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CID v. JavierJune 30, 1960 | Barrera, CJ. | EasementsDigester: Villafuerte, Beatriz C.

SUMMARY: The issue in the present case is whether respondents owners of building standing on their lot with windows overlooking the adjacent lor had acquired by prescription an enforceable easement of light and view arising from a verbal prohibition to obstruct such view and light. The Court held that respondents did not acquire the easement. Doctrine: Easements are in the nature of an encumbrance on the servient estate. They constitute a limitation of the dominical right of the owner of the subjected property. Hence, they can be acquired only by title and prescription, in the case of positive easement, only as a result of some sort of invasion, apparent and continuous, of the servient estate. By the same toke, negative easements cannot be acquired by less formal means. Hence, the requirement that the prohibition should be by a formal act, an instrument acknowledged before a notary public

FACTS: Parties in this case are neighbors. Respondents Irene Javier et.al are owners of a building standing on their lot with windows overlooking the adjacent lot, owned by petitioners Laureana Cid. The respondents house as well as that of the petitioner, are within their respective properties. The respondents wall stands only 50 cm from the boundary of the 2 lots. Whereas, the wall of the petitioners building was constructed 1 meter from the boundary or 1m and 50cm from the wall of the house of respondents. As a result, it was found by the lower court that the eaves of the 2 houses overlap by 24 centimeters. (This fact was derived from the 1961 resolution of the Supreme Court) Allegedly in 1913 or 1914, before the New Civil Code took effect, the predecessors-in-interest of petitioner were verbally prohibited by the respondent to obstruct view and light. It was found by the Court of Appeals that both lots were covered by Original Certificates of Title. However, in both of them, it does not appear any annotation in respect to the easement supposedly acquired by prescription, which counting the 20 years from 1913or1914, would have already ripened by 1937, date of the decrees of registration. Trial Court ruled in favor of Javier. Repsondents acquired the easement CA affirmed trial courts decision

RULING: Decision of the CA is reversed

Whether the respondents Javier had acquired by prescription an enforceable easement of light and view arising from a verbal prohibition to obstruct such view and lightNO. The alleged prohibition having been made in 1913 or 1914 before the present CC took effect, the applicable leagal provision is Article 538 of the Spanish Civil Code which provides that: to acquire by prescription of negative easement, the time of possession shall be computed from the day on which the owner of the dominant estate has, by a FORMAL ACT, forbidden the owner of the servient estate to perform any act which would be lawful without the easement. The law is explicit. It requires not any form of prohibition but exacts the doing not only of a specific, particular act, but a formal act. Formal or pertaining to form, characterized by one due form or order, done in due form with a solemnity regular; relating to matters of form. Actin civil law. A writing which states in legal form that a thing has been done, said or agreed. From these definitions, it would appear that the phrase formal act would required not merely any writing but on executed in due form or solemnity. That this is the intendment of the law although not expressed in exact language is the reason for the clarification made in Art. 621 of the Civil Code which specifically requires the prohibition to be in an instrument be acknowledged before a notary public. Easements are in the nature of an encumbrance on the servient estate. They constitute a limitation of the dominical right of the owner of the subjected property. Hence, they can be acquired only by title and by prescription, in the case of positive easement, only as a result of some sort of invasion, apparent and continuous, of the servient estate. By the same token, negative easements cannot be acquired by less formal means. Hence, the requirement that the prohibition (the equivalent of the act of invasion) should be by "a formal act", "an instrument acknowledged before a notary public."

FRANCISCO v. PAEZ AND JABSONSeptember 20, 2010 | Romualdez, J. | Easement- extinguishmentDigester: Venturanza, Maria

SUMMARY: Francisco claims a right of way across the land of defendants Paez and Jabson. However, the trial court ruled that his action is barred by prescription because he filed it only 18 years after the right of the original owners to claim a right of way arose. The Court held that this is not a case of prescription by non-use, but a claim to exercise legal easement. Thus, the action is imprescriptible. DOCTRINE: Prescription affects all easements lawfully arisen although they may not have been used. Nevertheless, the second paragraph of article [631] refers to an easement in use, for one cannot discontinue using what one has never used. Regarding legal easement, the right or the power to claim the exercise of legal easement does not prescribe.

FACTS: In a complaint filed on 1 September 1927, plaintiff Marcelo Francisco claims a right of way, upon payment of indemnity, across the land of defendants Timoteo Paez and Ricardo Jabson; that the latter recognize the plaintiff's ownership of a piece of land of 23.46 square meters, that they vacate it, and that the defendant indemnify him for the damages arising from said occupation. Defendant Paez answered with a general denial and set up the special defense of prescription. Defendant Jabson, in turn, also answered with a general denial, and by way of special defense denied that the plaintiff has any right of way over his land, because outside of it there is another possible way to the street, which is shorter and less prejudicial. CFI of Manila The trial court held that the plaintiffs action to enforce his right of way over defendant Paezs land is barred by the statute of limitations based on the following grounds (the court now narrates the origin of dispute): The parcels of land originally belonged to a certain Paulino Castaeda y Francisco. He obtained decree No. 3138 in proceeding No. 4865, and subsequently, certificate of title No. 1449. On 20 October 1909, this parcel of land was subdivided into two parts, one containing 193.66 square meters, situated in the inner portion of the space between Padre Rada and Ilaya Streets, and the other containing 173.71 square meters, conterminous with said streets. The first of these parcels, that is, the interior portion, after successive transfers became the property of the plaintiff herein, and the second portion, after several transfers also, became the property of defendant Jabson. From 20 October 1909, or when the property was subdivided, there arose the right of the original owners of the interior parcel to claim a right of way over the adjacent land which was then the land abutting upon P. Rada and Ilaya Streets, through which was the nearest and shortest way to said streets. However, none of the previous owners exercised the said right until plaintiff filed the complaint 18 years later. Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the action to recover ownership or possession of real property, or an interest therein, may only be exercised within ten years after the cause of said action arises. Thus, plaintiffs action is barred by the statute of limitations.

RULING: The judgment appealed from is modified and it is held that, upon payment of the proper indemnity, the plaintiff is entitled to a right of way through the shortest and least prejudicial portion of the servient estate, from plaintiff's lot designated No. 3 in the plan Exhibit A, through defendant Timoteo Paez's lot No. 12 according to said plan, to P. Rada Street, as provided in articles 564, 565 and concordant articles of the Civil Code.

