confessional divides and the politics of religious...
TRANSCRIPT
Confessional Divides and the Politics of Religious Difference:
Western European Democracy and Party Politics in Context
Paper for
IPSA conference
Panel “The Political Parties’ Appeal to Religious Voters in Europe”
Chair: Piero Ignazi
Madrid, July 8 – 12, 2012
Abstract
This paper attempts to analyze the political significance of confessional divides in Europe in the
context of religious pluralization. This is done at an historical and comparative-empirical level;
the European path towards democracy is considered in light of a historical delineation of the link
between the genesis of church-state regimes and the emergence of modern democracy at the
onset of globalization. Then, the interrelationship between the pressures resulting from cultural
and religious pluralization and the party and policy responses, in particular the degree of
inclusion or multicultural policies, are considered. The argument is advanced that despite many
regime changes and growing pressures resulting from religious pluralization, and despite some
signs of decline of the confessional cleavage and the weakening of Christian Democracy,
established patterns of confessional differences, institutional arrangements of religion and
politics, and even politics of cultural inclusion are surprisingly stable and resisting to change.
+++++ WORK IN PROGRESS – PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION ++++
Prof. Dr. Michael Minkenberg
Chair of Comparative Politics
Faculty of Social and Cultural Sciences
P.O. Box 1786
D-15207 Frankfurt (Oder), Germany
Tel. +49 (335) 5534-2694
Email: [email protected]
1
Introduction
Numerous political studies have underscored the significance of confessional differences for
contemporary European politics, be it the Catholic impact on public policy, in particular welfare
states, the relevance of the Church as an interest group, the paramount role of Christian
Democracy in the party systems, or the specific contribution of Catholicism to the project of
European integration (i.e. Castles 1993; Warner 2000; van Kersbergen 1995; van
Kersbergen/Manow 2009; Byrnes/Katzenstein 2006). This paper takes a larger perspective and
attempts to analyze the political significance of confessional divides in Europe in the context of
religious pluralization. This is done at an historical and comparative-empirical level; the
European path towards democracy is considered in light of a historical delineation of the link
between the genesis of church-state regimes and the emergence of modern democracy at the
onset of globalization. Finally, the interrelationship between the pressures resulting from cultural
and religious pluralization and the party and policy responses, in particular the degree of
inclusion or multicultural policies, are considered. The argument is advanced that despite many
regime changes and growing pressures resulting from religious pluralization, and despite some
signs of decline of the confessional cleavage and the weakening of Christian Democracy,
established patterns of confessional differences, institutional arrangements of religion and
politics, and even politics of cultural inclusion are surprisingly stable and resisting to change. In
order to show this, the paper applies a medium range comparison of sufficiently large Western
European democracies (EU-15, minus Luxembourg and Malta, plus Norway and Switzerland).
Historical church-state patterns, the Protestant-Catholic split, and democratization
Throughout the Middle Ages, church teachings underlined a strong domain delineation in the
Christian world, form the differentialist proclamation to “render unto Caesar the things that are
Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s” (Matthew 22, 21) to St. Augustine’s City of
God to the rivalry between Pope and Emperor. At the same time, a fusion of state and church
emerged which benefitted either side by adding legitimacy and power. Despite doctrinal
differences, this occurred already on both sides of the Great Schism of 1054 which separated the
Orthodox Church from Western Christianity. This mixture of fusion and separation continued
after the Protestant Reformation: with the divide between Protestants and Catholics and the
2
establishment of the principle cuius regio, eius religio1 the modern state arrived as a confessional
state (see Madeley 2003a: 9).
Figure 1: Confessional Map of Europe, Early Modernity (after Stein Rokkan)
Source: Madeley (2003b: 29f.)
In an attempt to map Europe according to its various confessionsal dividing lines and link
them up to political consequences, John Madeley reformulates and complements Stein Rokkan’s
1 “those ruling the territory determine the religion”, first established in the Augsburg Peace of 1555, later confirmd in
the Westphalian Peace Treaty of 1648
3
conceptual map of Europe from early modernity onwards (Rokkan 1970) and ties it to political
developments up to 2000: “From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, Europe knew three
monoconfessional culture areas of major size located severally across the eastern, southern and
northern margins of the Continent: the Orthodox, Catholic and Lutheran… In each the
confessional state pattern was institutionalized for most if not all of this period so as to make
membership of the political community coincident with submission to the locally dominant
creed” (Madeley 2003b: 27). Figure 1 depicts Madeley’s mapping of Europe according to the
confessional patterns and their geopolitical qualities, measured by the proximity to Rome.
The European periphery is constituted by the Northern (Lutheran) Protestant, the Eastern
Orthodox and the Southeastern Muslim countries. On the other hand, Catholic Europe is located
mainly in the heart of the continent, with seaward and landward empire-nations. A number of
smaller Catholic countries such as Ireland in the West and Hungary in the East take the role of
buffer or peripheral nations but they were part of larger empires or multinational states until the
early 20th
century.
The rise of nationalism and liberalism in the 19th
century challenged not only these
multinational empires. It also undermined the confessional state and paved the way for the
breakthrough of the postulate of the secular and neutral state (see Fischer 2009: 15-54). With
regard to the confessional divides, divergent paths of development and outcomes ensued:
First, in the Protestant countries of the European North and Northwest, in which the
church was also the national or state church – as in the Protestant countries outside Europe (USA,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand) where the Protestant churches underwent disestablishment in
the course of the 19th
century – a convergence between Protestantism and liberal ideas occurred
in the context of a progressing secularization triggered by the Protestant emphasis on
individualism, egalitarianism, and acceptance of diversity (see Bruce 2002: 4; 2003; also
Kallscheuer 2006). While this was a historically contingent process and by no means
predetermined, traces of this “marriage” can still be found in the fact that in general, Protestant
societies exhibit higher rates of approval of democratic ideals and performance, than Catholic or
Orthodox ones (see Figure 2; Norris/Inglehart 2004: 146).
Second, in Catholic societies during nation building, on the other hand, Protestantism and
liberalism were seen as an attack on the Church and its power, and a conflictual, if not
antagonistic relationship between Catholicism and liberalism prevailed. Nation building by
mostly liberal elites put Catholicism on the defensive, and often, the question of loyalty was
4
invoked. For example, in the French Third Republic as well as in the much less republican
German Empire, these tensions culminated in the aggressive anti-clerical politics of French
republicans and the separation law of 1905 and the persecution of Catholics under Bismarck in
the so-called “Kulturkampf”. During the French-German war of 1870/71, the liberal Swiss
historian Jacob Burckhardt proclaimed that after centuries of alliances between church and state
and the resulting “holy ossification” of this institutional relationship, it was time for the strict
separation of church and state: “… the problem of our time is the separation of state and church.
