Conclusion

In March 2008, the Under-Secretary-General for United Nations (UN)Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guehenno, applauded efforts madeby the UN to offer the world one of the most needed peacekeepingarrangement in response to the increasingly complex world order.Guehenno reiterated that reforms within the UN peace operation wereaimed at ensuring that civilians, police and the military have access toclear, authoritative guidance on the nature of tasks they are required toperform (United Nations, 2012). As pointed out by the Under-Secretary-General, the broadening of international peace and security from militaryto include non-military issues and its deepening from state security tohuman security (HS) captures and corresponds with the trajectory of inse-curity in most parts of Africa. The traditional security agenda with itsWeberian underpinnings and assumptions predicated on the monopoly ofuse of legitimate force by the state and other external forces has alwaysendured questionable relevance and validity on a continent in which suchmonopoly has either never existed or not been legitimate. It is howeverimportant to note that, the UN’s definition of ‘security sector’ recog-nizes other security actors beyond the state. Since 1990s, there have beendebates on the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. Some studies show thatthe UN is ineffective in halting conflict and pursuing peace (Hultmanet al., 2013; Jett, 2000).

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusivelicense to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021F. Onditi et al., Reimagining Security Communities,https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70869-6

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444 CONCLUSION

Yet others have revealed conditions under which peacekeepers operateto reduce hostilities (Diehl et al., 1998). But also, there are methodolog-ical problems; many studies simply dichotomize the presence or absenceof an operation in a given year (Jett, 2000), assuming the capabilitiesof missions do not change over time or that context does not bear anyimpact on the outcome of such operations. This comes with limitations.For instance, omission of diversity across missions or failure to factor incontextual uniqueness might complicate mandates, personnel commit-ments and force capacities. It was against such complications that theAfrican Union thought of an African-led peace operation. To this end,the African-led peace support operations have made tremendous effortsin the development of peace doctrines and standard operation proce-dures, including (1) the principle of non-indifference and the readinessof the AU member states to deploy troops in PSO; (2) the devel-opment of the ASF including its mission scenarios and requirementsfor deployment; and (3) the comparative advantage of using front-linestates as troops contributing countries under the guidance of the AU incollaboration with UN. Despite this impressive achievement, the Africansecurity community is yet to achieve an integrated system that puts all thecomponents of the peace and security architecture together into a systemwhole.

Our diagnosis reveals that the African Union uses the reductionistmodels to respond to various peace and security threats. The challengewith reductionist approach is that, it is unable to fully depict or allow theinterventionists to broadly understand, the new emerging complex anddynamic peace and security scenarios. In other words, as the founding“father” of systems thinking, Barry Richmond (1994) alludes, ‘peopleembracing systems thinking position themselves such that they can seeboth the forest and the trees’ (cited in Arnold & Wade, 2015: 671).Likewise, when it comes to matters of peace and security, without ST,the interventionists are unable to not only misdiagnose the problembut are likely to deploy wrong response. ST has the potential of estab-lishing the practice of coordination between the AU and RECs, withrespect to establishing peace missions and mandating PSOs. Notably, anST modality is required for how to determine a mandating authority forpolitical missions to ensure those initiatives obtain the maximum politicalsupport from the AU member states and other regional and interna-tional stakeholders. With the exponential growth and demand for artificialintelligence (AI) in peace operations, comes a growing need for systems

CONCLUSION 445

thinking in the AU’s and RECs to tackle the complex peace and conflictscenarios. Now, more than ever, systems thinking models are needed todesign interventions for an increasingly complex, regionalized, global-ized, conflict system of systems future in which everything from the Sahelconflict system to Great Lakes conflict system to the Horn of Africa’s willproduce ripple effects throughout the globe. Based on this reasoning,it could be strongly argued that all people at the AU and RECs/RMsdecision-making roles should have a solid grasp on systems thinking intheir day-to-day endeavours.

Thus, the overall question addressed in this work concerns structuralevolution of the regional security community (RSC) and how systemsthinking could enhance the functional capability of the African Peaceand Security Architecture (APSA). The precedence set by the UN Peace-keeping Operations on how entities should manage complex peace andsecurity situation elicited an interesting question as to why tensionspersisted between civilians and the military. One of the factors is (mis)trust and philosophical disconnection between the military and civil-ians. However, it is important to note that among the peacekeepingfraternity, the causes of tension between the military and civilians arecontext specific. They include organizational structures and institutions;cultural and policy differences; operating principles and norms; profes-sional and world view differences; political and career interface. Contraryto the popular notion that institutions cause tensions directly, evidenceemerged to illustrate how organizational structures and processes influ-ence behaviours of those interacting with the system or institutions. Thisexplains why authoritarian political regime is likely to generate consid-erable resentment even when the policy frameworks insist on inclusivedecision-making process. Military personnel drawn from such regimes aremost likely to create animosity with their civilian counterparts, comparedto a relatively liberal democratic regime. Hence, democratization of ASFand other PSO institutions is not sufficient towards attaining full oper-ational capability. Three things are essential to this process: domination,capacity building and actors.

Military Domination—Even though both the United Nations andthe African Union PSO doctrine recognizes the need for an integratedpeace operation, this is not the case with ASF subregional structures asa cross section of peacekeepers still believe that the military is a strongplayer on matters peacekeeping. The bitter part of this is that, if powerstruggle between the military and civilians is not managed, it jeopardizes

446 CONCLUSION

the ASF journey. Given an opportunity, the military institution or indi-viduals serving within this institution could exploit differences within theinstitutions or civilian structures to frame policies into what they wouldlike to see or cause high friction within the system. This poses risks ofpoliticking peacekeeping missions. In order to harmonize the situation,mechanisms aimed at establishing cohesion between the parties and sensi-tization to allow the military and civilians mix and work collaborativelyover long period of time might be of great importance to the future ofpeace operations. Within the complex operating context, the core func-tions of a multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation areto:

(a) Create secure and stable environment while strengthening theState’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule oflaw and human rights;

(b) Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and otherinternational actors pursue their activities at the country level in acoherent and coordinated manner;

(c) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconcil-iation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effectiveinstitutions of governance. Close coordination with these actorsand institutions is, therefore, essential.

The uncertainty that surrounds the supply and demand for peacekeepersraises questions on the viability of the ASF. At strategic level, theinter-organizational tensions in eastern Africa involving regional bodies(EAC, IGAD, COMESA and EASF) limits possibilities of realizing acomprehensive mechanism to respond to complex peace and security situ-ations. On the contrary, the ECOWAS’s comprehensive mechanism forconflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Securityis nuanced to allow for plurality of actors beyond the security sector. Inboth EASF and ECOWAS standby forces, there exist no clear mecha-nism for representation for Police and Civilian components at the highestpolicymaking organs, a factor that creates an instinctive military domi-nation of the ASF subregional structures. For instance, in the ad hocStanding Committee of Experts designated by the EASF, civilian repre-sentation is dismal with no police component being represented. Duringthe expert’s workshop held from 11 to 13 March 2013 in Kampala,

CONCLUSION 447

Uganda. Out of the 10 Member States representing EASF Heads of Statesand Governments, 7 were military of the rank of Colonel and only 1civilian represented the Government of Uganda.

Allocation of resources to various entities and equity at the ASFremains an area of concern. Inequalities are observed in budgetaryallocations across components. Inequitable resource allocation to theforces was a source of tensions among peacekeepers. During the finan-cial year 2012/2013, the military component with staff of 17 (16%)out of the total 106 was allocated USD 492,000 representing 21.40%of the total EASF budget (USD 2,289,528) FY 2012/2013. This wassignificantly high compared to the civilian and police who were allo-cated USD 118,800 (5.19%) and USD 146,400 (6.39%) respectively. Puttogether with other paramilitary structures, armed forces received thehighest amount 1,014,084 (44.29%) compared to the police and civil-ians combined, USD 265,200 (11.58%). In regard to the number ofemployees, the military with a total of 17 staff also surpasses police andcivilians combined with a total of 10 staff (Onditi, 2015).

