1REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,G. R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboaga del Sur, Branch 23, granting respondents petition for authority to remarry invoking par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen.Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son who was living with his wife in the States that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry.The Solicitor Generals motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER THE ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Held:

Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried. Therefore, the Petition of the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the RTC Br. 32 of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is hereby SET ASIDE.

Art. 26 (2) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under the Philippine laws.

Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case.

However, the legislative intent must be taken into consideration and rule of reason must be applied. The Supreme Court ruled that par. 2 of Art. 26 should be construed and interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be sanction absurdity and injustice. Were the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A stature may therefore be extended to case not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirits or intent.

2Quita vs Court of AppealsDecember 22, 1998Fact of the Case:Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married inthe Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23, 1954.Both of them remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the respondentherewith. They were blessed with six children.On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to whowill be the intestate heirs. The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held thatthe divorce acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Private respondentstressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in VanDorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized in thePhilippnes provided they are valid according to their national law. The petitioner herselfanswered that she was an American citizen since 1954. Through the hearing she alsostated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time she obtained the divorce. Implying the shewas no longer a Filipino citizen.The Trial court disregarded the respondents statement. The net hereditary estatewas ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and thePadlan children moved for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial reconsiderationwas granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to Fe Quita.Private respondent was not declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was declared voidsince it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.Blandina and her children appeal to the Court of Appeals thatthe case was decidedwithout a hearing in violation of the Rules of Court.Issue:(1)Whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo void ab initio.(2)Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary assurviving spouse of Arturo.Held:No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D.Quita at the time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here sinceshe was already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in theircountrys national law.Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo. She cannot be theprimary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of Arturo.

3G.R.No.L-12105January30,1960TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased.PHILIPPINE TRUST CO.,executor-appellee,vs.MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA BOHANAN,oppositors-appellants.Issues:The oppositors, Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children, question the validity ofthe executor/testator C.O. Bohanans last will and testament, claiming that they have been deprived of the legitimate that the laws of theform concede to them. Another, is the claim of the testator's children, Edward and Mary Lydia Bohanan, who had received legacies in theamount of PHP6, 000each only, and, therefore, havenot been given their shares in the estate which, in accordance with the laws, should be two-thirds of the estate left by the testator.

Facts:C.O.BohananwasborninNebraskaandthereforeacitizenofthatstate.Notwithstanding his long residence in the Philippines, he continued and remained to be a citizen of the United States and of the state of his pertinent residence to spend the rest of hisdays in thatstate. His permanent residence ordomicile in the United States depended upon his personal intent or desire, and he selected Nevada as his homicide and therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that state.

Held:The first issue refers to theshare that thewife of thetestator, Magdalena C. Bohanan, should be entitled toreceive. The will has notgiven her any share inthe estate left bythe testator. It is argued that it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce secured by the testator from his Filipino wife Magdalena C. Bohanan, and that aiddivorceshouldbedeclaredanullityinthisjurisdiction.Thecourtrefusedtorecognize the claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his former (or divorced) wife. No right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada, thus the oppositor can no longer claim portion of the estate left by the testator. With regards the second issue, the old Civil Code, which is applicable to this casebecausethetestatordiedin1944,expresslyprovidesthatsuccessionalrightstopersonal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, thus the two-third rule is notenforceable.Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the United States and ofthe State of Nevada and declares that his will andtestament is fully in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits the same to probate.As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentarydispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State ofNevada which allows atestator to dispose of allhis property according to hiswill, asin the case at bar, the order of the court approving the project of partition made inaccordance with the testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.

4.VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO, G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, VS. HON. MANUEL ROMILLO JR., as Presiding Judge ofBranch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARDUPTON, respondentsOctober 8, 1985

FACTS:Alice Reyes, the petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and they established residence in the Philippines. They had two children and they were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. The petitioner remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. The private responded filed against petitioner stating that the petitioners business is a conjugal property of the parties and that respondent is declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court, where respondent acknowledged that they had no community property as of June 11, 1982.

ISSUE:Whether or not the private respondent as petitioners husband is entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets?

