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CONCEPTUALIZING PARTY REPRESENTATION OF ETHNIC MINORITIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Joan DeBardeleben, Professor, Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies

Horia Nedelcu, PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science

Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada

Presented at the ECPR General Conference 2013

4 - 7 September 2013

Sciences Po Bordeaux, Domaine Universitaire, Bordeaux, France Introduction

Since the democratization of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) more than two decades

ago, scholars have attempted to classify the freshly created political parties in post-communist

states. Some scholars have identified new societal cleavages as responsible for the formation of

party systems after 1989 (Kostelecky, 2001:107; Kitschelt, 1995: 464); these cleavages may

result from the previous communist regime, be based in anti-communist grass-roots movements,

have a socio-economic base, or have a demographic character (e.g., generational cohort

differences). The political representation of ethnic minorities has been mainly studied through

the prism of nation-building and social integration, or civic versus ethnic conceptions of

citizenship. Ethnic issues thus focus on the dynamics between majorities and minorities, the

ethnic homeland and – in the case of new EU member states – the impact of international

institutions such as the EU (Kelly 2010, 2). While such factors are evidently important in

shaping state policies towards minorities, questions regarding the actual political representation

of minority interests have been less thoroughly addressed. As democracy has become

consolidated in the EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe, an important question

2      relates to the modality of representation that ethnic minorities have achieved in gaining a voice

in political life, particularly through formal political institutions.

This paper explores how ethnic minorities are represented in the political party system,

and then considers explanations for differences between countries. Much of the existing

literature on the topic applies the concept of the ‘ethnic minority party’ or ‘ethnonationalist

party’ (Gherghina and Jiglau, 2011). Various definitions of these terms are offered, but the key

idea seems to be twofold. First is the notion that such parties have as their primary objective the

promotion of the interests of a particular ethnic minority (Bernauer and Bochsler, 2011: 743;

Ishiyama and Breuning, 2011: 225). While other issues may be included in the party program,

these are secondary. Second is the notion of mobilization of the ethnic minority; the political

party turns constructed notions of shared identity and interest into an institutional mechanism for

their promotion (Gherghina and Jiglau, 2011: 52-3). In other words, the political party provides a

vehicle through which shared concerns or grievances of the minority can be represented through

the electoral process and possibly in the state’s institutional structure, if the party is successful.

While political mobilization may take other forms than political party activity, the latter is the

concern of this paper. In the first portion of the paper, we seek to develop a more nuanced

conceptualization of the notion of party representation of ethnic minorities by developing a

typology of party types.

In the second portion of the paper, we example four specific cases drawn from the new

EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). This involves a small-n comparison

that relies on a most-similar systems research design. Among the four cases are two pairs of

cases that share even more similarities with one another than they do with the other two cases

included in the study. The cases, however, differ in terms of the dependent variable, which is the

form of party representation of the most important ethnic minority in each of the four countries.

3      Accordingly we seek to identify those variables that explain the differing outcomes in terms of

party representation of ethnic minorities, despite the large number of similarities between the

cases. In this way we propose to generate hypotheses which can subsequently be tested more

systematically on a larger size sample.

Cases Studies

The four countries we have selected – Estonia, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia - are

among Central Europe’s most heterogeneous. At the time of post-communist democratization, all

four were dominated by nationalist elites that pushed for nation-state models and majority

control over the institutions of government. All are unitary states, thus federalism, as an

institutional factor affecting party formation or the political representation of ethnic minorities,

does not play a role. In none of the four cases has significant decentralization of power to

ethnically-dominated regions within the country taken place.

These countries are also similar in terms of the character of their ethnic minority

populations. All include sizable minorities with an ethnic homeland in a neighbouring state –

Russia in the case of the first two countries and Hungary in the later two. Historically, these

minorities also share a perceived image of ‘former masters’ vis-à-vis the majority group. This is

the case of the Russian minority in Estonia and Latvia between 1940 and the breakup of the

USSR as well as the case of the Magyar minority in Slovakia and Romania prior to WWI and

during Horthyst Hungary in WWII. In addition, smaller ethnic minorities are present in these

four states as well. (See Table 2) Most importantly, the largest minority in each of the four states

is actually large enough to pass existing electoral thresholds. Romania’s and Slovakia’s

Hungarian minorities stand at 6.5 per cent and 8.5 per cent of the population, respectively. In

Estonia, ethnic Russians make up 25% of the population (Statistics Estonia 2011), while in

Latvia they form just under 27%, down from 30.3 per cent in Estonia in 1989 (Melvin,

4      2000:135) and, about 34 per cent of the population in Latvia upon independence (Tsilevich,

1996) These figures may be misleading however, since most Russians were not immediately

granted citizenship (only those who had resided in the republic in the pre-World War II period,

plus a few other special categories), so that in 1992, at the time of the first post-independence

election, Melvin (2000: 148) estimates that about 10 per cent of the electorate was not of

Estonian ethnicity. The naturalization of the residents of minority ethnicity was a topic of

significant controversy after independence in both countries (Brands Kehris, 2010), The

proportion of Russians among Estonians citizens today stands at around 12 percent. 1 Muiznieks

(n.d.) estimated that in 2004 about 18 per cent of citizens in Latvia were Russian, but survey data

from 2011 suggest a somewhat lower proportion, between 15 and 16 per cent (Maturlionis et al,

2011: 9).2 Consequently, the current Russophone voting potential in both Baltic states exceeds

that of Romania’s and Slovakia’s Hungarians.

Similarly, the major minorities in all four states are, to varying degrees, concentrated in

specific areas of their respective states.3 Most of Slovakia’s 458,500 Hungarians live in the south

near the Hungarian border. They form a majority in two southwestern districts – Dunajska Streda

and Komarno (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovakia 2011). The bulk of Romania’s

1,227,600 Magyars predominantly reside in the country’s centre, forming a majority in two

counties– Hargita and Covasna.4 According to the 2011 census, of Latvia’s 557,119 Russians, t

47.5 per cent lived in Riga, making up about 40 per cent of the city’s population (Statistical

Agency of Latvia, 2011). Also in the southeastern region of the country, Latgale, about 39

percent of the population is of Russian ethnicity. In other regions of Latvia, there are still

significant numbers of Russians, but a lower proportion, between 9 percent (in Vidzeme region)

and 19 per cent (in Pieriga region). In Estonia the Russian population is somewhat more

concentrated, making up about 37 per cent of the population in Tallinn, and over 72 per cent in

5      Ida-Viru county, in the northeastern part of the country. In other counties, their share does not

exceed 13 per cent (in Tartu county), but generally falls below ten per cent and in some counties

as low as 3 per cent. Therefore the degree of regional dispersion of the Russian population in

Estonia is lower than in Latvia.

In comparing the paired cases of Estonia/Latvia with those of Slovakia/Hungary, some

important differences should also be noted. While the Hungarian population groups in Romania

and Slovakia have resided there for centuries, most of the Russian minority population

immigrated to these two Baltic states during the Soviet period. A burgeoning literature on

representation of immigrant minority groups has developed in the face of the rising political

importance of these groups in many West European countries (see, e.g, Bloemraad and

Schönwälder, 2013),; however the Russian case in Estonia and Latvia differs from their

experience in important respects. First, Russians were associated with the dominant power in the

Soviet period. Second, by now a large proportion of ethnic Russians in these countries were born

in Estonia or Latvia respectively. For example, according to the 2011 census about 63 per cent of

Estonia’s ethnic Russians were born in Estonia, and a much larger proportion among younger

age groups (Statistics Estonia, 2011). Consequently they are no longer recent immigrants; rather,

increasingly they are second or third generation. They thus form a unique case, standing between

the position of recent immigrant minorities in Western Europe and historic minorities in the

Romanian and Slovak cases.

