for a certain period of time before he

can be nominated as such.

Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code only mandates that a substitute candidate should be a person belonging

to and certified by the same political party as the candidate to be replaced. It became evident that when Emmanuel Sinaca

filed for a certificate of candidacy, he is recognized to be a member of LAKAS and he himself recognized his membershipwhen he accepted the substitute nomination.

As for the insufficient signature, Matugas was given the authority to nominate a person to run for Mayor as a LAKAS

Representative. Both Matugas and Barbers were given power but this power is separate and distinct. In other words, the

signature alone of Matugas will suffice in the nomination.

THE IMPORTANT PARTDiscussed in the Book

A political party has the right to identify the people who constitute the association and to select a standard bearer who best

represents the party. Thus, the rule is that the determination of disputes as to party nominations rests with the party, in theabsence of statutes giving the courts jurisdiction.

When there is no controlling statute or clear legal right involved, the court will not assume jurisdiction to

determine controversies within a political party, but will leave the matter to be determine by the party itself or by theelectors at the polls. Similarly, in the absence of specific constitutional or legislative regulations defining how

nominations are to be made, or prohibiting nominations from being made in certain ways, political parties may handle

party affairs, including nominations, in such manner as party rules may establish.

This means that when there is no statute, rules, regulations of any provision, or no legal right involve. The Court cannot

assume jurisdiction. One of the requisites of Judicial Inquiry is that there must be an Actual Case or Controversy,

since there is none then the Power of Judicial Inquiry cannot be exercised.


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I6 The Director of Prisons vs Ang Cho Kio (1970)

FACTS

Ang Cho Kio had been convicted of various crimes committed in the Philippines and sentenced to 45 years, 10

months and 21 days of imprisonment, plus life imprisonment and indemnities. However, while serving his sentence, he

was granted pardon by the President of the Philippines on the condition that he voluntarily leave the country upon his

release and never return. Respondent left the Philippines for Taipei in 1959.

In 1966, Ang Cho Kio, now under the name Ang Ming Huy, arrived at Manil a International Airport from Taipeenroute Honolulu. The stopover in Manila was about 72 hours (3 days). While staying at a hotel, he contacted his 2

friends who convinced him to stay longer. They went to the Bureau of Immigrations to request for a 14-day extension of

stay when authorities discovered his identity. The Executive Secretary Rafael M. Salas, by authority of the President, then

ordered him recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired prison term.

Ang Cho Kio filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus but which was denied by both the trial court and the CA

on the ground that the president exercised his prerogatives under Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code. It is

settled in jurisprudence that the President himself can determine if the conditions of a pardon were violated, a right to

which the Courts may not interfere with, however erroneous the findings may be.

However, the CA decision contained a recommendation that Ang Cho Kio be allowed to leave this country by the

first available transportation abroad. The Solicitor General thus came to the SC to ask that the recommendation be deleted

saying that it was beyond the issue raised by the petition of Ang Cho Kio and that it is not inherent or incidental to the

exercise of judicial functions. It is political in character, courts should not interfere.

ISSUES

WON the decision of the CA should be modified.

HELD

The petition for certiorari is denied and the decision of the CA stands.

DOCTRINE

Recommendatory powers of judges are limited to those expressly provided by law such that in the RPC sec5 onthe commutation of sentence; penalizing acts, etc

It is improper for the CA to make a recommendation suggesting a modification of an act, which they said wasaptly a prerogative of the Pres. It would thus amount to political interference.

It is better practice for courts to keep their opinions to those relevant to the questions presented before them. J. Fernando (concurring) said that it is not for any occupant of any court to play the role of adviser to the

President. To do so will not only be an infringement on the separation of powers concept but it would also

grossly endanger the duty of the courts to assure compliance with the constitutional mandates. The court should

ignore the limits of its own authority.

However, no majority vote was acquired to overturn the CA recommendation, hence it stands.


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I7 Dela Llana vs. Alba

FACTS:

The petitioners in the case filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking to

enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit and the Minister of Justice from

taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts (from CA to

MTCs except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA), unless appointed to the inferior courts

established by such act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. The petitioners likewise allege that

the termination of their incumbency justify the standing of this suit since the security of tenure provided by theConstitution has been ignored and disregarded by the enactment of such law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is unconstitutional for impairing the security of tenure of the

justices and judges?

HELD:

The petition is dismissed. BP Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.

DOCTRINE:

The Batas Pambansa has been granted the authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process of

abolishing existing ones. It is held that valid abortion of offices is neither removal nor separation of the

incumbents. The rule is, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office

The rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle

that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. Removal is also to be distinguished from

termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the

abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby

lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of

security of tenure does not arise.


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I8. Echagaray vs. Secretary of Justice

FACTS:The petitioner, Leo Echagaray, was found guilty of the crime of rape, and was subjected to death penalty

as punishment. However, on January 4, 1999, the SC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on theexecution of petitioner. The Secretary of Justice assailed the TRO as he claimed that the SC violated rules

regarding finality of judgments. Said rule allegedly deprived the SC of further jurisdiction over the case as afinal verdict had already been given. Therefore, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which sought the

lifting of the TRO.

ISSUE:Whether or not the SC still had jurisdiction over the case even if the decision agreed upon had already

become final and executory.

HELD:The finality of judgment did not make the SC lose its powers over the case. However, the SC granted

the motion for reconsideration and lifted the TRO.

