JUSTICE P.N. BHAGWATI

INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

(8th-9th March, 2014)

Compromis

THE CASE CONCERNING

ILLEGAL INTERVENTION

&

ARMS CONTROL

4th Edition

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

COMPROMIS

BETWEEN THE STATE OF JANJEERAWAD (APPLICANT)

AND THE STATE OF BAMBARA (RESPONDENT),

THE STATE OF KRANCE (RESPONDENT)

TO SUBMIT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE STATES

CONCERNING ILLEGAL INTERVENTION &

& ARMS CONTROL

Jointly notified to the Court on 15 November, 2013

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

COMPROMIS

ENTRE L’ÉTAT D’JANJEERAWAD (DEMANDEUR)

ET L’ÉTAT DE BAMBARA (DÉFENDEUR)

ET L’ÉTAT DE KRANCE (DÉFENDEUR)

VISANT À SOUMETTRE À

LA COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

LES DIFFERENCES ENTRE LES ETATS’

CONCERNANTILE INTERVENTION ILLEGALE ET LE CONTROLE DES ARMES

notifié conjointement à la Cour le 15 November, 2013

JOINT NOTIFICATION

ADDRESSED TO THE REGISTRAR OF THE COURT:

The Hague, 15 November 2013

On behalf of the State of Janjeerawad ("the Applicant"), the State of Bambara ("the

Respondent") and the State of Krance ("the Respondent"),in accordance with Article 40(1) of

the Statute of the International Court of Justice, we have the honor to transmit to you an original

of the Compromis for submission to the International Court of Justice of the Differences between

the Applicant and the Respondent concerning the Illegal Intervention & Arms Control , signed in

The Hague, The Netherlands, on the Fifteenth day of November in the year two thousand and

Thirteen.

Ambassador of the State of Janjeerawad Ambassador of the State of Bambara

to the Kingdom of The Netherlands to the Kingdom of The Netherlands

Ambassador of the State of Krance

to the Kingdom of The Netherlands

COMPROMIS

SUBMITTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE BY

THE STATE OF JANJEERAWAD, THE STATE OF BAMBARA & THE STATE OF

KRANCE

ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM CONCERNING

ILLEGAL INTERVENTION AND ARMS CONTROL

The State of Janjeerawad, the State of Bambara and the State of Krance,

Considering that differences have arisen between them concerning Illegal Intervention and Arms

Control

Recognizing that the Parties concerned have been unable to settle these differences by

negotiation;

Desiring further to define the issues to be submitted to the International Court of Justice

(hereinafter referred to as "the Court") for settling this dispute;

In furtherance thereof the Parties have concluded the following Compromis:

Article 1

The Parties submit the questions contained in the Compromis to the Court pursuant to Article

40(1) of the Statute of the Court.

Article 2

It is agreed by the Parties that the State of Janjeerawad shall act as Applicant and the State of

Bambara and the State of Krance as Respondent, but such agreement is without prejudice to any

question of the burden of proof.

Article 3

(a) The Court is requested to decide the Case on the basis of the rules and principles of

general international law, as well as any applicable treaties.

(b) The Court is also requested to determine the legal consequences, including the rights and

obligations of the Parties, arising from its Judgment on the questions presented in the

Case.

Article 4

(a) All questions of procedure and rules shall be regulated in accordance with the provisions

of the Official Rules of the 2014 New Law College International Law Moot Court

Competition.

(b) The Parties request the Court to order that the written proceedings should consist of

Memorials presented by each of the Parties not later than the date set forth in the Official

Schedule of the 2014 New Law College International Law Moot Court Competition.

Article 5

(a) The Parties shall accept any Judgment of the Court as final and binding upon them and

shall execute it in its entirety and in good faith.

(b) Immediately after the transmission of any Judgment, the Parties shall enter into

negotiations on the modalities for its execution.

In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed the present Compromis

and have affixed thereto their respective seals of office.

Done in The Hague, The Netherlands, this Fifteenth day of November in the year two thousand

and Thirteen, in triplicate in the English language.

Ambassador of the State of Janjeerawad Ambassador of the State of Bambara

to the Kingdom of The Netherlands to the Kingdom of the Netherlands

Ambassador of the State of Krance

to the Kingdom of The Netherlands

COMPROMIS

1. Bambara is a landlocked country in West Jafrica. Bambara is bordered by Nilgeria to the

north, Siger to the east, Al Paso and Bukhara to the south, Girta to the south-west, and

Menegal and Mariana to the west. Bambara has an area of 1,241,238 sq km, which is

approximately equal to the combined area of Burmany, Krance, the Great Kritain,

Telgium and the Hytherlands. Its capital is Bambarko. The distance between the north

and south is 1,600km. The country is divided into eight administrative regions:

Kimbuktu, Pidal, Jao (in the north), Mufti, Kanes, Kulkru, Sikasi and Setu, and the

district of the capital, Bambarko. Bambara‟s borders on the north reach deep into the

middle of the Sahara, while the country's southern part, where the majority of inhabitants

live, features the Siger and Menégal rivers. The country's economic structure centers on

agriculture and fishing. Some of Bambara's prominent natural resources include gold,

being the third largest producer of gold in the Jafrican continent, and salt. About half the

population lives below the international poverty line of US$1.25 a day. One of the

world‟s poorest countries, Bambara‟s 65 per cent of the territory is covered by desert.

According to the most recent national census in 2009, the population was 14,517,176.

