Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

8.1 hkvanco of Conununkativa Action

J k e n Habermas' pmject of cornmudcatin action is a comprehen- d n effort on hie part to present a theory which ~ C O + the vulnu- ability of all endeavours which have to summsriw their poaition and come out with a conclusion. Ha- has rtmw tonarda ad& ing genuine and vexatious aacial iwruas for which there are no d solutiom like the problems of reificaticm, alienation, beliefa, rsligiou- cultural- traditional ideologies, ego clashes, and peychologicd disor- dere too. Habemas himeell known certainly that it ie w i e r add than done when grappling with such ieeuea which defy any conclu- sion interminably. Whatever be the plight of mligiom or philosoph- ical movements atter their institutionalization, the rituatione which warranted a change and the intentions can nsver be doubted. Due to the vicissitudes of time, the followere of the principles bewme the f o l l m of the letters of the dictate of their mpective movements. Then the only criterion becornea what is raid in the form of preach- inga and the experiences behind those preachings and the motive0 and objectivee are reified endlessly.

Habermas deals with the problem of reitleation of i d w M ideal* gies in various institutions like culture, religion, and tradition. To address this problem he fabricates a technique of disco- or my- mentation with e m p b i e on everydqy wage. Thin d m at creating an aaanneaa and undaetandhg among all rectlom of the sodety which in laudable. The reaeon which Habermas adduw ir that only the languapin-uee haa the fluidity to roll over the anachronic viewe because of i b f o n d - pragmatic character. M h e r , he dso outlines the effective safe-guards in the form of discwivity and redeernabid-

ity of validity claims no that then will not be aqy proliferation of outmoded v i m and t h u ensuring continuou evduation. But the problem of reification ie not such that it can be rooted out com- plekly. If one belims that an idea is out of vogue someone elm would iind it fascinating and novel. Thin aspect of subjective view- pointa and preferences and added to t b is the rocid and cultural background of the partidpard which together d o u r the judgement. The problem of reification has ita genwin in human rdection which is paradoxically turned agaimt it& to counter reiflation. The ca- pacity to rdect and imbibe id- and to draw lemons from them and to utilize them, if necessary, givw the ideas f m h leaee of life.

Our pant is replete with rdfied experiences and by iqiecting a rational choice alone one cannot hope that the re i f idon will d ie appear. It in a problem with which life has to be Lived and only the intensity of the problems generated by a reified practice which dectn the society b to be curtailed. Our learning p m a w a are mi- fied until the rdectiw wmciouness develop with age. Our serly knowledge is moatly reproductive and recognitive. We model our- selves on eldere and the people who surround u. As in Hegel, the sublating w~eiouanear ia only retrospective.

6 1 Truth, T r u t h f u h , and Rightnew in

Art and Culture

Art is -tidy the cultivation of natural taknb. Realistidy speaking, artistes or artists develope their art through constant prac- tice. Even for precociouely talented people who aeldom practice but excel in the stage., practice suataina their performance level. An artist's confidence is boosted by his performance and vice versa. This depends on how he hones hie technique m d i m out r o d edges. The element of truth in an artist's performance is his d i s p b of entire range of capabilities without withholding anything or elee he must be found wanting in his intentions to perform to his best of capabilities. The element of truthfulness is in sustaining his normal level of performance even if, in his evaluation, the spectatore are not suffrdently attuned to enjoy the nuanees of his art. Becauue he not only perfom for others but also for himaelf it would be a cause for disappointment. And the satisfaction he would derive out of per- forming to his heart's content would be misling. The element of rightness lies in the artist's adherence to the conventions and norm of the art and not flouting the established and accepted practices. This is because, though the artist performs both for himelf M well aa for the spectator it is the responsibility of the artist to involve the spectator in his art. If the artiut doen something that i8 not in the vocabulary of the Listeuer or the perceiver he feels wroqed or if the artist's performance ie too good even then only a handful of connoisiewa can graep the import. Art like language is &o a social activity and a reflective one too. Thus, it in neceeeery to judiciously mix the subjective capabilities and the external expectations. Thus art is a prime example of a communitarian activity m d a h a field

which exhibits fonnal-pragmatic approach. Therefom, the fleld of art presents the dilemma of connecting the subjective, objective, and so- cial spheres.

