conflict trend issue03 2011
DESCRIPTION
from ACCORDTRANSCRIPT
Peacekeep i ng and Peacebu i l d i ng Nexus
ISSUE 3 , 2011
conflict trends I 1conflict trends I 1
EDITORIAL 2 byVasuGounden
3 ContextualisingthePeacekeepingandPeacebuildingNexus
byGustavodeCarvalhoandDorcasEttang
13 NavigatingHybridPoliticalOrders:BalancingPeacebuildinginChad
byDianaFelixdaCostaandJohnKarlsrud
22 ViolenceinLiberia:FallingbetweenPeacebuildingandPeacekeeping
byJenniferM.Hazen
29 TheUNMissionandLocalChurchesinSouthSudan:OpportunitiesforPartnershipsinLocalPeacebuilding
byIngridMarieBreidlidandAndreasØienStensland
37 PeacekeepingtoPeacebuildingfromaGenderPerspective:TheUNMILCase
byKristenA.Cordell
45 Civil-MilitaryCoordinationandTransitionManagement:TheUNMILExperience
byChristopherHolshek
53 Practitioners‘PerspectivesonthePeacekeeping-PeacebuildingNexus
byGustavodeCarvalhoandDorcasEttang
FEATURES
contentsct3|2011
InTERvIEw
2 I conflict trends2 I conflict trends
ByVaSUGOUNdEN
editorial
VasuGoundenistheFounderandExecutivedirectorofaCCORd.
Whilst theAfricancontinent issignificantlyafflicted
and affected by armed and violent conflict, it has also
providedaseriesofinnovativeresponsestoresolvesuch
conflicts. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives
haveevolved,transformedandadaptedtonewrealities,
withtheaimofprovidingmoreeffectiveandsustainable
responses to armed conflicts and the processes that
followtheaftermathoftheseconflicts.Thisevolutionis
visibleinvariousforms.Ontheonehand,peacekeepers
havebeenprovidingawiderrangeofresponses,moving
away fromthesimplemonitoringofpeaceagreements
only to providing stronger support for longer-term
peacebuildingpriorities–includingelectoralassistance,
institutional support to governments, confidence-
building,securitysectorreform,andsoon.Ontheother
hand, largerpeacebuildingprocessesareseennotonly
aspracticesthatbeginwiththedrawdownofmissions,
butareactuallyinitiatedconcomitantlytothedeployment
of peacekeeping operations. Such transformations
in peacekeeping operations indicate the increased
complementarity–andevenacertainlevelofoverlap–
betweenpeacekeepingandpeacebuilding.
An important and current debate in the conflict
resolutionfieldisthedistinctionbetweenpeacekeeping
andpeacebuilding,especiallyinsituationswherethishas
becomelessclearandwherethereisnowmoreoverlap
intasks.Thisdebateisoflessconcernattheconceptual
or theoretical level,butmorevalidatapractical level.
It isat thecoreofdesigningstrategiesfordealingwith
armed and violent conflicts, of allocating appropriate
and efficient efforts and resources for implementing
larger peacekeeping and peacebuilding processes,
and of defining clear strategies that can meaningfully
supportpost-conflictsocieties in theirquest for lasting
peace.Thisimportantdebateis,therefore,atthecenter
ofconsiderationsanddecision-makingonhowtomake
responses to conflict more meaningful, effective and
sustainableforthesocietiesbeingassisted.
However,whilst thisongoingdebate isessential for
a better understanding of the nature of peacekeeping
and peacebuilding processes, many questions are
yet to be answered. There is an important need for
increasing understanding on whether, when and how
peacekeeping operations should be involved in early
peacebuildingtasks.Also,determininghowto improve
coordinationbetweenpeacekeepingoperationsandother
peacebuildingactorson theground is key,particularly
as peacebuilding processes should be undertaken as
nationalresponsibilitiesandnotbeledsolelybyexternal
actors. In addition, as each conflict context – whether
it is Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo
or South Sudan – presents different characteristics,
dynamics,challengesandopportunitiesforapplyingand
understanding the relationship between peacekeeping
and peacebuilding better, these questions need to
be understood and applied in the context specific to
particularcountries,regionsandscenarios.Thesearebut
a fewexamplesof themanyquestionsand issues that
needtobeaddressedwhenattemptingtostrengthenthe
capacityofpeacekeepingandpeacebuildingprocessesin
theprovisionandsupportofsustainablepeace.
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution
of Disputes (ACCORD) is one of the main actors at
the forefront of shaping and supporting both the
peacekeeping and peacebuilding fields. It has assisted
countries in developing peacebuilding strategies, and
has supported the strengthening of peacekeeping
missions throughoutAfrica.Through itsongoingwork
andprojects,ACCORDremainscommittedtothegoalof
strengthening theunderstandingof thenexusbetween
peacekeepingandpeacebuilding.Tothisend,thisspecial
Issue of Conflict Trends unpacks and provides clarity
onsomeof thekeyquestionsand issuesrelated to the
peacekeeping-peacebuildingnexus,andhowit impacts
peacekeepingoperationsandthelargercontextsinwhich
theyoperate.
conflict trends I 3
Once upon a time, peacekeeping operations tended to be calm and consensual. … Today’s peacekeeping may take an
entirely different form. There is less clarity about peace, the conflict might even be ongoing, with no clear views on who
the parties to it actually are. … Not taking sides may be difficult. … The ‘international community’ is called upon to help
in diverse situations of tragedy and emergency. … In essence, instead of keeping the peace, the international community
is invited to participate in the building of peace.1
conflict trends I 3
Theabovequote, though largelyasimplificationof
peacekeeping,presentsinaverydirectwaytheevolution
of the field over the past 20 years. Peacekeeping has
evolvedfrommainly traditionalceasefireoperationsto
focusonmorecomplexconflict scenarioswherewider
responses are required, including early peacebuilding
initiativesandprogrammes.Inthiscontext,andaccording
to the September 2010 Department of Peacekeeping
Operations(DPKO)–DepartmentofFieldSupport(DFS)
Paper on Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, 10 of the
current16UnitedNations(UN)peacekeepingoperations
Contextualising the PeaCekeePing and PeaCebuilding nexusByGUSTaVOdECaRVaLHOANDdORCaSETTaNG
above:darfurdramaactorsperformatElSrief (Northdarfur),aspartofadisarmament,demobilisationandreintegration(ddR)outreachactivity,organisedbytheafrican Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation indarfur(UNaMId)andsupportedbytheUnitedNationsdevelopmentProgramme,theUnitedNationsChildren’sFund,theNorthSudanddRCommissionandthelocalnon-governmental organsiation, Friends of Peace anddevelopmentOrganization(July2011).Suchcoordinationamongvariousorganisationsandinstitutionsatalllevelsincreasestheeffectivenessandreachofpeacebuildingactivitiesandprogrammes.
UN
PH
OT
O/A
LBE
RT
GO
Nz
ALE
zFA
RR
AN
4 I conflict trends
aliTreki,the2010UNGeneralassemblypresident,notedthattheUNneededabroaderandholisticstrategyinbridgingpeacekeepingandpeacebuildingeffortstobuildsustainablepeaceincomplexandfragilesituations.
aremultidimensionalinnature,andhavemandatesfrom
the UN Security Council to perform a broad range of
peacebuildingactivities.2
This evolution in the peacekeeping field emanated
f rom changes in the internat ional system and
the nature of conflicts in which the UN and other
international organisations are directly involved. As
such, the institution and practice of peacekeeping has
faced constant pressure for adaptation and increased
effectiveness.Tothisend,peacebuildinghas,therefore,
been identified by some as the “overall framework in
which external assistance to post-conflict countries
should be included encompassing peacekeeping,
humanitarianassistanceanddevelopment”.3
Currently, it is clear that institutions involved in
peacekeepingare trying to findaway tobecomemore
meaningful and maximise their impact. Thus, while
peacekeeping is still largely seen as a tool to provide
securityandstabilityintheaftermathofaconflict,there
isalsoanincreasedbeliefthattodosorequiresashift
towards more sustainable and long-term post-conflict
processes.This shiftbecomesparticularly relevant for
the civilian capacities within a peacekeeping mission
that have focused frequently on peacebuilding and
statebuilding components in their functions and the
initiativesinwhichtheyareinvolved.
The 2010 UN General Assembly president, Ali
Treki,noted that theUNneededabroaderandholistic
strategy in bridging peacekeeping and peacebuilding
effortstobuildsustainablepeaceincomplexandfragile
situations and tackle the interlinked issues of security
and development in a comprehensive manner.4 This
highlightstheneednotonlytostrengthenpeacekeeping
andmakeitrelevanttocurrentconflictcontexts,butalso
tosolidifyitscontributiontopeacebuildingprocesses.It
portraysalargercommitmentbytheUNtocontinueits
focusonpeacebuildingwithinitsinstitutions.
Many of the changes that peacekeeping has faced
are due to the fact that, in an immediate post-conflict
context,thepriorityisnotonlytokeepthepeaceandhalt
violence,butalsotoensurethatissuesofgrosshuman
rights violations, weak infrastructure, unemployment,
poverty,traumaandweakstateauthorityareaddressed.
This, therefore, requires that peacekeepers – who are
usuallythefirstgroupontheground–taketheseissues
intoaccount.Suchissueshaveimplicationsforclarifying
UN
PH
OT
O/M
AR
KG
AR
TE
N
conflict trends I 5
and establishing how the mandates of peacekeeping
missionsaredesignedandimplemented.
Thisarticle firstpresentswhypeacekeepingshould
bepartofawiderpeacebuildingprocess,andthatboth
processes must be linked in complex situations where
suchfunctionsareneeded.Ithighlightshowpeacekeepers
areincreasinglyperformingearlypeacebuildingfunctions
at the policy and practical level. Second, the article
discusses some of the implications of the relationship
betweenpeacekeepingandpeacebuilding,andhowitcan
beclarifiedandstrengthenedfurther.
PolicyandPracticeConsiderations
Since the1990s,variouspeacekeepingoperations–
suchas theUnitedNationsMission inSudan (UNMIS)
ortheUnitedNationsMissioninCôted’Ivoire(UNOCI)–
weremandated inawiderscopeofactions.Therefore,
while peacekeeping still remains largely focused on
providing stability and security in a post-agreement
environment, var ious new funct ions have been
incorporated.Thesefunctions,whicharegroupedunder
the peacebuilding umbrella, are now often undertaken
by contemporary peacekeeping operations – and
include electoral support; supporting the restoration
and extension of state authority; the strengthening
of civil society; and supporting the disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants.
Peacekeepers are indeed providing peacebuilding
support – both in terms of directly supporting critical
peacebuildingtasksandthroughenablinglocalactorsin
developing and implementing peacebuilding priorities
andstrategies.
UN
PH
OT
O/T
IMM
CK
ULK
A
Contemporarypeacekeepingoperationsnowincludepeacebuildingfunctions,suchaselectoralsupport.Here,theUnitedNationsMissioninSudan(UNMIS)providedtechnicalandlogisticalsupporttoSudan’sNationalElectionsCommission:UNhelicoptersdeliveredballotsandpollingmaterialsforthenationalelections,toremoteareas insouthernSudan(april2010).
PEACEKEEPING HAS EVOLVED FROM
MAINLy TRADITIONAL CEASEFIRE
OPERATIONS TO FOCUS ON MORE
COMPLEx CONFLICT SCENARIOS WHERE
WIDER RESPONSES ARE REqUIRED,
INCLUDING EARLy PEACEBUILDING
INITIATIVESANDPROGRAMMES
6 I conflict trends
TheUNGeneralassemblyholdsathematicdebateon“UnitedNationsPeacekeeping:LookingintotheFuture”(June2010).
Main Roles Performed by Peacekeepers in the
BroaderPeacebuildingEffort,accordingtotheUN
SecretaryGeneral
• “Peacekeepers articulate strategic priorities by
supportingconsensusamongnationalcounterparts
andthebroaderinternationalcommunity.
• “Peacekeepers enable peacebuilding by others,
by providing a security umbrella, monitoring
commitments by parties to the conflict, expanding
andpreservingpoliticalspace,facilitatingassistance
efforts, delivering administrative and logistical
enabling support, and coordinating or directly
managingvariousresourcestreams.
• “Peacekeepingoperationsdirectlyimplementcertain
peacebuilding tasks, including measures for short-
termstabilityandlayingthefoundationsforlong-term
capacity building and institutional development in
collaborationwithpartners.”5
Jennifer Hazen appropriately highl ights that
more frequently peacemaking, peacekeeping and
peacebuildinghavebeenconceptuallyidentifiedasthree
distinct activities in a post-conflict context and that,
if successful, peacekeeping would lay the foundation
for peacebuilding.6 Emily Munro points out that, in
integrating peacebuilding activities into peacekeeping
missions, challengesemerge –particularly concerning
the frequent ambiguous nature of most mission
mandates on peacebuilding responsibilities, and the
inconsistencies between mission tasks and budgets.7
Whilethesestatementsprovideimportantdistinctionsin
termsofthefocusofactivitiesthatneedtobeconducted,
theyalsohighlighttheconfusionthatoccurs–especially
in areas where they overlap in implementation. This
confusionwasseeninthechallengesthatpeacekeeping
operations have faced in transitioning to longer-term
peace consolidation and development in Chad, Côte
d’Ivoire,Darfur, theDemocraticRepublicof theCongo
(DRC),Haiti,LiberiaandTimor-Leste.8Thesechallenges
includestruggleswithdeliveringonmissionmandates
to protect civilians and, at the same time, respond to
threats; inadequatecapabilitiesandsupport structures
tocarryoutmandateseffectively;andthe lackofcrisis
UN
PH
OT
O/E
SK
IND
ER
DE
BE
BE
conflict trends I 7
planninganddecision-makingintimesofenvironmental
crisis(suchastheearthquakeinHaiti).
More recen t l y, the Spec ia l Commi t tee on
PeacekeepingOperationshascalledforbetterdefinitions
and identification of peacebuilding activities in the
mandates of peacekeeping operations. It is expected
that the DPKO and DFS will soon develop an “early
peacebuilding strategy for peacekeepers to guide the
prioritisationandsequencingofinitiativesintheareasof
civilaffairs,policing,justice,corrections,securitysector
reform,mineaction,disarmament,demobilizationand
reintegration”.9
The increased interaction between peacekeeping
and peacebuilding activities has had a direct impact
ondiscussionsatUNHeadquarters level.TheSecurity
Council is often in discussions about the matter, and
thetopichassubsequentlyreceivedincreasedattention.
BetweenFebruary2010andFebruary2011,fiveSecurity
CouncilPresidentialStatementson topics linked to the
peacekeepingandpeacebuildingnexuswerereleased.10
Furthermore,variouscriticaldocuments(seeTable1)that
highlightthisrelationshiphavebeenreleased.Attention
to the peacekeeping and peacebuilding nexus became
acentral issue indiscussionsand in thesedocuments,
within thecontextofhowtoenhanceUNresponses to
conflicts.
A common theme can be gleaned from the
aforementioned documents. On the one hand, they all
confirmtheideathatpeacekeepingshouldpavetheway
forlonger-termsustainablepeace,throughtheirsupport
ofcomprehensivepeaceagreementsandby laying the
foundation for legitimate governance.15 On the other
hand,thesekeydocumentsalsoacknowledgethatthere
areseveralchallengesinstrengtheningthepeacekeeping
and peacebuilding nexus, so that it contributes to the
overallefficiencyoftheUN.
ImplicationsoftheNexusonthePracticeof
Peacekeeping
Thereareanumberofimplicationsforpeacekeeping
operations when considering the nexus between
peacekeepingandpeacebuilding.
Local OwnershipLocal ownership is central to discussions on
the principle and pract ice of peacekeeping and
peacebuilding. Building local institutions and national
ownership is a long-term process that continues long
Table1:RelevantdocumentsHighlightingthePeacekeepingandPeacebuildingNexus
UNdocument ExamplesofSectionsinthedocumentHighlightingtheNexus
Secretary General Report on Peacebuilding in the Aftermath of Conflict
“The Security Council plays an essential role in signalling strong international attention
and support for a peace process and for the initiation of peacebuilding, calling on all
stakeholders for their constructive support and engagement and authorising a number of
potential steps, including peacekeeping operations.” 11
A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping
“UN Peacekeepers play a critical role in building peace after conflict, in establishing the
conditions for recovery and development activities and in carrying out some of the tasks
essential to stabilisation and early consolidation of peace.” 12
Independent Report of the Senior Advisory Group - Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict
“The separation of peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and political affairs into separate boxes,
and the alignment of departments and funding modalities with these arbitrary divisions,
constrain the UN’s ability to deploy the right capacity at the right time and to adjust in
response to changing needs.” 13
2011 Substantive Session – UN General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (also referred to as C-34)
“The Special Committee stresses the importance of the explicit definition and clear
identification of peacebuilding activities in the mandates of peacekeeping operations,
whenever appropriate and of their helping to lay the foundations for longer-term
peacebuilding and sustainable peace and development.”14
8 I conflict trends8 I conflict trends8 I conflict trends
TheUnitedNationsIntegratedMissioninTimor-Leste(UNMIT)trainsandempowersthelocalpoliceforceindili(2008).Peacekeepingoperationsshouldensurethat localactorsand institutionsareenhancedfromtheonsetofpeace-keepingmissions.
UN
PH
OT
O/M
AR
TIN
EP
ER
RE
T
after missions have drawn down. In this context, it
is now widely acknowledged that, to provide lasting
results, the host country and local actors should be
widely engaged in the process of reconstructing their
society. One of the main challenges in increasing the
linkagesbetweenpeacekeepingandpeacebuildingisto
avoidthe‘dependency’syndrome,wherelocalactorsare
heavilyreliantonexternalactorstoleadandmanagethe
peacebuildingprocess.
However, wh i l s t i t s impor tance i s w ide ly
acknowledged, there are sti l l challenges in fully
implementing local ownership in practice. In the past,
many peacekeeping operations have performed as an
alternative to the state, which hindered sustainable
programmes. Hazen confirms this view by stating
that peacekeeping missions have tended to adopt a
short-termapproachbyadvisingandassistingnational
governments with post-confl ict processes and/or
performing tasks that the government is unable to
perform.16This short-termapproachcannot contribute
successfullytoaddressingtheunderlyingcausesofthe
conflictandtorebuildingthecountryinthelongterm.In
clarifyingthepeacekeepingandpeacebuildingnexus,the
focusmustremainonbuildingandenhancingnational
capacitiesandestablishingnational responsibilityand
commitmenttotheprocess.
Although current peacekeeping operations have
consciously focused on strengthening and targeting
national capacities through various peacebuilding
activities,moreconcreteeffortswouldensurethatthese
capacitiesarestrengthenedinanongoingandin-depth
manner, and that local actors and institutions are
A COMPREHENSIVE AND WELL THOUGHT-OUT STRATEGy ON HOW TO TRANSFER
INFORMATION,SKILLSANDExPERTISEFROMINTERNATIONALTOLOCALCAPACITIES
NEEDSTOBEDEVELOPED
conflict trends I 9
enhanced fromtheonsetof thepeacekeepingmission.
Theseeffortswouldincludethetrainingandbuildingof
localcapacitiesinconflictresolutionandpeacebuilding;
providing technical assistance to national institutions;
supportingthepolicydevelopmentandimplementation
process;andcreatingavenuesfordialogue,information
andknowledge-sharingbetweenvariouslocalinstitutions
and actors. Furthermore, national capacities must
be involved in the initial planning, coordination and
implementation of all activities. A comprehensive and
wellthought-outstrategyonhowtotransferinformation,
skillsandexpertisefrominternationaltolocalcapacities
needstobedeveloped.Thiswillcontributetobuildinga
thoroughandclearunderstandingofthepeacebuilding
process,andwillensurethatlocalactorsareenabledto
achieveasustainablepeace.
Provision of Peacebuilding Expertise Within Peacekeeping Operations
It is important thatpeacekeeperspossesssufficient
capacitiestoperformtheirpeacebuildingfunctionsfully.
Working in a peacebuilding context, these capacities
would require that peacekeepers are knowledgeable
on a wide range of thematic areas such as the rule of
law,genderissuesandsecuritysectorreform,andhave
skills in mediation, negotiation, analysis, persuasion
and communication. This knowledge will ensure that
theyareable to respond tochangingsituationson the
ground, meet the relevant needs on the ground, and
contribute to long-termpeacebuildingefforts.With the
objectiveof increasingtheUN’scapacity torespondto
post-conflictchallenges,theUNisundergoingaprocess
toreviewitsciviliancapacities.Thiswillensurethatthe
neededcapacitiesareavailabletocontributeadequately
to rebuilding post-conflict states. This process is still
underwayand,at thetimeofwriting,theUNSecretary
General’sreportonthereviewhasnotyetbeenreleased.
As such, it is difficult to assess how fundamental the
changesintheUNsystemwillbe,concerningthecivilian
capacity in theaftermathof conflict.However, there is
the expectation that the process can and will support
theUNtoutiliseciviliansmoreefficientlyinsupporting
post-conflict societies – particularly through increased
partnershipswithin theUNsystemandbeyond,better
StaffmembersoftheUnitedNationsIntegratedReferendumandElectoraldivision(UNIREd)provideassistanceduringathree-daytrainingworkshopconductedbytheCentralEquatoriaStateReferendumHighCommitteeinJuba,Sudan.Theworkshopwasdesignedtoprovideclassroomandpracticaltrainingtocounty-levelrepresentativesaheadofthereferendumheldinearly2011.
UN
PH
OT
O/T
IMM
CK
ULK
A
10 I conflict trends
UN
PH
OT
O/E
SK
IND
ER
DE
BE
BE
TheUNSecurityCouncildiscussestransitionandexitstrategiesinpeacekeepingoperations(February2010).
national ownership, and increased flexibility in the
utilisationofresourcesanddeployment.17
Clarity on Strategies for Peacekeeping TransitionHow the relationship between peacekeeping and
peacebuildingplaysout inthecontextofmissionsthat
will potentially draw down and transition is relevant.
questionssuchashowtoensuresuccessfultransitions
frompeacekeepingmissionstootherformsofsupport,
andhowtoensurethatrolesandfunctionsarehanded
over to national partners so that they are able to lead
and guide the peacebuilding process, are important.