In terms of political culture, there are significant differences between the ethnic Russians

in Estonia and Latvia compared to the minority Hungarian populations in Slovakia and Romania.

The differences within each one of the two paired cases are, however, less significant. In both

Estonia and Latvia the communities were fragmented, indigenous leadership was weak,

relatively recent immigration predominated, and the population over-represented urban,

6      industrial workers who faced a significant decline in socio-economic status following the

collapse of the Soviet system (Vöörmann and Helemäe, 2003). Likewise in both Baltic cases, at

the outset of independence there was minimal social integration with the dominant ethnic group

and considerable suspicion and alienation between the groups. In both cases the Russian minority

was largely marginalized, links to the homeland were viewed by the dominant population group

with suspicion, and laws relating to citizenship and education elicited a similar sense of

grievance. Agarin (2011) notes the similar role of civil society organizations in the interaction

between minority groups and the state in all three of the Baltic states, namely their dependence

on state funding and their weak advocacy role, although the latter is somewhat more pronounced

in Latvia than in the other two cases. “Baltic policymakers seek to co-opt civic organizations by

granting CSOs [civil society organizations] financial incentives to align their work to

governmental priorities” (192). These organizations, accordingly, “have little chance of being

considered as partners in political processes” (196), and are most effective when their positions

are presented as having a larger societal significance or when those involved in the party

subsequently take on party posts, or vice versa (See also Sikk, 2006).

Some observers have noted differences between the Russian communities in Estonia and

Latvia, but compared to their similarities these are relatively minor. Pettai and Kreuzer (1999)

argue that the Russian community has been somewhat more homogeneous in Estonia, and Kolstø

(1997) notes that they were more active in the early 1990s than in Latvia. This may have been

partly due to the greater geographic concentration in Estonia and a greater preponderance of

industrial labourers in Estonia, whereas Russian military personnel were more strongly

represented among Russians in Latvia. In addition, more Russians had resided in Latvia for a

longer time there, which led to higher rates of intermarriage and bilingualism, and a less sharp

boundary “between the Russians and the ‘natives’” (Kolstø, 1997: 384-5). At the same time,

7      Berg (2001) notes that in Estonia a cleavage did emerge among Russians between citizens and

non-citizens, even though the latter are entitled to vote in local elections (unlike in Latvia).

Societal and cultural factors may play some role in the manner of representation of minority

interests, however the impact of the relatively minor differences between characteristics of the

Russian communities in Estonia and Latvia is hard to assess.

When it comes to the political culture of the Hungarian/Magyar minorities in the Slovak

and Romanian cases, important similarities exist. Magyar communities in both countries

experienced a radical change in status vis-à-vis their Slovak and Romanian neighbours. Under

the Dual Monarchy and in the brief period between the Nazi-sponsored Vienna Awards and

1945, ethnic-Hungarians enjoyed a position of domination while other nationalities were

subjected to harsh Magyarization and discriminatory policies. However, in post-WWI and post-

WWII Czechoslovakia and Romania, the Hungarian communities were themselves turned into

disenfranchised minorities subjected to discriminatory and assimilationist policies. These

policies included closing down Magyar-language schools and the targeting of Hungarian-owned

large estates for land-redistribution in favour of members of the ethnic majority.

As a result of this, the Magyar community in both states shared similar features; it

became deprived of its political and economic elites existent in previous periods of Hungarian

domination; it lost its dominance over many of the cities, becoming largely rural; and, aside from

members of the communist party, it was also deprived of strong indigenous leadership or

political organizations.

Hungarians in post-communist Romania and Slovakia continued to be viewed with

suspicion when it came to their loyalty to the state, especially as the two countries defined

themselves as national states and unitary republics. In particular, discussions of territorial

autonomy are specifically regarded by ethnic majorities and mainstream parties as a first step

8      towards breaking away and joining their ethnic kin in neighbouring Hungary (Boschler and

Szlcsik 2013, 430).

While not denying the existence of socio-cultural distinctions between the cases, these

differences are matter of degree rather than of kind; they take on significance in interaction with

political-institutional features. Therefore we focus on political and institutional factors which

interacted with but were not essentially determined by these socio-cultural differences.

The small number of studies focused on ethnic minority representation in CEEC have not

adequately explained the different trajectories of minority representation in cases such as

Romania, Slovakia, Latvia, and Estonia. Moreover, almost all works on ethnic minorities and

representation do not distinguish between the several types of minority representation that ethnic

groups may opt for; instead, they often assume a zero-sum game that distinguishes solely

between those minorities that succeed in achieving representation (by having an ethnic party in

parliament) and those that do not. Such conceptualizations usually understand the CEE ethnic

party or the ‘ethnic particularistic’ party as a reaction on the part of the losers of post-communist

transition (Kitschelt 1995, 463-464; Gunther and Diamond 2003, 183). The ethnic-based party is

often caricatured, regardless of the actual variations among them, as a party void of a

transformative program or extensive organization and often involving a narrow strategy to

promote solely ethnic group interests save for territorial autonomy. Rather than opting for

outright separation, these parties are considered to be using state structures to channel benefits

towards their particularistic ethnically-defined clientele. By virtue of their limited electoral

appeal, such parties are incapable of pursuing mainstream party status. Instead, they mobilize

only voters from their ethnic group and draw clear boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, as the

ethnic interests are perceived to be inherently in conflict with those of the majority group.

9      Finally, because they often appeal to emotional symbols, they are depicted as usually being

dominated by a single charismatic leader. (Gunther and Diamond 2003: 183-184).

Although undeniably descriptive of some cases, this characterization promotes an ideal-

type ethnic minority party. Not all such parties fall neatly within this classification, however, and

our cases offer a range of modes of party representation of ethnic minorities. In many cases, their

programs reach beyond purely ethnic concerns. In Latvia the ethnic integrationist party

(Harmony Center) includes an economic dimension within its program. While in Romania and

Slovakia territorial autonomy is very much an issue advocated by Hungarian minority parties and

while the ‘us’-‘them’ dichotomy may describe Romania’s DUHR, it is not true of either

Slovakia’s new Most-Hid party nor of Latvia’s Harmony Centre party. Finally, the role and

charisma of the leader is sometimes important as in the Slovak case with Most-Hid’s Bela Bugar

and the DUHR’s Laszlo Tokes. It is not however the case for the DUHR after Tokes’ departure

in 2004.

Typology of Ethnic Party Minority Representation

Ethnic representation cannot be captured under an ideal-type model as it is not mono-

dimensional but can take several forms. The notion of minority ethnic party has been widely

considered in the literature as an important vehicle for political representation. Empirical

research that examines factors affecting the formation and impacts of ethnic minority parties

often overlooks critical distinctions in the nature of these parties. Therefore, we have developed

a more differentiated typology. The typology is based on two axes. The vertical axis draws

attention to the representation of minority ethnic interests, distinguishing between parties which

articulate such interests and those that do not. The horizontal axis distinguishes exclusivity or

inclusiveness, in terms of the explicit appeal of the party to the electorate, with one category

being exclusive parties that appeal only to a portion of the ethnic spectrum, and the other

10    referring to inclusive parties, meaning those that seek to draw support both from the ethnic

minority population and from the dominant national group.