Whether the plaintiffs right of way over defendant Paezs land has prescribed NO. It is true that easements are extinguished by nonuser for twenty years (no. 1 of article 546, now 631 of the NCC). Nevertheless, the case at bar does not deal with an easement which has been used, while the legal provision cited is only applicable to easements which being in use are later abandoned. The Court cites Manresa, who says: Prescription affects all easements lawfully arisen although they may not have been used. Nevertheless, the second paragraph of article [631], number 2, refers to an easement in use, for one cannot discontinue using what one has never used, and there can be no act, at least in all the cases, adverse to an inchoate easement. Regarding legal easement, such as the one in question, Manresa also says: the right or the power to claim the exercise of legal easement does not prescribe, as occurs especially in the case of the right of way and easement of aqueduct. In his appeal, plaintiff cites No. 5 of the said provision, which refers to extinction of easement by waiver. However, the Court says that in the case of intermittent easements, such as the right of way, the waiver must be, if not formal and solemn, at least such as may be obviously gathered from positive acts, and the mere refraining from claiming the right is not sufficient for the purpose. Manresa says: It seems then that as a general rule, an express waiver should be required, but without prejudice to having the courts decide in exceptional cases that there is an evident waiver, inferred from acts which reveal it beyond all doubt. The mere fact that the plaintiff and his predecessors refrained from claiming the easement, without any positive act to imply a real waiver, does not bring the case within the provision of the aforesaid article [631], No. 5, of the Civil Code. The Courts conclusion is that such a right of way, provided by the law for the benefit of private individuals, may be waived. In support of this, the Court once again cite Manresa: Legal easements established in the interest of private individuals may be waived, but not so those of public utility But the court holds, for the reasons stated above, that said article 546, No. 5, Civil Code, is not applicable to the instant case, with reference to waiver, nor is No. 2 of the same article, regarding non-user; and therefore, the plaintiff 's right of way cannot be deemed extinguished.

PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. DUMADAGMarch 11, 2013 | Peralta, J. | EasementsDigester: Agustin, Chrissete

SUMMARY: This is a case for certiorari (originating from an accion publiciana complaint). This is a case about property considered as easements (which is occupied by squatters). Petitioner filed a complaint for accion publiciana against the squatting respondents. The Court held that the land being occupied by the respondents is part of the 3-m easement required by law along the bank of the Mahabang Ilog Creek, and is therefore part of public land. Petitioners and respondents both have no right or title over it.DOCTRINE: Easement is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner or for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong. While the general rule is that the owner of the servient estate retains the ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use the same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement, there is an exception in the Code that states that all matters concerning easements established for public or communal use shall be governed by the special laws and regulations relating thereto.

FACTS:ARGUMENT BY THE PETITIONER: July 1, 2002 petitioner filed a Complaint for accion publiciana with damages against respondents for allegedly building their shanties, without its knowledge and consent, in its 5,613 m2 property located at Daisy Road, Phase V, Pilar Village Subdivision, Almanza, Las Pias City. It claims that said parcel of land, which is duly registered in its name under TCT No. 481436 of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, was designated as an open space of Pilar Village Subdivision intended for village recreational facilities and amenities for subdivision residents.

ARGUMENT BY THE RESPONDENT: In their Answer with Counterclaim, they denied the material allegations of the Complaint and briefly asserted that it is the local government, not petitioner, which has jurisdiction and authority over them.

Trial ensued. Both parties presented their respective witnesses and the trial court additionally conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property.

RTC May 30, 2007 Dismissed petitioners complaint, finding that the land being occupied by respondents are situated on the sloping area going down and leading towards the Mahabang Ilog Creek, and within the three-meter legal easement; thus, considered as public property and part of public dominion under Article 502, which could not be owned by petitioner. TC opined that respondents have a better right to possess the occupied lot, since they are in an area reserved for public easement purposes and that only the local government of Las Pias City could institute an action for recovery of possession or ownership. CA March 5, 2010 Sustained dismissal of the case. Referring to Section 2 of A.O. No. 9921 of the DENR, CA ruled that the 3-m area being disputed is located along the creek which, in turn, is a form of a stream; therefore, belonging to the public dominion. It said that petitioner could not close its eyes or ignore the fact, which is glaring in its own title, that the 3meter strip was indeed reserved for public easement. By relying on the TCT, it is then estopped from claiming ownership and enforcing its supposed right. Unlike the trial court, however, the CA noted that the proper party entitled to seek recovery of possession of the contested portion is not the City of Las Pias, but the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG pursuant to Section 101 of C.A. No. 141 (The Public Land Act).

RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 5, 2010 Decision and October 29, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 90254, which affirmed the May 30, 2007 Decision of the Las Pias RTC, Branch 197, dismissing petitioners complaint, is hereby AFFIRMED.

Whether the petitioner owns the subject lots NO. They are easements.ARGUMENT BY THE PETITIONER: Anchoring on Art. 630, petitioner contends that although the portion of the subject property occupied by respondents is within the 3m strip reserved for public easement, it still retains ownership thereof since the strip does not form part of the public dominion As the owner of the subject parcel of land, it is entitled to its lawful possession, hence, the proper party to file an action for recovery of possession against respondents conformably with Articles 428 and 539.

COURT: An easement or servitude is a real right on anothers property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his or her property, for the benefit of another person or tenement; it is jus in re aliena, inseparable from the estate to which it actively or passively belongs, indivisible, perpetual, and a continuing property right, unless extinguished by causes provided by law. The Code defines easement as an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner or for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong. Two kinds of easement according to source: by law (legal) or by will of the owners (voluntary). A legal easement or compulsory easement, or an easement by necessity constituted by law has for its object either public use or the interest of private persons While Article 630 of the Code provides for the general rule that [t]he owner of the servient estate retains the ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use the same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement, Article 635 thereof is specific in saying that [all] matters concerning easements established for public or communal use shall be governed by the special laws and regulations relating thereto, and, in the absence thereof, by the provisions of this Title [Title VII on Easements or Servitudes]. In the case at bar, the applicability of DENR A.O. No. 9921 (June 11, 1999), which superseded DENR A.O. No. 9705 (March 6, 1997) and prescribed the revised guidelines in the implementation of the pertinent provisions of RA No. 1273 and PD Nos. 705 and 1067, cannot be doubted. Inter alia, it was issued to further the governments program of biodiversity preservation. Section 2.3 of A.O. No. 99-21 contains provisions such as the strip of three (3) meters which falls within urban areas shall be demarcated and marked on the plan for easement and bank protection and three (3) meter wide strip along the banks of rivers or streams shall be observed and be made part of the open space requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216. The strip shall be preserved and shall not be subject to subsequent subdivision. In the case of residential subdivisions, the allocation of the 3meter strip along the banks of a stream, like the Mahabang Ilog Creek in this case, is required and shall be considered as forming part of the open space requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216 dated October 14, 1977. Said law is explicit: open spaces are for public use and are, therefore, beyond the commerce of men and that [the] areas reserved for parks, playgrounds and recreational use shall be nonalienable public lands, and nonbuildable. Even the Water Code of the Philippines (Art. 51) provides that The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas x x x are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind. Petitioners right of ownership and possession has been limited by law with respect to the 3meter strip/zone along the banks of Mahabang Ilog Creek. The Court cannot agree with the trial courts opinion, as to which the CA did not pass upon, that respondents have a better right to possess the subject portion of the land because they are occupying an area reserved for public easement purposes. Similar to petitioner, respondents have no right or title over it precisely because it is public land. Squatters have no possessory rights over the land intruded upon. The length of time that they may have physically occupied the land is immaterial; they are deemed to have entered the same in bad faith, such that the nature of their possession is presumed to have retained the same character throughout their occupancy Both the Republic of the Philippines (through the OSG) and the local government of Las Pias City, may file an action depending on the purpose sought to be achieved. The former shall be responsible in case of action for reversion under C.A. 141, while the latter may also bring an action to enforce the relevant provisions of R.A. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992). Under R.A. 7279, which was enacted to uplift the living conditions in the poorer sections of the communities in urban areas and was envisioned to be the antidote to the pernicious problem of squatting in the metropolis, all local government units (LGUs) are mandated to evict and demolish persons or entities occupying danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds. Moreover, under pain of administrative and criminal liability in case of noncompliance, it obliges LGUs to strictly observe resettlement and prohibition against new illegal structures. Petitioners proper action is for mandamus to compel the local government of Las Pias City to enforce with reasonable dispatch the eviction, demolition, and relocation of respondents and any other persons similarly situated in order to give flesh to one of the avowed policies of R.A. 7279, which is to reduce urban dysfunctions, particularly those that adversely affect public health, safety, and ecology. Indeed, as one of the basic human needs, housing is a matter of state concern as it directly and significantly affects the general welfare