Institutional capacity building and adaptation of peacekeepers—Itis a concern that participation of political, non-state actors such as civilsociety organizations has continued to narrow in the regional Peace-keeping Training Centres (PKTCs). Although the EASF and ECOWASin collaboration with AU Peace Support Operation Division (PSOD) andPKTCs have undertaken considerable effort in developing training guide-lines, doctrines and standards, there are considerable coordination issues.Institutional relationship, lack of clarity on training content, standard-ization, incoherent partnership architecture and competition for fundingopportunities remain the major bottle necks affecting capacity develop-ment. More so, the 2004–2013 data on PSO training shows that outof the total 9126 participants trained between 2004 and 2013, ECOWASaccounted for 6163 (67.5%) of the PSO trainees. Within the same period,EASF trained 2963 accounting for only 32.5%. The military personnelwere the most trained individuals in EASF region at 1869 (63%) followedby civilians at 750 (25.3%). Police were the least trained in the region withonly 344 accounting for 11.6%. In ECOWAS region, there was an evendistribution of trainees. On the same note, trained civilians accounted for39.5% (2434) followed by the military at 35.5% (2248) and lastly police,accounting for 24% (1481) (Onditi, 2015).

In regard to the institutional capacity, a trend is emerging withinthe APSA structures to initiate short-term capabilities to respond to

448 CONCLUSION

the emerging conflict situations. For example, AU Assembly initiatedthe process to create the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elim-ination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) in 2009. The PSCsubsequently developed a mandate for the initiative in collaboration withparticipating countries that were authorized by the Council. It involveda Joint Coordinating Mechanism chaired by the AU’s Commissioner forPeace and Security and the defence ministers of the participating coun-tries. The Regional Task Force (RTF) was designed to hold 5000 troopsand a Task Force Headquarters based in Yambio, south-western regionof South Sudan. Further, the African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity(ACIRC) intent to generate 5000 troops in the form of tactical battlegroups of 1500 personnel. This structure was established in 2013 undera centralized command made to attain a suitable combat and combatservice support with a minimal initial autonomy of 30 days. The greatestconcern here is the peeling back of the gains made since the establishmentof the ASF in 2003, since the ACIRC is based on military doctrine.

Peacekeepers are more curious in identifying themselves with their ownprofessional category, i.e. the military, police and civilians. This couldpredict positive engagement with the out-group, in this case such indi-viduals have greater propensity for sociocultural adaptation. However,identification with the host nation did not predict sociocultural adapta-tion to it. It is, therefore, an indication that the adaptation of the ASFpeacekeepers interacting either at the PKTC centres or at the Forces HQrelated more to their professional groups than to their inter-professionalmix. This implies that individuals are more inclined towards fending fortheir needs than building a regional image of the force that addresses theirprofessional mandate as opposed to an integrated formation. Patterns ofinter-professional tensions may suggest that identification to one’s orig-inal culture (to mean either military or civilian or police) rather thanabandonment of one’s professional culture was desirable for accultur-ating individuals and groups. The military as an institution is still centralto matters of peace and security irrespective of the geographical contextand occupational affiliation. The notion that comes with the terms suchas ‘operation’, ‘civil–military coordination’ seems to sway the thinkingof actors that an intervention is simply stopping fighting. However, anAfrican peace support operation architecture is unlikely to result in asustainable peace unless accompanied programmes designed to preventthe recurrence of conflict:

CONCLUSION 449

(a) Restoring the state’s ability to provide security and maintain publicorder;

(b) Strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights;(c) Supporting the emergence of legitimate political institutions and

participatory processes;(d) Promoting social and economic recovery and development,

including the safe return or resettlement of internally displacedpersons and refugees uprooted by conflict.

The Role of International Actors—The role of international commu-nity in promoting multidimensionality of the ASF is in doubt for thelast twelve years (2003–2015). While the international community wassupporting a change of knowledge attitude and practice (KAP) amongthe military forces through military and police training programmes, suchinitiatives continued to perpetuate militarization of PSO ecosystem. Inall the trainings that took place within a span of ten (12) years, 80%were those conducted by the UN Missions, 85.7% of NGOs/UNICEFand 87.2% of peacekeeping training centres provided child protectiontrainings for peacekeeping personnel (Onditi, 2015). Capacity buildinginitiatives by the PKTCs indicated a daunting trend. 94.2% of the totaltrainees were military compared to 65.70 and 62.80% police and civil-ians respectively (Onditi, 2015). This outlook casts doubt as to whetherefforts to attain multidimensional regional capability are feasible. Thecontinuous engagement of the international community on develop-ment of the force’s structures and processes, particularly in EASF hasperpetuated overreliance on external donors and technical support. Thisdevelopment continues to threaten the philosophy of African-CenteredSolutions (AfSol). Moreover, capacity-building institutions conductingtraining, coaching and policy development do not necessarily follow theASF policy guidelines including those regarding PSO training. Hence,the outcome of training does not correspond to the emerging peace andsecurity risks. Worse still, PSO architecture is thinning and giving way toa military operation. Both EASF and ECOWAS standby forces were notable to deploy a multidimensional force by 2015 due to lack of essentialcivilian capacities.

450 CONCLUSION

Towards A System-Wide Security Mechanism

The ECOWAS Peace Fund and the Council of the Wise gave theWest African Force leverage to connect directly with the communityand recognize non-executive members of the society to contribute topeace processes. The EASF an elitist institution focused on develop-ment of structures, rules, procedures and norms believed to guide theirprocesses. In fact, most of the structures were militaristic in nature: theyinclude Coordination Mechanisms; the Brigade Head quarter; the Plan-ning Element; and the Logistics Base. These structures within EASFsymbolized the might of the military and by extension the state. Thiscontravenes the ASF Policy Framework on a multidimensional approachto conflict resolution and management. The key driving forces in regionalintegration were security dependent. The transnational nature of conflictshad led many countries both in EASF and ECOWAS regions to rethinktheir security strategies. For example, the swinging of the Boko Harambetween north-eastern Nigeria and western Chad, the terrorist acts by theAl-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa and the unending violence against civil-ians by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in eastern and central Africaattest to the need for a collective security system.

Unlike the common understanding that the formation of a regionalsecurity system is a function of economic organizations, plans andpractice reveal otherwise. Collective security is in fact the process ofcombining both military and political strategy. In West Africa, forinstance, until the formation of the Economic Community of WestAfrican States (ECOWAS) in 1975, there was insufficient security interac-tion. ECOWAS linked together the whole block of coastal states Mali,Niger and Burkina Faso. It is noted that this development was notbecause Nigeria produces oil, but the power projected by the regionalpower house Nigeria humbled the rest of the countries in the regionto be led by Nigeria on matters ranging from economy to peace andsecurity. Unlike in eastern Africa, the main West Africa regional securitydynamic has remained unipolar. Although formation of a regional orga-nization such as ECOWAS does not necessarily indicate existence of amatching regional security complex, the evolvement of the Communityinto military-political security justified labelling West Africa as a proto-complex. The development of EASF, on the other hand, was detachedfrom the Regional Economic Community-EAC and, therefore, the Forcehad emerged out of the need to address the security challenges that EAC

CONCLUSION 451

was unable to respond to. The willingness of states such as Seychellesand Comoros from the Indian Ocean, non-members of the EAC, alsooccasioned the need to have a regional force uniting around the IndianOcean.

Integrated missions are designed to facilitate a coherent, system-wideapproach to the peace operation activities. The challenge of managingan integrated mission is compounded by the need to ensure that thereis some degree of coordination between the United Nations and therange of non-United Nations actors who are often present in conflictand post-conflict settings. The effectiveness of institutional coordinationis constrained by several factors. They include; conceptual issues, thedichotomy by civil–military cooperation and co-existence during peace-time and combat, philosophical differences, leadership wrangles, and lackof harmonized regional security systems as well as lack of a regulatorycivil–military coordination framework.

However, integration does not mean that all actors on the groundshould be physically infused under a single structure. Integration amongpeacekeepers cannot simply be imposed by an edit from above but isachieved through a constant process of dialogue and negotiation betweenthe actors concerned. The disconnect between various components of thesecurity system requires institutional civil—military coordination frame-work (ICMCF). The elements include concepts and constructs that woulddemilitarize the forces; stakeholders; harmonization of regional securitysystem; mode of getting stakeholders’ views and interest; source of intel-lectual capital. These concepts were applied in constructing what wouldsuffice as a model framework for coordinating military forces and civilianagencies for a multidimensional PSO. It is a concern that a large propor-tion of PSO training programmes taking place within the PKTCs do notnecessarily correspond to the regional peace and conflict needs and princi-ples. The process of recruiting and delivering on training is market drivenas opposed to a systematic identification of the problem and solution.The selection for trainees does not follow any systematic process but isbased on informal relationships between roster managers and applicants.This has negative implications for the quality of capacities available fordeployment.

