The Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Ghent University, the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and the Research Community ‘Neuroscience in relation to Experimental Psychology’ announce:

NEUROSCIENCE & COGNITION:

Consciousness & Cognitive control

December 3-4 2012 Flemish Academy of Belgium for Sciences and the Arts (KVAB), Belgium

Mélanie Boly, Victor Lamme, Hakwan Lau, Lionel Naccache, Mathias Pessiglione,

and David Badre Discussant

Axel Cleeremans

ORGANISED BY:

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Practical Information

Conference Venue:

Flemish Academy of Belgium for Sciences and the Arts (KVAB)

Paleis der Academiën

Hertogsstraat 1

1000 Brussel

How to get there?

• From the airport: Take the train to Brussels Central Station

• With the train: Brussels Central Station

• By car: At your own risk

• From Brussels Central Station:

o Take a walk (10 minutes)

o Take the underground walk way on your right (while staying in front of the main

announcement panel and ticketing offices - not left which is the exit to the city center)

o Go straight through the shopping mall "Ravenstein", take the steps at the end

o Cross the small street with "Palais des Beaux Arts" at your right, and take the steps at the

end

o Cross the street and cross the Park

o The academy is opposite the right exit

o Or with the metro (MIVB ): Metro station Troon

o From Central Station: line 1 or 5 to Kunst-Wet, then line 2 or 6.

o From Nord station: metro Rogier, line 2 or 6, direction Koning Boudewijn or Simonis

(Leopold II).

o From Midi station : line 2 or 6 direction Simonis (Elisabeth)

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Oral presentations

All presentations are held in the Auditorium Albert II of the KVAB.

Our six keynote lectures will be 45 minutes with opportunity for a 15-minute discussion.

A scientific committee selected 8 submissions for a short oral presentation. These oral presentations will

be 15 minutes with opportunity for a 5-minute discussion. All speakers are asked to adhere to these time

limits.

Poster sessions

Two poster sessions will be held:

• Poster session 1: Monday December 3, 17.00-19.00, Atrium KVAB

• Poster session 2: Tuesday December 4, 12.20-14.20, Atrium KVAB

From page 15 on, you can see which posters are to be mounted in the first and which in the second

session. If you are in the first session, please mount your poster immediately after registering (so that

early people can already have a look) and remove it before we leave for the conference dinner, so that

the people from the second session can mount their posters early on Tuesday morning. The idea is that

on both days, posters can be seen all day long.

The format for poster preparation is A0 portrait (84.1 cm x 118.9 cm or 33.1 x 46.8 inches). Material to

attach the posters to the poster panels will be provided at the venue. Poster numbers mentioned in this

program correspond to the poster panel where the poster should be displayed.

Organizing committee:

Eva Van den Bussche (Vrije Universiteit Brussel)

Filip Van Opstal (Ghent University)

Tom Verguts (Ghent University) Ralf Krampe (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven) Bert Reynvoet (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)

Contact:

Eva Van den Bussche

Eva.Van.den.Bussche@vub.ac.be

Vrije Universiteit Brussel

Department of Psychology

Pleinlaan 2, B-1050 Brussels

Belgium

Phone : +32-(0)2-629 14 82

Fax : +32-(0)2-629 24 89

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Program Overview

Monday 3 December 2012

9.00 10.00 Registration and coffee

10.00 10.10 Welcome

10.10 11.10 Keynote Lecture

Victor Lamme: How neuroscience will change our view on consciousness

11.10 11.40 Coffee break

11.40 12.40 Keynote Lecture

Mathias Pessiglione: Subliminal motivation of the human brain

12.40 14.00 Lunch

14.00 15.20 Oral Presentations:

14.00 14.20 Rémi Capa: Long-lasting effects of performance-contingent unconscious and conscious

reward incentives during cued task-switching performance

14.20 14.40 Floris De Lange: How consciousness changes the relative weights of evidence during human

decision making

14.40 15.00 Kobe Desender: Feeling the conflict: Metacognitive influences in masked priming

15.00 15.20 Gethin Hughes: The role of motor prediction in the processing of sensory action-effects

15.20 16.00 Coffee Break

16.00 17.00 Keynote Lecture

David Badre: Fronto-striatal systems supporting abstract rule learning

17.00 19.00 Poster session 1 and reception

19.15 19.30 Walk to the restaurant

19.30 Conference Dinner

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Tuesday 4 December 2012

9.30 10.00 Coffee

10.00 11.00 Keynote Lecture

Hakwan Lau: How to properly study the functions of consciousness?

11.00 11.20 Coffee Break

11.20 12.20

Keynote Lecture

Lionel Naccache: How far can “conscious posture” influence non conscious cognitive

processes?

12.20 14.20 Poster session 2 and lunch

14.20 15.40 Oral Presentations:

14.20 14.40 Anil Seth: Interoceptive predictive coding, presence, and agency

14.40 15.00 Simon van Gaal: Logical semantic operations in the absence of visual awareness

15.00 15.20 Heiko Reuss: Adaptation to unconscious conflicts in unconscious contexts

15.20 15.40 Tristan Bekinschtein: Losing Consciousness: wakefulness modulation of cognitive control

15.40 16.00 Coffee break

16.00 17.00 Keynote Lecture

Mélanie Boly: Brain connectivity in Disorder of Consciousness

17.00 17.30 Conclusions by Axel Cleeremans

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Keynote Speakers

Monday 3 December

10.10-11.10

How neuroscience will change our view on consciousness

Victor Lamme

Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Consciousness has always been defined from introspective and behavioral intuitions. This has gotten us

nowhere. What we need is a radical redefinition of what consciousness really is, from a convergence of

introspective, behavioral and neural arguments. The criterion for success should be whether such a new

definition explains what there is to explain about consciousness, not whether it fits our intuitive notions.

From such an approach (Lamme, 2006; 2010), it emerges that it makes sense to acknowledge that we

have conscious sensations (in the phenomenal, qualitative sense) without attention, without access, and

hence also without thought. In this talk, I will present further arguments that impose such a far reaching

conclusion.

Our latest experiments show that vision without attention is rich, detailed, precise, integrated, and -

most importantly – shows perceptual inference i.e. goes beyond the retinal image towards a perceptual

interpretation of that image. Moreover, we show a further dissociation between various forms of

cognition (categorization, control) and consciousness, while the association between integration-

segregation and conscious experience is strengthened.

In sum, there is now overwhelming evidence showing that neural representations outside the focus of

attention, and outside the realm of access or thought possess all the key properties of conscious

representations, except – of course – reportability. Moreover, these properties do all the explaining

towards the phenomenal nature of conscious experience. The absence of access does little to explain

that away. The proper conclusion is that we may have conscious sensations even when we don’t know it.

11.40 – 12.40

Subliminal motivation of brain modules

Mathias Pessiglione

Institut du Cerveau et de la Moelle épinière, Hôpital Pitié-Salpêtrière, France

“Eat popcorn” is certainly one of the most famous subliminal messages. It was inserted into a movie and

presented so briefly that the audience could not see it. There is no evidence that such subliminal

advertising actually works in ecological settings. However, several subliminal motivation effects have

been obtained in the lab. For instance, some behavioural experiments suggest that we exert higher

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effort following incentive cues that we do not consciously perceive. Also, we can learn the predictive

value of subliminal cues so as to guide our gambling choices. These processes may be not only subliminal

but also subpersonal, since one side of our body can be motivated independently from the other.

Neuroimaging and pharmacological studies have then identified the limbic basal ganglia and the

neuromodulator dopamine as responsible for such subconscious motivation processes. These deep brain

structures could therefore be considered as modules representing subconscious motivations that would

compete for controlling the behaviour, until they have access to the consciousness space.

16.00 – 17.00

Fronto-striatal systems supporting abstract rule learning

David Badre

Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, USA

People show a remarkable ability to behave flexibly and in a goal-directed way, even in novel situations

with which they have little direct experience. Cognitive control of this type partly arises from the

representation of abstract rule structures that relate classes of contexts and actions to desired

outcomes. This talk will describe a recent line of work investigating how such abstract rules can be

learned and implemented in the brain to control behavior. Evidence from behavioral, neuropsychological,

and fMRI studies of abstract rule use, novel rule learning, and the transfer of previously learned rules to

novel situations will be presented. I will then discuss recent combined computational modeling and fMRI

work that proposes a mechanism by which abstract rule learning might arise via nested loops between

prefrontal cortex and the striatum. Issues related to implicit versus explicit learning and awareness of the

rule structures themselves will be considered.

Tuesday 4 December

10.00-11.00

How to properly study the functions of consciousness?

Hakwan Lau

Psychology Department, Columbia University (USA)

The current consensus seems to be that: without perceptual awareness of the relevant visual

information some cognitive control functions can be exercised, but perhaps awareness enhances or

changes the nature of such functions. However, the relevant empirical studies (including the speaker's

very own) are problematic, because when we render stimuli unconscious, we typically greatly reduce the

stimulus strength & internal perceptual signal as well. So when we say we're comparing between

conscious and unconscious percepts and their respective functions, we do not know if we are just

comparing between strong and weak percepts/signals. This potential confound trivializes current

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empirical results: it's not surprising that a big signal can drive cognitive control better than a weak signal,

and that a weak signal - so long as it is not truly non-existent - can drive some cognitive control functions

weakly. I propose that we try to keep objectively measured signal strength (i.e. perceptual performance)

constant and manipulate subjective awareness in isolation, and see how different levels of subjective

awareness influences cognitive control. This is hard to achieve but I show preliminary data supporting

the possibility of this exciting new approach.

11.20 – 12.20

How far can “conscious posture” influence non conscious cognitive processes?

Lionel Naccache

Paris 6 University & CRICM, Pitié-Salpêtrière Hospital, France

For a long time unconscious processing of information, - as studied by experimental cognitive psychology

-, was considered as necessarily automatic in the “strong version” of the statement, including the

assumption of total impermeability to top down control. Whereas this assumption was discussed early

on, the first experimental invalidations of this robust theoretical assumption were produced around the

beginning of the 21st

century: several studies demonstrated that the processing of a subliminal stimulus,

inaccessible to subjective report, was under the influence of many voluntary conscious effects such as

endogenous spatial and temporal attention, response selection or inhibition, and task selection. Far from

being achieved, this dynamic field of research conveys major issues: 1) which are the “limits” (if any) of

this sensitivity of non conscious processing to conscious posture? 2) Is this influence asymmetric, - and

therefore diagnostic of conscious processing -, or may it be observed in the reverse direction? On which

solid bases could the concept of automaticity be reformulated? Far from answering those questions, I

will try to shake them in front of your (conscious?) mind.

16.00 – 17.00

Brain connectivity in Disorder of Consciousness

Mélanie Boly

Coma Science Group, University of Liège, Belgium

During the last decade, functional neuroimaging of disorders of consciousness (e.g., coma, vegetative

state and minimally conscious state) has evolved from measuring resting cerebral blood flow or electrical

activity to studying functional response to sensory stimuli and to active paradigm asking patients to

concentrate on doing a task like playing tennis. While offering new potential diagnostic tools in these

patients, these methods also show how difficult it is to clinically differentiate different states of

consciousness. Brain connectivity studies aim at evaluating global cerebral function in patients with

disorders of consciousness. In the present talk, I will cover results obtained using a range of functional

and effective connectivity approaches based on PET, fMRI, high density EEG, and TMS-EEG recordings.