From the time a final judgment had been rendered, the SC would only lose its power to amend, modify

or alter the same. The court would still have control over their decisions execution and enforcement. There isa difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modifyor alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of

enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. xxx For after the judgmenthas become final, facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible.

(Retired Justice Camilo Quiason, 19xx)

As early as 1915, in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance, the SC had ruled thatnotwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time,

the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this postponement canbe ordered in three ways: 1) by command of the King, 2) by discretion of the court, and 3) by mandate of the

law.

It would be an essential aspect of jurisdiction to have power to control the execution of its decisions. Thiswould be a safeguard against unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts could face to prevent

unfairness.

What the SC only did was a temporary restraint of Echagarays sentence to uphold as there were ongoing eventsin congress which questioned the death penalty law.

Giving the SC the jurisdiction over cases which had already been decided would also be in accordance with the

desire for the judiciarys independence which could be proven by the provisions in the 1935, 1973 and 1987

constitutions. The 1987 Consti specifically stated:

Section 5(5), Article VIII : The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice

and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to theunderprivileged. ...

**Also, the delaying of the death penalty was just an exercise of judicial powers, not an usurpation of thepresidential power of reprieve. **


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I9 RADIOWEALTH, INC v. AGREGADO (1950)

FACTS:

Petitioner installed Webster Teletalk, and Webster Telephone speakers on the second and third floor of

Malacanang, Annex which houses the SC.

Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee appointed by the President, disapproved the purchase and

installation as "contrary to the provisions of paragraph four (4) of Executive Order No. 302, series of 1940, and the policy

adopted by the Cabinet last year, discontinuing open market purchases," and "also a violation of the requirements of

Executive Order No. 298, series of 1940."

Petitioner then took the matter with Auditor General to request payment thereof. The latter agreed with PRC and

contended that court's independence is limited to the exercise of Judicial functions and that purchase of property does not

belongs to this category.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Judicial Department may make purchases without the need to secure an approval of theExecutive Department.

2. Whether or not the Auditor-General acted in excess of his jurisdiction.HELD:

Petition is granted

DOCTRINE:

1. Contrary to the respondents' theory, the prerogatives of this court which the Constitution secures againstinterference include not only the powers to adjudicate causes but all things that are reasonably necessary for the

administration of justice. So, we believe, it is within its power free from encroachment by the Executive to

acquire books and other office equipment reasonably needed to the convenient transaction of its business. These

implied, inherent, or incidental powers are as essential to the existence of the court as the powers specifically

granted. Without the power to provide itself with appropriate instruments for the performance of its duties, the

express powers with which the Constitution endows it would become useless. The court could not maintain its

independence and dignity as the constitution intends if the executive personally or through subordinate officials

could determine for the court what it should or use in the discharge of its functions, and when and how it shouldobtain them.

It is our considered opinion that this court is supreme and independent of the executive in this sphere. In

the requisition for fixtures, equipment and supplies, both the executive and judicial departments are on the same

footing. They derive their authority from the same source and represent the sovereignty in equal degree. It stands

to reason that the Chief Executive has no more authority to encroach on the Supreme Court in the choice of the

instruments needed to carry on its functions than the court has to dictate to the executive what, when and how to

get his.

2. Auditor General's authority to audit disapprove this court's expenditures has to limited to the conditionsprescribed by the Constitution, or statute, if there be one, which did not invade the court's independenceExecutive and administrative orders and regulations promulgated by officers who have no jurisdiction under the

law or the Constitution over the court, can give no justification or validity to the Auditor General's decision. In theabsence of express and valid legislation, (and by valid legislation we mean one which does not unreasonably

infringe upon the legitimate prerogatives of the Supreme Court), the Auditor General may not question the court'sexpenditures except when they are, in the words of the organic law, "irregular, unnecessary, excessive and

extravagant." Outside of these exceptions his duty to approve the payments is mandatory; and even when theobjection is that the expenditures are irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant, his decisions are not final.


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I11 PACU vs. Secretary of Education

G.R. No. L-5279

FACTS:PACUs petition is to declare Act No. 2706 ("An Act making the inspection and recognition of private schools

and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction" ) as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth ActNo. 180 to be unconstitutional because of its following effects: they deprive owners of schools and colleges as well asteachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of law; they deprive parents of their natural rights and

duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimitedpower and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power.

The respondents, however, asserts that the petitioners is not suffering from any wrong enforcement of the

criticized statute.Act No. 3162 was then enacted which creates the Board of Educational Survey tasked to make a study & survey

of the education in the Philippines. Of course, in order to post Recognized by the Government, it must first be inspected

by the proper government official. Since majority of them are money-making devices, this body recommends that in order

to prohibit the opening of any school by an individual or organization, a legislation must be enacted.Petitioners also argue that nowhere in Act No. 2706 can one find any description, either general or specific, of

what constitutes a 'general standard of efficiency.'; the basis or condition to ascertain what is 'adequate instruction to the

public.'; that there is any statement of conditions, acts, or factors, which the Secretary of Education must take into accountto determine the 'efficiency of instruction. It is true that the Secretary has issued rules and regulations that are "whimsical

and capricious" and that such discretionary power has produced arrogant inspectors who "bully heads and teachers ofprivate schools." Nevertheless, their remedy is to challenge those regulations. At this point, the petitioners again failed to

prove even though presenting a list of circulars & memoranda, that such official documents were constitutionallyobjectionable.