On the darker side, our art and culture are the standing exam- ples of reification. Especially, in art, the consumerization of which Adorno vehemently opposed is mostly inlitative, reproductive, and recognitive. If it appears different in each of its exponents it is not always due to a reflective variation of patter- but due to systemic peculiarity, i.e. each one is different from the other, in nature, in their perspectives. All art forn~s have undergone drastic changes but only in form and not in content, which is possible o~lly as reified forms. Art has an advantage because of its direct appeal to the beholder. The self-expreseion coupled with the experience and emo- tional element camouflages the reification. Once again, it is not the reflective component that is in the forefront but the systemic factors and also the natural limitation of human beings in being able to store their experiences only as ideas etched in the memory. Here again, Charles Peirce'a habit formation comes into the picture. The habit of spectatorship is cultivated aud one learns how to enjoy art.

6.3 Reiflcation in Learning Processes

In the field of learning too only what is already known i8 taught and it cannot be otherwise. The development of reflective element definitely matters in giving an oriwtation, in the acquisition of var- ious skills and competenees, to apply what is known. John Dewey'e

revolutionary ideas which rejuwnated Americsn aptem of education revolve on the concept of 'subject matter" which he defines ta the most suitable course in a given situation. Dewey did not believe in forcing the etuderite just for the sake that education is the win- dow of dect ive knowledge and plays a major role in the pveonelity development of a student and prepera him for a better social life. Dewey treated the students ae rational subjecta capable of rational choice and justification and felt that they would conduct themaelm admirably when allocated the rwponsibility. Teach- acted more as a reflective psrtovs who keenly studied the natural cornpetencar of their pupils and bring them into open and harness them.

Objections may be raised regarding the relegation of dl knowl- edge to reified set of information citing the exceptional example of science. The plethora of diecoveria and inventions that take place every day is an elevation from the reified conedouaneas which in course of time will become reified. The aim here is not to match away the intelligence, imagination, and creativity of humane but to emphasix that when it peters down to communication, dialogue, verbahtion or rymboliaation of the finding the reification Btartr. The contention here is that reification has to be evaluated and ad- dressed on its functional role in the mciety. It is to be noted that though everyday language is not encumbered by rigorow tical rulw and mulations it has to adhere to wuventionr predent in the language community. It ie true that the are more pr- and empirical and uninvited complexitiea of axpreesions and hackneyed phrasar will not be used. But ae IIabermaa himeelf feels, dl it be enough to aver all anglee of humau eommunieation? A sort of linguistic maetery and a grasp of formal laryuwe is ebo

indispensable.

0.4 Ibication - A Perennial Irritant

It is true that nification engenders exploitation and t h ir prop& gstsd to protect the rtatw quo of the dominating dm. But the quea- tion ia whether them w rerl md concrets w l u t h . Expbltatlon 18 not only external, i.e. pertaining to the economic and sodo.politid facton but also internal, i.e. the reaction of the individual with him emotions, likea and dislikes, and other subjective facton. People are exploited at one time or other but w Habermas and other critical theorists have averred in disagreeing with Mam, it ie not confined only to the working claesee. When evaluating the problem of ex- ploitation the responsibility and the amount of risk attached to each task assigned to the individuals and the mental and phyrical eflorts demanded by the job hse to be taken into account. In any big indw- trial h o w , the first man to be hauled over the c d o will be the chief executive, even though for smell losses there will alwaya be scape goats to be sacrificed. But when the ship goea down the captain will be the last ta desert the ship and moat of the timw he will also go down with the ship and thus the responsibility is mammoth for the top level decision makillg peoplo.