It is the logical conclusion of tolerance.” (Burckhardt 1934: 118; my translation, MM) According
to Burckhardt, the reason for this radical demand was the Catholic Church’s deeply ambivalent
relationship to modernity. On the one hand, the church strove for an accommodation with the
modern state, as it did with the feudal state, but it was unable to accept the modern democratic
spirit (ibid. 117; see also Anderson 2003).
Third, this conflict seems even larger in countries with an established Orthodox Church,
namely in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Here the late nation-building process fostered a
particularly close and illiberal alliance between church and state (see Anderson 2009: chap. 5) – a
connection which was not lost to Huntington when he first discussed post-1989 democratization
in Eastern Europe. He identified “the boundary of Western Christiandom of 1500” as the border
separating the East European extension of Western culture where prospects for democracy were
good, and that part of Eastern Europe, with predominantly Orthodox societies, where democracy
was rather unlikely to take root (see Huntington 1991: 299f.). This is the region to the right of the
dotted line in Madeley’s completion of Rokkan’s confessional European map (see above Figure
1).
Traces of these different confessional trajectories and their relevance for democracy today
can be seen in the spread of demoractic attitudes and values in a large cross-country comparison
where most Protestant countries in Europe appear in the figurative region with high approvement
of both democratic values and performance, whereas Catholic countries are more evenly spread
across thes two dimensions (see figure 2).
5
Figure 2: Democratic Values and Religious Differences
Source: Norris/Inglehart (2004: 146), based on World Values Surveys, European Values Survey
1995-2001, pooled sample
The uneven development of democracy along confessional lines is also illustrated by the
particular paths in interwar Europe of the 20th
centuray. When comparing Protestant and Catholic
countries in this period, Steve Bruce (2003, 2004) showed that with few exceptions like the
Weimar Republic, it was the Protestant countries in which democracy survived the crises of the
1920s and 1930s and the rise of fascism and communism. In contrast, fascist movements and
elites were particularly successful in Catholic countries, and Bruce attests the Catholic Church an
anti-democratic politics in countries with a Catholic monopoly. Either they cooperated openly
with right-wing authoritarian regimes and groups, as in Spain or in France (especially after the
establishment of the Vichy regime), or they took a more passive role, as in Italy and Germany.
His explanation points less at the doctrinal than the structural aspects of Catholicism:
“Catholicism, Orthodoxy and, to a lesser extent, Lutheranism, with their insistence on the
primacy of the institution of the church, are much more likely to see the state of the political
embodiment of ‘the people’ as a community, rather than as the expression of the preferences of
individuals” (Bruce 2003: 110). Based on Bruce and other sources, table 1 provides an overview
of democratic and right-wing authoritarian regimes in the interwar period, with only those non-
6
democracies listed which were not installed by German or Italian occupiers but emerged
independently or before occupation, such as the Dollfuß regime in Austria or Marshall Pétain’s
regime in France. German puppet regimes like Tiso’s in Slovakia are not included. As can be
seen, there was not a single Catholic country which remained democratic in the period.
Moreover, in many Catholic countries which turned to the right, the church was either passive or
supportive of the new regime.
Table 1: The Protestant-Catholic Divide, Church-State Relationships, and Political Regimes in
Interwar Europe (in parentheses: beginning year of non-demoratic regime – attitude of major
church towards regime) Democracy Right-wing Authoritarian Regime
Catholic
Countries
Czechoslovakia Austria (1934 – supportive)
France (1940 – supportive)
Hungary (1920s – supportive)
Italy (1922 – supportive)
Poland (1938 – supportive)
Portugal (1933 – initially supportive)
Spain (1939 – supportive)
Protestant
or Mixed
Protestant
Countries
Denmark (occupied by Germany 1940)
Finland (occupied by Germany 1944)
The Netherlands (occupied by Germ. 1940)
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Germany (1933 – passive)
(Baltic States – “benign despotism” in the
1930s)
Sources: Bruce (2003: 97-111); Anderson (2009: 49-54), amended by author.
It was more the horrors of the holocaust and the Second World War, i.e. secular politics
and outside pressures, rather than doctrinal reform from within which pushed the Vatican into
accepting human rights and democracy in the Second Vatican Council in the 1960s (see
Casanova 1994: 71; Anderson 2009: 38-40). This was accompanied and facilitated by the rise of
Christian Democracy in most Western European democracies in the decades following the war.
Democracy and Christian Democracy – the confessional cleavage in transition
As has been noted by many observers, Christian Democracy did not only play a key role in
politically rebuilding Western European countries after World War II, but also in establishing
democracy and launching the project of European integration (see Madeley 2010). The exit of
Christian Democracy from the “Catholic ghetto” and its conservative clericalism (von Beyme
1984: 125-133; idem, 2000; also van Kersbergen 1995) preceded the exit of the Catholic Church
7
from its hostility to democracy and was as instrumental in the latter as was the shock of the
holocaust and World War II itself (see also Warner 2000). This “dual conversion” raises the
question for European Christian Democracy to what extent it has become alienated from its
Catholic origins and hence, to what extent the confessional cleavage has lost salience in party
competition and voter mobilization, thus marginalizing the religious factor at the party and
electoral level.
The classification of parties in the mainstream literature on Christian Democracy (CD)
and Christian parties establishes them as a distinct party family (see e.g. Hanley, 1994, 2003;
Kalyvas, 1996; Kselman/Buttigieg, 2003; van Kersbergen, 1996 and others). Party research
distinguishes between traditional Christian Democracy with a strong Catholic imprint (such as
the Austrian, Dutch, German and Italian parties) and “newcomers” or “non-affiliated” parties
with a Christian lineage (such as the Scandinavian Protestant parties, or the Polish League for
Polish Families). Based on a rather inclusive definitions which stops short of embracing the
British Conservatives as a CD-party, table 2 provides an overview of voting strength for CD
parties in Western Europe (where applicable; following Hanley 2003).
Table 2: Christian Democratic and Other Religious Parties – Average Vote Share in Per Cent,
1945-2000s (Western Europe only) Country Party 1945-60 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Austria ÖVP 45 47 43 42 28 31
Belgium CVP + PSC 44 36 34 28 23 18
Denmark KrF - - 3 2 2 n.d.