The term ‘force’ is part and parcel of the African peace supportoperation architecture. In military science, the term ‘force’ means sophisti-cation and military advantage gained by effectively applying human skills,technology and hardware to defeat the enemy on the battlefield:

452 CONCLUSION

The involvement of other non-military entities such as civilian and policewould be treated as multipliers to support the strategic military objective.Although the concept ‘Force’ is frequently used by all components at theregional standby forces, the concept appears to be inadequately under-stood by both PSO actors as well as humanitarian agencies. (Focus GroupDiscussion in Nairobi, 12 July 2014)

The military’s view of the term maintains rooting in the militaryscience to mean material assets and sophisticated psychomotor manpowerskills applied to win a war. Most of the military’s description of whatthe term ‘force’ means, seems to borrow a lot from the work of RobertGreen (2007). In his work, the 33 strategies of war, Green, reiterates thatthe sure way of winning a war is segmenting the ‘forces’. Observationsand discussions with both police and civilians indicated that, it is thevery perception around the term ‘force’ that peacekeepers are not surewhether civilians should be part of a PSO. Suggestions have been madeby various actors towards building new concepts that will be inclusiveof all the regional standby forces’ entities. In the course of my researchin eastern and West Africa, we had identified several possible alternativeterms. They include, ‘formation’, ‘capacities’, ‘capabilities’ and ‘assets’.In my estimation on how the different terms are perceived, ‘the morecivilians and the military continue to interact, the more forms of percep-tion are developed’. Since the formation of the ASF structures throughthe Policy Framework of 2004, several physical and social structures havebeen developed.

Tensions are heightened whenever one component tries to exercisepower over the other. Our observation during the research indicates that,‘When you interact with the military, it is like the kinetic mode of “push-ing” and “pulling” forces in the environment, just as demand and supplydetermine the frequency and intensity of spatial processes that involve theecosystem of goods, services and people’. For example, a defiant civilian orpolice peacekeeper who does not necessarily wish to be controlled bythe military may be forced to hate military and their mode of opera-tion. This ‘hate’ may deepen leading to the opposing individuals formingrebellious alliances in solidarity against the domineering force. In otherwords, another ‘force’ is evolved in response to the master ‘force’. Suchtrend could degenerate into formations of several poles of ‘forces ’ withthe ‘Force’ dissociating to create separate peace support operation archi-tectures. This might lead regional bodies into security anarchy since the

CONCLUSION 453

mission to have an integrated ‘force’ will have been detracted. Our theo-rization of ‘power balance’ in the ASF structures led us to developscenarios, for a model, we coin as, ‘Ants Model of Relationship (AMR)’.This thinking likens the processes within the ASF to the behaviours ofhighly organized creatures such as ‘Ants ’. Ants live in colonies and leadclosed system lifestyle. Although Ants are insects with animal instinct, theirbehavioural pattern can be likened to system dynamics being witnessedwithin the ASF.

The point of convergence between the Ants and ASF as a regionalsecurity system is that both are very inflexible to allow changes withintheir respective systems. For example, Ants are known to be too protec-tive of the queen that any other deviant views even by members of thecolony are not welcome. Likewise, this is typical of military-dominatedsystems. ASF, being a military-led regional security system fits in thisanalogy. These structures were established to advance multidimensionalapproach to peace and security in response to asymmetric wars andconflicts. However, within a decade, the development of structures withinthis system has deteriorated into rigid military arrangements with limitedcivilian influence. As a result of this rigidity, interaction among actors (themilitary and civilians) has produced mixed outcome. In order to effec-tively theorize the spatiality or ASF, the field of geography and SpacePhysics became useful to me. The works of Abler et al. (1971) and IsaacNewton, the geographer and the physicist respectively was key. Chisolm(1975) and Tidswell (1976). Indeed, Newton’s theory of physical spacestated that, ‘every particle of matter attracts every other particle of matterwith a force proportional to the mass of each and to the universe; squareof the distance between them’ (Abler et al., 1971).

Ablers’ and Newton’s world view were influenced by enthusiasm ofhow tangible objects and space interacted. Similarly, we postulate thatsocial phenomenon such as decision-making processes and resource allo-cation in a political environment such as EASF and ECOWAS followspatterns of interaction that reflect sociopolitical realities, similar to whatthe two scientists describes in their thesis as ‘attraction’. In the lastdecades the asymmetric relationship between the military and civilianshas remained largely in favour of the former. The domination of the mili-tary is what creates the ‘square of the distance between them (military)and the civilians’. In other words, the ‘force’ of the military multipliesgeometrically, while that of the civilians remain constant or diminishesdisproportionately. However, our observation throughout the research

454 CONCLUSION

revealed that individuals portray same behaviour pattern when placed ininstitutions and structures with clearly defined objects and purpose. Forexample, the interaction between the military, police and civilians withinthe regional standby force were found to produce certain ‘energy’ orcapacities that could transform conflict situations into peace or resolute.In our thesis, the outcome of interaction between the military and civil-ians in training socialization is, therefore, theorized as ‘gravity’. In thefashion of strategic security studies, ‘gravity’ is the active ‘force’ requiredto neutralize belligerent groups posing threat to peace and stability. Inother words, for the ASF to produce proportional force against theenemy, this must be done in an integrated manner in order to harnessthe maximum force.

The interaction among the military, civilians and police were examinedanalytically by identifying elements that relate to each other to producethe required energy/force for restoring peace in a given conflict situation.In order to calculate the Index of Influence (IOI), there is need to deter-mine the level of interaction between the three components. Therefore,to calculate the rate of interaction among the Military (M), Civilian (C)and Police (P), each component is determined as the ratio of the total staffof the regional standby force. In order for the formula to be applied to areal situation, we conducted simulation exercises with actual or potentialpeacekeepers drawn from PKTCs in EASF and ECOWAS. Appropriatevariables were identified. Further simulation with peacekeepers generatedthe data and formulated what we coined as, ‘The Functional Strength’.The Functional Strength (FS) can be used to measure the human resourcestrength of a component within the ASF. In order to consider otherfactors in determining the FS, we directly measured the FS through indexof influence (IOI). This technique could be used to measure the degreeto which a component within the ASF or any other institution is betterplaced to influence key decisions and hence determine the outcome ofa social-political process. The outcome of the simulation revealed a rela-tionship that, ‘the higher the Index of Influence (IOI) the greater thedegree of policy influence’. In the case of ASF, organizational depart-ment with majority of highly influential professionals is likely to greatlydetermine decisions across departments. And so, it is not necessarily thenumber of such individuals, but the effectiveness of their influence onother potentially ‘opposing’ individuals.

CONCLUSION 455

The following illustrates computation of Index of Influence:

I = C/T × 100/1

whereI = Degree of Influence to policy processesC = Number of professional categories in the componentT = Total number of staff in the whole Force

To determine the functional strength (FS) of EASF for the three compo-nents, namely the military, civilians and police, the indices are worked outas follows:

i. (a) Military I = C/T × 100/1 = 30/40 × 100/1 = 75%ii. (b) Civilian I = C/T × 100/1 = 5/40 × 100/1 = 12.5%iii. (c) Police I = C/T × 100/1 = 5/40 × 100/1 = 12.5%

Based on the above computation, it is clear that the indices for civilian(12.5%) and police (12.5%) remain low compared to military (75%) inEASF. This implies that at any one given time, the decision-makingprocess is likely to tilt towards the military thinking. As such, influenceof civilian and police within the ASF is gradually eroded, not throughphysical fighting, but the power of influence. In the second example,a determination was made about the FS of IPSTC across the military,civilians and police based on field data.

i. Military I = C/T × 100/1 = 196/247 × 100/1 = 79.4%ii. Civilian I = C/T × 100/1= 45/247 × 100/1 = 18.2%iii. Police I = C/T × 100/1= 0/247 × 100/1 = 0%

From the two examples, it was evident that both the FS and the Indexof Influence (I-I) for the military are high. Thus, are able to influencepolicymaking processes. In some cases, such as the example of IPSTC,there exists no police officer to influence policies. This model could bereplicated and used to predict the outcome of policy processes withincollective security systems.