It is ironical that Mam who maid that the class conflictr rtarted from the day man started living for the morrow vainly hoped to surmount the elass dividone and through revolution tratuform the society and annihilate all dws consciouanese. It would have been

probable for Mant to have haearded a guess in a society in which the urncept of thrift had not been rooted firmly. Man had long learnt the value of money an only form of exchange which muld be mip rocated with thinga which he wanted to buy. Thus, the poemaim inetinct in him haa been stoked which will smoulder till the time he becomes extinct and it haa reached a proportion w b m man would not leave the world to survive him. All the evils of the present age is attributable not only to science or religion alone but the develop- ment of the 'I' into a robwt one.

It may be argued that the preaent condition of the society is due to more individuation and leas socialization becauee the individuale are prone to socialization when their individuation is under threat and this is where Habermaa has to presuppose many a desirable traits which man is capable of exuding, but only when be deairea. It may be contended that there are far too many great men to ac- cept the theais. But if one observea these great men evoked strong revulsion in their own sodetiea and the following they commanded waa not baaed alone on admiration and adoration but on awe and disbelief they inspired among the ordinary onea. Thir is the raason why religions, initiated by men of great deeda and character who enjoyed urntinted aupport during their epochs, became the epitome of r e i f idon after their period. This wan becaw people drew their conviction to follow the footsteps of thoee pereonalities from their worde and deeda an they must have been the personification of their worde. H b r m a s ' despairing search for an instance to subatantiate the identity of intentions and declaration of intentione were these men who lived an they spoke and spoke they lived.

-ding communication in everyday practice, it is intended mostly for perlocutionary en&. The ability to communiuts mom sffactively starb with dec t ion on one's awn abilitia and this is cornparad and w n t r W with the others. Thw a common OW meaning orientatiom for the individual smsnata which latar M-

s u m the guise of role formation which ia internalized and reach- a post-conventional stage discusaed in detail by Habermaa in hls M o d Co~ciousness and Cornmanicolive Action (1990) in his analysis of theories of moral development and Selman'e theory of cognitive d e velopment various stages of development of child's cognitive faculty. For Habermas, the pwt-conventional etage is the reflective stage and the actors involved in the process of argumentation are no more pria- onere of instinct and impulse and they are quite capable of justifying their actions.

The post-conventional etage in no way liberata us from the p re conventional and conventional etage. Every human being, at any point of time, experiences all the three stagea namely, conventional, preconventional and post-conventional stage. This in further cor- roborated by the fact that humane never ceaee to learn. If one t a l b about stagnation, it is only literally that one doea not evince any ap- titude for formal learning or due to ageing the mind gradually l o w it8 sharpnm to grasp information. This is because, the e x t a d world ia dynamic and only the sharp minde are able to gather more and more information and ebow constant improvement. Such a keen mind in n d a d for conducting our day to day life in which dl kin& of people come together. Searle's contextual grounding of spsech act8 and his refusal to rubmibe to the notion of a continuour illocution- sry force is in everyday life situation. An iUocutionary force

is not always met by an illocutionary fore. If a pereon uars M argu- ment with illocutionery force and he ir quite firm .bout it, stlwt, he must be able to gauge the pwlocutionary intentiom of hh partner to save h i d from harm. And if the partner in good enough to re alize the intentiom of the speaker he may turn over into a new leaf. On the other hand, if the speaker h i m d reaorta to perlocutionary mode this may dispel any illuniona that his partner might harbour of hoodwhkbq him and switch over to the illocutionary mode. It ie a h interesting to note that any desultory eonvenational activity etarte with a conatative epeech act which may or may not blweom into a meaningful and Iongetanding relatiomhip.

6.6 Moral Development and Everyday Life - rituation

Regarding learning procesees, any permn undagoa all the three etagee mentioned by Selman every day. For example, a person mwta another. Immediately, his reaction is to evaluate the rtranger's din- position toward8 himaelf. If the peraon appears to be calm and quiet, the observer is not perturbed aud a favourable or antagonirtic opin- ion is not formed. If the pereon who comes in is braah and inipetuous, the first person is, definitely, bound find his behaviour repulaive. On the other hand, if the new entrant haa the courtesy ofsmiling or wish- ing the observer the latter is bound to be pleased by his behaviour. Therefore, any relationship prwupposee a sense of -on, i.e. a sew of mine. So any behavioural learning p m rtartr with the pmeonventional level and only then p r d to eonventlonal m d poet-conventional levels. In the aforesaid example, the observer

may belong to any level bmuae of his mental a p p h k, the in- stance. And man 1- by experience. All the people & not exhibit behaviour borne out of the three lev& always. It w i e a with moodo and emotions. May be, retrospectively like Hegel's owl of Minem they may have the awareness to correct themeelm.

