CONFLICT BRIEFING NOTES

CONFLICT BRIEFING NO. 13, 26 MAY 2014

KEY MESSAGESON THE GROUND: STATES WHERE NSRP HAS FIELD PRESENCE PAGE

1. INCREASING VIOLENCE IN NORTH EAST 2

2. RESURGENCE OF COMMUNAL CLASHES AND BANDITRY IN KADUNA 3

3. IMPROVED SECURITY IN PLATEAU THREATENED 4

4. POLITICS AND POWER STRUGGLES THREATEN SECURITY IN KANO 5

5. VIOLENCE PERSISTS IN NIGER DELTA 6

THE NATIONAL CONTEXT

6. STATE OF EMERGENCY EXTENDED IN NORTH EAST FOR A THIRD TIME 7

7. HOW JONATHAN'S CANDIDACY DRIVES INSECURITY 7

8. NIGERIA SEEKS FOREIGN HELP TO COMBAT JAS 8

*Disclaimer: The contents of this briefing note do not necessarily reflect the views of DFID or the UK Government.

** All reports are based on anonymous NSRP sources.

ON THE GROUND

1. INCREASING VIOLENCE IN NORTH EAST The security situation in the North East worsened since December 2013, with April and May 2014 recording

the highest casualty figures since the onset of the insurgency. There are indications that Jamaatu Ahlis-

Sunna Liddaawati Wal Jihad (JAS) has recovered from the setbacks caused by the activities of the Civilian

JTF- the community security initiative that helped to restore security in Maiduguri and environs.

The JAS seems to have been emboldened by their successful attack on the Maiduguri military air base in

December 2013. General perception of both political leaders and members of the public is that insurgents

are better equipped militarily than the government forces. This perception appears to have bolstered the

JAS. Another factor that plays in favour of the JAS is absence of consensus among the political class on the

management of the insurgency. There are fears that the situation will worsen as the 2015 elections

approach.

Since early April 2014, JAS has systematically targeted rural communities especially those located in

frontier areas of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States. No specific reasons for targeting individual villages are

evident. This raises the suspicion that the insurgents are re-doubling efforts to overrun the entire North East

especially if seen in the context that attacks in the last quarter of 2013 manifested themselves as reprisal

attacks on communities that either supported the Civilian JTF or provided information linked to arrest and

killing of JAS militants.

The biggest and most widely condemned attack launched by JAS to date is the kidnap of about 270 girls in a

secondary school in Chibok, southern Borno. The insurgents who reportedly disguised as soldiers overran

the school and left with the hapless boarding students. A few girls are reported to have escaped from the

kidnappers. Apart from those few, none of the girls have been sighted by anyone since April 14 when the

incident occurred.

Reports of eyewitnesses and victims of JAS attacks in the past four months suggest that the insurgent

group is actively recruiting fighters and amassing weapons. NSRP sources claim young fighters are

being recruited from communities around the Chad Basin especially in southern Niger Republic with

offers of fifty thousand naira (N50,000). This suggests the availability of new funding sources for the

group.

The Nigerian Army established Division 7, which has its headquarters in Maimalari Cantonment, in

Maiduguri as a counter insurgency measure. However, military presence appears not to have offered much

relief to the endangered population who instead, have witnessed an upsurge in attacks. For instance, JAS

fighters on March 14 ransacked the Giwa Army Barracks in Maiduguri clearly sending the message that

military presence will not deter them. Heavy casualties sustained by the military, poor morale, indiscipline

and disloyalty among soldiers and perceived insensitivity of political leaders to the rising toll of dead soldiers

have allegedly demotivated the military and made soldiers increasingly vulnerable to the organized and

determined war machine of JAS. NSRP sources hint at rising number of security personnel that are

abandoning their posts. Another indicator pointing at corporate and individual apathy is the perceived

sluggish response to intelligence and early warning. There have been allegations by hapless Borno

communities that security agencies were slow to respond or did not respond at all to intelligence that would

have forestalled attacks. However, security sources refute the claims, insisting that they expend massive

resources following unfounded and baseless leads.