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA v PEDRO ROXASMarch 30, 1912 | Trent, J. | EasementsDigester: Angat, Christine Joy F.

SUMMARY: Roxas, in order to make his hacienda accessible from the public highway, filed a claim for a right of way across the lot owned by the Archdiocese of Manila. He alleged that his tenants had been using the said tract of land since time immemorial. The Court said that he has no claim of right of way. Since he based his claim on prescription, he failed to establish that the right of way was essential for the beneficial use of his hacienda. Further, the tract of land was devoted for the use of the churchgoers; the fact that his tenants were able to use them was due to the Archdioceses toleration.DOCTRINE: If the ground for a claim of right of way is prescription but the right of way is not essential for the beneficial enjoyment of the dominant estate, the proof showing adverse usewhich is an affirmative claimmust be sufficiently strong and convincing to overcome the presumption of permissive use or license.

FACTS: Pedro P. Roxas owns the Hacienda de San Pedro Macati. To enable his tenants to travel from the Hacienda to Calle Tejeron, he filed a claim for a right of way across parcel L, the lot owned by the Archdiocese of Manila. Parcel L is bounded on the north by an estero; on the west by hacienda, on the southwest by Calle Tejeron; and on the west by lands of Francisco Managen. The eastern line, which joins the hacienda, is 265 meters long. The claim of right of way starts across parcel L at a point 198 meters from the southern extremity of this line. During the trial, the parties established the following facts: The tract of land (located in parcel L) which connects Calle Tejeron and the Hacienda, has grown from a 1.5 to 2 meters wide to 4 meters wide Since time immemorial, it has been used by the tenants of the Hacienda for the passage of carts entering and leaving the Hacienda A church is constructed near the said tract, thus it is not only for the exclusive use of the tenants of Roxas hacienda, it is also used by the churchgoers, and sometimes by the people living in the Sitio of Suavoy, and other people

Court of Land Registration denied the claim of right of way across lot L

RULING: Petition denied.

Whether the claim of right of way should be granted NO. A right of way is a charge imposed upon real property for the benefit of another estate belonging to a different owner. It is a privilege or advantage in land existing distinct from the ownership of the soil. Because it is a permanent interest in anothers land with a right to enter at all times and enjoy it, it can only be founded upon agreement or upon prescription. If the ground for a claim of right of way is prescription but the right of way is not essential for the beneficial enjoyment of the dominant estate, the proof showing adverse usewhich is an affirmative claimmust be sufficiently strong and convincing to overcome the presumption of permissive use or license.IN THIS CASE: (1) the use of the road by the tenants of Roxas has not been such as to create an easement by prescription or in any other manner (in other words, Roxas failed to establish that the right of way was essential for the beneficial enjoyment of the hacienda) Roxas claim of right of way cannot prosper as his basis for such claim is not the necessity growing out of the peculiar location of his property, but by prescription the immemorial use by his tenants. It has not been shown that the tenants use of the road was absolutely necessary in order to cultivate the hacienda, as to deprive other people their right to pass by the same road. In fact, it was shown that the tenants use of the road was only for convenience; they can still reach Calle Tejeron by going other directions, especially south, only 198 meters. (2) the use of said road by all has been by permission or tolerance of the Archbishop of Manila (in other words, Roxas failed to prove that there was adverse use, hence the presumption of permissive use was not overthrown) Where a tract of land, attached to a public meeting house (the church in this case), is designedly left open and unenclosed for the convenience of the members, the mere passage of persons over it in common with those for whose use it was appropriated is to be regarded as permissive and under an implied license, and not adverse. Until the owner of the land thinks proper to enclose it, such use is not adverse and will not preclude it for enclosing the land when other views of its interests renders it proper to do so. Though an adjacent proprietor may make such use of the open land more frequently than another, the same rule will apply unless there be some decisive act indicating a separate and exclusive use under a claim of right. IN THIS CASE: The road was intended by the Archbishop of Manila for the convenience of the members or worshippers of the church; that the tenants and other people were allowed to use it more frequently was just mere toleration on the part of the Archbishop. Roxas failed to establish that he has a claim of right over the said tract of land, hence, their use of the land remain permissive and not adverse. To allow the Roxas claim that because his tenants has used the said tract of land since time immemorial, thus amounting to acquisition of a right of way over said land, will result to prohibition of travel: a man will most likely disallow his neighbor to pass in his land if after a lapse of time, he will be compelled to keep the land open for the neighbors benefit and enjoyment.

EDUARDO CUAYCONG ET AL. v. RAMONA BENEDICTO ET AL.Mar. 13, 1918 | Fisher, J. | Limitations on Property Rights Legal Easements: In favor of adjacent propertiesDigester: Arreza, Dapor

SUMMARY: For more than 20 years, plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest have made use of the Nanca-Victorias road openly, publicly, and continuously. However, on Nov. 15, 2012, the defendants closed the said road at the point at which it crosses Hacienda Toreno, and refused to allow plaintiffs to use it, to their prejudice. Plaintiffs questioned the act of the defendants and claimed that they were entitled to use the said road as they have been using it for the longest time, thus, they have acquired a right of use by immemorial prescription over said road. The CFI dismissed the complaint saying that the road was a public highway. The Court reversed the CFIs decision and held that the said road was not a public highway. As such, the defendants were within their rights when they closed the road in 1911.DOCTRINE: It is a fundamental principle of the law in this jurisdiction concerning the possession of real property that such possession is not affected by acts of a possessory character which are "merely tolerated" by the possessor, or which are due to his license. This principle is applicable not only with respect to the prescription of the dominium as a whole, but to the prescription of right in rem.