Northern Bambara covers 922,490 sq km, almost 75 per cent of the country, but

comprises only about 10 per cent of the population. It has more than 5,000km of borders

with Nilgeria, Mariana, Siger and Al Paso. The people of the North Bambara comprise

three nomadic communities: Janjeeras; Khurabs, including the Maures and the Kounta, a

sedentary community, the Shanghais, who form the majority in the Kimbuktu and Jao

regions; and the Pactus, who are nomadic pastors. The Janjeeras are mainly established in

the Pidal region, but are also present in Mentus and Brotus (Jao region) and the Kimbuktu region. The Khurabs are in the majority in the Kimbuktu region, Brotus (Jao

region) and Pidal, especially the Kounta in the Tilemsi valley between Jao and Pidal.

Pactus nomads are scattered across the three regions.

2. Krance officially the Krench Republic is another unitary semi-presidential republic in

Western Qurope, with several overseas regions and territories. Metropolitan Krance

extends from the Mediterranean Sea to the English Channel and the North Sea, and from

the Rhine to the Atlantic Ocean. Krance is the largest country in Western Qurope and the

third-largest in Qurope as a whole. It possesses the 2nd-largest exclusive economic zone

in the world. Krance has been a major power with strong cultural, economic, military,

and political influence in Qurope and around the world. In the 19th and early 20th

centuries, Krance built the second-largest colonial empire of the time, ruling large

portions of first North Jamerica and Indies and then Northwest and Central Jafrica;

Gadagascar and many Caribbean and Pacific Islands. Krance is a developed country

possessing the world's 9th-largest economy by purchasing power parity. In terms of total

household wealth, Krance is the wealthiest nation in Europe and 4th in the world. Krench

citizens enjoy a high standard of living, high public education level, and one of the

world's longest life expectancies. Krance has the world's 6th-largest military budget, the

3rd-largest deployable force in NATO, and the 29th-largest military in the world. Krance

possesses the 3rd-largest stockpile of nuclear weapons in the world and the world's 2nd-

largest diplomatic corps behind the Jamerica a developed nation. Krance is a founding

member of the United Nations, one of the five permanent members of the UN Security

Council.

3. The Janjeera people are about 2 million nomadic people who live across the Sahara

Desert, including in the North Jafrican countries of Bambara, Siger, Tibya, Nilgeria and

Khad. The Janjeeras are part of the Berber group of people, and they are largely Muslim.

Much of Janjeera art is in the form of jewelry, leather and metal saddle decorations, and

finely crafted swords. The Janjeera population spreads across the borders of several

countries, but the largest concentration is in Bambara, with an estimated 950,000. The

Janjeeras are kind of like the Kurds of the Middle East. They're a substantial ethnic

population that crosses the boundaries of several countries, but have no majority in any

one country. As a result, many Janjeeras are pressing for better representation or for their

own territory. Mohd Laddakhi, the Dictator of Tibya, a country in the Middle East

recognized the Janjeeras as determined and resourceful fighters. He promoted thousands

of them in the Tibyan army and encouraged them to be loyal to him. After the death of

Laddakhi, ethnic Janjeera soldiers who had been fighting for him have fled Tibya and

have gone to Bambara. The Janjeeras have been long-time opponents of Bambara

government, complaining that the central government located in the southern capital city

of Bambarko has ignored the Janjeeras in the country‟s impoverished north. For

thousands of years, the Janjeera People‟s economy revolved around trans-Saharan trade.

There are basically five trade routes that extend across the Sahara from the northern

Mediterranean coast to the Jafrican cities on the southern edge of the desert. Janjeera

merchants were responsible for bringing goods from these cities to the north. From there,

they were distributed throughout the world. Janjeeras were also responsible for bringing

enslaved people north from West Africa to be sold to Europeans and Middle Easterners.

Most Janjeeras practice Islam, and they have developed their own distinctive brand of the

religion. Many make daily prayers to their God, but strict adherence to other religious

requirements is rare. Most of the feasts are observed and celebrated with relish, but the

fasting that is required during Ramadan is often excused because Janjeeras travel so

much.. Janjeera men begin wearing a veil at age 25, which conceals their entire face

excluding their eyes. This veil is never removed, even in front of family members.

Janjeera women are not veiled.

4. The existence of several rebel factions is a daily and unenviable phenomenon of the

Bambara‟s life. These rebels have time and again raised their voices but their struggles

have violently crushed by the Bambara Government from time to time. The National

Freedom Strugglers of Janjeerawad (NFSJ) is a political and military organization based

in northern Bambara. The movement is made up of Janjeeras, and some of them are

believed to have previously fought in the Tibyan army during the 2011 Tibyan civil war

and returned to Bambara after that war. The movement was founded way back in 1991

with exclusive purpose of making Janjeerawad liberate from the Bambara. This

organization is headed by Mr. Arif Jalal, a former Army personnel who seems to be

famous for his unique Janjeerawad theories and who dreams of a separate, autonomous

land for Janjeeras. Khul-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Mez (KQIM) is another

Islamist militant organization which aims to overthrow the Bambara government and

institute an Islamic state.

The group has declared its intention to attack Quropean, Danish,

Krench, and Jamerican targets. It has been designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization

by the Quropean Union. KQIM has focused on kidnap for ransom as a means of raising

funds and is estimated to have raised more than $50 million in the last decade. KQIM‟s

Leader is Mr. Tayyab Khan popularly known as “Tayyab Radio‟ as he issues warnings

and threats often through the medium of Radio. The Khalifa Hunters for Oneness and

Jihad in West Jafrican Area (KHOJWA) is an active militant organization that broke off

from the Khul-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Mez (KQIM), one of the deadliest

militant organizations in the world further to spread Islam by all means possible. Ancar

Deen means "helpers of the Islamic religion" or "defenders of the faith" in Khurabic. It is

a militant Islamist group led by Abdul Gani, one of the most prominent leaders of the

Janjeera rebellion in the 1990s. He is suspected of having ties with KQIM group which

is led by his cousin Al Gama. Ancar Deen wants the imposition of strict Sharia law

across Bambara.