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Experimental work performed in other unconscious states (i.e., anesthesia, generalized seizures, and

deep sleep) will also be compared and reviewed. Practical and conceptual implications of these studies

will be discussed in light of recent theories of consciousness.

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Oral Presentations

Monday 3 December

14.00 – 14.20

Long-lasting effects of performance-contingent unconscious and conscious reward incentives during

cued task-switching performance

Rémi L. Capa1,2

, Cédric A. Bouquet3, Jean-Claude Dreher

4, & André Dufour

5

1 University of Liège, Department of Psychology, Cognition & Behavior, Belgium; 2 University of

Strasbourg, Department of Psychiatry, INSERM, France; 3 University of Poitiers, CeRCA CNRS, France; 4

University of Lyon 1, CCN Reward and Decision-Making Group CNRS, France; 5 University of Strasbourg,

LINC CNRS, France

Few studies using subliminal stimuli have reported short-lived effects on high-order executive control

functions. Building on research on unconscious motivation, in which a behavior of perseverance is

induced to attain a goal, we hypothesized that subliminal motivation can have long-lasting effects on

executive control processes. We investigated the impact of unconscious/conscious monetary reward

incentives on evoked potentials and neural activity dynamics during long runs of task switching. At the

beginning of each run, a reward (50 cents or 1 cent) was displayed, either subliminally or supraliminally.

Participants earned the reward contingent upon their correct responses to each trial of the run. A higher

percentage of runs was achieved with higher (conscious and unconscious) than lower rewards, indicating

that unconscious high rewards have long-lasting behavioral effects. Event-related potential results

indicated that unconscious and conscious rewards influenced preparatory effort in task preparation, as

suggested by a greater fronto-central contingent negative variation (CNV) starting at cue-onset. However,

a greater parietal P3 associated with better reaction times was observed only under conditions of

conscious high reward, suggesting a larger amount of working memory. Together, these results indicate

that unconscious and conscious motivations of electrophysiological-related executive control processes

have both similarities and differences during task-switching.

14.20 – 14.40

How consciousness changes the relative weights of evidence during human decision making

Floris P. de Lange1*

, Simon van Gaal1*

, Victor A.F.Lamme2, & Stanislas Dehaene

3,4,5,6

1 Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Nijmegen, Netherlands; 2 Department of Psychology,

University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands; 3 Inserm, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Gif-sur-Yvette, France; 4 Commissarìat à l’Energie Atomique, Neurospin Center, Gif-sur-Yvette, France; 5 Université Paris-Sud 11,

Orsay, France; 6 Collège de France, 75005 Paris, France; * These authors contributed equally

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Human decisions are based on accumulating evidence over time for different options. How is this

accumulation of evidence affected by the level of awareness of the information? We addressed this

question using combined behavioral methods and magneto-encephalography. Participants were

required to make decisions by accumulating evidence over a series of visually presented arrow stimuli

whose visibility was modulated by masking. Behavioral results showed that participants could

accumulate evidence under both high and low visibility. However, a top-down strategic modulation of

the flow of incoming evidence was only present for stimuli with high visibility: once enough evidence had

been accrued, the impact of new incoming stimuli was reduced. Neural recordings revealed that, while

initial perceptual processing was independent of visibility, there was stronger top-down amplification for

stimuli with high visibility than low visibility. Furthermore, neural markers of evidence accumulation

showed a strategic bias only for highly visible information, speeding up processing and reducing neural

computations related to the decision process. Our results indicate that the level of sensory awareness

changes decision-making: high visibility leads to important changes in strategical top-down decision

making. Our results therefore suggest a potential role of consciousness, in deploying flexible strategies

for biasing information acquisition in line with one’s expectations and goals.

14.40 – 15.00

Feeling the conflict: Metacognitive influences in masked priming

Kobe Desender1, Filip Van Opstal

2 & Eva Van den Bussche

1

1 Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium; 2 Department of Psychology, Ghent

University

In recent years, accumulating evidence suggested that some expressions of cognitive control can be

exerted unconsciously. For example, adaptation to unconscious response conflict was found to be

possible both blockwise and on a trial-by-trial basis. However, according to some authors, subjects were

actually aware of the conflict in all these studies, but on a metacognitive level. For example, if subjects

consciously notice that masked incongruent trials are more conflicting (e.g., more difficult, more error-

prone) than masked congruent trials, they can use this metacognitive information to adapt their

behavior. Although theoretically plausible, no empirical support for this claim has been provided.

Therefore, in a masked priming study we carefully questioned our subjects for metacognitive awareness

of the conflict on each trial. Our results showed that subjects indeed have a different metacognitive

awareness of congruent and incongruent trials. They rated congruent trials as less conflicting than

incongruent trials. However, our data seem to suggest that this metacognitive awareness cannot explain

cognitive adaptation effects. Although this metacognitive awareness seems to have a modulating effect

on conflict adaptation, actual conflict seems a crucial prerequisite for adaptation effects. This would

imply that subjects have some metacognitive awareness about the status of masked trials, but this

information is not the crucial source of adaptation.

15.00 – 15.20

The role of motor prediction in the processing of sensory action-effects

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Gethin Hughes1,2

, Andrea Desantis1,2

, & Florian Waszak1,2

1 Université Paris Descartes, Sorbonne Paris Cité, Paris, France ; 2 CNRS (Laboratoire Psychologie de la

Perception, UMR 8158), Paris, France

The selection and control of action has been shown to influence the way in which we perceive the

external world. For instance, sensory processing of action-effects has been shown to differ to that of

externally triggered stimuli, both with respect to the perceived timing of their occurrence (intentional

binding) as well as their intensity (sensory attenuation). These phenomena are normally attributed to

forward action models, such that when action prediction is consistent with changes in our environment,

our experience of these effects is altered. We systematically investigated the role of temporal prediction,

temporal control, identity prediction and motor prediction in previous reports of sensory attenuation

and intentional binding. This analysis revealed that the vast majority of studies do not isolate action

prediction mechanisms to be the cause of binding or attenuation. We also report data from 2 behavioral

experiments on intentional binding and an EEG experiment on sensory attenuation, which suggest that

while sensory attenuation is modulated by identity specific motor prediction, intentional binding is not.

These findings have important implications for understanding the way in which action shapes our

perception of the external world.

Tuesday 4 December

14.20 – 14.40

Interoceptive predictive coding, presence, and agency

Anil Seth1,2

, Keisuke Suzuki1,2

, & Hugo Critchley1,3

1 Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex; 2 Department of Informatics, University

of Sussex; 3 Department of Psychiatry, Brighton and Sussex Medical School

We describe a theoretical model of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying conscious presence, i.e.

the subjective sense of reality of the world and of the self. Our model is based on interoceptive

prediction error and is informed by predictive models of agency, general models of hierarchical

predictive coding and dopaminergic signalling in cortex, the role of the anterior insular cortex in

interoception and emotion, and cognitive neuroscience evidence from studies of virtual reality and of

psychiatric disorders of presence. The model associates presence with successful suppression by top-

down predictions of informative interoceptive signals evoked by visceromotor control signals and,

indirectly, by visceral responses to afferent sensory signals. The model is relevant to cognitive control by

connecting presence to agency since predicted interoceptive signals will depend on whether afferent

sensory signals are determined, by a parallel predictive-coding mechanism, to be self-generated or

externally caused. Anatomically, we identify the anterior insular cortex as the locus of key neural

comparator mechanisms, with speculative but testable roles for von Economo neurons which have been

previously associated with self-consciousness. Our model makes predictions for manipulations of agency

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and presence relevant to the experience of cognitive control, and offers a new view of emotion as

interoceptive inference. We describe tests of the model using an integrated experimental setup

combining augmented reality, Microsoft Kinect 3D modelling, and physiological monitoring.

14.40 – 15.00

Logical semantic operations in the absence of visual awareness

Simon van Gaal1,2,3,4,5

, Julia Meuwese2, Lionel Naccache

5, Laurent Cohen

5, & Stanislas Dehaene

3,4,6,7

1 Radboud University Nijmegen, Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Netherlands; 2 University of Amsterdam, Dept of Psychology, Netherlands; 3 Inserm, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Gif-sur-Yvette, France; 4 Commissarìat à l’Energie Atomique, Neurospin Center, Gif-sur-Yvette, France ; 5 Institut du Cerveau et de la Moëlle épinière, Paris, France ; 6 Université Paris-Sud 11, Orsay, France 7 Collège de France, 75005 Paris, France

Accumulating evidence suggests that non-conscious cognition is extremely powerful. Brain-imaging

studies have revealed extensive subliminal information processing in many different brain areas, from

low-level perceptual regions, to regions in the parietal and temporal cortex, even up to “executive” areas

at the highest level of the cortical and cognitive hierarchy, in the prefrontal cortex. Although great

progress has been made in characterizing the flow of information triggered by unconscious visual stimuli

in isolation, if and how multiple sources of unconscious information are integrated and combined is

largely unexplored. I will present a series of behavioral and ERP studies in which we probed the possible

flexibility and complexity at which multiple unconscious elements can be logically combined. Therefore,

we designed a masked priming paradigm in which subjects were presented with a rapid stream of three

words: an adverb (“not”/“very”), an adjective (e.g., “good”/”bad”) and a target noun (e.g.,

“peace”/”murder”). The first two words could either be masked or not. Subjects indicated whether the

consciously presented target noun had a positive or negative valence. Crucially, the nature of the adverb

dictated whether the overall three-word sequence was contextually consistent (e.g., very-bad-murder)

or inconsistent (e.g., not-bad-murder). Electrophysiological recordings revealed that such logical

semantic computations can partly unfold unconsciously (reflected in the N400 ERP component).

However, at the same time qualitative neural differences between conscious and unconscious logical

semantic operations were observed (on the P600 ERP component).

15.00 – 15.20

Adaptation to unconscious conflicts in unconscious contexts

Heiko Reuss1, Kobe Desender

2, Andrea Kiesel

1, & Wilfried Kunde

1

1 Julius-Maximilians-University, Würzburg; 2 Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

We investigated how context-specific conflict adaptation depends on both awareness of the conflict and

awareness of the context, and how timing of conflict and context is crucial. In Experiment 1, we used a

priming paradigm in which the visibility of the prime was varied and the format of the target represented

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a context of either low interference (20% incongruent trials) or high interference (80% incongruent trials).

By implementing inducing trials and test trials, we controlled for mechanisms of event learning. With

visible primes, congruency effects were larger in the low-interference context than in the high-

interference context. With masked primes, however, congruency effects were not modulated by the

context. In Experiment 2, the format of the prime represented the context. Thus, with masked primes,

both conflicting stimulus and context were presented unconsciously. Interestingly, we now found that

the context modulated congruency effects independent of prime visibility. Even with masked primes,

congruency effects were larger in the low-interference context than in the high-interference context,

both in inducing trials and test trials. This indicates that context-specific conflict adaptation processes

are able to operate independently of both conflict awareness and context awareness, but that a

simultaneous occurrence of context and conflicting stimulus is crucial.