What is strwaed in reflective level does not signal the end of the other two levela because our knowledge io not without aqy expect& tion accompanying it. Feelings are constant w m p a n i o ~ in any one's search for knowledge. And thus knowledge can never be impersonal because one's l i b and dielikea are channelized in it. Haberman himaelf tallre of intereatr permeating the human urge for knowledge in his Knowledge and Human Intereab (1971), of the cognitive and emandpatory interests in the knowledge claim. All of a sudden, even if the emancipatory interest is the upper most in the minds of all people the cognitive interests will not vanish. Thus, it ie alwaye a struggle between the various interests and it is not a tautology that all men should have the same interest when they engage in ar- gumentation. Habermas do- think of reciprocity requirement8 at various levela before finally taking them to their logical conclwion at communicative ethics in his Mom1 Conuc iowne~ and Commu- nieotictc Action (1990). Taking his cue from p s y c h d y s i s , he dis- t inguish~ four main states of ego-development: *symbiotic,' 'ego- centrjc," 'sociocentric-objestivistic," and 'universalistic." The fi~lal principle is the precursor for communicative ethi-.

Communicative ethiw which involm practical d i s c o m could be carried out in terms of communicative action as a formal-pragmatic

analy~b. Hahermad probkm in not to clothe the communicatiw ethics in wclusinly transcendental or in empirical term. It is fur- ther compounded by the attempt to transcend the ind iv id~o t i c tendencies for a universalistic communicative ethics and this tran- scendence, even if theoretidy, is not poaeibk without the situated- nee8 in the world.

6.6 Communicative Ethicr and Norm Formation

For Habennaa, univemalization means generalization and not tran- eeendence in Kantian terms. In hie communjcative ethics, H a b e r m ~ is concerned with moral development. Here, he takea Kohlberg's eix stages of development of human conacioueness like the egocentric, individualistic, interrelational, relationahips in a system, reflective individual, and finally that of a moral-rational individual. Thu , Habermaa seek to trace the development of rationality from the d e velopment of moral conaciouneee. Once again, after reaching the level of moral-rational, all decieiona are not taken at moral level and even if they are taken at the 111oral level other levels are implicitly aaaumed. Only at a moral level a commitment on the part of the individual is the greatest. A moral person deliberates whether it ir right on hie part to have done this or that and not from the angle whether it is right in the social viewpoint even though, as a life world, miety does influence the frame of mind of a permn. But there are innumerable instanma that even in mcwt trying of times and amongst raging eocid uphcavale people have been honmt, wm-

generoue, and eeMeea. Thie ie not due to some kind of

moral interest but a natural reaction to the travaile of fellow beim and this is a form of competence which is o priori . T b induda dl the six stsgea of Kohlbug's theory of development of moral con- sciousnc~ but the person is at the staga five and nix and hence hir moral development at the optimal level.

In Cambridge Companion to Haberman (1996), Georgia Warnhe detaile Habermaa' etreas on the need for a congruence between m o d norm formation, socialization, and education. She quota, 'the ed- ucational system must help in the "requisite inkrnalkation of su- perego controls and the abstractnese of ego identities." In order to highlight the human volition for moral development, Habennaa saya, "universalistic morality ia dependent upon a form of life that meets it halj way ." The moral perspective is too broad to lay down guide lines. It could resemble Kant'n categorical imperative which revolved the only good in itself which is the good will. Since Habermaa has to situate his thwry of moral action he introduces a process of moral argumentation as an antidote to the objectimting attitude. Even the concept of good is not without it share of controversies. A good man can be a person who does good to others, in a loose sense of the term. A moral person is the one does not do any wrong. There is total confusion when legal, moral and ethical pertlpectivea are con- sidered together. A moral, good, and a just person must go together but in institutionalizing the morality the legal and ethical r e h seek to reduce morality to what is plausible in argumentetion and diacunivity though not aa communicative action. Thus Mac Intyre'r criticizm of the inability of the reason to make any impregnable rulea and regulatim i~ not misplaced. But by having no concrete idea of moral would mire us in confusions. Habermas' defir~ition of illocu-