FACTS: Parties: Plaintiffs-appellees: Eduardo Cuaycong, Lino Cuaycong, and Eulalio Dolor, are the owners of a group of haciendas situated between the southern boundary of the Hacienda Toreno and the barrio of Nanca, of the municipality of Saravia, and that the appellees Silverio Ginoo, Gervasio Ascalon, and Juan Ledesma, are the lessees of part of said haciendas Defendants-appellants: Blasa Benedicto and Ramona Benedicto are the owners of Hacienda Toreno, a tract of land in the municipality of Victorias, Negros Occidental It was alleged in the complaint that for more than 20 years the appellees and their predecessors-in-interest have made use of the Nanca-Victorias road which crosses the Hacienda Toreno, openly, publicly, and continuously, with the knowledge of the owners of the said hacienda. The purpose was for the conveying of products of their haciendas to the town of Victorias and to the landing place there situated, and for the purpose of transporting supplies from those points to their haciendas, making use of the said road by means of carts, carabaos, and other usual means of transportation. They also alleged that that there is no outlet to a public road from the hacienda occupied by these plaintiffs, the only road and way by which the products of the plaintiffs' property can be taken to the town of Victorias and to the landing place there being across the Hacienda Toreno by the road marked on the plan attached to the complaint. And that on the Nov. 15, 1912, the defendants closed the road in question (Nanca-Victorias road) at the point at which it crosses the Hacienda Toreno, and refused to permit plaintiffs to continue using it. And because plaintiffs were about to commence to grind their crop of sugar cane, if they were prevented from transporting their sugar across the Hacienda Toreno to their point of embarcation, they would suffer damages difficult to estimate. Plaintiffs prayed for a judgment that they are entitled to use the Nanca-Victorias road as they have been using it in the past, and that a perpetual injunction be issued against plaintiffs restraining them from impeding such use. A preliminary injunction was requested by the plaintiffs while the case was pending, which was granted by the lower court. Defendants averred the that: The road crossing the Hacienda Toreno, over which plaintiffs claim the right of passage, is the private property of defendants; They have not refused plaintiffs permission to pass over this road but have required them to pay toll for the privilege of doing so. They also claimed damages for the use of the road by plaintiffs during the pendency of the suit, alleging that the preliminary injunction had been improvidently issued upon false statements contained in the verified complaint filed by plaintiffs. CFI: Dismissed the complaint with respect to plaintiffs who claimed the right to use the Dacuman-Toreno road. With respect to the Nanca-Victorias road, the court held that it was a public highway over which the public had acquired a right of use by immemorial prescription, and ordered the issuance of a perpetual injunction against plaintiffs, restraining them from interfering in any manner with the use of the said road. It said: [as] to the Nanca-Victorias road we find incontestable proof that it has been in existence for at least forty years. It found that hacienderos and the general public passed through the land freely and that it was used for all purposes of transportation without interruption until 2 or 3 years prior when the defendants announced that the road was private and that those who wished to pass over it with sugar carts would be obliged to pay a toll of ten centavosall other vehicles, it appears, were permitted to pass free of charge. This was the arrangement from 1911 til part of 1913 and the money collected only from hacienderos and not from others. It was said that the reason for the toll originated in an attempt to raise a fund for the repair of the road. There is no evidence that any other hacienderos between Nanca and Victorias or any other person made any attempt to close the road or to collect toll.

GENERAL STATEMENTS OF FACT FOUND BY THE COURT The trial judge, in holding that the road in question is public, bases his conclusion upon the fact, which he deems to have been proven, that the road has been in existence "from time immemorial," and had been "continuously used as a public roadand open to public as such for thirty or forty yearsuntilthe defendants undertook to claim it as private and to collect toll for the passage of carts." There is no doubt that for the past 30 or 40 years a road has existed between the former site of the town of Victorias and the barrio of Nanca, of the municipality of Saravia, and that this road crosses defendants' hacienda. It is also true that during this period the plaintiffs and their predecessors in the ownership of the hacienda now held by them have made use of this road for the purpose of going and coming from their haciendas to the town of Victorias; but the question is whether this use was limited to the plaintiffs, and their tenants and employees, or whether it was, as held by the lower court, a use enjoyed by the public in general. It may be reasonably inferred from the testimony of the witnesses presented in court that all persons having occasion to travel between Victorias and the haciendas of Bacayan, Esperanza, Alacaigan, Pusot, and Dolores, whether or not they were owners, tenants, or employees of said estates, made use of the road now in dispute, crossing the Hacienda Toreno, and to this limited extent it may be said that the public made use of the road, but there is nothing in the evidence to indicate that the so-called public use extended beyond this. Apart from the fact that there is no direct evidence that the road was of general public use, the records strongly show that when the complaint was filed plaintiffs did not contend that the road was a public highway, but merely contended that they had acquired by prescription an easement of way across the Hacienda Toreno. It is not averred in the complaint that the road in question was used by the public. On the contrary, it is averred that it was used by the plaintiffs and their predecessors. It shows that when they commenced this action they had in mind the provisions of articles 564 (now Art, 649), et seq. of the Civil Code, which relate to the method of establishing the compulsory easement of way. No evidence was taken to indicate that at any time since the road in question has been in existence any part of the expense of its upkeep has been defrayed by the general government, the province, or the municipality. The municipality of Victorias had no funds to devote construction and repair of roads, and the upkeep of the road depending entirely therefore on the initiative of the persons who used it, was attended to only at such times as repairs were absolutely necessary. The court also found that it appears that the road was already in existence since 1885, but we do not believe that the document in question proves that the said road was a public highway. The court also said that although the defendants closed the Nanca-Victorias road in the month of February, 1911, and since that time have collected toll from persons passing over it with carts loaded with sugar, including those belonging to several of the plaintiffs, nothing was done by them to prevent the continuation of this restriction until December, 1912, when this action was commenced. It is natural to assume that if plaintiffs had considered that the road in question was public, they would have protested immediately against the action of the defendants, and would have either commenced a civil action, as they subsequently did, or would have brought about a prosecution under section 16 of Act No. 1511.

RULING: For the reasons stated the judgment of the court below is REVERSED, the injunction issued against defendants is DISSOLVED, and the action is DISMISSED.

Whether the Nanca-Victorias road at the point at which it traverses the hacienda Toreno was a public highway NO The defendants are the owners of the Hacienda Toreno under a Torrens title issued in accordance with the Land Registration Act, conferring to them its absolute ownership, subject only to the limitations of paragraph 4 of section 39 of said Act. It is admitted that there is no annotation on the certificate of title regarding the road here in question, either as a "public road" or as a "private way established by law," and, therefore, the questions presented by this appeal are to be determined precisely as they would be had the Hacienda Toreno not been brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act. The plaintiffs being the owners of the property in question, the presumption of law is that it is free from any lien or encumbrance whatever, and the burden therefore rests upon plaintiffs to establish the contrary. The court had previously held in Fabie v. Lichauco that "It is a settled doctrine of law that a property is assumed to be free from all encumbrance unless the contrary is proved." There is admittedly no evidence to show that the land occupied by the road here in question was at any time conveyed to the general government or any of its political subdivisions by the present or any of the former owners of the Hacienda Toreno. The record fails to disclose any evidence whatever tending to show that the Government has at any time asserted any right or title in or to the land occupied by the road, or that it has incurred any expense whatever in its upkeep or construction. The evidence shows that the repairs were made by the owners of the estates benefited by the road, and by their laborers, as a purely voluntary act for their own convenience and interest. There being no evidence that the original use of the road by plaintiffs' predecessors was based upon any express grant of the fee to the road or of an easement of way, or that it began under the assertion of a right on their part, the presumption must be that the origin of the use was the mere tolerance or license of the owners of the estates affected.