Are there possibilities for reforms? It is evident from this analysis thatmilitarization of ASF structures and processes is bound to continue andthat ASF’s full operational capability seems to be a utopic proposition. Itwill, therefore, be in the interest of all PSO actors to make bold steps to

456 CONCLUSION

revisit the concept of multidimensional, particularly the terms of ‘force’.This is a conceptual problem which could be tackled by contextualizingdoctrines that inform operations within the political and socioculturalrealities of the continent, rather than the application of universal conceptsblindly. For example, the 1990s civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leonegreatly informed the doctrinal formation of ECOWAS standby force todevelop comprehensive mechanisms that would address not only statesecurity but also human security challenges that were facing the regionat that time. Moreover, the cynic attitude that exists between militaryelites and CSOs is a symptom of clientele politics within the African PSOecosystem, leading to exclusion of civilian agencies on matters of peaceand security.

The African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) is anideal platform for enhancing participation of non-military individuals indecision-making processes. Lack of political commitment to the philos-ophy of Pan-Africanism is perpetuated by self-interested agitations bysome African leaders seeking to shield themselves from global obliga-tions. As a result, a resource vacuum is created leading to proliferationof external donors and technical assistance. In view of this development,PSO actors at all levels should make deliberate efforts in strengtheninggovernance mechanisms such as the AGA (African Governance Architec-ture) and APRM (African Peer Review Mechanism). For this approachto benefit the majority of African people, the processes should be led bypan-African civil society organizations. If these mechanisms are left in thehands of the political class or bureaucrats they are bound to be abused andfractured by the same political bigotries expected to protect the values ofAfrican people.

That notwithstanding, the future of African Peace Support OperationArchitecture should be put in ‘binoculars ’. It is not possible to absolutelystop institutional challenges such as self-interests, conflict and wars onthe face of the earth. But, human race will continue to bear the brand ofconflicts and wars. It is, therefore, imperative to continue thinking newmodels for mitigating, managing and resolving conflicts. Thus, thinkingand policy intervention is required in areas such as doctrine, institu-tional reforms, how we conceptualize actors, systems thinking as wellas approaches to some of the most deleterious wars/conflicts in thetwenty-first century, such as insurgency and terrorism. But institutionalfragility/entropy within the AU seem to be the most threatening risk

CONCLUSION 457

to the African vision of attaining a fully operational ASF. The forma-tion of the ACIRC (African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises)for example, was such a threat to the initial conception of the multi-dimensional ASF. That slight institutional setback notwithstanding, in2018, the then Chair of the African Union, Rwandan President PaulKagame, outlined promising reforms towards making the AU financiallystable and reliable. Some of the reforms targeted the Peace fund tosupport Conflict Prevention, Mediation Support Unit (MSU) and thePeace Support Operation. In fact, by September 2018, the AU memberstates contribution towards operation and programme budget had hit US$269 million (66%). This implies that the donor/partner contributionhad significantly reduced to US $ 130 million (34%). This (in)dependencyshift is viewed as a transformation of the continent towards a self-reliant,United African States (UAS).

Possibilities for a HolisticSystems Approach: A 3Ds Model

Military counter-insurgency operations is a product of post-colonialAfrican states, characterized by persistent insecurity and cyclic conflictcaused by factors ranging from struggle over resources, unequal wealthdistribution, gross human rights abuse, governance issues as well as iden-tity politics (Keller, 2014; McCauley, 2014). These issues are often linkedto the deleterious legacy of distorted political economy deepened by yearsof military dictatorships and corruption (Onuoha et al., 2020; Amuwo,2009). Related to the issue of political and ideological identity is thephenomenon of ‘insurgency’ that characterizes several African states suchas Angola, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia,Sierra Leone and Nigeria. Globally, the insurgency network structures arecentrifuged under common ideologies, shared languages, culture and reli-gious extremism (Kilcullen, 2005; Cardenas et al., 2018). More often,the groups alienate themselves from the mainstream socio-economic andpolitical systems of the society. In some cases, fear of marginalization isoften rife in the contestation for the control of state power given the influ-ence of political power over socio-economic welfare as clearly illustratedin the case in Nigeria.

This approach is based upon (but not reducible to) the ‘Hearts andMinds’ (HAM) approach as popularized in Malaya in 1952 (Smith,2001). During this time British High Commissioner to Malaya, Gerald

458 CONCLUSION

Templer, famously remarked that ‘the answer [to the uprising] lies not inpouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of thepeople’ (Cohen, 2014: 1). The main tenet of HAM is the indispensabilityof winning the supports of the populace to implement counter-insurgencystrategies. It is considered crucial in addressing the state legitimacy crisesin insurgency-ridden zones. Hence, for instance in Afghanistan, HAM wasdemonstrated as ‘humanitarian and development operations performedmainly by military units or civil–military hybrids in order to increasestability through good faith and thereby increase the legitimacy of thegovernment of Afghanistan, as well as the international presence’ (Egnell,2010: 289). In social sciences, it is important to remember that there isrelationship between meaning and actions. Therefore, the kind of scien-tific explanations attached to 3Ds to explain its meaning and action arefunctional explanations. The criteria for validity of such explanation arebased upon their utility and not upon claims exclusivity against otherconcepts, which, in the case of insurgency may provide useful explanationsthat illuminate different dimensions of (in)security as illustrated within thecyclical 3Ds architecture.

Development

The first argument revolves around the non-negligible development–secu-rity nexus. The insurgency phenomenon has a socio-economic dimensionthat gives rise to social unrest and reaction. The essence of development,for instance, through economic support, is to ‘persuade the population tosupport the government instead of the insurgents’ (Grandia et al., 2009:14). Hence, the building of effective administrative capacity and institu-tions for the provisioning of security, basic needs and services in a mannerwhich is perceived as legitimate by the local population is crucial to aneffective sustainable counter-insurgency (Grandia et al., 2009: 19). Akinto this, HAM approach as demonstrated in the 3Ds architecture, stressesdevelopment as a precursor to security. It is for this reason that Egnell’s(2010) observed that concerning the tendency to construe developmentfrom the perspective of linear trajectory, and the implication thereof inturning development to a means rather than an end, in and of itself.However, the development sort herein is not only construed as a meansto an end (such as peace and stability) but it is also an end in and of itself.It is construed as a necessity for well-being, stability and peace, which

CONCLUSION 459

forms part of the overall end, being development (including security) inthe broadest sense.

Studies on the Afghan recovery processes (Suhrke, 2007), echo thecreation of the Development Zones (ADZs) as an enabling factor.External aid and support combined with a few agricultural initiatives gaverise to economic growth, while the local government service deliverycapability was being enhanced (Grandia et al., 2009: 38–42). Moreimportantly, as (Grandia et al., 2009: 42) explained, the developmentprojects such as agriculture, geared towards poverty reduction are easierto integrate into the community’s systems, hence, promoting ownershipby the insurgent groups. The two pertinent reasons for these include (1)that the insurgents may not destroy it because it is not of foreign origin,thus facilitating its sustainability; and (2) boosts the perception of thelocal governments among the populace in terms of its ability to ‘care fortheir survival and well-being ’. Furthermore, Grandia (2009: 45) notedthere was a balance between the development and aid efforts by the inter-national organizations. Thus, improving human security may also result ineconomic activities opening of markets and creating market opportunitiesfor produce from insurgent’s alternative pre-occupation. The confronta-tional nature of communities that are heated by insurgency may requireextra efforts through negotiation and dialogue (diplomacy).

Diplomacy

The second notion is ‘diplomacy’. Diplomacy, especially preventive diplo-macy (PD) is hardly disconnected to the idea of development. Theobject is persuasion that can solidify the allegiance of the populationto the government or switching it from insurgents. This also is aboutgovernance. It is about reducing, if not eliminating, the existence ofungoverned areas, through soft power rather than military operation.Indeed, ‘once warfare is connected to both development and diplo-macy, strategic and tactical military decisions can have a lasting impacton long-term objectives’ (Grandia et al., 2009: 45). In the same vein,the diplomatic element in 3Ds pertains to the efforts of the counter-insurgents to neutralize external assistance to the insurgents and, at thesame time, mobilize outside support for their own cause. For instance, itsoperationalization in Afghanistan included the launching of the Direc-torate for Local Governance (IDLG) in 2007, with the mandate to

460 CONCLUSION

improve governance for the attainment of stability (Grandia et al., 2009:38). It is within such climate that negotiation and political settlement canarguably foster stability and peace. On its own, diplomacy may not alwaysyield this result; hence, the relevance of the integration with the militarydimension (defence).

