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CONGO – FIRST AFRICAN WAR AND INDIAN SOLDIERS (1960-64)

KK Sharma

Background

The UN Operation in the Congo (Operation des Nations Unies au Congo or

ONUC) from July 1960 to June 1964 was one of the largest peace-keeping

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operations established by the UN, in terms of the complex responsibilities, the size of

area of operation and the number of peacekeepers involved. Democratic Republic of

Congo (Zaire during Mobutu rule) is the third largest country in Africa with an area of

about 1 million square miles. This country also has an important strategic position

and is exceptionally rich in minerals, much of them found and extracted in the

province of Katanga, inviting a special interest of its neighbours and colonisers. The

inhabitants of this Republic comprise more than 200 tribes, nearly 13.5 million out of

a population of 14 million, who are fiercely loyal to their tribal chiefs and engaged in

life-long feuds with neighbours.

The Belgian administration practiced a policy of paternalism which gave the

indigenous population one of the highest living standards on the continent, but little

political and educational advancement. In 1959, the Belgian Government announced

her intention to prepare the Country for independence and embarked upon a radical

decolonisation plan. Elections to the municipal and territorial councils were held in

December 1959 followed by a round – table conference of the Congolese in Brussels

in January 1960. During this conference Belgium agreed to grant independence to

the country on 30 June 1960.

This was followed by acrimonious debates and resultant tenuous compromise,

whereby the two rival dominant Congolese leaders were elected to two key positions

in a new political structure. Mr Joseph Kasavubu became President of the Republic

with Mr Patrice Lumumba taking over as a Prime Minister. Interestingly, both were to

find different global backers as the conflict arose with the former moving into Western

or American camp and the latter aligning with the Soviet policies.

On 29 June 1960, in a clever manoeuvre to retain its stranglehold on the

mineral rich country, a treaty of friendship, assistance and cooperation was signed

(but never ratified) between Belgium and Congo. Under this treaty, most of the

Belgian administrative and technical personnel were to remain in Congo. But the

most controversial clauses of the treaty pertained to the provision of two military

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bases at Kamina and Kitona, which were ceded to Belgium. It also cleverly stipulated

that the Belgian Government could, at the request of the Congolese Government, call

out the Belgian troops from these bases to assist the latter in maintaining law and

order. Belgium hoped that with this large assistance and the guarantees, it would be

possible to ensure a smooth transition from colonial status to independence and still

retain her control on the mineral riches. Its main hope lay in the Force Publique, the

Army with a strength of over 25,000, which had maintained law and order in the

country in a ruthless yet effective manner during the colonial times and which was to

continue to be commanded by Belgium’s Lieutenant General Emile Janssens, with an

all Belgian officers corps1.

Dr Ralph Bunchea was sent to Congo by the UN Secretary-General in June

1960 to ascertain the economic requirements of the new State and was later

appointed as the special UN Representative (equivalent to the present Special

Representative of the Secretary General) in Congo. Confusion enveloped the country

soon after independence as great expectations of the common people appeared to

have been belied. The euphoria of independence rapidly vanished and tribal violence

broke out at Luluabourg in Kasai. It was preceded by the mutiny of 25,000 soldiers of

the Congolese army (Force Publique), entirely officered by the Belgians. On 4 July

1960, the Congolese troops at Camp Hardy in Thysville demanded the expulsion of

all the Belgian military officers from the Force Publique, and increase in the pay of the

troops. Soon a mutiny broke out in the Leopoldville (now Kinshasa) garrison and

spread to several other cities in the country. As some mutineers attacked Belgians

and other Europeans and also committed atrocities, most Belgian administrators and

technicians fled the country, which led to the collapse of a number of essential

services throughout the country.

The Belgian Ambassador to Congo repeatedly urged Prime Minister Lumumba

to request the assistance of Belgian troops under the friendship treaty, but Lumumba,

a Dr Ralph Bunche was an American political scientist and diplomat who received the Nobel Peace Prize for his mediation in Palestine. He was closely involved with the drafting of the Charter of the United Nations. He was appointed as the Special Representative to oversee the UN commitments in Congo by the Secretary General.

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by now hostile to the Western influence in his country, refused. He attempted to

regain control of the Force Publique by agreeing to the Congolese soldiers’ demand

for reforms. He renamed the Force Publique as the Army Nationale Congolaise

(ANC), dismissed General Janssens and appointed Victor Lundula as Commander of

the Army and Colonel Joseph Mobutu as its Chief of Staff2. Ralph Bunche meanwhile

strongly advised the Belgian Ambassador not to call in Belgian troops without the

prior agreement of the Congolese Government. He also advised the Congolese

Government to request for technical assistance of military nature from the UN, which

was agreed to and a formal request to the UN Secretary-General was sent on 10 July

1960. The request was for the specific purpose of calling in experts and technicians,

who could assist Congolese government in developing and strengthening the national

army for national defence.

Belgium in the meanwhile sent its troops into Congo for the declared purpose

of restoring law and order and protecting Belgian nationals. Resultant clashes with

the Congolese forces increased the level of tension and disorder in the nation. In a

well planned move, Moise Tshombe, the provincial president of mineral rich Katanga,

proclaimed the secession on 11 July 1960. Kasai province under King Mulopwe

Albert Kalonji, followed suit and declared its independence. Alarmed at the breaking

of their country, President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba together sent a

joint telegram to the UN Secretary-General on 12 July 1960 requesting UN military

assistance. The main request was “to protect the national territory of the Congo

against the external aggression which was a threat to international peace”. They

further clarified that they were not asking for aid to restore the internal situation but to

respond to Belgian aggression3.

On 13 July 1960, the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld responded by

invoking Article 99 of the UN Charter – which empowers the Secretary-General ‘to

bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may

threaten international peace and security’. The Secretary-General, relying on the

lessons of first UN Emergency Force in Gaza, recommended establishment of a UN

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peacekeeping force to assist the Congolese Government in maintaining law and

order until its own national security force was able to meet these tasks. He assumed

that in the face of the UN action, the Belgian Government would withdraw its forces.

The Security Council adopted Resolution 143(1960), calling upon the Government of

Belgium to withdraw its forces from Congolese territory and decided “ to authorise the

Secretary-General to take necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of

the Republic of Congo, to provide such military assistance as might be necessary”.