See, www.nigeriawatch.org 2

Three dynamics appear to have further enabled JAS to operate from a position of strength in Borno. First,

is the total breakdown in relations between Abuja and Maiduguri with President Goodluck Jonathan and

Governor Kashim Shettima reportedly trading blames on ineptitude, abdication and complicity. This

unwholesome development reached its peak when the ruling Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)

reportedly accused its rival All Peoples Congress (APC) of undermining counter-insurgency efforts in

order to damage the prospects of the yet to be announced Jonathan presidential candidacy. On its part,

the APC has alleged that the lacklustre counter-insurgency campaign is a PDP orchestrated subterfuge

to extend emergency rule in opposition stronghold and ipso facto disenfranchise an opposing power

bloc. Intensification of attacks amidst the bickering among the political class is evidence that JAS

benefits from the politicization of national security.

Second, is the vast ungoverned space stretching between Southern Niger, Southern Chad, North East

Nigeria and North West Cameroon, which has enabled JAS militants move across borders to inflict terror

on communities. NSRP sources have hinted that JAS has more than a dozen bases in northern

Cameroon and the alleged reluctance of the Government of Republic of Cameroon to be drawn into the

conflict has hampered counter-insurgency initiatives.

Third, is the misguided strategy of the security to police commissioned border posts and main roads

when JAS militants operate through illegal border routes and cattle grazing routes. NSRP sources

indicate that killings and ambushes have mostly taken place in intersections between cattle routes

and main roads such as those between Kukareta and Warsala Villages, and Benisheik town and

Mainok Village linking Borno and Yobe states; Buni Yadi - Gujba route in Yobe that links to Sambisa

Forest via Damboa; and the Kawuri route in Konduga LGA. Although this trend has been

the Joint Task Force (JTF) has not established checkpoints at these nodes.

The sophisticated weaponry, huge logistic equipment and number of fighters that have increasingly been

deployed by the insurgents and the indiscriminate pattern of violence that they have perpetrated have led

close watchers of JAS especially residents of Borno to conclude that new forces and interests are

fighting the Nigerian state in the name of JAS.

2. RESURGENCE OF COMMUNAL CLASHES AND BANDITRY IN KADUNA Kaduna State generally remained stable even though several rural communities experienced attacks by

unknown invaders. Worse hit have been communities in Southern Kaduna where allegations of cattle

rustling have ignited inter-communal violence. For instance, over 100 persons were killed and hundreds

of houses destroyed in Ugwar Sankwai, Ungwar Gata and Chenshyi communities in Kaura LGA when

gunmen attacked at midnight of 13 March. Subsequent clashes between Atakar youths and Fulani

herdsmen in local government spilled over to communities in Riyom LGA of Plateau State.

However, there has been no major incident of violence linked to JAS in Kaduna state since January. The

only incident was the killing of Sheik Adam Albani on February 1. The Islamic cleric who has provided

counter-narratives to the doctrines of JAS was killed alongside his wife and son while returning from an

event in Markaz Salafiya Centre, Tudun Wada, Zaria. Investigations by the State Security Service (SSS),

which culminated in the arrest of 7 and killing of one suspected JAS members that masterminded the

killings, revealed that the JAS Shura Council took a decision in January to eliminate Albani for his anti-

JAS sermons. The killing of Albani has reportedly affected collaboration between security agencies and

the public over disappointments that security agencies could not provide protection to the few Islamic

religious leaders that have openly spoken against JAS. The incident also revealed that JAS remained

active in Kaduna State and was actively recruiting members to recover from massive arrests and

detentions it suffered in 2013.

established

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Many people in the state are concerned at the decision of the State Government to ban commercial cyclists

(Okada) in major towns of the state. The ban which took effect on May 21 will affect Kaduna North, Kaduna

South, Chikun, Igabi, Zaria, Jema'a, Sabon Gari and Birnin Gwari LGAs. The state government claims the

ban was necessitated by the reported influx of Okada riders into the state following the ban of their

operations in Abuja and neighbouring states of Kano, Niger and Plateau. There are fears that frustrated

cyclists will become susceptible in the ongoing recruitment drive of JAS.

