FACTS:

March 27, 1960: Idonah Slade Perkins died in New York City August 12, 1960: Prospero Sanidad instituted ancillary administration

proceedings appointing ancillary administrator Lazaro A. Marquez later on substituted by Renato D. Tayag

On January 27, 1964: CFI ordered domiciliary administrator County Trust Company of New York to surrender to the ancillary administrator in the Philippines 33,002 shares of stock certificates owned by her in a Philippine corporation, Benguet Consolidated, Inc., to satisfy the legitimate claims of local creditors

When County Trust Company of New York  refused the court ordered  Benguet Consolidated, Inc. to declare the stocks lost and required it to issue new certificates in lieu thereof

Appeal was taken by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. alleging the failure to comply with its by-laws setting forth the procedure to be followed in case of a lost, stolen or destroyed so it cannot issue new stock certs.

ISSUE: W/N Benguet Consolidated, Inc. can ignore a court order because of its by-laws

HELD: NO. CFI Affirmed

Fear of contigent liability - obedience to a lawful order = valid defense Benguet Consolidated, Inc. is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance

and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts Assuming that a contrariety exists between the above by-law and the

command of a court decree, the latter is to be followed. corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law...."It owes its life

to the state, its birth being purely dependent on its will.  Cannot ignore the source of its very existence

G.R. No. 124110 April 20, 2001UNITED AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner vs.COURT OF APPEALS, ANICETO FONTANILLA, in his personal capacity and in behalf of his minor sonMYCHAL ANDREW FONTANILLA, Respondents.

FACTS: Aniceto Fontanilla bought from United Airlines, through the Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila, three “Visit the U.S.A.” tickets from himself, his wife and his minor son, Mychal, to visit the cities of Washington DC, Chicago and Los Angeles. All flights had been confirmed previously by United Airlines.Having used the first coupon to DC and while at the Washington Dulles Airport, Aniceto changed their itinerary, paid the penalty and was issued tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the words: “Check-in-required.” They were then set to leave but were denied boarding because the flight was overbooked. The CA ruled that private respondents’ failure to comply with the check-in requirement will not defeat his claim as the denied boarding rules were not complied with applying the laws of the USA, relying on the Code of Federal Regulation Part on Oversales of the USA.

ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in applying the laws of USA.

HELD: No. According to the doctrine of “lex loci contractus”, the law of the place where a contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature and validity, obligation and interpretation shall govern. This has been said to be the rule even though the place where the contract was made is different from the place where it is to be performed. Hence, the court should apply the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued, where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Therefore, although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United States, the tickets were purchased through petitioner’s agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were "rewritten" in D.C., however, such fact did not change the nature of the original contract of carriage entered into by the parties in Manila

ADALIN VS POEA 238 SCRA 721 Facts:

On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B. Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas contract workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by filing an "Amended Complaint" with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims arising from their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII .

BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of its foreign principals.

The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund, interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay; fringe benefits; refund of SSS and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of B

Issue: Whether or not the proceedings conducted by the POEA, as well as the decision that is the subject of these appeals, conformed with the requirements of due process. Whether or not what is the prevalent law to be applied in this case, Art. 291 of Labor Code or Art. 1144 of Civil Code.

Ruling: Wherefore, all the three petitions are dismissed.

The three petitions were filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court on the grounds that NLRC had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders. We find no such abuse of discretion.

NLRC believed money claims-all money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred. This is embodied in the Article 291 of Labor Code which the petitioners failed to comply. It applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that "where the laws of the host country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall form part of the overseas employment contract."

Its interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is already a prepared form containing the stipulations of the employment contract and the employees merely "take it or leave it." The presumption is that there was an imposition by one party against the other and that the employees signed the contracts out of necessity that reduced their bargaining power.

Facts: Cadalin et al. are Filipino workers recruited by Asia Int’l Builders Co. (AIBC), a domestic recruitment corporation, for employment in Bahrain to work for Brown & Root Int’l Inc. (BRII) which is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Texas. Plaintiff instituted a class suit with the POEA for money claims arising from the unexpired portion of their employment contract which was prematurely terminated. They worked in Bahrain for BRII and they filed the suit after 1 yr. from the termination of their employment contract.