(Conser
vative)
(17) (20) (10) (19) (13) n.d.
France MRP 19 11 - - - -
Germany CDU/CSU 42 39 39 46 40 36
Ireland FG 26 33 33 34 27 n.d.
Italy DC 42 39 39 34 - -
PPI, etc 18 (1) n.d.
(FI) (21) (26)
Netherlands CDA 40 47 33 32 25 (2) 28
Portugal (PSD) - - (33) (39) (39) n.d.
CDS/PP 8 9 7 n.d.
Spain CDS, etc. - - 35 6 5 n.d.
(PP) - - (7) (26) (36) n.d.
PNV + CiU - - 2 3 6 n.d.
Sweden (MS) (16) (14) (15 (21) (22) n.d.
KDS - 2 1 6 7 n.d.
Switzerland CVP/PDC 23 23 21 20 17 15
EPP/PPE 1 2 2 2 2 n.d.
Notes:
(1) Figure contains DC-results of 1992 before collapse of party, but not the CD Center
8
(Berlusconi allies) which scores an aveage of 4 per cent.
(2) Figure contains average for small protestant parties.
Parties in parenthesis are Center-Right parties rather than classical CD parties.
Sources: Hanley (2003: 237), based on T. Mackie and R. Rose, International Almanac of
Electoral History, 1991, 1997 (www.electionworld.com); Ray (1999); own update.
This overview shows that overall Christian Democrats and related parties enjoyed considerable
voting support despite wide fluctuations over time and between some countries. In terms of
electoral strength, a certain decline can be observed in Christian Democratic core countries
(Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria and Italy). This has led observers to postulate an end of the
Christian Democratic age (Conway 2003: 43). However, when considering Germany along with
CD-newcomer countries such as Spain (allowing for the inclusion of the PP) and Ireland, the
picture looks less bleak. Moreover, in Austria, the Austrian People’s Party’s fortunes reversed in
the late 1990s.In Scandinavia, the Protestant parties underwent an electoral rise over the last
decades, although their voting strength remains rather small.
The relevance of the religious side of these parties and their policy positions as well as
policy making largely depends on the relevance of the religious factor in voting behaviour in
general. Overall, research has shown a considerable degree of contintuity in confessional voting,
with Catholics voting for parties of the right and Protestants or non-affiliated voting for the left or
liberals (see e.g. Dalton 2006). But these continuities in confessional voting cannot reveal some
signs of significant change. As the overview in table 2 show, there is a considerable variation in
the salience of the confessional cleavage (see also Knutsen 2004). In Catholics as well as mixed
Protestant countries, in particular in the Netherlands, this cleavage is quite robust. In Great
Britain and in Denmark, on the other hand, it has been rather weak, until the turn of the century.
A virtual disappearance of the cleavage occurred in Italy where the party system was
reconstituted after the breakdown of the partitocrazia in the early 1990s.
Table 3 shows something more fundamental. The weak to moderate decline of
confessional voting in many countries may be an indicator for a general decline of religion as a
politically relevant factor. In contrast, this trend could also indicate a change in the quality of the
religious cleavage. Recent studies show the emergence of a new religious cleavage in the United
States which does not rest on denominational differences but on the degree of religiosity (see
Leege et al. 2002). A similar development has been shown for the Federal Republic. The
difference in voting behaviour between Catholics and Protestants disappears in the 1980s and
thereafter, when individual religiosity is held constant (Wolf 1996
9
Table 3: The Religious Cleavage in Western Europe, 1990s
Religious Denomination and Voting Church Going and Voting
1990 1996 1999/2002 . 1990 1996 1999/2002
.50
.41
Austria (.46)
Netherl. (.44)
.40
.31
Netherlands (.37)
Belgium (.33)
Finland (.31)
Netherlands (.29)
Finland (.23)
Italy (.21)
Italy (.27)
Denmark (.27)
Finland (.24)
UK (.23)
Netherl. (.21)
.30
.21
Belgium (.30)
Denmark (.29)
Finland (.27)
Italy (.27)
Germany (E) (.26)
Austria (.26)
Spain (.25)
France (.22)
Germany (W) (.22)
Sweden (.26)
Italy (.23)
Denmark (.29)
Spain (.28)
Ireland (.27)
Italy (.26)
France (.22)
Germany (E)(.20)
Belgium (.18)
Austria (.15)
Sweden (.15)
France (.14)
Germany (W) (.14)
Ireland (.14)
Denmark (.13)
UK (.11)
France (.17)
Germany (.16)
Ireland (.15)
Sweden (.11)
Germany (.17)
Spain (.17)
Sweden (.17)
France (.16)
Belgium (.16)
Ireland (.16)
Austria (.15)
.20
.11
Sweden (.20)
Ireland (.16)
UK (.12)
Ireland (.18)
Germany
(.17)
France (.12)
Germany (.19)
UK (.19)
UK (.10) Italy (.08) .10
.00
UK (.08)
Note: Values in parantheses are Cramer’s V correlation coefficients, measured as the correlation between
membership in the Catholic church and voting support for a right-wing/conservative party (left half of
table) and frequent church going and voting support for a right-wing/conservative party (right half of
table). The survey data are taken from the World Values Survey 1990/91 and the International Survey
Program of 1996.
Sources: Dalton (1996: 180; 2002: 158, 2006: 161)
The overall level of religious voting in terms of the secular-religious divide is significantly
stronger than the one of confessional voting. Moreover, it has increased during the 1990s in
almost any country, except for Germany and France. Countries with historically strong Christian
Democratic parties (Austria, Netherlands, Belgium) top the list in religious voting at the turn of
the century, joined by countries with new Protestant parties or CD newcomers (Denmark,
Finland, Spain). In Italy, the trend is particularly striking: the decline of the confesional cleavage
is countered by a rist in the religious-secular cleavage.
Following these rather abridged considerations, an overall religious party effect in
Western Europe (which is more nuanced and far reaching than Castles’ “Catholic effect” based
10
on Catholicism and CD parties in government, see Castles 1994) is measured to determine, at a
later stage, the role of the religious cleavage on particular policies of democratic inclusion. This
is presented in table 4, based on criteria such as the proximity to church positions or a religious
policy agenda, instensitiy of the religious cleavage and length of government participation in the
period under consideration (for details, see Minkenberg 2002; 2010). In most countries in
Western Europe, there is a considerable religious party effect, in particular in countries with a
strong Christian Democracy.
