compiled digests batch 7 complete

7/26/2019 Compiled Digests Batch 7 Complete

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TORTS AND DAMAGES

7THBATCH

EMMA ADRIANO BUSTAMANTE, in her own behalf as Guarian!A!"i#e$ of $inors% ROSSE", G"ORIA, &O"ANDA, ERIC SON an EDERIC,all surna$e BUSTAMANTE, S'ouses SA"(ADOR )OCSON an*ATRIA BONE!)OCSON, S'ouses )OSE RAMOS an ENRI+UETACEBU!RAMOS, S'ouses NARCISO!HIMA&A an ADORACIONMAR+UE!HIMA&A, an S'ouses )OSE BERSAMINA an MA-COMMEMORACION *EREA!BUSTAMANTE,petitioners,vs.THE HONORAB"E COURT O. A**EA"S, .EDERICO DE" *I"AR ANDEDI"BERTO MONTESIANO,respondents.

FACTS:

A gravel and sand truck collided with a passanger bus.

During the incident, the cargo truck was driven by defendant ontesianoand owned by defendant Del !ilar" while the passenger bus was driven bydefendant Susulin. The vehicle was registered in the na#e of defendant$ovelo but was owned and%or operated as a passenger bus &ointly bydefendants agtibay and Serrado, under a franchise, with a line fro# $aic,Cavite, to 'aclaran, !arana(ue, etro anila, and vice versa, which $ovelosold to agtibay on $ove#ber ), *+)*, and which the latter transferred toSerrado Cerrado-.

##ediately before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger buswere approaching each other, co#ing fro# the opposite directions of thehighway. /hile the truck was still about 01 #eters away, Susulin, the busdriver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. 2e also observed thatthe truck was heading towards his lane. $ot #inding this circu#stance dueto his belief that the driver of the truck was #erely &oking, Susulin shiftedfro# fourth to third gear in order to give #ore power and speed to the bus,which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake orpass a 3ubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder ofthe highway. /hile the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing the

hand tractor and the truck was approaching the bus, the two vehiclessideswiped each other at each other4s left side. After the i#pact, the truckskidded towards the other side of the road and landed on a nearbyresidential lot, hitting a coconut tree and felling it.

5TC: the liability of the two drivers for their negligence #ust be solidary

CA: the appealed &udg#ent was 56765S6D and S6T ASD6 and theco#plaint dis#issed insofar as defendants8appellants Federico del !ilar and6dilberto ontesiano, owner and driver, respectively, of the sand and graveltruck. t based its ruling on the doctrine of last clear chance.

SS96: /$ respondent court was correct in absolving the owner anddriver of the cargo truck fro# liability. $

/$ the doctrine of last clear chance applies in this case. $

59;$th 6d., *+)?, p. *?@-.

The practical i#port of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is

liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been gro

negligent in placing hi#self in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiffs peri

according to so#e authorities, should have been aware of it in

reasonable eercise of due case, had in fact an opportunity later than th

the plaintiff to avoid an accident.

The doctrine cannot be etended into the field of &oint tortfeasors as a tewhether only one of the# should be held liable to the in&ured personreason of his discovery of the latter4s peril, and it cannot be invokedbetween defendants concurrently negligent. As against third personnegligent actor cannot defend by pleading that another had negligently fato take action which could have avoided the in&ury.=

8G-R- Nos- 79:;:!;


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herself and for her #inor children, filed separate actions for da#ages arisingfro# (uasi8delict against !A$T5A$C in the CF of !angasinan.

!A$T5A$C, aside fro# pointing to the late David cos alleged negligenceas the proi#ate cause of the accident, invoked the defense of due diligencein the selection and supervision of its driver, A#brosio 5a#ire.

The CF of !angasinan rendered a decision against !A$T5A$C awarding

the total a#ount of Two illion Three 2undred Four Thousand Si 2undredForty8Seven !E,01>,?>B.11- as da#ages, plus *1G thereof as attorneysfees and costs to aricar 'aesa and the total a#ount of Si 2undred FiftyTwo Thousand Si 2undred Seventy8Two !esos !?@E,?BE.11- asda#ages, plus *1G thereof as attorneys fees and costs to Fe co and herchildren.

n appeal, the cases were consolidated and the Court of Appeals #odifiedthe decision of the trial court by ordering !A$T5A$C to pay the totala#ount of ne illion ne 2undred 6ighty8$ine Thousand $ine 2undredTwenty Seven !esos !*,*)+,+EB.11- as da#ages, plus Twenty Thousand!esos !E1,111.11- as attorneys fees to aricar 'aesa, and the totala#ount of Three 2undred Forty8Four Thousand !esos !0>>,111.11- plusTen Thousand !esos !*1,111.11- as attorneys fees to Fe co and herchildren, and to pay the costs in both cases.

!A$T5A$C filed a #otion for reconsideration of the Court of Appealsdecision but was denied. 2ence, this petition for review.

Issue No-


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negligence of its e#ployee. t is incu#bent upon petitioner to show that inrecruiting and e#ploying the erring driver, the recruit#ent procedures andco#pany policies on efficiency and safety were followed. !etitioner failed todo this.

Issue No- =%

/hether or not the CA erred in fiing the da#ages for the loss of earning

capacity of the deceased victi#s. 8NO

Rulin2%

The Court of Appeals co##itted no reversible error in fiing the a#ount ofda#ages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased victi#s. hile i# is#rue #ha# 'ri1a#e res'onen#s shoul ha1e 'resen#e o/u$en#ar3e1ien/e #o su''or# #heir /lai$ for a$a2es for loss of earnin2/a'a/i#3 of #he e/ease 1i/#i$s, #he absen/e #hereof oes no#ne/essaril3 bar #he re/o1er3 of #he a$a2es in 6ues#ion- The testi#onyof Fe co and Francisca 'ascos as to the earning capacity of David co, andthe spouses 'aesa, respectively, are sufficient to establish a basis fro#which the court can #ake a fair and reasonable esti#ate of the da#ages forthe loss of earning capacity of the three deceased victi#s. oreover, infiing the da#ages for loss of earning capacity of a deceased victi#, thecourt can consider the nature of his occupation, his educational attain#ent

and the state of his health at the ti#e of death.

n the instant case, David co was thirty eight 0)- years old at the ti#e of hisdeath in *+)* and was driving his own passenger &eepney. The spousesCeasar and arilyn 'aesa were both thirty 01- years old at the ti#e of theirdeath. Ceasar 'aesa was a co##erce degree holder and the proprietor ofthe Cauayan !ress, printer of the Cauayan 7alley $ewspaper and the 7alleyTi#es at Cauayan, sabela. arilyn 'aesa graduated as a nurse in *+B? andat the ti#e of her death, was the co#pany nurse, personnel #anager,treasurer and cashier of the lagan !ress at lagan, sabela. 5espondentcourt duly considered these factors, together with the uncontradictedtesti#onies of Fe co and Francisca 'ascos, in fiing the a#ount ofda#ages for the loss of earning capacity of David co and the spouses'aesa.

2owever, #he Cour# of A''eals /o$$i##e error in fi4in2 #he/o$'ensa#or3 a$a2es for #he ea#h of Harol )i$ Baesa an

Mar/elino Baesa- 5espondent court awarded to aricar 'aesa ThirtyThousand !esos !01,111.11- as =co#pensatory da#ages for the death of2arold i# 'aesa and arcelino 'aesa.=. n other words, the Court of

Appeals awarded only Fifteen Thousand !esos !*@,111.11- as inde#nityfor the death of 2arold i# 'aesa and another Fifteen Thousand !esos!*@,111.11- for the death of arcelino 'aesa. This is clearly erroneous. nthe case of People v. de la Fuente, #he ine$ni#3 for #he ea#h of a'erson was fi4e b3 #his Cour# a# Thir#3 Thousan *esos *:,:::-::-*lain#iff Mari/ar Baesa shoul #herefore be aware Si4#3 Thousan*esos *:,:::-:: as ine$ni#3 for #he ea#h of her bro#hers,2aroldi# 'aesa and arcelino 'aesa or Thirty Thousand !esos !01,111.11- forthe death of each brother.

The petition is D6$6D. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ishereby AFF56D with the #odification that the a#ount of co#pensatoryda#ages for the death of 2arold i# 'aesa and arcelino 'aesa areincreased to Thirty Thousand !esos !01,111.11- each.

8G-R- NO-


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considered as entirely correct. This version atte#pts to show that the tankertruck, while being initially driven away fro# the right asphalted shoulder ofthe highway into the concrete right lane of said highway, bu#ped with its leftside the right #iddle portion of the body of said 3C8E1, thus causing thelatter to be shoved to the left concrete lane of said highway, where it wasbu#ped by the passing or overtaking ada #inibus.

n such a situation, wherein there was a truck starting to crawl on the right

lane traversed by the 3C8E1 and there was a #inibus trailing it, and in theprocess of passing or overtaking the 3C8E1, the driver of the #inibus sic-was epected to eercise caution and prudence to avoid hitting or being hitby either or both other #otor vehicles before it or trailing it, the fact that thedriver of the 3C8E1 did not either slacken his speed or even swerve hissteering wheel, however slightly, to avoid hitting or being hit by the tankertruck bespeaks reckless i#prudence on the part of third8party defendanti##y 'asilio as driver of said 3C8E1. 2ad he even only slackened thespeed of the 3C8E1, he could have avoided any contact between it and thetanker truck, given that distance of =E@ to 0@ #eters= fro# said truck whenthe latter was first seen. 2e chose not to do so.