The most important grievance of petitioners is the assessment of 1% levied on gross receipts of all private schoolsfor additional government expenses in connection with their supervision & regulation. Petitioners claim it to beunconstitutional because it is a tax on the exercise of a constitutional rightthe right to open a school, the liberty to teach

etc.

The last issue raised is whether the law may be enacted in the exercise of the States constitutional power tosupervise and regulate private schools (with regards to the validity of RA No. 139 which provides: The textbooks to beused in the private schools recognized or authorized by the government shall be submitted to the Board of Textbooks

which shall have the power to prohibit the use of any of said textbooks which it may find to be against the law or to offend

the dignity and honor of the government and people of the Philippines, or which it may find to be against the generalpolicies of the government, or which it may deem pedagogically unsuitable.)

ISSUE:WON Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 may be declared

unconstitutional.

HELD:Petition for prohibition was DENIED.

DOCTRINE:The Court declined to pass judgment on the question of the validity of Act No. 2706, which provided that before a

private school may be opened to the public, it must first obtain a permit from the secretary of education, because all the

petitioning schools had permits to operate and were actually operating, and none of them claimed that the secretary hadthreatened to revoke their permit. If the petitioner has not been injured and their operation not affected, there is no reasonto assail neither the validity of the power nor the exercise of power of Secretary of Education. The court will not pass

upon the constitutionality of a law on a complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured. Courts do not sit to

adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging.

The judicial power is limited to the decision of actual controversies or issues-- the mere apprehension of thepetitioner that the Secretary of State mightunder the law withdraw the permit will not constitute a justiciable controversy.

The Solicitor General added that insofar as petitioners' action attempts to restrain the further collection of theassessment, courts have no jurisdiction to restrain the collection of taxes by injunction. The action involving "the legality

of any tax impost or assessment" falls within the original jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance.


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With regards to the last issue, no justiciable controversy has been presented to the court again. There was no

information that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or that text, or that the petitioners refused or intend to refuseto submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights for so refusing.

The Constitution "provides for state control of all educational institutions" even as it enumerates certain

fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience

and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of citizenship.


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12 EXECUTIVE SECRETARY V. CA

429 SCRA 81 (2004)

FACTS:

The Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. (ARCOPhil) filed on July 17, 1995 a petition for declaratory

relief under Rule 63 0f the Rules of Court with the RTC of Quezon City to declare as unconstitutional portions of RA8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 with a plea for the issuance of a

temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the government from enforcing the said

portions of the law. The questioned portions of the said RA deal with illegal recruitment, penalties for illegal recruitment

and on the venue of criminal action for illegal recruitment

The respondents contends that, (1) the law discriminated against unskilled workers and their families as the law encouragethe deployment skilled Filipino workers, (2) the grant of incentives to service contractors and manning agencies to the

exclusion of

all otherlicensed andauthorized recruiters is an invalid qualification, (3) the penalty imposed by law, beingdisproportionate to the prohibited acts, discourage the business of licensed and registeredrecruitment agency, (4) the law violates the

prohibition against ex-post facto law and bill of attainder because it presumes that a licensed and registered recruitment

agency is guilty of illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage, upon a finding that it committed any of the prohibited

acts under the law, (5) the 90-day period which the labor arbiter should decide a money claim is relatively short, and coulddeprived a licensed and registered recruiters of their right to due process, (6) the law impair the power of the Supreme

Court to promulgate rules of procedure, (7) the law abridge freedom to contract, (8) the singling out of entertainers and

performing artist under the assailed department orders (implementing rules and regulations of RA 8042) constitutes classlegislation and violates the equal protection clause.

The respondent justified its plea for injunctive relief on the allegation in its amended petition that its members are exposed

to the immediate and irreparable danger of being deprived of their right to a livelihood and other constitutional rightswithout due process, on its claim that a great number of duly licensed recruitment agencies have stopped and suspendedfor fear that (a) their officers and employees would be prosecuted under the unjust and unconstitutional penal

provisions of RA 8042 and meted equally unjust and excessive penalties, including life imprisonment, for illegarecruitment without regard to whether the recruitment agencies involve dare licensed and/or authorized and (b) if the

members of the respondent, which are licensed and authorized, decide to continue with their business, they face the stigma

and the coursed of being labeled illegal recruiters. Petitioners contend that the petitioners has no locus standi, it failed toadduce in evidence a certified copy of its Articles of Incorporation and the resolution of said members authorizing it tore

present the said agencies in the proceedings. The petitioners assert that the law is presumed constitutional and, as such, therespondent was burdened to make a case strong enough to overcome such presumption and establish a clear right to

injunctive relief.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the trial courts order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by it

enjoining the petitioners from implementing the provisions of RA 8042.

HELD:No. The SC also held that the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction is mooted by case law.