As noted, classifications of ethnic minority parties have been only minimally nuanced

and generally have focused on the nature of ethnic demands, for example whether they include

advocacy for cultural or territorial autonomy (e.g., Bochsler and Szlcsik, 2013). Our typology, on

the other hand, focuses on the way in which the party representing the minority relates to other

population groups or political forces. Along similar lines, Ishiyama and Breuning (2011) argue

that the exclusivity of a minority party may be signaled by the inclusion of the group’s name in

the party title, and that adherents of such parties are generally more dissatisfied with democracy

in their country than the population at large. More broadly, these authors conclude that “what

differentiates different kinds of ethnic parties is how they portray themselves to an electorate

they seek to exclude” (227), contrasting this approach to those who classify parties by the nature

of their demands. Other authors, such as Chandra, include the notion of exclusiveness in their

understanding of minority ethnic parties (see Gherghina and Jiglau, 2011: 53).

SEE TABLE 1 IN THE APPENDIX

In our typology, however, we do not assume exclusivity, but rather differentiate different

approaches to it taken by parties that attract minority support. In Table 1, we distinguish three

types of ethnic minority representation embodied in differing types of political parties (the fourth

type, the national majority party, does not purport or strive to represent the minority): ethnic

particularistic minority parties, integrationist minority parties and finally, accommodative

majority parties. As noted above, the ‘ethnic particularistic’ minority party has been given the

most attention in the scholarly literature (Kitschelt 1995); it is focused almost exclusively on

representation of a particular ethnically defined clientele, drawing clear boundaries between ‘us’

11    and ‘them’, as the ethnic interests are perceived to be inherently in conflict with those of the

majority group (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 183-184). We suggest two additional types of party

representation for minorities: the integrationist minority party and the accommodative majority

party. The ‘integrationist’ minority party, although claiming to represent ethnic interests,

promotes cooperation between minority and majority groups. These parties seek to expand the

membership and electoral base beyond the ethnic group that was initially at the core of the

party’s organization; often they advertise their ethnically mixed membership as well as an

integrationist platform in order to appeal to voters outside that group. Third, the accommodative

majority party, although not claiming to exclusively represent minority interests, nonetheless

takes on the responsibility to be the voice of a particular ethnic group within the legislature, even

though the minority does not exclusively control the party membership and structure. The

question we ask is, what factors promote the dominance of one or another of these party types in

representing ethnic minorities in particular states. While we do not address the question of the

normative advantages or disadvantages of the various types of representation, this question might

highlight the significance of our findings.

Despite similarities between our four cases, the trajectories taken by parties in these four

countries represent the three types of party situations that involve minority groups. (See Table 2)

Comparing Romania and Slovakia, one can observe the consolidation of a strong ethnically

particularistic Magyar minority party in one case (Democratic Party of Hungarians in Romania)

but not in the other (Slovakia), where an integrationist minority party (Most-Hid) is strongest.

Despite being a relatively larger proportion of the electorate compared to Hungarians in Romania

or Slovakia, in neither Estonia nor Latvia has a Russian particularistic minority party gained

hold. In the Latvian case an integrationist minority party (Harmony Center) has by far the

strongest support from the Russian citizen population (running a successful contest for the

12    position of Riga’ mayor in the most recent election). In Estonia, in contrast, the Center Party, of

the accommodative majority type, draws the overwhelming majority of Russian votes. The

puzzle, therefore, lies in the fact that in spite of the evident similarities, the most important ethnic

minority in each of the four cases does not display similar paths of representation in the political

party system. In one case, an ethnic particularistic party has successfully formed and entered

parliament; in two others it is the integrationist minority parties that are most successful; and in

the fourth case an accommodative majority party has taken on the role of promoting minority

issues. The question we ask is what factors influence these distinct different trajectories of ethnic

minority parliamentary representation, with a particular focus on political-institutional factors.

SEE TABLE 2 IN THE APPENDIX

First we examine the role of formal electoral institutions, particularly the electoral

system, in relation to the size and territorial concentration of the minority electorate. (We have

excluded from our analysis ethnic minorities that would fall below the established threshold for

representation in the proportional representation system, Bernauer and Boschsler, 2011; Bochsler

2010). A second type of explanation focuses on political strategies of the dominant ethnic

leadership, and their institutional expression. These might include definitions of minority status,

and symmetric versus asymmetric state strategies towards minorities. State policies or

institutional structures may be differentially accommodative or restrictive in relation to different

ethnic minority groups or sub-groups within a given ethnic minority. Such policies and

institutions may favour or advantage some minorities while simultaneously discriminating

against others. In exploring this logic, we assume that ethnic elites pursue a rational strategy

based on incentives offered to them, however, these incentives extend beyond the more

frequently cited impacts of the electoral rules.

13    

In particular, asymmetric state policies (in which some minorities or subgroups of

particular ethnic groups are favoured over others) may have a ‘divide-and-conquer’ effect, either

between ethnic groups or within particular ethnic minorities, making the likelihood of formation

of a unified political movement more or less likely. It is our hypothesis that where state policies

or institutional structures affect various ethnic minority groups asymmetrically, i.e., where they

negatively discriminate against some minority groups while positively discriminating against

others, ‘ethnic particularistic’ minority parties are more likely to be successful. This is because

various ethnic groups are more likely to develop particularistic understandings of their interests,

based on the differential incentives offered to them.

A different situation may arise when state authorities privilege certain sub-groups within

particular ethnic minorities, especially in key transition periods. We consider this to be a form of

asymmetrical cooptation, which involves efforts to win the loyalty of opinion leaders or

influential figures in the given ethnic minority movement. While one could also interpret this as

a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy it contains an affirmative element by offering positive incentives

for public figures to participate in mainstream politics, and in this way to increase the likelihood

of positive integration. We hypothesize that such actions will encourage support by ethnic

minority groups for accommodative majority parties.

Finally, in states that engage in symmetric state policies (where different minority groups

and their sub-groups are treated in the same way), ethnic minorities are neither discouraged from

working with one another, nor are they encouraged to work with parties that primarily represent

the majority ethnic group. In this case ‘integrationist minority parties’ are more likely to be

successful.

Another factor that may affect the response of minority group leaders is the attitude of

majority parties toward the ethnic group. Referring to the work of Meguid, Bernauer and

14    Bochsler note the distinction between ‘adversarial, accommodative, and dismissive’ approaches

of majority parties (2011: 742), which may have differential impacts on the reaction of minority

ethnic parties (accommodative majority parties reducing their likely impact, while the other

types may make them more attractive). While Bernauer and Bochsler (2010: 750) conclude that

the position of the mainstream parties does not have a significant impact of the likelihood of the

entry of a minority ethnic party into electoral competition, we posit that historically this may

have been an important factor in setting a path dependent trajectory.

Electoral System + Territorial Concentration as Explanations for Minority Party Representation

This explanation, one commonly referred to in the literature, would suggest that the

electoral system, combined with the territorial concentration of ethnic minorities within a state, is

an important variable in explaining how such minorities are represented through the party

system; the chances of political representation are not just about the number of ethnic minority

members but also about where they live (Bochsler 2011: 233) and how the vote is calculated.

Important features of electoral systems could be whether they are based on a single member

district (SMD, plurality) principle or on some form of proportional representation (PR); in the

latter case, as noted, the electoral threshold for party representation could be important, as well

as the particular variant of PR that is adopted (Boscher, 2006, Boschler, 2010a).