=5eckless i#prudence consists in the doing or failing to do an act,voluntarily, but without #alice, fro# which #aterial da#age results by reasonof inecusable lack of precaution on the part of the person perfor#ing orfailing to perfor# such act, taking into consideration his e#ploy#ent oroccupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other

circu#stances regarding persons, ti#e and place. Art. 0?@, 5evised !enalCode-=

Defendant on the date in (uestion, has been shown to have beengrossly negligent in either a- i#properly parking his said truck on the rightlane of the national highway instead of totally on the asphalted shoulder ofsaid highway, or b- driving said tanker truck fro# said shoulder of thehighway into the right lane of said highway without previously carefullyobserving and #aking sure that no other vehicle was co#ing fro# the rear ofhis vehicle so as to avoid any possible accident fro# such direction, whichgross negligence constituted the proi#ate cause of the accident in(uestion.

therwise stated, had he not parked his truck i#properly, or had he #adesure that there was no onco#ing vehicle fro# the direction of the rear of histruck, the initial bu#ping between the said tanker truck and the suu 3C8E1would not have taken place and the subse(uent bu#pings by and a#ong

the other vehicles involved in the sub&ect accident would not have occurred. 5TC rationale-

Aggrieved by said decision of the trial court, scar aring and


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other side or turn back. ose 3oh blew the horn of the car, swerved to theleft and entered the lane of the truck" he then switched on the headlights ofthe car, applied the brakes and thereafter atte#pted to return to his lane.'efore he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurredin the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.

n his state#ent to the investigating police officers i##ediately after theaccident, )

kilo#eters- per hour.As a conse(uence of the collision, two E- cases, Civil Case $o. >>BB and$o. >>B), were filed on 0* anuary *+BB before the then Court of Firstnstance of !a#panga. n * arch *+BB, an nfor#ation charging 5uben>BB, privaterespondents asserted that it was the Ford 6scort car which =invaded andbu#ped sic- the lane of the truck driven by 5uben >B),private respondents first filed a #otion to dis#iss on grounds of pendency ofanother action Civil Case $o. >>BB- and failure to i#plead an indispensableparty, 5uben


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negligence of a clai#ant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence ofdefendant where it appears that the latter, by eercising reasonable care andprudence, #ight have avoided in&urious conse(uences to clai#antnotwithstanding his negligence.

The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prioror antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the last fair chance toavoid the i#pending har# and failed to do so, is #ade liable for all the

conse(uences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of theplaintiff L!icart v. S#ith, 0B !hil. )1+ *+*)-.Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule, as /e now rule, thatit was the truck driver4s negligence in failing to eert ordinary care to avoidthe collision which was, in law, the proi#ate cause of the collision. Ase#ployers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article E*)1of the Civil Code, directly and pri#arily liable for the resulting da#ages. Thepresu#ption that they are negligent flows fro# the negligence of theire#ployee. That presu#ption, however, is only &uris tantu#, not &uris et de

&ure. @+ Their only possible defense is that they eercised all the diligence ofa good father of a fa#ily to prevent the da#age.The diligence of a good father referred to #eans the diligence in theselection and supervision of e#ployees. ?1The answers of the privaterespondents in Civil Cases $os. >>BB and >>B) did not interpose thisdefense. $either did they atte#pt to prove it.

/2656F56, the instant petition is is S6T ASD6 while its Decision of E+$ove#ber *+)0 in C.A.818>* is 56$STAT6D, sub&ect tothe #odification that the inde#nity for death is increased fro# !*E,111.11 to!@1,111.11 each for the death of ose 3oh and 3i# 3oh c3ee.

ROGE"IO ENGADA, 'e#i#ioner, 1s- HON- COURT O. A**EA"S, .or$er.our#een#h Di1ision, Manila, an *EO*"E O. THE *HI"I**INES,

res'onen#s-

8G-R- No- - )une :, ::-?

Facts:

6dwin ran was driving a Toyota Ta#araw &eepney bound for loilo City whereSheila Seyan was a passenger. /hile traversing the road along 'arangay

Ac(uit, 'arotac $uevo, the Ta#araw passengers allegedly saw fro# theopposite direction a speeding suu pick8up, driven by 5ogelio 6ngada. Thepick8up had &ust negotiated a hilly gradient on the highway. /hen it was &usta few #eters away fro# the Ta#araw, the suu pick8up4s right signal lightflashed, at the sa#e ti#e, it swerved to its left, encroaching upon the lane ofthe Ta#araw and headed towards a head8on collision course with it. Seyanshouted at ran to avoid the pick8up. ran swerved to his left but the pick8upalso swerved to its right. Thus, the pick8up collided with the Ta#araw, hittingthe latter at its right front passenger side. The i#pact caused the head andchassis of the Ta#araw to separate fro# its body. Seyan was thrown out ofthe Ta#araw and landed on a ricefield. The pick8up stopped diagonallyastride the center of the road.

ssue: /%$ the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in the instant case.

2eld:

The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clearchance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligentacts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for theconse(uences of the accident. *+ 'ut as already stated on this point, noconvincing evidence was adduced by petitioner to support his invocation ofthe abovecited doctrine. nstead, what has been shown is the presence of ane#ergency and the proper application of the e#ergency rule. !etitioner4s actof swerving to the Ta#araw4s lane at a distance of 01 #eters fro# it anddriving the suu pick8up at a fast speed as it approached the Ta#araw,denied ran ti#e and opportunity to ponder the situation at all. There was noclear chance to speak of. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err inholding petitioner responsible for the vehicular collision and the resultingda#ages, including the in&uries suffered by rs. Sheila Seyan and the total

loss of the Ta#araw &eepney. t also did not err in i#posing on petitionesentence of four >- #onths of arresto #ayor.

ran could not be faulted when in his atte#pt to avoid the pick8up, heswerved to his left. !etitioner4s acts had put ran in an e#ergency situatiowhich forced hi# to act (uickly. An individual who suddenly finds hi#self situation of danger and is re(uired to act without #uch ti#e to consider t

best #eans that #ay be adopted to avoid the i#pending danger, is not gof negligence if he fails to undertake what subse(uently and upon reflect#ay appear to be a better solution, unless the e#ergency was brought bhis own negligence

G-R- No-


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RU"ING:

Both Drivers are Negligent/e rule that both parties were negligent in this case. 'orres was

at the outer lane when he eecuted a 98turn. Following Section >@b- of 5A

>*0?, 'orres should have stayed at the inner lane which is the lane nearest

to the center of the highway. 2owever, Deo/a$'o was e6uall3 ne2li2en#.

'orres slowed down the pick8up preparatory to eecuting the 98turn.Deoca#po should have also slowed down when the pick8up slowed down.

Deoca#po ad#itted that he noticed the pick8up when it was still about E1

#eters away fro# hi#. 7ehicular traffic was light at the ti#e of the incident.

The pick8up and the crewcab were the only vehicles on the road. Deoca#po

could have avoided the crewcab if he was not driving very fast before the

collision, as found by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance AppliesSince both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear

chance applies.The o/#rine of las# /lear /han/estates that where both parties

are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the

other, or where it is i#possible to deter#ine whose fault or negligence

caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss

but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss. n this case, Deoca#po had

the last clear chance to avoid the collision. Since Deoca#po was driving the

rear vehicle, he had full control of the situation since he was in a position to

observe the vehicle in front of hi#. Deoca#po had the responsibility of

avoiding bu#ping the vehicle in front of hi#. A 98turn is done at a #uch

slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, co#pared to running

straight ahead. Deoca#po could have avoided the vehicle if he was not

driving very fast while following the pick8up. Deoca#po was not only driving

fast, he also ad#itted that he did not step on the brakes even upon seeing

the pick8up. 2e only stepped on the brakes after the collision.Petitioners are Solidarily Liable

;AD6C alleges that it should not be held &ointly and severally

liable with Deoca#po because it eercised due diligence in the supervision

and selection of its e#ployees. ;AD6C did not show its policy in hiring its

drivers, or the #anner in which it supervised its drivers. ;AD6C failed to

substantiate its allegation that it eercised due diligence in the supervision

and selection of its e#ployees. 2ence, we hold ;AD6C solidarily liablewith Deoca#po.