DOCTRINE:The SC cited various cases it had earlier decided on apply RA8042. By these rulings, the SC, in effect, affirmed the

validity of the assailed provisions. Hence the enforcement of the provisions cannot be enjoined unless the SC, by

final judgment declares the provisions to be unconstitutional. In People vs. Chowdury, it was held that illegal recruitmentis a crime of economic sabotage and must been forced. The court in this case upheld the validity of Sec. 6 of RA 8042

which provides that employees of recruitment agencies may be criminally liable for illegal recruitment. An employee of a

company or corporation engage in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal together with his employer, if it isshown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. The employee or agent of a corporation engage

in unlawful business naturally aids and abets in the carrying on of such business and will be prosecuted as a principal if,with knowledge of the business, its purpose and effect, he consciously contributes his efforts to its conduct and promotion

however slight his contribution may be. In People vs. Diaz, the SC held that RA 8042 is but an amendment of the LaborCode of the Philippines and is not an ex-post facto law because it is not applied retroactively. In JMM Promotion and

Management, Inc. vs. CA, the issue of the extent of the police power of the state to regulate

a business, profession or calling vis-a-vis the equal protection clause and the non-impairment clause were raised and it


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was held that, a profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One

cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these are property rights, the arbitrary andunwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong. Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the

proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as legitimate subject of a valid

exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate

governmental functions, the preservation of the state, the public health and welfare and public morals. In PhilippineAssociation of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Drillon, the court held that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must

yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government. Equally important, into every contract is read provisions of

existing law and always a reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement deals with a subject impressed with

public welfare. The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege. Iis not to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to the object to which it is directed and by the territory in which

it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely all persons be treated alike under like conditions both asto privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. By its rulings, the court thereby affirmed the validity of the assailed pena

and procedural provisions of RA 8042, including the imposable penalties therefore. Until the court, by final judgment

declares that the said provisions are unconstitutional, the enforcement of said provisions cannot be enjoined.


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I14 KILOSBAYAN INC V MORATO (1995)

FACTS: This is a petition seeking to declare the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) invalid on the ground that it is

substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in G. R. No.113373, 232 SCRA 110. Petitioners contended that

the amended ELA is inconsistent with and violative of Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Offices (PCSO) charter and the

decision of the Supreme Court of 5 May 1995, that it violated the law on public bidding of contracts as well as Section

2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution in relation to the COA Circular No. 85-55-A. Respondents questioned the

petitioners standing to bring this suit

ISSUES: Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file the instant petition.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because some cases

are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of the law or by official action taken, but by

concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Petitioners do not in fact show what

particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. And they do not have present substantial interest in the ELA as

would entitle them to bring this suit.

STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure from

the settled rulings on real parties ininterest because no constitutional issues were actually involved.

LAW OF THE CASE (opinion delivered on a former appeal) cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the

same one litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as

the law of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not

RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed

upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties

involving a different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated

claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form

separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an

independent examination of the legal matters at issue.

Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitionersstanding.

STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more

appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

DOCTRINE: Standing: maybe brought by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who sue in public interest-

Whether such parties have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy xxx

Valmonte v. PCSO: 1) direct and personal interest;

2) has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustained some direct injury and 3) has bee or is about to be denied some

right or privilege. In the case at bar, there is no showing of particularized

interest or an allegation of public funds being misspent to make the action of public interest.

Real party in interest: Whether he is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or the party

entitled to the avails of the suit. - Petitioners invoke Sec. 5, 7 and 12 of the Constitution. But they do not embody

judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation. They cannot give rise to a cause of action in the

courts.

QUESTION of CONTRACT LAW: The real parties are those who are parties to the agreement or are bound

either principally or subsidiarily or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to one of the contracting parties and can

show the detriment which would positively result to them from the contract.

Petitioners do not have such present substantial interest. Questions to the nature or validity of public contracts

maybe made before COA or before the Ombudsman


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Petitioners have no standing. ELA is a valid lease contract. Petition for prohibition, review and/or injunction is

dismissed.


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I15 Tolentino v Sec of Finance(1994)

FACTS

The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale

or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration

by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on

various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by ArtVI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S

No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.

ISSUE

Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution

HELD

The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI,

Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required bythe Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the

bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the

House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments

Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an

increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the

theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the

local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of

its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House

bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by

the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President hadcertified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also

that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings

on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.


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I16 LOZADA V. COMELEC (1983)

FACTSA petition for mandamus was filed by Jose Mari Eulalio C. Lozada and Romeo B. Igot as a representative suit for

and in behalf of those who wish to participate in the election irrespective of party affiliation, to compel the respondent

COMELEC to call a special election to fill up existing vacancies numbering twelve (12) in the Interim Batasan Pambansa.

The petition is based on Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution which reads:In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a regular election, the

Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs toelect the Member to serve the unexpired term. As reason for their petition, petitioners allege that they are "... deeply concerned about their duties as citizens and

desirous to uphold the constitutional mandate and rule of law ...; that they have filed the instant petition on their own and

in behalf of all other Filipinos since the subject matters are of profound and general interest. "

ISSUEWhether or not the petitioners may file the instant petitionWhether or not the court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition

HELDNo. As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the instant petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged that tax money is

being illegally spent. The act complained of is the inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election and involves noexpenditure of public funds. It is only when an act complained of, which may include a legislative enactment or statute,involves the illegal expenditure of public money that the so-called taxpayer suit may be allowed.

As voters, neither have petitioners the requisite interest or personality to qualify them to maintain and prosecutethe present petition. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a persona

and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Inthe case at bar, the alleged inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election to fill-up the existing vacancies in the

Batasan Pambansa, standing alone, would adversely affect only the generalized interest of all citizens. Petitioners

standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind alleged here, which is held in common by all membersof the public because of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury supposedly shared by all citizens. Concrete injury,whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form

traditionally capable of judicial resolution. When the asserted harm is a "generalized grievance" shared in substantially

equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter's decision, orders

or rulings. This is as clearly provided in Article XI IC Section 11 of the New Constitution: Any decision, order, or rulingof the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from hisreceipt of a copy thereof.