By virtue of their very purpose, ethnic minority parties are limited in the constituencies

they aim to represent. In such circumstances, a majoritarian system, which tends to limit

effective political competition to a few large parties, could present a major obstacle to

parliamentary representation. Most research suggests that a proportional representation system is

more favourable to ethnic minorities that are of a size adequate to cross the established threshold;

however, there is some disagreement about how important a factor the electoral system is.5

15    Unless geographically concentrated, representatives of ethnic minorities would stand no chance

of running independently and winning unless they were part of a larger political bloc or party. In

situations where ethnic minorities are, however, geographically concentrated, a pure SMD

system would offer the opportunity for significant representation.

PR electoral systems, which favor smaller parties, would generally be more

accommodating to the formation of parties exclusively concerned with addressing and

representing minority issues, particularly in situations where the minority is dispersed

geographically. Within PR, a plethora of additional electoral mechanisms exist that may hinder

or promote ethnic minority parties. Daniel Bochsler (2010b) identifies two major electoral

constraints. The first is national legal threshold for a party to gain representation; this can range

from relatively small thresholds such as Albania’s three per cent to large ones such as Russia’s

seven per cent (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, IFES, Election Guide: Albania)).

Secondly, if, in a PR system, the entire country is treated as one large electoral district,

minorities cannot capitalize on their geographic concentration in a specific region, (Bochsler

2010b, 165-166). Thus, although they may be represented in an electoral sense, their influence

may be diluted. If the size of the ethnic minority is less than or close to the threshold then a

particularistic ethnic party would have difficulty gaining representation in this type of PR

system. In that case the party would either need to reach out to other parts of the population (the

minority integrationist approach) or seek representation through a party dominated by the other

ethnicities (the majority accommodative party). Even if the minority population in the electorate

exceeds the threshold by a reasonable margin, success of a particularistic minority party would

require an average or above average level of electoral mobilization among the ethnic minority

group, and relatively homogenous electoral preferences.

16    

If, however, the PR system involves multiple electoral districts, then minorities can

capitalize on their geographic concentration in a specific region, even if they do not form a

majority in any particular region. Various other variants of the PR system combine voter choice

among individual candidates on the party lists, which could encourage selection of those

candidates that are visibly of the ethnic minority. Mixed member proportional (MMP) systems

would similarly allow particularistic ethnic parties to launch candidates successfully in districts

where the ethnic minority dominates. None of the new EU member states of Central and Eastern

Europe has a purely first-past-the-post system. Most use PR or some type of MMP system,

which allocates at least part of the parliamentary seats through PR, with the PR threshold at

around five per cent in most instances, including the cases we are examining (see Table 2).

Nonetheless, particularities of the PR system can make a difference.

The two Baltic States both use district PR systems with multiple seats allocated per

electoral district. Estonia has 12 multi-member constituencies while Latvia has five; given the

smaller population of Estonia overall, the electoral districts are considerably smaller in

population and more differentiated demographically than in Latvia. This system is especially

favorable to parties catering to regional interests. A larger number of districts with multiple seats

increases the probability of local interests (including concentrated ethnic minority interests)

being represented in parliament and should, in principle, provide fertile ground for a

particularistic ethnic party to gain a foothold, more so in Estonia than Latvia.

There are some important distinctions between the operation of Estonia’s and Latvia’s PR

systems, and the question would be whether these help to explain the different forms that

minority party representation takes in the two cases. Whereas Latvia’s system involves party lists

that allow expression of personal preferences within the chosen list, the Estonian PR system has

the citizen voting for a particular candidate, with seats allocated between the parties based on a

17    three stage process involving individual mandates, district list, and compensatory elements to

achieve the final proportional outcome. A Latvian voter is given a set of party lists representing

all parties running in the district; the voter selects one party list to support and may then annotate

the ballot by indicating support for particular names on the list or by crossing some out. Seats

are distributed in each district according to the proportional vote, while rankings of candidates on

each party list are affected by the tally of positive and negative annotations. In the Estonian case,

the voter selects a candidate from the list of candidates running in the particular district and

enters that candidate’s registration number on the ballot (OSCE, 2007). When votes are tallied,

candidates that receive more than the proportional quota of votes in the district are elected. A

second step involves distribution of seats between parties in each of the districts according to

proportion of the votes received there for candidates associated with each party, and a final

‘compensatory’ stage distributes remaining seats to match the proportional outcome of the

election.

While both systems allow the voter to express candidate preferences, in the Latvian case

selection of the party list is done first and determines the final outcome. In the Estonian case,

selection of the individual candidate is done first, and this determines the proportional

distribution between parties. Khrychikov and Miall (2002: 193) contend that particular features

of Estonia’s application of the PR electoral system have helped to “[channel] the activities of

Russian-speaking groups into Estonian parties.” They argue that the system “encourages parties

to compete for votes across different constituencies and it also favours cross-party alliances and

voting for individuals” (202). Specifically, parties may run prominent Russian candidates in

those districts where larger numbers of Russians reside and in this way attract votes to the party,

thus increasing the party’s proportional share. Therefore, for example, including candidates with

Slavic names in the regional party list in districts with a large Russian population would

18    presumably increase the party’s attractiveness. In Estonia, the Russian-speaking population is

concentrated in only two regions, Tallinn, and Ida-Viru County. Beginning in the 2003

parliamentary election, the Center Party was able to capitalize on this system and has, since then,

run 3-4 identifiably Russian candidates in the Ida-Viru district, of the ten permitted on the ballot.

Since 2003, Mihhail Stanuhhin, the leading Center Party candidate there, has won enough votes

to guarantee himself a seat in the first distribution phase and by 2011 ranked third in the country

in his personal mandate votes compared to the quota needed to win a personal seat in his district,

falling only behind Centre Party leader Edgar Savisaar and the Reform party leader, Andrus

Ansip. Another Centre Party Russian candidate, Deniss Borodits, also made his way into the

parliament through the personal mandate, in this case elected from one of the Tallinn districts.

Two other Russians and one ethnic Estonian were elected on the Ida-Viramuu district list for the

Center Party, with one ethnic Russian elected from the district list from the Social Democratic

Party (National Election Committee, 2012).6 Over time, other parties have also included Russian

candidates in their lists in Ida-Viru county, with some success, indicating a more assertive effort

to court the Russian vote. For example, most of the other parties ran candidates with Russian

names in the district between 2003 and 2011, however only two were successful (one from the

Reform Party was successful, in this case as part of the third stage compensatory list; and one

from the Social Democratic Party in 2011, in this case from the district list).

Khrychikov and Miall argue (2002: 203) that at least until 2002 there was “a clear

preference for non-Estonians to cast their votes for candidates with Slavic names” whereas Berg

(2001: 18-10) suggests that ethnicity is not a primary determinant of vote, which had more to do

with a range of considerations. Apparently the Center Party affiliation was important as well the

Slavic cast, evidenced by the fact that in local elections in Ida-Viru County that party draws

strong majority support (e.g., 76.6% in the Narva local elections in 2009). It should be noted that,

19    unlike in Latvia, in Estonia non-citizen residents are entitled to vote in local elections, so these

local vote outcomes do not translate directly into national electoral results. Thus, while the

electoral system creates an opportunity for the Center Party, the party’s established reputation as

‘the’ party for Russians to support is also important. Despite all the conditions which arguably

would favor the success of a Russian ethnic minority party in Estonia, the Russians there have

opted for one of the major mainstream majority parties instead. By attracting prominent

Russians to the party, combined with the personalized choice provided for in the electoral

system, the Center Party has been able to define itself as the party of ethnic Russians, despite the

fact that the top leadership is made up of ethnic Estonians, that ethnic Estonians dominate in

most electoral districts, and that positions on issues that concern the Russian minority are

moderate and only form one component of the party’s identity. The size of the ethnic minority

may be one factor that motivates mainstream parties to reach out to the Russian community,

however the electoral system may play a facilitating role.