Inplanningatransitionfromafullyrobustpeacekeeping
mission to a smaller mission, important factors to
considerincludehoweffectivetheroleofpeacekeepers
have been in initiating sustainable peacebuilding
processes, and if local actors are equipped and
knowledgeable to take over these processes. These
considerationsareimportant,aspeacekeepersaremostly
internationalstaffandaredeployedforashortterm,and
the processes they initiate should ideally remain long
aftertheyhavedrawndown.
Many of the peacebuilding functions performed
by peacekeepers are evolving processes that are
increasingly part of a larger peacebuilding process
in thecountry.Oneclearexampleof thishasbeen the
role of civil affairs officers in performing certain early
peacebuildingtasks.18Inparticular,theexperiencefrom
theUnitedNationsMissioninLiberia(UNMIL)highlights
howcivilaffairsofficersgraduallybecamemuchmore
involved in peacebuilding tasks. In the early stages of
themission,civilaffairsofficersweremoreengagedin
thegatheringofinformationandinconflictmanagement.
As the mission (and the country’s situation) evolved,
civil affairs officers continued to be involved in those
initialengagements,butalsobecamemorefocusedon
IT IS IMPORTANTTHATAMISSIONTRANSITIONSORDRAWSDOWNATTHERIGHT
TIME,TOAVOID ‘OVERDEPENDENCy’ByTHEHOSTCOUNTRy,ONTHEONEHAND,
ANDTOENSURETHATITLEAVESTHECOUNTRyINASTABLESTATE,ONTHEOTHER
conflict trends I 11conflict trends I 11
workingwithlocalactorsandinstitutionsinsupporting
andstrengtheningtheircapacities.
It is important that a mission transitions or draws
down at the right time, to avoid ‘overdependency’ by
the host country, on the one hand, and to ensure that
it leaves thecountry inastablestate,on theother.As
such, there is a need for increased understanding of
theinitialbenchmarksthataresettomeasurethegoals
and achievements of a mission, which are used to
determinethebesttimetoexitfromaparticularcountry.
Understanding these benchmarks within an ever-
changingsituationinacountrywillensurethatthereis
sufficientplanningwellinadvanceofdrawdown,andcan
helptogaugeadequatelywhenthelocalactorsareready
totakeovertheprocess.
Coordination between Various Actors Inanyefforttobranchintopeacebuildingactivitiesin
aclearandsystematicmanner,itisimportanttonotethat
awiderangeofactorsexistinthefield–andareplaying
similar roles. Ongoing efforts to build coherence and
coordinationamongthesevariousactorsandinstitutions
at all levels (including local actors and institutions)
alreadyexist.
There are challenges between the coordination
mechanisms of peacekeeping and peacebuilding
institutions. At the level of the UN Headquarters,
coordinat ion among the Secur i ty Counci l , the
Peacebui ld ing Commission, the DPKO and the
Peacebuilding Support Office remain inadequate,
especiallyinrelationtotheiractivities.Frequently,their
activities are not fully coordinated, and planning of
peacekeepingmissionsarenotyetfullyintegrated.The
role of the World Bank is important, and the need for
closecollaborationbetweenit,theUNandotherfinancial
anddevelopmentpartnersisnecessary.Muchmorecan
bedonetoachievethis.Thischallengeisalsofeltatthe
missionlevel,especiallybetweenthemissionandother
peacebuildingactorsontheground.
RecentdevelopmentswithintheUNsystemtobuild
coherence and coordination amongst its missions,
agenciesandcountryteamsatthepoliticalandstrategic
level will help to solidify the relationship between
peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Recognising that
thesebodieshaveworkedindependently,itwillrequire
concrete and well thought-out efforts to harmonise
theirapproaches.Whenachieved, thiswillensure that
the UN can respond to short-, mid- and longer-term
peacebuilding activities in a holistic manner. Through
this integrated and strategic approach, the UN can
providesupport tocorepeacebuildingprocesses,such
asprovidingsafetyandsecurityduringelections,aswell
as economic revitalisation. In the case of UNMIL, the
missionhasbeenactive in facilitating theengagement
of the Peacebuilding Commission in the country, and
has played equivocal roles in facilitating the overall
peacebuilding process. In spite of ongoing efforts to
improvecoordination,muchmorecanbedoneso that
sustainableresultsareachieved.
Conclusion
This ar t ic le has focused on contextual is ing
the peacekeeping and peacebuilding nexus within
current-day peacekeeping operations. It has also
a t tempted to draw out the l inkages between
peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the policy and
practice of contemporary peacekeeping operations.
Understandinghowthepeacekeepingfieldhasevolved
from purely military operations to more robust and
multidimensional operations will strengthen the UN’s
role on the global stage. Furthermore, the need for
strongerandconsistentjointeffortsbetweentheDPKO
andtheUN’speacebuildingstructuresinunderstanding
thenexusbetweenpeacekeepingandpeacebuilding is
important,especiallyinthedesignandimplementation
ofmandates.
Howfuturepeacekeepingmandateswillbedesigned
and implemented wil l have implications on how
local ownership is perceived and achieved and how
the capacities of peacekeepers are built to perform
peacebuilding functions effectively. This will provide
moreclarityonthetransitionofpeacekeepingmissions,
especiallyastheydrawdown.Itisacknowledgedbythe
Security Council that there is the need for enhancing
ALTHOUGHCURRENTPEACEKEEPINGOPERATIONSHAVECONSCIOUSLyFOCUSED
ONSTRENGTHENINGANDTARGETINGNATIONALCAPACITIESTHROUGHVARIOUS
PEACEBUILDING ACTIVITIES, MORE CONCRETE EFFORTS WOULD ENSURE THAT
THESECAPACITIESARESTRENGTHENED INANONGOINGAND IN-DEPTHMANNER,
ANDTHATLOCALACTORSANDINSTITUTIONSAREENHANCEDFROMTHEONSETOF
THEPEACEKEEPINGMISSION
12 I conflict trends
peacebuildingactivitiesbyformulatingastrategybased
on the interdependence between sustainable peace,
security and development in its entire dimension.19
Dialogue between the General Assembly, Security
Council, theSecretariat, troop-andpolice-contributing
countries, and partners within and beyond the UN
system through both formal and informal channels,
highlight the ongoing efforts to understand and
clarify thepeacekeepingandpeacebuildingnexus. It is
important that these ongoing efforts and discussions
remainrelevantandintegraltothespecificcontextson
the ground in which the UN works – as it is here that
thechallenges inunderstanding thepeacekeepingand
peacebuildingnexusaremostvisible.
Gustavo de Carvalho is an analyst in aCCORd’sPeacekeeping Unit and Training for Peace (TfP)Programme.
dorcas Ettang is an analyst in aCCORd’sPeacebuildingUnit.
Endnotes
1 Ojanen,Hanna(ed.)(2006)‘Peacekeeping-Peacebuilding:PreparingfortheFuture’,Availableat:<http://www.upi-fiia.fi>.
2 UnitedNationsDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations,DepartmentofFieldSupport(2010)‘PeacekeepingandPeacebuilding:ClarifyingtheNexus’,Availableat:<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/PKO%20Peacebuilding%20Peacekeeping%20Nexus.pdf>Accessedon:13July2011.
3 Cutillo,Alberto(2006)‘InternationalAssistancetoCountriesEmergingfromConflict:AReviewofFifteenyearsofInterventionsandtheFutureofPeacebuilding’,Availableat:<http://www.ipacademy.org/media/pdf/publications/cutillo_e_rpt.pdf>Accessedon8July2011.
4 UnitedNations(2010)‘GeneralAssemblyThematicDebate:UNPeacekeepingLookingIntotheFuture’,pressrelease,22June2010,Availableat:<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/ga10953.doc.htm>.
5 UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly(2011)Report of the Secretary-General: Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations,A/650/680,4January2011.
6 Hazen,JenniferM.(2007)CanPeacekeepersBePeacebuilders?International Peacekeeping,14(3),p.324.
7 Cutillo,Alberto(2006)op.cit.
8 UnitedNationsDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations,DepartmentofFieldSupport(2010)The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No. 1.Newyork:DPKO–DFS.
9 UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly(2011)op.cit.
10 UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(2011)Update Report: Interdependence Between Security and Development,9February,No.2,Availableat:www.securitycouncilreport.org.
11 UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyandSecurityCouncil(2009)Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the
Immediate Aftermath of Conflict,A/63/881–S/2009/304,11June2009.
12 UnitedNationsDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperationsandDepartmentofFieldSupport(2009)A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping. Newyork:DPKO–DFS.
13 UnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyandSecurityCouncil(2011)Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict: Independent Report of the Senior Advisory Group, A/65/747-S/2011/85,22February2011.
14 UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly(2011)op.cit.
15 UnitedNationsDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperationsandDepartmentofFieldSupport(2010)op.cit.
16 Hazen,JenniferM.(2007)op.cit., p.326.
17 Thereviewofciviliancapacitiesisaprocessthatwasinitiatedatthe2009UNSecretaryGeneralReportonPeacebuildingintheImmediateAftermathofConflict.ItsSeniorAdvisoryGroupreleasedareportinFebruary2011withrecommendationsfortheprocess.Therecommen-dationsaremostlybasedonenhancingciviliancapacitythrough(1)amorelocallyownedprocess;(2)utilisingappropriateandwiderrangeofpartners;(3)withtherightexpertise;and(4)inaflexiblemanner.
18 Civilaffairsisoneofthecivilianfunctionsofpeacekeeping.Itsmainroleistointeractwiththelocalcommunities,under-standthemandcreatestrategiesforsupportingconflictmanagementinitiativesandenhancinglocalgovernance,onadailybasis.
19 UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(2001)Presidential Statement,2001,No.5,PRST2001/5,20February.
conflict trends I 13
Introduction
There isan increasingunderstandingof theneedto
take intoaccount thehybridpoliticalordersexisting in
post-conflict environments where peacekeeping and
peacebuildingoperationsaredeployed.However,mostof
thisworkisstillattheconceptual level.Thisarticlewill
attempttoadvancethetheoreticalandpolicydebateson
therelationshipbetweenlocal-levelandnationalactors,
andthecomplexitieswithinthenotionoflocalownership,
by highlighting some of the inherent challenges for
local-level peacebuilding. It also highlights some of
the potential avenues for further development of local
peacebuilding approaches in hybrid political orders
through examples from Chad. The practices employed
in Chad have followed liberal peacebuilding patterns
with unpredictable challenges at times, but also some
successes. This article argues that a more bottom-up
orientedapproach topeacebuilding,whichstrengthens
local confidence in – and ownership of – formal and
traditional institutions, can improve the success of
peacekeepingoperations.
Peacebuilding efforts have come to a crossroads,1
withmountingcriticismforsupportingnationalelitesat
theexpenseof traditionalauthoritiesat theperiphery,2
UN
PH
OT
O/O
LIVIA
GR
Ey
PR
ITC
HA
RD
navigating hybrid PolitiCal orders: balanCing PeaCebuilding in ChadBydIaNaFELIxdaCOSTaANDJOHNKaRLSRUd
above:MINURCaT’scivilaffairsofficersmeetandtalkwithlocal,displacedwomen.Itisimportanttogarnertheconfidenceandsupportofthelocalpopulationandtodeveloppeaceprocessesfromthegroundup.
14 I conflict trends
withering consent of host states,3 a sharply contracted
economicenvironmentinthepost-financialcrisisperiod
andageneralcriticismagainsttheliberalpeacebuilding
agenda.4 The legitimacy of United Nations (UN)
peacekeeping missions suffers from long drawn-out
missions that often do not seem to be able to deliver
stability,improvedsecurityorjusticetohostpopulations.
The peacebuilding agenda is thus under considerable
stress.yet,while someof thecriticismseems toargue
forendingwhatisconsideredaneo-colonialenterprise,
othershavearguedthatmostofthecriticsstillconceive
ofpeacebuildingreformthatisbroadlywithintheliberal
agenda.5
This art ic le wil l focus on examples of local
peacebuildingundertakenbyUNpeacekeepingofficers
in Chad. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Fianga
MANDOUL
KoumraLOGONE OCC.
Massenya
Fada
IribaBahia
Arada
Abou Deïa
GozBeïda
Salal
Koro Toro
Mangalmé
OumHadjer
Guéréda
Ngouri
Gélengdeng
Djédaa
Melfi
Bokoro
Am Zoer
Farchana
Am Dam
Kyabé
Maro
Pala
Zouar
MoïssalaGoré
Massenya
Aozou
HarazéMangueigne
Kélo
NokouNguigmi
Maiduguri
Ngaoundéré
Séguédine
Bilma
Fianga
Bol
Bongor
Sarh
DobaMoundou
Mongo
Am Timan
Abéché
Biltine
Lai
Ati
Mao
Massakory
Faya
Koumra
Fada
Bardaï
N'Djamena
Moussoro
KANEM BAHR ELGAZEL
BATHA
SALAMATGUERA
WADI FIRA
MOYEN-CHARI
MANDOUL
TANDJILE
CHARI-BAGUIRMICHARI-BAGUIRMI
LOGONE OCC.MAYO - KEBBI
QUEST
OUADDAÏ
DAR SILA
BORKOU
TIBESTI
ENNEDI
LAC
LOGONEORIENTAL
HADJER-LAMIS
MAYO - KEBBI
EST
B o r k o u
Grand Erg
de B
i lma
S a r i r T i b a s t i
E n n e d i
Massif d
u
T i b e s t iL
i
b
y
a
n
D
e
s
e
r
t
Massifde Guéra
Dépression du Mourdi
Massifde Marfa
Erg du Djourab
Kerkour N
oure
ne
Plateaudu Djado
Chari
Ouadi Hawach
Lac Fitri
Bahr Ergig
Lac Iro
LakeChad
Nga
dda Ye
dsera
m
MbakaouRes.
Vina
Wad
i Howar
Batha
Bahr AoukLogone
Gribingui
Bamingui
Bangoran
Bahr Salamat
N I G E R
CAMEROONCENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
NIGERIA
LIBYAN ARABJAMAHIRIYA
EGYPT
S U D A N
15° 20° 25°
20°
15°
10°
20°
15°
10°
15° 20°
The boundaries and names shown and the designations usedon this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptanceby the United Nations.
Map No. 3788 Rev. 8 United NationsMarch 2009 (Colour)
Department of Field SupportCartographic Section
CHAD
National capitalRégion capitalTown, villageAirportInternational boundaryRégion boundaryMain roadRoad or trail
CHAD
0
0
100 200
50 100 150 200 mi
300 km
conflict trends I 15
UN
PH
OT
O/A
RPA
NM
UN
IER
Peacekeepersmustdevelopworkingrelationshipsandpartnershipswithlocalleadersandauthorities.
(DPKO)civilaffairsofficersandtheircolleaguesareoften
theonlyUNpresenceinthefield,andtheirtasksinclude
supporting the strengthening of state authority and
coordinating thesupportofotherUNand international
actors,amongotherthings.Theythusrepresentoneofthe
nodeswherepeacekeepingandpeacebuildingintersect.
While it iscrucial forpeaceprocessestoevolveata
national level and for international support to solidify
itssubsequentacceptanceandrecognition, it isequally
important to garner the confidence and support of the
populations living in rural areas, and todeveloppeace
dividendsfromthegroundup.Howcanthisbeachieved?
How can international actors work towards linking the
centre and the periphery when implementing peace
processes?Andhowcan internationalactorsundertake
thedifficultbalancingactbetweenrespectingthenational
governmentasthemaincounterpart,whileacknowledging
that,at the local level, thenationalcounterpartmaybe
oneofthepartiestotheconflict?Insuchcases,whatcan
bedonetobuildconfidenceamongthelocalpopulation?
This article will argue for a more multilayered
approachtopeacebuilding,wherelocalownershiptakes
intoaccountlocalactorsaswellasnationalcounterparts,
and where the support offered from the international
community is better tailored to local needs and takes
intoaccountthepowerdynamicsbetweenthecentreand
periphery. The legitimacy of peacebuilding ultimately
dependsonacarefulbalancingactbetweentherespect
for national sovereignty and the need to engage with
all stakeholders, local administration authorities, local
traditionalauthoritiesandothernon-stateactors.
aTriangularRelationship
Therelationshipbetweenlocalactorsandinternational
actorsisnotstraightforward.Thereisnoeasyfixtothis
conundrum: international peacekeepers are present in
thefieldatthemercyofthehoststatewhich,depending
on their relative bargaining power, can also ask the
peacekeepers to leave – as was seen in Chad in 2010.
According toClapham,peacekeepers“view themselves
bringingsolutions”,whilethehostpopulationsperceive
the international support “as contributing resources,
whichmaybecapturedandusedbyoneormoreofthe
internalpartiestotheconflict, inorderto improvetheir
positionwithintheconflictitself”.6
This relationship can be framed as a ‘triangular
relationship’ between traditional local authorities,
administrativestateauthoritiesand internationalactors
16 I conflict trends
(largelyunderstoodbybothtraditionalandadministrative
stateauthoritiesasahomogenouscategory,despitethe
wide array of types of actors within the ‘international’
sphere). Internationalactors,workingwithin the liberal
peacebuilding paradigm, often overlook or neglect the
interplaybetweengovernmentadministrationauthorities
and traditional authorities at the local level, focusing
theirattentionontherelationshipwiththehoststateand
seeking to strengthen this at the local level, to extend
stateauthorityandservices.
Boege et al term the interplay between traditional
and administrative local actors as “hybrid political
orders”.7Localownershipshouldbediscussedinterms
oftheinteractionandrelationshipbetweenthese‘hybrid
political orders’ – the fusion or established relations
betweentraditionalandadministrativeauthorities–and
the thirdparty.AsarguedbyReich, thedebateof local
ownershipisnottobemeasuredinabsoluteterms;rather,
thefocusshouldbeonthecomplexrelationshipbetween
insidersandoutsiders, since it ishere thatpower isor
is not shared and negotiated, and that equality among
partnerscanbefulfilled.8
The followingsectionpresents fourgeneral lessons
fromChadonhowtodevelopapproachesthatconsider
existinglocal-leveldynamicswithinthenationalpolitical
context,andoutlineswaystobuildconfidenceamongall
stakeholders. It concludeswithasummaryon thevery
delicatebalancingactbetweenhybridpoliticalorders.
Supporting Multiple Layers of Governance Most post-conflict states contain multiple layers
of governance. As suggested by Boege et al, further
reflectionshouldbeplacedoncomprehendingthecontext
ofwhat trulyconstitutespoliticalorder insuchplaces.9
Forexample, ineasternChadat the regional and local
level, there are government and customary authorities
–suchasgovernorsandsultans,sub-prefectsandchefs
decanton–who togetherconstitutewhat iscommonly
knownas ‘localauthorities’. Ineffect, in regionswhere
formal central government representation and its
institutions are largely absent from rural areas, local
ownership depends on a working partnership between
traditionalauthorities(whoeffectivelyactasregulatorsof
sociallife)andadministrativestatelocalauthorities(who
representthecentralgovernment).
Peacebuilders must work towards a fine balance,
notonlybybeingawareofpotentialtensionsthatmight
exist – as often do – between these two categories
of local actors, but also to reflect on questions of
genuine legitimacyof stateactorsand their customary
counterparts,andsupporteachgroupaccordingly.Within
the IntercommunityDialogueStrategy (ICD),developed
andimplementedbythePoliticalandCivilAffairsSection
(POLCA)oftheUNMissiontotheCentralAfricanRepublic
and Chad (MINURCAT), as well as the wider mandate
ofCivilAffairs ingeneral,10greatemphasiswasplaced
on theextensionofstateauthority toareaswhere they
were previously absent. This was done as a means to
prevent intercommunity tensions and violence. While
this is laudable, there is some concern regarding the
heavy emphasis that international actors - such as UN
peacekeepingofficers,UNfundsandprogrammes-puton
extendingthepresenceofthestate.Particularlyincases
wherethestateisregardedbymanyashighlycorruptand
illegitimate,howrepresentativepeacekeepingofficersare
canbequestionable–particularlyifthestateiseffectively
oneoftheperpetratorsofviolence. Italsoraisesissues
ofcustomaryauthoritiesbeingsidelinedascommunity
representatives.
Contextual Awareness and Understanding the Local Political Environment
InsomeofitsofficesinChad,MINURCAT’sPOLCAhad
agoodunderstandingoftheregionitwasoperatingin,
builtonaconsistentrapportwithboththeadministrative
andcustomaryauthorities.11Throughcollaborationwith
MINURCAT’s Human Rights Section, information was
systematically collected and constant communication
maintained with other actors – including the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its national
non-governmental organisation (NGO) counterpart,
alongside other NGOs involved in protection and
economic recovery. The POLCA office used up-to-date
information to inform its community peacebuilding
strategy. Staff invested in building relationships and
trust with local authorities and developing follow-up
mechanisms, including supporting reconcil iat ion
commissions and encouraging other more long-term
actorsineasternChadtoimplementeconomicrecovery
projectswithtangiblepeacedividends.Inotherlocations,
however, UN agencies and NGOs expressed confusion
over POLCA’s role in intercommunity dialogue. The
POLCAofficersshowedlessunderstandingofthecontext,
andfewinitiativeswereundertaken.Fieldofficesseemed
tolackawarenessofwhatwashappeninginareasbeyond
their area of operations, and information flow within
POLCAwasweak.