15.20 – 15.40

Losing Consciousness: wakefulness modulation of cognitive control

Tristan Bekinschtein1

1 MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge, UK

Understanding states of consciousness and the transitions between conscious and unconscious states

has important theoretical and clinical implications. Yet despite the fact that we typically enter a state of

unconsciousness every night, remarkably little is known about how we fall asleep lose consciousness

while getting sedated. In a series of hd-EEG experiments of people falling asleep or getting sedated with

propofol, we explored the limits of perceptual and semantic decisions, inhibitory control, top-down and

bottom-up target detection and introspection. We found there is a differential modulation of the

cognitive control capacities by wakefulness showing that drowsiness affects faster (earlier in the

transition to unconsciousness) inhibitory control and top-down target detection than perceptual and

abstract (semantic) decisions. We believe these results may experimentally link the Information

Integration Theory of Consciousness and the Global Neuronal Workspace.

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Poster Session I: Monday 3 December 17.00-19.00

[1] Conditional Automaticity in Subliminal Morphosyntactic Priming

Ulrich Ansorge1,2

, Bert Reynvoet3, Jessica Hendler

2, Lennart Oettl

2, & Stefan Evert

4

1 Faculty of Psychology, Universität Wien, Austria; 2 Institute of Cognitive Science, University of

Osnabrueck, Germany; 3 Department of Psychology, University of Leuven, Belgium; 4 Institute of

Comparative Linguistics and Literature Studies, Technical University, Darmstadt, Germany

We used a gender-classification task to test the principles of subliminal morphosyntactic priming. In

Experiment 1, masked, subliminal feminine or masculine articles were used as primes. They preceded a

visible target noun. Subliminal articles either had a morphosyntactically congruent or incongruent

gender with the targets. In a gender classification task of the target nouns, subliminal articles primed the

responses: Responses were faster in congruent than incongruent conditions (Experiment 1). In

Experiment 2, we tested whether this congruence effect depended on gender relevance. In line with a

relevance dependence, the congruence effect only occurred in a gender-classification task but was

absent in another categorical discrimination of the target nouns (Experiment 2). The congruence effect

also depended on correct word order. It was diminished when nouns preceded articles (Experiment 3).

Finally, the congruence effect was replicated with a larger set of targets but only for masculine targets

(Experiment 4). Results are discussed in light of theories of subliminal priming in general and of

subliminal syntactic priming in particular.

[2] Mind-Wandering and the Little Voice of Meta-Consciousness

Mikaël Bastian 1

, Jonathan W. Schooler 2

, & Jérôme Sackur 1

1 Laboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique, Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, France ; 2

META-Lab (Memory, Emotions, Thought & Awareness), University of California, Santa Barbara, USA

Research on spontaneous and environment-independent thoughts has impressively grown since a

decade and has distinguished between two types of “mindwandering”: “tuning out” and “zoning out”.

“Tuning out” is mindwandering with meta-awareness : one knows that one’s mind is wandering. In

contrast, “zoning out” is mindwandering without meta-awareness: one experiences mindwandering but

lacks metaconsciousness of this phenomenon, as when one does not that one is reading without

understanding anything anymore. These two aspects of mindwandering challenge the common intuition

that we have a straightforward and permanent access to our thoughts. We suggest that the form of

mental contents during mindwandering predicts meta-awareness of the episode. Building on another

line of research that has suggested a role for language in self-awareness, we hypothesized that

metaconsciousness of an episode of mindwandering might be heightened when its form is verbal. In

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short, verbal thoughts would be more meta-aware than the rest of the thoughts. Using paradigms that

described, suppressed or induced inner speech, we show that intra-individual variation in inner speech

quantity relates to variation in meta-awareness, in the sense that the more inner speech one has, the

more meta-aware one is. Language could therefore be partly responsible for the access to

metaconsciousness of one’s mindwandering.

[3] Higher-Order Thoughts in Action: Consciousness as an unconscious redescription process

Bert Timmermans1, Leonhard Schilbach

2, Antione Pasquali

3,4, & Axel Cleeremans

3

1 Univ Hosp Cologne, Neuroimaging Grp, Psychiat & Psychotherapy Clin, D-50937 Cologne, Germany; 2

Max Planck Inst Neurol Res, D-50931 Cologne, Germany; 3 Univ Libre Bruxelles, Consciousness Cognit &

Computat Grp, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium; 4 Adam Neurogen, Neurogen Res Unit, F-20240 Solaro, France

Metacognition is usually construed as a conscious, intentional process whereby people reflect upon their

own mental activity. Here, we instead suggest that metacognition is but an instance of a larger class of

representational redescription processes that we assume occur unconsciously and automatically. From

this perspective, the brain continuously and unconsciously learns to anticipate the consequences of

action or activity on itself, on the world, and on other people through three predictive loops: An inner

loop, a perception-action loop, and a self-other (social cognition) loop, which together form a tangled

hierarchy. We ask what kinds of mechanisms may subtend this form of enactive metacognition. We

extend previous neural network simulations and compare the model with Signal Detection Theory,

highlighting that while the latter approach assumes that both Type I (objective) and Type II (subjective,

metacognition-based) decisions tap into the same signal at different hierarchical levels, our approach is

closer to dual-route models in that it assumes that the redescriptions made possible by the emergence

of metarepresentations occur independently and outside of the first-order causal chain. We close by

reviewing relevant neurological evidence for the idea that awareness, self-awareness and social

cognition involve the same mechanisms.

[4] How memory-related consciousness may help patients with schizophrenia improve their memory

reporting accuracy.

Elçin Akdogan1 & Elisabeth Bacon

1

1 Inserm u666, dépt de psychiatrie, Hôpitaux Universitaires, BP 426, 67091 STRASBOURG Cedex. France

Understanding cognitive and state of consciousness disturbances is central in understanding the

pathophysiology and for developing new therapies in schizophrenia. How consciousness guides behavior

comes within the metacognitive approach. Metamemory refers to one’s knowledge about memory

including the awareness of one’s cognitive ability and the strategic control of a memory task in progress.

The purpose of this study was to further investigate memory and metamemory processes in patients

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with schizophrenia in a more naturalistic situation, and pave the way for meta-cognitive remediation.

Patients and their healthy matched controls had to answer general knowledge questions whose answers

are all numerical following two conditions: one without any intervention as in a real-life, and two, guided

through a metamemory-based control. Participants answered the questions with respect to two

predefined intervals, one narrow and one large, and then made a confidence level judgment for both

answers, and had afterwards to select one of the two answers. The results show that patients, in spite of

their memory deficit in the free report, when they are offered a framework and allowed to rely on their

metamemory judgments, are able to improve their memory performance up to the accuracy level of the

healthy participants.

[5] Spontaneous and Intentional Social Inferences: Neural evidence of a Common Process

Frank Van Overwalle1, Ning Ma

1, Jenny Kestemont

1, & Marie Vandekerckhove

1

1 Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

Several lines of recent social neuroscientific evidence in our lab seem to contradict extant dual-process

models which assume that spontaneous and intentional inferences are guided by different (associative

versus symbolic) processes. First, using instructions for spontaneous (“read carefully”) or intentional

(“what is the goal / trait of this person?”) inferences between participants, ERP studies documented that

the onset of social inferences occurs at about the same time irrespective of instructions. Specifically, the

first neural signature was detected after about 200 ms for goal inferences and 600 ms for trait inferences.

Second, several recent fMRI studies using the same between-participants design have consistently found

on overlap between spontaneous and intentional instructions in core areas of mentalizing, including the

temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and medial prefrontal (mPFC). Collectively, the results suggest that a

common spontaneous process produces an initial social inference (e.g., irrespective of instructions),

after which intentional thoughts (e.g., after instructions) may invite observers to verify more carefully

the material and inference made (which results in additional activation in other brain areas), and to

avoid the fundamental attribution bias (which results in reduced activation in the mPFC, reflecting less

abstract trait-related inferences if they were not asked for).

[6] Short- and Long-term unconscious logo priming of brands and related words

Gigliola Brintazzoli1, Charlotte Muscarella

1, Eric Soetens

1, & Eva Van den Bussche

1

1 Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

It has often been assumed that unconscious influencing in daily life and advertising is highly unlikely,

given the short-lived nature of unconscious priming effects. This study assessed whether real-life

stimulus material can elicit short- and long-term unconscious priming. A typical masked priming

paradigm was used, with brand logo primes. The stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA) was manipulated so

18

that the distance between the onset of the prime and the onset of the target was either 350ms, 1000ms

or 5000ms. Our results show that unconsciously presented brand logos (e.g. logo of McDonald's)

significantly prime their brand names (e.g. "McDonald's") in all SOA conditions. The logos also have the

power to prime words associated to the brand (e.g. "hamburger"), but only if the SOA is short (i.e.

350ms). These results indicate that real-life stimuli can unconsciously influence our behaviour, even

when prime and target are separated by a 5-second interval. However, the mental representation of

words related to the subliminal information seems to vanish quickly as time passes.

[7] Unconscious Goal Activation and the Hijacking of the Executive Function

Hans Marien1, Ruud Custers

2, 1, Ran R. Hassin

3, & Henk Aarts

1

1 Utrecht University, The Netherlands; 2 University College London, United Kingdom; 3 The Hebrew

University, Israel

Building on research into unconscious human goal pursuit, and the dynamic nature of our mental and

physical world accompanying the pursuit of goals, we examined the idea that an unconsciously activated

goal hijacks executive control for its own attainment. This hijacking of the executive function by an

unconscious goal should be evidenced by impaired performance on an unrelated task relying on

executive control. The results of six experiments showed that subliminal activation of a socializing goal,

an idiosyncratic personal goal or an academic goal caused participants to perform worse on unrelated

tasks that depend on executive control, such as inhibition of prepotent responses in a memory-probe

task and detection of text errors during reading. These effects were unique to executive control; were

similar when the goal was consciously given; and were independent of task motivation and perceived

inter-goal relatedness between the primed goal and task goal. Furthermore, an unconscious goal

hijacked executive control to advance itself more strongly when the goal had personal value. These

findings are novel and important, and suggest that executive control processes are hijacked by goals in

order to advance themselves without postulating an inner agent that consciously accesses and directs

these control processes.

[8] Neglect Syndrome suggests that spatial awareness depends on unspecific attentional resources

Mario Bonato1

1University of Padova, Department of General Psychology, Padova, Italy

It is largely unknown how cognitive resources modulate spatial attention and awareness. Clinical

studies performed on right-hemisphere damaged patients suggest that the availability of unspecific

attentional resources determines successful access to spatial awareness (Bonato, under review).

In detection tasks, the mere request to monitor a wide range of spatial positions results in worst

contralesional performance with respect to when the spatial position to be monitored is only one (Marzi

19

et al., 2002). Moreover, brain-damaged patients with subclinical neglect are able to increase their

response speed to contralesional targets, from pathologically slow up to a normal level, while

performing a detection task (Bartolomeo, 1997). Thirdly, right-hemisphere damaged patients show

strikingly decreased awareness for contralesional targets when concurrent tasks have to be performed,

regardless of their nature (e.g. visuospatial or Working Memory-related; Bonato et al., 2010; 2012). The

ubiquitous variability in performance shown by patients in visuospatial tasks seems to closely depend on

the quantity of attentional resources engaged by the task at hand. Beside their clinical implications for

neglect assessment, these findings suggest that the availability of (unspecific) cognitive resources is a

major determinant for spatial awareness. Insights about the functioning of unimpaired cognitive

architectures will be discussed.

References

Bartolomeo, P. (1997). The novelty effect in recovered hemineglect. Cortex, 33, 323-332.

Bonato, M., (under review). Neglect and extinction closely depend on task demands: A review. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience.