It is obvious that the holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies exist, would entail

huge expenditure of money. Only the Batasan Pambansa can make the necessary appropriation for the purpose, and thispower of the Batasan Pambansa may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel the

Batasan to exercise its power of appropriation.Perhaps the strongest reason why the aforecited provision of the Constitution is not intended to apply to the

Interim National Assembly as originally envisioned by the 1973 Constitution is the fact that as passed by theConstitutional Convention, the Interim National Assembly was to be composed by the delegates to the Constitutional

Convention, as well as the then incumbent President and Vice-President, and the members of the Senate and House of

Representatives of Congress under the 1935 Constitution


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I17 LOZANO VS. NOGRALES

G.R. No. 187883

JUNE 16, 2009

FACTS:Petitioners, in their capacity as concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution

No. 1109 entitled A Resolution Calling upon the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of ConsideringProposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress. In essence

herein petition seeks to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by this Court ofSection 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. Unfortunately, this

Court cannot indulge petitioners supplications. While some may interpret petitioners moves as vigilance in preserving

the rule of law, a careful perusal of their petitions would reveal that they cannot hurdle the bar of justiciability set by thisCourt before it will assume jurisdiction over cases involving constitutional disputes.

ISSUE:WoN the courts have the jurisdiction to try and hear the instant petition.

HELD:It is well settled that it is the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is. The determination of the nature, scope

and extent of the powers of government is the exclusive province of the judiciary, such that any mediation on the part of

the latter for the allocation of constitutional boundaries would amount, not to its supremacy, but to its mere fulfillment ofits solemn and sacred obligation under the Constitution. This Courts power of review may be awesome, but itis limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties having adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full

opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lismota presented. The case-or-controversy requirement bans this court from deciding abstract, hypothetical orcontingent questions, lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action.

In the present case, the fitness of petitioners case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly lacking. Inthe first place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act complained of. In thesecond place, House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives shall convene at a future time

for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and norules of procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly, no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation

of power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves aquintessential example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may

not occur at all. The House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this

Court.

This Court, so long as the fundamentals of republicanism continue to guide it, shall not shirk its bounden duty towield its judicial power to settle "actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and

to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction on thepart of any branch or instrumentality of the government." Be that as it may, no amount of exigency can make this Courtexercise a power where it is not proper

Petition Dismissed.


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I18

Moldex Realty, Inc. vs Housing and Land Use Reagulatory Board (HLURB)

FACTS:

Moldex is the owner-developer of Metrogate Complex Phase I, a subdivision in Meycauayan, Bulacan. In 1988, HLURB

issued a License to Sell lots within the subdivision and in 1993, sufficient homeowners formally organized to become

Metrogate Complex Village Homeowners' Association (association).Since completion of the subdivision, Moldex has assumed the payment and maintenance of facilities, including

electric bills. However, in 2000, Moldex ceased to pay the electric bills and gave this obligation to the homeowners. The

association refused. Thus, Meralco discontinued its service, prompting the association to a apply for a preliminary

injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction with HLURB.

On 5 April 2001, Editha Barrameda (Regional Officer of HLURB's Office of Appeals) granted the association's

applicatiion for injunction, citing PD 957 and HUDCC Res. No. R-562, s.1994 which states that subdivision

owners/developers shall continue to maintain street light facilities, unless otherwise stipulated in the contract, pay the bills

for electric consumption of the street lights until facilities in the project are turned over to the local government until after

completion of development in accordance with PD 957, PD 1216 and implementing rules and regulations.

Moldex moved for reconsideration but was denied. Barrameda ordered Moldex to assume the obligation of paying the

cost of electricity of streetlight from December 2000 until the turn over to the Municipality of Meycauayan.

Moldex elevated the matter to the CA, praying for the reversal of the decision as well as the nullification of HUDCC Res.

No. R-562, s.1994 on the ground that it is unconstitutional.

During the pendency of the petition in the CA, HUDCC approved Board Res. No. R-699 (Amending the Rules and

Regulations Implementing the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's Protective Decree and Other Related Laws).

CA dismissed Moldex's peition on the ground that Moldex should have raised the issue of unconstitutionality directly to

the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions assailing the constitutionality of a law

or an administrative jurisdiction.

HELD:

Petition dismissed.

InDrilon v Lim, it was clearly stated that the lower courts have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a law at

the first instance, this authority is being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the

valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Art.X Sec.5(2) of the Constitution

vests in the SC appellate jurisdiction over the final judgments and validity of any treaty, international or executive

agreement, law, PD, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance or regulation is in question.

It is also a well-established rule of the court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be

unconstitutional. The Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota of the case

During the pendency of the petition in the CA, Board Res. No. R-699 amended certain design standards for subdivisions.

Among of which is the proportionate obligation of subdivision homeowners in the payment of the electricity cost of

streetlights. At the time of filing of the petition, the new provision was already in effect thus, making this instant petition

moot and academic.


