connecting the dots: improving unit safety culture to stop hai katherine j. jones, pt, phd...
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Connecting the Dots: Improving Unit Safety Culture to Stop HAI
Katherine J. Jones, PT, PhDUniversity of Nebraska Medical Center
Supported By
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• AHRQ Partnerships in Implementing Patient Safety Grants (1 U18 HS015822, 1R18HS021429)
The content is solely the responsibility of the author and does not necessarily represent the official views of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.
• National Rural Health Association• Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services• AHRQ Office of Communications and Knowledge
Transfer• Hospitals in Nebraska, Iowa, Louisiana, Washington,
Oregon, Alaska
Learning Objectives
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• Define safety culture• Describe how to measure safety culture• Explain the relationship between prevention
and healthcare-associated infections and safety culture
What is Safety Culture
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• Definition• Role of Organizational Culture• Categories of Culture• 3 Levels of Culture• 4 Components of Culture
Definition of Safety Culture
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• Enduring, shared, LEARNED1 beliefs and behaviors that reflect an organization’s willingness to learn from errors2
• Four beliefs present in a safe, informed culture3
– Our processes are designed to prevent failure– We are committed to detect and learn from error– We have a just culture that disciplines based on risk taking– People who work in teams make fewer errors
The Role of Organizational Culture
Safety Culture4
•A cross cutting contextual factor •Moderates effectiveness of patient safety interventions•Associated with adverse events and patient satisfaction
Organizational Culture1
•Allows us to make sense of environment•Reflects common language… is heard and observed•Leaders create/teach culture
– Share information– Reward, provide feedback– Hold people accountable
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Negative Correlation: HSOPS and Patient Safety Events5
Higher HSOPS scores are associated with fewer adverse events, which validates patient safety culture assessment as a meaningful indication of the safety of patients.
Positive Correlation: HSOPS and Patient Satisfaction6
“….behaviors and attitudes [of hospital employees] can directly affect the pain, discomfort, health, and recovery of patients.”
Categories of Culture1
• Macroculture
• Organizational Culture
• Subculture
• Microculture
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Three Levels of Organizational Culture1
“…values reflect desired behavior but are not reflected in observed behavior.” (Schein, 2010, pp. 24, 27)
Desired Behavior:Round to assess catheter appropriateness
Observed Behavior:Do not participate in rounds
Value:Teamwork
Value:Autonomy
Assumption:Safety is a system property
Assumption:Safety is a result of individual competency
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Four Components of Safety Culture7
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1. Reporting Culture2. Just Culture3. Flexible (Teamwork)
Culture4. Learning Culture
• Effective reporting and just cultures create atmosphere of trust
• Sensemaking8 of patient safety events and high reliability result from an explicit plan to engineer behaviors from each component of safety culture
Continuous Quality Improvement
HROs Engage in Continuous Improvement
Action Plan
Measure Beliefs and Behaviors
ImplementPractices
We can not change what we do not measure!12
How Do you Measure Safety Culture?1
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• Qualitative– Focus Groups– Structured Interviews– Observation
• Quantitative Survey Tools…use best tool for your setting– Goals of assessment
Goals of Culture Assessment 1,9,10
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• Identify areas of culture in need of improvement– Identify impairments in organizational learning
• Increase awareness of patient safety concepts• Evaluate effectiveness of patient safety
interventions over time• Conduct internal and external benchmarking, • Meet regulatory requirements• Identify gaps between beliefs and observed
behaviors within subcultures and microcultures
When Should you Measure Safety Culture?11
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• Baseline prior to patient safety intervention
• 12 – 24 month intervals to monitor change over time
Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture12
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• Survey tool kit available http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/patientsafetyculture/hospsurvindex.htm
• Comparative Database for Benchmarking http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/hospsurvey12/ – 1,128 hospitals; 567,703 respondents in 2012 database
• 42 items categorized in 12 composites/dimensions – 9 dimensions measure culture at dept/unit level– 3 dimensions measure culture at hospital level
• 2 additional outcome measures at dept/unit level (Patient Safety Grade, Number of Events Reported)
• Comments
How Do you Interpret HSOPS Results?