Defence

The final element is defence. It must be noted that the success of diplo-macy and development is hardly possible without the military firm holdon the violence of insurgency at least for a period. Hence, the defenceelement of 3Ds encompasses the wide range of military tasks includingeliminating those who commit atrocities, peace enforcement or coordi-nating disaster response to attaining peace and stability. This is the mostcommon approach to conflict around the world. Meanwhile, in the 3Dsframework, it means more. It means the nearness of the military to thepeople. Akin to this (Kilcullen, 2006), underscore the importance ofbeing present to the population-being there for people:

Presence should be established by living in close proximity to the popula-tion, through frequent patrolling on foot, night patrolling and sleeping inlocal villages. This type of activity, though seemingly dangerous, will estab-lish links with locals and increase human intelligence – thereby increasingthe security of the counter-insurgents. (cited in Egnell, 2010: 291)

The inadequacy, if not lack, of such presence not only makes theoperationalization of the other Ds less effective, but also difficult. Inthe case of Nigeria, this has resulted, for instance to the re-capture ofterritory by the insurgents. The use of HAM in the 3Ds to counterinsur-gency is not necessarily a panacea for mitigating impacts of insurgency.Not only is it open to a variety of (mis)interpretation, ranging frommere appeasement of the people through softness and goodwill to thepopulation without stamping of authority through the use of force, it isalso not immune to misapplication. However, its broader operationaliza-tion, especially, through the 3D reduces this weakness tied to a narrowerconception of legitimacy, which has meant that ‘counter-insurgents havehad preconceived ideas about what needs and grievances to address ratherthan to actually listen to the local population’ (Egnell, 2010: 292).

CONCLUSION 461

The Benefits and Criticism of the 3Ds Model

The 3Ds model is arguably a comprehensive counterinsurgency frame-work both in long and short term in Nigeria since the ‘ability to bearall instruments of national and coalition power and influence upon aproblem in a timely, coordinated fashion (i.e. diplomatic, economic, mili-tary, and informational) is increasingly essential to achieving effectiveresults’ (Leslie et al., 2008: 1). Meanwhile, in the need to avoid some ofthe challenges it has faced elsewhere such as Afghanistan and Iraq, 3Ds inNigeria must be predominantly engineered from within the national secu-rity system to take adequate cognizance of internal sociocultural nuances,while leveraging on external support where available and possible.

The relevance of the HAM, as operationalized through the 3D, lies inits emphasis on the civil–military cooperation (CIMIC) anchored essen-tially on good governance with the aims of depriving the insurgents theoxygen to breath, namely the population. The population’s support maybe due to an affinity with, or coercion from, the insurgents and/or thecombination of both (Kilcullen, 2006). Hence, a healthy balance of hardpower with soft power helps to bring the population into the pictureof COIN, since people are key to understanding and addressing the rootcauses of the insurgency. This dynamic, to some extent, is an improvementover its misinterpretation and misapplication in the narrative of colonialwithdrawal largely rooted in the legal-rational conception of legitimacy.

As far as governance is concerned, the HAM approach within the largerframework of 3Ds brings to the fore two basic but critical political factorsbehind insurgency, namely, bad administration and the lack of adminis-tration (Grandia et al., 2009). Both are glaringly obvious in Nigeria andimpact negatively on peace and security architecture of the country. Itis emerging that, the 3Ds concept can be useful in interrogating whichdevelopmental, diplomatic, as well as defence initiatives are likely to proveeffective in Nigeria’s COIN efforts considering the limited utility of themilitary approach as a sole tactic. Importantly, in this study, the 3Ds arenot limited to intervening force or external force, but proffered to thehost nation’s force, namely Nigeria. In other words, lessons drawn fromthe 3Ds approach are to be carefully and cautiously tailored into Nigeria’snational security system, in particular the COIN.

No doubt the 3Ds as operationalized in countries such as Afghanistansuffered from several challenges including lack of adequate integration,its principles are useful when treating the multifarious aspect of modern

462 CONCLUSION

insurgency; which are markedly different from conventional wars. Never-theless, its strength lay in ‘the shared responsibilities and planning’ thatit promotes among various agencies (Olsthoorn et al., 2015: 264). Itsgeneral emphasis on human security is pertinent and is of relevance to the‘alternative’ strategies we have proposed in the conclusion of this workcomprehensive approach within the broader framework of 3Ds. This isparticularly so due to the multidimensional nature of insurgency, rangingfrom material, ethnic, religious, to ideological demands such as thoseexperienced in the insurgency zones. The Dutch 3D COIN seems tohave been mainly popularized in Afghanistan and Iraq. By implication, theassessment of its applicability and efficacy in long term is anything but easydue to the limited environment where it has been operationalized. Somecritiques have observed that ‘impression that operations in Afghanistanvery seldom embody all 3Ds they either focus on development/diplomacyor on defence, not both as an integrated approach’ (Grandia et al., 2009:8).

It is emerging that the continued application of M-COIN in a complexpolitical economy environment is misdiagnosis, leading to persistency ofthe insurgency problem. However, 3Ds approach if well organized aroundprinciples of good governance and development can treat insurgency. Itis also evident that operationalization of the 3Ds mix is largely depen-dent on the country’s context. As such, contexts with strong governanceand robust social and political systems, conflicting interests are managedand ways found for groups to pursue their goals peacefully; but in situ-ations of fragility where there is poor governance and weak political andsocial systems such as Nigeria, grievances, disputes and competition forresources are more likely to become violent. Consistent with literatureon the 3Ds COIN, the near absence of well-coordinated institutions forCOIN in Nigeria can be problematic.

Furthermore, the compelling view that insurgents and terrorists evolverapidly in response to countermeasures, so that what works once may notwork again, and insights that are valid for one area or one period may notapply elsewhere calls for a development of flexible and context-relevantcountermeasures towards the two insurgencies. Minding these challengesthus, the operationalization of the 3Ds should leverage on lessons fromelsewhere rather than a ‘blind’ adoption of everything 3Ds. For instance,the CIMIC (civil–military relations) thrust of the 3Ds COIN arguablyunderscored the utility of developing solid partnerships with reliable localallies, in order to design, in concert with those allies, locally tailored

CONCLUSION 463

measures to target the drivers that sustain the insecurity and thus tobreak the cycle of violence. This involves the combination of the socio-economic measures, diplomacy and military force to deal comprehensivelywith insurgency.

Finally, the extent of a nation’s military sophistication, which issometimes a reflection of the level of development, is some relatabledeterminants of the extent of this challenge for states. The consistency ofthis view with the ideas of the Comprehensive Approach (CA) in coun-terinsurgency is appreciable. In this regard, global doctrine on security,broadly views COIN as those activities that encompass military, paramil-itary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeatan insurgency. With the requisite political will, Nigeria can indeed borrowadaptable lessons from the above conclusion in addressing the seem-ingly different but considerably similar insurgencies in the Niger Deltaand north east, especially from a political economy dimension. Thus,attaining a robust and sustainable COIN, socio-economic root causes andthe negative developmental impact of the insurgencies have to be clearlydiagnosed, prescribed and treated simultaneously, using the compressiveapproach, preferably the 3Ds.

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Index

AAbbott, Frederick, 419Abdulqawi Yusuf, Court President,

366, 367Abyei, 39Adama, Ethiopia, 260, 261Addis Ababa, 91, 102, 112, 308Afghanistan, xv, xxiv, xxv, 335, 345,

355, 356, 458, 459, 461, 462Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy

(AIMS), 374, 375African Capacity for Immediate

Response to Crisis (ACIRC),293, 307, 448, 457

African-Centered Solutions (AfSol),449

African Centre for the Construc-tive Resolution of Disputes(ACCORD), 138, 140, 268

African Civilian Response Capacityfor Peace Support Operations(AFDEM), 268

African Development Bank (ADB),153

African Governance Architecture(AGA), 135, 156, 163, 203, 456

African High Command (AHC), 214African-led International Support

Mission to Mali (AFISMA),xxxvii, xxxviii, 230–232, 292, 297

African Peace and Security Archi-tecture (APSA), xii, xxv–xxx,xxxvi–xlii, 10, 12, 17, 21, 23, 24,31, 32, 34–38, 40–42, 44, 66,68–75, 82, 86–90, 92, 101, 105,117, 118, 127, 128, 131–133,135–137, 141, 143, 145,147–156, 161–166, 168, 171,176, 177, 180, 183, 185, 198,202, 203, 211, 215–218, 236,240, 247–249, 251, 255–259,261, 263, 267–269, 271–277,279, 283, 445, 447