Respondent is Entitled to Moral Daages/e sustain the award of #oral da#ages. Moral a$a2es are

awarded to allow a plaintiff to obtain #eans, diversion, or a#use#ent that

will serve to alleviate the #oral suffering he has undergone due to the

defendants culpable action. The trial court found that respondent, who was

on board the pick8up when the collision took place, suffered shock, serious

aniety, and fright when the crewcab bu#ped his pick8up. /e sustain the

trial court and the Court of Appeals in ruling that respondent sufficiently

showed that he suffered shock, serious aniety, and fright which entitle hi#

to #oral da#ages.'oth the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to give any

&ustification for the award of attorneys fees. Awards of a##orne3s fees#ustbe based on findings of fact and of law and stated in the decision of the trial

court. Further, no pre#iu# should be placed on the right to litigate. 2ence,we delete the award of attorneys fees.

G-R- No- 1,111.11 and !>?1,111.11, respectively, b

turned out that the check covering the bigger a#ount was not sufficie

funded.

n Septe#ber 0, *+)E, 7icente aOosca #ortgaged the parcels of lan

!@11,111.11 to the respondent Asian Savings 'ank AS'-, with the he

i#postors who #isrepresented the#selves as the spouses, s#u

Canlas and Angelina Canlas.

/hen the loan it etended was not paid, respondent bank etra&udic

foreclosed the #ortgage.

n anuary *@, *+)0, s#undo Canlas wrote a letter infor#ing the AS'

the eecution of sub&ect #ortgage over the lands in (uestion was wit

their Canlas spouses- authority, and re(uest that steps be taken to a

and%or revoke the (uestioned #ortgage.

!etitioner s#undo Canlas also wrote the office of Sheriff ai#o

Contreras, asking that the auction sale on the land be cancelled or he

abeyance. 'ut respondents Contreras and AS' refused to heed petiti

Canlas4 stance and proceeded with the scheduled auction sale.

!etitioners instituted a case for annul#ent of deed of real estate #ortg

with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preli#inary in&unction. The trial c

issued an rder restraining the respondent sheriff fro# issuing

corresponding Certificate of Sheriff4s Sale.


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AS' appealed to the CA, which reversed the findings of the trial court.

ISSUE% /hether or not AS' eercised due diligence in ascertaining the realidentity of the couple who introduced the#selves as the Canlas

spouses relative to the #ortgage transaction it had with respondentaOoscaK

RU"ING%

The !etition is i#pressed with #erit.

Art. **B0 of the Civil Code, provides:

Art. **B0. The fault or negligence of the obligor consist in the

o#ission of that diligence which is re(uired by the nature of the

obligation and corresponds with the circu#stances of the persons,

of the ti#e and of the place. /hen negligence shows bad faith,

the provisions of articles **B* and EE1*, paragraph E, shall apply.

f the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be

observed in the perfor#ance, that which is epected of a good

father of a fa#ily shall be re(uired. **1>-

The e2ree of ili2en/e re6uire of bans is $ore #han #ha# of a 2oofa#her of a fa$il3L in ee'in2 wi#h #heir res'onsibili#3 #o e4er/ise #hene/essar3 /are an 'ruen/e in ealin2 e1en on a re2is#ere or #i#le'ro'er#3. The business of a ban is affe/#e wi#h 'ubli/ in#eres#,holin2 in #rus# #he $one3 of #he e'osi#ors, whi/h ban e'osi#s #heban shoul 2uar a2ains# loss ue #o ne2li2en/e or ba fai#h, b3reason of whi/h #he ban woul be enie #he 'ro#e/#i1e $an#le of #helan re2is#ra#ion law, a//ore onl3 #o 'ur/hasers or $or#2a2ees for1alue an in 2oo fai#h-

In #he /ase uner /onsiera#ion, fro$ #he e1ien/e on han i# /an be2leane unerrin2l3 #ha# res'onen# ban i no# obser1e #he re6uisi#eili2en/e in as/er#ainin2 or 1erif3in2 #he real ien#i#3 of #he /ou'le whoin#rou/e #he$sel1es as #he s'ouses Os$uno Canlas an An2elinaCanlas- I# is wor#h3 #o no#e #ha# no# e1en a sin2le ien#ifi/a#ion /arwas e4hibi#e b3 #he sai i$'os#ors #o show #heir #rue ien#i#3L an3e#, #he ban a/#e on #heir re'resen#a#ions si$'l3 on #he basis of #heresien/e /er#ifi/a#es bearin2 si2na#ures whi/h #ene #o $a#/h #hesi2na#ures affi4e on a 're1ious ee of $or#2a2e #o a /er#ain A##3-Ma2no, /o1erin2 #he sa$e 'ar/els of lan in 6ues#ion-

The efforts eerted by the bank to verify the identity of the couple posing

s#undo Canlas and Angelina Canlas fell short of the responsibility of

bank to observe #ore than the diligence of a good father of a fa#ily.

negligence of respondent bank was #agnified by the fact that the prev

deed of #ortgage which was used as the basis for checking

genuineness of the signatures of the supposed Canlas spouses- did

bear the ta account nu#ber of the spouses, as well as the Co##unity

Certificate of Angelina Canlas.

'ut such fact notwithstanding, the banknot re(uire the i#postors to sub#it additional proof of their true identity.

Uner #he o/#rine of las# /lear /han/e, whi/h is a''li/able here,res'onen# ban $us# suffer #he resul#in2 loss- In essen/e, o/#rine of las# /lear /han/e is #o #he effe/# #ha# where bo#h 'ar#iesne2li2en# bu# #he ne2li2en# a/# of one is a''re/iabl3 la#er in 'oin#i$e #han #ha# of #he o#her, or where i# is i$'ossible #o e#er$whose faul# or ne2li2en/e brou2h# abou# #he o//urren/e of in/ien#, #he one who ha #he las# /lear o''or#uni#3 #o a1oii$'enin2 har$ bu# faile #o o so, is /har2eable wi#h /onse6uen/es arisin2 #herefro$- S#a#e ifferen#l3, #he rule is #ha#an#e/een# ne2li2en/e of a 'erson oes no# 're/lue re/o1er

a$a2es /ause b3 #he su'er1enin2 ne2li2en/e of #he la##er, who #he las# fair /han/e #o 're1en# #he i$'enin2 har$ b3 #he e4er/isue ili2en/e-

Assu#ing that s#undo Canlas was negligent in giving 7icente aOo

the opportunity to perpetrate the fraud, by entrusting to latter the own

copy of the transfer certificates of title of sub&ect parcels of land, i# /abe enie #ha# #he ban ha #he las# /lear /han/e #o 're1en# #he frab3 #he si$'le e4'eien# of fai#hfull3 /o$'l3in2 wi#h #he re6uire$efor bans #o as/er#ain #he ien#i#3 of #he 'ersons #ransa/#in2 w#he$.

For not observing the degree of diligence re(uired of banking instituti

whose business is i#pressed with public interest, respondent Asian Sav

'ank has to bear the loss sued upon.

Se##le is #he rule #ha# a /on#ra/# of $or#2a2e $us# be /ons#i#u#e b3 #he absolu#e owner on #he 'ro'er#3 $or#2a2eL a $or#2/ons#i#u#e b3 an i$'os#or is 1oi- Consierin2 #ha# i# was es#ablisinubi#abl3 #ha# #he /on#ra/# of $or#2a2e sue u'on was en#ere an si2ne b3 i$'os#ors who $isre'resen#e #he$sel1es ass'ouses Os$uno Canlas an An2elina Canlas, #he Cour# is of

inelu/#ible /on/lusion an finin2 #ha# sub5e/# /on#ra/# of $or#2a2a /o$'le#e nulli#3-

G-R- No- 7:=9 Ma3 , 9

G"AN *EO*"ES "UMBER AND HARDARE, GEORGE "IM, .ABIAGAD, .E"I@ "IM an *AU" ACARIAS 3 IN.ANTE, petitionvs.

INTERMEDIATE A**E""ATE COURT, CECI"IA A".ERE (DA-CA"IBO, Minors RO&CE STE*HEN, )O&CE )OAN, )ANISE MA)AC+UE"INE BRIGITTE )OCE"INE CORAON, )U"IET GERA"D


9/24

)ENNI.ER )I"", all surna$e CA"IBO, re'resen#e b3 #heir $o#her,CECI"IA A- (DA- DE CA"IBO,respondents.