As provided by Art. 156 of the Amiri Decree aka as the Labor Law of the Private Sector of Bahrain: “a claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable after the lapse of 1 year from the date of the expiry of the contract,” it appears that their suit has prescribed.

Plaintiff contends that the prescription period should be 10 years as provided by Art. 1144 of the Civil Code as their claim arise from a violation of a contract.

The POEA Administrator holds that the 10 year period of prescription should be applied but the NLRC provides a different view asserting that Art 291 of the Labor Code of the Phils with a 3 years prescription period should be applied. The Solicitor General expressed his personal point of view that the 1 yr period provided by the Amiri Decree should be applied.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that as a general rule a foreign procedural law will not be applied in our country as we must adopt our own procedural laws.

EXCEPTION:

Philippines may adopt foreign procedural law under the Borrowing Statute such as Sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Rule stating “if by the laws of the State or country where the cause of action arose the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippines.” Thus, Bahrain law must be applied. However, the court contends that Bahrain’s law on prescription cannot be applied because the court will not enforce any foreign claim that is obnoxious to the forum’s public policy and the 1 yr. rule on prescription is against public policy on labor as enshrined in the Phils. Constitution.

The court ruled that the prescription period applicable to the case should be Art 291 of the Labor Code of the Phils with a 3 years prescription period since the claim arose from labor employment.

PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES (PIA) CORPORATION vs HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Minister of Labor; HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister; ETHELYNNE B. FARRALES and MARIA MOONYEEN MAMASIGG.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990

FACTS: Farrales & Mamasig (employees) were hired as flight attendants. Base station was in Manila and flying assignments to different parts of the Middle East and Europe. roughly 1 year and 4 months prior to the expiration of the contracts of employment, PIA sent separate letters, informing them that they will be terminated. Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, for illegal dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and bonuses.PIA contented that both private respondents were habitual absentees and further claimed that the services of both private respondents were terminated pursuant to the provisions of the employment contract. The court oredered that private respondents had attained the status of regular employees after they had rendered more than a year of continued service and entitled private respondents to reinstatement with full backwages.

ISSUE: (Relative to the subject) Which law should govern over the case? Which court has jurisdiction?

HELD: Philippine Law and Philippine courts

Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment agreement which specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and, secondly, lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in connection with the agreement “only [in] courts of Karachi Pakistan”.We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with public

interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship.the contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially; private respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do business (and actually doing business) and hence resident in the Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All the above contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties.Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it must therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the law of Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law.[DOCTRINE OF PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION, eh?]Petition denied.

FACTS:

Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had 5 legitimate

children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman

By his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had 3 legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis

August 5, 1952: Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines dividing his estate as follows:

1.    $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen2.    P40,000.00 each to his 3 illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam

Palma Bellis 3.    remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives

July 8, 1958: Amos G. Bellis died a resident of Texas, U.S.A September 15, 1958: his will was admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila on People's Bank and Trust Company as executor of the will did as the will directed Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions

on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children Probate Court: Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law

of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

ISSUE: W/N Texas laws or national law of Amos should govern the intrinsic validity of the will

HELD: YES. Order of the probate court is hereby affirmed

Doctrine of Processual Presumption:o The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved by the proponent

thereof, otherwise, such law shall be presumed to be exactly the same as the law of the forum.

o In the absence of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.  Apply Philippine laws.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

SPOUSES ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA vs. CA and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC.G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993

FACTS:

Petitioners-spouses Cesar Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana purchased 3 airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. petitioners checked in but were placed on the wait-list because the number of passengers who had checked in before them had already taken all the seats available on the flight. Cesar Zalamea and Mr. Zalamea was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding and were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines. petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach of contract of air carriage before the RTC- Makati. The lower court ruled in favor of petitioners. CA held that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith.

ISSUE;WON TWZ acted with bad faith and would entitle Zalameas to Moral and Examplary damages.