Bonato, M., Priftis K., Marenzi, R., Umiltà, C. & Zorzi, M. (2010). Increased attentional demands impair contralesional space

awareness following stroke. Neuropsychologia, 48, 3934-3940.

Bonato, M., Priftis, K., Marenzi, R., Umiltà, C. & Zorzi, M. (2012). Deficits of contralesional awareness: A case study on what

paper-and-pencil tests neglect. Neuropsychology, 26(1), 20-36.

Marzi, C.A., Natale, E., & Anderson, B. (2002) Mapping spatial attention with reaction time inneglect patients. In H.-O. Karnath, A.

D. Milner and G. Vallar (Eds.). The cognitive and neural basis of spatial neglect (pp. 275-288). Oxford: University Press.

[9] Attention on subliminal prime: role for unconscious task setting

Sébastien Weibel1, Rémi L. Capa

2, Caroline Huron

3, & Anne Giersch

1

1 INSERM, University Hospital of Strasbourg, France; 2 INSERM, University of Strasbourg, France; 3

INSERM-CEA U562 Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Gif/Yvette, France

Recent studies showed that unconscious stimuli can trigger task sets. We wondered about a possible

influence of attention processes on these effects. To address this issue, we modulated exogenous

attention with a sound during the task. The subjects’ main task was to make a phonological (2 vs. 3

syllable) or semantic (living vs. not living) decision on a word. The task type was indicated before the

word by means of an instruction letter, which was itself preceded by a masked and undetectable priming

letter. In a control experiment, subjects were instructed to identify the instruction letter. A neutral sound

occurred either with the unconscious prime or with the instruction letter, 83 ms later. We showed that

repetition priming (faster letter identification induced by prime/instruction congruency) was not

modified by attention modulation. On the contrary, unconscious task set priming (faster execution of the

task in case of prime/instruction congruency) was observed only when the sound occurred with the

prime. Synchrony between the sound and prime did not change the prime awareness. Hence attention

20

did not enhance the processing of the prime itself, but facilitated unconscious task set priming, thus

providing an explanation for contradictory findings in the literature.

[10] Conscious Experience Beyond Cognitive Control

Carolyn Dicey Jennings1

1 Boston University

At least three forms of conscious experience have been argued to be beyond the reach of cognitive

control: gist perception, imagistic consciousness, and phenomenal consciousness. After first showing

that the evidence for these three forms of consciousness is inconclusive on the question of whether they

exist outside of cognitive control, I here present a fourth form of consciousness that is likely to be more

successful: conscious immersion. I understand “conscious immersion” to be conscious engrossment in a

task, activity, or process that proceeds via unconscious, involuntary control. Because participants who

emerge from these immersed states sometimes claim to have been conscious during those states

(despite being unable, in most cases, to describe the content of those states), we should conclude that

these immersion experiences are sometimes conscious. Conscious immersion is unlike the other forms

in that it is not perceptual in nature. In lacking the structure of perception, it also lacks the direct

accessibility and reportability that conscious perception enjoys. I nonetheless find that these immersed

states are conscious and suggest avenues for more research on the topic.

[11] Perceptual sequence knowledge does not seem to consolidate

Daphné Coomans1, Natacha Deroost

1, Eva Van den Bussche

1, & Eric Soetens

1

1 Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

Past research showed that knowledge acquired in a typical structured serial reaction time task can be

consolidated. However, as knowledge in this task consists of perceptual and motor knowledge, it is not

known whether both kinds of knowledge are consolidated. In the current experiments, we determined

the consolidation of perceptual sequence knowledge. Motor components were minimized by varying the

response dimension randomly and by avoiding eye movements, using a circular display with a small

visual angle and a short presentation time. Participants had to respond to the identity of a target,

presented at one of four locations around a fixation cross. Unknown to the participants, target location

changed according to a sequence. To assess learning, the perceptual location sequence turned to

random in certain blocks. After participants acquired perceptual sequence knowledge in an initial

training session, we assessed whether this knowledge was still present after 1, 4 or 24 hours, using a

between subjects design. Results indicated that knowledge was preserved for 1 hour, but declined after

4 and 24 hours. This suggests that perceptual sequence knowledge is temporary, a proposition that fits

well in the sequence learning model of Hikosaka et al. (1999).

21

[12] Does working memory load influence consciousness?

Esther De Loof1, Wim Fias

1, & Filip Van Opstal

1

1 Ghent University

Are the frontoparietal connections thought to underlie working memory (WM) equal to those

hypothesized to trigger consciousness by igniting the global neural workspace? We hypothesize that

activating the frontoparietal network by a WM load could either limit the frontoparietal capacity for

consciousness or make the ignition mechanism more sensitive.

We probed consciousness through priming while varying WM load in a secondary task. In the main task,

participants judged a target number to be smaller/larger than five. The target number was primed by a

congruent/incongruent prime number. To manipulate the conscious perception of the primes, the

stimulus onset asynchrony between prime and target was varied. Participants indicated their awareness

of the prime number on each trial. In a secondary task, WM load was manipulated by letting participants

remember zero, two or six letters (i.e., zero, low, and high load conditions).

First, WM load limits conscious perception: the visibility threshold for prime numbers rises with

increasing WM load. Second, WM load tends to facilitate the congruency effect: the prime has a slightly

stronger influence on the response to the target when more letters are kept in memory. Both effects

shed light on the involvement of prefrontal cortex in WM and consciousness.

[13] Detecting the Neural Signatures of Conscious Processing in Non-Communicative Patients:

outperforming clinical diagnoses with a systematic EEG approach?

Jean-Rémi King1,2,3*

, Jacobo Sitt1,2*

, Frédéric Faugeras2,4

, Benjamin Rohaut2,4

, Imen El Karoui2,5

, Lionel

Naccache2,4,6

, & Stanislas Dehaene1,7,8

1 INSERM-CEA, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit/CEA/SAC/DSV/DRM/Neurospin Center, 91191, Gif/Yvette,

France; 2 INSERM-ICM Research Center, UMRS 975, 75013, Paris, France; 3 Ecole Doctorale Cerveau

Cognition Comportement, Université Paris 6, 75005, Paris, France; 4 Departments of Neurophysiology &

Neurology , AP-HP, Groupe Hospitalier Pitié-Salpêtrière, 75013, Paris, France; 5 Department of Biology,

École Normale Supérieure, 75005, Paris, France; 6 Faculté de Médecine Pitié-Salpêtrière, Université Paris 6,

75013, Paris, France; 7 Collège de France, 75005, Paris, France ; 8 Université Paris 11, 91400, Orsay,

France; * These authors contributed equally to this work

Despite their relatively intact arousal, Disorders of Consciousness (DOC) patients present an inability to

demonstrate robust intentional behaviors. Science and modern medicine have been challenged to know

whether these patients were conscious but unable to communicate or unconscious of their surrounding

environment.

22

We here implemented a series of analyses extracting most of the neural signatures of conscious

processing described in the EEG literature, in order to assess their respective validity and efficiency in the

clinics. We performed 197 high-density EEG recordings at bedside while Vegetative (VS), Minimally

Conscious (MCS) and Conscious patients (CS) were exposed to repeated series of sounds for 30 minutes.

Results demonstrated that although a large proportion of these markers could be used to predict

patients’ consciousness states, those focusing on lower frequency ones (delta - alpha) were by far the

most discriminatory. Secondly, predictive analyses combining all markers demonstrated successful

automatic classifications of patients’ clinical states. Finally, VS patients misclassified as MCS or CS by our

algorithm presented twice more chances of conscious recovery (44% of recovery) than correctly

classified VS patients (20%). On top of providing the first systematic review of the EEG signatures of

conscious processing in a large DOC patient cohort, analyses of misclassified patients’ outcomes thus

suggest the possibility of detecting conscious activity independently of behavior and intentions.

[14] Support for a response control deficit in freezing of gait Parkinson patients

Jochen Vandenbossche1, Natacha Deroost

1, Eric Soetens

1, Peter Zeischka

1, & Eric Kerckhofs

1

1 Vrije Universiteit Brussel

We investigated response activation and suppression processes in Parkinson’s disease patients with

freezing of gait (FOG). Fourteen freezers, 14 nonfreezers and 14 matched healthy controls performed the

attention network task (ANT) and the Stroop task. The former task has more stimulus-response overlap

and is expected to elicit stronger irrelevant response activation, requiring more inhibition. Congruency

effects were used as a general measure of conflict resolution. Supplementary RT distribution analyses

were utilized to calculate conditional accuracy functions (CAFs) and delta plots to measure response

activation and suppression processes. In agreement with previous research, freezers showed a general

conflict resolution deficit compared to nonfreezers and healthy controls. Moreover, CAFs pointed to a

strong initial incorrect response activation in FOG. As expected, conflict resolution impairment was only

apparent in the ANT, and not in the Stroop task. These results suggest an imbalance between automatic

and controlled processes in FOG, leading to a fundamental breakdown in both motor execution and

cognition.

[15] Distinct brain mechanisms for conscious versus subliminal error detection

Lucie Charles1,2,3

, Filip van Opstal1,2,3,4

, Sébastien Marti1,2,3

, & Stanislas Dehaene1,2,3,5

1 INSERM,U992, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, F-91191 Gif/Yvette, France; 2 CEA,DSV/I2BM, NeuroSpin

Center, F-91191 Gif/Yvette, France; 3 Univ Paris-Sud, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, F-91191Gif/Yvette,

France ; 4 Ghent University, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium ; 5 Collège de France, F-75005 Paris, France

23

Metacognition, the ability to monitor one’s own cognitive processes, is frequently assumed to be

univocally associated with conscious processing. However, some monitoring processes, such as those

associated with the evaluation of one’s own performance, may conceivably be sufficiently simple and

automatized to be deployed non-consciously. Here, we used simultaneous electro-and magneto-

encephalography (EEG/MEG) to investigate how error detection is modulated by perceptual awareness

of a masked target digit. The Error-Related Negativity (ERN), an EEG component occurring ~100 ms after

an erroneous response, was exclusively observed on conscious trials and showed a step-like increase in

amplitude with stimulus visibility. Nevertheless, even in the absence of the ERN, errors were still

detected at above-chance levels under subliminal conditions. Error detection on conscious trials

originated from the posterior cingulate cortex, while a small response to non-conscious errors was seen

in dorsal anterior cingulate. Our findings suggest two distinct brain mechanisms for metacognitive

judgements: a conscious all-or-none process of single-trial response evaluation, and a non-conscious

statistical assessment of confidence.

[16] Cognitive Control: A Role for Implicit Learning?