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1. Reason’s Components of Safety Culture7
2. Identify unit-wide areas in need of improvement 3. Conduct external benchmarking9
o State Averageso National Database ICU
4. Conduct internal benchmarking9 o Nurse vs. Non-nurse (professional subcultures)
5. Understand Reverse-worded Items6. Identify beliefs & behaviors in composites1
Crosswalk Reason’s Components7
Reason’s Components4
Reporting Culture – a safe organization is dependent on the willingness of front-line workers to report their errors and near-misses
Just Culture – management will support and reward reporting; discipline occurs based on risk-taking
HSOPS Dimension or Outcome Measure•Frequency of Events Reported (U)•Number of Events Reported (O)
•Nonpunitive Response to Error (U)
O=Outcome Measure, U=Unit, H=Hospital 18
Crosswalk Reason’s Components7
Reason’s Components4
Flexible Culture - authority patterns relax when safety information is exchanged because those with authority respect the knowledge of front-line workers
Learning Culture - organization will analyze reported information and then implement appropriate change
HSOPS Dimension or Outcome Measure•Teamwork w/in Units (U)•Staffing (U)•Communication Openness (U)•Teamwork ax Units (H)•Hospital Handoffs (H)
•Hospital Mgt. Support (H)•Manager Actions (U)•Feedback & Communication (U)•Organizational Learning (U)•Overall Perceptions (U)•Patient Safety Grade (O, U)
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Unit-Wide Areas in Need of Improvement
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• Below State or National average• Less than 75% positive • Large “gap” between beliefs and
behaviors within the composites
External Benchmarking
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Internal Benchmarking
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Reverse-Worded Items
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• Score reported is “percent positive”– Percentage of responses rated 4 or 5 (Agree/Strongly agree or
Most of the Time/Always) for positively-worded items, or 1 or 2 (Disagree/Strongly Disagree or Rarely/Never) for reverse-worded items
• Positive is positive for patient safety, higher score better– We work in “crisis mode” trying to do too much, too quickly.
(A14R)• 8 of 12 composites have at least 1 reverse-worded item• 2 Composites all items reverse-worded
– Handoffs & Transitions– Nonpunitive Response to Error
Reporting Culture Frequency of Events Reported
Three items elicit perceptions of reporting BEHAVIOR.
60%
68%
70%
54% 56% 58% 60% 62% 64% 66% 68% 70% 72%
1. When a mistake is made, but is caughtand corrected before affecting the patient,
how often is this reported? (D1)2. When a mistake is made, but has no
potential to harm the patient, how often isthis reported? (D2)
3. When a mistake is made that couldharm the patient, but does not, how often
is this reported? (D3)
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Action Planning: Interventions Support Reporting
Successful reporting systems13 •Nonpunitive•Confidential•Independent•Expert analysis•Timely•Systems-oriented•Responsive
• Formal Reporting of adverse events with standardized taxonomies (e.g. National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention A – I Error Severity Taxonomy)
• Near misses are frequently reported, valued, and learned from using anonymous log
• Non-harmful errors that reach the patient are frequently reported, valued, and learned from
• Informal Reporting – Safety Briefings14
• Informal Reporting – Leadership WalkRounds,15 Leveraging Frontline Expertise16
Just Culture Non-punitive Response to Error
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Three items elicit perceptions of response to error. Last item “R3. Staff worry that mistakes they make are kept in their personnel file.”…always least positive.
Action Planning: Interventions to Support Just Culture
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• Understand human error, 7 human factors– Active errors (sharp end)– Latent errors
• Just Culture and behavior 17-19
– Conduct: human error, negligence, reckless, intentional rule violation
– Disciplinary decision-making: outcome-based, rule-based, risk-based
• Unsafe Acts Algorithm7
• Disruptive Behavior Policy/Standards20
Unsafe Acts Algorithm7
Culpable Gray Area Blameless
Adapted from James Reason. (1997). Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents.
Known medicalcondition?
NO NO NO YES
NOYES
YES
YES
YESNO
YES
YES NO
NOYES
YESNO
Were the actions as intended?
Evidence of illness or substance use?
Knowingly violated safe procedures?
Pass substitutiontest? (Could someone else have done the same thing)?
History of unsafe acts?
Were the consequencesas intended?
Were proceduresavailable, workable, intelligible, correct and routinely used?
Deficiencies in training, selection, or inexperienced?