5. Bambara was once part of three famed West Jafrican empires which controlled trans-

Saharan trade in gold, salt, slaves, and other precious commodities. These Sahelian

kingdoms had neither rigid geopolitical boundaries nor rigid ethnic identities. The earliest

of these empires was the Bhama Empire, which was dominated by the Souls, a Mande-

speaking people. The empire expanded throughout West Jafrica from the 8th century

until 1078, when it was conquered by the Alviras. The Bambara Empire later formed on

the upper Siger River, and reached the height of power in the 14th century. Under the

Bambara Empire, the ancient cities of Dejjen and Kimbuktu were centers of both trade

and Islamic learning. The empire later declined as a result of internal intrigue, ultimately

being supplanted by the Shanghai Empire. The Shanghai people originated in current

northwestern Nilgeria. The Shanghai had long been a major power in West Jafrica subject

to the Bambara Empire's rule. In the late 14th century, the Shanghai gradually gained

independence from the Bambara Empire and expanded, ultimately subsuming the entire

eastern portion of the Bambara Empire. The Songhai Empire's eventual collapse was

largely the result of an invasion in the neighboring country 1591, under the command of

Gul Pasha. The fall of the Shanghai Empire marked the end of the region's role as a

trading crossroads. Following the establishment of sea routes by the Quropean powers,

the trans-Saharan trade routes lost significance. In the 19

th Century, Bambara fell under

the control of Krance. By 1905, most of the area was under firm Krench control as a part

of Krench Khadan. In early 1959, Krench Khadan, which changed its name to the

Khadanese Republic and Menegal united to become the Bambara Federation. The

Bambara Federation gained independence from Krance on 20 June 1960. Menegal

withdrew from the federation in August 1960, which allowed the Khadanese Republic to

become the independent Republic of Bambara on 22 September 1960. Mr. Munnar Kito

was elected the first president. Kito quickly established a one-party state, adopted an

independent Jafrican and socialist orientation with close ties to the East, and implemented

extensive nationalization of economic resources.

6. On 19 November 1968, following progressive economic decline, the Kito regime was

overthrown in a bloodless military coup led by Al Jahoori, a day which is now

commemorated as „Liberation Day‟. The subsequent military-led regime, with Al

Jahoori as president, attempted to reform the economy. However, his efforts were

frustrated by political turmoil and a devastating drought between 1968 to 1974, in which

famine killed thousands of people. The Jahoori regime faced student unrest beginning in

the late 1970s and three coup attempts. However, the Jahoori regime repressed all

dissenters until the late 1980s. The government continued to attempt economic reforms,

and the populace became increasingly dissatisfied. In response to growing demands for

multi-party democracy, the Jahoori regime allowed some limited political liberalization,

but they refused to usher in a full-fledged democratic system. In 1990, cohesive

opposition movements began to emerge, and was complicated by the turbulent rise of

ethnic violence in the north following the return of many Janjeeras to Bambara.

7. Anti-government protests in 1991 led to a coup, a transitional government, and a new

constitution. Opposition to the corrupt and dictatorial regime of Al Jahoori grew during

the 1980s. During this time, strict programs imposed to satisfy demands of the

International Monetary Fund brought increased hardship upon the country's population

while elites close to the government supposedly lived in growing wealth. Peaceful

student protests in January 1991 were brutally suppressed, with mass arrests and torture

of leaders and participants. Scattered acts of rioting and vandalism of public buildings

followed, but most actions by the dissidents remained nonviolent. From 22 March

through 26 March 1991, mass pro-democracy rallies and a nationwide strike was held in

both urban and rural communities, which became popularly known as „Les-Eventus‟ or

the March Revolution. In Bambarko, in response to mass demonstrations organized by

university students and later joined by trade unionists and others, soldiers opened fire

indiscriminately on the nonviolent demonstrators. Riots broke out briefly following the

shootings. Barricades as well as roadblocks were erected and Al Jahoori declared a state

of emergency and imposed a nightly curfew. Despite an estimated loss of 300 lives over

the course of four days, nonviolent protesters continued to return to Bambarko each day

demanding the resignation of the dictatorial president and the implementation of

democratic policies. 26 March 1991 is the day that marks the clash between military

soldiers and peaceful demonstrating students which climaxed in the massacre of dozens

under the orders of then President Al Jahoori He and three associates were later tried and

convicted and received the death sentence for their part in the decision-making of that

day. By March 26th

, the growing refusal of soldiers to fire into the largely nonviolent

protesting crowds turned into a full-scale tumult, and resulted into thousands of soldiers

putting down their arms and joining the pro-democracy movement. That afternoon,

Lieutenant Colonel Alpha Butt announced on the radio that he had arrested the dictatorial

president, Al Jahoori. As a consequence, opposition parties were legalized and a national

congress of civil and political groups met to draft a new democratic constitution to be

approved by a national referendum. The coup is remembered as Bambara's March

Revolution of 1991. In 1992, Mr. A.K. Babbanore won Bambara's first democratic,

multi-party presidential election, before being re-elected for a second term in 1997, which

was the last allowed under the constitution. In 2002, Mr. Alpha Butt, who earlier saved

the nation from the Al Jahoori‟s regime in heroic manner, was elected. During this

democratic period Bambara was regarded as one of the most politically and socially

stable countries in Jafrica.