While its original mandate as outlined in Security Council Resolution 143

(1960) remained valid, ONUC was given new responsibilities and new tasks during

the four years of its operation4. These tasks emerged out of the changing ground

situations and the operations on Congo can be briefly grouped under the following

four phases: -

Phase-I (July – August 1960) included restoration of law and withdrawal of

Belgian forces.

Phase-II (September 1960 – September 1961) covered the constitutional

crisis; sacking of the President by the Prime Minister and vice-versa.

Phase-III (September 1961 – February 1963) was the enforcement of the

mandate, restoration of freedom of movement by the UN forces and

termination of the secession of Katanga.

Phase-IV (February 1963 – June 1964) was consolidation of the Congolese

Government and withdrawal of the UN force.

Katanga and the Mercenaries

The UN Security Council had issued various resolutions calling for the

withdrawal of Belgian forces and had opposed the secession of Katanga. However,

Tshombe ignored international sanctions and hired white mercenaries, led by a

former Belgian Colonel “Black Jack” Schramme. Colonel Schramme was sent to

Kasimba, in northern Katanga, where he recruited teenage soldiers from the local

tribes to form his “Leopard Group”. They were the nucleus of what later became the

infamous “10 Commando”. Belgian Major Crèvecoeur, was contracted by Tshombe

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to create a Katangan Gendarmerie. This para-military arm was based upon Belgian

junior officers and police. The gendarmerie numbered nearly 10.000, with 400 original

mercenaries and they were formed into three battalions. These included 5

Commando under Mike Hoare, 6 Commando under the Frenchman Bob Denard, and

Schramme’s 10 Commando. Equipped with weapons and uniforms of the

gendarmerie, they acted as an elite spearhead, forming mobile groups and operating

in columns of eight to nine jeeps. Schramme, Denard and Hoare were commissioned

majors in the Katangan Army, later appointed Colonels. Crèvecoeur and several

other Belgian staff officers were, however, officially appointed as “technical

assistants” to Tshombe and his staff.

Most of the mercenaries were Belgian ex-servicemen recruited in Brussels,

while others had answered advertisements in Johannesburg, Salisbury and

Bulawayo. Some were Frenchmen who had seen service in Algeria while others were

British. Only on arrival were they issued with their service contracts. The mercenaries

were tough men, physically fit, who had joined up for a variety of personal and

political motives. They were present in Elizabethville, Kolwezi, Jadotville and

Albertville (Kalémié), and generally confined their presence to the areas where the

UN forces were not deployed.

Secession and Reinforcement of Katanga

During the latter half of 1960 and early 1961, Moise Tshombe was successfully

reinforcing his military capabilities in Katanga. He was determined to equip Katanga

Air Force with aircrafts and he allegedly purchased nine CM-170 Magisters from

France. On 15 February 1961, a Boeing YC-97 transport was flown by mercenary

pilots Joseph Deulin and Magain and only three of these Magisters were delivered in

Kolwezi. Jan Zumbach (“Mr Brown”), a Polish pilot serving in RAF during World War

II, was contracted to organize and command a KAT - also known as “Avikat” – AT-6-

unit5. The main base of Avikat was Luano airfield. KAT Magisters apparently became

operational during July 1961. By October 1961, the Avikat was reinforced with five

Dornier Do.28As alleged to have been procured from West Germany with South

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African contacts. In late 1961, Katanga also organized its own airline, called Air

Katanga, equipped with one DC-3 Dakota aircraft6.

On 4 April 1961, the Katangese regained the airport at Elisabethville from the

Swedish component and on 7 April 1961 at Manono there was a battle with Ethiopian

ONUC-contingent, leaving several soldiers killed. In the meantime, the Tshombe was

busy building up his military strength and also took a delivery of five Piper Carribeans

from South Africa and a number of paratroopers from the disbanded unit arrived from

Algeria. On 14 April 1961, ONUC was firmly authorised to use force in pursuit of its

goal of retaining the unity of Congo. Increasing the UN role in Katanga, Brigadier KAS

Raja was appointed as the UN commander Katanga with Headquarters in

Elizabethville. Main elements of the Indian Brigade Group Headquarters were located

at Albertville under the command of Lieutenant Colonel MG Hazari, officiating as

Deputy Commander of the Brigade. Later on Colonel VL Sathe joined the Brigade in

September 1961 as a Deputy Commander and took over these duties

The week of September 1961 brought many catastrophes for the UN. The

Secretary-General was negotiating with the national political groups and finally left for

Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) on 17 September 1961, in a DC-6 aircraft along

with his advisers and escort party. He was scheduled to meet Moise Tshombe in

Ndola (in what is now Zambia), for talks to end the ongoing fighting in Southern

Katanga. The aircraft met with a mysterious accident on the border between Katanga

and Northern Rhodesia, bringing to a tragic end to the life of brilliant peacekeeper –

Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld and his 16 other members of the team. Secretary-General

1 The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping, (New York: 1990), pp.215-2172 Ibid, pp.217-183 ibid, p.2194 UNSC. Resolution Adopted by the Security-Council at its 873rd Meeting on 13 July 1960. Document S/4387, 14 July 1960.

5 “CONTINENT ABLAZE; The Insurgency Wars in Africa, 1960 to the Present”, by John W. Turner, Arms and Armour Press, 1998 (ISBN: 1-85409-128-X)6 "AIR WARS AND AIRCRAFT; A Detailed Record of Air Combat, 1945 to the Present", by Victor Flintham, Arms and Armour Press, 1989 (ISBN: 0-85368-779-X)

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Dag Hammarskjöld lost his life on 17 September 1961 in the crash of his airplane on

the way to Ndola where talks were to be held for the cessation of hostilities (as per

the ONUC web site). The accident still haunts everyone from that era for its mystery7 ,

as the Secretary-General was the only one recognized after the accident as his

body/he was thrown out, while others were charred with the aircraft. It was a true

sacrifice in search of peace by an ardent believer of the instrument of UN

peacekeeping.

In a brief piece written for a radio program in 1953, Dag Hammarskjöld

had spoken of the influence of his parents: "From generations of soldiers and

government officials on my father's side I inherited a belief that no life was more satisfactory than

one of selfless service to your country - or humanity. This service required a sacrifice of all

personal interests, but likewise the courage to stand up unflinchingly for your convictions. From

scholars and clergymen on my mother's side, I inherited a belief that, in the very radical sense of

the Gospels, all men were equals as children of God, and should be met and treated by us as our

masters in God8."