.a/#s%

6ngineer rlando T. Calibo, Agripino 5oranes, and ai#o !atos were on

the &eep owned by the 'acnotan Consolidated ndustries, nc., with Calibo atthe wheel, as it approached fro# the South ;iada 'ridge going towards the

direction of Davao City. At about that ti#e, the cargo track, loaded with

ce#ent bags,


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'oth drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had a full view of each

other4s vehicle fro# a distance of one hundred fifty #eters. 'oth vehicles

were travelling at a speed of approi#ately thirty kilo#eters per hour. Theprivate respondents have ad#itted that the truck was already at a full stop

when the &eep plowed into it. And they have not seen fit to deny or i#pugn

petitioners4 i#putation that they also ad#itted the truck had been brought to

a stop while the &eep was still thirty #eters away. 7.ro$ #hese fa/#s #he

lo2i/al /on/lusion e$er2es #ha# #he ri1er of #he 5ee' ha wha# 5ui/ialo/#rine has a''ro'ria#el3 /alle #he las# /lear /han/e #o a1oi #hea//ien#, while s#ill a# #ha# is#an/e of #hir#3 $e#ers fro$ #he #ru/, b3s#o''in2 in his #urn or swer1in2 his 5ee' awa3 fro$ #he #ru/, ei#her ofwhi/h he ha suffi/ien# #i$e #o o while runnin2 a# a s'ee of onl3#hir#3 ilo$e#ers 'er hour- In #hose /ir/u$s#an/es, his u#3 was #oseiFe #ha# o''or#uni#3 of a1oian/e, no# $erel3 rel3 on a su''oseri2h# #o e4'e/#, as #he A''ella#e Cour# woul ha1e i#, #he #ru/ #oswer1e an lea1e hi$ a /lear 'a#h-

The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and co#plete a

defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked and applied in the

*+*) case ofPicart vs. Smith, supra,which involved a si#ilar state of facts.

CRESENCIO "IBI an AME"IA &A* "IBI, Petitioners, 1- HON-INTERMEDIATE A**E""ATE COURT, .E"I*E GOTIONG an SHIR"E&GOTIONG, Respondents-

.ACTS%

5espondent spouses are the legiti#ate parents of ulie Ann , *+B+, was an *)8year old first year co##erce student of the9niversity of San Carlos, Cebu City" while petitioners are the parents of/endell ;ibi, then a #inor between *) and *+ years of age living with hisaforesaid parents, and who also died in the sa#e event on the sa#e date.

For #ore than two E- years before their deaths, ulie Ann , *+B+, ulie Ann and /endell died, each fro# a singlegunshot wound inflicted with the sa#e firear#, a S#ith and /esson revolverlicensed in the na#e of petitioner Cresencio ;ibi, which was recovered fro#the scene of the cri#e inside the residence of private respondents.

!rivate respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, sub#ittedthat /endell caused her death by shooting her with the aforesaid firear#

and, thereafter, turning the gun on hi#self to co##it suicide. n the otherhand, Petitioners, puled and likewise distressed over the death of theirson, re&ected the i#putation and contended that an unknown third party,who# /endell #ay have displeased or antagonied by reason of his workas a narcotics infor#er of the Constabulary Anti8$arcotics 9nit CA$9-,#ust have caused /endells death and then shot ulie Ann to eli#inate anywitness and thereby avoid identification.

As a result of the tragedy, the parents of ulie Ann filed Civil Case in the thenCourt of First nstance of Cebu against the parents of /endell to recoverda#ages arising fro# the latters vicarious liability under Article E*)1 of theCivil Code.

CF: dis#issed the case" insufficiency of the evidence

CA: reversed

SS96:

*. /$ petitioners parents of the boy- are guilty vicariously liP6S

E. /hat is the liability of the petitionersK !ri#ary

59;$


11/24

Bran/h :, (i2an, Ilo/os SurL (ICTOR BUNDOCL an C"ARA BUNDOC,res'onen#s-

.a/#s%

n E1 ctober *+)E, Adelberto 'undoc, then a #inor of *1 years of age,shot ennifer Ta#argo with an air rifle causing in&uries which resulted in her

death. Accordingly, a civil co#plaint for da#ages was filed with the 5TC of7igan by petitioner acario Ta#argo, ennifer4s adopting parent, andpetitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Ta#argo, ennifer4s natural parentsagainst respondent spouses 7ictor and Clara 'undoc, Adelberto4s naturalparents with who# he was living at the ti#e of the tragic incident. n additionto this case for da#ages, a cri#inal infor#ation or 2o#icide through5eckless #prudence was filed against Adelberto 'undoc. Adelberto,however, was ac(uitted and ee#pted fro# cri#inal liability on the groundthat he had acted without discern#ent.

!rior to the incident, or on *1 Dece#ber *+)*, the spouses Sabas andFelisa 5apisura had filed a petition to adopt the #inor Adelberto 'undoc andthe sa#e was granted on *) $ove#ber *+)E, that is, afterAdelberto hadshot and killed ennifer.

5espondent spouses 'undoc, Adelberto4s natural parents, reciting the result

of the foregoing petition for adoption, clai#ed that not they, but rather theadopting parents, na#ely the spouses Sabas and Felisa 5apisura, wereindispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to theadopting parents fro# the #o#ent the successful petition for adoption wasfiled.

!etitioners contended that since Adelberto 'undoc was then actually livingwith his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor beenrelin(uished by the #ere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.

The trial court dis#issed petitioners4 co#plaint, ruling that respondentnatural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to theaction. !etitioners filed a #otion for reconsideration but the sa#e wasdenied. They then filed a notice of appeal with the trial court but was againdis#issed for being filed beyond the regle#entary period.

!etitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus and

certiorari (uestioning the trial court4s Decision but the CA dis#issed thepetition ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.

2ence, this !etition for 5eview.

!etitioners contention: 5espondent spouses 'undoc are the indispensableparties to the action for da#ages caused by the acts of their #inor child,

Adelberto 'undoc.

Issue%

/hether or not respondent spouses are indispensable parties to the actionfor da#ages caused by the acts of their #inor child. &ES

Rulin2%

t is not disputed that Adelberto 'undoc4s voluntary act of shooting enniferTa#argo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delictagainst hi#. As Article E*B? of the Civil Code provides:

/hoever by act or o#ission causes da#age to another, therebeing fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the da#age done.Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre8eisting contractualrelation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. . .

9pon the other hand, the law i#poses civil liability upon the father and, incase of his death or incapacity, the #other, for any da#ages that #ay becaused by a minor childwho lives with the#. Article E*)1 of the Civil Codereads:

The obligation i#posed by article E*B? is de#andable not only forone4s own acts or o#issions, but also for those of persons forwho# one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the #other,responsible for the da#ages caused by the minor children live in their company.The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease whenperson herein #entioned prove that they observed all the diligeof a good father of a fa#ily to prevent da#age.

This 'rin/i'le of 'aren#al liabili#3 is a s'e/ies of wha# is fre6ue

esi2na#e as 1i/arious liabili#3, or #he o/#rine of 0i$'ne2li2en/e0under Anglo8A#erican tort law, where a 'erson is no# oliable for #or#s /o$$i##e b3 hi$self, bu# also for #or#s /o$$i##eo#hers wi#h who$ he has a /er#ain rela#ionshi' an for who$ hres'onsible- Thus, 'aren#al liabili#3 is $ae a na#ural or lo2/onse6uen/e of #he u#ies an res'onsibili#ies of 'aren#s #'aren#al au#hori#3 whi/h in/lues #he ins#ru/#in2, /on#rollin2 is/i'linin2 of #he /hil-

The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was eplained by the CouCangco v. anila !ailroad Co.in the following ter#s:

/ith respect to etra8contractual obligation arising fro# negligewhether of act or o#ission, it is co#petent for the legislature to eN and our ;egislature has so elected N to li#it such liability to cain which the person upon who# such an obligation is i#pose#orally culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy

etend that liability, without regard to the lack of #oral culpabilityas to include responsi"ility for the negligence of those persons whacts or omissions are imputa"le, by a legal fiction,to others whoin a position to e#ercise an a"solute or limited control over them .legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit e#contractual lia"ilityN with certain well8defined eceptions N to cain which moral culpa"ility can "e directly imputed to the persons tcharged. This #oral responsibility #ay consist in having faileeercise due care in one4s own acts, or in having failed to e#erdue carein the selection and control of one4s agent or servants, othe control of persons who, "y reasons of their status, occup

position of dependency with respect to the person made lia"le for conduct.

The civil liability i#posed upon parents for the torts of their #inor childliving with the#, #ay be seen to be based upon the parental authvested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law assu#es

when an une#ancipated child living with its parents co##its a tortious athe parents were negligent in the perfor#ance of their legal and natural closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. !areliability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled presu#ed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties acco#pansuch authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only presu#ed andpresu#ption can be overtuned under Article E*)1 of the Civil Code by pthat the parents had eercised all the diligence of a good father of a fa#prevent the da#age.

In #he ins#an# /ase, #he shoo#in2 of )ennifer b3 Aelber#o wi#h anrifle o//ure when 'aren#al au#hori#3 was s#ill lo2e in res'onBuno/ s'ouses, #he na#ural 'aren#s of #he $inor Aelber#o- I# wo#hus follow #ha# #he na#ural 'aren#s who ha #hen a/#ual /us#o3 of$inor Aelber#o, are #he inis'ensable 'ar#ies #o #he sui# for a$a2

The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly #aintain that becausdecree of adoption was issued by the adoption court in favor of the 5apispouses, parental authority was vested in the latter as adopting parentof the time of the filing of the petition for adoption that is, "efore Adelbhad shot ennifer which an air rifle. The 'undoc spouses contend that were therefore free of any parental responsibility for Adelberto4s allegtortious conduct.