The electoral system in Latvia places more emphasis on the attraction of the party as

opposed to the individual candidates. While creating the opportunity for an ethnic minority party

to gain support, the PR system does not provide the parties there with the same flexibility to

present themselves with different faces in various districts with differing electoral makeups.

Even though there may be more Russian candidates included on the district electoral lists in

areas with a more strongly Russian electorate, the voter first picks the favoured party list, then

can evaluate the candidates, if desired. Unlike in Estonia, the only party that gained

parliamentary seats with a significant representation of Russian candidates on its list in 2011 was

the Harmony Center Party. Biographical data provided on the Latvian Electoral Commission

website indicates self-declared ethnicity of elected deputies. Of the deputies elected on the

Harmony Center list about 40 per cent indicate Russian ethnicity and only five indicate Latvian

20    ethnicity. One indicates German and one Karelian, and of those with no ethnicity indicated, the

majority appear to have Russian names. Compared to Estonia’s Center Party, Harmony Center is

more clearly a Russian party, but with some Latvian presence. In other words, it does not project

itself as an exclusivist Russian party, but an inclusive one. For other parties in Latvia, the vast

majority of deputies elected in 2011 indicate their ethnicity as Latvian with only one self-

identified Russian, one Lithuanian, and one deputy of Liv ethnicity in 2011. (Central Election

Commission of Latvia; see also Brands Kehris, 2010, p. 113). Neither the electoral system nor

the identity of the other parties encourages them to include Russian candidates on the party list,

thus reinforcing the existing ethnic cleavage in the party system.

In contrast to the more nuanced electoral systems in Latvia and Estonia, Slovakia and

Romania (until 2008) each had a single country-wide district with a 5% threshold. In Romania

prior to 2008, the system used was closed-list proportional representation. The Slovak system

bears some resemblance to the Latvian system but with one national list as opposed to district

ones. In the Slovak case, electors are given a ballot for each party. On the ballots, the parties list

all their candidates running. In addition to voting for a party, voters may circle up to four

preferred candidates from the party’s list. (IFES, Election Guide: Slovakia). Both the Slovak and

the Romanian variations of the proportional representation system are not favorable for smaller

ethnic groups. Nonetheless, PR would not impede concentrated or dispersed minorities from

entering parliament, provided they are larger than the threshold.

In Slovakia, the country’s Hungarian minority stands only slightly higher than the 5%

threshold at 8.5 per cent, an important factor given that a national list is used. However,

Hungarian ethnic parties have constantly entered national parliaments. Up until 1998, they have

done so in coalition. After 1998, the Slovak law ceased to recognize coalitions. As a result,

Slovakia’s three major Magyar parties merged in the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK) in

21    order to increase their chances of entering. Since the radicalization of the SMK in 2007, Most-

Hid, an integrationist party that split from the Hungarian Coalition, has been particularly

successful at gaining Magyar votes at the expense of the SMK.

The number of Hungarians in Romania stands at 6.5 per cent, barely surpassing the 5%

threshold. However, similar to the Slovak case, the ethnically based Democratic Union of

Hungarians in Romania (DUHR) has been very successful at gaining parliamentary seats in

every election since 1990. What is more interesting is that the DUHR is an ethnic particularistic

party. According to Bochsler as well as Bernauer (2011), this is less likely when the ethnic

minority hardly surpasses the threshold as it would need to vote strategically for one single party

and show up in high turnouts (744). Studies related to ethnic party mobilization and EU elections

have shown however that this is exactly what happens (Spirova, 2011). Throughout the last two

decades Slovakia’s electoral system has not undergone major changes. Romania, on the other

hand, has switched to a mixed system with 315 single-member electoral districts after 2008.

Candidates must now obtain 50 per cent +1 of the total number of votes in order to win the seat

in their district. Votes in those districts where no candidate obtains a majority are tallied

nationally and seats are allocated proportionally provided the party passes a five per cent

threshold or wins three single-seat districts in the senate/six single-seat districts in the lower

house (IFES, Election Guide: Romania). Districts with single-seats generally handicap parties

advocating minority interests. However, if the minority is highly concentrated within the

electoral riding, then the high threshold is effectively meaningless. In Romania, after 2008,

despite the small single-seat districts where candidates must win 50 per cent +1 of the votes,

ethnic parties in highly concentrated Magyar areas have no problem taking their seats.

An additional aspect worth mentioning is the presence of special reserved seats for

national minorities. While in the Baltic cases as well as in Slovakia no reserved seats exist, the

22    Romanian electoral system tries to offset the hindrance of ethnic minorities (other than Magyars)

to enter parliament by creating 18 reserved seats for minority groups that cannot win

representation otherwise. The electoral law envisions that each minority can possess one

reserved seat only... Thus the Romanian Constitution clearly spells out that organizations of

national minorities that fail to pass the national threshold automatically receive a seat in the

lower chamber (Spirova, 2011: 9) if they win 5 percent (10 percent after 2004) of the average

number of valid votes cast for lower house representatives in single-seat constituencies. This

came down to just 1,300 votes prior to the 2004 changes and circa 2,100 votes after (Protsyk and

Matichescu 2010, 34). This threshold is so low that practically all the 18 official minorities are

able to send representatives to parliament; because ethnic-Magyars have ethnic representation

through the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (DUHR), they do not receive an

additional reserved seat7.

In terms of who can vote for reserved minority representatives, no restrictions exist that

would limit voters to ethnic minority members only. As ethnicity is a determined through self-

identification, it is possible for ethnic-Romanians to vote for ethnic minority representatives

(King and Marian, 2012). Because of this, smaller minority organizations often find themselves

winning five times or even twenty times more votes than then actual members of the minority

group.

SEE TABLE 3 IN THE APPENDIX

In short, based on expectations related to the nature of the electoral systems,

particularistic parties have not emerged where we might normally have expected them – that is,

they are not present in countries where the minority group far surpasses the threshold, such in

Latvia, Estonia, and Slovakia – and in situations where other aspects of the electoral system

23    (such as the relatively small PR districts in Estonia) might have facilitated their emergence. On

the other hand, in Romania, where Hungarians barely constitute more than six per cent of the

total population, we might expect to see an integrationist minority party, in order to expand the

party’s voter base, but instead we see a particularistic minority party.

Particularities of the PR systems adopted in the four countries may, however, in fact

explain some of this variation. First, in Romania, the reserved seats for ethnic minorities may

play a role, as we discuss further below. Second, in Estonia, the particular nature of the PR

system may make parties representing the ethnic majority more likely to appeal successfully to

the minority. Nonetheless, as electoral system and territorial concentration on their own do not

seem to adequately explain which type emerges in particular cases, we now turn to examine

other explanations, particularly those based on historical patterns of development within

particular countries and strategies of majority elites vis-à-vis ethnic minorities. These strategies,

in turn, also, in some cases, may have been important reasons that the various electoral systems

developed as they did.

Majority Elite Strategies and Party Representation of Ethnic Minorities

We hypothesize that an understudied phenomenon in ethnic minority studies is the way

that states and majority political parties treat those minorities. Often state policies and associated

institutional structures are generated by motivations of key political actors at some key stage in

the political development process. In the case of the post-communist countries under

examination here, while some of the groundwork for these approaches may have been laid in the

communist period, the pivotal period was often the first few years or decade after independent

statehood was restored because in this time period new political institutions, including political

parties were established.