tionay speech acts applies perfectly to moral actions. There is no discrepancy between intentions and declaration of intentions. In a situation which demands moral choice it is not alwsys the caw that the result is a happy ending. Here, Bradley's differentiation be tww what is desired and what ie desirable presents the situation in a nut- ehell. This provea that even in moral realm there is always a gulf between theory and practice. Then, can moral be interpreted M the universal good or the rational and moral choice of the individual which in the literal sense might not bring any happineas or objective favours in kind or appreciation even from his kith and kin.

In this connection, Habermas cites the definition of Alau R.White who says that it is the best course of action available in a given situation which dissuades any attempt at universalization. In his communicative ethics, Habermas considers the position of Steven Toulmin who a i m at the interpretation of depth structure - aiming at 'real good' or 'real value'. This resembles Plato's archetypes and replica . This provea that the eternal search for an ideal which is practical is yet to attain fruition. Another resson for Habermas to say that at post-conventional level the innate competencea lose their strangle hold on the humans is to abrogate tbe aporias contami- nating the natural competencea. After reaching the reflective level it is possible to cultivate and carry out the dairable moral-ethical end-aim. And in order that the moral principles are not reified and the status quo exploited by the dominant claee, Habermaa in- troduces diecursivity and redeemability so that no one ku the final eay. For this, the argumentative enterpriee remaim the fora for gm- eraliation of norma preventing objectivimtion becaw nonnn can exist independently from facts. Habermas distinguishes norm from

moral pr indph since the former Is mom objactiw and the latter is more eubjective. He aims at making the former more subjective and the latter more objective.

Habermas quotes Kant'e definition of prudential imperative whieh indicates the failure of the moral agent to apply the criteria of uni- veraality of deairahle behaviour. From this, another interesting ob- servation accrues. The egocentric perspective in the .gent is more than the moral perspective. This prompted Haberman to a moral norm formation necessarily wnseneual. Here liw Haberman' inge- nuity. While Kant thought that the individual perspectivs should have a universal character. Habumm opinw that what L accepted as the univereal law should be accepted by the individual. Thw he dow away with the role of universalization and insert, the role of agreement.

6.7 The Ternion between Subjective and

Objective Realm

But in order to engage in a debate or a discourse aimed at discur- sive norm formation the partidpanta have to persuade themse1va to move out of their cocoons of their egcw and circle of clooe to heart 'b'. Coveted poeswsione have to be rewarded hanhmely by an enhancement in the benefit8 for the '1'. It is not the cognitive inkr- a t e or emancipatory interests which drive man relentlemly but his self-pr-ionary intereets. When 'Ie' come togetber on a ammon

intereat it is the intereat in 'I' which makes 'Is' to come together. Thia is not to be abhorred as abominable because it is the nature. But there is always an interaction between the individual and the society because one is infructuous in the absence of the other. Mead's role formation is not the ultimate solution because it does not Dortrav - - the reflective ability of the participants sufficiently and Habermas is not completely satisfied with Mead's ideaof socialized human beings for this reason.

Habermas dose not attempt any final solution like Hegel but as- pires to ameliorate the present situation. For this, he has to abrogate the rigid beliefs and ideologies which exercise a strangle hold over the minds of the people, He exhorts people to come out of their narrow confines of their respective egos and have a running dialogue with one and all. But one may ask what the conditions are which magis- trate the debates. Here too, Habermas does not supply a package of dos and don'ts and shrewdly leaves the specifics to be thrashed out among the participants and delineates only a broad outline agree- able to all and controversial to none so as to facilitate a free and fair discourse.