The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the bof parental liability for the torts of a #inor child is the relationship eisbetween the parents and the #inor child living with the# and over who#law presu#es, the parents eercise supervision and control.

The Su're$e Cour# oes no# belie1e #ha# 'aren#al au#hori#3 is 'ro're2are as ha1in2 been re#roa/#i1el3 #ransferre #o an 1es#e inao'#in2 'aren#s, #he Ra'isura s'ouses, a# #he #i$e #he air shoo#in2 ha''ene- e o no# /onsier #ha# re#roa/#i1e effe/# $a3


12/24

2i1er #o #he e/ree of ao'#ion so as #o i$'ose a liabili#3 u'on #heao'#in2 'aren#s a//ruin2 at a tie !hen adopting parents had noact"al or physically c"stody over the adopted child-5etroactive affect#ay perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where suchis essential to per#it the accrual of so#e benefit or advantage in favor of theadopted child. n the instant case, however, to hold that parental authorityhad been retroactively lodged in the 5apisura spouses so as to burden the#with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which

they could not have prevented since they were at the ti#e in the 9nitedStates and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto- would be unfairand unconscionable. Such a result, #oreover, would be inconsistent with thephilosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability.!ut a little differently, no presu#ption of parental dereliction on the part ofthe adopting parents, the 5apisura spouses, could have arisen since

Adelberto was not in fact sub&ect to their control at the ti#e the tort wasco##itted.

EN BANC G-R- No- "!9:; O/#ober =,


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officials of the school.= As stated above, the phrase used in the cited articleN =so long as the students- re#ain in their custody= #eans the protectiveand supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers eerciseover the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in theschool, including recess ti#e. There is nothing in the law that re(uires thatfor such liability to attach the pupil or student who co##its the tortious act#ust live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court,and the dicta in ercado as well as in 6conde- on which it relied, #ust

now be dee#ed to have been set aside by the present decision. .

E. The case at bar was instituted directly against the school officials ands(uarely raises the issue of liability of teachers and heads of schools under

Article E*)1, Civil Code, for da#ages caused by their pupils and studentsagainst fellow students on the school pre#ises. 2ere, the parents of thestudent at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon wasalready of age at the ti#e of the tragic incident. There is no (uestion, either,that the school involved is a non8acade#ic school, the anila Technicalnstitute being ad#ittedly a technical vocational and industrial school. .

ssue: w%n defendants head and teacher of the anila Technical nstitutedefendants 7alenton and uibulue, respectively- are liable &ointly andseverally for da#ages to plaintiffs8appellants for the death of the latter4s#inor son at the hands of defendant Daffon at the school4s laboratory roo#.

5uling: Pes.

The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortiousacts of their pupils and students, so long as they re#ain in their custody, isthat they stand, to a certain etent, as to their pupils and students, in locoparentis and are called upon to =eercise reasonable supervision over theconduct of the child.=

This is epressly provided for in Articles 0>+, 0@1 and 0@E of the Civil Code.n the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of theschool heads and teachers is #andatorily substituted for that of the parents,and hence, it beco#es their obligation as well as that of the school itself toprovide proper supervision of the students4 activities during the whole ti#ethat they are at attendance in the school, including recess ti#e, as well as totake the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody fro#dangers and haards that would reasonably be anticipated, including in&uriesthat so#e student the#selves #ay inflict willfully or through negligence ontheir fellow students. .

As tersely su##aried by r. ustice .'.;. 5eyes in his dissenting opinion

in 6conde, =the basis of the presu#ption of negligence of Art. *+10 LnowE*)1M is so#e culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. aresupposed to have incurred in the eercise of their authority= and =where theparent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter,and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts co##ittedwhile under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposedto interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority andsupervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction.= The schoolitself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or negligence of its school headand teachers under the sa#e cited article.

0. $o liability attaches to defendant 'rillantes as a #ere #e#ber of theschool4s board of directors. The school itself cannot be held si#ilarly liable,since it has not been properly i#pleaded as party defendant. /hile plaintiffssought to so i#plead it, by i#pleading i#properly defendant 'rillantes, itsfor#er single proprietor, the lower court found that it had been incorporatedsince August E, *+?E, and therefore the school itself, as thus incorporated,

should have been brought in as party defendant.Final $ote:

Defendants 7alenton and uibulue as president and teacher8in8charge ofthe school #ust therefore be held &ointly and severally liable for the (uasi8delict of their co8defendant Daffon in the latter4s having caused the death ofhis class#ate, the deceased Do#inador !alisoc. The unfortunate deathresulting fro# the fight between the protagonists8students could have beenavoided, had said defendants but co#plied with their duty of providingade(uate supervision over the activities of the students in the schoolpre#ises to protect their students fro# har#, whether at the hands of fellowstudents or other parties. At any rate, the law holds the# liable unless theyrelieve the#selves of such liability, in co#pliance with the last paragraph of

Article E*)1, Civil Code, by =proving- that they observed all the diligence ofa good father of a fa#ily to prevent da#age.= n the light of the factualfindings of the lower court4s decision, said defendants failed to prove suchee#ption fro# liability. .

Decisive here is the touchstone provision of Article EE0*, Civil Code, tha(uasi8delicts, ee#plary da#ages #ay be granted if the defendant awith gross negligence.= $o gross negligence on the part of defendants found by the trial court to warrant the i#position of ee#plary da#ageswell as of interest and increased attorney4s fees, and the Court has not bshown in this appeal any co#pelling reason to disturb such finding. .

ACC5D$@ April *@, *+))S6 S. AAD5A, et. al,petitionersvs.2$5A';6 C95T F A!!6A;S, et. al, respondents.

FACTS:n April *0, *+BE, Alfredo A#adora, while they were in the auditoriutheir school, the Colegio de San ose85ecoletos, a class#ate, !aDaffon, fired a gun that #ortally hit Alfredo, ending all his epectations his life as well. The victi# was only seventeen years old.

Daffon was convicted of ho#icide thru reckless i#prudence. Additionallyherein petitioners, as the victi#4s parents, filed a civil action for da#aunder Article E*)1 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San 5ecoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, andphysics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through trespective parents. The co#plaint against the students was later drop

After trial, the Court of First nstance of Cebu held the re#aining defendliable to the plaintiffs in the su# of !E+>,+)>.11, representing dco#pensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral epen#oral da#ages, ee#plary da#ages, and attorney4s fees . n appeal torespondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all

defendants were co#pletely absolved.

n its decision, the respondent court found that Article E*)1 wasapplicable as the Colegio de San ose85ecoletos was not a school of and trades but an acade#ic institution of learning. t also held thatstudents were not in the custody of the school at the ti#e of the incidenthe se#ester had already ended, that there was no clear identification ofatal gun and that in any event the defendant, had eercised the necesdiligence in preventing the in&ury.

The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his phyeperi#ent as a prere(uisite to his graduation" hence, he was then uthe custody of the private respondents. The private respondents sub#it

Alfredo A#adora had gone to the school only for the purpose of sub#his physics report and that he was no longer in their custody becausese#ester had already ended.

SS96: /hether or not Colegio de San ose85ecoletos, an acade

school, is liable under Article E*)1 of the Civil Code for the tortuous act ostudents.

59;$


14/24

custody and sub&ect to the discipline of the school authorities under theprovisions of Article E*)1.

During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher8in8charge who #ustanswer for his students4 torts, in practically the sa#e way that the parentsare responsible for the child when he is in their custody. The teacher8in8charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other ad#inistrativesuperior to eercise supervision over the pupils in the specific classes or

sections to which they are assigned. t is not necessary that at the ti#e ofthe in&ury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it.Custody does not connote i##ediate and actual physical control but refers#ore to the influence eerted on the child and the discipline instilled in hi#as a result of such influence. Thus, for the in&uries caused by the student, theteacher and not the parent shag be held responsible if the tort wasco##itted within the pre#ises of the school at any ti#e when its authoritycould be validly eercised over hi#.

n any event, it should be noted that the liability i#posed by this article issupposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts andtrades and not on the school itself. f at all, the school, whatever its nature,#ay be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the headthereof under the general principle ofrespondeat superior, but then it #ayeculpate itself fro# liability by proof that it had eercised the diligence ofabonus paterfa#ilias.Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the

school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort co##itted by thestudent. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessaryprecautions to prevent the in&ury co#plained of, he can eonerate hi#selffro# the liability i#posed by Article E*)1, which also states that:

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the !ersonsherein #entioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good fatherof a fa#ily to prevent da#ages.

n this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liablenot only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not re(uire thatthe offending student be of #inority age. 9nlike the parent, who wig be liableonly if his child is still a #inor, the teacher is held answerable by the law forthe act of the student under hi# regardless of the student4s age.

The Supre#e Court however clarified that the school, whether acade#ic ornot, should not be held directly liable. ts liability is only subsidiary.