Natacha Deroost1, Jochen Vandenbossche

1, Peter Zeischka

1, Dpahné Coomans

1, & Eric Soetens

1

1 Vrije Universiteit Brussel

We investigated the influence of implicit learning on cognitive control. In a sequential Stroop task,

participants implicitly learned a sequence placed on the color of the Stroop words. The amount of

conflict was manipulated by means of the number of incongruent trials. The results showed that

participants who learned the color sequence were no better at resolving conflict than participants who

did not undergo sequence training. Accordingly, implicit knowledge did not reduce conflict. At the same

time, the amount of conflict had no effect on the amount of learning either. However, conflict had a

significant impact on the expression of implicit learning, as most knowledge was expressed under the

highest amount of conflict. Task-optimization in the Stroop task was thus accomplished by an increased

reliance on implicit sequence knowledge under high conflict. These findings demonstrate that implicit

learning processes can be flexibly recruited to support cognitive control functions

[17] Control of the mindfulness states by multiple levels of sensorimotor experience

Sergio S.C. dC Rubin1,2,3

1 LabMet, University of Gent; 2 Schenkman’s Cell and Moleular Biology Lab, University Federal of Sao

Paulo; 3 Bolivian Center of Biotechnology Research

The mindfulness state is the consciousness of the embodied mind action in the present time of the

experience. The mindfulness can be seen as opposite to the Cartesian state i.e. cogito or mindlessness,

which is more often rooted in our daily activity. Loose and recovering of mindfulness during the

24

ontogeny may be linked to specific learning process and its background context. The first-person

methodology allows us to recover and have control of mindfulness state by specific multiple levels of

sensorimotor experience such as play a musical instrument, intense and/or equilibrium exercises,

focused meditation as well as by relax-touch experience. Beyond that, this control of mindfulness states

can be extended to daily experience if the practices become habit. Also our observation indicate that the

absence of pain in some human swing pierced skin body suspension is due to they have deep control of

the dissociation body-mind and reach the mindlessness state. Those spaces of possibilities are of applied

interest.

[18] Electrodermal activity during implicit processing for emotional faces

Thibaut Dondaine1,2,3

, Jean-François Houvenaghel1,2

, Paul Sauleau1,2

, Gabriel Robert1,3

, Bruno Millet1,3

,

Marc Vérin1,2

, & Julie Péron1,4

1 Behavior and Basal Ganglia' research unit (EA 4712), University of Rennes 1, Hôpital Pontchaillou, CHU

de Rennes, rue Henri Le Guilloux, 35033 Rennes, France; 2 Psychiatry Unit, Hôpital Guillaume Regnier, 108

avenue du Général Leclerc BP 60321 - 35703 Rennes, CEDEX 7; 3 Neurology Unit, Hôpital Pontchaillou,

CHU de Rennes, rue Henri Le Guilloux, 35033 Rennes, France; 4 ‘Neuroscience of Emotion and Affective

Dynamics’ laboratory, Department of Psychology, and Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, University of

Geneva, 1205 Geneva, Switzerland

Automaticity can be defined as uncontrolled, unintentional, unconscious, efficient or/and quick behavior.

A dynamic blend of these features is possible according to the emotional situation. Electrodermal activity

characterizes the treatment of emotional information. In this study, we explored electrodermal activity

in the context of an implicit emotional task.

We proposed a two-alternative forced-choice task (‘same’ or ‘different’) with explicit genre/implicit

emotion and explicit emotion matching conditions in a sample of 42 healthy participants. During these

tasks, electrodermal activity was recorded.

We did not show difference between the rate of electrodermal responses between emotional conditions

for the two different tasks (implicit or explicit). For the implicit task, we showed an interaction between

responses choice (‘same’ or ‘different’) and emotion (F> 3.30; p<0.001) for both behavioral and

electrodermal data. Contrasts revealed a significant difference between ‘same’ and ‘different’ choice

only for anger.

In conclusion, we showed an effect of automatic emotional processing correlated with electrodermal

activity: when the participant had to make a decision about sex matching, we observed greater

electrodermal activity if the faces displayed anger emotional state. This study showed the influence of

automatic processing on biologically relevant and physiological responses. This automatic processing of

emotions is involved in many situations that require quick and appropriate response.

25

[19] Involuntary processing of facial emotions studied with ERPs in anxious participants

Wioleta Walentowska1 & Eligiusz Wronka

1

1 Psychophysiology Laboratory, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland

There is a common suggestion that trait anxiety can influence the processing of threat-related

information even without reaching the level of conscious awareness. To test this hypothesis, ERPs were

recorded in response to subliminally presented and backward masked faces (fearful and neutral) and

non-faces in the preselected low- and high-anxious individuals. The N170 amplitude was found to be

larger when elicited by faces in comparison to non-faces, however it was not found to be emotion-

sensitive or modulated by the level of anxiety. Interestingly, early differences between low- and high-

anxious individuals appeared within the latency of P1 component irrespective of the stimulus content. At

later stages, within the EPN component, stronger negativity specific for fearful faces was recorded

exclusively in the low-anxious participants. These findings indicate that anxiety level can modulate early

stages of information processing (P1 component), which leads to the anxiety-related differences in

involuntary emotional expression detection at later stages (EPN component).

[20] A matter of matching: how goals and primes affect experiences of self-agency.

Anouk van der Weiden1, Henk Aarts

1, & Kirsten I. Ruys

2

1 Utrecht University; 2 University of Tilburg

The experience of causing action-outcomes, also referred to as the sense of self-agency, is a pervasive

experience that people infer from their actions and the outcomes they produce. Recent research

suggests that self-agency inferences arise from an explicit goal-directed process as well as an implicit

outcome-priming process. Two experiments examined potential differences between these two

processes. In these experiments, participants had the goal to produce an outcome or were primed with

the outcome. Next, they performed an action in an agency-ambiguous situation, followed by an outcome

that either matched or mismatched the goal or prime. After observing each outcome, participants

indicated experienced self-agency over the action-outcome. Results showed that goals and outcome-

primes equally enhanced self-agency overmatching outcomes. Furthermore, goals reduce self-agency

over mismatching outcomes. However, outcome-primes did not affect self-agency over mismatching

outcomes, and even enhanced self-agency over mismatching proximate outcomes. The differences in

how goals and primes affect experienced self-agency over mismatching outcomes are explained in terms

of cognitive control processes and spreading of activation. Our findings provide novel evidence that self-

agency experiences result from two distinct inferential routes, and that goals and primes differentially

affect the perception of our own behavior.

[21] Two ways to miss your target in Attentional Blink conditions

26

Chie Nakatani1 & Cees van Leeuwen

1

1 KU Leuven, Belgium

We typically perceive some, but not all of the things that occur in our visual field. Certain events are

missed, even when a perceiver is alert, attentive, and knows what to look for. Some of these effects are

systematic. Amongst these perceptual blindness phenomena, the Attentional Blink (AB) is probably the

one most widely explored. To explain the AB, several neuro-computational models have been proposed.

The most recent of these, the Visual Selection and Awareness model (ViSA, Simione et al., in press)

predicts the timing of certain task-relevant neural activities, such as the onset of inhibition among

adjacent target and non-target items, a fast build-up of activity in visual cortices to sustain target

information, and a slower, large-scale activity to consolidate target information in working memory. In

particular, ViSA predicts that the onset of consolidation would be delayed in AB compared to non-AB

conditions. The onsets of the predicted activities were estimated from human EEG data recordings from

an Attentioanl Blink task. The analyses confirmed the model predictions. Moreover, they showed two

distinct AB scenarios: failure of sustained target activation versus premature onset of consolidation

activity.

[22] Delta plots reveal the role of response inhibition in lying

Evelyne Debey1, Bruno Verschuere

2, Richard Ridderinkhof

2, & Jan De Houwer

1

1 Ghent University, 2 University of Amsterdam

Previous research has shown that lying is accompanied by longer reaction times than truth telling. Since

lying involves withholding the truth, this ‘lie effect’ (lie – truth) may be due to the time-consuming

process of response inhibition. We investigated this response inhibition hypothesis on lying using the

delta-plot method, in which condition differences are mapped as a function of reaction time. Delta plots

prototypically have a positive slope. However, if the conditions differ in the amount of inhibition that is

applied, a gradually developing inhibition process makes delta plots level off for slow responses. This

leveling-off has shown to be more pronounced in people with better inhibitory control (Ridderinkhof,

2002). In two experiments, we let participants perform a reaction time task in which they alternately lied

and told the truth on autobiographical questions. We hypothesized (1) that the delta plot of the lie effect

would level off for slow responses and (2) that this leveling-off would be more pronounced in

participants with better inhibition skills (i.e., smaller lie effects). The results of both experiments verified

these predictions. Our experiments therefore support the hypothesis that response inhibition may be

crucially involved in lying. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

[23] Analysis of the unconscious context effects

Goultchira Chakirova1,2

27

1 Department of Psychiatry, the University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK; 2 The Human Brain Research

Foundation

A significant part of perceived information is processed outside of conscious awareness. This includes not

only lower level of analysis such as sensory analysis but also complex cognitive processing. Some of the

consciously processed information might become unconscious (through some protective psychological

defence mechanisms, for example repression or suppression). However, this information does not

disappear but rather is stored even if it is believed to be forgotten, and could be retrieved. This storage

of information consists of primitive instinctive impulses, desires, emotions and memories that

sometimes are too stressful if they are accessed consciously. Such repressed information, however,

influences human behaviour and decisions. Moreover, life scenario could be created on the basis of this

repressed information. Retrieved life scenario information in four volunteers demonstrated that those

scenarios were created during early childhood and were realised later. At least one of those scenarios

consisted of the entire life plan including an approximate date of death. This preliminary data indicates a

vital importance of understanding of the relationship between conscious and unconscious processing

and provided an insight on the degree to which unconscious processes might influence our behaviour

and decisions.

28

Poster Session II: Tuesday 4 December 12.20-14.20

[24] Sequence learning under different practice schedules in the Serial Reaction Time paradigm

Koen Homblé1 & Natacha Deroost

1

1 Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

Both laboratory and field studies on motor learning have demonstrated that the organization of training

can have a large influence on the acquisition of procedural skills. In general, using highly variable practice

schedules is found to be more advantageous than using more structured training schedules. We

investigated whether similar effects also apply for sequential learning in a Serial Reaction Time (SRT) task.

Two groups of participants performed an SRT task with the same sequence under either fragmented or

blocked practice conditions. Both indirect and direct measurements of implicit and explicit sequential

knowledge were administered afterwards. Contrary to our expectations, the blocked practice group

showed a larger implicit sequential learning effect as compared to the fragmented practice group. No

differences in explicit knowledge were found between conditions. We propose that the use of different

processing strategies in the SRT task might explain these results.

[25] Cognitive control, response inhibition and error detection of children with ADHD in the Stop-

Signal Task: An event-related potentials study.

Magdalena Senderecka1, Jakub Szewczyk

2, Krzysztof Gerc

3, Roman Chmylak

4, & Anna Grabowska

5

1 Cognitive Science Unit, Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland; 2

Psychophysiology Laboratory, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland; 3 The

Department of Developmental and Health Psychology, Institute of Applied Psychology, Jagiellonian

University, Cracow, Poland; 4 NZOZ EEG-GRAF, EEG Laboratory, Cracow, Poland; 5 Nencki Institute of

Experimental Biology, Warsaw, Poland

The first aim of the study was to determine whether deficient inhibitory control distinguishes children

with a diagnosis of ADHD combined type from normally developing children. The second aim was to

investigate error processing in ADHD children. 40 right-handed children aged between 6.9 and 12.3 years

participated in the study, with 16 boys and 4 girls in each groups. Participants performed a standard

Stop-Signal Task. Relative to controls, the go stimulus reaction time and the stop-signal reaction time

were prolonged in ADHD children. They showed reduced P2, enhanced, delayed N2, and reduced P3

component to auditory stop-signal compared with controls in successful stop-signal trials. Additionally,

the amplitude of response-locked event-related potentials, containing the ERN-Pe complex, was smaller

in ADHD children. These results support the hypothesis of a complex deficit of inhibitory control, conflict

monitoring, and error recognition mechanisms in ADHD. Reduced amplitude of the P2 reflects an early

29

orienting deficit. Enhanced amplitude and delayed latency of the N2 are associated with inability to

activate an urgent inhibitory process. Reduced amplitude of the P3 reflects a deficit in cognitive control

operations affecting overall performance monitoring. Finally, reduced amplitude of the ERN-Pe complex

is associated with impaired error detection and evaluation.