If it be held that the road in question is not a public highway, have plaintiffs proven their acquisition of an easement of way over the Hacienda Toreno at the point traversed by the road in question? NO It is a fundamental principle of the law in this jurisdiction concerning the possession of real property that such possession is not affected by acts of a possessory character which are "merely tolerated" by the possessor, or which are due to his license. This principle is applicable not only with respect to the prescription of the dominium as a whole, but to the prescription of right in rem. In the case of Cortes vs. Palanca Yu-Tibo the Court said: "The provision of article 1942 of the Civil Code to the effect that acts which are merely tolerated produce no effect with respect to possession is applicable as much to the prescription of real rights as to the prescription of the fee, it being a glaring and self-evident error to affirm the contrary, as does the appellant in his motion papers. Possession is the fundamental basis of the prescription. Without it no kind of prescription is possible, not even the extraordinary. Consequently, if acts of mere tolerance produce no effect with respect to possession, as that article provides, in conformity with article 444 of the same Code, it is evident that they can produce no effect with respect to prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary. This is true whether the prescriptive acquisition be of a fee or of real rights, for the same reason holds in one and the other case; that is, that there has been no true possession in the legal sense of the word." Possession, under the Civil Code, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be possession under claim of title (en concepto de dueno), or to use the common law equivalent of the term, it must be adverse. Acts of a possessory character, performed by one who holds by mere tolerance of the owner are clearly not en concepto de dueo, and such possessory acts, no matter how long so continued, do not start the running of the period of prescription. The Court of the opinion, and so hold that upon the facts established by the evidence it does not appear that the road in question is a public road or way. We are also of the opinion that plaintiffs have failed to show that they have acquired by prescription a private right of passage over the lands of defendants. The Court had held in the case of Ayala de Roxas v. Case that "The third Partida in title 31, law 15says that discontinuous servitudesmust be proved by usage or a term so long that men can not remember its commencement. In many judgments the supreme court of Spain has refused to accept proof of any definite number of years as a satisfaction of this requirement of the law. We are of the opinion that in order to establish a right of prescription [title of prescription based upon use from time immemorial] something more is required than the memory of living witnesses. Whether this something should be the declaration of persons long dead, repeated by those who testify, as exacted by the Spanish law, or should be the common reputation of ownership recognized by the Code of Procedure, it is unnecessary for us to decide. On either theory the appellant has failed in his proof..." The same thing may be said in this case. Witnesses have testified that they have known the road for a certain period of years, beginning at a time prior to the enactment of the Civil Code, but no evidence has been made to prove immemorial use by either of the means of proof mentioned in this decision cited, nor is immemorial user averred in the complaint as the basis of the right. It is evident, therefore, that no vested right by user from time immemorial had been acquired by plaintiffs at the time the Civil Code took effect. Under that Code no discontinuous easement could be acquired by prescription in any event. Our conclusion is, therefore, that plaintiffs have not acquired by prescription a right to an easement of way over the defendants' property; that their use of the Nanca-Victorias road across the Hacienda Toreno was due merely to the tacit license and tolerance of the defendants and their predecessors in title; that the license was essentially revokable; and that, therefore, the defendants were within their rights when they closed the road in 1911.

VALDERRAMA, RODRIGUEZ, URRA, et al v. NORTH NEGROSDecember 18, 1925 | Villamor, J. | Legal EasementsDigester: Aspi, Maria Margarita

SUMMARY: Several hacienda owners of Manapla entered into a milling contract with Miguel Osorio. North Negros subsequently acquired the rights and interests of Osorio in the milling contract. The hacienda owners could not furnish sufficient cane for milling, as required by the capacity of said central, so North Negros made other milling contracts with various hacienda owners of Cadiz in order to obtain sufficient cane to sustain the central. This gave rise to the plaintiffs filing their complaint, alleging that the easement of way, which each of them has established in his respective hacienda, was only for the transportation through each hacienda of the sugar cane of the owner thereof. The Court held that the easement was created for the benefit of the corporation, owner of the central. North Negros may cause its wagons to pass upon the road as many times as it may deem fit, according to the needs of the central. If the plaintiffs do not produce sufficient cane to cover the capacity of the central, it would be unjust to impose upon North Negros the burden of maintaining a central.DOCTRINE: The owner of the dominant estate, in making on the servient estate the necessary works for the use and preservation of the easement, cannot alter it, nor make it more burdensome; but this does not mean that the defendant cannot transport in the wagons passing upon the railroad other cane than that of the plaintiffs.

FACTS: November 17, 1916, several hacienda owners of Manapla, Occidental Negros, entered into a milling contract with Miguel J. Osorio, wherein Osorio agreed to install in Manapla a sugar central of a minimum capacity of 300 tons, for grinding and milling all the sugar cane to be grown by the hacienda owners, who in turn bound themselves to furnish the central with all the cane they might produce in their estates for thirty years from the execution of the contract. Defendant North Negros Sugar Co., Inc., acquired the rights and interest of Miguel J. Osorio in the milling contract. January 29, 1919, Catalino Valderrama, and on February 1, 1919, Emilio Rodriguez and Santos Urra, Ignacio Benito Huarte, Adolfo Huarte and Pedro Auzmendi made with the appellant other milling contracts identical with the first one of November 17, 1916, with some new conditions. In view of the fact that the hacienda owners, who were up to that time customers of the central, could not furnish sufficient cane for milling, as required by the capacity of said central, the defendant made other milling contracts with various hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros, in order to obtain sufficient cane to sustain the central; and this gave rise to the plaintiffs filing their complaint, alleging that the easement of way, which each of them has established in his respective hacienda, was only for the transportation through each hacienda of the sugar cane of the owner thereof, while the defendant maintains that it had the right to transport to its central upon the railroad passing through the haciendas of the plaintiffs, not only the sugar cane harvested in said haciendas, but also that of the hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros. The plaintiffs, in separate complaints, prayed the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros to pronounce judgment, holding that the defendant had no right, under the easement or otherwise, to cause its locomotives and wagons to run across the estates of the plaintiffs for the purpose of transporting sugar cane of any agriculturist of Cadiz, Occidental Negros. Defendant, as a special defense, alleged that the plaintiffs respectively granted the defendant, for the period of fifty years from the date of the aforesaid contracts, an easement of way 7 meters wide upon the lands of the plaintiffs for the construction and operation of a railroad for the transportation of sugar cane; that said easement of way was established without any restriction whatsoever, as regards the ownership of the cane to be transported over the said railroad; that said contract was then in full force and effect and had never been annulled or modified.

TRIAL COURT Defendant had no right to pass through the lands of the plaintiffs described in their amended complaints for the transportation of sugar cane not grown from any of the haciendas of the plaintiffs.