30 years later, the Chairman of the Truth Commission in South Africa,

Archbishop Desmond Tutu released documents he said suggested, a Western plot

was behind the death of the head of the United Nations in 1961. “The commission

has discovered...documents discussing the sabotage of the aircraft in which the U.N.

Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold died on the night of September 17 to 18,

1961,” Tutu told a news conference. “We have been unable to investigate the veracity

of these documents and of allegations that South Africa or other Western intelligence

agencies were involved in bringing about the air crash,” he said.

The documents came from the South African Institute for Maritime Research

(SAIMR) - said to be a front company for the South African military. These documents

included the references to the meeting of US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and

the British MI5 security service and stated, “In a meeting between MI5, special

operations executive and the SAIMR, the following emerged,” reads one document

7 Not all of the details of the crash are known; for in-depth discussions see Gavshon, The Last Days of Dag Hammarskjöld and Thorpe, Hammarskjöld: Man of Peace.8 Aulén, Gustaf, Dag Hammarskjöld's White Book: An Analysis of "Markings". Philadelphia, Fortress, 1969.

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marked Top Secret, “it is felt that Hammarskjold should be removed.” “I want his

removal to be handled more efficiently than was Patrice (Lumumba),” the document

said. The CIA opened its files on Cold War assassinations in 2002, and admitted it

ordered the murder of Patrice Lumumba. Another letter headed “Operation Celeste”

gives details of orders to plant explosives in the wheel bay of an aircraft primed to go

off as the wheels were retracted on takeoff. Hammarskjold and 15 other people were

killed when their aircraft had just about gained height over then Northern Rhodesia,

now Zambia. “We have it on good authority that UNO will want to get its greedy paws

on the province,” reads a letter dated July 12, 19609.

While the ONUC officials were still recovering from the aftermath of the

accident, the UN command in Katanga had no options but to accept late Secretary-

General’s direction to cease-fire immediately. As envisaged under the cease-fire

agreement, the prisoners were exchanged by both sides. Post office and Radio

Katanga in Elizabethville were restored to the Katanga authority. Local civil

authorities and the Katangese Gendarmerie were permitted entry in Elizabethville

airfield and some other places in Katanga. Thus the ‘Status Quo Ante’ was restored;

resulting in Tshombe becoming more confident and increasingly aggressive than ever

before. In early October 1961, a strong anti-UN Campaign was organised by

interested parties in the neighbouring countries of Angola, Brazzaville Congo,

Rhodesia and South Africa and funds were also collected to aid these campaigns. At

the same time Premier Adoula assailed the cease-fire agreement between the UN

and the Katanga Government, and announced that his Government would resort to

its own means to put an end to the secession of Katanga. On 20 October, 5000 ANC

troops made their first bid to that effect by attacking the Gendarmerie in North

Katanga. Although they gained some initial successes and stationed themselves in

Albertville, their offensive did not last for a very long time.

Enlargement of UN Enforcement Action through Air

Involvement of Fouga aircraft in attacking UN positions and other mysterious

sightings of aircraft in the skies of Katanga, forced the UN to induct its own combat air

9 Reuters, August 19, 1998

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element in Congo. The UN air component was constituted under command of Air

Commodore Morrison, from the Royal Canadian Air Force and consisted of six Indian

Air Force (IAF) Canberra, four Ethiopian Air Force American F-86F Sabres. Later on

three Saab J-29B Tunnan fighters and two S-29C unarmed reconnaissance fighters

of Swedish Air Force F22 Squadron also joined the force. 16 AMI C-119s and a

combined UN Dakota squadron commanded by Wing Commander KL Suri and later

under Wing Commander R Singh with crew members of different air forces were also

available to the UN for the transport fleet.

No. 5 Squadron of the Indian Air Force (IAF), known as “Tuskers”, led Indian

air components in the volatile situation of Congo in the 1960s. The unit had six

Canberra B (I) MK-58 fighter aircraft with the aircrew and ground support personnel10.

The Squadron was commanded by Wing Commander AIK Suares. The first

contingent accompanying four out of the six aircraft from the Squadron left Agra and

flew to Jamnagar on 9 October 1961, to the tunes of Para Brigade band. First group

left the Indian shores on the 11 October 1961 and landed at Aden in Yemen which

was their first transit point. From Aden they flew to Nairobi, a three hours journey

which was extremely challenging as they flew over a very difficult terrain. On 12

October 1961, the contingent reached Leopoldville in Congo, after which Wing

Commander AIK Suares and his team reported to Air Commodore Morrison and were

inducted into the Mission immediately11.

After arriving in Congo, the Canberra team adopted an intensive flying

schedule to familiarise themselves with the environment around. The Squadron was

given its area of responsibility over the most hostile and troublesome southern

Katanga aligned with the Indian ground forces. The Canberras practiced low level

(500 feet) and night flying over the area of operations. They started their operations

by attacking and destroying certain mercenary positions in the strategically significant

town of Kolwezi. The rebels had a substantial air component which comprised old

10 Chris Wren, “The Canberras in Congo”, the Indian Air Force Golden Jubilee Report; pp.78-80 11 Official report of the Indian Air Force on IPKF in Congo in support of United Nations in 1961, pp.1

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aircraft including Fouga, which posed a great danger to the UN freedom of movement

in the area. The Squadron was given the task of locating and destroying this air

component.

The Canberras repeatedly raided Katangan targets and were instrumental in

providing the much needed long range air support to the UN Katanga ground forces.

Some of targets were 1,000 kilometres away and the route had with an intense cloud

cover over. The pilots used many ingenious methods to lead themselves on to the

targets. The pilots used a prominent lake, to the west of Kolwezi and then combined

this land mark with some old map-reading over the final leg to the airfield, using the

Green Satin airborne navigation aid. In one of the air to air combat actions, the

Squadron Commander made a bold decision of making an air dive through the cloud

and went over to an altitude of 400 feet over the surface of the lake, while chasing

and attacking Katangan Fouga aircraft12. Wing Commander Suares carried out this

daring yet risky engagement profile, using 20mm cannon. This was followed by

another attack by Flight Lieutenant Gautam, which surprised the unsuspecting Fouga

pilot and resulted in the destruction of CM-170 Fouga Magister aircraft. By the efforts

of these two officers, the IAF was able to establish a near air supremacy over the

skies of Elizabethville and Kamina.