24    

Three types of state strategies can be identified: (1) instances where the state

discriminates between different minority groups; (2) cases where the states seeks to

asymmetrically coopt portions of a particular minority ethnic group over other parts of that same

minority; and (3) situations in which the state pursues an even-handed approach to different

ethnic groups and subgroups within particular ethnic minorities. In the latter case, this is not to

say that the latter group is necessarily accommodative towards minorities but rather that it does

not differentiate between them (at least in legislation concerning political representation).

Romania seems to represent the clearest example of the first case (where the state has

discriminated between different ethnic minority groups) and Estonia the second, while Slovakia

and Latvia fit into in the third category (involving non-discriminatory policies). We hypothesize

that these institutional choices, at least in these instances, are significantly responsible for the

different types of ethnic representation that ensued.

The Romanian and Estonian Cases: Cases of Asymmetric State Policy

The Romanian electoral law is in and of itself a case of asymmetric state policy as it

gives preferential reserved seats to some minorities (i.e., small minority groups) but not to

ethnic-Hungarians, based on the argument that they receive representation already though the

DUHR. Thus, the very establishment of this system is what is of interest to us. The motives

attributed to Romanian political elites for codifying this practice immediately after the anti-

communist 1989 Revolution vary. One purpose may have been to increase legitimacy of the new

post-1989 National Salvation Front (NSF) government. Similarly, it may have been intended to

appease international concern in light of the deteriorating situation of minorities in the Balkans

during the 1990s (King and Martin 2012: 566). Most importantly, however, some analysts see it

as directed at counterbalancing the presence and influence of the anti-NSF Democratic Union of

Hungarians in Romania (Alionescu 2004, 63). In short, the intent of Romanian political elites

25    after 1989 may have been to appear pro-minority, while limiting the ability of the Hungarian

minority to effectively build a broader base of power. The result of this has been that the 18

minority representatives who enter parliament via reserved seats are the most loyal allies of any

government (left or right). Such representatives are aware that preferential rules concerning the

elections of minorities could easily be removed by a simple amendment to the electoral law

(Alionescu 2004, 69). Therefore, unlike the DUHR, minority MPs unconditionally vote for the

party in power as they do not want to endanger their presence in future parliaments.

This asymmetric electoral law has other implications as well. For instance, it

automatically encourages ethnic particularistic parties among minorities other than the

Hungarians, as competition for the reserved minority seats occurs solely between ethnic

organizations. Alionescu (2004) illustrates that since the minority seat is guaranteed and since

the threshold is so low, the electoral system encourages a proliferation of ethnic organizations as

was the case with Bulgarian and Rroma groups (67-68). Additionally, mainstream parties are

neither encouraged to recruit members of ethnic minorities, nor do they attempt to appeal to

ethnic minorities as the reserved seat candidates are already competing for minority votes.

Protsyk and Matichescu (2010) illustrate that this is exactly what is exhibited in the party

membership of mainstream majority parties (36).

Furthermore, the law has often been abused by ethnic-Romanians who established

alternative ‘ethnic parties’ with little or no link with actual ethnic groups, thus passing the

smaller ‘ethnic-threshold’ and entering parliament by claiming to represent minority issues

(Alionescu 2004, 68-69). The system thus occasionally fails to do what was originally

envisioned – to represent small ethnic minority groups.

However, counterbalancing the Magyar vote by positively discriminating in favour of all

other minorities has had an effect on the DUHR as well. The party has been prevented from

26    successfully taking on the issues of other minority groups to expand its voter base (such as Most-

Hid in Slovakia) since their representation is assured through the guaranteed MP seat.

Furthermore, by diminishing the importance of Magyar interests in parliament, this

system encourages the DUHR to adopt an ethnic particularist position instead of an integrationist

one. The DUHR platform is focused exclusively on Magyar issues and places important

emphasis on Magyar culture, Magyar representation as well as Magyar territorial autonomy

(UDMR 2012). The party members as well as the voter-base for the party is similarly

overwhelmingly Magyar as Hungarians vote almost exclusively for this party (Alionescu 2004,

65; Protsyk and Matichescu 2010, 37). The mix of policies towards Hungarians and the other

national minorities has resulted in the particularistic nature of the DUHR. As the majority parties

are perceived to be not just insensitive but also outright hostile to Magyar representation

(epitomized by the electoral rule aimed at balancing the Magyar ethnic presence in parliament

with other ‘loyal’ minorities), DUHR is trapped into a particularist position. A different kind of

asymmetric policy towards minorities was practiced in Estonia in the period immediately

following independence. In this case, however the asymmetric approach involved cooptation of

important figures within the Russian-speaking minority. Like Latvia, Estonia was an independent

state before 1940 and saw its independence as a restoration rather than establishment of a new

state. Combined with the questions of legitimacy surrounding Estonia’s incorporation into the

USSR in 1940, citizenship was granted only to those who, irrespective of ethnicity, were citizens

of the country before 1940, including some Russian-speaking Old Believer communities that had

settled in Estonia much earlier. Overall approximately 80,000 Russian-speakers (ca. 25 per cent

of Estonia’s Russophones) were quite quickly granted citizenship. Nonetheless, the largest

portion of ethnic Russians as well as many ethnic Ukrainians and Belorussians who had entered

Estonia (as industrial workers or associated with the military) under Soviet rule were not granted

27    citizenship. However, very significant was a policy of granting citizenship to a select group of

Russian-speaking pro-independence political activists (Berg, 2001). This group, estimated at

about 500 individuals, included media personnel, political leaders, community activists, trade

union leaders, and cultural figures. At the same time the Estonian state, under the leadership of

Edgar Savisaar of the moderately leftist Centre Party (Sikk, 2006), encouraged the formation of

Russian civic organizations, particularly the Russian Parliamentary Assembly (, 2000: 149), a

process, that facilitated the development of a segment of the Russian-speaking community with a

Russian-Estonian identity rather than a Russian identity that would link them to the Russian

Federation. Berg (2001: 15) argues that “this helped promote political factionalism among

Russian ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’, between so-called integrationists (or ‘loyalists’), who had chosen

institutional politics as an arena to champion citizens’ rights, and ‘hard-liners’ (or ‘extremists’),

who demanded both unconditional citizenship and the installation of Russian as the second

official language.” According to Park (1994) the Estonian government treated these

organizations like other public formations, and there emerged Russian-dominated trade unions,

city councils, and media. The website of the government of Estonia (Estonia.EU) indicates that a

much larger number, 24,201 individuals, were granted citizenship by naturalization in the period

between 1992-1995 due to their support ‘for the independence of Estonia” (Estonia.eu).

One result may have been a division within the Russian speaking population between the

‘Soviet-Russians’ represented by Intermovement who supported the continuation of the USSR

and those “Baltic-Russians’ that supported independence (Melvin, 2000). Thus the ethnic

Russian party that did gain about 6% of the vote and 6 seats in the Estonian parliament in 1992

(Our Home is Estonia) splintered shortly after that electoral success, with votes dispersing

among various Estonian parties (Khrychikov and Miall, 2002: 203; Pettai, 1996). In addition

that part of the Russian-speaking population that was oriented negatively toward the new

28    Estonian state was also less likely to make the effort to attain Estonian citizenship, forming part

of the current seven per cent of the Estonian population that are Russian citizens and of the eight

per cent with undetermined statehood (neither Russian nor Estonian citizens).These individuals

cannot vote in national elections and cannot be members of political parties; they therefore

cannot contribute to supporting an ethnic party. They were, however, granted the right to vote in

local elections (unlike in Latvia) but not to form parties or run for office. Those parties

dominated by ethnic Estonians are able to compete for their votes in local elections.