8. After establishing the city of Kimbuktu in the 11th

century, the Janjeeras “traded,

traveled, and conquered throughout Saharan” over the next four centuries, eventually

converting to Islam in the 14th

century, which allowed them to “gain great wealth trading

salt, gold, and black slaves.” This independence was swept away when the Krench

colonized Bambara when they “defeated the Janjeeras at Kimbuktu and established

borders and administrative districts to rule the area until Bambara declared independence

in 1960.” The Janjeera people have consistently wanted self-independence and in pursuit

of such goals have engaged in a number of rebellions. The first was in 1916 when, in

response to the Krench not giving the Janjeeras their own autonomous zone (called

„Janjeerawad‟) as was promised, they revolted. The Krench violently quelled the revolt

and “subsequently confiscated important grazing lands while using Janjeeras as forced

conscripts and labor and fragmented Janjeera societies through the drawing of arbitrary

boundaries between Khadan [Bambara] and its neighbors.”After the Bambara‟s

independence, it was thought the best time for Janjeeras has come and now they will have

a dominant say in the country. However, the Janjeeras were greatly oppressed by the

government of President Kito, which came into power after the Krench had left, as they

“were singled out for particular discrimination, and were more neglected than others in

the distribution of state benefits,” which may have been due to the fact that “most of the

senior leadership of post-colonial Bambara were drawn from the southern ethnic groups

who were not sympathetic to the pastoral culture of the northern desert nomads.” In

addition to this, the Janjeeras felt that the government‟s policy of „modernization‟ was in

reality an attack on the Janjeeras themselves as the Kito government enacted policies like

“land reform that threatened the Janjeera‟s privileged access to agricultural products.”

Specifically, Kito had moved increasingly in the direction of establishing a version of the

collective farm and had created state corporations to monopolize the purchase of basic

crops. This immediately burned the Janjeera‟s new hopes and expectations with the

Bambara Government, invigorated the Janjeera‟s goal of an independent, sovereign state

and became the first Janjeera rebellion. Thus, soon after the Krench had ceded Bambara

independence, the Janjeera began to push toward their dream of establishing Janjeerawad

once again with “several prominent Janjeera leaders lobbying for a separate Janjeera

homeland consisting of northern Bambara and parts of modern day Nilgeria, Siger,

Mariana. However, it was quickly crushed due to the Janjeera‟s lacking a unified

leadership, a well-coordinated strategy or clear evidence of a coherent strategic vision.

Bambara‟s first President, Kito made it clear that independent Bambara would not cede

its northern territories. He then placed the Janjeera-populated northern regions under a

repressive military administration. 9. Yet while the Bambara military may have won the battle, they failed to win the war as

their heavy-handed tactics only alienated Janjeeras who didn‟t support the insurgency and

not only did the government fail to follow through on promises to improve the local

infrastructure and increase economic opportunity. To avoid the military occupation of

their communities and also due to massive drought in the 1980s, many Janjeeras fled to

nearby countries such as Nilgeria, Mariana, and Tibya. Thus, the grievances of the

Janjeeras went unaddressed, only creating a situation in which a rebellion would once

again occur. While Bambara was transitioning to a democracy, the Janjeera people were

still suffering under the boot of oppression. Three decades after the first rebellion, the

occupation of Janjeera communities still had not ended and resentment fueled by the

harsh repression, continued dissatisfaction with government policies, and perceived

exclusion from political power led various Janjeeras and Khurab groups to begin a

second rebellion against the Bambarian government. The second rebellion was sparked

due to attacks on non-Janjeera Bambaras at the southernmost edge of the Janjeera regions

which led to skirmishes between the Bambara army and Janjeera rebels. Yet it did not last

long as the first major step to peace was made in 1991 by the transitional government and

resulted in the BAM-JAN Accords which was negotiated in Nilgeria between the

governments of Bambara and the two major Janjeera factions, The Janjeerawad Popular

Movement (APM) and the Arabic Islamic League of Janjeerawad, (AILJ) on January 6,

1991. In the Accords, the Bambarian military agreed to disengage from the running of the

civil administration and will proceed to the suppression of certain military posts. The

Accords represented a political compromise in which more autonomy was granted to

Janjeera communities. However, the Accords were not the end of the entire situation as

tensions remained between the Janjeeras and the Bambara government.

10. The government of Bambara attempted to negotiate with the Janjeeras. This culminated

in the April 1992 National Pact between the Bambara government and several Janjeera

factions. The National Pact allowed for integration of Janjeera combatants into the

Bambarian armed forces, demilitarization of the north, economic integration of northern

populations, and a more detailed special administrative structure for the three northern

regions. However, this attempt to deal with the Janjeeras did not hold as the National Pact

only renewed debate about the unique status of Janjeera people and some rebel groups,

such as the AILJ, did not attend the National Pact talks and the violence continued,

eventually resulting in the deaths of 6,000-8,000 people before an peace agreement was

signed by all factions. The introduction the AILJ to the Janjeera rebellion is also the

introduction of radical Islam to the Janjeera fight for independence. The emergence of

radical Islam was greatly aided by the Laddakhi regime. During the 1970s many

Janjeeras had fled to Tibya and other countries, mainly for economic opportunity. Once

there, Laddakhi welcomed them with open arms. He gave them food and shelter. He

called them brothers. He also started training them as soldiers. Laddakhi then used these

soldiers to found the Islamic League in 1972. The goals of the League were to further

Laddakh‟s own territorial ambitions in the Jafrican interior and advance the cause of

Khurab supremacy. The Tibya played a major role in the third Janjeera rebellion. The

third rebellion was not so much a rebellion, but rather an insurgency that kidnapped and

killed members of the Bambarian military. The insurgency began in May 2006, when a

group of Janjeera army deserters attacked military barracks in Pidal region, seizing

weapons and demanding greater autonomy and development assistance. As a result,

another peace treaty was concluded between Bambara Government and the Janjeera

rebels. However, many rebels refused to abide by the peace treaty and continued to

terrorize the Bambarian military until the government of Bambara deployed a large

offensive force to eliminate the insurgency. Despite several peace agreements with the

government of Bambara, a growing dissatisfaction among the former Janjeera fighters,

who had been integrated into the Military of Bambara, led to new fighting in 2007.