After much persuasion, finally the Belgian Government issued a communiqué

on 6 November 1961, warning all Belgian citizens that if they continued to serve in

Katangese forces, their passports would be withdrawn. This resulted in many Belgian

officers leaving Katanga. However, Tshombe intensified his anti-UN campaign and

started hectic preparations for a show-down with the UN causing violence in many

areas. The law and order situation in the whole of Katanga deteriorated immensely in

November 1961. The acting UN Secretary-General, U Thant, adopted a tough policy

towards Katanga and refused to be influenced by the power politics in New York. This

gave the UN in Congo operational freedom to react in the mission as per a situation.

On 17 November 1961 he signed an agreement with the Congolese Foreign Minister,

12 Vayu, Jan 2006; pp.119-24.

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Mr. Bomboko, giving the UN troops and officials full freedom of movement throughout

Congo. On the other hand, sporadic attacks on the UN continued. In one such

incident, while attempting to save two kidnapped UN civilian representatives from

Katangan troops, Major Ajit Singh of 1/3 GR risked his own life. Along with his driver,

this brave officer engaged the mercenaries in a gun battle in order to provide security

to the unarmed civilian UN personnel, finally succumbing to the bullet injuries

sustained during the fire-fight; however, not before he had extricated all civilians and

seen to their security and safety.

Operation UNOKAT

From 2 December 1961 onwards the number of violent incidents increased

and ultimately led to open hostilities. The Gendarmerie started attacking the UN

troops and set up road-blocks in various areas. Katanga was also experiencing the

full impact of the new Secretary-General’s strong policy. Heavy reinforcements were

sent to Katanga from all other parts of Congo in order to take immediate and forceful

action against the Gendarmerie. The UN Air Force was also boosted with the joining

of four F-86 jets from Ethiopia. The ONUC forces were divided into two groups to

facilitate operational command and control. The ONUC launched Operation UNOKAT

with the aim of attaining the freedom of movement of the UN forces and capture of

strategic points.

As a part of Operation UNOKAT, air element was used effectively for the first

time in a planned manner by the Indian Brigade Group against the rebels. The

operation was launched on 5 December 1961. The IAF Canberras were tasked to

attack the airfields at Jadotville and Kolwezi. Wing Commander AIK Suares had first

to find the most identifiable lake due west of Kolwezi, and then map-read over the

final leg to the airfield. With a cloud base at only 120 metres above the surface of the

lake, flying was hazardous. Just as the Canberras arrived over Kolwezi, a light

transport aircraft was seen taking off and rapidly disappearing into the low clouds; two

large transports were parked near the control tower, while other aircraft were parked

near the main runway. Suares strafed the parked aircraft using 20mm cannon, while

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Flight Lieutenant Bob Gautam destroyed the sole Fouga Magister on ground. The two

Canberras made two more passes, setting most of the aircraft, the control tower, and

the nearby fuel depot afire before making way for four additional Indian bombers

following their raid.

The first strike against Kolwezi was a huge success, where not only that Indian

Air Force pilots had taken out the an operational Magister, but also destroyed Do.28s,

one each of DC-3, a DC-4, Dove aircraft and disabled the second Magister. The

second strike was abandoned midway, as Suares’ Canberra was hit by ground fire

and his navigator was injured. The flight had to abandon its attack and return to

Kamina, the base of the UN Air Force. Subsequently, Wing Commander AIK Suares

with his team carried out effective offensive air support over Kolwezi. After locating

the rebel positions, the Indian Canberras carried out low-level flying sorties and

engaged these positions with cannon fire. After testing rebel reaction capability, a

deliberate offensive action was then under-taken by another team led by Flight

Lieutenant Dushyant Singh, who raided the rebel hideout in the Post Office area. The

Canberras encountered strong anti-aircraft firing from the rebels. The lead pair of the

aircraft distracted all the anti-aircraft guns, while the following aircraft destroyed road

convoys, ammunition dumps and some key locations of the rebels. In the weeks

following these attacks, the squadron made many such operational sorties around

Elizabethville. The Canberras also carried out armed reconnaissance sorties,

engaging rebel lines of communications and hideouts. The squadron had an added

capacity of photo reconnaissance, which was made full use of by the ground forces.

This included both photographic and visual reports on the conditions of bridges in

rebel held territory; movement of the rebel forces and their concentrations.

The UN forces in Katanga were engaged in active operations with the

mercenaries and Katanga armed Forces in all the sectors. Indian troops clashed with

Katangan column moving from Jadotville towards Elizabethville, near Sabena

Guesthouse. Using recoilless rifles, the Indians knocked out one M-8 Greyhound

scout car and a “home-made” Momouth tank, built on caterpillar chassis, and

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disabled several armoured trucks and other vehicles, forcing the opposition to pull

back.

During one such incident on 5 December 1961, 3/1 GR was ordered to clear a

roadblock established by the gendarmerie at a strategic roundabout at Elizabethville.

The plan in brief was that one company of the Battalion with two Swedish armoured

cars would attack the position frontally. Captain Gurbachan Singh Salaria with two

sections of his Company and two Swedish armoured personnel carriers would

advance towards this roadblock from the airfield to act as a cut-off force. Captain

Salaria and his small force came under heavy automatic and small arms fire from an

undetected enemy position dug in on his flank. The mercenaries had two armoured

cars and about 90 men opposing Captain Salaria's small force.

Captain Salaria appreciated that he had run into a subsidiary roadblock and a well

laid out ambush, and that this mercenary force might reinforce the strategic round-

about, thus jeopardising the main operation. He decided to remove this opposition on

his own. He led a charge with 16 men armed with bayonets, Khukris and grenades

supported by a rocket launcher. In this gallant engagement, Captain Salaria and his

sections killed 40 mercenary and knocked out their two armoured cars. This

unexpectedly bold action completely demoralised the opponents who fled despite

their numerical superiority and protected positions.

In the ensuing charge, Captain Salaria was wounded by a burst of

automatic fire in his neck but continued to fight till he collapsed owing to bleeding and

subsequently died of his wounds. Captain Salaria's personal example, utter disregard

for personal safety, and dauntless leadership inspired his small but gallant force of 26

soldiers to dominate the enemy and inflict heavy casualties despite the enemy's

superiority in numbers and dominating position. For his leadership, courage, and

unflinching devotion to duty and disregard for personal safety in the best traditions of

Indian Army, he was recognised by an award of ‘Param Veer Chakra’, the highest

gallantry award for bravery in war conditions, the only one so far to a soldier on UN

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Peacekeeping duties. 3/1 GR captured the round-about from the mercenaries.