This projected image of the “Baltic” vs. the “Soviet” Russian has had a significant impact

on the choice for political representation that ethnic-Russians have opted for. Because of the

assimilationist implications that naturalization entailed, Baltic Russians were encouraged to

develop a particular Baltic Russian identity rather identification with Russians in Russia or

elsewhere in the post-Soviet space. As a result of this, ever since 1991, the Centre Party of Edgar

Savisaar has been particularly successful at projecting an image of the mainstream party that

represented Russians, alongside its social-liberal economic program (Vihalemm 2007, 483);

furthermore, it has periodically been part of the governing coalition in Tallinn (briefly in 1995,

2002-03, and 2005-07), as well as succeeding at the local level in Tallinn and in localities in Ida-

Viru county, thus reducing the political marginalization of the Russian speaking population

there.

The Slovak and Latvian Cases: Cases of Symmetric State Policy

The asymmetric policies employed in Romania and Estonia are somewhat different from

those in the other two cases, Slovakia and Latvia. In both of these cases, minority integrative

parties emerged.

In Slovakia, no attempt was made to positively or negatively discriminate between

various ethnic minority groups. While this has deprived Roma, Czechs, Ruthenians and

29    Ukrainians of receiving the type of representation they would have in Romania, it has also

allowed the major Hungarian parties to adopt a moderate integrationist stance while

simultaneously taking on the responsibility to represent Rroma or Ruthenian minority interests.

The Party of the Hungarian Coalition (between 1998 and 2007) and especially the new Most-Hid

Party, formed in 2009, adopted a more integrationist message rather than advocating exclusive

Hungarian interests. When the leader of the Hungarian Coalition, Bela Bugar, was ousted as the

party turned towards a more radical platform in 2007, Bugar and former Hungarian Coalition

moderates formed a new party that also included a number of ethnic-Slovaks in an attempt to

project a moderate counter-image to that of the Coalition (Berenyi, 2013). In the 2010 as well

as the 2012 parliamentary elections, it was the new Most-Hid party that made it to parliament

while the Hungarian Coalition failed to pass the 5% threshold. Most-Hid –even more so than the

Coalition before its radicalization – places a significant emphasis on the cooperation between

Hungarians and Slovaks and claims to appeal to both Magyar but also Slovak voters. It

renounces attempts to create a separate autonomous Hungarian territorial polity and instead opts

for a multi-national bi-cultural Slovak state (Most-Hid Program 2012). In its program, it

mentions the Rroma and other minorities more often than it mentions Magyars and it promotes

itself as a multi-ethnic rather than ethnic party as its membership is drawn from all of Slovakia’s

ethnic groups (Most-Hid Program 2012). Finally, Latvia’s case resembles Slovakia. Like

Estonia, Latvia granted limited automatic citizenship upon independence to those that were

citizens in 1940 and their descendants. Those that took up residence after that year had to pass

the same sort of language and history tests as in Estonia. As in Estonia there was also an attempt

to court loyal Russians, but no special legal accommodation was given to large elements of the

Russian-speaking elite that supported the independence movement. The reasons for this are

subject to speculation, but it seems possible that the Latvian population felt more threatened than

30    in neighbouring Estonia, in part because the portion of the population of Latvian ethnicity had

fallen more dramatically, to 52 per cent (just above majority status) compared to 61.4 per cent in

Estonia in 1989 (Melvin, 2000: 135). Higher rates of inter-marriage and residential inter-mixing

(Melvin, 2000: 136) in Latvia may have also raised greater concerns about ethnic dilution; in

addition, Russians formed the majority in virtually all Latvian cities, with Latvians dominant

only in the countryside (Dreifelds, 1996: 148). This situation may have contributed to higher

levels of tension and a greater sense of threat to ethnic integrity both among Latvians and

Russians. According to Melvin, Latvian elites also did not “[develop] a strategy to facilitate the

creation of civil institutions within the non-Latvian community” (2000: 142), although Brands

Kehris (2011) notes several efforts to do so. Non-citizens were not given the right to vote in local

elections, as they were in Estonia. All of these factors led to fragmentation and an exit of

Russian-speakers to seek advancement in the private rather than the political sphere, also

developing close ties to Russian business (Melvin, 2000: 144).

Reasons why a particularistic party did not develop in Latvia may be similar to those

affecting Estonia. As in Estonia, fragmentation and infighting among Russian groups (Tsilevich,

1996: 56), lack of leadership, and the low proportion of Russian speaking voters may have

contributed to this outcome. By 2011 about two thirds of Latvia’s non-Latvian population

received citizenship (Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012); as the number of Russian-

speaking voters increased and the possibilities to gain political representation accordingly also

became more realistic, it made sense not just to appeal to ethnic Russians but to Russian-

speakers of various ethnicities (Ukrainians, Belorussians, and others), since citizenship and

language concerns would unite these groups. Furthermore, given the importance of the

citizenship issue, a particularistic message might be counterproductive to the party’s efforts to

push for more Russians to be “let in” or enfranchised. While these factors gravitated against a

31    particularistic party outcome, on the other hand no Latvian majority party matched the effort of

the Center Party in Estonia to court Russian votes.

The result was the articulation of a strong Russophone integrationist political movement

that took the form of the Russian minority party, National Harmony. In addition a number of

minor more radical parties claiming to represent Russophones were formed, but they did not gain

significant support. In most elections, it was the moderate National Harmony - and later on the

Harmony Centre party - that became the main political advocate representing Russian interests.

More radical Russian parties had to either join the Harmony Centre coalition or simply stay

outside parliament. The path towards suffrage taken in the Latvian case has created a particular

emphasis on citizenship and languages - illustrated even by the most recent language referendum

of 2012. This has ultimately polarized ethnic-Latvians versus ethnic-Russians and has prevented

a mainstream Latvian party from becoming a credible Russian-minority advocate as in the

Estonian case. On the other hand, it has also promoted the creation of an integrationist political

movement which, although aiming to represent Russian interests, is by no means exclusivist. Its

political platform is not Russian-particularistic but rather integrationist as its primary aim is to

enfranchise the country’s non-Latvian residents. The disadvantage is, however, that Harmony

Centre and its predecessors have never been accepted into the national governing coalition,

(despite the fact that the party won the largest number of votes in the September 2011

parliamentary elections), presumably due to reluctance on the part of the other important parties,

namely Zatler’s Reform Party and the Unity Party in 2011, to form a coalition with such strong

Russian connections.

Conclusion

This paper has identified three types of parties in Central and Eastern Europe that cater to

ethnic issues: ethnic particularistic minority parties, integrationist minority parties and

32    accommodative majority parties. We have explored political and institutional factors that affect

the success of one type of party as opposed to the other two. The study is based on a comparison

of two pairs of largely comparable cases (Estonia and Latvia on the one hand, and Hungary and

Romania on the other),

The argument is that while electoral laws and patterns of territorial concentration may be

a factor in explaining differences in party representation of minorities, they become important n

the broader political institutional context that emerged in the first decade following the collapse

of Soviet power. In all four cases, the nature of the electoral system would have been conducive

to formation of a particularistic ethnic party. However, this only occurred successfully in one

case. In the case of Romania, state policies towards various minorities were asymmetrical; here,

the ‘ethnic particularistic’ minority parties was successful. In –another case – Estonia - state

policy and at least one major party pursued a cooptative and integrationist approach; here an

accommodative majority party has been the most successful. Finally, in cases where institutional

rules did not discriminate between their minorities (Latvia and Slovakia), ‘integrationist’

minority parties emerged as the most attractive.