African Peace Fund, 153, 154African Peace Support Trainers

Association (APSTA), 456African Peer Review Mechanism

(APRM), 456

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusivelicense to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021F. Onditi et al., Reimagining Security Communities,https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70869-6

467

468 INDEX

African Socialism, 13African solutions, 201African Standby Force (ASF), xiii, xviii,

xxv, xxvi, xxviii–xxx, xxxii, xxxvii,xxxix, xli, xlii, 91–96, 100–102,104, 106, 115, 118, 161–174,177–186, 192, 196, 197, 201,248, 249, 257, 261–263, 267,268, 272–274, 283, 314–322,325, 329, 330, 335–337, 339

African Union/United NationsHybrid Operation in Darfur(UNAMID), 265

African Union (AU), xiii, xiv, xxii, xxv,xxvi, xxviii–xxxii, xxxvi–xlii, xliv,14, 19, 24, 29, 34–39, 41, 44,65, 66, 68, 70, 71, 82, 86, 88,89, 91–94, 101–106, 108, 109,112, 114–117, 119, 131, 132,135–138, 140–144, 147–156,161–172, 174, 177–183, 197,198, 201–203, 291–297, 299–301, 304–310, 314–316, 318,320, 321, 329, 330, 336–339,374, 375, 444, 445, 447, 448,456, 457

African Union Mission in Somalia(AMISOM), xxii, xxxii, xxxvii,xxxviii, 67, 73, 102, 169, 172,175, 178, 293, 295, 297, 304

Afrocentricity, 84Agenda 2030, 299Agenda 2063, 41, 88, 299Agronomy, xxivAidid, Mohamed Farah, 233Akosombo, 215Alemazung, J.A., 210Al-Ittihad Al-Islami, 233, 234Al Qaeda, xvii, 356Al Shabaab, xiii, xv, xxiii, xxix, xxvii,

100, 115, 117, 175, 178, 210,223, 224, 240, 450

AMANI AFRICA, 165AMANI II, 169, 197Amharic, 348Andersen, R.L., 131Anglophone, 43Angola, 139, 457Angyal, Andras, 256Annan, Kofi, 140, 220, 353, 356Ansar al-Dine, 231Antonio Cassese, 367Anzilotti, Dionisio, 367Aouzou Strip, 362Arab, 212Arab League, 71, 108, 114, 115Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), 90,

107, 108, 114, 116Arab Sea, 380Architecture, xiii, xiv, xxv, xxxix, xlii,

128, 132, 140, 149, 153Armed civilians, 131ASEAN family, 269, 270, 273, 275Asia, xviiAssociation of South East Asian

Nations (ASEAN), 293, 412AU Constitutive Act, 165, 198Auschwitz, 351, 359Australia, xxiv, 51, 377, 379–382,

384, 385, 388, 389, 399

BBakassi Peninsula, 362Balkans, 63, 335Bamako ceasefire, 214Bam, Sivuyile, 197Bancroft Global Development, 230Bangladesh, 379, 388, 397Bangura, I., 249BBC, 352, 356Belgium, 139Bellamy, A., 219, 240BENELUX, 345

INDEX 469

Bergen Belsen, 351Berlin Conference, 411Berlin Wall, 355Bertocchi, G., 249Big brother, 251Big Man Syndrome, 20Binoculars, 154, 203Biological bodies, 255Bloodshed, 171Blue economy (BE), 373–375, 377,

380, 382, 389–391, 394–396,399–402, 404

Bohemia, 348Boko Haram, xiii, xxiii, xxix, 66, 210,

222, 293, 450Boots and berets, 163Bosnia, 174, 187, 190Bosnich, David, 90Botswana, 85, 95Boutellis, A., 128, 147, 153, 262Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 146, 164,

325Briand–Kellogg Pact, 344, 346Burgess, S., 164Burkina Faso, 98Burundi, 93, 99–101, 103, 104, 106,

107, 112–115, 139, 148, 152,164, 178

Buzan, Barry, 81

CCairo Declaration, 141Cambodia, 212, 219, 322Cambridge, 347Canada, 55Capitol Hill, 365Casablanca Group, 84, 214Catalonia, 58, 63Ceasefire, 179, 180Cedric de Coning, 162, 192

Central African Multinational Force(FOMAC), 93, 104, 105, 163,179

Central African Republic (CAR), 135,145, 154, 321, 338

CEWARN, 21, 24, 111Chad, 66, 224–226, 232Chief of Defense Staff, 161, 163, 167Child protection, 167, 198Children Rights, 306China, xxv, xxxii, xxxiv, xxxv, 98,

270–274, 276, 378, 379, 382,392, 394, 395, 398

China-Africa relations, 127Civil–military cooperation (CIMIC),

461, 462Cold War, 2, 3, 25, 43, 54, 61, 72,

107, 143–146, 189, 195, 210,212–214, 233, 335, 344, 355,392

Colombia, xvColonel, 447Colonel Paul Otieno, 261Colonialism, 210Combat brigade, 181Combined Exclusive Maritime Zone

of Africa (CEMZA), 375Command Post Exercises (CPX), 216Common Market of Eastern and

Southern Africa (COMESA),140, 142, 446

Conteh-Morgan, E., 130Council of Ministers, 176, 179, 429Council of the Wise, 450Counter-insurgency (COIN), 457,

458, 460–463COVID 19, 58, 103Criminal Tribunal, 367Cuba, 360Cybernetics, 250Cybersecurity, 50, 67Cyberwarfare, 87

470 INDEX

DDachau, 351Darfur, 31, 35, 39, 72, 164, 265Darku, Alexander, 420Darkwa, Linda, 162Darwinian, 411, 429–432Declaration (1990), 150Democracy, xii, xxviii, 10, 26, 29, 30,

37Democratic Republic of the Congo

(DRC), 139, 295, 298, 306, 457Deutschian model, 1, 13, 16–18, 22,

24, 25, 28, 30, 31, 43Deutsch, Karl, xi, xl, 50, 54, 81, 82Diplomacy, xv, 4, 16, 163, 170, 171,

294, 298–300, 459, 460, 462,463

Disarmament, 95, 105, 179, 221Displaced persons, 229Djibouti, 100, 101, 103, 104, 109,

111, 112, 115, 259, 273Dominance, xxxii–xxxv, 61, 183–185,

188DPKO, 265, 266Drugs, 61Durban, 161, 163, 170, 202, 218,

224Durban Communique, 391Durkheim, 129

EEarly warning, xxv, xxviii, 89, 118,

137, 138, 141, 142, 153, 155,163, 203, 215, 249, 280, 296,301

East African Community (EAC), 16,17, 90, 99–101, 111, 112, 114,259, 263, 272, 277, 283, 388,396, 399, 404

Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF),93, 99, 101–104, 114, 446, 447,449, 450, 453–455

Eastern bloc, 24Ebola, 97, 229Economic and Monetary Community

of Central Africa (CEMAC), 148Economic Community of Central

African States (ECCAS), 90, 99,104–107, 114, 115, 142, 145

Economic Community of West AfricanStates (ECOWAS), xxvii, xxix,xxxii, xxxvi–xxxviii, 14, 17,19, 29, 31, 66, 71, 90, 93,95–98, 102, 108, 114, 140, 142,148, 152, 154, 163, 165, 167,171, 176–178, 185, 224, 225,231, 232, 248, 264, 277, 278,292–297, 300–305, 307, 309,310, 317, 325, 326, 336, 446,447, 449, 450, 453, 454, 456

Ecosystem, 247, 249, 250, 253,255–257, 259, 263–268, 271,283

ECOWAS Monitoring Group(ECOMOG), 96, 177, 178,302–304

Egypt, 14, 18, 31, 379, 394, 396Elections, 24, 37Electoral violence, 258Eminent African Personalities, 140Emperor Haile Selassie, 347Engel, U., 154England, 8Environment, 249, 253–258, 261,

262, 264, 266, 276, 277Epstein, 250Equity Bank, 429Eritrea, 100–102, 104, 109, 110,

112, 114, 117, 298Esmenjaud, R., 214, 217Ethiopia, 71, 72Ethnic vibes, 198Eurocentrism, 127Europe, 7, 8, 12, 22, 24, 130