Table 4: Strength of Religious Partisan Impact (Western Europe, 1945-2000)
0
1
2
3 3.5*
4
5
France
Ireland
Spain
Sweden
UK
Austria
Belgium
Germany
Denmark
Finland
Netherlands
Italy
* mean
Notes: Countries that are underlined are those with strong traditional Christian Demoratic parties. The
measure of a “religious” (Christian) instead of a mere “Catholic” partisan impact, countries are classified
according to five criteria (time span 1945 until 1999): 1) are there explicitly religious parties? 2) are there
(other) parties with ties to religious groups or churches? 3) do the platforms of these parties contain
explicitly religious contents? 4) is the religious cleavage salient (i.e. a value of 0.25 or more, as measured
by Dalton 1996: 180)? 5) have any of these parties been part of the national government for at least 20
years? For details see Minkenberg (2002).
Source: Minkenberg (2002).
Pressures of Pluralization: Convergence or Divergence?
In the next step of analysis, the paper turns to the issue of religious pluralization, mostly due to
immigration and democgraphic chance, and the consequences for democratic politics in
institutional and behavioral regards. The question is whether and to what extent religious
pluralization pushes European democracies towards more uniform and, more specifically, more
separationist state-church arrangements along with policies of inclusion which would open up for
religious minorities and to what extent this process diminishes confessional differences in the age
of heightened religious pluralism. Or, seen from another angle: can we trace confessional
differences in these respects despite the pressures from religious pluralization and differentiation?
Clearly, over the last 20-30 years, the established patterns of church-state relations in most
11
Western democracies are confronted with growing pressures which challenge the legitimacy of
the time-honored regulations described above. These pressures result from two basic sources: on
the one hand, the current regulations are the result of particular historical power constellations,
both between the respective Christian denominations/the Catholic Church and between these and
the state. This means they have been modeled – with the exception of the non-European
democracies – before the onset of democratization and parliamentarization. On the other hand, it
is precisely this historical heritage which is challenged by the current processes of globalization,
of the integration of European states into the EU, and of religious pluralization. The latter – and
this is true for the European as well as the non-European democracies – results from both
international migration at a large scale and internal differentiation of the religious landscape.
These processes of religious pluralization have shaped the non-European immigration
countries from the beginning – hence the early introduction of a separationist regime, albeit with
different heights and solidities of the “walls of separation”: lower in Canada, especially Québec,
higher in the US, somewhere in-between in Australia. In Europe, this is a more recent
phenomenon, beginning largely in the postwar era. Since most of the last wave of immigrants
(from the 1970s on) hail from Muslim countries in Africa, the Middle East and in Asia, the
European debate about immigration has increasingly become a debate about Islam and how to
deal with it (see Casanova 2006). The cultural pluralization and increasing heterogeneity of the
religious map in Western democracies led to a growing number and intensity of conflicts at the
intersection of politics and religion, state and church, with the most visible examples being the
immigration and growth of non-Christian minorities, in particular Muslims, and non-mainline
Christian denominations. One should also not forget the increasing number of atheists or
unaffiliated. For example, in Germany, with the accession of the GDR to the Federal Republic in
1990, the percentage of officially counted non-religious, or those not affiliated with any church
jumped from a few in the old Federal Republic to about almost 30% today. They prompt new
public debates on the regulation of the relationship between religion and politics, not always with
results in their favour.
As Table 6 illustrates, in 13 of 15 Western European democracies Islam is the third or
even second largest religious community. The countries where Islam is second are among those
which are traditionally very homogenous in denominational terms, two Lutheran cases in
Scandinavia (Denmark, Norway) and two Catholic cases (Belgium, France) located in the West
of Europe. In two other Catholic countries, Spain and Austria, Muslims are on the verge of
12
leaving Protestants behind. Moreover, the analyses have shown that from around 1980 until
around 2000, religious pluralism has increased in all of Western Europe, except for Sweden.
Table 6: Religious Pluralism in 15 Western European Democracies, ca. 2000 (or Year Nearest to
It), in Per Cent of Resident Population (Sources Indicated by Letter in Parenthesis)
(a) These values indicate the degree of religious fragmentation, measured by 1 – H (Value of the
Herfindahl Index): the smaller the value, the higher the degree of pluralism. H is defined as the probability
that two randomly drawn persons belong to the same religious denomination. Data for ca. 1980 from
Chaves /Cann (1992: 278), data for ca. 2000 from Alesina et al. (2003).
(b) Bowden (2005: 32, 94, 404). The Protestant group includes independent Christian groups which do not
belong to an organized denomination. In some countries such as Great Britain, but also Norway and the
Netherlands, the size of this group varies between 3 and 4 per cent.
(c) Census data and other government statistics around 2000 in Fischer Weltalmanach (2004). Estimates
by Maréchal/Dassetto (2003: Tables 1 and 2) for Muslims in various European countries diverge
somewhat from Census data, in some countries even significantly (Muslims in F: 7.0%, in N: 0.5%, in A:
2.6%, in CH: 3.0%).
(d) Estimate by Maréchal/Dassetto (2003: Tables 1, 2) for the late 1990es (Census data, corrected by
expert opinion).
Source: see also Minkenberg (2007: 898f.)
More specifically, the data in Table 7 show that in the Netherlands (similar to the non-
Euorpean democracies; see Minkenberg 2007) religious pluralism has increased from an already
high level. In other countries like Austria, France, Italy and Spain – all Catholic – the jump
started from a much lower level and has been particularly pronounced, thus challenging the
dominant religion and its actor, the Catholic Church, and the established mechanisms in the
relationship between the church and the state in a fundamental way. Moreover, in most these
cases the majority of which are Catholic countries, radical right-wing parties are strongly
Catholics Protestants Orthodox Jews Muslims Other/ None Pluralism
Index, ca.
1980 (a)
Pluralism
Index, ca.
2000 (a) Anglicans Other Protest.