Substance abusewithout mitigation
Sabotage, malevolent damage
Substance usewith mitigation
Possible recklessviolation
System inducedviolation
Possible negligentbehavior
System inducederror
Blameless error, corrective training, counseling indicated
Blameless error
NO
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Flexible Culture Teamwork within Units
88%
79%
79%
57%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
1. People support one another in thisdepartment. (A1) BELIEF
2. When a lot of work needs to be donequickly, we work together as a team to get
the work done. (A3)
3. In this department, people treat eachother with respect. (A4)
4. When one area in this department getsreally busy, others help out. (A11)
BEHAVIOR
Four items elicit perceptions of teamwork within units. TeamSTEPPS Tools to bridge gap between belief and behavior: Briefs, Huddles, Debriefs; Situational Awareness, Mutual Support, Seeking & Offering Task Assistance
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Flexible CultureCommunication Openness
Three items elicit perceptions of communication openness. TeamSTEPPS Tools to Bridge the Gap between belief and behavior : Advocacy and Assertion, Two Challenge Rule, CUS
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Flexible CultureHandoffs & Transitions
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Four items elicit perceptions of handoffs & transitions. TeamSTEPPS Tools to Structure Communication: SBAR, Check Back, Call Out, I PASS the BATON
Action Planning: Interventions to Support Flexible (Teamwork) Culture
Team Strategies & Tools to Enhance Performance & Patient Safety 21
http://teamstepps.ahrq.gov
Adopting team behaviors positively impacts all components of safety culture because teamwork supports learning.22
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Mutual Support Tool: CUS…Graded Assertiveness
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• I’m CONCERNED that Mr. Johnson has a urinary catheter. It was put in in the ICU without an order.
• No response…• I’m UNCOMFORTABLE leaving it in because he does
not currently have any evidence-based indications for a catheter.
• No response…• This is a SAFTEY issue. Mr. Johnson is at risk for a
CAUTI if we do not remove the catheter.
Communication Tool: SBAR…Brief, Clear, Timely, Complete Communication
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• At shift change:• S: Mr. Johnson still has a urinary catheter.• B: It was put in in the ED without an order. I have
a call in to Dr. Smith, the hospitalist, to remove it.• A: Mr. Johnson does not currently have any
indications for a catheter.• R: Call Dr. Smith again, if he does not return the
call within an hour.
Learning CultureSupervisor Manager Expectations
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Four Items elicit perceptions of leadership behavior. Interventions: TeamSTEPPS Leadership Tools (Briefs, Huddles, Debriefs; Feedback; Resource Management; Conflict Resolution); Frontline engagement15, 16
Learning CultureFeedback & Communication about Error
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Four items elicit perceptions of feedback about error. Interventions: TeamSTEPPS Briefs, Huddles, Debriefs; Frontline engagement; 15, 16
Communication Notebook; Bulletin Board; Unit Newsletter; Formal In-services & Unit meetings
Learning CultureOrganizational Learning—Continuous Improvement
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Learning Tools : Briefs, Huddles, Debriefs; Leadership WalkRounds,15 Leveraging Frontline Expertise;16 Individual and Aggregate RCA; Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
Action Planning: Reporting, Just, and Flexible Practices Support Learning
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• Ultimately, the willingness of workers to report depends on their belief that the organization will analyze reported information and then implement appropriate change—organizational practices support a learning culture.7
Practices/Tools• Individual RCA23
• Aggregate RCA24
• FMEA25
• Safety Briefings14
• Leadership WalkRounds,15
Leveraging Frontline Expertise16
• Close the loop with reporting…feedback
What is the Relationship between Patient Safety Interventions and Safety Culture?
Safety culture, patient safety interventionsand leadership influence each other.
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Role of Leaders in Transformational Change 1
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• Create a compelling positive vision• Concretely define the goal as a performance
problem…not “changing culture”• Ensure new behaviors are formally taught• Ensure new behaviors are reinforced
– Provide opportunities for practice, coaching, feedback– Be a positive role model
• Create structures consistent with new way of thinking/working/behaving…policy/procedure, job descriptions, performance appraisals
Summary
• What is safety culture? – Beliefs, behaviors reflect organizational ability to learn– Associated with adverse events, patient satisfaction
• How do you interpret results?– Reason’s Components (12 composites – 4 components)– Gaps between beliefs/behaviors within composites– Variation by subculture (profession), microculture (unit)– Leadership must drive culture
Summary
• Action Planning– Identify areas in need of
improvement within 4 components…reporting, just culture, teamwork, learning
• What is the relationship between STOP HAI and Safety Culture?
Leaders Engineer Culture
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“…it is the unique function of leadership to perceive the functional and dysfunctional elements and to manage cultural evolution and change.”
Schein, E.H. Organizational Leadership and Culture 4th ed. San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons; 2010.
Thank you!
Questions?
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References
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1. Schein, E.H. Organizational Leadership and Culture 4th ed. San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons; 2010.