The ideal speech situation and discourse ethics are desirable to all. Iu order that he himself does uot get entangled either knowingly or unknowingly in the ideology and beliefs from which he is not safe. Haberluas has not shied away from soliciting the help from science for its impartial analysis and thoroughness of inquiry. He appreci- ates hermeneutics for its flexibility and dynamic vision of the past, present, and future and for its constant review and continuous inter-

pretation with reference to the context and historical situation which exonerates it from any dogmatic appendage. He cites psychoanaly- sis for its expedition into the mysterious realm of the unconscious and its ministration to the systematic dictions. He freely borrows from its remarkable chest of information on the nexus between vari- ous psychic disorders and human interaction, and from other seminal thinkers in philosophy, sociology etc. By making his theory of com- municative action more comprehensive he has shed light upon the dimensions of the problems involved and, in turn, has made the task of addressing the problem more onerous. His strategy of suggesting an abstract method of argumentation as the reflective medium of norm formation compounds the problem further.

Consensus is elusive and Habermas' tonic of illocutionary force is not always the appealing force as the majority opinion stifles the individual freedom of expression and the protestations more often than not are lost in the din. Democracy, which is the cardinal prin- ciple on which communicative action stands is the prime example of people's apathy towards cooperative activity. What is going on in democracies is that people have lesser problems than the totalitar- ian societies and it is just another institution for them which does not hinder their daily conduct of life. The redeeming feature is the freedom of expression and choice. Habermas might object to this crude portrayal of consensus formation in a den~ocracy by pointing out to the role of judiciary. In the legal sphere, the laws are leg- islated and only a chosen few are authorized to compile the legal lexicon. Only the laws pertaining to individual practices, religious beliefs, and nodal taboos are amended in order to prevent my mis- use of the loopholes in then1 whereas laws coveri~lg civil and criminal

offences, though in principle amendable, are followed unreflectively. Circumstances and not truth is evaluated when passing judgement over an accused. The law statutes which have sanction from the peo- ple, which have been edicted in the interests of the people assume the consensual assent of the people. C O R S ~ N C ~ ~ ? ~ upon the ideas of universal and moral principles of justice and common good, it stands as the mute testimony to the singular failure of the most plausible consensual endeavour. As a sequel to the responsibilities not given and not taken democracy does not have any concerted action plan towards total development.

This is not to dwarf the effort of Habermas but rather to can- didly place for perusal the ground realities. It is to show that it is not the larger interests but the parochial interests which serve as the launching pad for nobler deeds. That is, perlocutionary inten- tions underlie every illocutionary act. Only if the perlocutionary intentions are quenched will the illocutionary act be successful. This can not be explained easily in Austinian parlance as abuses, infelic- ities or unhappiness since Habermas a i m at solving the problem of social rationalization, social integration, and socialization with the help of argumentation technique supported by communicative reason. Habermas' critique is right from his angle of formulating a multi-dimensional social theory in which the participants aspire to attain versatility which is, once again, desirable. Weber's critique of the society is based on realistic analysis of the current situation. Another point that can be held against Habermas is his insistence on employing all the amm~lllition available in his armoury to tackle a problem. If Gadamer was ini~uical to science aud method he was influenced by the historical and social factors which Haberrnaa can

never ever transcend becawe of the horizon. The gap between t h e ory and practice atill remains unbridgeable though Habermaa takes recourse to formal-pragmatic component of language which ia the perfomative utterance. Habermas specially singles out illocutionary speech act as the sole candidate for bringing about the much needed consensus as it alone has the critical component of monitoring the cliche in translating intentions into declaration of intentions. Far too many things are presupposed like the sincere intention of the par- ticipants to arrive at an understanding, adherence to the preagreed code of fair practices, not attempting anything strategic, and grace- ful conduct in acceptance or rejection of opinions. In such debates there is no question of triumph or defeat.