Austria 73.6 (b) 0.0 (b) 4.7 (b) 1.9 (b) 0.1 (c) 4.2 (c) 15.5 0.15 0.41
Belgium 80.9 (b) 0.1 (b) 1.6 (b) 0.5 (b) 0.35 (c) 3.8 (d) 12.8 0.05 0.21
Denmark 0.6 (b) 0.1 (b) 88.4 (b) 0.0 (b) 0.06 (c) 2.8 (d) 8.0 0.07 0.23
Finland 0.1 (b) 0.0 (b) 91.0 (b) 1.1 (b) n.d 0.4 (d) 7.4 0.09 0.25
France 78.8 (c) 0.0 (c) 1.6 (c) 0.3 (c) 1.1 (c) 8.5 (c) 9.7 0.08 0.40
Germany 32.1 (c) 0.0 (c) 31.8 (c) 1.1 (c) 0.12 (c) 3.7 (c) 30.3 0.54 0.66
Great Britain 11.0 (c) 29.0 (c) 14.0 (c) 0.6 (c) 0.48 (c) 2.7 (d) 42.2 0.59 0.69
Ireland 77.0 (c) 9.1 (c) 7.4 (c) 0.0 (c) 0.8 (c) 0.2 (d) 5.5 0.09 0.15
Italy 97.2 (b) 0.0 (b) 1.5 (b) 0.2 (b) 0.05 (c) 1.0 (d) 0.1 0.03 0.30
Netherlands 34.5 (b) 0.1 (b) 30.0 (b) 0.0 (b) 0.19 (c) 5.7 (c) 29.9 0.62 0.72
Norway 1.0 (b) 0.0 (b) 97.1 (b) 0.0 (b) n.d 1.4 (c) 0.5 0.15 0.20
Portugal 90.8 (b) 0.0 (b) 4.2 (b) 0.0 (b) 0.02 (c) 0.3 (d) 1.3 n.d. 0.14
Spain 96.1 (b) 0.0 (b) 1.1 (b) 0.0 (b) 0.04 (c) 0.7 (d) 2.1 0.02 0.45
Sweden 2.0 (b) 0.0 (b) 95.2 (b) 1.3 (b) 0.2 (c) 1.1 (c) 0.2 0.29 0.23
Switzerland 41.8 (c) 0.2 (b) 35.3 (c) 1.8 (c) 0.2 (c) 4.3 (c) 16.4 0.55 0.61
13
embedded in the nation’s electorate, often pushing an anti-Islamic discourse and “rediscovering”
the Christian roots of the country or Europe as a whole (see Minkenberg 2008a). Some argue that
within Western democracies religious traditions, in particular Protestantism or Catholicism,
assume a particular role in shaping politics and policies, such as social policies or policies of
immigration and integration, that there are so-called “families of nations” shaped, in part, by
particular Christian legacies and a pronounced role of Christian Democratic parties in national
politics (e.g. Castles 1993, 1998; Martin 1978; van Kersbergen 1995).
Table 7: Religious Pluralism and Pluralization Trends in Western Europe (1980-2000) Weak Pluralization
(d< 0.10)
Moderate Pluralization
(0.10 - 0.20)
Strong Pluralization
(d>0.20)
Low level pluralism
(<0.30)
Ireland
Portugal
(Sweden: d=negative)
Belgium*
Demark*
Finland
Norway*
Moderate pluralism
(0.30-0.50) France*
Italy*
Austria*
Spain
High level pluralism
(d>0.50)
Switzerland*
Germany
Great Britain
Netherlands
Notes:
The base of categorization is the pluralism value of 2000 (0: completely
homogenous, 1.00: completely pluralistic);
d = difference of pluralism value between 1980 and 2000 (trend).
Countries in italic have church-state separation (see Minkenberg 2003)
In countries in bold, Islam is the second larges religious community (in Austria
and Spain: counted as equal to Protestantism)
* indicates a strong radical right-wing or xenophobic party in the country’s party
system (at least 5% in every national election in the past 20 years).
Source: see Table 6 above.
Taken together, this means that today, most Western European democracies are markedly
more fragmented in religious terms than they have been a generation ago. And these
developments all push in the same direction: the established institutional and political
arrangements to regulate the relationship between religion and politics in the framework of liberal
democracies, long seen to have been solved once and for all, are challenged fundamentally and
require new justifications. Even without 9/11, the multicultural facts of modern Western society
raise new (and very old) questions about the political regulation of religion. Accordingly, we see
some major shifts in the debate in two groups of Western democracies, the ones with a more or
14
less established church structure, and those with a more or less clear separation between church
and state (see Minkenberg 2003a).
The first group comprises countries like Great Britain or the Federal Republic of Germany
as well as the Scandinavian countries. Here, we witness increasingly conflictual processes of
realigning religion in the public sphere, for example with regard to the role of religious education
(an increasingly controversial topic in Germany), the presence of headscarves and Christian
symbols in the public space (see the Crucifix-sentence of the German Constitutional Court of
1996 or the current wave of legislation banning the headscarf from public offices), the fight for
religious freedom for non-Christian churches, for example the debate in Great Britain regarding
the recognition of Muslim communities and the torn position of the established Church of
England, or the steps towards disestablishment of the state church in Sweden in 2000 (see
Gustafsson 2003; Modood 1997). But also in the second group, i.e. the countries with a more
separationist regime such in France or the Netherlands, the established role of religion
experiences increasing pressures from actors who interpret the neutrality and indifference of the
state in religious matters particular political positions at the expense of religion. Secularism is
seen not as a guarantee for state neutrality and a balance between all religious forces, but as a
political program equivalent to a secularist state religion (see Kymlicka/Norman 2000; Watson
1997). Moreover, these developments in various parts of the world are accelerated by and
interwoven with economic and cultural globalization processes (see Haynes 1998; Robertson
1991, 2003). As a result of the processes, state institutions and national identities are weakened,
leaving an ideological vacuum. This provides an opportunity for religions traditions, or their “re-
inventions”, to gel into cores of cultural identities, projects of transnational unities and loyalties –
it is this scenario where Huntington’s argument of a “clash of civilization” unfolds its most
persuasive power (Huntington 1996; see also Barber 1996).
As the case of Sweden has demonstrated, the inherited state-church regimes are not
indefinitely tied to the type of democracy. Earlier analysis shows that in the majority of countries
with high levels of religious pluralism, state and church are separated but this concerns more the
non-European democracies (Minkenberg 2007). From this one may infer that in other countries
with no separationist regime but high levels of pluralism and/or strong pluralization, the pressures
to disentangle church and state will increase precisely because of the democratic mechanisms at
work (as Sweden has shown). This, then, points at growing convergence in light of these
processes, and it shows that the ongoing struggle for democracy, in this case the struggle for
15
democratically legitimated inclusion of religious minorities, has new effects on church-state
relations.
A final look at the policies of inclusion of non-Christian minorities underscores the
tension in European democracies. Following earlier analyses of integration policies in the
Western world (see Minkenberg 2008b), Table 8 depicts the patterns of inclusionary or
exclusionary policies and their relation to the dominant religious factors. Group rights refer to
policies which allow the practice of non-Christian religions, here mainly Islam, inside and outside
of public institutions (such as ritual slaughter, call to prayer, religious service in public
broadcasting and others; see Koopmans et al. 2005; appendix in Minkenberg 2008b).