These conclusions will require confirmation in further case studies in future studies.. In

addition the particular features of the Baltic cases also deserve attention, given that the gradual

acquisition of the franchise created particular problems for both ethnic minority and ethnic

majority actors in attracting political support from Russian-speakers. The role of historic

contingency (e.g., of particular leaders and political forces such as Savisaar) in the transition

period may also be important. What is clear is that neither a mechanistic examination of the

impact of electoral systems nor a sociocultural explanation that focuses exclusively on the nature

of the ethnic minority group are adequate to explain the outcomes; political factors that originate

in the actions and strategies of the majority ethnic leadership must also be examined. This

33    conclusion places upon these groups a certain key responsibility for fostering political outcomes

that encourage greater political integration and more effective representation of the minority.

34    

APPENDIX

Table 1: Types of parties, in relation to ethnic minority populations

EXCLUSIVE INCLUSIVE

IMPETUS FROM MINORTIY GROUP

Particularistic ethnic minority party

Integrationist ethnic minority party

IMPETUS FROM

MAJORITY GROUP

National majority party Accommodative majority

party

35    

Table 2: Ethnicity, Citizenship and Ethnic Minority Party Representation for Selected Countries

Country

Total population

Citizens Largest Minority

Size of largest minority

Minorities as % of citizens)

Dominant type of ethnic minority representation

Other ethnic- minorities

Estonia 1,294,4551

1,101,761 1 Russians 321,198 1 ~122

Accommodative majority (Center Party)

Ukra. 1.7%3 Belrus. 1.0 Finns 0.6%

Latvia 2,070,3714

1,728,2134 Russians 557,1194 ~15.5- 185

Integrationist minority (Harmony Center)

Belrus.3.3%4 Ukra. 2.2% Poles 2.2%

Romania 20,121,6416

20,121,641 Magyars 1,227,623 6.5

Ethnic particularistic (Democratic  Union  of  Hungarians  in  Romania)

Roma 3.3% Ukra. 0.3% Germ. 0.2%

Slovakia 5,397,0367 5,397,036 Magyars 458,467 8.5

Integrationist minority (Most-Hid)

Roma 2.0% Ruthn. 0.6%

                                                                                                                         1  Statistics Estonia, Population and housing census, “PCE04: Enumerated Permanent Residents by Ethnic Nationality and Sex, 31 December 2011,”; “CE05: “Enumerated Permanent Residents, 31 December 2011 by Citizenship and Sex”, http://www.stat.ee/phc2011, http://pub.stat.ee/px-­‐web.2001/Dialog/Saveshow.asp; also http://www.stat.ee/phc2011. 2  According to the census in 2011, 89,913 residents enumerated were citizens of the Russian Federation; 4707 of Ukraine; 1472 of Belaurs; 183 of Azerbaizan; 168 of Armenia; and 158 of Georgia. In addition there were 84, 494 of undetermined nationality and 3116 unknown. While not all of those from the other post-soviet states would be of Russian ethnicity, many likely would be. Likewise, most likely to vast majority of those of undetermined nationality are Russian ethnicity. Excluding those who are citizens of other post-Soviet states besides Russia, but including all of those of undetermined or unknown nationality, the number of Estonia’s 321, 198 Russians who would be included as Estonian citizens would be 143,675, or about 12 per cent of the population. This is an estimate. 3  Statistics Estonia, 2013 4  Central  Statistical  Bureau  of  Lativa,  Population  and  Housing  Census  ,  2011,  http://www.csb.gov.lv/en/statistikas-­‐temas/population-­‐census-­‐30761.html   5  For Latvia, Matulionis et al (2011) report survey data indicating that 57.6 of Russian respondents have Russian citizenshi According to the 2011 census there are 556,422 residents of Russian ethnicity in 2011 and 2,067,887 citizens. Muznieks (n.d., Table 4) indicates that in 2004 330,201 of Latvia’s 1,805,156 citziens were Russian, citing the Citizenship and Migration Affairs Board.  6  Romanian National Institute of Statistics, http://www.recensamantromania.ro/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/REZULTATE-DEFINITIVE-RPL_2011.pdf 7  Statistics Office of the Slovak Republic, http://portal.statistics.sk/files/table-­‐11.pdf  

36    

Table 3: Electoral systems and ethnic minority populations in Estonia, Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia8

Electoral

system Threshold Number of electoral

districts for PR part of vote

Degree of territorial concentration of the relevant ethnic minority*

Estonia Personalized PR

5% 12 (6 to 13 seats each) High in northeast Estonia Mixed in Tallinn

Latvia List and personalized PR

5% 5 (13-29 seats) High in urban areas (especially Riga and Latgale district)

Romania prior to 2008

PR 5% 1 (nationwide) High in Covasna/Harghita Mixed in northwest Transylvania

Romania after 2008

MMP (includes overhang seats)

5% or 6 seats in lower house or 3 in Senate, 8-10% for alliances; reserved seats for minorities

315-single-member districts (candidates must win 50%+1 votes) 1 (nationwide) for votes in districts where no majority wins

High in Covasna/Harghita counties Mixed in northwest Transylvania

Slovakia PR 5% 1 (nationwide) High in southern Slovakia (especially in Dunajska Streda and Komarno districts)

*national elections only

                                                                                                                         8 Webpage of the Interparliamentary Union:the Riigikogu (Estonian Parliament), http://www.ipu.org/parline-­‐e/reports/2105_b.htm; Saeima (Latvian parliament), http://www.ipu.org/parline-­‐e/reports/2177_B.htm; Camera Deputatilor (Romanian Chamber of Deputies), http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2261_B.htm; Národná rada( Slovak National Council, http://www.ipu.org/parline-­‐e/reports/2261_B.htm,, accessed 19 April 2012.

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                                                                                                                         1  See Table 2.

2 See Table 2

3 Bochsler (2010) notes that in all four countries ‘the electoral geography is closely linked to the ethnic structure of the territory” (817).

4 Boschler and Szlcsik (2013) note areas of similarity and difference between the position of Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia. In particular they note in both countries the small proportion of Hungarians to vote for non-Hungarian parties (431).

5 Ruedin (2009), for example, concludes that cultural factors (for example, attitude toward the minority group) are more important, and that the electoral system as well as quotas are major factors explaining the degree of ethnic representation, although they may have an impact in some cases. Protsyk and Matichescu (2010), and Protsyk and Sachariew (2012) caution that specifics of the proportional representation (PR) system must be taken into careful account when considering their actual impact on minority representation.

41                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            6 These findings are based on an examination of electoral results provided by the National Electoral Committee (2012). Assessments of whether candidates are Russian relied on name identification, material in the biographical information provided, and web searches of information about the candidates. Ethnicity is not directly indicated in these biographies. The following were taken as indicators of being ethnic Russian: Slavic name (or adapted Slavic name); education received in Russia; a Russian-language web presence (e.g., blog, interviews in Russian). These indicators are not foolproof and are subject to some error.

7 This clause was used at least once, during the 1996 parliamentary election, when the Szekler (Szeklers along with Czangos are related ethnic Magyar groups, making up circa 600,000 and 30,000 out of Romania’s 1,227,000 ethnically Hungarian population) minority candidate was denied his seat despite passing the 10% threshold because Hungarians were already represented by the DUHR (King and Martin 2012, 576).