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19 FABIAN VS DESIERTO

FACTS:Petitioner was the president and major stockholder of a construction company, petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was

the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) that participated in

the bidding for government construction projects including those under the administration of private respondent, Nestor

V. Agustin, who is a District engineer. They had an affair that lasted for some time, in the course of which privaterespondent gifted petitioners company with public works contracts. Petitioner wanted to end their amorous relationship

but private respondent refused. The latter employed acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. Petitioner eventuallyfiled with the Ombudsman an administrative case against private respondent. Ombudsman found private respondent guiltyof misconduct and meted out the penalty of suspension without pay for 1 year. After private respondent moved for

reconsideration, the Ombudsman discovered that the private respondents new counsel had been his classmate and close

associate, hence, he inhibited himself. The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman who exoneratedprivate respondent from the administrative charges. Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rulesof Court.

In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinentlyprovides that: In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman

may be appealed to the SC by filing a petition for certiorari within 10 days from the receipt of the written notice of theorder, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

However, she points out that Section 7, Rule III of the Administrative Order (AO) No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of

the Office of the Ombudsman), when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an administrative proceeding the decision

of the Ombudsman is final and unappealable. She accordingly submits that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authorityunder the law to restrict, in the manner provided in its aforesaid Rules, the right of appeal allowed by RA 6770, nor tolimit the power of review of SC. Because of the aforecited provision in those Rules of Procedure, she claims that she

found it necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, because of the doubt it creates onthe availability of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the

Office of the Ombudsman to the SC in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is valid.

HELD:Although the parties of this case did not challenge the constitutionality of Section 27 of RA 6770, together with

Section 7, Rule II of AO No. 7, the SC declared aforementioned law and AO invalid as Section 27 of RA 6770 cannotvalidly authorize and appeal to the SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases

it consequently violates the proscription in Section 30 Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the

appellate jurisdiction of the SC. The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to Court of Appeals for finaldisposition in accordance with Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.

The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the SC via a petition for

review on certiorari under Rule 45. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review on

certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Sec. 1 thereof. Appeals from judgmentsand final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review,under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a uniformrule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies

DOCTRINE:While the courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the pleadings, the

rule has been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its ownjurisdiction or compel it to enter a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a courts jurisdiction in


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a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction, in the proceeding, and since it may determine

whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute.


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I21 TAN V. BARRIOS

FACTS:Then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, thru General Order No. 8 dated September 27, 1972, authorized the AFP

Chief of Staff to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be

referred to them."

On May 22, 1987, this Court promulgated a decision in Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34, et al(150 SCRA 144), vacating the sentence rendered on December 4, 1984 by Military Commission No. 34 against

Olaguer, et al. and declaring that military commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction, even during theperiod of martial law, over civilians charged with criminal offenses properly cognizable by civil courts, as long

as those courts are open and functioning as they did during the period of martial law. This Court declaredunconstitutional the creation of the military commissions to try civilians, and annulled all their proceedings.

The petitioners asked the Court to declare unconstitutional General Order No. 8 creating the military tribunals,annul the proceedings against them before these bodies, and grant them a retrial in the civil courts where their right to due

process may be accorded respectively.On November 7, 1988, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed this petition for certiorari and

prohibition praying that the informations in Crim. Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825, and the order of respondent Judge dated

October 26, 1988 be annulled, and that the public respondents or any other prosecution officer "be permanently enjoined

from indicting, prosecuting and trying them anew for the offenses charged therein because they had already beenacquitted of the same by Military Commission No. 1 in Crim. Case No. MC-1-67" (p. 23, Rollo).

The petitioners allege that State Prosecutor Barrios exceeded his jurisdiction and gravely abused his discretion inreprosecuting them.

ISSUES:

WON State Prosecutor Barrios has exceeded his jurisdiction and gravely abused his discretion in reprosecutingthem.

HELD:

The petition forcertiorari and prohibition is granted.

DOCRTINE:The public respondents gravely abused their discretion and acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction in

misconstruing the third paragraph of the dispositive portion of this Court's decision in Cruz vs. Enrile as their authority torefile in the civil court the criminal actions against petitioners who had been tried and acquitted by Military Commission

No. 1 during the period of martial law. It is an unreasonable application ofCruz vs. Enrile, for the decision therein will besearched in vain for such authority to reprosecute every civilian who had ever faced a court martial, much less those who

had been acquitted by such bodies more than a decade ago like the petitioners Tan, et al. herein.

The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against the petitioners and their co-accused beforeMilitary Commission No. 1. The principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians

should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular case of the petitioners, the proceedings werefair, that there were no serious violations of their constitutional right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of themilitary commission that heard and decided the charges against them during the period of martial law, had been affirmed

by this Court (Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546) years before the Olaguer case arose and camebefore us.

Because of these established operative facts, the refiling of the information against the petitioners would place

them in double jeopardy, in hard fact if not in constitutional logic.

Furthermore, depriving the petitioners of the protection of the judgment of acquittal rendered by the militarycommission in their particular case by retroactively divesting the military commission of the jurisdiction it had exercisedover them would amount to an ex post facto law or ruling, again, in sharp reality if not in strict constitutional theory.