There are also growing fears following mobilizations towards the 2015 elections by APC and PDP

elements in the state. Given the incumbency likely to be enjoyed by Governor Muhktar Ramalan Yero

and the Vice President Mohammed Sambo factor mobilizations by APC to take over the state is raising

fears about the re-enactment of the 2011 post-election violence. Kaduna recorded the largest casualty

figures in the anti-PDP demonstrations that followed the announcement of the victory of the PDP in the

presidential elections.

Non-implementation of the recommendations of the Kaduna State Peace and Reconciliation Committee,

which submitted its report in December 2013, continues to aggravate feelings of alienation among groups in

Southern Kaduna who expected the committee to redress longstanding concerns about land ownership and

constituency delineation. Perceptions that some powerful individuals from Northern Kaduna prevailed on

Governor Yero to ignore pressures to implement recommendations of the report has undermined efforts to

ease tensions between North and South.

3. IMPROVED SECURITY IN PLATEAU THREATENED The security situation in Plateau has remained relatively stable in April after sporadic attacks recorded in

some parts of the state in the first three months of the year. Areas worse affected were Barkin Ladi, Jos South

and Riyom in Plateau North Senatorial District as well as Wase and Langtang North in Plateau South

Senatorial District. These LGAs have experienced the worst incidents of violence in the past 5 years.

Resurgence of violence in these areas has been linked to the rise in incidence of cattle rustling, competition

over control of artisanal mining, mobilizations among political factions for advantage and marginalization of

so-called non-indigenes.

The competition for political power contributed to rising tensions as competing groups mobilised to win the

local government council elections. As a result of the violence, elections were postponed in Jos North and

Wase LGAs. The appointment of caretaker committees in the LGAs has also accentuated grievance as

committee members are considered proxies of powerful individuals in government rather than

representatives of the communities.

Politically generated tensions are also associated with the expected controversial return of former PDP

stalwarts who left the party in 2011 to the fold. Party members are resisting what they consider as an

opportunistic move to catch in what appears to be the absence of an heir-apparent to the Plateau

Government House. The perception that the governor has not groomed a successor seems to have opened

the floodgates to many aspirants and is generating heat in the Plateau body polity.

The increase in incidence of cattle rustling in the past few months has had adverse implications for peace

and security. It has promoted distrust among communities and provoked misplaced aggression as

aggrieved cattle owners reportedly mobilise to unleash havoc on suspected cattle thieves. Moreover,

representatives of the Fulani community in Plateau State, who have been the major victims of cattle theft in

the state, walked out of the Plateau Peace Mediation process facilitated by the Centre for Humanitarian

Dialogue (CHD) in protest.

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The rising incidence of cattle rustling is being linked to activities of organized criminal groups whose network

stretch beyond the state. Fears of criminal activities undermining peace and security in the state were

heightened when an attempt to kidnap Alhaji Maanu, a Jos based millionaire was foiled by security operatives.

The cross border dimension of the network was underscored by the fact that kidnap group were sponsor by

Kaduna based associate of the victim.

Confidence in improving security situation in the statee was shaken in early May when explosions occurred in

crowded locations in Jos, killings scores of individuals. However, many observers see the absence of reprisal

attacks as evidence of the success of peace-builiding processes. Previous bomb attacks in Plateau triggered

sectarian violence.

4 POLITICS AND POWER STRUGGLES THREATEN KANO SECURITYThe security situation in Kano State has been relatively stable since February 2014 when suspected JAS

suicide bomber detonated IEDs at a crowded bus park in Sabo Gari Kano. However, NSRP sources claim

politics and power struggles are threatening the relative peace. Economic and social life is recovering and

there are indications that relations between security institutions and communities have continued to improve.

Stability and security in Kano have been sustained amidst troubling developments in the political

environment. The defection of Governor Rabiu Musa Kwankanso and his allies to the opposition All

Progressives Congress (APC) disrupted existing political structures. It resulted in the take-over of the APC

party structure from Mallam Ibrahim Shekarau, former state governor who as national leader of the All Nigeria

Peoples Party (ANPP) had been the rallying point of the APC in Kano.