RULING:

The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent, in her deposition that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. No official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court’s finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court where the

passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law.

Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the passengers concerned to an award of moral damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, where passengers with confirmed bookings were refused carriage on the last minute, this Court held that when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of them would show up for the check in. For the indignity and inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger is entitled to an award of moral damages.

For a contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty — a duty to provide public service and convenience to its passengers which must be paramount to self-interest or enrichment.

Respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not informing its passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract of carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. Respondent TWA should have incorporated stipulations on overbooking on the tickets issued or to properly inform its passengers about these policies so that the latter would be prepared for such eventuality or would have the choice to ride with another airline.

Respondent TWA was also guilty of not informing its passengers of its alleged policy of giving less priority to discounted tickets. Neither did it present any argument of substance to show that petitioners were duly apprised of the overbooked condition of the flight or that there is a hierarchy of boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is evident that petitioners had the right to rely upon the assurance of respondent TWA, thru its agent in Manila, then in New York, that their tickets represented confirmed seats without any qualification. The failure of respondent TWA to so inform them when it could easily have done so thereby enabling respondent to hold on to them as passengers up to the last minute amounts to bad faith. Evidently, respondent TWA placed its self-interest over the rights of petitioners under their contracts of carriage. Such conscious disregard of petitioners’ rights makes respondent TWA liable for moral damages. To deter breach of contracts by respondent TWA in similar fashion in the future, we adjudge respondent TWA liable for exemplary damages, as well.

In the case of Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, this Court explicitly held that a passenger is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of the tickets he had to buy for a flight to another airline. Thus, instead of simply being refunded for the cost of the unused TWA tickets, petitioners should be awarded the actual cost of their flight from New York to Los Angeles.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED

Garcia-Recio vs. Recio

TITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. RecioCITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987.  They lived as husband and wife in Australia.  However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989. 

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City.  Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.  As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

HELD:

The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian.  However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree.  The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either:

(1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD vs. CA and PNCCG.R. No. 110263, July 20, 2001

Facts: Petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation organized under the laws of Malaysia while private respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation is a corporation duly incorporated and existing under Philippine laws.

Petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur. Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from private respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated the complaint before RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya.

Private respondent sought the dismissal contending that the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya should be denied recognition or enforcement since on in face, it is tainted with want of jurisdiction, want of notice to private respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or fact. Dismissal was, however, denied by the trial court and Court of appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in denying recognition and enforcement to the Malaysian Court judgment.

Ruling: Yes.

Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, the rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries.

In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that the trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a

prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment.

A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum Under Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was the governing law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial court and respondent appellate court, a judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.

In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the money judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered. Petitioner’s sole witness, testified to the effect that he is in active practice of the law profession in Malaysia; that he was connected with Skrine and Company as Legal Assistant up to 1981; that private respondent, then known as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, was sued by his client, Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad, in Kuala Lumpur; that the writ of summons were served on March 17, 1983 at the registered office of private respondent and on March 21, 1983 on Cora S. Deala, a financial planning officer of private respondent for Southeast Asia operations; that upon the filing of the case, Messrs. Allen and Gledhill, Advocates and Solicitors, with address at 24th Floor, UMBC Building, Jalan Sulaiman, Kuala Lumpur, entered their conditional appearance for private respondent questioning the regularity of the service of the writ of summons but subsequently withdrew the same when it realized that the writ was properly served; that because private respondent failed to file a statement of defense within two (2) weeks, petitioner filed an application for summary judgment and submitted affidavits and documentary evidence in support of its claim; that the matter was then heard before the High Court of Kuala Lumpur in a series of dates where private respondent was represented by counsel; and that the end result of all these proceedings is the judgment sought to be enforced.

In addition to the said testimonial evidence, petitioner also offered the documentary evidence to support their claim.

Having thus proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence and authenticity of the foreign judgment, said foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then fell upon the party who disputes its validity, herein private respondent, to prove otherwise. However, private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden that fell upon it – to prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds which it relied upon to prevent enforcement of the Malaysian High Court judgment.