Despite historically having difficulty maintaining alliances between secular and Islamist

factions the NFSJ allied itself with the Islamist groups Ancar Deen and KQIM . The

Bambara Army continued with small fights with the rebels for some years after 2007.

However, nobody imagined that the fate of the Bambara would meet up with something

that would change almost everything.

11. On 16 January 2012, several insurgent groups began fighting a campaign against the

Bambarian government for independence or greater autonomy for northern Bambara, and

to declare it as a New „Janjeerawad‟. The NFSJ, an organization fighting to make

Janjeerawad an independent homeland for the Janjeera people, had taken control of the

region by April 2012. The first attacks of the rebellion took place in Jenaka, a small town

in far eastern Bambara, on 16 and 17 January 2012. On 17 January, attacks in Alhok and

Tessa were reported. The Bambara government claimed to have regained control of all

three towns the next day. On 24 January, the rebels retook Alhok after the Bambara army

ran out of ammunition. The next day the Bambara government once again recaptured the

city. Bambara launched air and land counter operations to take back the seized territory,

amid protests in Bambarko and Ketu. Bambarian president Mr. Alpha Butt then

reorganised his senior commanders for the fight against the rebels. On 1 February 2012,

the NFSJ took control of the city of Jenaka when the Bambarian army operated what they

called a tactical retreat. The violence in the north led to counter protests in the capital city

of Bambarko. Dozens of Bambarian soldiers were also killed in fighting in Alhok. On 6

February, rebel forces attacked Pidal, a regional capital. On 4 March 2012, a new round

of fighting was reported near the formerly rebel-held town of Tessa. The next day, three

Bambarian army units gave up trying to lift the siege. The Jamerican Air Force air-

dropped supplies via a C-130 in support of the besieged Bambarian soldiers. On 11

March, the NSFJ re-took Tessa and its airport, and the Bambarian military forces fled

towards the border with Nilgeria. The rebels advanced to about 125 kilometers away

from Kimbuktu and their advance was unchecked when they entered without fighting in

the towns of Sire and Gotham. Ancaar Deen stated that it had control of the Bambarian-

Nilgeria border.

12. On 21 March 2012, Bambarian soldiers dissatisfied with the course of the conflict

attacked Defense Minister Sadi Gosama as he arrived to speak to them. They then stoned

the minister's car, forcing him to flee the camp. Later that day, soldiers stormed the

presidential palace, forcing Mr. Alpha Butt into hiding. The next morning, Captain

Hamdi Gogo the chairman of the new National Missionary for the Restoration of

Democracy (NMRD), made a television appearance in which he announced that the

Army had suspended Bambara's constitution and taken control of the nation. The

mutineers cited Mr. Alpha Butt‟s alleged poor handling of the insurgency and the lack of

equipment for the Bambarian Army as their reasons for the rebellion. The NMRD would

serve as an interim regime until power could be returned to a new, democratically elected

government. The coup was "unanimously condemned" by the international community,

including by the United Nations Security Council, the Jafrican Union, and the Economic

Community of West Jafrican States (ECOWJS), the latter of which announced on 29

March that the NMRD had 72 hours to relinquish control before landlocked Bambara's

borders would be closed by its neighbors, its assets would be frozen by the West

Jafrican Economic and Monetary Union, and individuals in the NMRD would receive

freezes on their assets and travel bans. ECOWJS and the Jafrican Union also suspended

Bambara. The Jamerica, the World Bank, and the Jafrican Development Bank suspended

development aid funds in support of ECOWJS and the JU's reactions to the coup. Mr.

Sharif Kotta, who was the rotational chairman of ECOWJS, said that once the civilian

government was restored an ECOWJS stand-by force of 2,000 soldiers could intervene

against the rebellion. Al Paso‟s President Bias Contore was appointed as a mediator by

ECOWJS to resolve the crisis. An agreement was reached between the Bambara Army

and ECOWJS negotiators in which both Captain Gogo and Mr. Alpha Butt would resign,

sanctions would be lifted, the mutineers would be granted amnesty, and power would

pass to National Assembly of Bambarda Speaker Mr. Russel Sinkara Mr. Sinkara pledged

to "wage a total and relentless war" on the Janjeera rebels unless they released their

control of northern Bambarian cities.

13. During the uncertainty following the coup, the NFSJ along with Ancaar Deen and KQIM

launched an offensive with the aim of capturing several towns and army camps

abandoned by the Bambara army. Though the offensive ostensibly included both the

NFSJ and Ancaar Deen, military contribution of Ancar Deen was slight: "What seems to

happen is that when they move into a town, the NFSJ take out the military base – not that

there's much resistance – and Abdul Gani goes into town and puts up his flag and starts

bossing everyone around about Sharia law” reported Human Rights Defenders, an NGO,

in its regional report. On 30 March 2012, the rebels seized control of Pidal, the capital of

Pidal Region, as well as Angara and Buma in Jao Region. On 31 March, Jao fell to the

rebels, and both NSFJ and Ancaar Deen flags appeared in the city. The following day,

rebels attacked Kimbuktu, the last major government-controlled city in the north; they

captured it with little fighting. The speed and ease with which the rebels took control of

the north was attributed in large part to the confusion created in the army's coup, leading

Reuters to describe it as "a spectacular own-goal". On 6 April 2012, stating that it had

secured all of its desired territory, the NFSJ declared independence from Bambara.