The decampment of Kwankwaso, who is apparently ambitious of contesting for the presidency under the

platform of the APC, has reignited the age-old rivalry between Kwankwaso and Shekarau in the state.

Kwankwaso had allegedly orchestrated the compulsory retirement of Shekarau as permanent secretary in

the state civil service during his first tenure as governor (1999-2003) for his closeness with the influential

Ulama who felt Kwankwaso was not committed to implementation of Sharia. Shekarau subsequently

contested against and defeated Kwankwaso in the 2003 elections with the support of the Ulama. Since

returning to power in 2011 after Shekarau completed his maximum 2 terms in office, Kwankwaso has

reportedly invested a great deal of effort to undermine the influence and legacy of Shekarau who lost many of

his supporters when he contested the 2011 presidential elections against his godfather Gen. Muhammadu

Buhari.

There are fears about the fate of Kano in the lead up to the 2015 elections as three political heavy weights

with considerable influence in the state have interests in determining who becomes the next governor as

well as in contesting for the presidency. The decision of Shekarau to decamp to the PDP means he

remains de facto leader of the opposition in the state since APC became the governing party.

The significance of the decampment is underscored by the fact that President Jonathan visited Kano to

personally receive Shekarau into the party. There are feelers that Shekarau is being offered the position of

Minister of Education, which has been vacant for months since the removal of Prof. Ruquyyatu Ahmed

Ruffai, a close ally of Sule Lamido, governor of Jigawa State and presumed PDP presidential aspirant.

The appointment of Aminu Wali, a PDP stalwart who was the immediate past Nigerian ambassador to

China as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and plans to appoint Shekarau as Education Minister are intended to

rebuild the PDP structure in the state in preparation for the elections. The ruling party reportedly considers

this a worthwhile investment given Kano's historic position as the state with the largest voting population.

These mobilizations raised concerns that the local government elections scheduled for May 17 would be

marred by violence. Fears of violence were heightened by dissatisfaction with the conduct of the party

primaries which produced unpopular candidates that are considered loyalists of political godfathers. Clashes

by opposing parties and candidates during campaigns for the elections resulted in several reported deaths.

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The results of the election which showed that the APC won all 44 LGAs attracted protests by PDP supporters

who claimed APC supporters snatched ballot boxes and intimidated voters during the elections. NSRP

sources indicate that JAS elements took advantage of the tensed environment following the local government

elections to launch an attack on May 18. According to police sources 5 persons were killed in the bomb blast

that targeted a relaxation centre in Sabon Gari, Kano.

There are also growing concerns about violence in rural areas of Kano state. Most of the conflicts have been

linked to competition for resources. For instance, 3 persons were killed and 26 injured when residents of

Jogana village in Gezawa LGA clashed with police during protest against take-over of the farmlands by a

Chinese company for the construction of a shoe factory. Secondly, clashes between farmers and cattle

herders in Gulbai village in Doguwa LGA resulted in the death of 5 persons including the village head.

5. VIOLENCE PERSISTS IN THE NIGER DELTAThe security situation in the Niger Delta remained precarious as power struggles, competition over access to

oil wealth among communal and ethnic groups and organized crime contributed to violence. A key cause for

concern for the people of the region is the persistence of longstanding dynamics of violence in the lead up to

2015 which would witness general elections and scheduled termination of the amnesty programme.

Tensions arising from power struggles between supporters of President Goodluck Jonathan and

supporters of Governor Rotimi Amaechi in Rivers State have declined considerably since February when

the Police Commissioner was transferred and the Rivers legislature resumed normal proceedings.

However, information from NSRP sources suggests that the competing groups are involved in

subterranean mobilization and are arming gangs and cults in preparation for the 2015 elections. The

mobilizations have reportedly triggered intra and inter cult and gang violence in parts of the states, notably

Etche and Emohua LGAs where clashes between Deebam and Deewell cults led to the death of 10

persons early May. There are also reports of some incidents of assassinations and violence in Ogba

Egbema Ndoni LGA (ONELGA) and Etche LGA as supporters of PDP and APC leaders in the state

clashed. Political realignments in the state are also generating intra-party conflicts as old members resist

take-over of party machinery by powerbrokers that have joined the parties.