INDEX 471

European Union (EU), 58, 62, 63,98, 271, 276, 292–294

Evolution, 165, 170, 183, 195Ex-junta, 231Ezulwini Consensus, 144

FFederalism, 56Field Training Exercise (FTX), 216Fit for purpose, 258Foreign policy, 174–177France, 139, 146, 148Francophone, 39, 43, 66, 96, 97, 99,

104Franke, B., 214, 217Free Trade Area (FTA), 136, 420,

421French military, 321French troops, 306

GGaddafi, Muammar, 85, 108, 231,

356, 358, 359Gambari, 249Gambia, 171, 366Garcia, Diego, 379, 394, 395Gates, Robert, 272Gender, 167, 191General Assembly, 128, 147General Mike Jackson, 352Geneva, 347, 348Genocide, 85, 86, 92, 100, 116, 117,

130, 137, 142, 151, 351, 352,354, 355, 357, 363, 366

Geology, xxivGeopolitical relations, 263Geopolitics, 49, 50, 420German Society for Technical

Cooperation (GTZ), 323Germany, 8, 176Ghana, 85, 98

Global order, 129, 144, 146Goukouni Weddeye, 225Governance, 86, 87, 97, 103, 110,

115Grandia, M., 458–462Great Lakes, 296, 445G77, 395, 404Guehenno, Jean-Marie, 443Guinea-Bissau, 295, 296, 302Gulf War, 356

HHaas, Ernst, 409, 413Hague, 104Hall, Edward, 324Hammarskjold, Dag, 211Hapsburg Empire, 8Hearts and minds (HAM), 188, 457,

458, 460, 461Hegel, Georg, 253Helicopter, 170Hettne, Bjorn, 409–412, 416, 417Hispanophone, 43, 104Hissene Habre, 225Horn of Africa (HOA), 87, 90, 92,

99–101, 112, 167, 176, 225,233, 240, 445, 450

Humanitarian space, 187, 188Human rights, 161, 167, 172, 173,

175, 180, 187, 190, 197, 198,201

IIceberg model, 69, 250Idi Amin, 92India, 270, 273, 275, 276, 377–379,

381–385, 388, 389, 392–395,397–399

Indian Ocean, xxviii, 271, 273,279, 374, 377–384, 386, 388,390–394, 396–401, 404

472 INDEX

Indian Ocean Research Group(IORG), 379

Indian Ocean Rim Association(IORA), 377, 379–391,393–400, 403, 404

Indian Ocean Tourism Organization(IOTO), 379

Indonesia, 269, 271, 275, 376, 377,379, 382, 388, 395, 397, 399

Industrial Revolution, 87Institutional bricolage, 248, 249, 256,

269Intergovernmental Authority on

Development (IGAD), 14, 29,42, 90, 99–101, 105, 109–111,140, 142, 148, 176, 179, 295,298, 446

International Committee of the RedCross (ICRC), 188, 193, 327

International Conference for the GreatLakes Region (ICGLR), 148

International Court of Justice (ICJ),362–364, 366, 367

International Humanitarian Law(IHL), xiii–xvi

International Monetary Fund (IMF),301

International Police (INTERPOL),299

Iran, 379Iraq, xv, 190, 344, 345, 352, 353,

355–357, 360, 461, 462Ireland, 8Irish Republican Army (IRA), 63Islamic, xxiv, 233, 359Islamic Court Union (ICU), 234Islamic fundamentalists, 115Israel, xxiv, 212Italy, 8, 18

JJakarta, 376, 395, 399

Japan, 270, 271, 276, 345–347, 350,351

Jewish, 367Jumuiya, 411, 415, 417, 419, 433

KKaberuka, Donald, 153Kabul, 356Kagame, Paul, 149, 150, 437, 457Kampala, 428, 446Kamudzu Banda, xlii, 209Kashmir, 212Kaunda, Kenneth, 139Kenya, xiii, xxiii, xxiv, xxxiii, 99–104,

109–112, 115, 139, 140, 259,263, 269–271, 273, 275, 276,283, 374, 378–381, 384, 390,393, 394, 397, 399, 401, 402

Kenya Airways, 429Kenya Commercial Bank, 429Kenya Defense Force (KDF), xxiii,

175, 261Kenyatta, Jomo, xlii, 139, 209, 283Kenyatta, Uhuru, 283, 380, 437Kinnvall, Catarina, 430Kisiangani, Emmanuel, 138Kismayo port, 402Kosovo, 322, 324, 344, 352–357Kuwait, 355

LLaden, Osama Bin, 356Lagos, 411Latin America, 22, 29League of Arab States, 355, 358League of Nations, 59, 130, 144,

344–349, 359, 360Legal Advice, 167Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

(LTTE), xvi

INDEX 473

Liberia, xxxi, xxxvii, 295, 297,302–304

Libya, 344, 352, 355–360, 365Light weapons, xxviii, 374Lord Goldsmith, 356Lord Richards, 359Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), 293,

306, 448, 450Lusophone, 43, 97, 104

MMachar, Riek, 272Machiavellian superpower politics, 146Madagascar, 171, 378, 379, 382, 385,

389, 393, 396Mafia, 237Maghreb region, 298Maghufuli, John Pombe, 282, 437Mahbub ul Haq, 351Malaysia, 269, 271, 375–377, 379,

397Maldives, 379, 390, 397Manchuria, 345–347, 350Mandela, Nelson, 139, 384, 392Mano River, 97Maritime, 279, 373–376, 378–382,

384, 390, 391, 393–398,400–402, 404

Maslow, H.A., 184Mattessichian, 343, 365Mauritius, 377–379, 382, 384, 385,

387–389, 393, 395–397, 399,400

Mbeki, Thabo, 85, 86McNair, Lord, xliii, 344, 347Mercosur, South America, 412, 414MICOPAX, 106Middle East, 378, 400Migingo Island, 16, 270Migration, 61Military, xiv, xvi, xx, xxiii–xxvi,

xxix–xxxii, xxxvii–xxxix, 49,

50, 52, 53, 59–61, 63–65, 67,73, 313, 314, 317, 321–328,335–338, 443, 445–461, 463

Military operation, 211, 217–219,222, 233

Militia, 128, 131, 145Mitrany, David, 409, 411, 412Mkandawire, T., 412Mockaitis, T., 324Mogadishu, 229, 233, 235, 236Mombasa, 402Monrovia Group, 84Morocco, 107–109Mozambique, 378, 379, 385, 389Murray, Gilbert, 349Musa Y’Ardua, 86Museveni, Yoweri, 437Muslim brotherhood, 298Muslim Rohingya, 366Mwanza peace process, 139Myanmar, xvi, 269

NNairobi, 177, 198–200, 216, 220,

233, 236Namibia, 212Naval base, 379, 394, 395Nazi, 349Neorealism, 2Neo-Stalinist, 101Nepal, 273Nesadurai, Helen, 270Netherlands, 176New Partnership for African

Development (NEPAD), 86Newton, Isaac, 453New World Order (NWO), 85New Zealand, 270, 276Nicaragua, 364Niger Delta, xviii, 210, 463Nigeria, 3, 11, 13, 14, 18, 35, 42Nkrumah, Kwame, xlii, 85, 209, 214

474 INDEX

Non-traditional approach (NTA), 49,60, 61, 64–69, 75

North Africa Regional Capability(NARC), 93, 107–109, 114, 163,179

North America, 83North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO), xxx, 7, 30, 51, 185,292, 323

Northern Cape, 165Northern Ireland, 58Norway, 8Nuclear weapons, 392Nyerere, Julius, xlii, 139, 209, 283,

409

OObasanjo, Olusegun, 85Offshore Hydrocarbons, 395Ogaden, 103, 115Ogilvy, Jay, 253Okhonmina, S., 85, 86Okoth, P.G., 170Oluwadare, A.J., 165Oman, 379, 384, 393Onditi, F., 167, 170, 178, 185, 224,

225, 261, 264, 447, 449Open systems theory (OST), 253,

255–258, 262, 266Operation Sangaris, 321Organization of African Unity (OAU),

1, 34–36, 41, 43, 82, 84, 85, 92,107, 108, 119, 138–142, 150,151, 296

Organization of American States(OAS), 345

Ottoman, 345

PPadelford, N., 129Pan-African, 411

Pan Africanism, 84, 85, 137, 138, 335Panel of the Wise, 24, 35, 36, 39, 86,

103, 118, 171, 202, 215–217,248, 274

Para-military, 447Parliament, 327, 345Partnership for the Environmental

Management of the Seas of EastAsia (PEMSEA), 377

Peace, xi–xiv, xxii, xxiv–xxvi, xxviii–xxxii, xxxvii–xlii, 1–3, 6–13,15–19, 22–25, 28–30, 32–42,82–84, 86–91, 93–109, 111–115,117–119