[26] The neural correlates of stimulus-driven and intentional inhibition: a comparison

Margot A. Schel1,2

, Simone Kühn3, Marcel Brass

3, Patrick Haggard

4, & Eveline A. Crone

1,2,5

1 Institute of Psychology, Leiden University, the Netherlands; 2 Leiden Institute for Brain and Cognition

(LIBC), the Netherlands; 3 Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, Belgium; 4 Institute

of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, United Kingdom; 5 Department of Psychology,

University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands

Response inhibition can be both externally driven, such as when a traffic light turns red, and internally

driven, such as when one decides not to take another biscuit from the biscuit box. Until now the

concepts of external stimulus-driven inhibition and internal intentional inhibition have never been

compared in one study. The present study was set out to compare the neural correlates of these two

forms of response inhibition. A group of adults (N=24, aged 18-26) performed two response inhibition

tasks while lying in the scanner. Stimulus-driven inhibition was measured by a stop-signal task in which

participants had to inhibit an already initiated motor-response when a stop-signal was presented.

Intentional inhibition was measured by the marble task, in which participants are instructed to freely

decide between acting on and inhibiting a prepotent response triggered by a rolling marble. Results

showed that during both stimulus-driven and intentional inhibition a similar neural network, consisting

of lateral prefrontal cortex, lateral parietal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex / presupplementary

motor area, was recruited. The same neural network was also activated during intentional action.

Together these results indicate that the same decision-making network is involved in stimulus-driven

inhibition, intentional inhibition, and intentional action.

[27] Modulating effect of COMT genotype on the brain regions underlying proactive control process

Mathieu Jaspar1,2

, Julien Grandjean1,2

, Eric Salmon1, Pierre Maquet

1, & Fabienne Collette

1,2

1 Cyclotron Research Centre; 2 Department of Psychology: Cognition and Behavior, University of Liège,

Liège, Belgium

Catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT) is an important enzyme which degrades catecholamines, such

dopamine, notably in the prefrontal cortex [1]. A large number of studies reported an effect on executive

functioning of COMT genotype [2], each genotype being associated with a different COMT enzymatic

activity [3].

30

In an event-related fMRI study, a modified form of the Stroop task was administered to three groups of

15 young adults according to their COMT val158met genotype (VV, VM and MM). Based on the theory of

dual mechanisms of control [4], the Stroop task has been built to induce proactive or reactive control

processes according to the task context.

Behavioral results did not show significant group differences for reaction times. However, fMRI results

revealed that proactive control is specifically associated with increased activity in the anterior cingulate

cortex in MM and VM groups by comparison to VV, but also with increased activity in the middle frontal

gyrus in the VV and VM groups by comparison to MM.

These observations, paralleling to the higher cortical dopamine level in MM individuals, confirms our

expectation of a COMT Val158Met genotype modulation of the brain regions underlying proactive

control, especially in frontal areas as suggested by Braver & al. [4].

References

[1] Männistö, P.T., & Kaakkola, S. (1999), ‘Catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT): Biochemistry, molecular biology,

pharmacology, and clinical efficacy of the new selective COMT inhibitors’, Pharmacological Reviews, vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 593-628.

[2] Barnett, J. H., Jones, P.B., Robbins, T. W., & Muller, U. (2007), ‘Effects of the cathecol-O-methyltransferase Val158Met

polymorphism on executive function: a meta-analysis of the Wiscosin Card Sort Test in schizophrenia and healthy control’, vol.

12, no.5, pp. 502-509.

[3] Weinshilboum, R. M., Otterness, D. M., & Szumlanski, C. L. (1999), ‘Methylation pharmacogenetics: cathecol O-

methyltransferase, thiopurine methyltransferase, and histamine N-methytransferase’, Annual Review of Pharmacology and

Toxicology, vol. 39, pp. 19-52.

[4] Braver TS, Gray JR, Burgess GC (2007) Explaining the many varieties of working memory variation: Dual mechanisms of

cognitive control. In: Conway ARA, Jarrold C, Kane MJ, Miyake A, Towse JN, editors. Variation in working memory. New York:

Oxford University Press. pp. 76-106.

[28] Psycholinguistic approaches of speech control

Sarah Brohé1, Véronique Delvaux

1, Kathy Huet

1, Myriam Piccaluga

1, & Bernard Harmegnies

1

1 University of Mons, Belgium

While the acquisition of a second language has been extensively examined in the literature, many

questions remain open with respect to the cognitive processes involved in phonetic learning. Our

research project deals with the factors influencing the control of perception and production of foreign

sounds by individuals. The acquisition of new ways of speech control is submitted to manipulable,

extrinsic factors but also to intrinsic ones whose knowledge is relatively poor. Precisely, we aim at

highlighting the cognitive processes contributing to the control of speech perception and production,

namely attention and memory, using classical psycholinguistic tasks. As an example, in a previous study

we addressed the effect of orienting attention (by providing information about the cues that were

relevant for distinguishing the sounds and by giving feedback after each response) on the processing of

31

unfamiliar speech sounds in a categorization task. Ultimately, our research program is designed to

provide insights into controversial issues: the role of attention in learning, the potential role of feedback

in regulating behavior and the relevance of implicitversus explicit methods in phonetic training.

[29] Neural correlates of individual differences in self control

Anja Waegeman1, Carolyn H. Declerck

1, Christophe Boone

1, Ruth Seurinck

2, Wim Van Hecke

3, & Paul M.

Parizel3

1 University Antwerp, Management Department, Prinsstraat 13, B-2000 Antwerp; 2 University Ghent,

Department of Data-Analysis, H. Dunantlaan 1, B-9000 Ghent; 3 University Hospital Antwerp,

Wilrijkstraat 10, B-2650 Edegem

Effective self control is known to have much predictive value correlating withpsychological health, well-

being, career choices, leadership abilities and success, while self control failure characterizes many

clinical and personality disorders. Using event related fMRI (n = 41) we investigated individual

differences in inter-situational self control in two different experimental tasks that engage two

commonly studied aspects of self control: the ability to control impulses in a time discounting task and

the ability to adapt behaviour to a changing environment in a probabilistic reversal learning task. Based

on cognitive control theory and research, we hypothesize (1) that cognitive control across both tasks is

associated with activation in a lateral neural network (e.g. inferior frontal gyrus and nucleus caudatus)

and (2) that this network is more active in individuals with high self control compared to low self

controlled individuals for whom behaviour is driven by brain regions involved in reward processing (e.g.

medial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum). By focusing on the joint activation pattern of two

different tasks in individuals with high and low self control abilities, we are able to draw conclusions

regarding the generalizability of self control as a stable individual trait and as an inter-situational

construct.

[30] Reward-based learning of unconscious sequences during crowding

Anne Atas1, Nathan Faivre

2, Axel Cleeremans

1, & Sid Kouider

2

1 Consciousness, Cognition, and Computation Group (CO3); Université Libre de Bruxelles; 2 Laboratoire de

Sciences Cogntives et Psycholinguistique (LSCP); Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris

Can we learn complex information without awareness? During the last fifty years, this important issue in

neuroscience has been extensively investigated. However, most of empirical data suggests that learning

is accompanied by awareness. This lack of evidence for unconscious learning might reflect the systematic

use of visible stimuli during the learning phase. In the present study, we overcome this problem by

testing whether sequence learning can take place when each stimuli within a sequence cannot be

perceived consciously. We used gaze contingent crowding to ensure that each visual event can be

32

presented for a long duration while remaining invisible. Our task involved discriminating between two

subliminal sequences based on a corresponding outcome: one sequence was always associated with a

monetary reward and the other with a monetary punishment. Our results revealed a significant

facilitation of responses times for the reward sequence in comparison with punish sequence, whereas

awareness tests indicated no awareness of the sequence of stimuli. Our results thus demonstrate, for

the first time, that sequence learning can take place completely unconsciously. These findings also

suggest that the serial structure of unconscious information can not only be processed but also lead to

long-lasting traces in the brain.

[31] Mindwandering heightens accessibility of negative cognitions in at-risk individuals

Igor Marchetti1, Ernst H.W. Koster

1, & Rudi De Raedt

1

1 Department of Experimental-Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Belgium

Mindwandering (MW) is defined as a shift of attention away from a primary task toward internal

information and consistently associated with both positive and negative outcomes. Among the latter,

negative mood and negative cognitions have been reported, but the mechanisms through which this

happens are still unclear. We put forward that MW could either directly enhance negative thinking or

indirectly heighten the accessibility of negative thoughts. We measured in our sample (n = 79) emotional

thoughts during the Sustained Attention on Response Task (SART) which induces MW, and the

accessibility of negative cognitions by means of the Scrambled Sentences Task (SST) after the task. We

also measured both depressive symptoms and rumination. Results show that, only in individuals with

significant levels of depression, MW during SART predicts higher accessibility of negative thoughts after

the task, rather than negative thinking during the task. This effect was not due to mood changes and

rumination was associated with MW-related negative thinking. These findings contribute to our

understanding of the underlying mechanisms of MW and may shed light on the relationship between

task-involvement and affect.

[32] Stress related diminishment of cognitive control in Non-Suicidal Self-Injury.

Ingrid Van Camp1 & Mattias Desmet

1

1 Department of Psychoanalysis and Clinical Consulting, Ghent University, Belgium

The Social Problem Solving Skills Task (SPST; Nock, 2006) assesses a person’s choice of an optimal

response to a stressful situation and their actual response. Twenty five self-harming subjects with a

history of at least one traumatic event were assessed and compared with a large control group. Results

show that both groups perform equally well in choosing an optimal problem solution, which suggests an

intact mentalization capacity. Self-harmers did differ significantly from controls in their most likely actual

33

response: self-harmers tend to vent emotions as opposed to non-self-harmers whose response

approaches the optimal problem solution.

This suggests the occurrence of a regression to a lower level of mentalization, which is a well-

documented phenomenon supported by neurocognitive research. Extreme arousal at the time of a

traumatic event produces lasting neurobiological changes. (1) Changes in the neural arousal mechanisms

cause the arousal system to be easily triggered by later relatively mild emotional stimuli. (2) Triggering of

the arousal system causes a neurochemical switch from conscious, declarative memory, mediated by the

hippocampus, to the activation of the amygdala thereby provoking the expression of emotional

responses.

These findings confirm the validity of the SPST as a test of mentalization quality and regression

probability.

[33] CNV, LRP, and ERN/PE effects in the differentiation-of-deception paradigm

Kristina Suchotzki1, Bruno Verschuere

2, Fren Smulders

3, Ewout Meijer

3, & Geert Crombez

1

1 Ghent University; 2 University of Amsterdam; 3 Maastricht University

The Differentiation-of-Deception paradigm is unique in that the experimental (lie) and control (truth)

condition only differ in the crucial variable: Deception. We extended the paradigm to gain insight in the

cognitive mechanisms of deception using event-related components: the Contingent Negative Variation

(CNV), the Lateralized Readiness Potential (LRP) and error-related components, i.e., the Error-Related

Negativity (ERN) and the Error Positivity (Pe). Twenty participants committed a mock crime and gave

speeded yes/no responses to crime and control questions using left and right button presses. A question

was presented (e.g., Did you steal a…) for 2000 ms, followed by a truth (T) or lie (L) cue. The cue was

replaced after 1500 ms by a keyword (e.g., wallet), allowing participants to respond. The CNV was

measured during the cue-keyword interval, the LRP during the keyword-response interval, and the ERN

and Pe after (correct) responses. Results revealed an enlarged frontal CNV after the lie cue, which could

probably be interpreted as anticipation of higher cognitive workload. The stimulus-locked LRP and the

ERN did not differ between both conditions. A larger Pe was found after lie responses compared to truth

responses, which may indicate a conscious conflict between the lie response and the known truth.