The situation in neighbouring Bayelsa State is also very tense as a result of similar dynamics. The bone of

contention is the rumoured vote of no confidence passed on Governor Seriake Dickson by President Goodluck

Jonathan and First Lady Dame Patience Jonathan. Dickson reportedly incurred the wrath of his sponsors by

creating parallel political structures and concentrating development projects in his own senatorial district at the

expense of the president's home senatorial district. This move has been interpreted as intended to undermine

the president's popularity in the state as it indirectly lends credence to perceptions that the president has

favoured his own section of the state in dispensation of benefits. Dickson is believed to be following the

precedent where power-holders cornered resources to their communal base. DSP Alameiyeiseigha, the first

executive governor of the state chose Ammasoma, his home town as location of the state university. Jonathan

who took over from Alameiyeiseigha and subsequently became president approved the location of the Federal

University in Otuoke, his home town. Dickson has been under pressure from 'his people' in Bayelsa West

Senatorial District to continue the pattern set by his predecessors.

Dickson is believed to have adopted different survival strategies in response to fears that the Jonathans have

shortlisted candidates to anoint in the 2016 governorship elections. He reportedly dropped 7 nominees of the

president in a recent cabinet reshuffle. He is also believed to have started mobilizing militant groups that he will

use to further his ambitions. This is reportedly evidenced by his appointment of Ebikaowei Victor Ben,

popularly known as Boy Loaf as chairman of the Centre for Youth Development. The appointment is expected

to provide Boy Loaf, one of the leaders of ex-militant groups that benefitted from the amnesty programme, the

carrot to mobilize unemployed youths. The appointment represents a significant shift as Dickson had publicly

stated his opposition to the ex-militants who were clients of former Governor Timipre Sylva.

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Also worrisome is the resurgence of conflicts of varying intensities between communal and ethnic groups over

benefits from oil wealth. During the period in review, there were reported clashes and demonstrations in Bayelsa

and Delta states as competing groups struggled for oil company largesse and location of oil related government

projects. A case in point is the protest of Ijaw communities in Warri South West LGA of Delta State over the

location and naming of Ogidigben Gas Plant and Export Processing Zone. Similar protests over location of the

headquarters in Ogidigben in 1997 triggered the bloody six-year Warri conflicts.

THE NATIONAL CONTEXT

6. STATE OF EMERGENCY IN NORTH EAST EXTENDED FOR A THIRD TIMEThe Federal Government in May 2014 extended the state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states for

another six months. The extension was based on the need to allow the security agencies more time to

consolidate on gains of containing the insurgency in the region. Although there is widespread appreciation of the

precarious security situation in the region there was less support for the extension of emergency rule. This is

because of the perception that the insurgency has worsened since declaration of the state of emergency.

Consequently, the proposal for extension of state of emergency was opposed by key political groups, notably

legislators from the affected states at the National Assembly. However, debates over the extension were

overshadowed by the lingering kidnap of about 270 school girls in Chibok, Borno State. Campaigns for the

release of the girls and the strong advocacy for extension by the security establishment weakened the

opposition.

NSRP sources also suggest that opposition to extension was not strong because even the opponents realised it

would not jeopardise their political interests. Apart from the perceived lacklustre performance of counter-

insurgency initiatives under the state of emergency, the main ground for opposition to emergency rule is its

implication for the 2015 elections. Members of the opposition APC have claimed that the state of emergency is a

ploy by the ruling PDP to disenfranchise residents of the three states governed by APC governors. This is

because the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) had announced it would not be able to

conduct elections in states under emergency rule for security reasons. Thus, although ostensibly opposed to

the proposal for extension, the opposition calculated it would not undermine their interest as the third phase of

the state of emergency would expire 3 months before scheduled elections.

