conscript
DESCRIPTION
ConScript. Specifying and Enforcing Fine-Grained Security Policies for JavaScript in the Browser. Leo Meyerovich UC Berkeley. Benjamin Livshits Microsoft Research. Web Programmability Platform. openid.net. yelp.com. adsense.com. Google maps. Rich Internet Applications are Dynamic. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
ConScript
Specifying and Enforcing Fine-Grained Security Policies for JavaScript in the Browser
Leo MeyerovichUC Berkeley
Benjamin LivshitsMicrosoft Research
2
Web Programmability Platform
yelp.com
openid.net
adsense.com
Google maps
3
Rich Internet Applications are Dynamic
Yelp.com: main.js … jQuery.js … adSense.js … GoogleMaps.js … OpenID_API.js
flexible runtime composition … but little control.
Towards Safe Programmability for the Web
4
Can’t trust other people’s codeMash-ups
5
Goals and Contributions
• protect benign users• by giving control to hosting site• ConScript approach: aspects for security
control loading and use of scripts
• 17 hand-written policies• correct policies are hard to write• proposed type system to catch common attacks• implemented 2 policy generators
express many policies safely
• built into IE 8 JavaScript interpreter• runtime and space overheads under 1% (vs. 30-550%)• smaller trusted computing base (TCB)
browser support
6
approach protect benign users by giving control to the hosting site
: aspects for security
7
ConScript
• Approach– protect benign Web users – give control to the hosting site
• How– Browser-supported aspects for security
8
Contributions of ConScript• protect benign users by giving control to hosting site• ConScript approach: aspects for security• built into IE 8 JavaScript interpreter
A case for aspects in browser
• Policies are easy to get wrong• Type system to ensure policy correctness
Correctness checking
• 17 hand-written policies• Comprehensive catalog of policies from literature and practice• implemented 2 policy generators
Expressiveness
• Tested on real apps: Google Maps, Live Desktop, etc.• runtime and space overheads under 1% (vs. 30-550%)• smaller trusted computing base (TCB)
Evaluation
9
manifest of script URLs
HTTP-only cookies
resource blacklists
limit eval
no foreign links
no hidden frames
script whitelist
<noscript>
no URL redirection
no pop-ups
enforce public vs. private
Policies
10
CONSCRIPT aspectsimplementing aspects in IE8checking CONSCRIPT policiesgenerating CONSCRIPT policiesperformance
11
heap
eval is evil
window.eval =function () { throw ‘Disallowed’};
function
eval
heap object
documentwindow
xyz…
div
stack
eval
eval
foo bar
12
No postMessage: A Simple Policy?
Wrapping: [[Caja, DoCoMo, AOJS, lightweightjs, Web Sandbox, …]]
window.postMessage = function () {};frame1.postMessage(“msg”, “evil.com”)
Aspects: [[AspectJ]]
void around(String msg, String uri) : call DOM.postMessage(String m, String u) { /* do nothing instead of call */ }
… no classes in JavaScript / DOM …
13
function () { [native code] }
function () { throw ‘exn’;}
Specifying Calls using References
around(window.postMessage, function () { throw ‘exn’; });
[Object window]
[Object frame] postMessage
postMessage
14
1. FunctionsDOM: aroundExt(postMessage, function (pm2, m, uri) { … });
JS: aroundNat(eval, function (eval, str) { … });
User-defined: aroundFnc(foo, function (foo2, arg1) { … });
2. Script introduction<script>: aroundScr(function (src) { return src + ‘;’ + pol;});
inline: aroundInl(function (src) { return src + ‘;’ + pol;});
ConScript Interface
15
CONSCRIPT aspectsimplementing aspects in IE8checking CONSCRIPT policiesgenerating CONSCRIPT policiesperformance
16
function f () { … }
function f () {<before> … <after>}
Problem: Implementation?
Source Rewriting [[aojs, docomo, caja, sandbox, fbjs]]
50%-450% more to transfer, 30-70% slowdown limited: native (DOM) functions, dynamic code? big assumptions: adds parser to TCB, …
17
Mediating DOM Functionswindow.postMessage
frame2.postMessage
JavaScript interpreter
IE8 libraries(HTML, Networking, …)
postMessage
0xff34e5arguments: “hello”, “evil.com”
call advice
aroundExt(window.postMessage,
off
0xff34e5 off
);
advice dispatch
[not found]
0xff34e5
function advice1 (foo2) { if (ok()) { foo2(); } else throw ‘exn’; }
function foo () { }
Resuming Calls
18
function advice2 (foo2) { if (ok()) { bless(); foo2(); } else throw ‘exn’; }
function foo () { }
advice onadvice off
bless() temporarily disables advice for next call
Optimizing the Critical Path
19
function advice2 (foo2) { if (ok()) { bless(); foo2(); } else throw ‘exn’; }
function foo () { }
advice on
function advice3 (foo2) { if (ok()) foo2(); else { curse(); throw ‘exn’; } }
function foo () { }
advice offadvice on
• calling advice turns advice off for next call• curse() enables advice for next call
20
CONSCRIPT aspectsimplementing aspects in IE8checking CONSCRIPT policiesgenerating CONSCRIPT policiesperformance
21
Basic Usage
Yelp.com: main.js, index.html … jQuery.js … adSense.js … GoogleMaps.js … OpenID_API.js
script whitelist
no eval
no innerHTML
no hidden frames
only HTTP cookies
no inline scripts
<script src=“main.js” policy=“noEval()”/>
SURGEON GENERAL’S WARNING
Policies are written in a small JavaScript subset.