RULING: Judgment appealed from must be reversed and the appellant absolved, as it is hereby absolved, from the complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs. Whether the use of the easement is limited only to the transportation of cane grown by plaintiffs in their respective haciendas NO. In the contract executed by the plaintiff Valderrama with the defendant on January 29, 1919, there appears: "6th. That in order to have the obligations herein entered into by Mr. Valderrama duly registered, in regard to the rural estates belonging to him and which are described hereinafter, an easement of way 7 meters wide and for the period of 50 years from the date hereof is hereby created in favor of the 'North Negros Sugar Co., Inc.,' upon his property hereinafter described, at such place as said corporation may see fit for the construction of a railroad." In the contract of the plaintiff Rodriguez of February 1, 1919, there also appears: "6th. That in order to have the obligations herein entered into by Mr. Emilio Rodriguez duly registered, in regard to the rural estates belonging to him which are hereinafter described, an easement of way 7 meters wide and for the period of 50 years from the date hereof is hereby established by said Mr. Emilio Rodriguez in favor of the 'North Negros Sugar Co., Inc.,' upon his estate aforementioned, at such place as said corporation may see fit for the construction of a railroad." In the contract of Santos Urra and others of February 1, 1919, there likewise appears: "7th. That in order to have the obligations herein entered into by Santos Urra, Ignacio Benito Huarte, Adolfo Huarte and Pedro Auzmendi duly registered, in regard to their estate hereinafter described, an easement of way 7 meters wide and for the period of 50 years from the date hereof is hereby established in favor of the 'North Negros Sugar Co., Inc.,' upon their estate hereinafter described, at such place as said corporation may see fit for the construction of a railroad."

PLAINTIFFS ARGUMENT # 1 The aforesaid clause is ambiguous, and under the first exception of Sec. 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure, they have the right to introduce extraneous evidence to explain the true intent of the parties. It is ambiguous because it may be applied to the transportation of the cane of the plaintiffs or of other producers, which is contrary to the intent of the contracting parties.

COURT Said clause is clear enough in its terms to express what the parties have intended to agree upon. Had the clause mentioned only an "easement of way," there might be a doubt as to whether or not the easement of way is for pedestrians, horsemen or carriages. But when the clause says: "easement of way 7 meters wide for the period of 50 years for the construction of a railroad," there can be no doubt about what the contracting parties have agreed upon: that the plaintiffs have created upon their respective haciendas at a suitable place an easement of way 7 meters wide and for a period of fifty years, in order to enable the defendant to build and maintain a railroad for the transportation of sugar cane to the central. To limit the use of the road exclusively to the cane of the plaintiffs and within their respective haciendas would make the contract in question ineffective, except as to the hacienda which is contiguous or nearest to the central. The object of such a milling contract, from which arises the easement in question, is undoubtedly to obtain mutual benefit to the producers of sugar cane and the corporation putting up the central. But the contract could not produce any benefit to the parties, if the explanation given by the plaintiffs would be admitted. It is against the nature of the easement to pretend that it was established in favor of the servient estates, because it is a well-settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of ownership and not by reason of easement. This is a case of an easement for the benefit of a corporation, voluntarily created by the plaintiffs upon their respective estates for the construction of a railroad connecting said estates with the central of the defendant. Once the road is constructed, the easement is apparent because it is continuously exposed to view by the rails which reveal the use and enjoyment of said easement. The cane of the plaintiffs is to be transported to the central by means of wagons passing upon the railroad; but as the easement was created for the benefit of the corporation, owner of the central, it may cause its wagons to pass upon the road as many times as it may deem fit, according to the needs of the central. If the plaintiffs do not produce sufficient cane to cover the capacity of the central, it would be unjust to impose upon the defendant corporation the burden of maintaining a central.

PLAINTIFFS ARGUMENT # 2 By transporting upon the road, through the servient estates, the cane of the planters of Cadiz, it would alter the easement, making it more burdensome.

COURT The owner of the dominant estate, in making on the servient estate the necessary works for the use and preservation of the easement, cannot alter it, nor make it more burdensome; but this does not mean that the defendant cannot transport in the wagons passing upon the railroad other cane than that of the plaintiffs. What is prohibited is that the defendant, in extending the road or in repairing it, should occupy a greater area of land of the servient estates, or deposit excavations or building materials outside of the area of 7 meters, because in the first case, the easement will be altered, and in the second it would become more burdensome. But nothing of the kind happens when the defendant transports on the railroad, crossing the servient estates, the cane of the planters of Cadiz; the railroad continues to occupy the same area on the servient estates, and the incumbrance resulting from the easement continues to be the same. At the time of the execution of the milling contracts above referred to, there was no intention on the part of the contracting parties to limit the use of the railroad to the transportation of cane grown by the plaintiffs in their respective haciendas, and that is because, while the duration of the milling contracts is fixed at thirty years, that of the easement is at fifty. So that if at the end of thirty years the plaintiffs or their successors should no longer desire to furnish canes for milling in the central of the defendant, the latter shall still have the right to the easement for the remaining period, but without transporting on the railroad any cane for the central.

NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO. v. SERAFIN HIDALGOOctober 31, 1936 | Recto, J. | Legal EasementsDigester: Batac, JeffreySUMMARY: North Negros Sugar Co. constructed a road within its property to connect its mill site to the provincial highway. It made the use of such road available to the general public and the motorists upon payment of a P0.15 toll per automobile. In October 1933, it filed for an injunction to prevent Serafin Hidalgo, the owner of a tuba saloon adjacent to NNSC's property, from using its road. The Court held that NNSC cannot enjoin Hidalgo from using said road because: (a) NNSC merely fabricated allegations against Hidalgo; and that (b) the subject road was an easement of way voluntarily constituted in favor of a community. As such, NNSC cannot discriminate against anyone so long as anyone who wishes to use said road pays the toll.

DOCTRINE: When private property is devoted to public use in the business of a public utility, certain reciprocal rights and duties are raised by implication of law between the utility and the public it undertakes to serve, and no contract between them is necessary to give rise thereto.

FACTS: North Negros Sugar Co. (NNSC) was the owner of a site in which was located its sugar central, with its factory building and residence for its employees and laborers, known as the "mill site." It also owned the adjoining sugar plantation known as Hacienda "Begoa." Across its properties, NNSC constructed a road connecting the "mill site" with the provincial highway. Through this road plaintiff allowed vehicles to pass upon payment of a toll charge of P0.15 for each truck or automobile. Pedestrians were allowed free passage through it. One of the users of said road was Serafin Hidalgo, the owner of a billiard hall and a tuba saloon located at Hacienda Sagay adjacent to NNSC's mill site. Like other people in and about the place, Hidalgo used to pass through the said road because it was his only means of access to Hacienda Sagay. Later on, by NNSC' order, every time that Hidago passed by driving his automobile with a cargo of tuba, NNSC's gatekeeper would stop him and prevent him from passing through said road. In such cases, Hidalgo merely deviated from said road and continued on his way to Hacienda Sagay across the fields of Hacienda "Begoa," which also belonged to NNSC. In October 1933, NNSC filed before the CFI of Negros Occidental a complaint praying that an injunction be issued, restraining Serafin Hidalgo from entering or passing through NNSC's properties, specially through the "mill site." NNSC alleged that Hidalgo caused trouble among the peaceful people of the place by disturbing public order and molesting NNSC's employees and their families. The CFI ruled in favor of NNSC and issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting Hidalgo from using said road. After the issuance of the preliminary injunction, NNSC decided to amend its complaint by dropping its allegations against Hidalgo. It turned out that NNSC merely fabricated the allegations and failed to state that the subject road was in fact open for the public to use. The real damage which NNSC sought to avoid, as it were, did not consist in Hidalgo's taking tuba with him while traversing the NNSC's property, as there was no causal relation between the act and any resultant damage, but in the fact that tuba was disposed of at the Hacienda Sagay to which NNSC's laborers had access. As a result, said laborers would ingest tuba, become drunk, and occasionally fight against one another, to the detriment of the peace in NNSC's property and the sugar production.