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I22 PLANTERS PRODUCTS vs FERTIPHIL CORP (2008)

FACTS:

Petitioner PPI and respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated under Philippinelaws, bothengaged in the importation and distribution of fertilizers,pesticides& agriculturalchemicals.Marcos issued Letter

of Instruction (LOI) 1465, imposing a capital recovery component of Php10.00 perbag of fertilizer. The levywas to continue until adequate capital was raised to make PPI financiallyviable. Fertiphil remitted to the

Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), which was then remitted thedepository bank of PPI. Fertiphil paidP6,689,144 to FPA from 1985 to 1986.After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition

of the P10 levy. Fertiphildemanded from PPI a refund of the amount it remitted, however PPI refused. Fertiphilfiled a complaintfor collection and damages, questioning the constitutionality of LOI 1465, claiming that it was

unjust,unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of dueprocess.PPI argues that Fertiphil has no locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 because

itdoes not have a "personal and substantial interest in the case or will sustain direct injury as a result of itsenforcement." It asserts that Fertiphil did not suffer any damage from the imposition because"incidence of the

levy fell on the ultimate consumer or the farmers themselves, not on the sellerfertilizer company.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Fertiphil has locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465.

RULING:

Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine of standing is a mereproceduraltechnicality which may be waived.The imposition of the levy was an exercise of the taxation power of the

state. While it is true that thepower to tax can be used as an implement of police power, the primary purpose ofthe levy was revenuegeneration. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the rea

and substantialpurposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax.Police power and the power of taxation areinherent powers of the State. These powers are distinct andhave different tests for validity. Police power is the

power of the State to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promotethe general welfare, while the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for public purpose. The

main purpose of police power is the regulation of a behavior or conduct, while taxation is revenue generation.The "lawful subjects" and "lawful means" tests are used to determine the validity of a law enacted under the

police power. The power of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and constitutionalimitations

DOCTRINE:

Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,which provides:SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have thefollowing powers:x x x x(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal orcertiorar, as the law or the

Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:(a) All cases in which the

constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executiveagreement, law, presidential decreeproclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation isin question.


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I23 Kilosbayan Foundation v Ermita 2007

G.R. No. 177721; July 3, 2007

FACTS:

This case arose when respondent Gregory S. Ong was appointed by Executive Secretary, in representation of

the Office of the President, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Petitioners contended that respondent

Ong is a Chinese citizen, born on May 25, 1953 to Chinese parents. They further added that even if it were

granted that eleven years after respondent Ongs birth, his father was finally granted Filipino citizenship by

naturalization, that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a natural-born citizen. For his part, respondent

Ong contended that he is a natural-born citizen and presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration

and the DOJ declaring him to be such.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen.

DOCTRINE:

Only natural-born Filipino citizens may be appointed as justice of the Supreme Court

Decision of administrative body (Bureau of Immigration) declaring one a natural-born citizen is not binding

upon the courts when there are circumstances that entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper

judicial proceedngs

Respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status

by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that

respondent Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his father.

The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong's ancestors, by

various births, marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial

proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have

to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong's mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in

the records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tree as wel

as his citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an

appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be prevented

by injunction from doing so.


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I24 League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC (2009)

FACTS

The consolidated petitions for prohibition commenced by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of

Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas assail the constitutionality of the 16 laws each converting the

municipality covered thereby into a city and seek to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from

conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws.

Preliminaries

During the 11th Congress, 57 cityhood bills were filed before the House of Representatives. Of the 57, 33 became

laws, 24 were not acted upon.

Amending the Local Government Code of 1991 increased the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a

city from P20 million average annual income to P100 million, RA 9009 took effect June 30, 2001.

After its effectivity, the Lower House of the 12th Congress in a Joint Resolution No. 29 sought to exempt from the

income requirement prescribed in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose conversions into cities were not acted

upon during the previous Congress. The 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving H. Joint Resolution

No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the same was re-adopted as H. Joint Resolution 1 but the Senate again failed to

approve the joint resolution. Senator Pimentel Jr suggested the filing by the House of Representatives of

individual bills to pave the way for the municipalities to become cities and then forwarding them to the Senate for

proper action.

Heeding the advice, 16 municipalities filed individual cityhood bills, common to them is a provision exempting

the municipality covered from the P100 million income requirement which were approved by both Houses on

June 2007 which eventually lapsed into law on various dates. Each cityhood law directs the COMELEC within 30

days from its approval, to hold a plebiscite to determine whether the voters approve of the conversion.

Thus, instant petitions on the constitutionality of such acts, violating Art X Sec 10 (1) of the constitution and the

equal protection rights.

Court Proceedings

On November 18, 2008 the Court en banc by a 6-5 vote granted the petitions and nullified 16 cityhood laws for

being violative of Art X Sec 10 of the Constitution and the equal protection clause.

Subsequently, respondent LGUs moved for reconsideration. By resolution of March 31, 2009, a divided Court

denied the motion for reconsideration.

PerResolution dated April 28, 2009 the court voting 6-6, disposed of the motion for lack of merit; the motion is

denied since there is no majority that voted to overturn the Resolution of March 31, 2009.

May 14, 2009another motion was filed by the LGUs. In its resolution of June 2, 2009, motion is expunged but

two Justices (De-Castro and Bersamin) moved to grant the motion for reconsideration of the April 28 resolution

because entry was effected before the Court could act on the aforesaid motion which was filed within the 15-day

period counted from receipt of the April 28, 2009 resolution.

ISSUES

1. WON dismissing a motion for reconsideration due to ground that the basic issues have already been passedcould suffice to hurdle the voting requirement needed for a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the cityhood

laws in question?

2. WON the cityhood laws violate Art X Sec 10 (1) of the constitution and it violates equal protection clause


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HELD

First issue

A deadlocked vote does not reflect the majority of the Members contemplated in Art VII Sec 4 (2) of the

Constitution. According to Justice Puno in Lambino v COMELEC, a deadlocked vote of 6 is not a majority and a

non-majority cannot write a rule with precedential value.