RULING:The petition is granted. Complaint is dismissed.The policy against absolute divorce cover only Philippine nationals. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law.From the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves marriage, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage between them with the petitioner. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985ALICEREYES VAN DORN,petitioner,vs.HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of theNationalCapital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTONrespondents.MELENCIO-HERRERA,J.:

PetitionerAliceReyesis a citizen of thePhilippineswhileprivaterespondent is a citizen of the United States; they were married in Hong kong. Thereafter, they established their residence in the Philippines and begot twochildren. Subsequently, they were divorcedin Nevada, United States, and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.Private respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitionersbusinessinManilais their conjugal property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting ofthe businessand that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismissthe casecontending that the cause of action is barred by the judgment in thedivorce proceedings before the Nevada Court. The denial now is the subject of the certiorari proceeding.ISSUE:Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to thealienspouse.HELD:Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolutedivorcesthe same being considered contrary to our concept ofpublic policyand morality. However, aliens may obtaindivorcesabroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to theirnationallaw. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from themarriagefromthe standardsof American Law, under which divorce dissolves themarriage.Thus, pursuant to hisnationallaw, private respondent is no longer thehusbandpetitioner. He would have nostanding tosuein the casebelow as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own countrys court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

5.Pilapil vs Ibay-SomeraTITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-SomeraCITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.

ISSUE:Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD:The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et alG.R. No. 80116June 30, 1989FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling, Pilapil had an affair with a certain William Chia. The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was assigned to the court presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery, considering that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners MTQ is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case is hereby made permanent.NOUnder Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the raison detre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

6.GARCIA vs. RECIO G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, VS. RODERICK A. RECIO,respondentOctober 2, 2001

FACTS:The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. Since October 1995, they lived separately; and in 1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned of the respondents former marriage only in November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his first marriage was dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.

RULING:The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient; and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of petitioners failure to object properly because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility.Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. However, there are two types of divorce, absolute divorce terminating the marriage and limited divorce merely suspending the marriage. In this case, it is not known which type of divorce the respondent procured.Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. Under the Australian divorce decree a party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute commits the offense of bigamy. This shows that the divorce obtained by the respondent might have been restricted. Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with other evidences submitted, they dont absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to the alleged foreign law.Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage between the petitioner and respondent can not be declared null and void based on lack of evidence conclusively showing the respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner. With the lack of such evidence, the court a quo may declare nullity of the parties marriage based on two existing marriage certificates.

Garcia-Recio vs. RecioTITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. RecioCITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Redericks marriage with Editha Samson.

ISSUE:Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

HELD:

The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either:(1) an official publication or(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

7.WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.G.R. No. 142820June 20, 2003

Facts: Petitioner Wolfgang, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen, a Filipina, on 11 December 1980 in Hamburg, Gemany. Early 1981, the marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. They had two daughters, Carolyne and Alexandria Kristine. Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati on 28 August 1996. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondent but was again denied by the trial court. In 1997, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese and granting the custody of the children to the father. It was June 14, 1999 when public respondent issued an order granting the petitioners motion to dismiss, but was partially set aside on September 1999 for the purpose of tackling issues regarding property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children. Petitioner assailed for the trial courts lack of jurisdiction, and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge.

Issue: Whether or not the Philippine courts can determine the legal effects of a decree of divorce from a foreign country.

Held: Yes. Our courts can determine the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as those concerning with support and custody of the children. In this case, the decree did not touch as to who the offending spouse was. The trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education of the best interests of the children. After all, the childs welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolyne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs.MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.

Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied.

Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the parental custody of the children should be vested to Wolfgang.

Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree had already been promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public Respondent RTC Judge Salonga.

Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties between her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially setting aside her previous order for the purpose of tackling the issues of support and custody of their children.

1st Issue:W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial motion for reconsideration.

Ruling:Yes.

A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality, as in the case at bar.

The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.

2nd issue:W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed and retained jurisdiction as regards child custody and support.

Ruling:Yes.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts.

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to Wolfgang by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of Wolfgang to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was the extent of Carmens participation in the proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear.

Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children.8.HOLY SEE VS ROSARIO, JR.G.R. No. 101949 01 December 1994FACTS:

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots. These lots were sold to Ramon Licup. In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of the lot of concern to Tropicana.

ISSUE:

Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity

RULING:

As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generally accepted principles of International Law. Even without this affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations. In the present case, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.

The Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling the lot of concern is non-proprietary in nature. The lot was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose of the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.

HOLY SEE VS.ROSARIOLeave a commentTHE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994FACTS:Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicanapetitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioners motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.ISSUE:Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entityRULING:The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionisIf the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent failed to dispute said claim.Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character. Petitioner did not sell Lot 5-A for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose off the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation. The fact that squatters have occupied and are still occupying the lot, and that they stubbornly refuse to leave the premises, has been admitted by private respondent in its complaintPrivate respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against petitioner is DISMISSED.9.Norse Management Co. vs National Seamen BoardChester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!

NORSE MANAGEMENT CO. (PTE) and PACIFIC SEAMEN SERVICES, INC., petitioners,vs.NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD, HON. CRESCENCIO M. SIDDAYAO, OSCAR M. TORRES, REBENE C. CARRERA and RESTITUTA C. ABORDO, respondents.

Facts:

Napoleon B. Abordo, the deceased husband of private respondent Restituta C. Abordo, was the Second Engineer of M.T. "Cherry Earl" when he died from an apoplectic stroke in the course of his employment with petitioner NORSE MANAGEMENT COMPANY (PTE). The M.T. "Cherry Earl" is a vessel of Singaporean Registry. In her complaint for compensation benefits filed before the National Seamen Board, private respondent alleged that the amount of compensation due her from petitioners should be based on the law where the vessel is registered. Petitioners contend that the law of Singapore should not be applied in this case because the National Seamen Board cannot take judicial notice of the Workmen's Insurance Law of Singapore instead must be based on Boards Memeorandum Circular No. 25. Ministry of Labor and Employment ordered the petitioner to pay jointly and severally the private respondent. Petitioner appealed to the Ministry of Labor but same decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the law of Singapore ought to be applied in this case.

Held:

The SC denied the petition. It has always been the policy of this Board, as enunciated in a long line of cases, that in cases of valid claims for benefits on account of injury or death while in the course of employment, the law of the country in which the vessel is registered shall be considered. In Section 5(B) of the Employment Agreement between petitioner and respondents husband states that In the event of illness or injury to Employee arising out of and in the course of his employment and not due to his own willful misconduct, EMPLOYER will provide employee with free medical attention. If such illness or injury incapacitates the EMPLOYEE to the extent the EMPLOYEE's services must be terminated as determined by a qualified physician designated by the EMPLOYER and provided such illness or injury was not due in part or whole to his willful act, neglect or misconduct compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines or the Workmen's Insurance Law of registry of the vessel whichever is greater. Finally, Article IV of the Labor Code provides that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its implementing rules and resolved in favor of labor.

10.MITSUI VS. CA, 287 SCRA 366MENDOZA,

Facts:Petitioner Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. is a foreign corporation represented in the Philippines by its agent, Magsaysay Agencies. Itentered into a contract of carriage through Meister transport, Inc., an international freightforwarder, with private respondent Lavine Loungewear Manufacturing Corporation to transport goods of the latter from Manila to Le Havre, France. Petitioner under took to deliver the goods to France 28 days from initial loading. Onjuly 24, 1991, petitioners vessel loaded private respondents container van for carriage atthe said port of origin.However, in Kaoshiung, Taiwan thegoods were not transshipped immediately, with the result that the shipment arrived in Le Havre only on November 14, 1991. The consignee allegedly paid only half the value of the said goods on the ground that they did not arrive in France until the off season in that country. The remaining half was allegedly charged to the account of private respondent which in turn demanded payment from petitioner through its agent.Issue: Whether or not private respondent-s action is for loss or damage to goods shipped within the meaning ofthe carriage of Goods by Sea Act(COGSA).Ruling:No.The suit is not for loss or damage to goods contemplated in Section 3 par. (6),the question of prescription of action is governed not by the COGSA but by Art. 1144 of the Civil Code which provides for a prescriptive period of ten years. As defined in the Civil Code and asapplied to Section 3, paragraph 4 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, loss contemplates merely a situation where no delivery at all was made by the shipper of the goods because the same had perished, gone out of commerce, or disappeared in such a way that their existence is unknown or they cannot be recovered. There would be some merit in appellants insistence that the damages suffered by him as a result of the delay in the shipment of his cargo are not covered by the prescriptive provision of the carriage of goods by Sea Act above referred to, if such damages were due, not to the deterioration and decay of the goods while in transit, but to other causes independent of the condition of the cargo upon arrival, like a drop in their market value.