At any rate, the 566DP of the teacher, to avoid direct liability, and for the

school, to avoid subsidiary liability, is to show proof that he, the teacher,eercised the necessary precautions to prevent the in&ury co#plained of,and the school eercised the diligence of a bonus pater fa#ilias.

Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San ose85ecoletos cannotbe held directly liable under the article because only the teacher or the headof the school of arts and trades is #ade responsible for the da#age causedby the student or apprentice. $either can it be held to answer for the tortco##itted by any of the other private respondents for none of the# hasbeen found to have been charged with the custody of the offending studentor has been re#iss in the discharge of his duties in connection with suchcustody.

$T6S:For non8acade#ic schools, it would be the principal or head of school whoshould be directly liable for the tortuous act of its students. This is becausehistorically, in non8acade#ic schools, the head of school eercised a closerad#inistration over their students than heads of acade#ic schools. n short,

they are #ore hands on to their students.

For acade#ic schools, it would be the teacher8in8charge who would bedirectly liable for the tortuous act of the students and not the dean or thehead of school.

BEN)AMIN SA"(OSA an BAGUIO CO""EGES.OUNDATION, petitioners,

vs.

THE INTERMEDIATE A**E""ATE COURT, EDUARDO B- CASTRO,DIOMEDES B- CASTRO, (IRGINIA B- CASTRO an RODO".O B-

CASTRO-, respondents.

G-R- No- 7:=;> O/#ober ;, >

Facts:

'aguio Colleges Foundation 'CF- is an acade#ic institution. /ithin

pre#ises of the 'CF is an 5TC 9nit, the 'aguio Colleges Founda

5eserve fficers Training Corps 5TC- 9nit, which is under the full co

of the Ar#ed Forces of the !hilippines. The 'aguio Colleges Founda

5TC 9nit had i##y '. Abon as i ts duly appointed ar#orer. As ar#or

the 5TC 9nit, i##y '. Abon received his appoint#ent fro# the AF!being an e#ployee of the 'CF, he also received his salary fro# the AF

well as orders fro# Captain 5oberto C. 9ngos, the Co##andant of

'aguio Colleges Foundation 5TC 9nit. i##y '. Abon was als

co##erce student of the 'CF.

n 0 arch *+BB, at around ):11 p.#., in the parking space of 'CF, i#

'. Abon shot $apoleon Castro a student of the 9niversity of 'aguio with

unlicensed firear# which the for#er took fro# the ar#ory of the 5TC

of the 'CF. As a result, $apoleon Castro died and i##y '. Abon

prosecuted for, and convicted of the cri#e of 2o#icide by i

Co##ission $o. 01, AF!. i##y Abon was not attending any class or sc

function at the ti#e of the shooting incident.

ssue: /%$ 'CF can be held solidarity hable with i##y '. Abonda#ages under Article E*)1 of the Civil Code, as a conse(uence of

tortious act of i##y '. Abon.

2eld:

9nder the penulti#ate paragraph of Art. E*)1 of the Civil Code, teache

heads of establish#ents of arts and trades are liable for =da#ages cau

by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they re#ain in t

custody.= The phrase used in LArt. E*)1 N 4so long as the students- re#

in their custody #eans the protective and supervisory custody that

school and its heads and teachers eercise over the pupils and students

as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess ti#e.

n line with the case of Palisocvs $rillantes, a student not=at attendanc

the school= cannot be in =recess= thereat. A =recess,= as the concep

e#braced in the phrase =at attendance in the school,= conte#plate

situation of te#porary ad&ourn#ent of school activities where the studen

re#ains within call of his #entor and is not per#itted to leave the sc

pre#ises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. 5ec

by its nature does not include dis#issal. ;ikewise, the #ere fact of b

enrolled or being in the pre#ises of a school without #ore does

constitute =attending school= or being in the =protective and superv

custody4 of the school, as conte#plated in the law.

9pon the foregoing considerations, we hold that i##y '. Abon canno

considered to have been =at attendance in the school,= or in the custod

'CF, when he shot $apoleon Castro. ;ogically, therefore, petitioners ca

under Art. E*)1 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with i##y '. A

for da#ages resulting fro# his acts.

G-R- No-


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St. ary conducted an enrol#ent drive and as part of this drive,they ca#paign to different schools for prospective students. n thatfortunate day, one na#ed Sherwin Carpitanos88student of St. ary and partof the ca#paign group went to a particular school with his class#ates ridingin a #itsubishi &eepney owned by one na#ed 7ivencio 7illanueva and drivenby his class#ate who was a #inor. Allegedly the latter droved the &eepney ina reckless #anner and as a result the &eepney turned turtle.

As a result Sherwin Carpitanos died due to the in&uries hesustained fro# the accident

The lower court held St. ary solidarily ;iable under article E*)and E*+ of the fa#ily code and the guardians of the #inor driver and theowner of the &eepney as subsudiarily liable. on appeal to CA the owner of the

&eepney was freed fro# liabilities.

SS96: *- /26T265 ST. A5P S ;A';6 8 $

E- /26T265 776$C 7;;A$967A S ;A';6 8P6S

*- 9nder Article E*) of the Fa#ily Code, the following shall have

special parental authority over a #inor child while under their supervision,

instruction or custody: *- the school, its ad#inistrators and teachers" or E-

the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental

authority and responsibility applies to all authoried activities, whether inside

or outside the pre#ises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such

authority and responsibility applies to field trips, ecursions and other affairs

of the pupils and students outside the school pre#ises whenever authoried

by the school or i ts teachers.+

9nder Article E*+ of the Fa#ily Code, if the person under custody is a #inor,

those eercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable

for da#ages caused by the acts or o#issions of the une#ancipated #inor

while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.

2owever, for petitioner to be liable, #here $us# be a finin2 #ha# #he a/# oro$ission /onsiere as ne2li2en# was #he 'ro4i$a#e /ause of #hein5ur3 /ause be/ause #he ne2li2en/e $us# ha1e a /ausal /onne/#ion

#o #he a//ien#.

=n order that there #ay be a recovery for an in&ury, however, it #ust be

shown that the Uin&ury for which recovery is sought #ust be the legiti#ate

conse(uence of the wrong done" the connection between the negligence

and the in&ury #ust be a direct and natural se(uence of events, unbroken by

intervening efficient causes. n other words, #he ne2li2en/e $us# be #he'ro4i$a#e /ause of #he in5ur3. And U#he 'ro4i$a#e /auseof an in&ury isthat cause, which, in natural and continuous se(uence, unbroken by any

efficient intervening cause, produces the in&ury, and without which the result

would not have occurred.=

n this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner

was the proi#ate cause of the death of the victi#. The i$$eia#e /auseof #he a//ien# was no# #he ne2li2en/e of 'e#i#ioner or #he re/less

ri1in2 of )a$es Daniel II, bu# #he e#a/h$en# of #he s#eerin2 wheel2uie of #he 5ee'-

Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the

proi#ate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school

authorities, or the reckless driving of a#es Daniel . there was no evidence

that petitioner school allowed the #inor a#es Daniel to drive the &eep of

respondent 7ivencio 7illanueva. t was Ched 7illanueva, grandson of

respondent 7ivencio 7illanueva, who had possession and control of the &eep.

2e was driving the vehicle and he allowed a#es Daniel , a #inor, to drive

the &eep at the ti#e of the accident.

2ence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the

#inor driver or #echanical detach#ent of the steering wheel guide of the

&eep, #ust be pinned on the #inors parents pri#arily. The ne2li2en/e of

'e#i#ioner S#- Mar3s A/ae$3 was onl3 a re$o#e /ause of #he a//iBe#ween #he re$o#e /ause an #he in5ur3, #here in#er1ene ne2li2en/e of #he $inors 'aren#s or #he e#a/h$en# of #he s#eewheel 2uie of #he 5ee'-

Conse(uently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for #

da#ages in the a#ount of !@11,111.11. Moral a$a2es $a3

re/o1ere if #he3 are #he 'ro4i$a#e resul# of #he efenan#s wrona/# or o$ission-n this case, the proi#ate cause of the accident wasattributable to petitioner.

E- ncidentally, there was no (uestion that the registered owner o

vehicle was respondent 7illanueva. 2e never denied and in fact ad#

this fact. e ha1e hel #ha# #he re2is#ere owner of an3 1ehi/le, e1eno# use for 'ubli/ ser1i/e, woul 'ri$aril3 be res'onsible #o'ubli/ or #o #hir 'ersons for in5uries /ause #he la##er while #he 1ehwas bein2 ri1en on #he hi2hwa3s or s#ree#s.= 2ence, withoverwhel#ing evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Da

spouses that the accident occurred because of the detach#ent of

steering wheel guide of the &eep, it is not the school, but #he re2is#owner of #he 1ehi/le who shall be hel res'onsible for a$a2es forea#h of Sherwin Car'i#anos-

G-R- No- ; )une 9, :


16/24

n the #iddle of the eperi#ent, LaysonM, who was the assistant leader of

one of the class groups, checked the result of the eperi#ent by looking into

the test tube with #agnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of

his group #ates who #oved it close and towards the eye of LaysonM. At that

instance, the co#pound in the test tube spurted out and several particles of

which hit LaysonsM eye and the different parts of the bodies of so#e of his

group #ates. As a result thereof, LaysonsM eyes were che#ically burned,

particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had tospend for his #edication.

n the other hand, Lpetitioners SC, Sr. osephini A#batali, SFC, and

TabugoM alleged that LaysonM and his class#ates were given strict

instructions to follow the written procedure for the eperi#ent and not to look

into the test tube until the heated co#pound had cooled off. LaysonM,

however, violated such instructions which led to the accident.