[34] Chunking in rapid serial visual presentation: consequences for visual awareness

Maria Falikman1,2

& Vyacheslav Stepanov3

1 Center for Cognitive Studies, Dept. of Linguistics, and Dept. of Psychology, Lomonosov Moscow State

University; 2 Cognitive Research Lab, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow,

Russia; 3 UsabilityLab Inc., Moscow, Russia

34

Visual events that occur beyond awareness due to the lack of attention (or, at least, do not enter

conscious report) can become conscious, when they form a part of a larger whole. This is true for various

modifications of the phenomenon known as a word superiority effect (WSE), first described by J.M.

Cattell more than a century ago and rediscovered by cognitive psychologists in 1960-es. In our

experiments, we studied WSE in a variety of attentional paradigms, including a dual-task rapid serial

visual presentation (RSVP) paradigm with letter-by-letter presentation of Russian words. We have

demonstrated that the lack of visual awareness known as an attentional blink, normally observed in this

paradigm, disappears for target letter stimuli embedded in words. Using word and nonword strings with

instructions "to read words" and "to identify letters", we have also demonstrated that this effect is due

to the controlled strategy of word reading rather than to the automatic word processing. Finally, by

introducing an extra probe stimulus in letter strings containing words, we have also shown that the

attentional blink does not completely disappear but rather shifts towards the end of a to-be-read word

as a functional "unit" of visual information processing.

[35] Traits are represented in the medial Prefrontal Cortex: An fMRI adaptation study

Ning Ma1, Kris Baetens

1, Marie Vandekerckhove

1, Jenny Kestemont

1, & Frank Van Overwalle

1

1 Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

Neuroimaging studies on trait inference about the self and others have found a network of brain areas,

the critical part of which appears to be medial PreFrontal Cortex (mPFC). In this study, we investigated

whether the mPFC plays an essential role in the neural encoding and representation of traits. To localize

the neural representation of traits, we used fMRI-adaptation, which is a rapid suppression of neuronal

responses upon repeated presentation of the same underlying stimulus, in this case, the implied trait.

Participants had to infer an agent’s (social) trait from brief trait-implying behavioral descriptions. In each

trial, the critical (target) sentence was preceded by a sentence (prime) that implied the same trait, the

opposite trait, or no trait at all. The results revealed robust suppression of activation in the ventral mPFC

in all three target conditions compared to their respective primes, and nowhere else in the brain.

Crucially, this adaptation effect was graded: strongest after being primed with a similar trait, moderate

after an opposite trait and weakest after a trait-irrelevant prime. In line with previous research on fMRI

adaptation, we interpret these findings as indicating that trait concepts are not only processed, but also

encoded and represented in the ventral mPFC.

[36] Sleep deprivation selectively disrupts cognitive control in the Stroop task.

Wim Gevers1, Gaetane Deliens

2, Sophie Hofmann

3, Wim Notebaert

1, & Philippe Peigneux

2

1 Unescog, Cognitive Neurosciences Unit, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) ,Bruxelles, BE; 2 UR2NF,

Neuropsychology and Functional Neuroimaging Research Unit, Université Libre de Bruxelles

35

(ULB) ,Bruxelles, BE; 3 Université Libre de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, BE; 4 Department of Experimental

Psychology, Ghent University ,Ghent, BE

Sleep deprivation (SD) markedly impacts prefrontal cortex, a brain area known as an essential

component in executive functions and cognitive control. In the paradigmatic Stroop task, participants

must name the ink colour of written colour words, eventually leading to interference when meaning and

ink colour are discrepant. However, besides overall increased RT, prior studies failed to show SD--related

changes in Stroop interference (e.g. Cain et al., 2011). Here, we investigated this issue taking sequence

effects into account. Indeed, it is known that congruency effects are weaker after incongruent than after

congruent trials, a sequential modulation effect explained by top-down, increased cognitive control after

the detection of conflict. Alternatively, bottom-up repetition effects of stimulus and response features

have been proposed. Notebaert et al. (2006) demonstrated that both bottom-up and top-down

modulations can operate in parallel but that top-down control needs time and cognitive resources to

build up. We used this paradigm to investigate the influence of SD on bottom-up and top-down

processes in the Stroop task. We demonstrate that SD impacts on top- down but not bottom-up

modulations of congruency effects in the Stroop task, hence reflecting the inability of sleep-deprived

subjects to raise cognitive resources needed for increased cognitive control after conflict detection.

[37] Memory repression can be triggered unconsciously.

Alexandre Salvador1, Fabien Vinckier

2, & Raphaël Gaillard

1.

1 Centre de Psychiatrie et Neurosciences, INSERM U894, Paris ; Institut du Cerveau et de la Moelle,

INSERM U610, Paris

In 2001, Anderson argued that people can exert cognitive control to prevent unwanted declarative

memories from entering awareness, which results in a long lasting deterioration of recall. This process

relies on a conscious effort, and is associated with increased activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.

Meanwhile, the view that cognitive control requires consciousness is being challenged. Recent findings

show that non consciously perceived stimuli can activate complex cognitive functions, such as task

switching, response inhibition or orienting of attention.

Our study questioned whether the scope of unconsciously triggered cognitive control processes could be

further extended to memory repression.

After initial learning of 24 word pairs, we trained 30 subjects to repress or to allow the recall of the

second word when presented with the first, in response to an arbitrary geometric cue. We then

subliminally presented the geometric cues while asking subjects to perform an unrelated task on the first

word (gender determination). We then measured recall performance.

Results indicate that a cue associated with the memory repression task set but non consciously

perceived deteriorated performance on future recall, compared to baseline.

36

We therefore extend the scope of unconsciously triggered cognitive control processes to memory

repression.

[38] Progression of auditory discrimination based on EEG decoding predicts awakening from coma

Athina Tzovara1, Andrea Rossetti

2, Lucas Spierer

3, Jeremy Grivel

4, Micah Murray

2, Mauro Oddo

6, &

Marzia De Lucia1

1 Center for Biomedical Imaging, Department of Radiology, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois and

University of Lausanne, Switzerland; 2 Department of Clinical Neurosciences, Centre Hospitalier

Universitaire Vaudois and University of Lausanne, Switzerland; 3 Department of Medicine, University of

Fribourg, Switzerland; 4 Psychiatry Department, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois and University of

Lausanne, Switzerland; 5 Adult Intensive Care Medicine, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois and

University of Lausanne, Switzerland

In comatose patients neural evidence of mismatch negativity (MMN) has been associated with their

chance of survival. Because auditory discrimination has been typically assessed at various delays after

coma onset, it is still unclear whether this impairment depends on the time of the recording. Here, we

studied 30 post-anoxic comatose patients resuscitated from cardiac arrest and five healthy, age-matched

controls. Using a MMN paradigm, we performed two electroencephalography (EEG) recordings: the first

within 24 hours after coma onset and under mild therapeutic hypothermia, and the second after one day

and under normo-thermic conditions. We analyzed EEG responses based on a multivariate decoding

algorithm that automatically quantifies neural discrimination at the single-patient level. Results showed

high average decoding accuracy in discriminating sounds both for control subjects and comatose patients.

Importantly, accurate decoding was largely independent of patients’ chance of surviving. However, the

progression of auditory discrimination between the first and second recordings was informative of

patients’ chance of surviving. A deterioration of auditory discrimination was observed in all non-survivors.

We show evidence of intact auditory processing even in comatose patients who do not survive and that

progression of sound discrimination over time is informative of patients’ chance of surviving.

[39] Alertness and shielding effects of language on task switching: dopamine and goal activation

contributions.

Hichem Slama1,2,3

, José Morais2, Sarah Bourgognon

1, & Philippe Peigneux

1

1 UR2NF - Neuropsychology and Functional Neuroimaging Research Unit, Faculty of Psychology; 2

UNESCOG - Cognitive Neurosciences Research Unit, Faculty of Psychology; 3 Department of Clinical and

Cognitive Neuropsychology, Erasme Hospital Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium

The impact of verbal mediation on task switching1,2

has been recently studied using verbal activation (VA)

or verbal interference (VI) procedures3-5

. In this study, twenty participants were tested in both VA

37

(repeating aloud the cue) and VI (articulatory suppression), and in long (LPT) and short preparation time

(SPT) baseline conditions. A new cued sorting task was used that reduces the memory load of

stimulus-response mappings, and targets the task goal. Proactive interference mechanisms were studied

using neutral and interfering transitions in switch trials. Eye blink rates (EBR) were recorded as markers

of dopamine activity6. Results indicated that both VA and VI had a general positive effect on speed. VA

also affected accuracy switch costs (ASC) with fewer errors in switch trials compared to LPT and VI.

Greater ASC were also observed in LPT compared to SPT reflecting an increase in goal neglect with time.

Higher EBR were correlated with reduced ASC when proactive interference was present. Together, those

results suggest two roles of language in task switching. First, a shielding role against proactive

interference, correlated with dopamine activity, and affecting task goal activation. Second, a general

alertness function observed in both VA and VI.

References

1. Vandierendonck A, Liefooghe B, Verbruggen F. Task switching: interplay of reconfiguration and interference control. Psychol

Bull;136:601-626.

2. Kiesel A, Wendt M, Jost K, et al. Control and Interference in Task Switching-A Review. Psychological Bulletin 2010;136:849-874.

3. Kirkham AJ, Breeze JM, MarGreek Small Letter Iota With Tonos-Beffa P. The impact of verbal instructions on goal-directed

behaviour. Acta Psychol 2012;Vol.139:pp.

4. Saeki E, Saito S. Verbal representation in task order control: An examination with transition and task cues in random task

switching. Memory & Cognition 2009;Vol.37:pp.

5. Kray J, Eber J, Karbach J. Verbal self-instructions in task switching: a compensatory tool for action-control deficits in childhood

and old age? Dev Sci 2008;11:223-236.

6. Dreisbach G, Muller J, Goschke T, et al. Dopamine and cognitive control: the influence of spontaneous eyeblink rate and

dopamine gene polymorphisms on perseveration and distractibility. Behav Neurosci 2005;119:483-490.

[40] Can task instructions overcome automatic Stroop processing of conscious and subliminal stimuli ?