11.CANON KABUSHIKI KAISHAvs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 120900,July 20, 2000

FACTS:

On January 15, 1985, private respondent NSR Rubber Corporation filed an application for registration of the mark CANON for sandals in the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks, and Technology Transfer (BPTTT). Canon Kabushiki Kaisha filed a Verified Notice of Opposition alleging that it will be damaged by the registration of the trademark CANON in the name of private respondent since they were using the same trademark for their footwear line of products. The private respondent will also use the name Canon for its footwear products.

Based on the records, the evidence presented by petitioner consisted of its certificates of registration for the mark CANON in various countries covering goods belonging to class 2, paints, chemical products, toner, and dye stuff. Petitioner also submitted in evidence its Philippine Trademark Registration No. 39398, showing its ownership over the trademark CANON.

The BPTTT, on November 10, 1992, issued its decision dismissing the opposition of petitioner and giving due course to NSR's application for the registration of the trademark CANON. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals that eventually affirmed the decision of the BPTTT.

ISSUE:

Is the use of trademark, CANON, by the private respondent affects the business of Canon Kabushiki Kaisha who has an existing ownership of a trademark also known as CANON?

HELD:

The Supreme Court says thatordinarily, the ownership of a trademark or tradename is a property right that the owner is entitled to protectas mandated by the Trademark Law. However, when a trademark is used by a party for a product in which the other party does not deal, the use of the same trademark on the latter's product cannot be validly objected to.

The BPTTT correctly ruled that since the certificate of registration of petitioner for the trademark CANON covers class 2 (paints, chemical products, toner, dyestuff), private respondent can use the trademark CANON for its goods classified as class 25 (sandals). Clearly, there is a world of difference between the paints, chemical products, toner, and dyestuff of petitioner and the sandals of private respondent.

12.Case Title: PRIBHDAS J. MIRPURI vs. COURT OF APPEALS,DIRECTOR OF PATENTSand the BARBIZON CORPORATIONPetitioner's claims: "Barbizon" products have beensold in the Philippines since 1970. Petitionerdeveloped this market by working long hours and spending considerable sums of money onadvertisements and promotion of the trademark andits products. Almost 30 years later, privaterespondent, a foreign corporation usurps the trademark and invades petitioner's market. Justiceand fairness dictate that private respondentbe prevented from appropriating what is not its own.Legally, at the same time, private respondent is barred from questioning petitioner's ownership ofthe trademark because of res judicata in view of IPC No. 686.Respondent's claims: The Opposer's goods bearing the trademark BARBIZON have been usedinmany countries, including the Philippines, for at least 40 years and has enjoyedinternationalreputation and goodwill for their quality. Their trademarks qualify as well-known trademarksentitled to protection under Article 6bis of the Convention of Paris for the Protection ofIndustrial PropertyIssues:1. Whether IPC No. 2049 is barred on the ground of res judicata2. Whether a treaty affords protection toa foreign corporation against aPhilippine applicant forthe registration of a similar trademark.Ruling:1.IPC No. 2049raised the issue of ownership of the trademark and theinternationalrecognition and reputation of the trademark for over 40years here and abroad, differentfrom the issues of confusing similarity and damage in IPC No. 686. There was also a newcause of action arising from the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of registration forfailure to file the affidavit of use. Also, thefirst and second cases are based ondifferentlaws, one on Trademark Law and the other on the Paris Convention, E.O. No. 913 andthe two Memoranda of the Minister of Trade and Industry. Thus, res judicatadoes notapply to the instant case.2.The WTO is a commoninstitutional frameworkfor the conduct of trade relations amongits members in matters related to the multilateral and plurilateral tradeagreementsannexed to the WTO Agreement, one of which is the Agreement on Trade-RelatedAspects of Intellectual Property Rights or TRIPs. Members to this Agreement haveagreed to adhere tominimum standards of protection set by several Conventions,including the Paris Convention. The Philippines and the US have acceded to the WTOAgreement. Conformably, the Statemust reaffirm its commitment to the global