RULING: Writ of injunction against Hidalgo denied.

Whether NNSC can enjoin Hidalgo from using its road. NO. NNSC's road is an easement of way voluntarily constituted in favor of a community. Art. 531 of the old Civil Code read that "easements may also be established for the benefit of one or more persons or of a community to whom the encumbered estate does not belong," while Art. 594 of the old Civil Code provided that, "The owner of an estate may burden it with such easements as he may deem fit, and in such manner and form as he may consider desirable, provided he does not violate the law or public order." It is undisputed the road in question was constructed by NNSC on its own land, and that it connected the central or the "mill site" with the provincial road. NNSC also made this road accessible to the general public, regardless of class or group of persons or entities. Its use has been extended to employees and laborers of NNSC, and so also to all those who have a mind to pass through it, except that, in cases of motor vehicles, a passage fee of P0.15, each should be paid. It has also been sufficiently proven in court that NNSC's road was the only road that can be used by those living in Hacienda Sagay because they didn't have access to the provincial road. Therefore, under Art. 564 of the old Civil Code, there existed a forcible right of way in favor of the owner and occupants of Hacienda Sagay. Property becomes clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large. Therefore, as a private property affected with a public interest, it is unlawful to make arbitrary exceptions with respect to its use and enjoyment. The circumstance that NNSC is not the holder of a franchise or certificate of public convenience, or that it is a company devoted principally to the manufacturer of sugar and not to the business of public service or that the state has not as yet assumed control or jurisdiction over the operation of the road in question by NNSC, does not preclude the idea that the said road is a public utility. All told, Hidalgo cannot be enjoined from using said road for no valid cause, especially since he complies with the condition set by NNSC to pay P0.15 as toll every time he uses said road. He cannot be arbitrarily or whimsically excluded from its use.

Whether NNSC was in good faith when it filed for an injunction to prevent Hidalgo from using its road. NO. The existence of a right violated is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. The alleged conveyance of tuba to NNSC's "mill site" or the sale thereof within its property has not been established by the evidence adduced in this case. Neither is there any evidence to show that Hidalgo actually created disturbance in NNSC's properties, including its "mill site." In other words, there has been a failure on NNSC's part to establish either the existence of a clear and positive right specially calling for judicial protection through an extraordinary writ of the kind applied for, or that Hidalgo has committed or attempts to commit any act which has endanger or tends to endanger the existence of said right, or has injured or threatens to injure the same. The legal rule is that what the law does not authorize to be done directly cannot be hone indirectly. If NNSC cannot judicially enjoin Hidalgo from selling tuba at Hacienda Sagay, neither can it obtain said injunction to prevent him from passing over its property to transport tuba to that place as long as Hidalgo is ready to pay the transit fees required by NNSC and does not sell the said goods inside the said property. NNSC's action is frivolous and baseless. In petitioning the courts for an injunction to avert "friction or ill-feeling" against Hidalgo, NNSC is in effect attempting to intrust to the courts a mission at once beyond those conferred upon them by the Constitution and the laws, and unbecoming of their dignity and decorum. The well-known principle of equity that "he who comes to equity must come with clean hands" bars the granting of the remedy applied for by NNSC. To obtain a preliminary injunction in this case, NNSC alleged under oath in its original complaint facts which it knew to be false, or, at least, unprobable, because it did not only eliminate them from the amended complaint which it filed after the issuance of the preliminary injunction, but it failed to substantiate them at the trial. From all this, it follows that NNSC, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction, trifled with the good faith of the lower court by knowingly making untrue allegations on matters important and essential to its cause of action. Consequently, it did not come to court with clean hands.

NOTES:

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING: J. Laurel

No servitude of way under the (old) Civil Code has been created on the tenement of the NNSC in favor of Hidalgo. No legal servitude of way exists in the present case. Hidalgo has not shown that his right of passage across the tenement of NNSC exists by reason of necessity growing out of the peculiar location of his property. He does not even own the tenement where he conducts his business. NNSC's construction of a road, performed wholly upon its own exclusive property, should not be construed to constitute the creation of a servitude. Servitus in faciendo consistere nequit. "For a man should not use that which belongs to him as if it were a service only, but as his own property." The mere opening of the private way in question to the public did not necessarily clothe it with a public interest such as to compel the owner thereof to allow everybody to pass thereon. Even on the hypothesis that such private way is affected with a public interest, still, it is good law that the owner thereof may make reasonable restrictions and limitations on the use thereof by the general public. NNSC was denied the right as the owner of the private way to impose a reasonable limitation upon the use of its property. Hidalgo in his store sells and otherwise dispenses tuba which intoxicates the laborers of NNSC, incapacitates them for work, and breaks their morale. The damage to NNSC is positive and real. It is not mere "bare possibility." Therefore, NNSC may prohibit Hidalgo from using its private property. Stated otherwise, the use by Hidalgo of the private way of NNSC may be conditioned upon his not carrying tuba. Nonetheless, J. Laurel still concurs with the majority opinion that a writ of injunction should not be issued in favor of NNSC because: (a) the relief sought for by NNSC is an "accion negatoria," which has been repealed by the (old) Civil Code; (b) the granting/denial of an injunction is not subject to appeal except where there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, which abuse is absent in this case; (c) the remedy sought here is not against the transportation of tuba by Hidalgo through the premises of NNSC, but the entire exclusion therefrom of Hidalgo regardless of whether he carries tuba or not; and (d) issuing the writ of injunction in favor of NNSC will result in a discriminatory and unjust condition where Hidalgo shall become the sole person excluded from the use of the subject road while the general public will still be able to use it.

DISSENTING: J. Villareal

Writ of injunction should be issued in favor of NNSC because as the owner of the private road in question, NNSC has a right to regulate its use by imposing reasonable restrictions and limitations. To prohibit its use by Hidalgo who has repeatedly disregarded the warning of NNSC's auditor not to use the road when delivering tuba, thus becoming a persona non grata, is certainly not unjust.