2. Wiegmann. A synthesis of safety culture and safety climate research; 2002. http://www.humanfactors.uiuc.edu/Reports&PapersPDFs/TechReport/02-03.pdf
3. Institute of Medicine. Patient safety: Achieving a new standard of care. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press; 2004.
4. Weaver SJ, Lubomski LH, Wilson RF, Pfoh ER, Martinez KA, Dy SM. Promoting a culture of safety as a patient safety strategy: A systematic review. Ann Int Med. 2013;158:369-374.
5. Mardon RE, Khanna K, Sorra J, Dyer N, Famolaro T. Exploring relationships between hospital patient safety culture and adverse events. J Patient Saf 2010;6: 226-232.
6. Sorra J, Khanna K, Dyer N, Mardon R, Famolaro T. Exploring relationships between patient safety culture and patients’ assessments of hospital care. J Patient Saf 2012;8: 131-139.
7. Reason, J. (1997). Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
References
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8. Battles et al. (2006). Sensemaking of patient safety risks and hazards. HSR, 41(4 Pt 2), 1555-1575.9. Nieva VF, Sorra J. Safety culture assessment: A tool for improving patient safety in healthcare
organizations. Qual Saf Health Care 2003; 12(Suppl II): ii17-ii23.10. Jones, Skinner, Xu, Sun, Mueller. (2008). The AHRQ Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture: a
tool to plan and evaluate patient safety programs. Advances in Patient Safety: New Directions and Alternative Approaches http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK43699/
11. National Quality Forum (NQF). Safe practices for better healthcare--2010 update: A consensus report. Washington, DC: NQF; 2010. Available at: http://www.qualityforum.org/Publications/2010/04/Safe_Practices_for_Better_Healthcare_–_2010_Update.aspx
12. AHRQ. Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture. Available at: http://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/quality-patient-safety/patientsafetyculture/hospital/resources/index.html
13. Leape, L.L. (2002) Reporting adverse events. The New England Journal of Medicine, 347, 1633-1638 Institute for Healthcare Improvement.
References
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14. Conduct Safety Briefings. Available at: http://www.ihi.org/knowledge/Pages/Changes/ConductSafetyBriefings.aspx
15. Institute for Healthcare Improvement. Patient Safety Leadership WalkRounds. Available at: http://www.ihi.org/knowledge/pages/tools/patientsafetyleadershipwalkrounds.aspx
16. Singer SJ, Rivard PE, Hayes JE, Shokeen P, Gaba D, Rosen A. Improving patient care through leadership engagement with frontline staff: A Department of Veterans Affairs case study. The Joint Commission Journal on Quality and Patient Safety. 2013;39:349-360.
17. Marx D. Patient Safety and the “Just Culture”: A Primer for Health Care Executives. New York, NY: Columbia University; 2001. Available at: http://psnet.ahrq.gov/resource.aspx?resourceID=1582
18. Frankel AS, Leonard MW, Denham CR. Fair and just culture, team behavior, and leadership engagement: the tools to achieve high reliability. HSR. 2006;41(4),PartII:1690-1709.
19. Wachter RM, Pronovost PJ. Balancing "no blame" with accountability in patient safety. N Engl J Med. 2009;361:1401-1406.
20. AHRQ. Patient Safety Primers. Disruptive and Unprofessional Behavior. Available at: http://psnet.ahrq.gov/primer.aspx?primerID=15
References
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21. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. TeamSTEPPS: Strategies and tools to enhance performance and patient safety. Available at: http://teamstepps.ahrq.gov/.
22. Jones KJ, Skinner AM, High R, Reiter-Palmon R. A theory-driven longitudinal evaluation of the impact of team training on safety culture in 24 hospitals. BMJ Qual Saf. 2013;22:394-404.
23. US Department of Veterans Affairs. National Center for Patient Safety. Root Cause Analysis Tools. Available at: http://www.patientsafety.gov/CogAids/RCA/index.html#page=page-1
24. Neily et al. Using aggregate root cause analysis to improve patient safety. Jt Comm J Qual Saf 29(8):434-439, 2003.
25. US Department of Veterans Affairs. National Center for Patient Safety. Using Healthcare Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. Available at: http://www.patientsafety.gov/SafetyTopics/HFMEA/HFMEA_JQI.html
Funding
Prepared by the Health Research & Educational Trust of the American Hospital Association with contract funding provided by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality through the contract, “National Implementation of Comprehensive Unit-based Safety Program (CUSP) to Reduce Catheter-Associated Urinary Tract Infection (CAUTI), project number HHSA290201000025I/HHSA29032001T, Task Order #1.”