Table 8: Religious Legacies and Multicultural Politcs: Confessional Divide, State-Church
Relations, and Christian Democracy
Recognition of Religio-Cultural Group Rights
Low
Moderate
High
Predominantly
Protestant
Great Britain
Denmark*
Finland*
Norway
Sweden
Mixed Protestant
Switzerland
Germany**
Netherlands**
Catholic
France
Ireland
Portugal
Austria**
Belgium**
Italy**
Spain
Notes:
countries in bold are those with high religiosity;
countries in italics with low religiosity.
countries that are underlined fall into the category of strict church-state separation.
*/** countries with two asterisks are those with a strong Christian Democratic party
effect, those with one have a strong religious (but not CD) party effect.
Sources: Minkenberg 2008b, table 4 above.
The overall picture suggests a denominational, or distinctly Catholic, effect on cultural
integration policies. Predominantly Protestant countries exhibit moderate-to-high levels of
16
cultural group rights recognitions whereas Catholic countries fall in the range of low-to-moderate
levels. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the shifts towards cultural pluralism occurred mostly in
Protestant countries – regardless of their “starting point” – whereas Catholic countries remained
more static in his period (see appendix in Minkenberg 2008b). Moreover, the Catholic camp is
split: Catholic countries with a strong role of Christian Democracy (according to table 4 above)
exhibit a middle path in these policies. Among mixed Protestant countries, strong Christian
Democracy seems to have had no effect on the politics of inclusion. On the one hand, in the
Netherlands with their tradition of pillarization and church-state separation, an early policis of
multiculturalism has enused while Switzerland remains at the polar opposite on this dimension,
with Germany somewhere in the middle but closer to Switzerland (ibid., table 3.7). On the other
hand, the firm presence right-wing radical parties in the party system (see table 5 above), seems
much less relevant. There are two cases where recognition of group rights is high and the radical
right has had only a short life (Sweden, the Netherlands) but if there is a causal link, is less than
certain.
Furthermore, the suggestion, found in some comparative public policy studies (see Castles
1998: 8f.; Baldwin-Edwards 1992) to identify a special Southern or Mediterranean group of
countries with regard to their policies is not supported by the distribution in table 8. In part, this
misconception results from mixing up immigration rates and immigration policies (e.g. Faist
1998: 152). While Mediterranean countries share the common fate of being latecomers as
receiving countries, their approach to integration is shared by other, non-Mediterranean countries
as well (Belgium, Austria). Our analysis suggests that what this group has in common is their
religiosity, not their geography. This is also true with regard to the growing proportion of
Muslims in these countries. All four countries where Islam is the second religion (see above
Table 6) employ a restrictive-to-moderate integration policy; moreover, they are Catholic
countries (with Denmark having closed ranks recently, after data collection). Secularization
measured in church-going rates underscores this trend. All countries with high church attendance
show low-to-moderate recognition of group rights. On the other hand, with the notable exception
of France, countries with low church-going rates are more ready for such an integration policy.
Finally, when looking for a common religious denominator for the group with open immigration
policies, one must go beyond confessions and church-going rates. As shown in other analyses, the
regime of church-state relations can also claim a certain explanatory power for variations in
particular public policies (see Minkenberg 2002, 2003b and Fetzer/Soper 2005).
17
The distributions in tables 8 show that in contrast to the relevance of church-state relations
for immigration policies (see Minkenberg 2008c) and also somewhat contrary to the argument by
Fetzer and Soper (2005) about the significance of church-state legacies for the accommodation of
Muslims, there is hardly any overall effect of this particular institutional arrangement on the
degree of cultural integration policies. Rather there seems to be a polarization. Per se, a
separationist regime does not lead to a low recognition of cultural group rights but on the basis of
the data in this table, one can detect such an effect in combination with Catholicism. Among
Protestant countries, there appears an effect in the opposite direction, with Sweden as a
prominent outlier.
The general argument to be made here, based on table 8, is that religious and cultural
minorities (in particular Muslims) get higher recognition in those Protestant countries where there
is a clear separation of church and state. Protestant countries with partial and full establishment
are less accepting of such cultural group differences. Moroever, Christian Democrats are not
particularly helpful for the integration of non-Christian minorities. Fetzer and Soper’s conclusion
about the non-accomodating effects of separationst church-state regimes hold only for France,
and possibly Ireland, but cannot be generalized. Also, as has been shown elsewhere (see
Kastoryano 2002; Laurence 2008), one has to distinguish the type of Muslim group organizations
when analyzing the effects of state-church relations: “European governments have evolved from
a laissez-faire policy of ‘outsourcing’ state-Islam relations to Muslim diplomats (1974-1989)
toward a proactive policy of ‘incorporation’ (1989-2004). The goal of incorporation is to co-opt
the competing representatives of both ‘official’ and ‘political’ Islam.” (Laurence 2008: 242).
Finally, as the case of Sweden illustrates, an active and long-lasting multicultural, i.e. inclusive,
policy approach can open the political space for a significant rearrangement of state-church
regimes. Even in countries which are stubbornly clinging to their time-honoured institutional
arrangements, such as France on the one hand, and Germany on the other, demographic change
will likely increase rather than decrease pressures for change. These can be considered highest in
traditionally homogenous Catholic countries where openness for multiculturalism is less
developed than in Protestant ones.
Conclusions
The paper has shown that comparative analysis of church-state patterns in Western Europe can
reveal important insights into classical questions of political science.
18
First of all, regardless the multi-vocality of religious traditions, not all voices are equal and a
historical mapping can show that democratization processes in Europe – and elsewhere – occur in
distinct patterns which are related to cultural legacies. Catholic countries are late-comers in the
world of democracies, as are Orthodox ones. Second, even with the universal acceptance of
democracy among the major European churches, there is no uniform model of church-state
relations in an institutional sense. The guarantee of basic religious and civil rights does not
translate into any particular regime. Rather, there is a pluriverse of church-state regimes which
are also respected by the European Union. Third, the religious cleavage is undergoing change,
and the role of Christian Democracy is somewhat diminishing. But the polity and policy patterns
that they had set in the postwar decades still hold in many respects, even in the transition to the
21st century. Fourth, religious pluralization processes in most European countries, especially the
visibility and growth of Islam puts pressures on the institutional arrangements. Catholic countries
seem more resisting to opening up to these pressures than are Protestant ones, reinforced by the
legacies of strong Christian Democracy. Fifth, in combination with the previous point,
multicultural policies today are shaped by a distinc mix of church-state patterns, confessional
legacies, and the role of Christian Democracy. Catholic countries resist the recogniction of
cultural and religious group rights more than Protestant ones, and Christian Democracy reinforces
this within the Catholic world – yet not when it operates in a mixed environment such as
Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland where the effects are ambiguouos.