Similarly, on 6 December 1961, Lance Naik Ram Bahadur of the same Battalion

distinguished himself, while fighting with his ‘B’ company for Manono position in the

same area. He single-handedly killed nine rebels who were impeding the Company

advance with a strategically sited machine gun. He rushed on to the position

fearlessely and destroyed the machine gun, but fell to the fierce firing of the rebels.

His bold action won back Manono position for the Battalion. His act of outstanding

courage and bravery was rightly rewarded with a Mahavir Chakra, the second highest

gallantry award of the Indian Army.

As the operations gained momentum, for the first time the UN Secretary

General in consultation with the Security Council gave a free hand to deal with hostile

action of the Katangese authorities13. The Secretary-General also instructed the UN

command to take whatever action was required to ensure freedom of movement of

the UN personnel and the restoration of law and order in Katanga; so that the UN

resolutions could be implemented fully. With the Operation aiming at restoring the

UN’s freedom of movement with minimum blood-shed, fighting inside Elizabethville

was scrupulously avoided by the UN. All possible attempts were made by the forces

to capture many strategic points around the city and thereby forcing the rebels to

withdraw southwards. By 19 December 1961, the UN troops succeeded in gaining all

their objectives and several positions of the Gendarmerie were occupied by them.

They also dominated the town of Elizabethville, thus breaking the backbone of rebel

resistance.

The Kitona Agreement

With the successes of the UN operations, Mr Moise Tshombe realised the

futility of fighting against the UN forces. He agreed to fly to Kitona in order to talk with

Premier Adoula; and after two days of discussions they signed a declaration where

he accepted the national constitution, recognised the ‘indissoluble unity’ of the

Republic of Congo with President Kasavubu as its Head of State. He also agreed to

13 Chakravorty, ‘Armed Forces of the Indian Union: The Congo Operation 1960-63’, p.94.

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recognise the authority of the Central Government over all parts of the Republic and

agreed to send representatives to a meeting of a Governmental Commission in

Leopoldville to study a draft constitution. He pledged to take ‘all necessary steps’ to

enable Katanga officials to perform their mandate within the Government of the

Republic, agreed to place the Katanga Gendarmerie under the authority of the

President of the Republic and pledged to implement the UN General Assembly and

Security-Council Resolutions14.

In view of the Kitona Agreement, the UN forces were issued a directive to

scale down their operations and fire only in self defence. They were to ensure

freedom of movement by extensive patrolling and suitably deal with any opposition

that may be encountered. The forces were directed to avoid destruction of civil

property and tasked to take action against any one indulging in the act of looting or

pilfering15. Unfortunately, the Kitona Agreement did not put an end to Katanga

secession and minor acts of violence between the Gendarmerie and the UN troops

continued. Politically, ONUC managed to apply steady pressure on Tshombe. It was

in the same period that the Kasai secession also ended. On 15 February 1962, the

Katanga Assembly adopted the Kitona Agreement “as a potential basis of discussion

with a view to the settlement of the Congolese Conflict”, and also authorized the

Government of Katanga to establish contact with the Central Government. From

March till June 1962, Tshombe continued talking with Prime Minister Adoula, but they

could not reach common ground. Planning to resurrect his military capabilities,

Tshombe used this pause in fighting and had flown to Geneva. Using various

intermediaries, Tshombe acquired six T-6Gs ex-USAF stocks in Belgium and after

testing them in Switzerland; these were flown to Antwerp and then delivered to

Luanda, in Angola, in May 1962. These were alleged to have been assembled by

Portuguese Air Force technicians and then flown to Kolwezi. These aircraft were

eventually distributed between airfields at Kipushi, Kolwezi, Jadotville, Kisenge and

Dilolo, well outside the UN-controlled zones16.

14 Ibid, p.102

17

Indian Troops Turn-Over

The first turn over of the Indian Independent Brigade Group took place from

March to May 1962. Major General

Dewan Prem Chand assumed the

command of Headquarters Katanga Area

on 3 May 1962, while Brigadier KAS Raja

was replaced by Brigadier RS Noronha.

The brave air force crew under Squadron

Leader Suares returned to India in April

1962 and was replaced by another set

under Wing Commander S Jena17. New

units came to Katanga and replacement was carried out in an orderly and in well

planned manner, even when sporadic skirmishes were going on with the rebels. The

task of the new Indian Air Force contingent was primarily of reconnaissance, and to

be standby for operations with the UN forces if required. Their main air base was in

Leopoldville, while they also maintained a permanent two aircraft detachment at

Kamina airfield. Air Commodore Verma took over as the over all UN Air Force

Commander from a Swedish Air Force Officer18.

4th battalion, The RAJPUTANA RIFLES (4 RAJ RIF) under Lieutenant Colonel

FP Shinde boarded the UN’s troop ship, ‘USNS Major General Blatchford’ in Bombay

on 16 March 1962 and reached Dar-es-Salam on 19 March 1962. The Battalion

thereafter travelled on trains, barges and road to finally reach Elizabethville on 28

March 1962. The Battalion relieved 1 DOGRA and was initially given the arduous task

of ‘escorting trains bringing refugees’ from Elizabethville. On 26 June 1962, one such

train was involved in a head-on collision with a goods train. Prompt actions by the

escorting soldiers’ ensured quick first aid and evacuation of injured. 4 th Battalion, the

15 ibid, p.10616 "AIR WARS AND AIRCRAFT; A Detailed Record of Air Combat, 1945 to the Present", by Victor Flintham, Arms and Armour Press, 1989 (ISBN: 0-85368-779-X)17 Chakravorty, ‘Armed Forces of the Indian Union: The Congo Operation 1960-63’, pp.1-418 Official report of the Indian Air Force on IPKF in Congo in support of United Nations in 1961, pp.1-4

Components of the Brigade Group:

Headquarters Indian Brigade Group, Squadron AMX tanks 121 Heavy Mortar Battery, 4 RAJPUTANA RIFLES (OUTRAM), 4 MADRAS, 2/5 GORKHA RIFLES, 22 Field Company Engineers, Brigade Signal Company, D Company 4 MAHAR, Medium

Machine Gun elements

18

MADRAS Regiment (4 MADRAS) under Lieutenant Colonel DS Randhawa, the next

unit to leave India, embarked at Bombay on 25 April 1962 and reached Dar-es-Salam

on 5 May 1962. The Battalion was airlifted to Elizabethville the same day. Militarily,

the situation in Katanga still continued to be full of confusion and chaos. Despite

Tshombe giving assurances, there was no freedom of movement for the UN troops in

the areas which were not held by them. 4 RAJ RIF came face to face with a violent

anti-UN demonstration on 17 July 1962, in which women and children were used by

Katangan politicians to show their anger at the UN force. The situation went out of

control; due to the firing by Katangese troops and the company of 4 RAJ RIF had to

use unusual weapons – locally fabricated baton, as well as fire in air, in order to

control the situation. Indian Army is definitely not trained to use non-lethal force or

police actions, yet the restraint shown by troops was remarkable and appreciated by

all in the UN Force Headquarters.