Thus Habermas has concentrated his theory on Illocutionary speech acts as the symbol of all out effort for eliminating the residue of reifi- cation, exploitation, overt objectification and extreme subjectifica- tion. For Habermas the communicative action defies all attempt8 at ideology formation with the indispensable qualificatiol~ of being both transcendental as well as empirical, the former in regard to the latent competence and the latter in respect to being the historical appara- tus. Habermas haa taken on a stupendous project, a thankless one at that, becawe what he will receive in return is criticizm and not bouquets. His earnest effort to draw people to debates and sort out their differences is noteworthy in an increasingly sytematized ~ociety in which either confrontation is avoided or skirted and if drawn into one a submissive compromise or placatory truce is favoured.

Habermas has suggested a way in which ~)roblems can be ad-

dressed and redressed without attaching importance to the social status, age or other external discriminations. His theory ie situated purely on the merit of the arguments advanced and rationale be- hind the justifications put forward by the interlocutors involved in the discourse. In his quest to attend to alI facets of the problem in his communicative action, Habermaa has constructed a theory which has more ideas than practical solutions. In the maze of details, his own line of thinking haa been obscured and what is immediately dis- cernible is his treatment of other thinkers whom he seem to discues in great detail in the name of running dialogue.

6.8 Communicative Action in the Indian Context

Habermas has developed his theory of communicative action keeping in mind a society which has differences in attitude, culture, tradition, and language. But it is debatable whether Habermaa has even an inkling of the Indian context. Indian society is a multi-racial, multi- lillgual, multi-religious, and multi-cultural. Statistically speaking, tweuty eight lauguages are spoken in Iudia and the dialects number, roughly, eight hundred. It is ironical that even the concept of na- tional language, which is Hindi, is not accepted by more than three quarters of the total population. Apart from this, food, dress, cus- t o m aud manners all vary from region to region. Even the climatic conditions are different. How, then in a couutry which exhibits such a bewildering variety, is a consensual approach feasible? It is immi- nent that such a country cannot survive without solving its problem through a process of argumentation and consensus. It is here that

Habermas' human interest in emancipation and the innate compe tence to share a common lifeworld comes into focus.

It is a herculean task to even arrive at a preunderstanding regard- ing the lifeworld and the horizon in the Indian context. Before the entry of Judaic-Chistian religions into India, there were no state re- ligions. Though the kings patronized the religion which was holding sway over the masees at that period of time they were not inimi- cal towards other religions. There were a few exceptions. The Hindu pantheon of Gods testify to the open attitude of the people. Monism, Monotheism, Pantheism, and Henotheism can all be observed even today in the Indian religion.

The Indian conception of religion is different from what was seen by West as Hinduism. There were efforts by great preceptors and sages to equip the individual both intellectually as well as his sc- cial behaviow and not to institutionalize religion as such. Even now there is no real concerted effort to unify all practices and evolve a common religious code, unlike Christianity or Islam. Religion is a way of life as Dr Radhakrishnan has elnphasized. Indian society has adjusted itself to diverse religious and cultural practices. The ap- proach of an average Indian is to follow one's own tradition without enforcing it on others. In the famous words of Jawaharlal Nehru, one can find unity in diversity in the Indian approach. The concept of institutionalized religion is alien to Indian culture. Therefore, it is wrong to talk of IIindu religion as a wlloleso~ne concept. Rather it iti Illore seusible to speak of lndiau thoughl.

In such a vast and vivid society, Habermad idea of norm forma- tion becomes highly improbable. There is no time nor is it possible for norm formation. Even discourse loses its potency when con- fronted with so much variety. The discourse aimed at the idea of a consensus jteelf will lead to lot of problem because to arrive at a common ground everyone has to sacrifice cherished beliefs. There fore, the best course to be adopted in a society like that of India is non-intrusion. Since there is no established institution of religion there are no accurate laws governing the religious facet except in the case of social evils and inhuman practices perpetrated in the name of religion. In times of tension between various beliefs and practices the mutual respect for other beliefs were emphasized. The Indian conception of religion in the words of Swami Vivekananda:

As so many rivers, having their source in different moun- tains, roll down, crooked or straight, and at last come to the ocean - so, all these various creeds and religions, taking their start from different standpoints and running through or straight courses at last come to thee.