The analysis and other data suggest that the inherited regulations of religion and politccs
are not immutable, even in a fixed democratic setting. In countries with no separationist regime
but high levels of pluralism and/or strong pluralization, the pressures to disentangle church and
state will increase because of the democratic mechanisms at work (as Sweden has shown). They
most likely will, in their own national paths, follow the immigration countries with high religious
pluralism and a separation of state and church. Here are signs of growing convergence in light of
these processes: ongoing struggles for democracy, in this case the struggle for democratically
legitimized inclusion of religious minorities, have new effects
19
References
Alesina, Alberto, et al. 2003. Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth 82: pp. 219-258
Anderson, John. 2003: Religious Liberty in Transitional Societies. The Politics of Religion.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Anderson, John. 2004: Does God Matter, and If So Whose God? Religion and Democratization,
in: Anderson, John (ed.), Religion, Democracy, and Democratization. London: Frank Cass,
192-217.
Anderson, John. 2009: Christianity and Democratization. Manchester: Manchester University
Press.
Bader, Veit. 2006: Secularusm or Democracy? Associational Governance of Religious Diversity.
Amsterdam: Amsterdam Univ. Press.
Baldwin-Edwards, Martin. 1992. Immigration after 1992. In: Policy and Politics 19, 3, pp. 199-
211.
Barber, Benjamin, 1996: Jihad vs. McWorld. New York: Ballantine.
Barbier, Maurice. 1995. La Laïcité. Paris: Éditions l’Harmatan.
Bowden, John (ed.) (2005) Encyclopedia of Christianity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bruce, Steve, 1996:Religion in the Modern world. From Cathedrals to Cults. Oxford/New York.
Oxford University Press.
Bruce, Steve, 2002: God Is Dead. Secularization in the West. Oxford: Blackwell.
Bruce, Steve. 2003: Politics and Religion. Oxford: Polity Press.
Bruce, Steve. 2004: Did Protestantism Create Democracy? In Anderson, John (ed.) Religion,
Democracy, and Democratization. London: Frank Cass, 3-20.
Burckhardt, Jacob (n.d.) [1934] Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen. Stuttgart: Kröner.
Byrnes, Timothy, and Katzenstein, Peter (eds.) 2006: Religion in an Expanding Europe.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Canas, Victor. 1996: State and Church in Portugal. In: G. Robbers (ed.) State and Church in the
European Union. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 259-278
Casanova, José, 1994: Public religions in the modern world. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
Casanova, José, 2006: Religion, European secular identities, and European Integration. In:
Byrnes/Katzenstein (eds.), pp. 65-92.
Castles, Francis, (ed.), 1993: Families of nations. Patterns of public policy in Western
democracies. Aldershot: Ashgate..
Castles, Francis, 1998: Patterns of Public Policy. Patterns of post-war transformation.
Cheltenham.
Champion, Francois. 1993. Les rapports Eglise-Etat dans les pays européens de tradition
protesante et de tradition catholique: essai d’analyse. In: Social Compass 40/4, pp. 589-609.
Chaves, Mark, and Cann, David E. 1992: Regulation, Pluralism, and Religious Market Structure,
in: Rationality and Society 4 (3), pp. 272-290.
Czada, Roland. 1995: Institutionelle Theorien der Politik. In: Dieter Nohlen and Rainer-Olaf
Schultze (eds.) Politische Theorien, vol. 1, Lexikon der Politik. München: Beck.
Dalton, Russell J., 2006: Citizen Politics. Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced
Industrial Democracies. 4th
ed.. New York/London: Chatham House Publishers of Seven
Bridges Press.
Eisenstadt, Shmuel. N. 1993: Religion and the Civilizational Dimensions of Politics. In:
Arjomand, Said (ed.) The Political Dimensions of Religion. Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press, pp. 13-41.
20
Faist, Thomas. 1998.Immigration, Integration und Wohlfahrtsstaaten. Die Bundesrepublik
Deutschlnad in vergleichender Perspektive. In: Bommes, Michael and Halfmann, Jost, eds.
Migration in nationalen Wohlfahrtsstaaten: theoretische und vergleichende Untersuchungen.
Osnabrück: Universitätsverlag Rasch, 147-170.
Fetzer, Joel, Soper, J. Christopher. 2005: Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fischer Weltalmanach (2004) Der Fischer Weltalmanach 2003. Frankfurt/Main: Fischer Verlag.
Fischer, Karsten, 2009: Die Zukunft einer Provokation. Religion im liberalen Staate. Berlin:
Berlin University Press.
Fox. Jonathan. 2008: A World Survey of Religion and the State. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
Press.
Geertz, Clifford. 1973: The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books.
Gustafsson, Göran. 2003: Church-State Separation – Swedish Style. In: Madeley, J./Enyedi, Z.
(eds.) Church and State in Contemporary Europe. London, 51-72.
Hammond, Phil E. (ed.), 1985: The Sacred in a Secular Age. Towards Revision in the scientific
Study of Religion. Berkeley/Los Angeles.
Haynes, Jeffrey. 1998: Religion in Global Politics. London/New York: Longman
Heikkilä, Markku/Knuutila, Jyrki/Scheinin, Martin, 1995: Staat und Kirche in Finnland. In:
Gerhard Robbers (ed.). Staat und Kirche in der Europäischen Union. Baden-Baden, 303-318.
Hervieu-Léger, Danièle. 2001: La religion en miettes ou La question des sectes. Paris.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1991: The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.
Norman: Oklahoma University Press.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1996: The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New
York: Basic Books.
Kallscheuer, Otto, 2006: Macht Religion Politik? Ein Panorama. In: Tobias Mörschel (ed.):
Macht Glaube Politik? Religion und Politik in Europa und Amerika. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht, pp. 84-100.
Kastoryano, Riva. 2002. Negotiating Identities. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Koopmans, Ruud/Statham, Paul/Giugni, Marco/Passy, Florence. 2005. Contested Citizenship.
Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
Knutsen, Oddbjørn, 2004: Religious Denomination and Party Choice in Western Europe: A
Comparative Longitudinal Study from Eight Countries, 1970-1997. In: International Political
Science Review 25 (1), S. 97-128.