Peace architecture, 2, 13, 21, 41Peacebuilding, xii, xiv, xxv, 137, 141,

144, 147, 213, 241Peace Fund, 36, 65, 138, 142, 143,

248Peace interventions, 162, 195Peacekeepers, 300, 302–305, 322,

325, 328, 330Peacekeeping, xiv, xxv, xxvii–xxix, 4,

10, 33, 35, 40, 211, 213, 214,218–222, 224–227, 230, 232,237, 239, 241, 249, 254, 259,261, 265, 279

Peacemaking, 4, 40, 137, 141, 146,147, 213, 219, 241

Peace support operation (PSO), 162,163, 165, 167–170, 173–175,178, 182, 186, 189–192, 194,195, 197–203, 444, 445, 447,449, 451, 452, 455, 456

Pearson, Lester, 211Philippines, 269Piracy, xxvi, xxviii, 373–376, 379,

380, 395, 400Pirates, 299Poland, 348Police, 443, 446–449, 452, 454, 455Policy framework, 209, 214, 240

INDEX 475

Portuguese Supreme court, 361Post-election crisis, 140Postmodern, 52Poverty, 161Power struggle, 445President Ali Mahdi Mohamed, 233President George W. Bush, 355Preventive diplomacy, xii, xiv, xxv,

142, 143, 147, 213Protocol(s), xxv, xxviii, 15, 19, 96,

103, 105, 108, 138, 141, 143,151, 215, 225, 229, 248, 249

RRadbruch, Gustav, 361Rapatsa, M., 10Realism, 2, 26Regional Economic Communities

(REC), 87–91, 93, 96, 99, 108,111, 112, 114, 119, 314, 315,320, 329, 336, 338, 339, 375,444, 445

Regional security community (RSC),445

Relative deprivation (RD) theory, xvii,xix

Religious fundamentalism, xxiiiRhineland, 347, 349, 350Richmond, Barry, 251, 281Richmond, Oliver, 236Rim-Centre Actors Analytic Frame-

work (RICAAF), 316, 318–320,329, 330, 335

Rome, 199Rubicon, 349Ruggeri, Andrea, 314Russia, 146, 270, 271Rwanda, xliii, 11, 17, 23, 34, 39, 92,

93, 99–101, 103, 104, 112, 113,115, 117, 130, 136, 139, 142,148, 151, 174, 176, 178, 212,344, 352–354, 367

SSaddam Hussein, 355Safaricom, 429Sahel, 3, 87, 92, 293, 295, 296Said Barre, 233Sanctions, xiv, 8, 19Sanjak, 348Schmitt, Carl, 344, 349–351Scotland, 8Seabed Minerals, 395Security, 1–20, 22, 24–44, 49–70,

74, 75, 373–375, 378, 379, 382,384, 394–396, 398, 401–404

Security architecture, 254, 256–258,267, 269, 271, 274, 276

Security Council, 128, 144–147, 177,194, 328

Security Council in Central Africa(COPAX), 105, 107, 179

Security studies, xxix, 32, 454Seleka rebels, 338Sempijja, N., 130Senghor, Leopold Sedar, 209Serbia, 352Seychelles, 259, 273, 377, 379, 388,

390, 393, 400Shaba Province, 214Shangri-La Dialogue, 272Sharia, 232, 234Shaw, Timothy, 409, 416Shock troops, 181Sierra Leone, xxxi, xxxviiSilence the Guns, 70, 163, 202Singapore, 269, 275, 379, 384, 385,

394Situation Room, 142, 156Six Party Talks, 271Small arms, 161Small sister, 251Social power, xxxivSoderbaum, Frederik, 409, 410, 412,

416

476 INDEX

Soft issues, 258Soft power, xxivSoft targets, xviiSomalia, 88, 92, 100–104, 109, 110,

112, 114, 115, 117, 136, 139,142, 151, 154, 155, 210, 218,223, 225, 229, 233–235, 379,380, 393, 397

South Africa, 161, 163, 165, 181,183, 197, 198, 202, 379, 380,383–385, 392, 396, 397, 399

South African Development Commu-nity (SADC), 66, 71, 248, 263,269, 272–274, 277, 279, 283

Southern African DevelopmentCommunity (SADC), xxvii, xxviii,xxxviii, 14, 17, 19, 20, 29, 31,90, 93–95, 99, 102, 114, 163,171, 178–180

Southern Rhodesia, 85South Sudan, 11, 17, 31, 35, 39, 448,

457South West Africa, 85Sovereignty, xii, 162Soviet Union, xvi, 344Spain, 361Srebrenica, xliii, 212, 344, 352–354Sri Lanka, 379, 392Strait of Malacca, 377Sudan Peoples’ Liberation

Army/Movement (SPLA/M), xviSummit, 176, 198Superpowerism, 417Sweden, 8Swing states, 14, 18, 19, 35Switzerland, 8Syria, xv, 345, 348, 358, 365Systemic corruption, 211

TTaiwan, 272Taliban, 356

Tanzania, xxvii, xxviii, xxxiii, 85, 92,99, 103, 114, 115, 139, 148,263, 269, 273, 275, 282, 283,379, 381, 385, 402

Taylor, J.P., 349Territorial dispute, 139Territory, 162Terrorism, xiii, xviii, xxi–xxiii, xxvi,

50, 58, 66, 73, 87, 97, 100, 108,109, 112, 272, 374–376, 380,404

Thailand, 269, 270, 272, 379, 397Timbuktu, 232Tocquevillian thesis, 417Tribunal, 179, 180TROIKA, 271Tuareg tribesmen, 231Turkish, 345

UUbuntu, 9–11, 23Uganda, xxxiii, 92, 93, 99–103,

109–115Uganda People’s Defense Force

(UPDF), 304, 306UK House of Commons, 359UN Charter, xiv, xliii, 91, 292, 293,

296UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 337,

449UN General Assembly, 297, 354Union of Comoros, 379United Arab Emirates, 379United Nations Conference on Trade

and Development (UNCTAD),98, 377

United Nations Development Program(UNDP), 110, 298

United Nations MultidimensionalIntegrated Stabilization Missionin Mali (MINUSMA), 232

INDEX 477

United Nations Office for theCoordination of HumanitarianAffairs (OCHA), 323

United Nations Operation in SomaliaII (UNOSOM II), 324

United Nations Security Council(UNSC), xx, xxiii, xxv, xliii, 104,127–129, 145, 146, 149, 150,152, 327, 344, 352, 356–358,360, 366

United Nations (UN), xiv, xxx, xxxii,128–132, 136, 139, 141, 142,144–150, 152–154, 314, 322,323, 325, 328, 329, 337

United States of America (USA), 8,14, 16, 39, 53, 54, 66, 86, 91,136, 139, 142, 145, 146, 191,233, 295, 324, 344–346, 352,355–359, 365, 375, 376, 378,379, 382, 394, 395, 398, 402,404, 426

University of Garissa, xiiiUN Mission in South Sudan

(UNMISS), 102UN Missions, 449UNOCA, 297UN Women, 298Uppsala University, 63USSR, 145, 146

VVietnam, 269Violence, xi, xv–xx, xxiiViolent extremism, 89, 97, 109

WWaltz, Kenneth, 52Warfare, 3, 4, 27Warlords, 131Warner, J., 161We-feeling, 23, 26, 82, 119, 416Weissmann, M., 272, 273Weiss, T.G., 152We-ness, 6, 9, 20, 24, 29Western Sahara, 71, 72, 107–109, 117Westphalia, 52Westphalian, 352Wildlife Fund, 377Williams, Paul, 248, 261, 262World Bank, 98, 110World Food Program (WFP), 190,

323World Summit, 352, 354, 355WWI, 144, 343, 344, 349WWII, xii, 7, 12, 59, 128, 144, 343,

344, 346, 348, 351, 359

XXue, Hanqin, 367

YYamashita, H., 129Yambio, South Sudan, 306Yemen, xv, 379, 385, 393Yugoslavia, 322, 367

ZZambia, 85, 112, 113, 139Zimbabwe, 85, 93, 95, 112Zucker, L., 318