7. HOW JONATHAN'S CANDIDACY DRIVES INSECURITYSurreptitious mobilizations for the candidacy of Dr. Goodluck Jonathan in the 2015 presidential elections

appear to have contributed to the escalation of violence acrossthe country. There is evidently a coincidence

between tale-tale indications of presidential campaigns and the rising attacks by armed bandits and

suspected insurgents.

Although Jonathan has not openly declared his candidacy for the elections he has become increasingly

involved in partisan political activities amidst unambiguous media campaigns for his re-election. This is said to

be his response to criticisms within the PDP that he had abandoned the party to its fate and had refrained from

using presidential incumbency to the advantage of PDP. For much of 2013, a fractured PDP appeared waiting to

be swept aside by the so-called 'Broom Revolution' of a resurgent APC. Consequently, since 2014 Jonathan

has confounded his critics by deploying all the advantages of incumbency to the PDP. He reportedly seems to

have decided to share his time more or less equally between party affairs and state affairs. Jonathan's

omnipresence in PDP 'unity' and 'reunion' rallies across the country has contributed to the reinvigoration of the

PDP under the chairmanship of Adamu Muazu.

The alleged concentration of Jonathan on party affairs has attracted critics who condemn the involvement of the

president in revelries associated with party events in moments of national emergency. For instance, many

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commentators criticised the decision of the president to attend a PDP rally in Kano in honour of Malam th

Ibrahim Shekarau a day after bomb explosions in Nyanya killed about 80 persons on 14 April. This is even

after security reports filtered in the same day that suspected JAS militants had kidnapped over 270 school

girls in Chibok.

NSRP sources indicate that Jonathan is acting on the advice of his close supporters who believe the

insurgency and other acts of disorder that threaten national stability and cohesion are intended to undermine

his popularity in the 2015 elections. They point to the coincidence of insurgent attacks with moments when the

Jonathan administration is expected to showcase its achievements. These include the increase in incidents

of violence shortly before the Nigeria Centenary celebrations and Nigeria's hosting of the World Economic

Summit.

Thus, pro-Jonathan 2015 campaigners claim insecurity is orchestrated to deter the president from seeking

re-election. This is the crux of the allegation of the PDP establishment that the APC is sponsoring the JAS

insurgency. This is also the viewpoint of some close watchers of JAS who claim different groups now operate

in the name of the organization to achieve both political and material benefits.

The allegation that the insurgency is a ploy to stop Jonathan from contesting the 2015 election has

become widespread and increasingly receives sympathetic hearing from the ordinary people, especially

in much of the Niger Delta and South East. This perception is believed to have pressured the opposition

to become more outspoken against the insurgents. Thus, key opposition figures such as General

Muhammadu Buhari and Alhaji Atiku Abubakar have increasingly been quoted in recent media reports as

criticising the insurgents and their activities.

8. NIGERIA SEEKS FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR COUNTER-INSURGENCY

An unexpected result of the global campaign for the release of about 270 school girls kidnapped in Chibok is

the resort of the Federal Government to seek foreign help to combat the insurgency. Nigeria has secured the

commitment of United Kingdom, United States, France, China and other powers to combat the JAS menace.

Although the Government has tried to underplay the significance of the development, it represents a major

shift in Nigeria's foreign policy. Since the termination of the Anglo-Nigeria defence pact in the early 1960s,

Nigeria has tried to achieve minimum external involvement in national security. This policy was bolstered by

the country's experiences during the civil war. Post war oil wealth has helped to support the country's

ambitions to project its power internally and externally and to respond to internal security challenges with

minimum external support. For instance, the country resisted offers for foreign support during the militancy in

the Niger Delta and reputedly implemented a so-called home-grown DDR programme.

While there is popular support for the acceptance of the offer of international support, the government has

been careful to dismiss fears of potential external interference by underscoring the point that JAS is no longer

a national security challenge. This was the thrust of President Goodluck Jonathan's message at the Security

Summit convened in Paris by President Francois Hollande. The position of government is that JAS is now a

transnational terrorist organization with strong links with Al Queda. This characterisation of JAS legitimizes

the government's acceptance of international support to combat the insurgency. Government's admission of

the transnational nature of JAS represents a departure from its earlier stance on US classification of JAS as a

terrorist organization.

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