Kselman, Thomas / Buttigieg, Joseph A. (Hrsg.), 2003: European Christian Democracy.
Historical Legacies and Comparative Perspectives. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press.
Kymlicka, Will, and Norman, Wayne ( eds). 2000: Citizenship in Diverse Societies. Oxford
Laurence, Jonathan. 2008. Muslims and the State in Western Europe. In: In: A. Chebel
d’Appollonia und S. Reich (eds.) Immigration, Integration, and Security. America and Europe
in Comparative Perspective. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, pp 229-253.
Leege, David, u.a., 2002: The Politics of Cultural Differences. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Levey, Geoffrey Brahm, and Modood. Tariq (eds.). 2009. Secularism, Religion, and Multicultural
Citizenship. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Luhmann, Niklas, 1977: Die Funktion der Religion. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp.
Madeley, John. 2003a: European Liberal Democracy and the Principle of State Religious
Neutrality, in: Madeley, John/Enyedi, Zolt (eds.), Church and State in Contemporary Europe.
Special Issue of West European Politics. London: Frank Cass, pp. 1-22.
21
Madeley, John. 2003b: A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Church-State Relations in
Europe, in: Madeley, John/Enyedi, Zolt (eds.), Church and State in Contemporary Europe.
Special Issue of West European Politics. London: Frank Cass, pp. 23-50.
Madeley, John, 2010: E unum pluribus. The role of religion in the project of European
integration. In: Jeffrey Haynes (Hrsg.): Religion and Politics in Europe, the Middle East and
North Africa. London: Routledge, S. 114-135
Madeley, John/Enyedi, Zolt (eds.), 2003: Church and State in Contemporary Europe. Special
Issue of West European Politics. London: Frank Cass.
Maréchal, Brigitte/Dassetto, Felice. 2003. Introduction: from Past to Present. In: Maréchal,
Brigitte/Allievi, Stefano/Dassetto, Felice/Nielsen, Jørgen, eds. Muslims in the Enlarged
Europe. Religion and Society. Leiden/Boston: Brill, S. xvii – xxvii.
Martin, David. 1978. A general theory of secularisation. London: Blackwell
Minkenberg, Michael. 2002: Religion and Public Policy: Institutional, Cultural, and Political
Impact on the Shaping of Abortion Policies in Western Democracies. In: Comparative
Political Studies 35 (2): 221-247
Minkenberg, Michael. 2003a. Staat und Kirche in westlichen Demokratien. In: Minkenberg,
Michael/Willems, Ulrich (eds.), 2003: Politik und Religion. PVS Special Issue 33/2002,
Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 115-138..
Minkenberg, Michael. 2003b: The Policy Impact of Church-State Relations. Family Policy and
Abortion in Britain, France, and Germany. In. Madeley, John/Enyedi, Zolt (eds.), Church and
State in Contemporary Europe. Special Issue of West European Politics. London: Frank Cass,
195-217.
Minkenberg, Michael. 2007. Democracy and Religion: Theoretical and Empirial Observations on
the Relationship between Christianity, Islam, and Liberal Democracy. In: Journal of Ethnic
and Migration Studies 33, 6 (August), pp. 887-909.
Minkenberg, Michael, 2008. The Radical Right in Europe. An Overview. Gütersloh: Verlag
Bertelsmann-Stiftung.
Minkenberg. Michael. 2008b. “Religious Legacies and the Politics of Multiculturalism.” In: A.
Chebel d’Appollonia und S. Reich (eds.) Immigration, Integration, and Security. America and
Europe in Comparative Perspective. Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 44-66.
Minkenberg, Michael. 2008c. Religious Legacies, Churches, and the Shaping of Immigration
Policies in the Age of Religious Diversity. In: Politics and Religion, vol. 1, no. 3 (Dec.), 349
– 383
Minkenberg, Michael, and Willems, Ulrich (eds.). 2003: Politik und Religion. PVS Special Issue
33/2002, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Modood, Tariq (ed.) 1997: Church, state, and religious minorities. London
Monsma, Steven, and Soper, J. Christopher. 2009: The Challenge of Pluralism. Church and State
in Five Democracies. 2nd
ed. Lanham, MD.
Norris, Pippa, and Inglehart, Ronald. 2004. Sacred and Secular. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
Press.
North, Douglass, 1990: Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Peters, B. Guy. 1998: Political Institutions, Old and New. In: Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter
Klingemann (eds.) A New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
205-220.
Robbers, Gerhard (ed.).1996: State and church in the European Union. Baden-Baden.
22
Robertson, Roland. 1987: Church-State Relations in Comparative Perspective. In: Robbins,
Thomas/Robertson, Roland (eds.), Church-State Relations. Tensions and Transitions. New
Brunswick, 153-160
Robertson, Roland (ed.) 1991:. Religion and Global Order. New York.
Robertson Roland. 2003: Religion und Politik im globalen Kontext der Gegenwart. In:
Minkenberg/Willems, eds., 581-594
Rokkan, Stein, 1970: Citizens, Elections, Parties. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
Schmidt, Manfred G. 2000: Demokratietheorien. 3rd ed. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
Stepan, Alfred, 2000: Religion, Democracy, and the ‚Twin Tolerations‘. In: Journal of
Democracy, 11 (October), pp. 37-57.
Van Kersbergen, Kees, 1995: Social Capitalism. Boston.
Van Kersbergen, Kees/Manow, Philip (eds.) 2009: Religion, Class Coalitions, and Welfare
States. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Von Beyme, Klaus. 1984: Parteien in westlichen Demokratien. 2nd ed. München: Piper.
Von Beyme, Klaus. 2000: Parteien im Wandel. Von den Volksparteien zu den
professionalisierten Wählerparteien. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Warner, Carolyn, 2000: Confessions of an interest group. The Catholic church and political
parties in Europe. Princeton: Princeton Univ Press.
Wolf, Christoph. 1996: Konfessionelle versus religiöse Konfliktlinie in der deutschen
Wählerschaft. In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 37 (4): 713-734
Willaime, Jean-Paul. 1996. Laïcité et religion en France. In: Grace Davie and Danièle Hervieu-
Léger (eds.), Identités religieuses en Europe. Paris: La Découverte, 153-171.
Zylberberg, Jean. 1995: Laïcité, connais pas: Allemagne, Canada, Etats-Unis, Royaume Uni. in:
Pouvoirs 75, pp. 37-71.