Mahatma Gandhi lived aa an example of truth, non-violence, and tolerance. He was able to influence the masses to a great extent. But even he could not succeed in establishing a society based on non-violence and tolerance. All the ideals practised by Gandhi were forgotten the moment he died and he remains as a distant memory reminding one of the missed opportunities for achieving a society characterized by freedom, justice, and happiness. Gandhi succeeded M an individual but failed in his social endeavour. The religion from which he derived his principles of tolerauce, truth, aud non-violence was the reason for the people to become sharply divided among them- selves which resulted in the slaughter of innocent lives. This proves

how theory and practice remain estranged.

But atteupts have been made by some great names in Indian philosopby like Buddha, Mahavira, Samkara, Ramanuja, Madhwa, the saints of the Bakti cult, and in the recent past by Sri Ramakr- ishna Paramshamsa, Swami Vivekananda and Ramana Maharishi to name a few in the endless liet of saints and seers of India. Many saints from Islam also contributed immensely towards establishing social harmony and brotherhood.

Sankara's advaita advocated the unity of the eelf and the tran- scendental Ego, which he calls Brahman . It is because of ignorance (avidya ) that humans attach so much importance to the illusory ex- ternal world even though for general purposes it is to be considered real. For Sankara, the realization of the inseparable nature of the transcendental and individual selves ( j i vas ) is the ultimate knowl- edge. S a n h a seems to emphasize that t l ~ c esseutial nature of t l ~ c selves are the same and if the surfacial and apparent differences are transcended there would be only oneness. George Herbert Mead's social emergence of the self has a faint resemblance to Sankara's Transcendental Ego. Mead assumes that the essential nature of the human nature is the same and the changes are only in the mani- festation of the particular competences, habits, and behaviour. His generalized other which plays a vital role in the role formation is built upon the assumption of the uniformity of human nature. While Sankara's conception is transcendental, Mead's idea is pragmatic.

Another great Indian philosopher, Ramanuja stressed the equal ontological status of both animate (cit ) and inanimate (acit ) ob- jects with respect to the ultimate reality ( B d m a n ). He was a great social reformer who strove to eliminate social evils and took care to involve all sectiona of people. For him, religion waa both intellectual and emotional. Though the Western philosophers level the charge of being teleological against Indian philosophy for being God centred it does not stipulate any rigorous method. Whatever method is fol- lowed, the emphasis is on good thinking and good deeds. But more importance is given to individual conduct both in moral and ethical dimensions while the material possession far beyond one's needs is decried. Thus they sought to cor~trol the possessive instinct by con- stantly reminding the liluited nature of the individual ego and the vastness of the unknown. Religion was seen mostly as an instrument to serve the society in a variety of ways. Music, dance, sculpture, and architecture flourished under the patronage of religion.

It is impossible to separate religion from the social practices in India unlike in Western societies. Since religion does not strangu- late the individual freedom by regulating individual behaviour the developments in science are not contested as detrimental to the soci- ety. Rather science is accepted as the progress in the human acumen which increases the standard of living. The reason lies in the Indian tradition itself, The Indiau traditiou is commentarial and argumen- tative. Each preceptor established his position through debates and his ideas were passed on by his disciples and this continued for gen- erations. It was possible to propagate ideas though argumentation and discourse when the participants were few in number.

Habermas' discourse can succeed only if the differences in outlook and other external factors are liquidated. But, is it really ncessary to be a part of the society deprieved of variety 7 If the society is cleansed of all diversity, human lives would be too monotonous and mechanical. Life would become a burden. Therefore, life is to lived with all the troubles and the challenge lies in surmounting the troubles without losing heart. In the words of Radhakrishnan, 'The world would be a much poorer thing if one creed absorbed the rest. God wills a rich harmony and not a colourless uniformity."