Imen El Karoui1,2,3

, Kalliopi Christoforidis1, & Lionel Naccache

1,4,5

1 ICM Research Center, INSERM/UPMC UMRS 975, 75013, Paris, France; 2 Department of Biology, École

Normale Supérieure, 75005, Paris, France; 3 Ecole Doctorale Cerveau Cognition Comportement, Université

Paris 6, 75005, Paris, France; 4 Assistance Publique Hôpitaux de Paris, Groupe Hospitalier PitiéSalpêtrière,

75013, Paris, France; 5 Faculté de Médecine PitiéSalpêtrière, Université Paris 6, 75013, Paris, France

The present study investigates whether a behavioral strategy established on conscious stimuli can be

applied to nonconscious stimuli. We derived our experimental paradigm from the task used by Merikle

et al (1995, Consciousness & Cognition). In this paradigm, subjects are asked to respond to the color of a

green or blue string of ampersands. Preceding this target, the word “GREEN” or “BLUE” is presented

either consciously or nonconsciously. Trials are organized in conscious and nonconscious blocks. In each

block, 80% of the trials are incongruent. Critically, we added rare nonconscious trials inside conscious

38

blocks. We also included one conscious and one nonconscious control blocks, in which the proportion of

incongruent trials is 50%. We will present behavioral and EEG data, using this paradigm. We are currently

analyzing these data, but preliminary analyses indicate that subjects show a reverse Stroop effect on

conscious trials and a highly reduced Stroop effect on nonconscious trials embedded in conscious blocks

compare to the unconscious control block. Interestingly, the Stroop effect was reduced in nonconscious

blocks only when they were presented after conscious blocks, suggesting that subjects can strategically

adapt to the frequency of incongruent trials when the word is visible, but that they can apply this

strategy to subsequent trials.

[41] Conflicting Stimuli and Their Impact on Processing Strategies in Artificial Grammar Learning

Ivan Ivanchei1 & Nadezda Moroshkina

1

1 Department of Psychology, St. Petersburg State University, Russia

The interaction of conscious and unconscious processing in artificial grammar learning was investigated.

The main research question was how the conflict between implicitly learned dependencies in stimuli

affects their classification. The experiment consisted of two phases. In the first phase participants

memorized letter strings generated by a finite state grammar. All grammatical strings had also an

additional subtle feature: the letters' lengthiness was increased. In the second phase participants

classified the new strings as grammatical or not. For the first group of participants, all grammatical

strings had the increased lengthiness, and all nongrammatical had not. For the second group,

grammaticality and lengthiness did not correlate. The results of the experiment showed that participants

implicitly learned to classify the new stimuli according to both grammar and lengthiness. Participants of

the two groups demonstrated similar level of classification accuracy, but their strategies were different.

Participants of the second group were not aware of the contradiction between grammaticality and

lengthiness, but changed their strategy to a more analytical one. It was evident from the lower Yesrate

and, as a consequence, lower level of false alarms. This result suggests that conflicts in implicit

knowledge enhance conscious control of the task performance.

[42] Using the Spatial Tapping task to explore the relations between attention and executive control

Mariama Dione1, Laurent Ott

1, & Yvonne Delevoye-Turrell

1

1 University Lille Nord de France; 2 URECA EA 1059, rue du Barreau BP 60149, 59653 Villeneuve d’Ascq

Cedex, France

Executive functions are usually assessed using complex planning tasks. Although these tasks are largely

used for clinical assessment, there are known to suffer of validity problems. The objective of this study

was to propose Spatial Tapping as a novel task to observe and measure executive functions. Following

the theoretical assumptions of Cools (2006) and Miyake (2000), we propose that executive control is

39

under the influence of two mutually opponent computations, i.e. cognitive stability (that requires

maintaining a cognitive representation in WM) and cognitive flexibility (that requires shifting attention

from a current mental state to the next). In the present study, we propose a simple task in which we

manipulated the tempo of task execution. By analysing the spatio-temporal properties of error

distribution, we demonstrate that participants (N=31) maintain attention on the current target in slow

tempi, but shift attention quickly from a current action to the next for fast tempi, in order to keep

synchronized to a sequence of tones. In a second task (N=41), in order to confirm that the previous

results are related to the attentional abilities of 'maintaining & shifting', we used abrupt onsets to

facilitate/distract attention performances in the Spatial Tapping task.

[43] Global mismatch negativity does not require awareness of stimulus regularity

Alexandre Simonin1, Athina Tzovara

2, Andrea Rossetti

1, Micah Murray

2, Mauro Oddo

3, & Marzia De Lucia

2

1 Department of Clinical Neurosciences, Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois and University of

Lausanne, Switzerland; 2 Center for Biomedical Imaging, Department of Radiology, Centre Hospitalier

Universitaire Vaudois and University of Lausanne, Switzerland; 3 Adult Intensive Care Medicine, Centre

Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois and University of Lausanne, Switzerland

Auditory evoked potentials (AEPs) are informative of intact brain functions of comatose patients. One

marker is provided by the differential AEPs responses to standard and deviant sounds in mismatch

negativity (MMN) paradigms. A rich literature interprets this effect as a preattentive and unconscious

processing of the incoming stimuli. By contrast, MMN effect induced by the identical repetition of groups

of sounds (global MMN) has been reported only when subjects were aware of the regularity. Here we

test this hypothesis in five postanoxic comatose patients who underwent therapeutic hypotermia. We

recorded AEPs while delivering groups of five sounds. They included either four identical sounds and one

different in duration or five identical sounds. Each of these group of sounds was used either as standard

or as deviant stimuli in a way that we could test the global MMN while controlling for the local MMN.

We carried out a single-trial topographic analysis which quantifies the differential responses between

two experimental conditions at single patient level. Three patients show the global irregularity effect

despite unconscious and despite their hypotermic condition. These results suggest that active

maintenance of perceptual representation do not require consciousness and that comatose patients can

discriminate complex patterns of sounds.

[44] Cognitive control and number comparison : An fMRI-guided TMS study

Michael Andres1, Charlotte Desmet

1, Filip Van Opstal

1, Marcel Brass

1, & Wim Fias

1

1 Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University

40

Number comparison is known to recruit the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) but also frontal regions associated

to cognitive control, such as the inferior frontal junction (IFJ). It is unclear, however, whether these

regions are necessary to perform comparison tasks and whether their role is selective for numbers. We

used fMRI to reveal the parieto-frontal networks involved in number processing and cognitive control, as

measured by a Stroop task. Results showed overlapping activations in the left IFJ, SMA and IPS, with

number-related activations extending more anteriorly in IPS than control-related activations. The same

participants were then asked to select the largest of two numbers or the most dangerous of two animals

while rTMS was used to create virtual lesions of left IFJ or IPS. Preliminary results (N=6) showed that,

when compared to a control site, rTMS over IPS slowed down responses irrespective of stimulus

category. Although our fMRI results converge with others to underline the involvement of IFJ in number

comparison, our results failed to evidence a deficit after rTMS over this region. We propose that IFJ

codes the rules that underlie stimulus-response associations during number comparison, but that its

integrity is required only when these rules need to be updated.

[45] Training subjective experience in binocular rivalry

Michał Wierzchoń1, Bert Windey

2, Krzysztof Gociewicz

1, Marcin Koculak

1, & Axel Cleeremans

2

1 Jagiellonian University, Institute of Psychology, Consciousness Research Lab; 2 Universite Libre de

Bruxelles, Consciousness, Cognition and Computation Group

Here, we explore the possibility of intentional training of subjective experience in binocular rivalry (BR).

In this paradigm, a different stimulus is presented to each eye, leading to the suppression of one of both

stimuli. Typically, which stimulus is seen or suppressed varies over time in a regular manner (i.e. regular

switches between percepts are observed every few seconds). However, early studies suggest that

instructions can influence the perceptual transitions in BR, resulting in changes of subjective experiences

of stimuli. In the present study, we further investigated this finding, asking whether it is possible to learn

to control our perceptual experience in BR. To test this research question, we asked participants to

control their perception, trying to focus on one of the possible percepts for the whole block of the task.

We trained participants for 20 blocks, 1 minute each, counterbalancing the stimuli that should be

perceived by participants. As a result of training, we expected participants to report proportionally

longer perception of the image that they are required to focused on. The results are under analysis and

will be discussed in context of the Radical Plasticity Thesis predictions (Cleeremans, 2011).

[46] Placebo-suggestion modulates conflict adaptation in the Stroop Task

Pedro M. Saldanha Da Gama1, Hichem Slama

2, Emilie A.Y. Caspar

1, Wim Gevers

3, & Axel Cleeremans

1

1 Research Unit in Consciousness, Cognition and Computation Group (CO3), Department of Psychology,

Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium; 2 Research Unit in Cognitive Neurosciences (UNESCOG) and

Neuropsychology and Functional Neuroimaging Research Unit (UR2NF), Department of Psychology,

41

Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium; 3 Research Unit in Cognitive Neurosciences (UNESCOG),

Department of Psychology, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium

Expectation manipulations such as suggestion, placebo and post-hypnotic suggestion have been shown

to bias several cognitive processes (pain, visual awareness and emotions). Here we demonstrate that a

mixed placebo-suggestion is able to create expectations that have a profound impact on conflict

adaptation assessed by objective measures. Two groups were exposed to a placebo-suggestion to induce

either positive or negative expectations about the properties of a sham “brain wave” machine while

performing a Stroop task. The experimental design associated a placebo (the equipment and procedure)

to a suggestion (verbal and written persuasive information). The machine was described as either

enhancing (positive group) or impairing (negative group) participants’ ability to perceive colors. In the

baseline condition, participants completed the Stroop task without the equipment. We found a double

interaction between Stroop conditions, suggestion and group. Planned comparisons indicated that the

suggestion only influenced accuracy in the incongruent conditions. Participants committed fewer errors

compared to baseline when under the positive suggestion but more errors when under the negative

suggestion. Furthermore, participants’ intra-individual variability was influenced by suggestion and group.

This study thus demonstrates that expectations induced by a placebo-suggestion can modulate cognitive

conflict.

[47] Timing, Sequencing, and Cognitive Control in Complex Movement Coordination

Ralf Krampe1, Nici Wenderoth

1, Ann Lavrysen

1, & Stephan Swinnen

1

1 KU Leuven, Belgium

80 young (20--35 yrs) and older (54-67 yrs) professional musicians and age-matched novices (20 in each

group) performed unimanual tapping tasks, which either required low-level timing (isochronous tapping

of identical target intervals), rhythmic sequencing (performance of a rhythm consisting of multiple target

intervals) or switching between different rhythmic sequences. Data was collected during two fMRI scan

sessions with (for novices) six laboratory training sessions in between. In general professional musicians

outperformed novices with effects of expertise increasing with task complexity. Age-effects were

pronounced in novices and in tasks requiring sequencing or cognitive control. Besides well-documented

motor networks active in all groups, we found that novices heavily relied on parieto-prefrontal networks

(Left post IPS, Right IPL, R+L Lateral PFC) for sequencing and switching tasks, evidencing high levels of

cognitive control. In contrast, expert musicians showed no (young musicians) or less activation (older

musicians) of prefrontal regions or IPS in these tasks. Instead, musicians showed pronounced activation

in the primary sensorimotor cortex. Acquisition and maintenance of high-level motor control apparently

amounts to a gradual release from domain-general cognitive control through optimizing task-specific

"lower-level" functions.

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Sponsorship

This conference is organized with the financial support of:

• The Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Science and the Arts (http://www.kvab.be/)

• VISITBRUSSELS (http://visitbrussels.be)1

• The Research Community ‘Neuroscience in relation to Experimental Psychology’ sponsored by

the Research Foundation Flanders (http://www.fwo.be/)

1 Only the organizers of NEUROCOG’12 are responsible for all communications or publications with regards to the

conference. VISITBRUSSELS is not responsible for the use that can be made of the information in these

communications or publications.