If the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied. Basis: Rule 56 Sec. 7 of the

Rules of Court in complementary to AM No. 99-1-09-SC

SC said that since (1) the finality of the Nov 18, 2008 decision has et to set in, the issuance of the precipitate entry

of judgement notwithstanding and (2) the deadlocked vote on the second motion for reconsideration did not

definitely settle the constitutionality of the cityhood laws, the Court is inclined to take another hard look at the

underlying decision. It bears to stress that the Court has the power to suspend its own rules when the ends

of justice would be served thereby . Rules of procedure are only tools crafted to facilitate the attainment of

justice. Their strict and rigid application must be eschewed, if they result in technicalities that tend to frustrate

rather than promote substantial justice. Substantial rights must not be prejudiced by a rigid and technical

application of the rues in the altar of expendiency.

Second Issue

The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008 decision and declared as constitutional the Cityhood

Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into cities. It said that based on Congress

deliberations and clear legislative intent was that the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of

the minimum income requirement of PhP100 million that Senate Bill No. 2159 proposes and RA 9009

would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned. The conversion of a

municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such, it added. The

Court held that the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on

substantial distinction.

The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 9009.

To impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be

indeed unfair. Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate that they should be given a legal remedy by which they

should be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth

under the LGC of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009.


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H25 Republic vs. Express Telecommunications Co. Inc (2002)

FACTS:

On 29 December 1992, the International Communications Corporation (now Bayan Telecommunications, Inc.orBayantel) filed an application with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for a Certificate of

Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN, NTC Case 92-486) to install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular

Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a Provisional Authority (PA). Shortly thereafter, oron 22 January 1993, theNTC issued Memorandum Circular 4-1-93 directing all interested applicants fornationwide or regional CMTS to file their respective applications before the Commission on or before 15

February 1993, and deferring the acceptance of any application filed after said date until further orders. On 6May 1993, and prior to the issuance of any notice of hearing by the NTC with respect to Bayantels original

application, Bayantel filed an urgent ex-parte motion to admit an amended application. On 17 May 1993, thenotice of hearing issued by the NTC with respect to this amended application was published in the Manila

Chronicle. Copies of the application as well as the notice of hearing were mailed to all affected parties.Subsequently, hearings were conducted on the amended application. But before Bayantel could complete the

presentation of its evidence, the NTC issued an Order dated 19 December 1993 stating that in view of the recentgrant of 2 separateProvisionalAuthorities in favor of ISLACOM and GMCR, Inc., which resulted in the closing

out of all available frequencies for the service being applied for by Bayantel, and in order that the case may notremain pending for an indefinite period of time, the case was ordered archived without prejudice to its

reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency becomes available. On 17 May 1999, Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing the availability of new frequency bands for CMTSoperators. On 1 February

2000, the NTC granted BayanTels motion to revive the latters application and set the case for hearings onFebruary 9, 10, 15, 17 and 22, 2000. The NTC noted that the application was ordered archived without

prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency shall become available. ExpressTelecommunication Co., Inc. (Extelcom) filed in NTC Case 92-486an Opposition (With Motion to Dismiss)

praying for the dismissal of Bayantels application; arguing that Bayantels motion sought the revival of anarchived application filed almost 8years ago, and thus, the documentary evidence and the allegations of

Bayantel in said application are all outdated and should no longer be used as basis of the necessity for the

proposed CMTS service. On 3 May 2000, the NTC issued an Order granting in favor of Bayantel a provisionalauthority to operate CMTS service, applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure.Extelcom filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition (CA-GR SP 58893), seeking

the annulment of the Order reviving the application of Bayantel, the Order granting Bayantel a provisionalauthority toconstruct, install, operate and maintain a nationwide CMTS, and Memorandum Circular 9-3-

2000allocating frequency bands to new public telecommunication entities which are authorized to install,operate and maintain CMTS. On 13 September2000, the Court of Appeals granted the writs of certiorari and

prohibition prayed for, annulling and setting aside the NTCordersdated 1 February and 3 May 2000 in NTCCase 92 486, dismissing Bayantels Amended Application without prejudice to the filing of a new CMTS

application. Bayantel and the NTC, the latter being represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision. On the other hand, Extelcom filed a Motion

forPartialReconsideration, praying that NTC Memorandum Circular 9 3-2000 be also declared null and void.On 9 February2001, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution denying all of the motions for reconsideration of

the parties for lack of merit. Hence, the NTC and Bayantelfiled their petitions for review on certiorari (GR147096, and GR 147210 respectively). Inthepresent petition, Extelcom contends, among others, that the NTCshould have applied the Revised Rules which were filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register

on 3February 1993. These Revised Rules deleted the phrase on its own initiative; accordingly, a provisionalauthority may be issued only upon filing of the proper motion before the Commission. The NTC, on the other

hand, issued a certification to the effect that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules have not been published in anewspaper of general circulation, the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules.

ISSUE:


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Whether the 1978 or 1993 NTC Rules of Practice and Procedure should govern in the approval of Bayantels

application.

DOCTRINE:

The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the Commissioner of theNTC stating that the NTC

was still governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993Revised Rules have not taken effect at the

time of the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with

the UP Law Center on February 3,1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of

1987which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules

f

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