Applications only lose a few dangerous features.
22
Policy Integrity
Objects defined with policy constructors do not flow out
Old Policyaround(postMessage, function (m, url) { w = {“msn.com”: true}; …
23
Policy Integrity
Objects defined with policy constructors do not flow out
Old Policyaround(postMessage, function (m, url) { w = {“msn.com”: true}; …
policy object: must protectunknown: do not pass privileged objects!
24
Policy Integrity
Objects defined with policy constructors do not flow out
Old Policyaround(postMessage, function (m, url) { w = {“msn.com”: true}; …
User ExploitpostMessage(“”, “msn.com”);w[“evil.com”] = 1;postMessage(“”, “evil.com”);
25
Policy Integrity
Objects defined with policy constructors do not flow out
New Policyaround(postMessage, function (m, url) { window.w = {“msn.com”: true}; …
User ExploitpostMessage(“”, “msn.com”);w[“evil.com”] = 1;postMessage(“”, “evil.com”);
var w
26
Policy Integrity
Objects defined with policy constructors do not flow out
New Policyaround(postMessage, function (m, url) { window.w = {“msn.com”: true}; …
policy object: must protectunknown: do not pass privileged objects!
var w
27
Maintaining Integrity
1. Policy objects do not leak out of policies2. Access path integrity of calls (no prototype hijacking)
• ML-style type inference– basic– program unmodified– only manually tested on policies
• JavaScript interpreter support– call(ctx, fnc, arg1, …), hasOwnProperty(obj, “fld”)– caller
28
Transparency
• If running with policies throws no errors– … for same input, running without should be safe– empty advice should not be functionally detectable
• Difficult with wrapping or rewriting– Function.prototype.apply, exn.stacktrace, myFunction.callee,
arguments.caller, myFunction.toString, Function.prototype.call
– correctness vs. compatibility vs. performance …• Simpler at interpreter level– rest up to developer– no proof
29
CONSCRIPT aspectsimplementing aspects in IE8checking CONSCRIPT policiesgenerating CONSCRIPT policiesperformance
30
Automatically Generating Policies
• Intrusion detection– can we infer and disable unneeded DOM functions?
• C# access modifiers– can we enforce access modifiers like private?
• ASP policies– can we guarantee no scripts get run in <% echo %>?
31
Intrusion Detection 1: Learn Blacklist
evalnew Function(“string”)postMessageXDomainRequestxmlHttpRequest…
log
audit
32
Intrusion Detection 2: Enforce Blacklist
33
Enforcing C# Access Modifiers
class File { public File () { … } private open () { … } …
C# JavaScript
function File () { … }File.construct = …File.open = ……
Script#compiler
policygenerator
around(File, pubEntryPoint);around(File.construct, pubEntryPoint);around(File.open, privCall);
ConScript
34
CONSCRIPT aspectsimplementing aspects in IE8checking CONSCRIPT policiesgenerating CONSCRIPT policiesperformance
35
Performance
Microbenchmarks: 1.2x (vs. 3.4x)
Initialization time: 0-1%Runtime: 0-7% (vs. 30+%)File size blowup: < 1% (vs. 50+%)
36
Microbenchmark: Mediation Overhead
function advice2 (foo2) { bless(); foo2();}
function advice3 (foo2) { foo2();
}
var raw = obj.f;obj.f = function () { raw();}
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
wrap bless autobless3.42x
1.44x
1.24x
37
File Size Increase (IDS)
ConScript Docomo Caja Sandbox0.01.02.03.04.05.06.07.08.09.0
10.011.0
1.01.7
4.8
1.21.0 1.5
3.9
10.4
1.0 1.5
4.4
1.5
MSN GMail Google Maps
38
Access Modifier
Enforcement
Intrusion Detection System
Runtime Overhead
Google Maps (183ms)
MSN (439ms) GMail (736ms)0%
20%40%60%80%
7%1% 0%
30%
73%63%
ConScript DoCoMo (JavaScript rewriting)
Runti
me
over
head
Application Loading Opening a Folder0
100200300400
291.05
155.5
297.45
156.9
Uninstrumented Secured Private Methods
Runti
me
(ms)
39
Goals and Contributions
•protect benign users•by giving control to hosting site•ConScript approach: aspects for security
control loading and use of scripts
•16 hand-written policies•correct policies are hard to write•proposed type system to catch common attacks•implemented 2 policy generators
express many policies safely
•built into IE 8 JavaScript interpreter•runtime and space overheads under 1% (vs. 30-550%)•smaller trusted computing base (TCB)
browser support
manifest of URLslimit eval
no foreign links
resource blacklists
no hidden frames
script whitelist
<noscript>
no URL redirectio
n
HTTP-only cookies
no pop-ups
enforce public vs.
private
Questions?
40ConScript Docomo Caja Sandbox
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
1.01.7
4.8
1.21.0 1.5
3.9
10.4
1.0 1.5
4.4
1.5
MSN GMail Google Maps
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0.51
1.52
2.53
3.54
wrap bless autobless
Google Maps (183ms)
MSN (439ms) GMail (736ms)0%
20%40%60%80%
7% 1% 0%
30%
73% 63%ConScript DoCoMo (JavaScript rewriting)
Runti
me
over
head
Application Load-ing
Opening a Folder0
300291.05 155.5297.45 156.9
UninstrumentedSecured Private Methods
Runti
me
(ms)
41
END.