Thecore tasksof theUNDPKOCivilAffairsofficers
are tosupportstateauthorities, facilitate reconciliation
between population groups and liaison between the
centre and periphery, facilitating the local voice in
nationalpolicyprocesses.12Thesevarioustaskscall for
adeepunderstandingof the localpoliticalenvironment
and the operational context – balancing the role of
supporting local authorities and strengthening their
capacitywith theroleofbeinganexternal facilitator in
conflictresolutionprocesses.UNDPKOofficersandother
peacebuildersatthelocal levelareexpectedtodevelop
akeenunderstandingofthevariousformalandinformal
governance mechanisms at play. They should see
conflict trends I 17
Insomeareas,MINURCaT’sPoliticalandCivilaffairsSection(POLCa)hadagoodunderstandingoftheregionitwasoperatinginandtheneedsofthelocalpeople.Here,locallyelectedwomenleadersofinternallydisplacedpersonsandrefugeesreceivesolar-poweredradiotransmittersdonatedunderaninitiativeledbyPOLCa.
themselvesasmorethanprovidersoflogisticalassistance,
support for capacity development and developing
infrastructure. They can negotiate the relationship
between formal and informal forms of governance at
the community level, and the relationship between the
localandcentral level.Theyare importantprovidersof
both political and economic resources, and can confer
legitimacy upon their interlocutors. The peacebuilders
themselvesareperhapsthemost importantresourceof
theexternalintervention,andtheirunderstandingofthe
world they inhabitcanhavevery realconsequenceson
theground.
The Perilous Assumption of a National and Local Commitment to Peace
Local peacebuilding, according to the l iberal
peacebuildingtemplate,involvesextendingtheauthority
of a state – regarded by many as highly corrupt or
illegitimate, or simply as an alien and largely external
force. This is often done at the cost of traditional
authorities, who are the de facto ‘leaders’ at the local
level. This approach can have the unintended and
unwelcome result of increasing instead of decreasing
tensionandviolence.
Thesituationatthelocallevelmayormaynotreflect
theengagement–or,perhapsmostaccurately, the lack
ofengagement–atthenationallevel.InChad,therecent
electionsinApril2011–consideredtobethecornerstone
oftheinternationalcommunity’sstrategyfora‘democratic
transition’inChad–offeredlittlehopetomanyChadians,
who are eager for peace and saw the elections as just
anotherwayof legitimising thestatusquo.The results
wereunsurprising:PresidentDébywonafourthtermin
power;nowreachingmorethan20yearsinoffice.13
Whileelectionsareproposedbymanyasasolutionfor
ademocratictransition,itisunlikelythattheywillleadto
sustainablepeacebeforeacomprehensiveandinclusive
nationaldialogue isheld. Indeed,averageChadiansare
tiredofviolenceandconflict.Whileanational inclusive
dialoguecouldbenefitgreatlyfromstrongerinternational
pressurefromactorssuchasFranceandtheUnitedStates
(US), local initiatives suchas the local intercommunity
UN
PH
OT
O/O
LIVIA
GR
Ey
PR
ITC
HA
RD
18 I conflict trends
UN
PH
OT
O/E
VAN
SC
HN
EID
ER
MINURCaTassisted localgovernorsandstateofficials toestablishwaterdrillingunits indryandremoteareas.Thishelped tostrengthen theconfidenceof the localpopulationandhumanitariancommunity in localofficialsandMINURCaT.
dialogue are partially thwarted by the lack of progress
in a genuine wider national engagement to a peace
process. Local administrative authorities – particularly
administrativestateauthorities–atthecommunitylevel
were quick to understand the benefits of collaborating
withMINURCAT,bothintermsofperceivedlegitimacyin
faceoftheinternationalcommunity,andofthematerial
andpolitical resources theycouldbenefit fromthrough
engagement.
The rebel groups, which mostly hail from the east,
onlyaccountforaminorpartofthepopulation,whilethe
majorpartofthepopulationlivesinthesouth.Similarto
Sudan,thereisanorth-southdivideinChad,andthesouth
controlledChaduntil1979.14Thesouthernpopulation–
andindeedthepopulationatlarge–isscarcelyinvolved
inthepoliticalandsecuritystructuresofthestate.Their
resilience relies on local patrimonial structures that
provide security, food and provision of services. They
survive as nomadic herdsmen or subsistence farmers,
andoftenhavean instrumental relationship tonational
authorities, as well as international humanitarian,
peacebuilding and development actors. However, this
israrelyaccountedfor in thestrategiesof international
actors, which assume that support to state authorities
atthelocal levelwill improvetheresilienceofthelocal
population.Instead,thissupportcanbetakenhostageby
nationalauthoritiestostrengthentheirpoweratthelocal
level,anddevolvetheauthorityoftraditionalleaders.
Managing Consent and Building Confidence – The Balancing Act between Formal and Traditional Authorities
Onehelpfulwaytolookattherelationshipandpower
negotiationsbetweenthevarioussetsofactorsistofocus
ontheinterplaybetweendifferentlocalactors–including
betweenadministrativeandcustomaryauthorities–and
of these with international actors. In addition, the UN
is also aware that its legitimacy as a mission partially
dependsonitbeingableto‘win’orguaranteethesupport
oftraditionalauthorities.
While it is crucial to strengthen central state
institutions, this must be done parallel to existing
customary structures. More focus should be placed on
supportingadialogueandpartnershipbetweencentral
government authorities and its few representatives at
the local level with traditional authority structures. In
conflict trends I 19
the balancing act between national government, local
administration and traditional authorities, an analysis
mustbeundertakentomaptheinterestsofactorsatall
levels.Peacebuildersnavigateverycomplexanddifficult
watersinfragilestates,wheretheirstrategies,formedin
theliberalpeacebuildingmould,caninhibit theirability
toperceiveandunderstandtheinterestsofalltheparties:
Domestic combatants have a clearer and longer-
term view of what they are trying to achieve;
they are uncluttered – or uninhibited – by the
value system within which the peacekeepers are
operating;theyareoftenwellawareofthedomestic
and international constraints on the behaviour of
the peacekeepers, while suffering from few such
constraints themselves;and theyhavea farbetter
graspofthelocalpoliticalscene.15
In Chad, MINURCAT’s ability to implement the
intercommunity dialogue successfully rested in its
capacity to build confidence that the security situation
couldbe improvedbyengagingindialogueat the local
level.OneofthelessonsfromChadisthat,inthemidst
ofconflict,thereisspacetobuildlocalpocketsofpeace.
Manyconflictsareessentially local in theirnature,and
canberesolvedlocally.
However, national authorities may be wary of
engagementwithtraditionalauthorities.Whileespousing
a will for peace, national authorities may not be as
forthcoming in practice. In eastern Chad, the national
authoritieswereperceivedbymanyatthelocal levelto
beoneofthepartiestotheconflict–havingsupportedthe
zaghawatribe(fromwherePresidentDébyandmanyof
hisclosestallieshail)intheethnicviolencethatinlarge
partresultedinthedisplacementoflocalpopulations.The
sustainabilityofactivitiesandthelevelofconfidenceand
trustthatthelocalpopulationhasinnationalauthorities
dependsonanawarenessoftheseperceptions,andtaking
them into account when designing and implementing
projects.
At the local level, MINURCAT enjoyed a very good
relationshipwithgovernorsandotherstateofficials.As
an example, the mission supported them with a water
drillingunitwhich,incooperationwiththehumanitarian
community, was able to locate, drill for and establish
water sources in very dry and remote areas. The
water drilling unit was hugely popular and assisted in
strengthening the confidence of the local population
andhumanitariancommunityinlocalofficials.Duringa
high-levelvisitbyUNofficialsfromheadquartersinearly
2010,afterthepresidentofChadhadsentaletterasking
themissiontoleave,localofficialswhowereclosetothe
presidentunderscoredtheirwishforthemissiontostay–
mentioning the support to intercommunity dialogue,
securitypatrolsandthewaterdrillingunitas important
contributionsatthelocallevel.16
Whatemergedwasatensionbetweenthenationaland
locallevel,wherelocal-levelofficialsenjoyedtheeffects
ofmaterialsupportthroughtheincreasedconfidenceof
thepopulationandthelegitimacythisconferredonthem.
Ontheotherhand,nationalauthorities,havinganational
outlookanddifferentinterests,wantedtoendthemission
as they did not want to be perceived as a ‘fragile’ or
‘weak’state.Whenthemissioncouldnolongerprovide
any significant material resources, there was a strong
resistanceagainstinvolvementin‘internalaffairs’andthe
improvedrelationshipbetweenSudanandChadmadethe
needforanexternalsecurityproviderobsolete,fromthe
president’sperspective.
LiberalPeacebuildingNavigatingHybridPolitical
Orders:aBalancingact
Peacebuilding literaturehas focusedon theneed to
support‘fragile’,‘weak’or‘failed’statesinre-establishing
security,corestatefunctionsandtheprovisionofbasic
services to thepopulation.yet, as suggestedbyBoege
etal,speakingof ‘weak’statessuggeststhereareother
actorsthatarestronginrelationtothestate.Effectively,
itacknowledgesthat“thestateisonlyoneactoramong
othersand‘stateorder’isonlyoneofanumberoforders
claiming to provide security, frameworks for conflict
regulationandsocialservices”.17
Conflict resolution in eastern Chad, as in most
sub-Saharan countries, is based on legal pluralism.
Conflict management institutions and social practices
fromdifferentdomains–traditionalsociety,religionand
state, forexample–co-existand intermingle inconflict
mediation and resolution processes. Pawlitzky et al
highlighthow,ineasternChad,reconciliationprocesses
launched and led by mixed delegations (comprising
traditional, religious and state authorities) had higher
chancesofsuccessfullybringinglocalcommunityleaders
together in constructive dialogue, and generating a
reconciliationagreementandstrategy.18
To be able to adapt to new surroundings, time and
spaceareneededtoadjust,understandandlearnabout
the different context. International peacekeepers need
toreassess their rolewithin thepeacebuildingprocess.
As suggested by Pouligny: “Contrary to what they may
THE PEACEBUILDERS THEMSELVES
ARE PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT
RESOURCE OF THE ExTERNAL INTER-
VENTION, AND THEIR UNDERSTANDING
OF THE WORLD THEy INHABIT CAN
HAVE VERy REAL CONSEqUENCES ON
THEGROUND
20 I conflict trends
be inclined to feel or believe they [international actors]
arenotthemainactors,butshouldthinkofthemselvesas
facilitatorsofaleverageprocess.”19Assuch,theyshould
actflexiblyandmodestly,andacceptthatwhattheyhave
tooffer isonlyuseful insofarasitbuildsuponnational
capacitiesandworkswithlocalactors.
Conclusion
The critiques offered by Richmond, Chandler, Paris
andotherscholarshasbeenjust,buthaslackedpractical
suggestions forhow itshouldbeoperationalised. In the
UN, the importanceof the roleof civilianpeacebuilders
has gained ground with the issuing of the Capstone
Doctrine in 2008, the Secretary General’s report on
peacebuilding released in 2009 and the Guéhenno
Reportonciviliancapacitiesreleasedthisyear.20Inthese
attemptsat reformingpeacekeeping– includingoffering
greateremphasistopeacebuildingwithinpeacekeeping–
the UN has shown intent to restructure and improve
its practices. However, in academic literature, little has
been offered in terms of functional examples on how
peacebuilding practices can be improved. This article
represents an attempt to bridge the divide between
academic critique and UN policymakers, by providing
examplesfromChadthathighlightsomeofthedilemmas
thatpeacebuildersareconfrontedwith,andpointatsome
potentialsolutions.
Multiple and competing layers of governance exist
in most fragile states. Even when good local context
analysis is carried out and the host state is responsive,
a lack of commitment from local actors will cause local
peacebuildinginitiativestofail.Themostpressingquestion
when assessing the UN’s role in local peacebuilding is
whether local actors actually want external assistance
in the first place. MINURCAT’s mandate problematically
assumedthatnationalandlocalauthoritiesinChadwere
committed to resolving local tensions and promoting
reconciliationeffortsandactivelyinterestedinchangingthe
statusquo.ThiswasaperilousassumptioninChad,where
thegovernmentoftenappearedtosupportspecificethnic
groups and had a long history of co-opting customary
authoritiesandoppositionmembers.
The aim of the international effort must first and
foremostbetohelpdeveloptheconfidenceandresilience
of the local population. With all-embracing mandates
incorporatingissuesrangingfromruleoflawandgender
tohumanrightsandsecuritysectorreform–tonamejust
afew– legitimatequestionscanberaisedastowhether
multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations have
sufficientexpertise,contextualknowledgeandstaminato
carryouteffective conflict resolutionandpeacebuilding
workatthelocallevel.Amissioncanbringaddedresources
and contribute positively to local level peacebuilding
efforts,butitisclearthatifpeacekeepingoperationstake
on this task, it must be done in close cooperation with
otherUNagencies,NGOsandlocalpartnerstoensurethat
engagementcontinuesafterthemissionhasleft.
UN civil ian peacekeepers facil itate local-level
peacebuilding such as the provision of basic services,
intercommunity dialogue and strengthening local
security, which may often consist of simple, low-cost
interventions.21Whendonewell, such interventionscan
provideaUNoperationwithkeyknowledgeandcontribute
tothebottom-uppeacebuildingthatiskeytothelong-term
success of any peace operation.22 However, engaging
inpeacebuildingat the local level requiresspecific local
knowledge,flexibilityandlong-term,sustainedcommitment
– a challenge for large, unwieldy and time-limited
peacekeeping operations. Together with the short-term,
project-basedculturesofsomedonororganisations, this
generatesconsiderablepressurefortherapidachievement
of concrete and measurable results. Success is thus
oftenmeasured in termsof tangibleoutcomes–suchas
thequantityof infrastructurerehabilitatedornumbersof
returnedinternallydisplacedpeople(IDPs)andrefugees–
ratherthanwhethertheunderlyingcausesofconflict(and
thepoliticaldynamics)havebeensustainablyaddressed.
Anyengagementhastobesustained,longtermandaimed
at building the capacity of local governance structures
andpartnershipswithnationalNGOsandotheractors, to
ensurecontinuityaftertheUNpullsout.
UNpeacekeepingoperationsmayprovetobe anassetin
facilitatingthespacerequiredforlocal-levelpeacebuilding
andinadvocatingforearlyrecoveryactivities,byfostering
structures that meet basic human needs and maximise
publicparticipation.However,thishastobedonealongside
nationalauthoritiesanddevelopingactorswithinarealistic
timeframe.Internationalpeacekeepersandpeacebuilders
represent a considerable supply of material and other
resources to all levels of governance in a fragile state,
which has instrumental value to all parties. Navigating
between a mandate directed at supporting a host state
and avoiding detrimental impact on existing traditional
structureswillremainaseriouschallengeforinternational
actors.However,examplesfromChadshowthat,whilethis
balancingactmayattimesfail,itcanbeachieved.
EVENWHENGOODLOCALCONTExTANALySIS ISCARRIEDOUTANDTHEHOSTSTATE
IS RESPONSIVE, A LACK OF COMMITMENT FROM LOCAL ACTORS WILL CAUSE LOCAL
PEACEBUILDINGINITIATIVESTOFAIL
conflict trends I 21
dianaFelixdaCostaisanIndependentResearcherworking on issues related to local-level peace-buildingandcommunitydevelopment,andhybridpolitical orders in post-conflict states. Shehas conducted research in South Sudan, Chad,Mozambique,HaitiandTimor-Leste.
John Karlsrud is a Research Fellow at theNorwegianInstituteofInternationalaffairs(NUPI)andaPhdcandidateattheUniversityofWarwick.
Endnotes1 Inthisarticle,peacebuildingisunderstoodbroadlyasefforts
“toidentifyandsupportstructuresthatwilltendtostrengthenandsolidifypeaceinordertoavoidarelapseintoconflict”[Boutros-Ghali,Boutros(1992)An Agenda for Peace.UNdocu-mentA/47/277-S/24111(17June1992)].Itwillusetheterm‘peacebuilders’forthecivilianstaffthatworkinpeacekeepingandpeacebuildingoperations,withtasksintendedtoreducethefragilityofstatesravagedbyconflictandstrengthentheirresilienceagainstarelapseofconflict.
2 FelixdaCosta,D.andKarlsrud,J.(2010)ARoleforCivilAffairsinCommunityConflictResolution?MINURCAT’sIntercommunityDialogueStrategyinEasternChad.Humanitarian Exchange Magazine,48(October2010);HumanitarianPracticeNetwork,ODI,London;Autessere,S.(2010)The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding.Newyork:BarnardCollege,ColumbiaUniversity.
3 Karlsrud,J.andPiccolino,G.(forthcoming)WitheringConsent,butMutualDependency:UNPeaceOperationsandNewAfricanAssertiveness.Conflict, Security and Development, 11(4).
4 Thisarticlewillfocusonearlypeacebuildingactivitieswithinpeacekeepingoperations,asdefinedbytheSecretaryGeneralinhisopeningremarksoftheSecurityCouncildiscussiononpeacebuilding,13October2010,wherehestressedthatpeace-keepingmissionsshouldbeenabled“tohaveanimpactas‘earlypeacebuilders’”[UN(2010)‘AsSecurityCouncilWeighsMeasurestoStrengthenPeacebuilding,Secretary-GeneralStressesRapidDeploymentofTrainedStaff,PredictableFinancing,Women’sInput’,pressrelease,Availableat:<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sgsm13181.doc.htm>Accessedon:28October2010].See,forexample,Paris,R.(2004)At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress;Richmond,OliverP.(2006)TheProblemofPeace:Understandingthe‘LiberalPeace’.Conflict, Security and Development, 6(3),pp.291–314;andChandler,David(2006)Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-building.London,AnnArbor:PlutoPress.
5 Paris,R.(2010)SavingLiberalPeacebuilding.Review of International Studies,36(2),pp.337–365.
6 Clapham,C.(1996)BeingPeacekept.InFurley,O.andMay,R.(eds)Peacekeeping in Africa.Surrey:Ashgate,pp.303–319(p.306).
7 Boege,V.,Brown,A.,Clements,K.andNolan,A.(2008)On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the Context of ‘Fragility’. Berlin:BerghofResearchCenter,Availableat:<http://www.berghofhandbook.net/uploads/download/boege_etal_handbook.pdf>.
8 Reich,H.(2006)‘Local Ownership’ in Conflict Transformation Projects – Partnership, Participation or Patronage? BerghofOccasionalArticleNo.27(September2006),BerghofResearch
CenterforConstructiveConflictManagement,Availableat:<http://www.berghof-center.org/uploads/download/boc27e.pdf>.
9 Boege,V.etal.(2008)op.cit.,p.6.
10 SeeUnitedNationsDPKO(2008)Policy Directive: Civil Affairs.DepartmentofPeacekeepingOperationsandDepartmentofFieldSupport(April2008),Availableat:<http://www.undg.org/docs/8915/Civil-Affairs-Policy.pdf;UnitedNations(2008)United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (The Capstone Doctrine)>.DepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations,Newyork:UnitedNations,Availableat:<http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdfandMINURCAT’sICDStrategy>.
11 TheassessmentsinthissectionarebasedonfieldresearchundertakenbyDianaFelixdaCostainAugust2009,aswellasJohnKarlsrud’sworkinChadwithMINURCATasaSpecialAssistanttotheSRSGbetweenAugust2008andJanuary2010,andstrategicplannerfromJuly2009toFebruary2010.
12 UnitedNationsDPKO(2008)op.cit.
13 BBC(2011)‘Chad’sPresidentIdrissDebyRe-electedAmidBoycott’,10May2011,Availableat:<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13342664.
14 PowershiftedfromsouthtonorthinthelateseventiesafterPresidentTombalbayewaskilledinacoupin1975.Subsequently,ChadwasledbyamilitaryjuntaunderthecommandofthesouthernGeneralFélixMalloumuntil1979,whenNigeriaandtheOrganizationofAfricanUnitybrokeredtheLagosAccordthatestablishedanewnorthern-dominatedgovernment.Sincethen,powerhasshiftedhandsseveraltimes,buthasremainedamongthetribesfromthenorth.
15 Clapham,C.(1996)op.cit.,p.308.
16 Oneoftheauthors,JohnKarlsrud,waspartofthemission,wheretheSRSGandhisteamvisitedAmleyuna,Gaga,Farchana,HadjerHadidandAbecheineasternChadon12and13January2010.
17 Boege,V.etal(2008)op.cit.,p.6.
18 Pawlitzky,C.,Jánszky,B.,Behrends,A.andReyna,S.(2008)‘Sources of Violence, Conflict Mediation and Reconciliation: A Socio-anthropological Study on Dar Sila’, July2008,Availableat:<http://minurcat.unmissions.org/Portals/MINURCAT/English_final_revised.pdf>.
19 Pouligny,B.(2004)CivilSocietyandPost-conflictPeacebuilding:AmbiguitiesofInternationalProgrammesAimedatBuilding‘New’Societies.PaperpresentedattheconferencePost-conflictPeacebuilding:HowtoGainSustainablePeace?LessonsLearntandFutureChallenges, GraduateInstituteofInternationalStudiesGeneva,11–14October2004,Availableat:<http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/cherlist/pouligny/111004.pdf,p.12>.
20 UN(2008)The Capstone Doctrine;UN(2009)Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, UNdocument(A/63/881-S/2009/304,Newyork:UnitedNations;andGuéhenno,J.M.etal.(2011)‘Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict: Independent Report of the Senior Advisory Group’,Availableat:<http://civcapreview.org>,Accessedon26August2011.
21 FelixdaCosta,D.andKarlsrud,J.(2010)op.cit.
22 Kalyvas,S.N.(2006)The Logic of Violence in Civil War.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
22 I conflict trends
violenCe in liberia: Falling between PeaCebuilding and PeaCekeePingByJENNIFERM.HazEN
The peacekeeping burden has grown substantially
overthepastdecade.ThebudgetforUnitedNations(UN)
peacekeepingin2010–2011stoodatUS$7.83billion.1The
expansion of peacekeeping has resulted from both an
increaseinthenumberofcivilwarsthathaveended(and
thereforethenumberofpeacekeepingmissionsdeployed),
andtheexpandingnatureofpeacekeepingmandates.The
shift from traditional peacekeeping, aimed at providing
a buffer between warring factions, to multidimensional
peacekeeping,whichnowencompassesmanyadditional
tasks, has stretched the capacity of peacekeepers to
respond to the challengesofpost-conflict environments.
It has also raised important questions about the role of
peacekeepersinpeacebuildingactivities.AlthoughtheUN
isstill in theprocessof clearlydelineating the tasksand
responsibilities of peacekeeping versus peacebuilding,
there is growing consensus that peacekeepers, although
ill-equippedtobelong-termpeacebuilders,cancontribute
toearlypeacebuilding.2This contribution largelycentres
on providing a secure environment in which others can
implementpeacebuildingtasks.
Whencivilwarsend throughnegotiated settlements,
attention often shifts to how best to prevent a return to
conflict.Peacekeepingprovidesasecurityumbrellaunder
whichpartiescanimplementpeaceagreementsandwhere
peacebuildingcan takeplace.This isnecessary, aspost-
conflictcountriesoftenlackthecapacitytocarryoutbasic
UN
PH
OT
O/S
TAT
ON
WIN
TE
R
above:Peacekeepingprovidesasecurityumbrellaunderwhich parties can implement peace agreements andwherepeacebuildingcantakeplace.
conflict trends I 23
governance functions, such as providing law and order,
crimepreventionandbasic security.AUNpeacekeeping
presenceprovidesthebasisforpeacebuildingbydeterring
the largest threats to the peace – often through a focus
on the belligerent parties – and providing security more
generally. Peacebuilding, by contrast, “entails a range
of activities aimed at making peace self-sustaining and
reducing the risk of relapse into conflict”, and always
continues beyond the departure of the peacekeeping
mission.3Thetwoprocessesareimportantforthetransition
ofapost-conflictcountryfromfragiletostable.However,
theyareinsufficientwithoutathirdprocess:statebuilding.4
Statebuilding is “an endogenous process to enhance
capacity,institutions,andlegitimacyofthestate”toenable
theemergenceofa“capable,accountable,andresponsive
state”.5Whilebuildinginstitutionalcapacityandlegitimacy
aretheresponsibilityofastateanditspopulation,andnot
somethingthatcanbeimposedbyexternalactors,thisdoes
notprecludearoleforinternationalactors.
Liberia exemplifies the challenge of ensuring
statebuilding is not forgotten. Reports from the UN
Peacekeeping Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) over the past
severalyearsindicatethesituationinLiberiais“generally
stable” with no evidence of a return to war at hand.
Peacekeepinghasbeensuccessfulinprovidinganenabling
environmentforthenationalpeaceprocess.However,nearly
eightyearsafter theendof thewar, thecountry remains
“fragile”.UNMILhasyettohandoverfullresponsibilityfor
securitytonationalauthorities.Widespreadreportsofarmed
robbery, rape and mob violence continue to undermine
public perceptions of security. A 2009 special report on
Liberia’sprogressonachievingspecificbenchmarksstated:
“Liberiaisfarfromattaininga‘steadystateofsecurity’.”6
Concerns about a growing regional drug trade, poorly
reintegrated ex-combatants, widespread corruption and
limitedeconomicopportunitiessuggestthat,whileUNMIL
providesadeterrenttoareturntowar,thepervasivenature
of localisedviolenceandcrimemaydomoredamage to
prospectsforsecurityanddevelopmentinLiberiainthelong
run.Preventingthisfromhappeningisachallengeforboth
peacekeepingandpeacebuilding,butcanonlybeaddressed
throughstatebuilding.
Widespreadreportsofarmedrobbery,rapeandmobviolencecontinuetounderminepublicperceptionsofsecurityinLiberia.
RE
UT
ER
S/T
HE
BIG
GE
RP
ICT
UR
E
24 I conflict trends
InMonrovia,mostresidentsfeelunsafeintheirneighbourhoodsandhavefearsthatsomeoneintheirhouseholdswillbecomeavictimofcrime.
Understanding the situation inLiberia today requiresacknowledging the starting point of post-conflict efforts.Afternearly14yearsofcivilwar:
LiberiawasacompletelyfailedState,withthreewarringfactionscontrollingdifferentpartsofMonroviaandtheinterior.Thealreadylimitedinfrastructurelayinruins,athirdofthecountry’spopulationhadbeendisplaced,andthepublicsectorhadcompletelycollapsed.Thenationalarmy and the police had disintegrated into variousfactions,andwhatremainedofthesecuritysectorwasdominated by a proliferation of agencies created bysuccessive regimes to persecute political opponents;the justice system had completely broken down;and criminal economic exchange, dominated by theillegalexploitationofnaturalresources,wasthriving.7
LiberianpresidentEllenJohnsonSirleafcalledthisstartingpoint“theabyss”andemphasisedtheenormouschallengesfacing thecountry– the“landofa thousandpriorities”.8Everything–fromsecurityforcestogovernmentinstitutionsand economic activities to social relations – had to berebuilt from a limited foundation. However, while mostinstitutionsdidnotfunctioninlate2003,neitherwasthereablankslateuponwhichtobuild.Liberiafacedahistoryofconflict,grievances,ethnicdivisions,discriminatorypolicies
andinstitutionallegacies,whichwereexacerbatedbyboththewarandthepeaceprocess.Thus, itwasnotamatterofrebuildingadilapidatedstatebut, infact,creatingnewstate institutions thataddressed this legacyandavoidedreifyingtheconditionsthatledtowarinthefirstplace.Thishighlightsanimportant intersectionofpeacebuildingandstatebuildingefforts:statebuildingaimstocreateeffectivegoverninginstitutions,whilepeacebuildingaimstoensurethoseinstitutionsdonotre-createpastcleavagesorincreasethelikelihoodoffutureconflict.
‘No security without development, no development
withoutsecurity’isaphrasecommonlyheard.Butwarisnot
theonlythreattodevelopment.Oftentimes,violencedoes
notendwiththesignaturesonapeaceagreement.Instead,
violenceofvaryingtypes–criminal,political,communal–
continues in thepost-conflictperiod.Thisviolence isnot
theresultofareturntowar.Instead,itiscommoncriminal
andinterpersonalviolenceenabledbylimitedstatecapacity
toensure lawandorder.Theendofwar isnoguarantee
of either security or development. In fact, the two are
often linked. Weak state institutions and poor economic
opportunitiesprovideanenvironmentconducivetocrime
and violence. At the same time, violence and crime can
RE
UT
ER
S/T
HE
BIG
GE
RP
ICT
UR
E
conflict trends I 25
UN
PH
OT
O/M
NO
VIC
KI
Ex-combatantsandthelargepopulationofunemployedyouthareoftenblamedforthewidespreadcrimeinLiberia.
deterinvestment,reduceeconomicopportunities,weaken
governanceandreducepopularconfidenceingovernment,
therebyhindering–orevendelaying–development.Crime
and interpersonalviolencetaketheir tolloncommunities
andonrecoveringeconomies, impedingprogressinboth
securityanddevelopment.TheWorldDevelopmentReport
2011 identifies insecurity as “a primary development
challenge”.9Animportantprimarysteptostatebuildingis
“securingphysical controlovera territory”10 –while the
UNhasestablishedabroadsecurityblanketagainstlarge
threats,theLiberiangovernmenthasnotyetachievedthe
most basic of state functions: providing security to the
population. This suggests that addressing post-conflict
violence requires linkingpeacekeepingandstatebuilding
moreclosely.Peacekeepingcanprovidetemporarysecurity,
butonlystatebuildingcanproducelong-termsecurity.
Theprimaryroleofpeacekeepingistoprovideasecure
environment. As such, peacekeeping efforts have come
to entail certain expected elements, such as providing
a deterrent force to renewed war, supporting national
authorities to provide basic security, supporting the
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of
ex-combatants,andsupportingthereformofstatesecurity
forces(SSR)–suchasthepoliceandthemilitary–toenable
them to takeon the responsibility forprovidingnational
securityindependentofexternalsupport.11Intheirsecurity
role,peacekeepers tend to focuson themostvisibleand
most obvious threats to peace: the belligerent factions.
While it is important to focus on the most dangerous
threats–thosewhoaremostlikelytospoilthepeaceand
renewthewar–thiscanoftenleavelow-levelbutperhaps
moreinsidiousviolenceunchecked.Althoughthisviolence
rarelythreatenstheoverallpeaceprocess,itdoesthreaten
the prospects for human security and development, and
handicaps peacebuilding efforts. Large security threats
remainthepurviewofpeacekeepers,butcommoncrimeis
oftenlefttoanationalpoliceforcewithlimitedcapacityand
resourcestorespond.
Liberia’s situation illustrates the challengewell.Over
the past few years, every UN Secretary General’s report
onLiberiahas listed thekeysecurity concernsasarmed
robbery,rapeandmobviolence.Thereportsalsohighlight
theinabilityoftheLiberianpolicetorespondtorisingcrime
ratesandemphasisethatpeaceandstabilityrestmainlyon
thesecurityprovidedbyUNpeacekeepers(bothmilitaryand
police),andthatanydrawdownoftheforcelevelsshould
becarefullyconsideredinlightofthepersistentdeficiencies
withintheLiberiansecuritysector.12Onechallengeissimply
26 I conflict trends
to understand the dynamics of violence and crime on
theground.
AlthoughUNreportscommonlyciteahigh incidence
ofcrime,thedataavailableoncrimeandviolenceremains
inadequate to provide solid evidence of rates of specific
crimes, or even whether the general trend is improving.
UNMILoriginallycollectedthisdataintheearlyyearsofthe
peacekeepingmission,becausetheLiberianpolice lacked
the capacity todoso.However, thequalityof thedata –
andeventhenumberofcategoriesofcrimes–variedover
time,largelydependingonthosetaskedwithcollectingthe
inputs.Thishasmade itdifficult tocomparedataacross
years.13TheLiberianNationalPolice(LNP)havenowputin
placeasystemtocollectcrimestatistics.Allpolicestations
aresupposedtoreportcrimesonaregularbasisusinga
standardform,toensurethecomparabilityofdataacross
regionsofthecountry.Currentreportingvaries–and,given
thedifficultyofdeployingpolice forcesoutsideofmajor
towns,itisunlikelythatthedataiscomplete.However,ifthe
LNPstatisticsonviolentcrimereportedin2009and2010are
takenasindicative,themainviolentcrimesincludedrobbery
(armedandunarmed),assault(aggravatedandsimple)and
rape,andthegeneraltrendhasbeenanincreaseinthese
andotherviolentcrimes.14Thishelpstoexplainwhyboth
theUNand theLNPcontinue toexpress concernsabout
violenceandcrime.
Bycontrast, thepopulation is increasingly concerned
aboutdevelopmentissues.15In2010,whenaskedabouttheir
mostseriousconcerns,respondentsfocusedoncleanwater,
healthcare,education, transportation,sanitation,housing
and electricity, while very few mentioned the security
situation.Roughlytwo-thirdsoftherespondentsreported
feelingsaferin2010thanin2009(12monthsprior).Thisisa
significantchangefroma2008assessment,whichfoundthat
“mostLiberiansfelttheirsecuritywasmoreprecariousthan
atanytimesincethewarended”.16However,the2010survey
resultssuggestastarkcontrastbetweenMonroviaandthe
counties.InMonrovia,lessthanhalfoftherespondentsfelt
safeintheirneighbourhoods,comparedto83%feelingsafe
orverysafe in their communities in thecounties.Nearly
two-thirdsofrespondentsinMonroviaexpressedfearthat
someoneintheirhouseholdwouldbecomeavictimofcrime,
whereasonlyone-thirdexpressedthisfearinthecounties.
Themostcommonlycitedconcernsmirroredthosereported
bytheUNandLNP:robbery,assaultandviolenceagainst
women.Althoughatpresentthepopulationismostvocal
about development needs, feelings of insecurity clearly
lingerwithinthepopulation.
Concerns also persist about ex-combatants and the
largepopulationofunemployedyouth.Intheearlyyearsof
peacebuilding,‘ex-combatants’servedaseasyscapegoats
foranythingthatwentwrong.Thelabel,althoughlessused
now,iscommonlyheardalongside‘criminal’and‘youth’to
describeperpetrators.Ex-combatantsremainthefocusof
discussionsoftheillegaloccupationofrubberplantations
and the prevalence of motorcycle taxi unions, whereas
unemployedyouthareoftenblamedforwidespreadcrime.
Thesolutiontoconcernsaboutcrimeandviolenceiswidely
expected to come from economic improvement through
development, with attention focused on the presumed
underlyingcauseofcrime:lackofeconomicopportunities.17
yetjobsareunlikelytocomeavailablequicklyorinsufficient
numbers,leavingthepotentialforcrimetofester,criminal
organisations to develop firmer roots in the economy,
and the past criminal war economy to transform into a
criminalised peace economy. This suggests that waiting
for thesituation togetbetteron itsownas theeconomy
growsandinstitutionsdevelopisnotthebestsolution,but
thatmoreneedstobedoneonthesecuritysidetoenhance
policecapacity,bothtodetercrimeandpunishcrimesthat
dotakeplace.
Shouldapeacekeepingforceberesponsiblefortaming
non-conflictpost-conflictviolence?UNpeacekeepershave
been tasked with protecting civilians under imminent
threatofphysicalviolence,supportingnationalefforts to
establishasecureenvironmentforphysicalsafetyandthe
protectionofrights,andtakingdeterrentactiontodecrease
levelsofviolenceandcrime.18Giventhis,itisnotastretch
to argue that more attention should be paid to reducing
levelsofviolenceandcrime,andthatsucheffortsfallwithin
apeacekeepingmandate.Unfortunately, thereexists little
agreementonwhatprotectionmeans,anditisnotalways
cleartoUNtroopsandpolicewhatisexpectedfromthem.19
UNMIL,throughformedpoliceunits,backstopstheLNPand
aUnitedNationspoliceofficerofUNMILtrainsaLiberianNationalPolicerecruitonarrestprocedure.
UN
PH
OT
O/C
HR
IST
OP
HE
RH
ER
WIG
conflict trends I 27
respondstoincidentsthepoliceproveunabletohandle.This
isimportant,andhasaidedinimprovingpopularconfidence
in the security forces. However, responding to major
episodesofunrestisnotthesameasrespondingtosystemic
andfrequentincidentsofcriminalviolence.Mostofthese
incidentsoccurinLiberiawithoutresponse,investigation,or
oftentimesevenreporting.
The2003peaceagreementprovidedforthedisbanding
of the Liberian police and the complete reconstruction
of the force. UNMIL is mandated to assist the Liberian
government inmonitoring, trainingandrestructuring the
policeforce.Thishasprovenadifficulttask.Giventhatthe
startingpointwaszero,UNMILfocusedinitiallyonsimply
increasingthenumbersintheranks.However,thisapproach
didnottranslateintoensuringaqualitypoliceforce.20Initial
monetarysupportforUNMIL’sroleintrainingthepolicewas
limited,leavingUNMILhavingto“begforessentialfacilities
andequipment”neededtoimplementitsmandate.21Funding
forpolice reform improved,but remaineduncoordinated
andpiecemeal.The result isnotsurprising.AJune2009
UNreviewoftheLNPprovided“asoberingassessment…
characterizingtheforceasineffectual”.22Whilemanyfactors
havecontributedtothepoorqualityoftheLNP,thereport
highlightedthe“shortcomingsinthetrainingandmentoring
thatUNMILpoliceadvisersareproviding”andthelackof
donorsupport.23Lawandorderclearlystandoutaspriorities
for2011.
Criminal violence is not a problem that either
peacekeepersorpeacebuildersalonecansolve.Improving
securityrequiresmorethanjustgoodpolicing.Addressing
widespread crime and violence requires a competent
nationalpolice force,modern laws,aneffective judiciary
systemandpropercorrectionalfacilities.Theseareprimarily
statebuildingtasks.Improvingpolicecapacitytoinvestigate
crimes and arrest perpetrators does little to provide a
deterrentorimprovepopularconfidenceinthegovernment
whenthosesameperpetratorsareoftenreleasedduetothe
dysfunctionofthejudicialsystem,orsimplyescapefrom
prison.Improvingsecuritywillalsorequireaddressingthe
underlyingfactorsthatenable,andevenencourage,crime
andviolence–includingunemployment,poverty,corruption
andeconomicincentivesforviolence.
Peacekeeping addresses large security challenges.
Peacebuildingaddresses the root causesof conflict, and
TheLiberiangovernmentneedstoassumeresponsibilityforthesecurityofthecountrybyreformingtheLiberianNationalPoliceandimprovingtheircapacitytoprovidelawandorder.
UN
PH
OT
O/C
HR
IST
OP
HE
RH
ER
WIG
28 I conflict trends
aimstoimproveconflictmanagementwithingovernment
andsociety.Bothsetsofactivities focusonpreventinga
returntowar.Butneitherfocusesdirectlyonstatebuilding.
Peacekeepers have mandates to assist and support
statebuildingefforts,justaspeacebuildersstrivetoensure
statebuilding efforts are conflict-sensitive; but what is
neededto fill thegap isactualstatebuilding.These tasks
havebeenlefttowar-torngovernmentswithlimitedcapacity
andmeanstoachievethem.Inpart,thishasresultedfrom
national concerns about sovereignty – and, at times, at
thebehestofnationalgovernmentswantingtopavetheir
futuresthemselves,ratherthansimplyrespondtodictates
fromtheinternationaldonorcommunity.Italsostemsfrom
agrowingrecognitionamongdonorsthatstatebuildingisa
nationaltask–onethatcanbesupportedbutnotimposed
from outside. Both are admirable notions, but neither
ensuressecurityinapost-conflictcountry.
The most fundamental building block – a necessary
condition for both peacebuilding and statebuilding – is
security. The UN can provide security, especially early
in the lifeof apeacekeepingmission,whengovernment
capacity toensure lawandorder is limited.However, the
bluesecurityblanketofUNpeacekeepingisnoreplacement
forimprovinganationalgovernment’scapacitytoaddress
securitychallenges. Inmid-2009,PresidentEllenJohnson
Sirleaf admitted that police reform was off track.24
Reportingin2011suggeststhatsignificantimprovements
haveyettobemade.IftheLiberiangovernmentistotake
responsibilityforthesecurityofthecountryfollowingthe
October2011elections,thensignificantprogressneedsto
bemade inbuilding institutionalcapacity,andreforming
thepoliceandimprovingtheircapacitytoprovidelawand
order.Thiswillrequirebettertraining–somethingtheUN
admitshasnotbeenadequatethroughUNMIL25–andbetter
funding–somethingthatdonorswillneedtoputforward.
Ultimately,reducinginsecurityrequiresabettercoordination
ofpeacekeepingandpeacebuildingandamoreproactive
approachtowardsstatebuilding.
Criminalandinterpersonalviolenceremainawidespread
probleminLiberia–onetheLNParenotyetabletohandle,
and one the UN has proven unwilling to address more
directly.Certainlythechallengeisanationalone,but the
internationalcommunitycandomoretoaidthegovernment
in pushing statebuilding efforts forward. Leaving these
problems to the government, and therefore deferring
addressingthemuntilpoliceinstitutionsarestrongerand
governmentcapacityisrebuilt–aprocessPresidentSirleaf
hasstatedwilltakeatleast20years–providestimeforcrime
andviolencetogrow.This,inturn,hamperseffortstoward
encouragingdevelopmentandimprovingsecurity.Passing
thebucknowonlycreateslargerproblemsdowntheroad.
dr Jennifer M. Hazen is a Research Fellow andLecturerattheLydonB.JohnsonSchoolofPublicaffairsattheUniversityofTexasataustin,USa.
Endnotes
1 UnitedNationswebsite,Availableat:<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml>Accessedon:22June2011.
2 Hazen,JenniferM.(2007)CanPeacekeepersBePeacebuilders?International Peacekeeping,14(13),pp.1–16.TheUNstatedasimilarargumentin2009–seeUNGeneralAssembly(2009)Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations,UNdocumentA/64/573(22December2009),pp.7–8.
3 DPKO/DFS(2010)Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Clarifying the Nexus,workingpaper.
4 SeeParis,RolandandSisk,TimothyD.(2009)Introduction:UnderstandingtheContradictionsofPostwarStatebuilding.InParis,RolandandSisk,TimothyD.(eds)The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations.Newyork:Routledge,pp.1–20.
5 OECD(2011)Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance.Paris:OECDPublishing,pp.20–22.
6 UNSecurityCouncil(2009)SpecialReportoftheSecretary-GeneralontheUnitedNationsMissioninLiberia,UNdocumentS/2009/299(10June2009),pp.8,10.
7 Ibid.,p.2.
8 JohnsonSirleaf,Ellen(2011)‘Liberia:TheChallengesofPost-warReconstruction–TheLiberianExperience’.SpeechdeliveredattheRoyalInstituteofInternationalAffairs(ChathamHouse),13June.
9 TheWorldBank(2011)World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development.Washington,DC:TheWorldBank,p.1.
10 OECD(2011)op.cit.,p.42.
11 UNDocumentA/64/573,p.7.
12 SeeUNDocumentS/2009/299,p.3.
13 AuthorviewedtheUNMILcrimestatisticsdatafor2004–2007.
14 StatisticsarereportedinSmallArmsSurvey(forthcoming2011)Crime and Victimization in Liberia.LiberiaArmedViolenceAssessment,IssueBrief2.Geneva:SmallArmsSurvey.
15 ThisparagraphisbasedondatafromtheSmallArmsSurvey(availableat:<www.smallarmssurvey.org>)collectedduringanationwidesurveyofpublicperceptionsaboutsecurityinLiberiainearly2010.Theresultsofthestudywillbereleasedinaseriesofbriefingpapers.IssueBrief1,Perceptions of Security in Post-war Liberia,andIssueBrief2,Crime and Victimization in Liberia,shouldbeavailableinAugust2011.
16 InternationalCrisisGroup(2009)Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform.Brussels:ICG,AfricaReportno.148,p.19.
17 TheLiberianPovertyReductionStrategylinkselevatedratesofcrimeto“highunemploymentamongex-combatantsandex-servicemen”.RepublicofLiberia(2008)Poverty Reduction Strategy.Monrovia:GovernmentofLiberia,April2008,p.53.
18 UNDocumentA/64/573,p.5.
19 Williams,PaulD.(2010)Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa,ACSSResearchPaperNo.1.Washington,DC:NationalDefenseUniversityPress,pp.14–15.
20 SeeMalan,Mark(2008)Security Sector Reform in Liberia: Mixed Results from Humble Beginnings.Carlisle,PA:USArmyWarCollege,StrategicStudiesInstitute,pp.46–66.
21 Ibid.,p.66.
22 UNDocumentS/2009/299,p.7.
23 Ibid.,p.7.
24 Ibid,p.8.
25 Ibid,pp.7,13,17.
conflict trends I 29
On9July2011,SouthSudandeclareditsindepend-
ence from Sudan, marking the formal end of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). While many
disputedissuesbetweenthepartiesremainunresolved,
oneofthemainchallengesfacingthenewUnitedNations
Mission in theRepublicofSouthSudan (UNMISS)will
be the prevalence of South-South conflicts. Some of
theseconflictsaredirectlylinkedtotheconflictbetween
theNorthand theSouth,butmostarerooted in tribal,
ethnicandpoliticaldifferenceswithintheSouth.These
conflictsarelikelytoincreaseinthepost-CPAperiodasa
resultofpoliticalpowerstruggles,resourcecompetition,
armed insurgencies, redrawing of internal borders,
resurfacing of ethno-political tensions, cattle rustling,
armsproliferation,lackofpeacedividendsandthereturn
ofrefugeesandinternallydisplacedpersons(IDPs).
UN multidimensional peacekeeping operations,
commonlydescribedasearlypeacebuilders,playakey
role inpost-conflictpeacebuilding. In thisprocess, the
integration of peacebuilding at the macro (national)
and micro (local) levels is increasingly recognised as
adeterminantofsuccess.1Thus, inviewof theconflict
dynamics in South Sudan, local peacebuilding has
the un Mission and loCal ChurChes in south sudan: oPPortunities For PartnershiPs in loCal PeaCebuildingByINGRIdMaRIEBREIdLIdANDaNdREaSØIENSTENSLaNd
above:On9July2011,SouthSudandeclared its in-dependence from Sudan, marking the formal end oftheComprehensivePeaceagreement.OneofthemainchallengesfacingthenewUNMISSwillbetheprevalenceofSouth-Southconflicts.
RE
UT
ER
S/T
HE
BIG
GE
RP
ICT
UR
E
30 I conflict trends30 I conflict trends
emerged as a vital task for the United Nations (UN)
peacekeepingmission2.However,therecent UNMission
in Sudan (UNMIS) and partners have a mixed record
whenitcomestolocalpeacebuilding.
In recent years, scholars and practitioners have
expressedincreasinginterestinthepotentialofreligious
actorsinpeacemaking.3SouthSudanesechurchesplayed
an important role in peace processes during the civil
war,andwere instrumental inbridging intercommunal
differences and uniting different ethnic and political
groupsintheSouth.Whiletheroleofthechurchesinlocal
peacebuilding has diminished, they still have many of
thefeaturesthatcontributedtotheirhistoricalsuccess–
including their presence in rural areas, indigenous
knowledgeandlocallegitimacy.
ThispaperthereforearguesthatthenewUNmission
would benefit from partnering with local churches to
improve the impact of local peacebuilding initiatives
in South Sudan. To this end, it
explores the approaches to local
peacebuilding applied by UNMIS
and the loca l churches . The
overall objective is to identify the
comparative advantages of both
actors,anddiscusschallengesand
opportunitiesforsynergiesinlocal
peacebuilding.4
UNMIS’sRoleinPeacebuilding
andConflictManagement
UNMIS was authorised under
UN Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1590 to support the
signatoryparties, theGovernment
of Sudan and the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement (SPLM) in
implementing the CPA5. Similar
to the new mission, UNMIS was
a m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l m i s s i o n
comprising civil ian, police and
m i l i t a r y c o m p o n e n t s u n d e r
the leadership of the Special
Representative of the Secretary
General. The mission, with its
headquarters in Khartoum and
Juba (regional),waspresent inall
10 states of South Sudan. In the
capacity of being an integrated
miss ion , UNMIS was fur ther
expectedtocoordinateandengage
in joint planning with the UN
CountryTeamtoconsolidatepeace.
Whi le the overa l l pol i t ica l
mandateandpriorityofthemission
wastosupportCPAimplementation
– sometimes at the cost of local conflict management
init iat ives – the mission leadership increasingly
acknowledged the importance of integrating national
andlocal-levelpeacebuilding.Theescalationofviolent
conflictsontheground,althoughnotnecessarilylinked
to any of the CPA parties, further resulted in calls for
enhanced efforts to prevent and resolve local-level
conflicts.
The Civil Affairs Division (CAD) of UNMIS was
directly mandated to support the authorities and local
communities in areas related to local peacebuilding –
including conflict management and reconciliation,
political analysis, and support to political space and
governance structures at the sub-national level.6 This
entailedsupporttopeaceandreconciliationinitiativesat
the local level, incoordinationwiththeGovernmentof
SouthSudan(GoSS),stateandlocal-levelauthoritiesand
traditionalleaders.
Abu Zabad
Ed Da‘ein
Halfa alGadida
KKHHAARRTTOOUUMM
Buram
Dongola
Halaib
Kapoeta
Karima
MuhammadQol
Nagishot
Radom
Selima Oasis Salala
Suakin
Yei
Haiya
Kerma
Maridi
Sodiri
Laqiya Arba‘in
Muglad
Nukheila
El‘Atrun
Miski
Karora
Shendi
Abu ‘Uruq
Kafia Kingi
Tullus
Abu Zabad
KologiTalodi
En Nahud
Umm Badr
Renk
KigilleRaga
LiYubu
FathaiAkobo
UkwaaTowot
Famaka
Gonder
Omdurman Halfa alGadida
GadamaiAtbara
Tokar
Abu Hamed
Paloich
Ed Da‘ein
Abyei
Wadi Halfa
Amadi
Merowe
Kosti
Nyala
ToritYambio Juba
Bentiu
Al FasherEl Geneina
Wau
El Obeid
Malakal
Al Fula
Sinnar
Rumbek
Ed Damer
Wad Medani
Port Sudan
Gedaref
Kassala
Aweil
Kadugli
Bor
Ed Damazin
Adis Abeba(Addis Ababa)
Khartoum Asmara
Jebe
l Aby
ad P
late
auJe
bel N
agashush
Qoz
Ab
u Dulu
Administrativeboundary
Da r H a m i d
N u b i a n
D e s e r t
Administrativeboundary
Semna WestKumma
Meroë
Old Dongola
Li
by
an
D
es
er
t
Nuba Mts.
S u
d d
Abay
Pibor
Pongo
Victoria Nile
Wadi e l Milk
Bahr el'Arab
LolJur
Albe
rt Ni
le
Omo
Dinder
Sobat
R E D S E A
Wadi H
owar
Jong
lei C
anal
Wad
i Odi
b
Nile
Abay (Blue Nile)
LotagipiSwamp
LakeNubia
LakeNasser
L. Albert L. Salisbury
L. Turkana(L. Rudolf)
Ch'ew Bahir
L. Kyoga
KenamukeSwamp
T'anaHayk'
KobowenSwamp
Tekeze
White
Nile
Bahr
ez Z
araf
White Nile
Atbara
NORTHERNDARFUR
WESTERNDARFUR
SOUTHERN DARFUR
UPPER
NILE
BLUE
NILE
WHITENILE
NILE
JONGLEI
EASTERNEQUATORIA
CENTRALEQUATORIA
WESTERNEQUATORIA
WESTERN
BAHR
EL GHAZAL
NORTHERN BAHREL GHAZAL
KHARTOUM
R E D S E A
N O R T H E R N
NORTHERNKORDOFAN
SOUTHERN KORDOFAN
UNITY
WARRAB
LAKES
KASSALA
GEDAREF
SENNARSENNAR
El GEZIRA
K E N Y A
U G A N D A
E G Y P T
C H A D
CENTRALAFRICAN
REPUBLIC
SAUDI ARABIA
E T H I O P I A
ERITREA
DEMOCRATICREPUBLIC OFTHE CONGO
S O U T H S U D A N
National capitalState (wilayah) capitalTownMajor airportInternational boundaryState (wilayah) boundaryMain roadTrackRailroad
1000 200 300 km
0 100 200 mi
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptanceby the United Nations.
SUDANSOUTH
MapACCORD.SourceUnitedNations.
conflict trends I 31
Strengths of the Mission in Local Peacebuilding and
Conflict Management
UNMIS had several features and capacities that
made it a key player in local-level peacebuilding and
conflictmanagement inSouthSudan.Throughregular
patrolling and interactions with local communities,
the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and local
police, the UN mission was well-placed to develop
soundconflictanalysisandearlywarningmechanisms.
ThepresenceofCADofficersinallofthemission’sfield
officesfacilitatedaccesstogovernment,traditionaland
community leaders,andofferedanopportunity for the
missiontoobtainlocallyinformeddata.CAD’scontextual
knowledge and analysis of the political, security and
conflictdynamicsonthegroundwascommonlyusedto
informandrecommendcoursesofactiontothemission
leadership in efforts to prevent and mitigate conflicts.
This had the potential of making UNMIS a valuable
advisor to the parties and other stakeholders in local
conflicts.
The UN mission also had a strong position and
leverage vis-à-vis GoSS because of its consent-based
presenceandsupporttothepeaceprocess.Particularly
at the top level, theUNwasandstill isperceivedasa
legitimateactor.ThispositionwasvaluablewhentheUN
missioncontributedwithsupport tomediationand the
managementoflocalconflictsthatrequiredinvolvement
from the top level. While UNMIS did not have funds
to implement local peace- and conflict management
projects,7 the mission could make use of its broad
international network, including partnerships with UN
andnon-UNimplementingorganisations,tosupportand
securefundingforlocalpeaceinitiatives.
The mission also had access to valuable logistical
assets,includinghelicoptersandairplanes.Inthecontext
ofSouthSudan,wherethepoorinfrastructureprevents
both government officials and humanitarian agencies
ChristianityisanintegralpartofSouthSudaneseidentity.WomenholdcrossesastheymarchduringtheIndependencedayceremonyinJuba(July2011).
RE
UT
ER
S/T
HE
BIG
GE
RP
ICT
UR
E
32 I conflict trends
UN
PH
OT
O/O
LIVIE
RC
HA
SS
OT
Localchurchesareoftentheonlyindigenousnon-governmentalactorspresentinmanylocalitiesandtheythereforehaveanimportantroletoplayinpeacebuilding.
fromreachingouttocommunities,theseassetsproved
invaluable to the mission’s engagement in conflict
management, and to transport participants to peace
conferencesandcommunityconsultations.
In addit ion to these functions, UNMIS had a
comparativeadvantageoverotheractorsduetoitsability
todeterviolence through thepre-emptivedeployment
oftroops.Whiletheeffectwasshort-lived,theset-upof
temporaryoperationalbasesinJongleiStatein2009is
illustrativeofhowthemerepresenceofUNMIStroops
avertedfurtherclashesbetweentherivaltribes.
Weaknesses of the Mission in Local Peacebuilding and Conflict Management
ThemainconflictmanagementtoolutilisedbyUNMIS
at the local levelwas thesupport toand facilitationof
so-called ‘grassroots’ peace conferences. While these
conferencessought to involveabroadspectrumof the
local community – including chiefs, elders and youth,
aswellaskeypoliticiansandgovernmentauthorities–
the impact of a majority of these initiatives has been
limited. This needs to be seen in relation to the lack
of implementation and follow-up by the relevant
stakeholders.Mostofthesepeaceconferencestendedto
beone-offevents–withtop-downresolutionsimposed
by the government – instead of long-term processes.8
Lackofownershipandcommitmentamong theparties
andlocalstakeholdersresultedinsub-optimalfollow-up–
and,insomecases,allowedactorsatthelocal,stateand
nationalleveltomanipulateandunderminetheprocess.
Lack of presence in and – outreach to – remote
locations further contributed to hamper the mission’s
abilitytopreventandmanagelocalconflictseffectively.
Even though UNMIS had access to helicopters, and
its military component carried out air patrols on a
regularbasis, thetimeonthegroundwaslimited.This
preventedthemissionfrombuildingtrustanddeveloping
networks inremoteareas. Insomecases, thisalsohad
negative implications for the UN mission’s ability to
identifyandinvolverelevantlocalstakeholdersinpeace
initiatives, particularly women with limited access to
these arenas. Instead, UNMIS became too dependent
onthegovernmentauthorities,whonotonlylackedthe
conflict trends I 33
UN
PH
OT
O/T
IMM
CK
ULK
A
SouthSudanesechurchandcivilsocietyleadersmeetandspeakwithHildeJohnson,SpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretary-GeneralandHeadofUNMISS,ataspeciallyconvenedmeetinginJuba,toenableUNMISStobetterservethepeopleofSouthSudan(July2011).
UN
PH
OT
O/T
IMM
CK
ULK
A
necessarylegitimacyontheground,butsometimesalso
hadtheirownvestedinterestsintheconflict.
Indigenous knowledge, or deep insights into the
values and beliefs of the local community, is critical
to identify complex causes and solutions to conflicts.
While local staffmembersarean invaluable sourceof
suchinsights,theytendtobeinshortsupply.Moreover,
theUN,similar tothegovernment, isstillperceivedas
an ‘outsider’andmaystill lack theneeded indigenous
knowledgeandlegitimacyamongthelocalcommunities.
Becauseof itsnon-implementingmandate,theCAD
was totally reliant on UN and non-UN implementing
partners – such as the UN Development Programme
(UNDP)–tosupportsubstantiallyandimplementpeace
initiatives. However, cooperation with these actors
had been weak and ad hoc for a number of reasons –
includingbureaucraticconstraints,divergingmandates
andpriorities,andlimitedflexibility.Hence,muchofthe
conflictmanagementworkof theCADwas reduced to
reporting,advising, logistical supportandmonitoring.
Instead of focusing on measures and initiatives to
prevent conflicts, themission tended tobe reactive in
responsetomass-scaleviolenceorCPAviolations.
ChurchInvolvementinConflictResolutionduring
theCivilWar9
The South Sudanese churches, under the auspices
oftheNewSudanCouncilofChurches(NSCC),cameto
playasignificantrole inpeacebuildingduringthecivil
war,bothatthenationalandlocallevel.10Aspartofthe
NSCC’sPeopletoPeople(P2P)Peacemakingprogramme,
thepeace conferences inAkobo in1994andWunlit in
1999reconciledrivallingtribesandpoliticalfactionsafter
yearsof internecineconflict.TheNSCCalsomobilised
external fundingandsupport through its international
networks.
Followingthesigningof theCPA, thechurches lost
much of their significance in local peacebuilding, due
to both internal and external causes. The problematic
mergeroftheNSCCandtheSudanCouncilofChurches
(SCC)ledstaffmemberstoseekjobsinGoSS,theUNand
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Additionally,
financialmismanagementintheSCCandthenewfocus
onCPAimplementationspurreddonorstoredirecttheir
fundstothenewlegitimategovernmentintheSouth.
Added Value of Churches in Local Peacebuilding Churchesareeagertoengageinlocalpeacebuilding.
Theysee itasoneof theirmainpurposes,andseek to
promotepeacefulcoexistencethroughtheirownlimited
financialmeans.Severalfeaturesoflocalchurchesmake
them well-suited to play an active role in grassroots
peacebuilding.
Christianity is an integral part of South Sudanese
identity, and the legitimacy of the local churches is
strong.During thecivilwar, thechurchesgrewrapidly
as a result of the emergence of local leaders and lay
evangelists, making Christianity accessible to local
notionsofspirituality.Overtime,Christianitybecamea
symboloftheresistanceagainsttheArabIslamistregime
34 I conflict trends
Womenarealreadyactivemembersintheircongregationsandchurchesprovide animportantarenaforstrengtheningthepositionofwomeninlocalpeacebuilding.
in Khartoum. This was, no doubt, augmented by the
factthatlocalchurcheswereamongthefewactorsthat
stayedandsufferedwiththelocalpopulationsduringthe
civilwar.Asaresult,politiciansatthefederal,stateand
locallevelwereattentivetocriticismandpraisefromthe
church.ThiswasseenduringtheKajikoIIconferencein
October2010,wheretheSCCunitedthechurchleaders
in support of the referendum, and held politicians
accountableforlackofservicedelivery.Illustratively,this
wasalsowherePresidentSalvaKiirchosetoannounce
hisamnestytobreakawaySPLAcommandersandmilitia
leaders.
Local churches are often the only indigenous
non-governmental actors present in many localities.
Becausepastorsandchurchleadersliveandworkinrural
townsandvillagesyear-round,theyhavewell-established
networks in local societies. They can disseminate
informationandmessagesofpeaceandreconciliationto
theircongregations.Duringthewar,churchesalsoplayed
an early warning function, relaying information about
conflicts to the international community. Inter-church
committees(ICCs)–localecumenicalforums–serveas
coordinating mechanisms across denominations, and
are a natural entry point for external actors wishing
to engage the local churches. Additionally, presence
in rural areas has given the local churches invaluable
indigenous knowledge – a key factor in the success of
theP2Pconferences.Thefacilitatorsacknowledgedthe
importance of people with various forms of authority
andplacedthemattheheartoftheprocess–including
chiefs, spiritual leaders, women, youth, government
administrators and the military. The use of traditional
practices, combined with Christian rituals, proved a
powerfulcovenant‘binding’thesignatories.
CHURCH REPRESENTATIVES ALSO PLAy A CENTRAL ROLE IN SO-CALLED PEACE
COMMITTEESORPEACECOUNCILS,CREATEDATTHECONFERENCESAND INTENDED
TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE, DEVELOP MEDIATION SKILLS, AND DISSEMINATE AND
IMPLEMENTRESOLUTIONS
RE
UT
ER
S/T
HE
BIG
GE
RP
ICT
UR
E
conflict trends I 35
The ICCs and the i r member churches were
importantpartnersfortheNSCCinfacilitatingtheP2P
peacemaking conferences. The churches consulted
and mobilised local communities and contributed to
thepeacebuilding initiativesbeingongoingprocesses
ratherthanonce-offevents.Becausethechurcheshave
apermanentpresenceinmostcommunities,theyhave
incentivestofollowupresolutionslongafterthepeace
conferencesareover.Churchrepresentativesalsoplay
a central role in so-calledpeace committeesorpeace
councils, created at the conferences and intended
to promote dialogue, develop mediation skills, and
disseminateandimplementresolutions.
Although the local churches have few women in
leadershippositions,womenarecentralmembersoftheir
congregationsandparticipateinarangeofactivities–
includingdomesticconflictresolution,communitywork,
and so on. As women are already active members in
their congregations, churches provide an important
arenaforstrengtheningthepositionofwomeninlocal
peacebuilding.
Limitations of Local ChurchesThe churches are not immune to the weaknesses
thataffectSouthSudanesesocietyatlarge.Corruption
and nepotism are also found within the church
organisations.Further,becausedenominationalborders
oftenfollowethnicandpoliticalcleavages,churchescan
alsobeinvolvedinethnicpolitics.
Following the CPA, church organisations became
f ragmented and s ta r ted focus ing on in te rna l
organisation-specific interests, rather thanecumenical
c o o p e r a t i o n . T h i s w e a k e n e d c o h e s i o n a c r o s s
denominations,andhencetheirability tocooperate in
supportofpeacebuildingactivities.
The brain-drain phenomenon continues to weaken
the capacity of many local churches. Their failure to
meetthecriteriaofdonorshindersaccesstofunding–
and hence their ability to engage effectively in local
peacebuilding.Withoutfunding,theyarealsounableto
providesorelyrequiredtrainingfortheirstaffmembers,
thus perpetuating the low levels of capacity. Several
local churches have given up external fund-raising
altogether. Without increased skills in financial and
projectmanagement,localchurcheswillnotbeableto
escapethisvicious‘capacity-funding’cycle.
ConclusionandRecommendations
UNSCR1996 (2011),mandating thenewmission in
South Sudan (UNMISS), recognises “the importance
of supportingpeacebuildingefforts inorder to lay the
foundationforsustainabledevelopment”and“sustained
cooperationanddialoguewithcivilsocietyinthecontext
of stabilizing the security situation and ensuring the
protection of civilians”. UNMISS envisions a more
decentralised approach, with a focus on reaching the
most vulnerable areas and populations and engaging
local communities in a bottom-up manner. To achieve
these objectives, the mission needs to partner with
local actors already present on the ground. Some
recommendations on how a strengthened partnership
with local churches can contribute to the mission’s
peacebuildingeffortsfollow.
• First,whiletheUNmissionhasastrongposition
vis-á-visthegovernment,itneedstostrengthen
itslegitimacyandoutreachontheground.Tothis
end,localchurchescanfunctionasaninterface
betweenthesecular,modernUNmissionandthe
traditional, spiritually oriented communities in
ruralareas.
• Second, while the UN mission has proven its
ability in developing sound conflict analyses,
these can be strengthened further by tapping
into the indigenous knowledge of the local
churches.Thiswillimprovethemission’sconflict
managementinitiatives,includingearlywarning
mechanisms.
• Third,capacitybuildingof localchurchesisnot
onlyatrade-off– it isalsoanecessaryelement
for the UN mission to succeed in sustainable
local peacebuilding. In addition to its support
to the judiciary, army and local police, the UN
mission and partners could provide capacity
building and the training of local churches in
conflict management and mediation skills as
wellasfund-raisingandfinancialmanagement.
This is imperative ifchurchesaretoescapethe
‘capacity-funding’ cycle.At thesame time,any
WHILE THE ROLE OF THE CHURCHES IN LOCAL PEACEBUILDING HAS DIMINISHED,
THEySTILLHAVEMANyOFTHEFEATURESTHATCONTRIBUTEDTOTHEIRHISTORICAL
SUCCESS–INCLUDINGTHEIRPRESENCEINRURALAREAS,INDIGENOUSKNOWLEDGE
ANDLOCALLEGITIMACy
36 I conflict trends
intervention at the local level in the form of
fundingwillrequiretactandcarefulfollow-upto
avoidcorruptionandrivalryamongthechurches.
• Fourth, the UN mission’s lack of presence
in remote areas – as well as its rather short
attention span, due to numerous mandated
tasks – hampers the mission’s ability to follow
uppeace initiatives thoroughly.Localchurches
makevaluablepartnersduetotheircontinuous
presenceandwell-establishednetworkson the
ground.Whenactingthroughecumenicalforums,
theyalsohavethepotentialtotranscendethnic
identities.
• Fifth,thecrucialroleofwomeninpeacebuilding
is well-recognised in UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR
1820. However, UNMIS was not able to utilise
this potential sufficiently. The reasons for this
arecomplex,andarerelatedtowomen’soverall
marginalisation in South Sudanese society.
Importantly,women’sdomestic responsibilities
inhibit them from participating in training
and workshops taking place outside their
own communities. Through more conscious
mobilisationandprogramming,UNMISSandits
partners canencourageandaid local churches
to facilitate peacebuilding initiatives at the
grassroots level, where churches are already
presentandwomenaremorelikelytoparticipate.
This art ic le has explored the strengths and
weaknesses of UNMIS and local churches in local
peacebuilding inSouthSudan.Ouranalysis illustrates
thelimitationsofbothactorsinthisprocess.ForUNMIS,
this included insufficient presence in remote areas,
lackof indigenousknowledge,andlimitedfollow-upof
peacebuildinginitiatives.Localchurches’demonstrated
abilitytoactasagentsofchangehas,ontheotherhand,
been constrained by their weak capacity and lack of
fundingtoimplementmorecomprehensiveprogrammes.
While there is no quick fix to solve South Sudan’s
conflicts, many of these challenges can be mitigated
throughincreasedcooperationbetweentheUNmission
and local churches. As both actors have comparative
advantages in local peacebuilding, a strengthened
partnershipcancreatesynergiesandenhancetheimpact
oflocal-levelpeacebuildinginSouthSudan.
Ingrid Marie Breidlid is an advisor at theNorwegianInstituteofInternationalaffairs(NUPI),and is currently working on issues related topeacekeepingandpeacebuildinginafrica.
andreasØienStenslandisaResearchassistantatNUPI, and iscurrentlyworkingon issues relatedto the protection of civilians, peacekeeping andpeacebuildinginafrica.
Endnotes1 Auteserre,Séverine(2010)The Trouble with the Congo: Local
Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding. Newyork:CambridgeUniversityPress.
2 Foranoverviewofrecentscholarshiponreligionandpeace-makingandatypologyofreligiousbrokers,seeHarpviken,KristianB.andRøislien,HanneE.(2008)FaithfulBrokers?PotentialsandPitfallsofReligioninPeacemaking.Conflict Resolution Quarterly,25(3).SeealsoSmock,David(2006)ReligiousContributionstoPeacemaking:WhenReligionBringsPeace,NotWar.Peaceworks,55, Washington: UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace.
3 ThestudyisbasedonfieldresearchbytheauthorsinJuba,JongleiandEasternEquatoriainOctober–November2010,inrelationtoresearchprojectsontheprotectionofcivil-iansundertheauspicesoftheTrainingforPeaceinAfricaprogramme.
4 UNMIS’smandateexpiredon9July2011,andwasreplacedbytheUnitedNationsMissionintheRepublicofSouthSudan(UNMISS).ThenewmissionisauthorisedunderUNSecurityCouncilResolution1996(2011).
5 UNMIS(2011)‘CivilAffairsDivisionFactSheet’,Availableat:<http://unmis.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=p4xSixFqSB8%3d&tabid=2157>Accessedon:20July2011.
6 Withtheexceptionofminorgrantsthroughthequickimpactprojects.
7 ACCORD(2010)The Conflict Management Work of the Civil Affairs Division of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).Durban:ACCORD.
8 ThissectionispartiallybasedonBradbury,Mark;JohnRyle,John;Medley,MichaelandSansculotte-Greenidge,Kwesi(2006)Local Peace Processes in Sudan: A Baseline Study.RiftValleyInstitute;InternationalCrisisGroup(2002)God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan.InternationalCrisisGroup,report39(28January2002);Kayanga,SamuelE.andWheeler,Andrew(1999)But God is Not Defeated! Celebrating the Centenary of the Episcopal Church of the Sudan, 1899–1999. Nairobi:PaulinesPublicationsAfrica;andSchomerus,MareikeandAllen,Tim(2011)Southern Sudan at Odds with Itself: Dynamics of Conflict and Predicaments of Peace. London:DESTIN.
9 TheSCCmembersincludetheAfricaInlandChurchSudan,theEpiscopalChurchoftheSudan,thePresbyterianChurchoftheSudan,theCatholicChurchofSudan,theCopticOrthodoxChurch,theEthiopianOrthodoxChurch,theGreekCatholicChurch,theGreekOrthodoxChurch(PatriarchateAlexandria),theSudanEvangelicalPresbyterianChurch,theSudanInteriorChurch,theSudanPentecostalChurchandtheSudaneseChurchofChrist.
10 UNSC,6576thmeeting.Resolution1996.OfficialRecord.Newyork,8July2011.p.1–2.
conflict trends I 37
PeaCekeePing to PeaCebuilding FroM a gender PersPeCtive: the unMil CaseByKRISTENa.CORdELL
Introduction
In a post-conflict environment, keeping the peace
through the provision of kinetic or physical security
rapidly transitions to addressing the wider needs of
the population through peacebuilding tasks. Under
theumbrellaofpeacekeeperprotection,peacebuilding
efforts work to ensure the basic safety and protection
of civilians, establish credible political processes and
systems, ensure access to basic services (including
foodandwater),andnormaliseeconomicactivity.The
transition between peacekeeping and peacebuilding is
overlapping,fluidanddiverse–and,forthepurposeof
thisarticle,isdescribedasanexus.
Gender mainstreaming is a core part of both
peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, as it ensures
thattheservicesandbenefitsestablishedwillreachboth
above: UNMIL launches the "16 days of activism"campaignwithmessagesonthousandsofwoodenstarstostrengthentherightsofwomenandtostopgender-basedviolence(2008).
UN
PH
OT
O/C
HR
IST
OP
HE
RH
ER
WIG
38 I conflict trends
men and women within the community. In the least,
thismeansensuringthatwomenwillbeprotectedinan
ongoing conflict through peacekeeping. More broadly
defined, itmeans thatwomenwillbeactiveplayers in
an evolving equitable society through peacebuilding.
However, it israrelysosimple.Betweentheconclusion
ofarmedconflictand the introductionofdevelopment
opportunities lies a wide spectrum of gender equality
issues. How international peacekeeping operations
canengageand involvewomenacross thedivide from
peacekeeping topeacebuilding, specifically replicating
the success of the United Nations Mission in Liberia
(UNMIL),istheprimaryfocusofthisarticle.
Background
Forwomen,wardoesnotendwith thecessationof
conflict. In the post-conflict environment, women are
continually plagued by political exclusion, economic
marginalisation, sexual violence and constraints on
human rights. This has dramatic limitations for any
country’s development and long-term stability.1 To
successfullynavigate thenexusbetweenpeacekeeping
and peacebui ld ing , re levant ac tors must take
integrated action on a variety of social, economic,
political and security platforms in a gender-relevant
manner. Wider than simply the provision of physical
security, an inclusive approach has proven to be an
operationalimperative–notjustagoalofwell-meaning
peacebuilders.
Acorepartofthisinclusivityiswomen’sparticipation
in post-conflict transitions as a means for ensuring
state stability. The links between the two are now
more clear than ever. In 2009, the RAND-sponsored
study,Women and Nation Building,foundthatstronger
emphasis on gender equality and women’s inclusion
early in peacekeeping activities was likely to improve
theoutcomesofstatestability(theoverarchinggoalof
thepeacekeepingcommunitywrit large).2This finding,
built on World Bank-sponsored research, indicated
that societies which remained stratified by gender
showed a continued proclivity towards violence and
oppression in the long term. The author concluded
that:“Genderequality isnotmerelyamatterof social
justice but of international security in predicting state
aggressiveness internationally.”3 In other words, there
is a positive correlation between domestic gender
inequality and external aggression. Thus, those in the
peacekeepingcommunitywhopushfor the installation
WomenreadelectioninstructionalmaterialprovidedbyUNMILpeacekeepersduringasensitisationtour,inParloma,Liberia(2005).
UN
PH
OT
O/E
RIC
KA
NA
LST
EIN
conflict trends I 39
LaymahGbowee,ExecutivedirectorofWomeninPeacebuildingNetworkafrica(WIPNET)ofLiberia,speaksontheroleofwomeninpeacebuildinginafrica,atajointpressconferenceheldbywomen’sorganisationsfromaroundtheworld,attheUNheadquartersinNewYork(2006).
ofnewinstitutionsandgovernancemechanisms,butare
cautiousonwomen’s inclusion,mayhavethings inthe
wrongorder–especiallyiflong-termstabilityisthegoal.
Peacebuilding (in all its various forms) is focused
on self-sustaining peace and a reduction of the risk
of conflict relapse, with gender equality as an inherit
goal.4 There are hundreds of resources available on
the integration of women in peacekeeping. However,
the implementation of such policy – especially in the
murky post-conflict context – remains unclear. How
can peacekeepers include women in the most fragile,
early transitions without jeopardising a fragile peace?
In addition, how can the same multilateral operations
enforce gender mainstreaming across the life of the
missionandbeyond?
Mandate
As a tool for examining the components of gender
equality in effective peacekeeping-to-peacebuilding
transitions, this article presents the case of UNMIL.
Theresearchwasconductedaspartofacomprehensive
draw-down best practice exercise hosted by UNMIL
in2010.5
UNMILprovidesanexcellenttemplateforthestudy
ofthenexusbetweenpeacekeepingandpeacebuilding,
because it postured itself to address gender equality
within its various activit ies from the start. As a
multidimensionalpeacekeepingoperation,UNMIL’swork
ongendermainstreamingcameundertheleadershipof
theOfficeoftheGenderAdvisor(OGA).Thisofficeisthe
responsiblepartyforcoordinatingtheeffortandaligning
thegoals for the integrationofgender throughout the
mission.Despitelimitedresources(and, inmanyways,
duetolimitedresources),theofficerealisedearlyonthat
fullmainstreamingthroughoutthemission’svariousunits
wouldbetheonlywaytocarryoutitsmandateoverthe
transitionprocess.Thisapproachiscrucialinthe“space”
between conflict and peace, where “effective support
requires integrated action across the peacekeeping,
development,humanrightsandhumanitarianpillarsof
thesystem.”6
“Foramissiontobesuccessful, thenexusbetween
peacekeeping and peacebuilding must be coordinated
UN
PH
OT
O/E
SK
IND
ER
DE
BE
BE
40 I conflict trends
byanoverallstrategysothatsetsof tasksdonotexist
in a vacuum, but are part of a larger vision of what it
willtaketoreachasustainablepeace.”7Across-cutting
andstrategicapproachtomainstreaminggenderwasnot
just best practice, but the only feasible practice at the
time.Giventhelimitsoftime,staffingandresourcesof
theOGA, itwasessential tobuild the internalcapacity
ofvariousunitswithin themission to integrategender
independently (or with as little oversight as possible).
The OGA took a strategic approach in helping units
acrossthemissiontoidentifygender-relevantgoalsand
relevantstakeholdersforeachtask,andcoordinatewith
localandnationallevelprocesses.
One example of this approach is the work the
OGA undertook early on with the Civil Affairs Unit, in
preparation for a national presidential election. The
OGA encouraged the Civil Affairs staff to identify the
importanceofwomen in theupcomingelection,create
messages around voting that were gender-specific,
andwork tobuild thecapacityof theNationalElection
Committeeongender.Theresultwasnotonlyagender-
relevantelection,butalsoaCivilAffairsstaff that fully
understood the relevance of gender throughout their
work.Thiscross-cuttingapproachintroduceda‘common
vision’ for gender mainstreaming in the mission from
thestart.
BestPracticeStrategies
In 2003, UNMIL’s founding mandate – UN Security
CouncilResolution(UNSCR)1509–specificallyaddressed
the“importanceofagenderperspectiveinpeacekeeping
operationsandpost-conflictpeacebuildinginaccordance
with resolution 1325”,8 and gave special attention to
addressingviolenceagainstwomenandgirlsasatoolof
warfare.Theresolutionalsocalledfortheestablishment
of administrative structures, the restructuring and
supportofthepolice,andtheconsolidationofthejustice
sector – interventions essential for addressing and
respondingtogender issues inacross-cuttingmanner.
It effectively laid the framework forUNMIL, aswell as
emerging Liberian institutions, to address actively the
needsofwomenandgirlsinemergingstatestability.9
Effectivetransitionsarereliantonpeaceagreements
that are treated as living documents, with flexibility
JudgesoftheartsforadolescentsandWomen’sRightsPaintinganddrawingCompetitiondiscusstherankingsofthefinalists.TheeventisorganisedbyUNMILandtheUnionofLiberianartists(July2011).
UN
PH
OT
O/S
TAT
ON
WIN
TE
R
conflict trends I 41
and long- term open-endedness . 10 The L iber ian
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was also a
productofthewillandattentionoflocalwomentomove
thepeaceprocess forward.TheCPAcalledfor“gender
balanceinapportioningresponsibilitiesforprogramme
implementation”, across “programming for national
rehabilitation, reconstructionanddevelopment, for the
moral, social and physical reconstruction of Liberia in
the post-conflict period”. 11 The document set gender
quotas for members of the Transitional Legislature
Assembly to include representatives from women’s
groups, and ensured a gender balance in elective and
non-electiveposts.Theresultwasahighlygender-aware
transitionalframework,includingaTransitionalCabinet
with three women out of 21 members, a Transitional
NationalAssemblywithfourwomenoutof76members,
a National Elections Commission with three women
out of seven members, and representation for women
on the newly formed Liberian National Committee
on Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and
Rehabilitation(NCDDRR).
Intheearliestofoperations,UNMILsupportedUNSCR
1509andtheCPA.Oneofthefirstexampleswasthepush
for the inclusion of Women Associated with Fighting
Forces (WAFF) in the country’s ongoing disarmament,
demobilisation,reintegrationandrehabilitation(DDRR)
activities. Not only did inclusion give the process
credibilityandawiderbeneficiaryframework,butwomen
wererecognisedasactorswhowouldbeimportanttothe
country’srebuildingprocess.Toaccomplishthis,UNMIL/
EllenJohnson-Sirleaf,PresidentofLiberia,addressesthepaneldiscussion,“WomenasaCriticalForceindemocraticGovernance”,jointlyorganisedbytheCouncilofWomenLeadersandCommunitiesofdemocracy(September2010).
THEOGAENCOURAGEDTHECIVILAFFAIRSSTAFFTO IDENTIFyTHE IMPORTANCEOF
WOMEN IN THE UPCOMING ELECTION, CREATE MESSAGES AROUND VOTING THAT
WERE GENDER-SPECIFIC, AND WORK TO BUILD THE CAPACITy OF THE NATIONAL
ELECTIONCOMMITTEEONGENDER
UN
PH
OT
O/PA
ULO
FILGU
EIR
AS
42 I conflict trends
OGA advocated for early policy mandates on DDRR in
LiberiatoincluderesourcesforWAFF.
UNMILworkedtoreachwomenthroughcentralised
informationoperationsanddecentralisednetworks for
an inclusive outreach process. It empowered national
women’s civil society organisations to sensitise and
disseminate information to women in the country. A
centralisedcampaigndemystifyingtheDDRRprocessfor
women was facilitated through the Public Information
Office(PIO).Thefull integrationofwomenintheDDRR
process ensured that they would be beneficiaries of
development and economic support programmes. By
supporting women combatants in the demobilisation
processinthecountry,UNMILcreatedtheconditionsfor
effectiveDDRRthatwouldfullyreintegratewomenwho
hadparticipatedintheconflict.
As peacekeeping missions evolve to peacebuilding
efforts,militaryforcesdrawdown,effectivelyto“allow
thecountry theroomandfreedomtogrowandto take
responsibilityforthoseaspectsofsecurityandlogisticsit
can”.12Asthemilitarypresenceshrinks,afullyfunctional
nationalsecuritysectorshouldprovidesafetyandensure
stability over time (this is especially relevant in areas
where conflict is fluidand regional).Withan inclusive
DDRRprocesssettingthetoneforwidespreadinclusion
of women, the OGA was able to turn its attention to
capitalisingonthe inclusionofwomenin thecountry’s
emergingsecuritysector.
In2006,UNMIL’sPoliceUnit(UNPOL)establishedthe
Liberian National Police (LNP) Committee for National
RecruitmentofWomen.Within thiscommittee,UNPOL
workedwithpartnerstorecruitandretainwomenwithin
UNMIL’sPoliceUnitworkedwithpartnerstorecruitandretainmorewomenintheLiberianNationalPolice.
WOMENBETWEENTHEAGESOF18AND35,WHOCOMPLETEDATLEASTNINTHGRADE,
WEREELIGIBLETOPARTICIPATEINATHREE-MONTHSHORTACADEMICPROGRAMME,TOBE
FOLLOWEDByTHREEMONTHSOFPOLICETRAININGATTHENATIONALPOLICEACADEMy
UN
PH
OT
O/C
HR
IST
OP
HE
RH
ER
WIG
conflict trends I 43
the LNP better. They created the Educational Support
Programme(ESP)–acondensedversionofahighschool
diploma that women could complete as a prerequisite
forentering thenationalpolice force.Womenbetween
the ages of 18 and 35, who completed at least ninth
grade,wereeligibletoparticipateinathree-monthshort
academicprogramme,tobefollowedbythreemonthsof
policetrainingattheNationalPoliceAcademy.TheESP
dramaticallyincreasedthenumberofwomenintheLNP–
apositivechangeforwomeninthecountry.
Withinthetransitionfromconflicttopeace,theHead
ofMission,ortheSpecialRepresentativetotheSecretary
General(SRSG),isacrucialactorwhohasthepotential
to “generate and sustain the international political
supportthatiscriticaltokeepingthepartiesontrack”.13
Throughout its life cycle, UNMIL’s SRSG supported a
visionthatwouldnottradewomen’sinclusionforother
politicalpriorities.14TheSRSGpassedthisvisiondown
through the ranks, advancing a common goal for all
missionstaffandsettingthetoneforallactivities.Within
themission,strongleadershipadvancedtheOGA’sability
toaddresscross-cuttingissuesandpresentedagender
awarenessthat“workeditswaydown”tootherunitsand
partnersinthemissionandtheUN.Thishassimplified
theneedfortheOGAto“makethecaseforgender”,and
allowed theoffice tospend timeprovidingsubstantive
andtechnicalexpertiseforthemission.15
TheOGAalsoestablishedastrongrelationshipwith
theUNCountryTeam(UNCT),asatoolformanagingthe
transitiontopeace.Theclearestexampleisinrelationto
addressingsexualandgender-basedviolence(SGBV)in
thecountry. In2009, the fieldofactorsaddressing this
topic was growing – as were the monetary resources.
UNMIL’s OGA helped set up the Gender Theme Group
(UNGTG)andtheUnitedNationsDevelopmentAssistance
Framework(UNDAF)toprovidestrategiccoordinationfor
partnerswithintheUNCT.Astheco-chairoftheUNGTG,
the OGA worked alongside the UN Fund for Women
(now UN Women) to support the government and UN
gendermainstreaminginitiatives.Together,thesebodies
coordinated a range of programmes and projects on
SGBV,ensuringbotha responsibleuseof resources in
the immediate term and a platform for developmental
organisations to take over this important work in the
longterm.
Atthenationallevel,theOGAintroducedarangeof
participatoryprocessestoengagewomen’scivilsociety
in emerging national frameworks. This illustrated a
highrecognitionof localpoliticalwill forgenderissues
in the country. The office worked to support local
capacitythroughfacilitatingparticipatoryprocessesthat
would leave organisations more stable for a peaceful
transition.This iskey,giventhat thepeacekeepingand
peacebuilding relationship must extend “beyond the
UN, [through] close collaboration with key partners,
suchas international financial institutionsandregional
organizations”.16 The OGA supported government
authorities by providing training programmes and
capacity building, technical expertise and long-term
supportfortheMinistryofGender–thekeygovernment
body for mainstreaming gender in Liberia. Examples
includeinputonthepreparationofapovertyreduction
strategy (PRS), the Liberian National Action Plan on
1325 (LNAP), theNationalGenderPolicyand theTruth
andReconciliationReport(PRSP).Ineachcase,women’s
networks(withthesupportoftheOGA)facilitatedalarge
number of county-level consultations across Liberia,
resulting in the mobilisation of women to participate,
and policy documents that reflect their needs and
preferences. The final product – full gender-inclusive
national documentation – will guide the transition to
developmentinthecountry.
Conclusion:GenderandtheRoadtodevelopment
Today, Liberia is at a crucial stage in the transition
from conflict to peace. The recovery process is well
underway. However, recovering from armed conflict
will require inclusivepeacethroughlong-termchanges
insocial infrastructureandreform.Throughtheir long-
standing civic participation and dedication to peace
and prosperity, women have solidified a place in the
publicsphere,butstillfacelimitsinsecurity,accessand
equality.Perhapsnowhereisthismoreclearthaninthe
lead-uptothecountry’s2011election17where,despitea
strongshowing(ascandidatesandvoters) in2005,few
womenhavesignedupascandidates.18
Retainingthemomentumofgenderequalityoverthe
changingactorsandnationalsystemswhilepromoting
sustainabilityofeffortisasignificantchallenge.National
actors and institutions must take over the tasks of
UNMILPROVIDESANExCELLENTTEMPLATEFORTHESTUDyOFTHENExUSBETWEEN
PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEBUILDING, BECAUSE IT POSTURED ITSELF TO ADDRESS
GENDEREqUALITyWITHINITSVARIOUSACTIVITIESFROMTHESTART
44 I conflict trends
the international community. Economic recovery and
infrastructuresustainabilityarereplacingtheprovision
ofsecurityaspriorities.Itiscriticalthatpolicywhichis
created with the express goal of empowering women
not be left on the shelf, but instead be implemented
effectively and efficiently by relevant actors. UNMIL –
specifically the OGA – has systematically capitalised
on theabilitiesandcapacitiesof the country’swomen
to build a stable and equitable society. The networks
and mechanisms established by this office must be
maintained and expanded with increased national
ownership.
Through a mult idimensional , straightforward
approach, UNMIL advanced a series of best practices
for gender mainstreaming in a challenging post-
conflict transition.The lessonsof thisapproachshould
influencemissionplanningacrosstheUNDepartmentof
PeacekeepingOperationsandtheworld.
Kristena.CordellhasservedtheUNinmissionstothedemocraticRepublicoftheCongo,LiberiaandLebanon,whereshehasadvisedonissuesrelatedto sexual and gender-based violence, securitysector reform, policy interventions for improvednational capacities and empowerment strategiesforwomeninpost-conflictcontexts.ShecurrentlysupportsRefugee International’sworkongenderandpeacekeepingintheMiddleEastandafrica.
Endnotes1 Caprioli,Mary(2003),GenderEqualityandStateAggression:
TheImpactofDomesticGenderEqualityonStateFirstUseofForce.International Interactions,29,pp.195–214.Alsosee:Benard,CherylandCordell,Kristen(2007)WomenandHumanSecurity:TheCaseofPostConflictAfghanistan.Georgetown University: WIIS Words Journal,Winter2007;andCarment,David;Prest,Stewart;Gazo,John;ElAchkar,Souleima;Samy,yiaqadeesenandBell,Terry(2006)FailedandFragileStates2006.Country Indicators for Foreign Policy,November2006.
2 Benard,Cheryl;Jones,Seth;Oliker,Olga;Thurston,Cathryn;Stearns,BrookeandCordell,Kristen(2008)Women and Nation Building.SantaMonica,CA:TheRANDCorporation.
3 Carment,Davidetal.(2006)op.cit.,p.209.Alsosee:Caprioli,Mary(2003)op.cit.,p.196.
4 UnitedNationsDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations(UNDPKO)(2010)‘PeacekeepingandPeacebuilding:ClarifyingtheNexus’,UNDepartmentofFieldSupport,Availableat:<http://www.effectivepeacekeeping.org/reports/peacekeeping-and-peacebuilidng-clarifying-nexus>.
5 Thefindingsaretheresultofover80interviewsand10focusgroupsthroughoutthecountry,examiningtheperiodbetween2001and2010.Thisarticleisbasedlargelyontheoutputofthatresearch–Cordell,Kristen.Best Practices in Gender Mainstreaming.StudyforUNDPKO,facilitatedandsupportedbytheOGA/UNMIL.CordellwouldliketothanktheOGAandCaroleDoucetandherstaffatUNMIL,whofacili-tatedthereportbyprovidingaccessandsupport.
6 UNDPKO(2010)op.cit.
7 ColumbiaUniversitySchoolofInternationalandPublicAffairs(SIPA)andUNDepartmentofFieldSupport(2011)VoicesfromtheField:AnAnalysisonBestPracticeReporting.AjointprojectoftheUNStudyProgram,SIPAandthePeacekeepingBestPracticesService.
8 UNSecurityCouncil(2003)SecurityCouncilResolution1509ontheEstablishmentoftheUNMissioninLiberia(UNMIL),19September2003,S/RES/1509(2003),Availableat:<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f8d304d4.html>Accessedon:15July2011.
9 SubsequentUNMILresolutions(developedduringvariousphasesofthemission)havereaffirmedtheoriginalcommit-mentofresolution1509,includingonissuesofgender-basedviolence,protectionandsexualexploitationandabuse.TheseresolutionshavemadeUNMILthecentralbodyfortherestorationofstateauthority,enhancinghumansecurityandprovidingprotection–allcrucialelementsinrestoringthesecurityofthenation’swomen.
10 TheCenterforInternationalCooperation(2011)Global Peace Ops Review 2011.NewyorkUniversity.
11 ComprehensivePeaceAgreementBetweentheGovernmentofLiberiaandtheLiberiansUnitedforReconciliationandDemocracy(LURD)andtheMovementforDemocracyinLiberia(MODEL)andPoliticalParties,Accra,18August2003.
12 UNSecurityCouncil(2008)SecurityCouncilResolution1836ontheExtensionoftheMandateoftheUNMissioninLiberia(UNMIL),29September2008,S/RES/1836(2008),Availableat:<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48e47cda8.html>Accessedon:15July2011.
13 UNDPKO(2010)op.cit.
14 Doucet,Carole(2009)Women in Peacekeeping: The Power to Empower.Remarksfortheseminar‘TheImportanceofIncludingWomeninPeacekeepingMissions’,UniversityofLiberia.
15 Authorinterviews,UNMILstaff,2009,asnotedin:Cordell,Kristen(2010)Best Practices for Gender Mainstreaming at the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) from 2003 to 2008.UnitedNationsBestPracticesUnit.
16 UNDPKO(2010)op.cit.
17 Atthetimeofwriting,thedateoftheelectionisunclear.WhileitiscurrentlyscheduledforOctober,anationalrefer-endumislikelytopushitbacktoNovember2011.
18 Authorunknown(2011)‘Analysis:DoLiberiansKnowWhatThey’reVotingfor?’IntegratedRegionalInformationNetworks,8August2011.Availableat:<http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=93431>.
conflict trends I 45
Civil-Military Coordination and transition ManageMent: the unMil exPerienCeByCHRISTOPHERHOLSHEK
Ithas longbeenwidely recognised that“cooperation
andcoordinationbetween themilitaryandhumanitarian
componentsarecriticalinmultidimensionalpeacekeeping
operations”.1 While the stress on issues of civil-military
coordination (CIMIC) has largely been regarding
peacekeeping and humanitarian organisations, less
attentionhasgoneto theroleof themilitary in fostering
peacebuilding; moreover, the role of CIMIC across the
spectrum of peace support operations and enabling
the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. The
conceptputatworkintheUnitedNations(UN)Missionin
Liberia(UNMIL),whichdirectlyaddressesthechallengeof
connectingsecurityanddevelopment,hasprovenacase
studyofinteresttothelargerpeaceandstabilityoperations
community, with implications for general civil-military
approachesformilitaryandcivilianprofessionalsalike.
Background
In January 2008, UNMIL began to slowly draw
down its forces parallel to the Government of Liberia’s
above: The Liberian project manager of a youthagriculturaltrainingfarmexplainsthepilotprojecttotheUNMILChiefofCIMICandstaffofficersoftheresidentBangladeshpeacekeepingbattalion.
CH
RIS
TO
PH
ER
HO
LSH
EK
46 I conflict trends46 I conflict trends
anarmedForcesofLiberia(aFL)soldierassistsUNpeacekeeperswithscreeningpatientsatamedicaloutreachcentreinSinoeCounty(2008).
CH
RIS
TO
PH
ER
HO
LSH
EK
implementationof itsPovertyReductionStrategy (PRS).2
The international community supported the PRS using
the United Nations Development Assistance Framework
(UNDAF)andotherplansdesignedtohelpbuildthecapacity
of theGovernmentofLiberia–particularlyat thecounty
level–todeliveressentialpublicservices.Theseservices
includedsecurity,governance,theruleoflaw,andeconomic
andsocialdevelopment.Theintentoftheseframeworksis
toreachfulfillmentoftheseservices,articulatedinaseries
of benchmarks, by the time of the next general election
inNovember2011.Thiswillmark theendof the second
(ordrawdown)phaseand thebeginningof the thirdand
final phase of withdrawal, characterised by civilian-led
peacebuildingfocusedondevelopmenttosupplantsecurity-
intensive,military-basedpeacekeepingoperations.3
Inrecognitionofitsroleinunderpinningthisstabilisation
process,withtheonsetoftheseframeworksthatendedthe
peacekeepingconsolidationphaseandstartedthedrawdown
phase(transitioningtopeacebuilding)inJanuary2008,the
UNMIL Force approach to CIMIC changed substantially,
basedontheconstantconcerninForceCommandreports
on“theincreasingdependenceoftheGovernmentofLiberia
ontheassetsoftheForce…”4Sincethen,thegreatestrisk
for security and stability in Liberia has been persistent
dependency on the mission in general and the military
in particular as Force capability diminishes, bringing on
potentiallydestabilisingeffectsthatrisktheinvestmentand
sacrificesofmanytobringlastingpeacethere.
Forthedrawdownphase,bothrisksandopportunities
abounded. Under enormous international pressure,
accelerated drawdown intensified these civil-military
concerns. Further, military reductions paralleled a
humanitarian assistance drawdown, requiring more
efficientandeffectivecoordination in the transition from
relief to recovery. The real and perceived effectiveness
of countygovernments, inparticular, todeliveressential
publicservices–amongthemsecurityandtheruleoflaw–
hasbeenthevitalcentreofgravitytothefulfilmentofthe
mandate and the mission’s exit strategy. Additionally,
largeconcentrationsof idleandunemployedyouthhave
presented the most dangerous threat to long-term civil
stability.Thisisparticularlytrueamongyoungmeninurban
areas,whoare idealrecruits for illicitactivitiesasLiberia
struggleseconomically,furtherfeedingthegeneralproblem
ofacorruptsociety.
However,therehavealsobeenopportunitiestofacilitate
the transition from military-intensive peacekeeping to
civilian-led, self-sustained peacebuilding, per the PRS.
conflict trends I 47
Oneopportunityhasbeentherelativelypeacefulandstable
situationenduringfromthepeacekeepingeffort.Another
hasbeenthesubstantialdevelopmentassistancepresence
stillresidinginLiberia–amongthis,strongbilateraldonor
nation supportof Liberiaaswell as coordinationamong
thosenations,themission,andtheGovernmentofLiberia
insupportofawell-developed,home-growntransitionplan
(thatis,thePRS).Therehasalsobeentheessentiallypositive
environment forCIMICunder strongmission leadership,
emphasisingintegratedmissioncoordinationunderthe‘one
UN–deliveringasone’concept,andviewingCIMICasone
amonganumberofmissioncoordinationmanagementtools.
Lastbutnotleast,theLiberiangovernmentandpopulation
havethoughtpositivelyoftheinternationalpresence–due
innosmallparttoaneffectivepublicinformationcampaign.
With the linkagesbetweencapacitydevelopmentand
securitythusclearlyestablished,theracewasontofacilitate
the transitionprocess,build local capacity,andwork the
Forceoutofmany jobsdeemedessential tostabilitybut
ultimatelytheresponsibilityoftheGovernmentofLiberia–
allbeforetheForceitselfreducestoalevelofineffectiveness
toinfluencethetransitionprocess.
TheUNMILCIMICConcept:“It’sNotaboutUs;It’s
aboutThem”
As introduced in 2008, the UNMIL CIMIC concept is
firmly nested in the UN integrated mission concept and
“…motivated by the need to maximize coordination and
coherencebetweenthemilitarycomponentandthecivilian
componentsofthesameintegratedmission,betweenthe
militarycomponentofaUNpeacekeepingoperationandthe
restoftheUNsystem,andbetweenthemilitarycomponent
ofthemissionandotherexternalandinternalcivilianactors
in the same mission area”.5 The UNMIL CIMIC concept
helpedformthebasisofwhatisnowarticulatedinthenew
‘UN–CIMIC’policyforallUNpeacekeepingforces–namely,
that civil-military coordination, writ large, has two core
functions:first,tosupportmanagementofthe“interaction
betweencivilianandmilitaryactors”;andsecond,tofostera
“creatingandenablingenvironmentfortheimplementation
of the mission mandate by maximizing the comparative
advantage of all actors operating in the mission area”.6
Especiallywithrespecttothe latter, theForceengages in
CIMICwiththeaimofleveragingcivilianpartnerstoreduce
itsownrole.
The concept of CIMIC in Liberia is well articulated in
theUNMILForceCIMICDirective,auniqueUNplaybook
thathasbeensourcedattheDepartmentofPeacekeeping
Operations (DPKO)andsharedwithother fieldmissions.
Lessconcernedwith ‘winningheartsandminds’ through
thedirectuseofmilitaryforcesforhumanitarianassistance
ordevelopmentprojectsthatservetoreinforceratherthan
reducedependency–andoftencreatesfrictionwithcivilian
partnerorganisations,theCIMICintentinLiberiahasbeen
tousethecapabilitiesoftheForceto“…enableandmultiply
civilianinitiatives,andconductedincoordinationwiththe
UNMILcivilcomponent(jointly)andUNagenciesaswell
asNGOsandtheGovernmentofLiberia(collaboratively)”.7
Thisentailsamoreindirectroleformilitaryassets–more
clearlyinsupportofcivilianagenciesandleadinglessfrom
thefrontandmorefrombehindtheUNMILcivilcomponent,
UNagenciesandtheGovernmentofLiberia,alignedwith
themand their frameworksandbenchmarks, topromote
localownershipofciviladministrationandessentialpublic
services responsibilities,and tohelpbuildcivilauthority
andpublicconfidence.Tode-emphasise‘winningheartsand
minds’,thesloganforUNMILCIMICbecame:“It’snotabout
us;it’saboutthem.”8
Figure 1 depicts the conceptual intent of UNMIL
CIMIC: of leading more from behind than the front. The
idea is to bring the Force from the front to the rear of
assistanceeffortsthroughadeliberateprocessoftransition
management.First,themilitaryshiftstheuseofitsassets
away from direct assistance to the population and more
to enabling efforts led by UN agencies. These work in
tandem with non-governmental organisations (NGOs),
whilegraduallyintegratingCIMICeffortswiththoseledby
conflict trends I 47
Figure1:depictionofCIMICConceptEmployedatUNMIL
48 I conflict trends
LiberianMinistryofPublicWorkspersonnelreceiveon-the-jobtraininginculvertrestorationfromBangladeshiengineers.
CH
RIS
TO
PH
ER
HO
LSH
EK
theseagencies (that is, to ‘civilianise’militaryassistance
efforts).Simultaneously,itlookstoimprovepartnerefforts
tobuild thecapacityofGovernmentofLiberiaentities to
performciviladministrationfunctions(thatis,to‘localise’
ownershipofthepeacebuildingprocesstoaddressthelocal
civilsituationandallitschallenges).Inthisdoubletransition,
theaimiscreatetheproperalignmentofassistanceefforts
tofacilitatetheconditionsdesiredbyallthreestakeholder
groups.
Themilitary itself is the real ‘forcemultiplier’.At the
sametime,theassumptionofamoreindirectandsupporting
rolehasmadeiteasierfortheForcetodiminishitspresence
and operations, while mitigating or reducing potential
destabilisingdrawdown-relatedgapsandrisksassociated
withover-dependencyastheForcepreparesforwithdrawal–
verymuchinitsownsecurity interests. Inotherwords: it
worksitselfoutofajob.
Agoodexampleoftheapplicationofthiscivil-military
transition concept is the CIMIC approach to project
management. To facilitate transition, ownership and
sustainability,UNMILCIMICdirectsthatitsprojectsshould
involveGovernmentofLiberiaofficialsthroughouttheentire
reliefordevelopmentprojectlifecycle–thatis,assessment,
planning, coordination and execution – to ‘front-load’
ownershipandsimultaneouslyenhanceprojectmanagement
skilldevelopment,which isaclearcapacitydevelopment
outcome. In addition, it should demonstrably support
specificPRSobjectives.Understandingthat ‘civilsuccess
is Force success’ gradually makes the Force a minority
stakeholder in the provision of essential public services,
and thus facilitates theCIMICendstate.The indicatorof
thisisthesuccessfulexecutionofForcedrawdownwithno
debilitatingcivil-militaryimpactsand100%civilianleadinall
civil-militaryinitiatives.
Similarly, UNMIL’s approach to its military-assisted
quick Impact Project (qIP) programme has, accordingly,
de-emphasised ‘hearts and minds’ and focused more on
helpingtobuildcapacityandconfidence–specifically,inthe
renovationorconstructionoflocalrule-of-lawinfrastructure,
including dozens of police stations, courthouses and
detentionfacilities.WhileForceengineerslargelydidthis
earlieron, local contractorswere increasinglyemployed,
conflict trends I 49
UN
PH
OT
O/S
TAT
ON
WIN
TE
R
wheretheygainedexperience,withtheadditionalimpactof
creatinglocalemploymentandtrainedlabour.Thistransition
management combination of CIMIC and qIP is a model
waytheUNingeneralcanmaximisebothCIMICandqIP’s
stability-orienteddevelopmentdollars.
The key linkages of this concept are UNMIL CIMIC’s
linesofcoordination,whicharepointedlyindirectascivilian
partnersareplacedbetweentheForceandlocalentitiesat
all levelsofcoordination.Atthetactical (orcounty) level,
CIMICsupporttothecountyordistrictgovernmentoccurs
throughtheUNMILJointCountyOffices.Attheoperational
(or national) level, CIMIC coordination occurs through
theOfficesof theSpecialRepresentativeof theSecretary
General (SRSG)andDeputySRSGs,whoheaduptheUN
CountryTeam.TheChiefCIMICOfficerprovidesoperational
level‘reachback’fortacticalCIMICintheformofplanning
guidanceandidentificationofresourcesbeyondthoselocally
available.Theruleissimple:allrequestsorproposalsfor
militarysupporttociviladministrationfirstcomesthrough
theappropriateUNMILcivilianmissioncoordinationoffice
andlevelofcommand.
There are two other essential characteristics of the
UNMIL CIMIC concept. First, because peace support
operationsareinanoperatingenvironmentthatislargely
psychological rather than physical, UNMIL CIMIC forges
a close relationship between CIMIC and information
operations,which iscritical toachievedesiredoutcomes.
Regardless of measurable development progress, if the
common perception remains that the country’s future is
fragileandthatthedepartureofUNMILwouldprecipitate
renewedmassviolence–theunderlyingsecurityconcern
ThedeputyCommissioneroftheLiberianNationalPolicecutstheribbononanewsecuritydepotindolo’sTown,MargibiCounty,Liberia(July2011).ThedepotisoneofUNMIL’sQuickImpactProjects,whichinvolvesrefurbishingorconstructingcourthouses,policestations,andpolicebarrackstostrengthentheruleoflawinLiberia.
WHILE THE UN PEACEBUILDING
SUPPORT OFFICE, FOR ExAMPLE,
ACKNOWLEDGES THE LINKAGE
BETWEEN PEACEKEEPING AND
PEACEBUILDING AND ADVOCATES
GREATER ‘COORDINATION’ OF THE
PROCESS, IT MAKES NO MENTION OF
THE MILITARy’S OBVIOUSLy CRITICAL
ROLEINENHANCINGTHISTRANSITION
50 I conflict trends
inLiberia– thecountrymay indeeddestabilise following
drawdownandwithdrawal.Thiskeylinkagebetweensecurity
anddevelopmentisthuslargelyperceptual.Second,UNMIL
CIMICemphasisesbuildingbothcapacityandconfidencein
waysthatgobeyondsimplepublicinformation.Itdirectsthat
Liberiansbevisiblyintheleadofcapacity-buildingefforts
or events such as medical outreach, even if most of the
effortisfromtheForce.Inclearsupportofgovernanceand
securitysectorreform,whenfeasible,italsolookstoinvolve
localpoliceandthemilitaryinCIMICprojectstobuildtheir
capacityand,moreimportantly,promotepublicconfidence
inthegovernmentbytransferringthepsychologicalcapital
ofpublictrustgainedbytheUNMILtotheGovernmentof
Liberia.
InadditiontothemorefamiliaruseofCIMICactivities
as sources of ‘good news stories’, CIMIC itself has been
supportive of public information through ‘key leader
engagement’ of indigenous public opinion makers and
international civilian relief and reconstruction managers.
Thisencouragesgreatersensitivitytolocalcultureandthe
useofnon-mediapubliccommunication. Incountries like
Liberia,traditionalcommunicationpracticesinruralareas
beyondthereachofmediaareoftenprimary.Inthiscontext,
forexample,awell-synchronisedCIMICinformationeffort
can also educate locals on issues such as public health,
gender-basedviolenceandotherdriversofconflictimportant
tobothcivilianandmilitarystakeholders.
AmajorUNMILCIMICchallengehashadtodowiththe
capability of the Force to implement a concept of CIMIC
thatgoesbeyondthewidelyheldbeliefthatCIMICissome
kindofpublicrelationsactivity.AswithmostAfricanpeace
support operations, a critical vulnerability has been the
relatively lowunderstandingof thismorecomprehensive
ideaofCIMICamongbothmilitaryandcivilianplayers in
themission,alongwithashortageoftrainedmilitaryCIMIC
officers–even thoughcivil-militaryoperationsareat the
coreofpeaceandstabilityoperations.
To mitigate this, UNMIL instituted a multisourced
education and training strategy to improve overall
understanding of CIMIC, build CIMIC capability and thus
enhancemissioncoordination.ThisincludesaCIMICcourse
thathastrainedForceofficersbutincludedtheGovernment
ofLiberia,NGOsandUNpolice,aswellasmembersofthe
Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and the Liberian National
Police (LNP) – thus further contributing to both capacity
building and security sector reform. The introductory
CIMIC course concentrates on two important CIMIC
operations skills: assessments and project management.
Additionally, UNMIL CIMIC officers are required to build
furthersubjectmatterexpertise throughvirtualaccess to
ThearmedForcesofLiberia(aFL’s)firstBaileybridgelaunchindecember2008.Theauthorispictured(centre-left)withaFLengineers,officers,contractmentors,internationaldevelopers,MinistryofPublicWorksmenandwomen,andfemaleaFLmembers.
CH
RIS
TO
PH
ER
HO
LSH
EK
conflict trends I 51
theUNPeaceOperationsTraining InstituteCIMICcourse
andthefirstpartoftheUNOfficefortheCoordinationof
HumanitarianActivities(OCHA)Civil-MilitaryCoordination
(CMCoord)course.
‘TheirGamePlanisOurGamePlan’
ThefinalgoalofintegrationofUNMILCIMICwithcivilian
effortsiscoinedinacatchphrasetopromoteitstransitional
thrust:‘Theirgameplanisourgameplan.’CIMICactivitiesin
Liberiaarewithinthesamefour-pillarstructureasthePRS.
Acloser lookat therangeofactivities ineachofthefour
pillarareashelpsillustratethebreadthanddepthofCIMIC
activitiesinLiberia:
• Inthesecuritypillar,theForcehasprovidedtraining
and capacity-building assistance to the AFL to
enhancecommunity-basedapproachesandinstilan
organisationalethosofpublicserviceandsensitivity
tocivilsociety.ForceencouragementoftheAFLledto
itsfirstmilitarycivilactionprojectinDecember2008,
with the launchofaBaileybridgealongastrategic
supplyroute intosouth-eastLiberia.TheForcealso
assistedwithmanagementconsultationtotheCenter
forCivil-MilitaryRelations,acivilsocietyorganisation
attheUniversityofLiberia,co-sponsoringanumberof
eventsdesignedtopromotecivildialogueonsecurity-
related issues. It also assisted AFL/LNP outreach
andgendermainstreamingthroughtrain-the-trainer
workshops,participationinleadershipseminarsand
jointcommunitysensitisationactivities.
• In economic revitalisation, the Force has provided
vocationalskillstrainingforover8000ex-combatants
and youth on generator, vehicle and building
maintenance;carpentry;masonry;welding;tailoring
anddesigning;animalhusbandry;computers;andfirst
aidandbasicmedicalcare.UNMIL,togetherwithlocal
governmentand internationaland localNGOs,also
ranagricultural trainingmodel farmsfor thousands
moreyouthandex-combatants,aswellasinsupport
ofcommunity-basedvillagecapacitydevelopment,in
Bong,NimbaandLofacounties.
• In governance and rule of law, the Force helped
to build local physical capacity in the execution of
numerousspeciallyselectedrule-of-lawqIPs.Italso
indirectly shared informationanddatacollectedby
militaryobserverteamsonthecivilsituation–inorder
tobuildciviladministrative informationcapacity,as
wellasassistwithlocalassessments,earlywarningof
civilunrest,andmonitoringofdevelopmentprogress.
• In infrastructure and basic social services, major
projectareashaveincludedmedicaloutreachfeaturing
‘on-the-job’trainingofLiberianmedicalstaff;support
to Ministry of Public Works synchronised road
UNMIL peacekeepers teach young Liberians, in Tubmanburg, to lay bricks as part of a job training programme(May2010).
UN
PH
OT
O/S
TAT
ON
WIN
TE
R
52 I conflict trends
rehabilitation projects involving multiple partners;
execution of World Bank and UNDP-funded civil
engineeringprojects formore than600kmofmajor
roadmaintenance,withsecurityandgovernanceas
well as commercial implications;and logistical and
best-practice support and sharing to NGOs, NGO
collaboration and coordination, and information-
sharing. UNMIL CIMIC also assisted in public
education, includingtherehabilitationofmore than
three dozen schools, and providing and mentoring
dozensofschoolteacherstofillcapacitygaps.
Critiques
Thiscriticaldearthinunderstandingpointstoanother
majorweakness:thefailuretograspthecomprehensiveness
and importance of the transition process itself. As the
generalelectionnears,andwithitthebeginningofUNMIL
withdrawal,keytransitiontasks,particularlyinthesecurity
sector,haveonlybeenidentifiedandagreedupon,butnot
yetput intoplace inanyserious,concertedway.Security
sectorreforminLiberiaisstillbeing‘coordinated’.Thisis
verylateinthegame,reflectingastillrelativelywidespread
failure to appreciate fully the importance of building
confidenceandnotjustcapacityintransitionmanagement–
thepsychologicalaspectofwhichisthemostcriticalandyet
requiresgreaterpatienceandriskmanagement.
Conclusion
UNMILCIMIChasbeendistinctiveinUNpeacesupport
operations. It goes beyond ‘CMCoord’ and it is more
comprehensive,withgreateremphasisonindirectsupport
to capacity development rather than just humanitarian
assistance,involvesmanagingtransitionsfrompeacekeeping
topeacebuilding, ismore collaborative, andclearly links
security with development within a human security
context.Consistentwithcomplexandinterconnectedpeace
operations environments and the UN integrated mission
approach, it establishes the role of the military as the
enablerof the civilian-ledpeaceprocess,duplicating the
civil-military relationshipdesired indemocraticsocieties,
andmarkinganunambiguouspathtothe‘endstate’ofall
peace operations: self-sustained peace and civil society.
This transitionmanagementaspect,which isat theheart
of CIMIC, should be of interest to military and civilian
peacekeepers and peacebuilders alike during the steady
stateofmissionplanningandpreparationpriortoacrisis,
andcertainlynotasdrawdownbegins.Withthechallenges,
risksandopportunities in internationalconflictmitigation
andbuildingpeacegrowingincomplexityandintensity,as
the linkagesbetweensecurityanddevelopmentcontinue
togrow,andespeciallyinthefaceofdiminishingfinancial
resources,allcontributorsmust findaway toworkmore
effectivelytotransitiontoself-sustainablepeace–orface
failure–together.
Col.ChristopherHolshekisaretiredUnitedStatesarmy Civil affairs Officer who served as UNMILChiefofCIMICfromJanuary2008toJuly2009.
Endnotes1 Lloyd,Gary,VanDyk,GieleA.J.andDeKock,Francois(2009)The
PsychologicalSelectionProfileforCivil-MilitaryCoordinationOfficersinPeaceSupportOperations:TheResultsofFieldResearchintheSudan.African Journal of Conflict Resolution,9(3),p.54.
2 ThePRS,launchedinApril2008,istheGovernmentofLiberia’sdonor-fundedpost-conflictplantoreducethedriversofconflictandbringLiberiatoabaselineofself-sustaineddevelopmentalongfourmajorpillars(I–ConsolidatingPeaceandSecurity;II–RevitalizingtheEconomy;III–StrengtheningGovernanceandtheRuleofLaw;andIV–RehabilitatingInfrastructureandDeliveringBasicServices).Acopyofthedocumentisavailableat:<http://www.emansion.gov.lr/content.php?sub=Final%20PRS&related=PRS>.
3 ForanexcellentdiscussionandcritiqueofUNMIL’sapproachtopeacekeeping-peacebuilding,seeGray-Johnson,Wilfred(2009)AssessingtheUnitedNationsApproachtoPost-conflictPeacebuildinginAfrica:TheMissioninLiberia.Conflict Trends,3,pp.11–18.
4 UNMILForceHqConceptofOperationsfortheConductofOperationsbytheUNMILForceforthePeriod1January2008–31December2008,p.3.
5 DeConing,Cedric(2010)Civil-MilitaryRelationsandUNPeacekeepingOperations.World Politics Review,19May2010,4.
6 UN-CIMIC,Civil-MilitaryCoordinationinUNIntegratedPeacekeepingMissions,Ref.2010.2,UnitedNationsDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations,DepartmentofFieldSupport,October2010,5.
7 UNMILForceHqCIMICForceDirectivefortheConductofCIMICbytheUNMILForcefortheDrawdownPhase,Version2,15June2009,6.
8 Momudu,Sulaiman(2008)It’sNotAboutUs…UNMIL Focus,September–November,30.
9 UnitedNations(2010)Peacebuilding Review.Newyork:UnitedNationsPeacebuildingSupportOffice,October2010,esp.pp.9–14.
conflict trends I 53conflict trends I 53
SouthSudan is thenewestnation in theworld,with
independencegainedon9July2011.Thenewcountry
isnowfacedwithenormouschallengesthatneedto
beaddressedbyacomprehensivepeacebuildingprocess.The
SouthSudancontextalsopresentsanarrayofopportunities
fortheUnitedNations(UN)peacekeepingmissiontoenhance
itssupport to theSouthSudanesepeacebuildingprocess,
particularly throughengagementwithcivilsociety.Moses
John,ExecutiveDirectoroftheSudaneseOrganisationfor
NonviolenceandDevelopment(SONAD),sharedhisviews
ontheSouthSudanesepeacebuildingprocessandtherole
thattheUNMissioninSouthSudan(UNMISS)canplayin
thisregard.
Conflict Trends: How do you see the role that peacekeepers
are playing currently in South Sudan?
John:SouthSudan isnownearlyonemonthasanation
andhasverylittleexperienceoftheroleofpeacekeepersin
consolidatingpeace. Ibelieve thatUNpeacekeepershave
played a mostly positive role in peacebuilding in South
Sudan.UNpeacekeeperswereabletofollowthewithdrawal
of forces between South and North Sudan in accordance
withtheComprehensivePeaceAgreement(CPA)timelines.It
establishedmediaforpeace,suchasRadioMirayaFM,which
isawidelytrustedradiothatprovidesreliableinformationand
haswiderconnectionswiththecommunitiesintheremote
villagesofSouthSudan.Thepeacekeepersalsoprovided
logistical support in termsof flights, carsandsometimes
othermeansof transport topeacestakeholders, including
interVieW
Practitioners‘ PersPectiVes on the PeacekeePing-Peacebuilding nexus1
The relat ionship between peacekeeping and
peacebuilding has gained increasing attention by those
who want to understand post-conflict environments
and international interventions better. Opportunities
to understand the peacekeeping-peacebuilding nexus
are most often presented to practitioners who directly
implement mechanisms to deal with conflict and post-
conflict environments. As such, it is important to learn
how practitioners understand the peacekeeping and
peacebuildingrelationship–particularlyconcerningroles,
responsibilitiesandopportunities.Thus,theAfricanCentre
for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
interviewed three representatives from different sectors
whoaredirectlyinvolvedwithpracticalissuesthatpertain
tothepeacekeeping-peacebuildingnexus.Theinterviewees
includearepresentativefromaSouthSudanesecivilsociety
organisation,arepresentativefromtheDemocraticRepublic
of theCongo (DRC)government,anda representativeof
international non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
workingonpeacekeepingandpeacebuildingpolicyissues.
MosesJohnExecutivedirector,SudaneseOrganisation
forNonviolenceanddevelopment
AC
CO
RD
54 I conflict trends
themilitaryandmembersofthepoliticalparties,fordialogue
meetingswithinSouthSudanandbetweenSouthSudanand
NorthSudan.It’sworthnotingthatpeacekeeperswereable
todocumenthumanrightsviolationsthatoccurredinSouth
Sudan,althoughverylittlechangehappenedasaresultof
UNreports.Theyalsoprovidedsecurityandlogisticalsupport
before,duringandaftertheApril2010generalelectionand
thereferendumheldinJanuary2011.
DespitethepositiverolesplayedbypeacekeepersinSouth
Sudan, therearealsosomenegativeaspects.Thegeneral
populationperceivesthemaspassiveforces,astheycando
verylittle–especiallyduringintercommunalconflicts,where
hundredsofliveswerelostinSouthSudan.Someofthese
killingsoccurredright in frontofUNpeacekeepingforces,
yettheywereunabletodoanythingastheydidnothavethe
mandatetointervene.Somepeacekeeperswerealsoaccused
ofsexualexploitationandrelatedhumanrightsviolations.
WiththeappointmentofHildeJohnsonastheUNChief
in theRepublicofSouthSudan,wewillseepeacekeepers
playamuchgreaterrolethanbefore,fortwomainreasons.
First,themandategivenisclear:tosupportandstrengthen
thecapacityofthegovernmentofSouthSudantodevelop
andmaintainpoliticaldiversity,respectfordemocraticand
humanrightsprinciplesandtoconsolidatepeacefollowing
the CPA. Second, Johnson has earned the confidence of
thepeopleandgovernmentofSouthSudanforplayingan
activeroleduringtheCPAnegotiationsinNaivasha,Kenya,
andhasspearheadedthedonorconferencetosupportSudan
followingtheCPA.
Conflict Trends: How can peacekeepers better support longer-
term peacebuilding processes in South Sudan?
John:Iwanttostressoneaspectonly:workinpartnership
with the local peace actors! This includes youth groups,
women’s groups, traditional leaders or chiefs, religious
bodies, political parties and the local government.
Peacekeepersshouldallowthelocalpopulationtoownthe
workifitistobesustained.Otherwise,theworkhaltsbythe
timethepeacekeepers’mandateends.Peacekeepersmust
bereadytolearnthelocalconflictdynamicsfromthelocal
people,notjustfrominformationtheyreadontheInternet.
MostinformationontheInternetabouttheconflictinSouth
SudaniswrittenbypeopleintheSudanesediaspora–and
on theground.Strengthening thecapacityof localactors
isalong-terminvestmentforpeace.Also,respectforlocal
resources,culturesandtraditionsisimportant.
Conflict Trends: How can local capacities be more involved in
the peacebuilding tasks that the UN mission is implementing?
John: There should be clear policy in terms of the work
thatthelocalandinternationalorganisationsshouldfollow,
includingtheUN.TheUNpeacebuildingtasksshouldsearch
forappropriatepartnerstoworkwith, includingministries
thatarefocusedonpeaceanddefenceissues.Thereshould
beaconsortiumof localandinternationalNGOsinvolved.
Internationalorganisationsshould implementactivities in
partnershipwithlocalorganisations.
Conflict Trends: In the eventual drawdown of the mission,
what are the main priority areas that need to be addressed by
the mission?
John: Ensure sustainability of the work of the mission
throughempoweredlocalactors.Withdrawalshouldbedone
inphases,not justwhen themission’smandatecomes to
anend.
The DRC case provides a real example of a very
complexpeacebuildingprocessinAfrica.Célestin
CibalonzaByaterana,Directorof theOfficeof the
Minister of Interior and Safety in the DRC, shared his
views about the country and his perspectives on what
roletheUNstabilisationmissionintheDRCcanplayin
theCongolesepeacebuildingprocess,particularlywith
regardtotheinvolvementoflocalactors.
Confl ict Trends: How do you see the role that
peacekeepers are playing currently in the DRC?
Byaterana: IntheDRC,theBlueHelmetsoftheUnited
Nations Organization Stabilisation Mission in the DRC
(MONUSCO) play a peacekeeping role in maintaining
peace with their interventions to handle hostilities on
theground.Thisrole isusually toprotectciviliansand
restoresecurityintheprovinces.
Conflict Trends: How can peacekeepers better support
longer-term peacebuilding processes in the DRC?
Byaterana: The DRC government has set up a
structure called the Framework for the Stabilisation
and Reconstruction of Post-conflict zones in Eastern
Congo (STAREC), in partnership with MONUSCO.
CélestinCibalonzaByaterana
directoroftheOfficeoftheMinisterofInteriorandSafetyinthedRC
This structure has been set up to faci l i tate the
population’s reintegration by creating better living
conditionsinpost-conflictareas(buildingroads,houses,
andsoon).Through this initiativeand thesubsequent
partnership,MONUSCOcancontinuetosupportlonger-
termpeacebuildingprocessesinthecountry.
Conflict Trends: How can local capacities be more
involved in the peacebuilding tasks that the UN mission is
implementing?
Byaterana:Forlocalcapacitiestobeinvolvedinrestoring
peace, they have to be directly associated with the
peacebuildingprocess.Theymustbeinvolvedinidentifying
problemsand inproposingsolutions to theseproblems.
Civilsocietysupportsthegovernmentinthepopularisation
ofpeacebuildingprocessesandassiststhepopulationto
understand and grasp these efforts. They also support
MONUSCOinitsmandatetosecurepost-conflictregions
andassistwiththeprovisionofinformationtofacilitatethe
mission’swork.
Conflict Trends: In the eventual drawdown of the
mission, what are the main priority areas that need to be
addressed by the mission?
Byaterana:Themainpriorityareasincludestrengthening
the state’s authority, peacebuilding, improving living
conditions for the population and creating an ongoing
dialogue on issues that affect the population in all
sectors (including security, employment, the economy
andculture).
conflict trends I 55
CedricdeConingResearchFellow,aCCORdandtheNorwegian
InstituteofInternationalaffairs(NUPI)
The relationship between peacekeeping and
peacebuilding is particularly important at the
level of policy development. Cedric de Coning,
Research Fellow at ACCORD and NUPI, shared his
views on the relationship between peacekeeping and
peacebuilding,particularlytheevolutionoftheseconcepts
and therelationshipand the impact theywillhave in the
developmentofmechanisms fordealingmoreefficiently
withconflictsandpost-conflictenvironments.
Conflict Trends: How do you see the role of peacekeeping
operations in supporting longer-term peacebuilding
processes?
deConing:Peacekeepingoperationsthataremandatedto
supporttheimplementationofpeaceagreementstypically
support the first threecrucial stagesofapeaceprocess,
namely the stabilisation, transition and consolidation
phases.Theyhelptoensureasecureenvironmentwithin
whichthetransitioncanunfold.Theyfacilitatethetransition
process during which new political and governance
arrangementsarenegotiatedandimplemented.Andonce
thenewpost-conflictarrangementsareinplaceandtherisk
ofrelapseisatacceptablelevels,peacekeepingoperations
drawdown,handovertheirresponsibilitiesandwithdraw.
The peace consolidation process, and various forms of
internationalsupport, continues after the withdrawal of
the peacekeeping mission. The core point is, thus, that
peacebuildingdoesnot comeafterpeacekeeping; rather,
peacekeeping is a tool that the international community
should use during the first phases of a peacebuilding
process.
Thepeacekeepingperiod typically represents, invery
genericterms,one-quartertoone-thirdofthelonger-term
peacebuildingprocess;thatis,averyroughruleofthumb
couldbethatifapeacekeepingoperationwasdeployedfor
eightyears, theoverallpeacebuildingprocess is likely to
continueforanother24to32years.
Conflict Trends: How can current peacekeeping operations
be strengthened further within a peacebuilding process?
deConing:Peacekeepingoperationscanbestrengthened
bydevelopingassessment,analysis,planning,management
and evaluation approaches, mechanisms and tools that
AC
CO
RD
56 I conflict trends56 I conflict trends conflict trends I 56
CONFLICT TRENDS
Editor-In-Chief
VasuGounden
ManagingEditor
VenashriPillay
LanguageEditor
HaleyHarvey
design&Layout
ImminsNaudé
Contributors
IngridMarieBreidlid
KristenA.Cordell
DianaFelixdaCosta
GustavodeCarvalho
DorcasEttang
JenniferM.Hazen
ChristopherHolshek
JohnKarlsrud
AndreasØienStensland
aCCORd’sPeacekeepingandPeacebuildingUnits’teamsareacknowledgedfortheirassistanceinplanningthisIssue.
Publisher
TheAfricanCentreforthe
ConstructiveResolutionofDisputes
(ACCORD)
PrivateBagx018
UmhlangaRocks4320
SouthAfrica
Tel:+27-031-5023908
Fax:+27-031-5024160
Email:[email protected]
Website:<www.accord.org.za>
ACCORDisanon-governmental,
non-alignedconflictresolution
institutionbasedinDurban,South
Africa.Theinstitutionisconstituted
asaneducationaltrust.Views
expressedinthispublicationare
theresponsibilityoftheindividual
authorsandnotofACCORD.
ConflictTrendsisaquarterly
publication.Backissuescanbe
downloadedfromtheACCORD
websiteat<www.accord.org.za>
ISSN1561-9818
PrintingColourPlanet,Durban,SouthAfrica
are able to cope with the complex social
change processes they are meant to
influence. This implies processes that
can monitor, adapt and co-evolve with
the highly dynamic, non-linear and
complex systems we are dealing with.
Too often, we are narrowly applying
borrowedcausaltheoriesofchange,andare
blindtotheireffects,includingthenegative
andunintendedsideeffectsthatundermine
the very goals and objectives that these
missionshavebeenmandatedtoachieve.
Conflict Trends: As external actors,
peacekeeping operations face challenges
between short- and long-term measures
in their work. In this context, two of these
challenges include: determining the
departure of the peacekeeping missions,
and the benchmarks that they need to reach
before they can depart. How do you see
these apparent contradictions and challenges
faced by peacekeeping operations?
de Coning: A peacekeeping operation
should be evaluated against the extent
to which it contributes to long-term self-
sustainable peace consolidation. Pursuing
shorter-termgoalsthatgenerateinstitutions
which merely mirror internat ional
benchmarksareperverse.Peacekeeping is
not an end in itself. Peacekeeping is only
an initial security guarantee and change
catalyst. Its role is limited to providing
externalstimulustowhathastobealocal
change process. It should only intervene,
as a last resort, to avoid a relapse into
violentconflict.Theprimaryprinciple that
shouldinformpeacekeepingdesignisthus
the recognition that, for peacebuilding to
achieveself-sustainablepeaceconsolidation,
ithastobeanindigenousprocess.
Robustsocialsystemsthatareresilient
enough to cope with major political and
socialchange,withoutrelapsingintoviolent
conflict, cannot develop in a few short
years. Societies need time to generate,
absorb,adaptandrefinenewsocialnorms,
andtointegratetheseintonewinstitutions
grounded in, and interlinked with, the
network of indigenous systems. It thus
follows that, for such transitions to be
sustainable, these change processes have
to be at a pace that can be meaningfully
absorbedbythelocalsociety.
Endnotes1 Interviewswereconductedon7–12August
2011byGustavodeCarvalhoandDorcas
EttangofACCORD.
AC
CO
RD