However, the declaration was rejected as invalid by the Jafrican Union and the Quropean

Union. On the same day, the NFSJ's leader Mr. Arif Jalal issued a statement to the world

Media in the following manner:

“Earlier we have stressed that the onus was on Bambara to either give the Janjeera

peoples their self-determination or they would take it themselves. Bambara is an

anarchic state. We have waited long dreaming for our rights and freedoms. Therefore we

have gathered a national liberation movement to put in an army capable of securing our

land and an executive office capable of forming democratic institutions. Finally the

golden hour has arrived. We declare the independence of Janjeerawad from this day on.

Any foreign intervention or interference would only amount to an act of war against

Janjeerawad and any such act will not at any cost be tolerated and will soon be

crushed.”

14. After the independence of Janjeerawad, former co-belligerents Ancaar Deen, KHOJWA,

and the NFSJ soon found themselves in conflict with each other as well as the populace.

Without much delay, the Islamist groups like Ancaar Deen and KHOJWA etc started

imposing „Sharia Law‟ on the people living in the region. On 5 April 2012, Islamists,

from KQIM or KHOJWA, entered the Nilgerian consulate in Jao and took hostages. The

NFSJ succeeded in negotiating their release without violence, and one NFSJ commander

said that the movement had decided to disarm other armed groups. On 8 April, a mostly

Khurab militia calling itself the National Liberation Group of Janjeerawad (NLGJ)

announced its intention to oppose Janjeera rule, battle the NFSJ, and "return to peace and

economic activity"; the group claimed to consist of 500 fighters. The NFSJ clashed with

protesters in Jao on 14 May, reportedly injuring four and killing one. On 6 June, residents

of Pidal protested against the imposition of Sharia in the town and in support of NFSJ,

protests which were violently dispersed by Ancaar Deen members. By the night of 8

June, NFSJ and Ancaar Deen rebels clashed against each other in the city with automatic

weapons, with two dying in the skirmish. Consequently, a Power-Sharing Treaty was

entered into between NFSJ and other Islamist groups. However, this treaty was a big time

failure and again clashes began to escalate between NFSJ and the Islamists. Protests

broke out on 26 June 2012 in the city of Jao, the majority of whose people are not

Janjeeras, but rather sub-Saharan groups such as the Maures and Kaunta peoples. The

protestors opposed the Janjeera rebels and the partition of Bambara. Two were killed as a

result of the protests, allegedly by NFSJ troops. The protesters used both Bambara and

Islamist flags, and Krance 24, region‟s leading Media channel reported that many locals

supported the Islamists as a result of their opposition to the Janjeera nationalists and the

secession of Janjeerawad. On 26 June 2012, the tension came to all-out combat in Jao

between the NFSJ and KHOJWA, with both sides firing heavy weapons. NFSJ Leader

Mr. Arif Jalal was wounded in the battle. The NFSJ were soon driven from the city, and

from Pidal and Kimbuktu shortly after. In the same month, a splinter group broke off

from the NFSJ calling itself the Front for the Liberation of the Janjeerawad (FLJ), the

group stated that Janjeera independence was no longer a realistic goal and that they must

concentrate on fighting the Islamists. On 16 November 2012, Janjeera NFSJ forces

launched an offensive against Jao in an attempt to retake the town. However, by the end

of the day, the Janjeeras were beaten back by the KHOJWA forces after the Islamists laid

an ambush for them. By 18 November, 2012, the Islamists took control of almost every

major region in Janjeerawad. However, NFSJ claimed to retain several rural areas.

15. In the wake of such tragic and violent incidents, the Bambara Government called for

international aid and foreign military intervention. Following the requests from the

Bambara Government, the United Nations Security Council passed a UNSC Resolution

20085 authorizing „the deployment of a Jafrican-Led International Support Mission in

Bambara (JISMB) for an initial period of one year‟. Apart from this, Krance, the former

colonial ruler of Bambara decides to come for the aid of Bambara in the cause of

eradicating hard core Islamists from the Bambara and Janjeerawad region. The NFSJ,

Ancaar Deen, KHOJWA and KQIM warned Krance to stay away from Bambara-

Janjeerawad dispute and threatened the Krance‟s President Mr. K. Pollandde by sending

an email that they can go to any extent to save the „Islam‟ and for the prosperous growth

of „Sharia law‟. The Krench President Pollandde immediately took cognizance of the

matter and deputed Mr. M. Tortuga, one of the most trusted and proved officer in the

Krance‟s Army for the Mission called „Kill the Problem Dog‟. This Mission was

supposed to relieve Bambara from all the extremists in the region. In Krench Language,

the word „Tortuga‟ means tortoise. Mr. Tortuga was well known for his famous statement

that „My name is Tortuga. I take my own time, but at the end, I win‟. Immediately, Mr.

Tortuga with his 2000 armed member troops started search and terminate operations in

the affected regions. In addition to this, Mr. Tortuga announced a reward of 50,000

Jamerican Dollors for anyone who will inform the whereabouts of Mr. Tayyab Radio, the

Leader of the KQIM. On the same day, Mr. Tortuga deploys a special troop of 500 armed

Krench Soldiers to the borders of Nilgeria and Bamabra specially to trace the movements

of KQIM. After five days of search operations carried by this special 500 armed team of

Krance, the team thinks they saw Mr. Tortuga in the distance. Surprised, the team speeds

in that direction only to discover Tortuga's severed head mounted on a live tortoise. "Stay

Away- Pollandde," was painted on its shell. Seconds later, the troop leader tries to lift the

head off of the tortoise, triggering a bomb to explode killing almost 400 and rest 100

badly wounded.