The parents of LaysonM, through counsel, wrote SC a letter de#anding that

it should shoulder all the #edical epenses of LaysonM that had beenincurred and will be incurred further arising fro# the accident caused by the

science eperi#ent.

SC eplained that the school cannot accede to the de#and because the

accident occurred by reason of LaysonsM failure to co#ply with the written

procedure for the eperi#ent.

aysons father, on &aysons behalf, sued petitioners for da#ages, due to

their sleepless nights, #ental anguish and wounded feelings as a result of

their sons in&ury which was due to petitioners fault and failure to eercisethe degree of care and diligence incu#bent upon each one of the#. They

also contend that the school should be held liable for #oral da#ages.

The 5TC rendered &udg#ent in favor of LaysonM and against Lpetitioners

!etitioners appealed to the CA, however, the latter affir#ed the ruling of the

5TC.

ISSUE%

*- /hether or not the proi#ate cause of &aysons in&ury was his alleged

contributory negligence which was in co#plete disregard of instructions

given prior to the eperi#entK $

E- /hether or not ayson is entitled to #oral da#ages in the case at barK

$

RU"ING%

The Court found no reason to depart fro# the unifor# rulings of the locourts that petitioners were =negligent since they all failed to eercise

re(uired reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to preven

avoid in&uries to the students.=

*- !etitioners #aintain that the proi#ate cause of aysons in&ury was

own negligence in disregarding the instructions given by Tabugo prior to

eperi#ent and peeking into the test tube.

!etitioners invoked the ruling in St. arys Acade#y v. Carpitanos w

absolved St. arys Acade#y fro# liability for the unti#ely death ostudent during a school sanctioned activity, declaring that =the negligenc

petitioner St. arys Acade#y was only a re#ote cause of the accident.=

The Court was not convinced.

t affir#ed the 5TC ruling #ha# #he i$$eia#e /ause of #he a//ien# no# #he ne2li2en/e of 8)a3son? when he /uriousl3 looe in#o #he #ube when #he /he$i/als suenl3 e4'loe whi/h /ause his in5bu# #he suen an une4'e/#e e4'losion of #he /he$iine'enen# of an3 in#er1enin2 /ause- 8*e#i#ioners? /oul h're1en#e #he $isha' if #he3 e4er/ise a hi2her e2ree of /are, /auan foresi2h#-

The court a (uo correctly ruled that:

0All of #he 8'e#i#ioners? are e6uall3 a# faul# an are liable for ne2li2ebe/ause all of #he$ are res'onsible for e4er/isin2 #he re6ureasonable /are, 'ruen/e, /au#ion an foresi2h# #o 're1en# or a

in5uries #o #he s#uen#s-The individual LpetitionersM are persons chawith the teaching and vigilance over their students as well as the supervand ensuring of their well8being. Base on #he fa/#s 'resen#e beforeCour#, #hese 8'e#i#ioners? were re$iss in #heir res'onsibili#ies la/in2 in #he e2ree of 1i2ilan/e e4'e/#e of #he$-

$o evidence was presented to establish that LpetitionerM Tabugo was in

the classroo# for the whole duration of the eperi#ent. t was unnatur

the ordinary course of events that LaysonM was brought to the school c

for i##ediate treat#ent not by LpetitionerM sub&ect teacher 5osalinda Ta

but by so#ebody else.


17/24

6stefania Abdan is e(ually at fault as the sub&ect adviser or teacher in

charge because she eercised control and supervision over LpetitionerM

Tabugo and the students the#selves. t was her obligation to insure that

nothing would go wrong and that the science eperi#ent would be

conducted safely and without any har# or in&ury to the students.

L!etitionerM Sr. osephini A#batali is likewise culpable under the o/#rine of/o$$an res'onsibili#3 because the other individual LpetitionersM wereunder her direct control and supervision. The negligent acts of the other

individual LpetitionersM were done within the scope of their assigned tasks.

The defense of due diligence of a good father of a fa#ily raised by

LpetitionerM St. oseph College will not eculpate it fro# liability because it

has been shown that it was guilty of inecusable laity in the supervision of

its teachers and in the #aintenance of what should have been a safe and

secured environ#ent for conducting dangerous eperi#ents.

L!etitionerM school is still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and

e#ployees because it had full infor#ation on the nature of dangerous

science eperi#ents but did not take affir#ative steps to avert da#age and

in&ury to students

Schools should not si#ply install safety re#inders and distribute safety

instructional #anuals but should provide protective gears and devices to

shield students fro# epected risks and anticipated dangers.

rdinarily, the liability of teachers does not etend to the school or university

itself, although an educational institution #ay be held liable under the

principle of 56S!$D6$T S9!655. t has also been held that the

liability of the e#ployer for the LtortuousM acts or negligence of its e#ployees

is pri#ary and solidary, direct and i##ediate.

!etitioners #ake #uch of the fact that Tabugo specifically instructed her

students at the start of the eperi#ent not to look into the heated test tube

before the co#pound had cooled off. !etitioners would allocate all liability

and place all bla#e for the accident on a twelve *E-8year8old student, herein

respondent ayson.

As found by both lower courts, #he 'ro4i$a#e /ause of )a3sons in5ur3was #he /on/urren# failure of 'e#i#ioners #o 're1en# #he foreseeable$isha' #ha# o//urre urin2 #he /onu/# of #he s/ien/e e4'eri$en#-*e#i#ioners were ne2li2en# b3 failin2 #o e4er/ise #he hi2her e2ree of/are, /au#ion an foresi2h# in/u$ben# u'on #he s/hool, i#sa$inis#ra#ors an #ea/hers-

Article E*) of the Fa#ily Code, in relation to Article E*)1 of the Civil C

bestows special parental authority on the following persons with

corresponding obligation, thus:

Ar#- -The school, its ad#inistrators and teachers, or the individual, eor institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority responsibility over the #inor child while under their supervision, instructio

custody.

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authoried activities whe

inside or outside the pre#ises of the school, entity or institution.

Ar#- :-The obligation i#posed by Article E*B? is de#andable not onlones own acts or o#issions, but also for those of persons for who# on

responsible.

;astly, teachers or heads of establish#ents of arts and trades shall be l

for da#ages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so lon

they re#ain in their custody.

oreover, petitioners cannot si#ply deflect their negligence and liabilit

insisting that petitioner Tabugo gave specific instructions to her science c

not to look directly into the heated co#pound.

$either does our ruling in St. arys preclude their liability in this ca

Unfor#una#el3 for 'e#i#ioners, S#- Mar3s is no# in 'oin#- n that crespondents thereat ad#itted the docu#entary ehibits establishing tha

cause of the accident was a #echanical defect and not the recklessnes

the #inor, a#es Daniel , in driving the &eep. /e held, thus:

Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that

pro#imate cause of the accident was the negligence of the sc

authorities, or the rec*less driving of +ames Daniel .

# # #.

Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the m

+ames Daniel to drive the eep of respondent ivencio illanueva. t

Ched illanueva, grandson of respondent ivencio illanueva, who

possession and control of the eep. /e was driving the vehicle and

allowed +ames Daniel , a minor, to drive the eep at the time of

accident.


18/24

/ence, lia"ility for the accident, whether caused "y the negligence of the

minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the

eep, must "e pinned on the minor(s parents primarily. The negligence of

petitioner St. ary(s &cademy was only a remote cause of the accident.

$etween the remote cause and the inury, there intervened the negligence of

the minor(s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of theeep.

E- The Court held that the proi#ate cause of LaysonsM in&ury was the

eplosion of the heated co#pound independent of any efficient intervening

cause, however, LaysonM is partly responsible for his own in&ury, hence, heshoul no# be en#i#le #o re/o1er a$a2es in full bu# $us# liewisebear #he /onse6uen/es of his own ne2li2en/e- 8*e#i#ioners?, #herefore,shoul be hel liable onl3 for #he a$a2es a/#uall3 /ause b3 #heirne2li2en/e.