At the political front, in Leopoldville, the Congolese Government was engaged

in drafting a Federal Constitution in order to replace the unitary constitution, to

provide a measure of autonomy and federal governance in various provinces in the

hope that Katanga will relent from the path of confrontation. The UN Secretary-

General also thought about applying economic pressures on Katanga if it failed or

refused to yield to the UN and Central Government demands. For this purpose the

UN formulated a ‘Plan of National Reconciliation’, which was given to Tshombe and

Adoula for acceptance19. Tshombe just paid a lip service to it and instead of national

reconciliation; his troops began to strengthen themselves by enlisting new

mercenaries and procuring fresh military stores and equipment from friendly

neighbours.

On 29 August 1962, the Gendarmerie Para Commandos set up a road-block

on Martini Board junction in the capital city of Elizabethville; in a total contravention of

the standing agreements. When the efforts to persuade them to withdraw failed, two

platoons of 2nd Battalion, the Gurkha Rifles (2/5 GR) under Lieutenant Colonel ZC

19 Chakravorty, ‘Armed Forces of the Indian Union: The Congo Operation 1960-63’, p.114.

19

Bakshi made a show of exemplary courage and succeeded in driving them away.

Coincidentally, the battalion had two Victoria Cross Winners serving with the unit in

Congo (Subedar Major Gaje Ghale and Subedar Agan Singh Rai20). On 12

September 1962, some officers from 2/5 GR and a troop of Malayan Ferrets were

fired upon in the North of Elizabethville Airfield by over a hundred Gendarmerie. The

UN troops fired back in defence. Another patrol of 2/5 GR suffered casualty due to a

land mine blast, wherein two soldiers were injured. The Kitona agreement of February

1962 had given enough time for the Katanga forces to re-group and re-build

themselves to be a direct threat to the UN forces again.

Operations Jacaranda and Grand Slam

The final round of active military operations by the UN in Katanga was

triggered by an act of violence of Katanga Gendarmerie on 24 December 1962. The

rebels opened fire on the UN road-block in Elizabethville, in contravention to the

provisions of Kitona Agreement. Same day an unarmed UN helicopter on a routine

reconnaissance mission with Captain Jasbir Singh, Second Lieutenant SS Kang, two

non-commissioned officers of 121 Heavy Mortar Battery, one Norwegian Lieutenant

and a Swedish Corporal, was fired upon by the Katangese troops. The helicopter was

badly hit and force-landed in an area occupied by the Gendarmerie. All the

passengers were injured in the firing but instead of giving medical aid, they were

arrested and subjected to physical torture by the Katangese soldiers. In spite of this

grave provocation, Brigadier RS Noronha successfully negotiated release of the

helicopter and the UN personnel. Unfortunately Second Lieutenant SS Kang

succumbed to the injuries received due to crash landing and mal-treatment by the

Katanga troops21. The UN force had reached a breaking point in their self-restraint,

yet held their fire in the hope of peace.

From the last week of December 1962 onwards, the UN positions in

Elizabethville and Jadotville were fired upon repeatedly. Electricity, water connections

20 Fauji Akhbar, “Fifth peace Mission” Volume 10/12 January-June 1963.21 Chakravorty, ‘Armed Forces of the Indian Union: The Congo Operation 1960-63’, pp.117-119

20

and telephone lines linking Elizabethville with the UN areas were also cut. In a

meeting between Tshombe and the UN representatives, it was made very clear to

him that the Katangese Gendarmerie must stop firing and vacate the road-block

around Elizabethville or else the UN would be forced to take action. Instead, the firing

by Gendarmerie intensified and they even planned for night bombardment of the

airfield. Under these grave provocations, the Major general Dewan Prem Chand, the

General Officer Commanding UN Katanga Area issued orders for the implementation

of planned Operation Jacaranda; in spite of usual dithering and mixed signals from

the Force Headquarter level. The Indian Air Force component flew back to India on

12 December, thus closing its “air chapter” in India’s long and significant association

with the UN mission of peace and re-unification in Congo22.

The plan was comprised of two Phases. Phase I envisaged securing of

Gendarmerie road-block/positions around Elizabethville with a view to eliminating

Gendarmerie firing, enlarging the area of freedom of movement of UN troops and

securing whole of Elizabethville for the UN forces to concentrate on other areas.

Phase II envisaged advancing towards Kipushi and Jadotville towns, strongholds of

Katangan forces and the mercenaries. In order to carry out Phase I of Jacaranda, the

Indian Brigade Group launched an operation, code-named “Grand Slam” at 4.15 pm

on 28 December 196223. The troops moved quickly to achieve their objectives. ‘A’

company of 2/5 GR moved into the gymnasium area of Elizabethville and took it over

from the Katangese troops. 4 MADRAS secured Radio Colony area of the city,

advanced towards the outlying town of Karavia town and captured it the next day. In

spite of Gendarmerie reinforcing its positions, 4 Ethiopian Battalion with two

Companies of 2/5 GR, supported by a troop of armoured cars, captured Kasapa. 4

RAJ RIF supported by a troop of 121 Heavy Mortar Battery and a platoon of 4

MAHAR Machine Guns secured Martini Board area in Elizabethville.

22 Fauji Akhbar, “Canberras in Congo” Volume 10/7 January-June 1963.23 ibid, p.120

21

The UN troops secured Simba Hills on 29 December 1962 and after repairing

the bridge linking it over river

Kafubu by 22 Field Company,

Kipushi was also secured. 4 RAJ

RIF in the meanwhile went ahead

and secured the junction of

Kasanga road and Kilobeloba radio

station by 30 December 1962.

Thus by the evening of the same

day, the Indian Brigade Group was

successful in completing the first

phase of the operation. Swiftly, the

UN troops had captured all the

eight road-blocks in Elizabethville.