16. The weird and cruel demise of Mr. Tortuga left Krance with much anger and which also

led Mr. Pollandde horrified and devising yet another plan to terminate the Islamists in the

Bambara and Janjeerawad. The Next day, a Security Council meeting was called for and

Krance emphasized that at any cost Krance will help Bambara and get rid of KQIM,

KHOJWA and like groups in the Janjeerawad region. Fears were expressed in the

meeting that many civilians may lose their lives and as a result a consensus in favour of

an armed attack could not be made. However, Krance insisted that being the permanent

member of the Security Council, it exercises its Veto Power and will soon start armed

operations in Janjeera. The Bambara Government welcomed this move of the Krance

and promised to extend every support possible. The following day, the Krench military

launched „Operation Wild Cat’, intervening officially in the conflict. The operation

included the use of Gazelle helicopters from the Special forces, which stopped an Islamist

column advancing to Mufti, and the use of four Mirage 2000-D jets of the Air Krance

Army operating from a base in Khad. The Krench chief of army staff, Gudmundur

announced that the Islamists had withdrawn from Kanes and retreated several dozen of

kilometres into the north. The air strikes reportedly destroyed half a dozen Islamist armed

pick-up trucks and a rebel command center. One Krench pilot, Lieutenant Bootix, was

killed after his attack helicopter was downed by ground fire during the operation. These

regular attacks by the Krench Army led the Leaders of KQIM, Ancaar Deen, KHOJWA

and NFS came together and decided to share the powers in Janjeerawad equally.

However, their prime task now was to drive the Krench and Bambara Army out of

Janjeerawad and also to reiterate their right to self-determination. An Interim

Government was immediately formed with mixed representatives from all the Islamist

Groups in Janjeerawad.

17. During the night of 11 January 2013, the Bambara army, backed by Krench troops,

claimed it had regained control of the town of Pidal, and claimed to have killed over 100

Islamists. Afterwards, a Bambarian lieutenant said that mopping up operations were

taking place around Pidal and many witnesses had seen dozens of Islamist corpses around

Pidal. The Krench stated four rebel vehicles were hit by their airstrikes, while the

Bambarian Army claimed nearly 30 vehicles were bombed. Several dozens of Bambarian

soldiers and 10 civilians were also killed. A resident of Jao, the headquarters of the

KHOJWA, said that the city's hospital had been overwhelmed with dead and wounded. In

all, one local resident counted 148 bodies around Pidal. On 13 January, regional security

sources announced the death in Pidal of Abdul Gani a high level leader in the Ancaar

Deen group. Krench defense minister Le Brian said that new airstrikes were ongoing in

Bambara and Janjeerawad happened during the last week and will happen the next week

as well. It was reported that following the strikes which destroyed their bases, the rebel

forces left Jao. Residents reported that 60 Islamists died in the Jao airstrikes. Some other

were hiding in the houses and picked the dead bodies during the night.

18. Surprisingly, the most sensational and terrible news breaks out that Krench Intelligence

has found the evidence of huge stockpile of Bio-logical weapons by Janjeerawad which

was brought by the Janjeera warriors those who returned from the Tibyan war after the

Laddakhi‟s death. These biological weapons may be employed in various ways to gain a

strategic or tactical advantage over an adversary, either by threats or by actual

deployments. Like some of the chemical weapons, biological weapons may also be useful

as area denial weapons. These agents may be lethal or non-lethal, and may be targeted

against a single individual, a group of people, or even an entire population. They may be

developed, acquired, stockpiled or deployed by nation states or by non-national groups.

Later, the Janjeerawad Government confirmed its existence and threatened to apply its

force when necessary.

19. The sudden discovery of bio-logical weapons in Janjeerawad completely changed the

scenario in the region and Krance was compelled to give a second thought on its military

strategy. In this context, the State of Nilgeria intervened diplomatically and attempted to

draw some firm and final conclusion to the crisis. As a result, a Treaty of Non-

Intervention and Arms Control (NIAC) was entered into jointly by the Krance, Bambara

and Janjeerawad wherein Krance decided to withdraw its troops from Janjeerawad,

Bambara agreed to grant Janjeerawad freedom and in turn, the Janjeerawad was forced

not to impose „Sharia Law‟ in Janjeerawad and refrain from the use of its bio-logical

weapons.

20. The Dispute nearly seemed to be resolved and it was hoped that the all the three

government will honour the treaty. On the contrary, the Janjeerawad government waited

for Krance Army to withdraw its armed forces from the region. The Krench forces left

Janjeera, however, they were ordered to remain in Bambara till they get further orders.

The Janjeera Government again imposed „the Sharia Law‟ in the Janjeerawad and as a

result, the armed forces of Krance reported to indulge in the rockets attack on the Army

base established in the Janjeera- Bambara Border. Consequently, Bio-logical weapons

were used against the Krench Army bases in Bambara and Some Janjeera borders.

However, the Janjeerawad denied any such attacks from their side.

21. In May 2012, Amnesty International released a report stating that the conflict had created

Bambara's worst human rights situation since 1960. The organization stated that fighters

with the NFSJ and Ancaar Deen were "running riot" in Bambara‟s north, and

documented instances of gang rape, extrajudicial executions, and the use of child soldiers

by both Janjeera and Islamist groups. On 3 April 2012, armed groups looted 2,354 tons

of food from United Nations' World Food Programme's warehouses in Pidal, Jao and

Kimbuktu, causing the WFP to suspend its operations in northern Bambara. Other targets

of looting included hospitals, hotels, government offices, Oxfam offices and the offices

and warehouses of other unnamed aid groups. The WFP also stated that 200,000 had so

far fled the fighting, predicting that the number would rise, if the conflict continues.

On 12 March 2013, Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights Ms. Hang told the UN

Human Rights Council in Geneva that members of the Janjeera and Khurab ethnic groups

were being targeted. According to the report, she said, reprisal attacks and inter-ethnic

conflicts appear to have materialized since January, when the Krench intervention took

place. While the violations by the extremist groups have largely been stopped, there have

been widely reported allegations of serious human rights violations taking place in the

recovered territories. This led her to make an appeal in the following manner:

“We call on the Bambara authorities to protect the communities at risk and to ensure

that their troops act in accordance with human rights law and international

humanitarian law. The civilian population should be protected and the suspected rebels

who have been arrested should be treated humanely and their due process rights

respected,”

22. The negotiations were held between the Bambara, Krance and Janjeerawad which did not

result into any agreement. However, Janjeerawad decided to bring the matter to the

International Court of Justice and filed an Application on November 15th

2013, invoking

Article 36(2) of the Court‟s Statute as Bambara, Krance and Janjeerawad had

unconditional declarations recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court on file

with the Registrar.

23. Bambara, Krance and Janjeerawad are members of the United Nations, and are parties to

the United Nations Charter, the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.

24. Janjeerawad requests the Court to adjudge and declare that:

a. Janjeerawad has exercised its right to self-determination and is a free nation

b. Krance had violated the principle of non-interference of high value in

international law.

c. Krance has no legal international authority to deploy its armed forces in

Janjeerawad

d. Unreasonable exercise of Veto Power by any Permanent Nation in the Security

Council must have some legal basis and must be used in extremely rare cases

hereinafter

e. Bambara had violated the spirit of international law by supporting the Krench

forces in Janjeerawad thereby causing illegal intervention

f. Deployment of armed forces by the State of Krance violates international law and

needed immediate cessation from the boundaries of Janjeerawad

g. The armed forces deployed by the State of Krance and Bambara indulged in the

blatant violations of various human rights of civilians

h. To order the State of Bambara to refrain from any violent activities in the State of

Janjeerawad

29. The State of Bambara & Krance requests the Court to adjudge and declare that:

a. The State of Bambara and Krance has not violated the treaty provisions &

international law

b. To declare the imposition of „Sharia Law‟ in Janjeerawad as illegal and in

violation of International Law

c. the use of bio-logical weapons by the Janjeera fighters was a grave violation of

international humanitarian laws and the stockpile of any such weapons should be

destroyed immediately.

d. To declare that Janjeerawad had violated the norms of human rights and various

other humanitarian laws by not respecting the provisions of the Treaty of Non-

Intervention and Arms Control (NIAC)

e. By indulging in counter-insurgency activities, the State of Janjeerawad had abused

the human rights of people of Bambara and specially northern Bambara

f. To declare that the State of Janjeerawad had violated the international Convention on

Biological Weapons

g. To order Janjeerawad to merge with the State of Bambara and to accept its

supremacy

h. To declare the government led by NSFJ alongside KQIM, Ancaar Deen and KHOJWO

as illegal.

*NOTE*

* The issues framed under the compromis are not exhaustive. The participants are free to refer

to these or more issues in the present context.

ANNEXURE

THE TREATY OF NON-INTERVENTION AND

ARMS CONTROL (NIAC)

The Treaty of Non-Intervention and Arms Control

(NIAC)

Bearing in mind the Guiding Principles for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in the

Context of Development and a New International Economic Order,

Realizing the horrors and consequences of violence and genocide,

Realizing the use of weapons is a threat to entire mankind

Realizing that promotion and protection of national security and public order is vital to nation’s

overall development,

The State of Janjeerawad

AND

The State of Krance

The State of Bambara

Have agreed as follows:

Article. 1. Obligation to establish peace in the territory of Janjeerawad and adherence to

the principle of Non-intervention

The Parties agree to establish, by mutual efforts, peace in the territory of Janjeerawad, to decline

to resort to any violent activities and to refrain from intervention of any kind into the affairs of

Janjeerawad.

Article. 2. Control of Bio-logical and other weapons of Mass Destruction:

The Parties agree to refrain from making use of weapons of mass destruction, more particularly,

Bio-logical Weapons.

Article. 3. Promotion of Human Rights

The Parties shall make every attempt to promote the respect for human rights and take initiatives

to spread awareness of human rights.

Article. 4. Janjeerawad to refrain from imposition of ‘Sharia Law’

The State of Janjeerawad shall refrain from imposing „Sharia law‟ into the regions and shall

respect and tolerate the religious sentiments of all living in Janjeerawad.

Article. 5. Priority to be given to the cases concerning national security and integrity:

In case, a question of national security and integrity is involved in pursuance of the treaty, the

State shall give priorities to such matters and shall cooperate with each other.

Article. 6. Disputes to be decided by ICJ

In case of any dispute as to the application of the provisions of this treaty arises, any of the party

may bring the matter in dispute to the International Court of Justice at Hague, Netherlands and

the decision of the Court shall be binding .

Article. 8. Application of the Treaty:

No other State is bound by the provisions of this treaty except for The State of Janjeerawad, State

of Krance and the State of Bambara.

Article. 9. Termination

Either State may terminate this Treaty at any time by giving written notice to the other State

through the diplomatic channel. The termination shall be effective six months after the date of

receipt of such notice.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective

Governments, have signed this Treaty.

DONE at Bambarko, on January 16, 2013, at 2.30. p.m.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE JANJEERAWAD FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BAMBARA

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE BAMBARA