CASTRO v. MONSODFebruary 2, 2011 | Nachura, J. | Legal Easements in favor of adjacent propertiesDigester: Bathan, Lizzie

SUMMARY: This case is one for the annotation of Monsods adverse claim against Castros property. Castro started excavations and diggings on the embankment adjoining the two parties properties. Monsod sought to annotate his claim to prevent Castro from continuing such activities, since it could cause the rear portion of his house to collapse. The Court ruled in favor of Monsod that a permanent injunction is necessary in order to protect Monsods interest. However, the annotation is not necessary anymore since a judicial recognition of the same already binds the property and owner of the same.DOCTRINE: An owner, by virtue of his surface right, may make excavations on his land, but his right is subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. Between two adjacent landowners, each has an absolute property right to have his land laterally supported by the soil of his neighbor, and if either, in excavating on his own premises, he so disturbs the lateral support of his neighbors land as to cause it, or, in its natural state, by the pressure of its own weight, to fall away or slide from its position, the one so excavating is liable

FACTS: Castro (petitioner) is a registered owner of a parcel of land located on Garnet St., Manuela Homes, Pamplona, Las Pias City covered by a TCT with an area of 130 sqm. Monsod (respondent) is the owner of the property adjoining said lot, located on Lyra St., Moonwalk Village, Phase 2, Las Pias City. There is a concrete fence about 2m high, dividing the two villages. Feb. 29, 2000 Monsod caused the annotation of an adverse claim against 65sqm of Castros property. The claim was filed without any claim of ownership over the property. Monsod was merely asserting the existing legal easement of lateral and subajacent support at the rear portion of his estate to prevent the property from collapsing, since his property was at an elevated plateau, about 15 ft above the level of Castros property. Monsod also filed a complaint for malicious mischief and malicious destruction before the office of the Brgy. Chairman for Castros alleged attempt to destroy and/or remove portions of the existing lateral/subjacent land and cement supports adjoining the two properties. In fact, a portion of the easement was already destroyed/removed, to the continuing prejudice of Monsod. Castro filed a complaint for damages with TRO/Writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Las Pias. Prior to the filing of the case, there were deposits of soil and rocks about 2m away from the front door of the house of Castro. Because of this, Castro was not able to park her vehicle at the dead-end portion of Garnet St. When she noticed a leak, she hired construction workers to see where the leak was coming from. They were already working when police officers sent by Monsod stopped them. ARGUMENTS OF PETITIONER (CASTRO): When she bought the property from Manuela Homes in 94, there was no annotation or existence of any easement over the property. Monsod neither asked permission nor talked to her with regard to the use of 65sqm of her property as easement. She feared that she would not be able to sell her property. However, she admitted that her TCT does not cover the open space at the dead-end portion of Garnet Street. ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENT: He and his family had been residing in Moonwalk Village since June 1984, adjacent to Castros property. When he bought it in 1983, the land elevation of Moonwalk was almost on the same level as Manuela Homes. However, in 1985, Pilar Development Corp. (PDC, developer of Manuela Homes), bulldozed, excavated, and transferred portions of the elevated land to the lower portions of Manuela Homes, making it lower than Moonwalk Village. Before excavation, Monsod complained to PDC and was assured that an embankment, which is more than 15 ft higher, will be retained at the boundary of the two villages as provided by the National Building Code. Manuela Homes retained the embankment consisting of soil and rocks. Monsod had the open space riprapped with stones as reinforcement against any potential soil erosion, earthquake, or possible digging by any person. He asserted that the affidavit of adverse claim was for the annotation of the lateral and subjacent easement of his property over the property of Castro, in view of her manifest determination to remove the embankment left by PDC. RULING OF THE RTC Cancelled Monsods adverese claim, Ordered him to pay Castro P50k moral damages, dismissed Castros claim for actual damages, etc. Such claim was non-registrable considering that the basis of his claim was an easement and not an interest adverse to the registered owner, and neither did Monsod contest Castros title. Furthermore, the adverse claim failed to comply with the requisites provided under Sec. 70 of PD 1529 RULING OF THE CA reversed the RTC and ordered the retention of the annotation at the back of the TCT, not as an adverse claim, but a recognition of the existence of a legal easement of subjacent and lateral support constituted on the lengthwise or horizontal land support/embankment area of 65sqm of Castros property. While the adverse claim could not be sanctioned because it did not fall under the requisites for registering an adverse claim, the same might be duly annotated in the title as recognition of the existence of a legal easement subjacent and lateral support. The annotation prevents Castro from making injurious excavations on the subject embankment as to deprive the residential house and lot of Monsod of its natural support and cause its collapse. MR of Castro denied.

RULING: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated May 25, 2007 and the Resolution dated July 14, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 83973 are hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the annotation at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T36071, recognizing the existence of the legal easement of subjacent and lateral support constituted on the lengthwise or horizontal land support/embankment area of sixtyfive (65) square meters, more or less, of the property of petitioner Margarita F. Castro, is hereby ordered removed.sO ORDERED.Whether the easement of lateral and subjacent support exists on the subject adjacent properties. Yes. The right of the owner provided in Art. 437, NCC is not absolute and is subject to the following limitations: 1) servitudes or easements, 2) special laws, 3) ordinances, 4) reasonable requirements of aerial navigation, 5) rights of third persons. Monsods assertion that he has an adverse claim over the 65 sqm is misplaced since he does not have a claim over the ownership of the land. The annotation of an adverse claim over registered land under Sec. 70 of PD 1529 requires a claim on the title of the disputed land. Annotation is done to apprise third persons that there is a controversy over the ownership of the land to preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of the controversy. In reality, what Monsod is claiming is a judicial recognition of the existence of the easement of subjacent and lateral support over the 65sqm portion of Castros property covering the land support/embankment area. His reason is only to prevent her from removing such embankment. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner. 2 kinds of easements: Either by law or by will of the owners. The courts cannot impose or constitute any servitude where non existed. It can only declare its existence. There are therefore no judicial easements. Art. 684, NCC provides that no proprietor shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. An owner, by virtue of his surface right, may make excavations on his land, but his right is subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. Between two adjacent landowners, each has an absolute property right to have his land laterally supported by the soil of his neighbor, and if either, in excavating on his own premises, he so disturbs the lateral support of his neighbors land as to cause it, or, in its natural state, by the pressure of its own weight, to fall away or slide from its position, the one so excavating is liable. In the case at bar, an easement of subjacent and lateral support exists in favor of Monsod. The embankment and the riprapped stones have been in existence even before Castro became the owner of the property. It was proven that Castros diggings and excavations on the embankment could cause the foundation of the rear portion of Monsods house to collapse, resulting in the destruction of ahuge portion of his family dwelling. A permanent injunction on the part of Castro from making injurious excavations is necessary in order to protect the interest of Monsod.

Whether the easement may be annotated at the back of the title of the servient estate Not necessary The easement exists whether or not it is annotated or registered in the registry of property. A judicial recognition of the same already binds the property and the owner of the same, including her successors-in-interest.

NOTES: Section 70 of Presidential Decree 1529: Adverse claim.Whoever claims any part or interest inregistered land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to thedate of the original registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or interest is claimed.The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's residence, and a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be canceled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest: Pro vided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of First Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered canceled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing, shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.