Tshombe soon saw the UN determination of ending the secession once and for all

and therefore fled to Rhodesia. The ONUC controlled postal, telephone and telegraph

offices, railways and radio stations in order to stop Tshombe’s propaganda against

the UN. 4 RAJ RIF further consolidated the UN positions on 31 December 1962 by

capturing the city’s powerhouse. There was a fierce fight for this all important

powerhouse near Lokoshi. The rebels, realising its importance, had concentrated all

their forces to save it from falling in the UN hands. The Battalion lost four brave

soldiers in the battle. A 0.50 inch machine gun still showcases the battalion prowess

in this bloody encounter and can be seen in the quarter guard of 4 RAJ RIF.

4 MADRAS was tasked to capture Jadotville, nearly 130 kilometres south west

of Elizabethville and an important mining hub for copper and cobalt. The UN troops

started advancing towards the city and encountered several Gendarmerie positions

and heavy firing on the way. With dogged determination and grit, the UN forces

captured all these positions during their advance. To reach Jadotville, two bridges

over Lufira River were of strategic importance, but these were blown up by the

retreating Katangan rebels. 4 MADRAS crossed over on a single girder and

Brave Peacekeeper – Lieutenant VP Trehan

While tackling various road blocks around Elizabethville, 4 RAJ RIF was tasked to capture airport complex and Zaruri junction from Katanga Gendarmerie. On 29 Dec 1962, Lt VP Trehan led a special patrol to distract rebel firing, while the battalion was getting into position for the final assault. The patrol party spotted a Gendarmerie position which would have caused heavy casualty on the battalion. Without wasting time in passing the information to battalion headquarter, Lt VP Trehan with his party decided to attack the rebel position and neutralize it themselves. The assault carried them into the trenches and hand-to-hand combat, but the resolve of this small patrol party forced the rebels to flee. His valiant act protected the exposed flank of the battalion, but he succumbed to his injuries, falling for peace in a country so remote from his homeland. The exceptional act of gallantry won him `Mahavir Chakra’, the second highest gallantry award in India.

22

established planned bridgehead. Soon the battalion was across the crocodile infested

river in a torrential rainy night. Next morning the great innovative spirit was put into

display, when the battalion constructed a ferry with an old raft and crossed all the

vehicles across. When the Indian Independent Brigade Group finally reached

Jadotville, most of the Gendarmes had either withdrawn towards Kolwezi or had gone

into the bush. The remaining ones were rounded up and disarmed. 4 MADRAS was

given the responsibility of security and maintenance of law and order in Jadotville,

and a company of 4 RAJ RIF was kept at the Lufira bridge site. The next plan was put

in place and on 13 January 1963, the troops advanced towards Kolwezi. Tshombe

too had arrived in Kolwezi from Rhodesia, as this was the last stronghold of the

Katangese Gendarmerie. On 14 January 1963, Brigadier RS Noronha with his

Brigade Major and a section escort visited 4 RAJ RIF positions and a blown up bridge

at Dilkulwe. The party came under accurate rebel firing. Sensing the danger to the

Commander and others, the Brigade Major, Major K Sunderji took control of the

section, directing their firing and asking the Commander to move to a safer location.

The officer with the section of 4 RAJRIF effectively neutralised the rebel firing,

showed conspicuous gallantry and presence of mind, winning him a mention-in-

despatches. The officer later rose to become Chief of the Army Staff in Indian Army.

The Indian troops broke the resolute resistance of the Katanga rebels around

Kowlezi, an important stronghold of the rebel movement. Though Kowlezi was yet to

fall to the UN forces, by 14 January 1963, Tshombe was outmanoeuvred in his

favourite game of brinkmanship, politically isolated and militarily defeated. He finally

announced the end of the Katangese secession in a letter to Premier Adoula. After

being assured of protection by the UN, Tshombe signed an agreement in

Elizabethville on 17 January 1963. The agreement was signed in the presence of

ONUC officials, who included among others Major General Dewan Prem Chand and

Brigadier RS Noronha. Tshombe undertook to order his forces everywhere not to

offer any resistance to the UN troops and to surrender all their arms to the latter.

However, in spite of the assurances and agreement, the build-up of the Indian

Brigade and other UN forces for the advance into Kolwezi continued.

“Bogie is five and you are on the green in three. Keep it up. Bogie should be in the bag, but go for the birdie and God willing birdie should not be too difficult:

- Radio message from Major genral Dewan Prem Chand to Brigadier RS Noronha, just before his entry into Kolwezi .

(Fauji Akhbar, “Katanga Chapter Ends”, Vol 13/10, January-June 1963.

23

On 19 January 1963, Brigadier RS Noronha personally led entry of the Indian

Brigade into the town of Kolwezi with the commanding officers of all three Indian

infantry battalions. It was a 321 kilometre advance, in support of peace and

tranquillity in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Within a week of arrival in Kolwezi, last

secessionist stronghold was occupied by the UN

forces without any untoward incident. On 21

January 1963, the UN announced the end of

second phase of military operations which had

begun on 28 December 1962 and declared that

the Katangese Gendarmerie had “ceased to exist”

and that “all important centres hitherto held by the Katangese” were now under UN

control. In appreciation of the brilliant service rendered by the Indian peacekeepers,

congratulatory messages came in from various quarters. The mercenary

commanders Schramme and Denard were driven out of the jungle hideouts after

which most of the Katangan Gendarmerie recruits quietly returned to their own

countries, while most of the mercenaries perhaps left for Angola. By 15 January

1963, the UN had established full control over Katanga. Tshombe went into exile in

Spain and his military commander swore an oath of allegiance to the Government of

Democratic Republic of Congo. In February 1963, after Katanga had been

reintegrated into the national territory of the Congo, a phasing out of the Force was

begun, aimed at its termination by the end of that year. At the request of the

Congolese Government, however, the General Assembly authorized the stay of a

reduced number of troops for a further six months. The Force was completely

withdrawn by 30 June 1964. Although the military phase of the United Nations

Operation in the Congo had ended, civilian aid continued in the largest single

programme of assistance undertaken until that time by the world Organization and its

agencies, with some 2,000 experts at work in the nation at the peak of the

programme in 1963-196424.