=9> .ebruar3 =,


19/24

/$ respondent school is liable under Art. E*)1. $, but the SC held that

the school is not entirely without l iability

59;$


20/24

;aw 0, Title *@, !artida B, on that the person obligated, by his own fault ornegligence, takes part in the act or o#ission of the third party who causedthe da#age. t follows therefro# that #he s#a#e, b3 1ir#ue of su/h'ro1isions of law, is no# res'onsible for #he a$a2e suffere b3 'ri1a#eini1iuals in /onse6uen/e of a/#s 'erfor$e b3 i#s e$'lo3ees in #heis/har2e of #he fun/#ions 'er#ainin2 #o #heir offi/e, be/ause nei#herfaul# nor e1en ne2li2en/e /an be 'resu$e on #he 'ar# of #he s#a#e in#he or2aniFa#ion of bran/hes of #he 'ubli/ ser1i/e an #he a''oin#$en#

of i#s a2en#sLon the contrary, we #ust presuppose all foresight hu#anlypossible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the generalweal and that of private persons interested in its operation. 'etween theselatter and the state, therefore, no relations of a private nature governed bythe civil law can arise ecept in a case where the state acts as a &udicialperson capable of ac(uiring rights and contracting obligations.The responsibility of the state is li#ited by article *+10 to the case wherein itacts through a special agent and a special agent, in the sense in whichthese words are e#ployed, is one who receives a definite and fied order orco##ission, foreign to the eercise of the duties of his office if he is aspecial official- so that in representation of the state and being bound to actas an agent thereof, he eecutes the trust confided to hi#. This /on/e'#oes no# a''l3 #o an3 e4e/u#i1e a2en# who is an e$'lo3ee of #he a/#i1ea$inis#ra#ion an who on his own res'onsibili#3 'erfor$s #hefun/#ions whi/h are inheren# in an na#urall3 'er#ain #o his offi/e anwhi/h are re2ula#e b3 law an #he re2ula#ions-

There bein2 no showin2 #ha# wha#e1er ne2li2en/e $a3 be i$'u#e #o#he E$er2en/3 Con#rol A$inis#ra#ion or i#s offi/ers, was one b3 ans'e/ial a2en#, be/ause #he offi/ers of #he E$er2en/3 Con#rolA$inis#ra#ion i no# a/# as s'e/ial a2en#s of #he 2o1ern$en# wi#hin#he abo1e efine $eanin2 of #ha# wor in ar#i/le


21/24

car when the incident happened. Apparently, the chauffeur, co#ing fro# theopposite direction and was driving straight ahead and when the auto#obileabout to be boarded by Chap#an was in front of hi#, he Lthe chauffeurMinstead of swerving left he suddenly swerved right to the direction ofChap#an thereby hitting and running over hi#.

The &udg#ent of the trial court was for defendant.

SS96: /hether or not 9nderwood is liable for the negligent act of his

chauffeur.

59;$


22/24

streets, avenues, and alleys and sidewalks and the regulation of the usethereof #ay be legislated by the unicipal 'oard. Thus, the charter clearlyindicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalkwhere the open drainage hole is located.

There is, therefore, no doubt that the City 6ngineer eercisescontrol or supervision over the public works in (uestion. 2ence, the liabilityof the city to the petitioner under article E*+) of the Civil Code is clear.

ON DAMAGES:

'e all that as it #ay, the a/#ual a$a2esawarded to the petitioner in thea#ount of ! *1,111.11 should be reduced to the proven epenses of !

),1@0.?@ only. The trial court should not have rounded off the a#ount. n

deter#ining actual da#ages, the court can not rely on =speculation,

con&ecture or guess work= as to the a#ount. /ithout the actual proof of loss,

the award of actual da#ages beco#es erroneous.

Moral a$a2es#ay be awarded even without proof of pecuniary loss,inas#uch as the deter#ination of the a#ount is discretionary on the court.

Though incapable of pecuniary esti#ation, #oral da#ages are in the nature

of an award to co#pensate the clai#ant for actual in&ury suffered but which

for so#e reason can not be proven. 2owever, in awarding #oral da#ages,the following should be taken into consideration:

*- First, the proi#ate cause of the in&ury #ust be the clai#ee4s acts.

E- Second, there #ust be co#pensatory or actual da#ages as

satisfactory proof of the factual basis for da#ages.

0- Third, the award of #oral da#ages #ust be predicated on any of

the cases enu#erated in the Civil Code.

n the case at bar, the physical suffering and #ental anguish suffered by the

petitioner were proven. /itnesses fro# the petitioner4s place of work testified

to the degeneration in her disposition8fro# being &ovial to depressed. She

refrained fro# attending social and civic activities.

$evertheless the award of #oral da#ages at ! *@1,111.11 is ecessive. 2er

handicap was not per#anent and disabled her only during her treat#ent

which lasted for one year. Though evidence of #oral loss and anguish

eisted to warrant the award of da#ages, the #oderating hand of the law is

called for. The Court has ti#e and again called attention to the reprehensible

propensity of trial &udges to award da#ages without basis, resulting in

ehorbitant a#ounts. The a#ount of #oral da#ages should be reduced to !

E1,111.11 based on &urisprudence.

As for the awar of e4e$'lar3 a$a2es, the trial court correctly pointedout the basis:

To serve as an ea#ple for the public good, it is high ti#e that theCourt, through this case, should serve warning to the city or cities

concerned to be #ore conscious of their duty and responsibility to their

constituents, especially when they are engaged in construction work or

when there are #anholes on their sidewalks or streets which are

uncovered, to i##ediately cover the sa#e, in order to #ini#ie or

prevent accidents to the poor pedestrians.

Too often in the eal to put up =public i#pact= pro&ects such as beautification

drives, the end is #ore i#portant than the #anner in which the work is

carried out. 'ecause of this obsession for showing off, such trivial details as

#isplaced flower pots betray the careless eecution of the pro&ects, causing

public inconvenience and inviting accidents.

G-R- No-


23/24

*- /hether or not the petitioners were negligent in the case at barK P6S

E- /hether or not the respondent is entitled to #oral da#ages in the case

at barK $

0- /hether or not the respondent is entitled to ee#plary da#agesK P6S

RU"ING%

*- $egligence

*ro4i$a#e /ause is efine as an3 /ause #ha# 'rou/es in5ur3 in ana#ural an /on#inuous se6uen/e, unbroen b3 an3 effi/ien#in#er1enin2 /ause, su/h #ha# #he resul# woul no# ha1e o//urreo#herwise.*ro4i$a#e /ause is e#er$ine fro$ #he fa/#s of ea/h /ase,u'on a /o$bine /onsiera#ion of lo2i/, /o$$on sense, 'oli/3 an're/een#-

That the negligence of petitioners was the proi#ate cause of the accident

was aptly discussed in the lower court4s finding, which we (uote:

Facts o"taining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of Fe"ruary

01, 2311 which caused almost the life and lim" of Fulgencio Dacara, +r.

when his car turned turtle was the e#istence of a pile of earth from a digging

done relative to the "ase failure at atahimi* Street nary a lighting device or

a reflectori4ed "arricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an

adequate warning to motorist especially during the thic* of the night where

dar*ness is pervasive.

Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were

signs, gasera which was "uried so that its light could not "e "lown off "y the

wind and "arricade, none was ever presented to stress the point thatsufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed at atahimi*

Street. f indeed signs were placed thereat, how then could it "e e#plained

that according to the report even of the policeman which for clarity is quoted

again, none was found at the scene of the accident.

5egligence of a person whether natural or uridical over a particular set of

events is transfi#ed "y the attending circumstances so that the greater the

danger *nown or reasona"ly anticipated, the greater is the degree of

required to "e o"served.

The provisions of &rticle 0213 of the 5ew Civil Code capsuli4es

responsi"ility of the city government relative to the maintenance of ro

and "ridges since it e#ercises the control and supervision over the sa

Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision found in

su"ect-article is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the

government lia"le. /arsh application of the law ensues as a result the

"ut the state assumed the responsi"ility for the maintenance and repa

the roads and "ridges and neither e#ception nor e#culpation from lia

would deem ust and equita"le.

Bo#h #he #rial an #he a''ella#e /our#s finin2s, whi/h are a$subs#an#ia#e b3 #he e1ien/e on re/or, /learl3 'oin# #o 'e#i#ionne2li2en/e as #he 'ro4i$a#e /ause of #he a$a2es suffereres'onen#s /ar- No ae6ua#e reason has been 2i1en #o o1er#urn fa/#ual /on/lusion.

E- oral Da#ages

!etitioners argue that #oral da#ages are recoverable only in the instan

specified in Article EE*+ of the Civil Code. Although the instant case iaction for (uasi8delict, petitioners contend that #oral da#ages are

recoverable, because no evidence of physical in&ury were presented be

the trial court.

To awar $oral a$a2es, a /our# $us# be sa#isfie wi#h 'roof offollowin2 re6uisi#es%


24/24

I# is a''aren# fro$ #he De/isions of #he #rial an #he a''ella#e /our#s,howe1er, #ha# no o#her e1ien/e su/h as a $ei/al /er#ifi/a#e or 'roofof $ei/al e4'enses was 'resen#e #o 'ro1e .ul2en/io )r-s bareasser#ion of 'h3si/al in5ur3-

Thus, #here was no /reible 'roof #ha# woul 5us#if3 an awar of $orala$a2es base on Ar#i/le

compiled digests batch 7 complete

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