24 www.un.org

……. one day last week, Secessionist Moise Tshombe slipped out of his pink palace in Elizabethville, climbed into the back seat of a black Comet sedan, and sped off down the road toward the Northern Rhodesian border. Soon an armoured column of 500 United Nations troops was on his tail. For a moment, it looked as if the U.N. were in hot pursuit of its old foe. But no! To the astonishment of bug-eyed natives along the way, Moise was actually leading the blue helmets, urging his own tattered Katangese gendarmes to lay down their arms so the U.N. could re-open vital rail and road links. Bizarre as it was, the incident was an accurate indicator of the way things actually were going last week in the Congo's copper-rich Katanga province, where the U.N. was waging war with Tshombe's breakaway regime for the third time since September 1961. In two weeks, the tough U.N. troops had seized a steadily lengthening ribbon of rail lines and nearly every major population centre in the province. Only the western copper town of Kolwezi remained in Katanga's grip; it was defended by 2,000 boozy gendarmes, 100 of Tshombe's white mercenaries, and a smashing blonde ambulance driver known as "Madame Yvette," who sauntered about in paratroop boots, camouflage uniform, bush hat and shoulder holster. Only 50 miles from Kolwezi, Indian infantrymen probed cautiously forward, waiting only for the signal to head full blast toward the town. But the signal would not be given rashly, for the ragtag mercenaries threatened to blow up a huge dam and industrial installations, leaving the town a blackened shell. They might not be bluffing.

"I Am Back." But with full backing from the U.S. and the Afro-Asian nations, the U.N. was determined to dictate a settlement to Tshombe and make it stick. If it fails, the rest of the Congo, starved of the riches that enable Katanga to account for 65% of the country's exports, could splinter into a score of warring tribal domains. Already a corps of 100 Central Government functionaries was flying into Elizabethville to take charge of Katanga's administration. The big question mark, as usual, was the slippery Tshombe. As the week began, he was holed up defiantly in Kolwezi with the mercenaries. There were rumours that he might flee to Europe rather than give in to the U.N. But he was not surrendering Katanga's top job. Lo and behold, he was back in Elizabethville. "In spite of all the trouble and bloodshed," he declared with MacArthurian grandeur, "I am back." What policy would he follow? No one could say, for before long he was bouncing wildly from one position to another. "Pure India rubber," marvelled a foreign diplomat. …………. In the space of three days, Tshombe 1) promised to "abstain from making any declarations against the U.N."; 2) immediately broke his promise by threatening "a scorched-earth policy" in Kolwezi; 3) was clapped under house arrest by infuriated U.N. officials "to restrain him from further irresponsible acts"; and 4) got his house arrest commuted to a night time curfew by leading the U.N. troops to the Rhodesian border. Then, having baffled everybody, he vanished once more from the capital. ……….

24

An interesting article in Time25 (January 1963) had summed up Tshombe’s

character and his predicament at this point of time:

Humanitarian Work

The 152 General Hospital was under raising in Leh when it was earmarked for

duty in Congo in August 1960. The Indians set up the UN Hospital in Leopoldville in

September 1960; with a 200 bed capacity and later on established 100 bed hospital

in Lulubourg and 50 bed facility at Coquilhatville. Lieutenat Colonel NB Banerjee was

credited with setting up the hospitals under most trying conditions. The Indian hospital

also had 20 nursing officers, serving in all the three hospitals. The hospital provided

medical cover to 20 participating nations and a number of local Congolese civilians.

25 Times. Friday, Jan. 18, 1963

25

22 (Bombay) Field Company Engineers played a crucial part in both combat

engineering tasks, which were to be the boon for the civilian movement in the country

side. Under Major AM Joglekar, the sappers made history by building as many as

nine new bridges thus replacing the destroyed bridges over a stretch of 200 km. The

sappers also de-mined many civilian areas, thus creating safe environment for the

locals.

De-induction of Indian Brigade and Lessons Learnt

Many believed that the UN mission fulfilled its key objectives. The country had

not descended into civil war, super-power rivalry was kept out of a sensitive area,

Congo remained intact by the end of 1963 and political stability was finally achieved.

Also the UN undertook responsibility for the humanitarian programme needed in the

country. However not every nation was pleased by what the UN had achieved.

Russia, France and Belgium refused to pay their part of the $400 million spent to pay

for the cost of the Congo operation. This nearly pushed the UN to bankruptcy. Those

nations that had supported the UN were also critical of some parts of the UN actions.

The role of Dag Hammarskjöld was criticised as it was felt that he had over-reached

his authority regarding what the UN should do and what it should not.

After a successful peace mission, the Indian troops started de-inducting in

early March 1963. The main components of the Brigade reached the shores of

Bombay between 24 March and 19 April 1963. USNS Blatchford and USNS Gordon

brought these troops back. Indian contribution in the ONUC Force was around 28.3

percent of the total26. The Congo mission is considered a brilliant chapter in Indian

experiences in peacekeeping and resolute display of political and military tenacity in

the face of casualties. As was seen later in Somalia, many countries could not stand

the mounting casualties and left Somalia to the war lords. Had India reacted the same

way in Congo, the history and shape of the country would surely have been different.

The Indian troops displayed an exceptional sense of duty in the service of the UN and

26 Chakravorty, ‘Armed Forces of the Indian Union: The Congo Operation 1960-63’, p.146

26

the Government of India did not withdraw the Brigade, even when the casualties were

mounting. It was a true reflection of India’s resolve to an international commitment. 25

officers and men laid down their lives in combat action for the restoration of peace

and maintenance of the integrity of this country. The Indian troops were professional

and extremely well trained for the given tasks. The presence of Indian Air Force

squardon of Canberra aircraft had a marked influence on the very conduct of the UN

operations in Congo.

Writing in ‘Observer’, Colin Legum had said, ‘Much of the credit for the success of the

present Operations in Congo, belongs to two Indian Army officers, Major General Dewan Prem Chand

and Brigadier Reginald Stephen Noronha and an Irishman, Colonel Patrick Delaney…. but the almost

legendary hero of Congo is 44 years old Brigadier Noronha, a burly cheerful man, roars through life

and was equal abandon with his exploits of mercenaries…”.

"The Indian (Independent) Brigade Group can be likened to a very small blanket thrown over a very large man. When the tops of the body gets cold the blanket is drawn up, and when the feet get cold the blanket is moved down again. Not only this, but the blanket had had to get into small pieces to cover at the same time various parts of the body".

- Lieutenant General Sean Mackeown of Ireland, the UN Force Commander

27

End Notes: