Pp vs. Bacor

Facts:

Julian Albores was resting at the living room of his house at Barangay Seor, Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental. His companions in the house were his son Dionisio and the latters common-law wife Delia, who were then eating in the kitchen. Suddenly, Julian heard a gunfire followed by Delias exclamation that Dionisio had fallen down on the floor. Consequently, Julian rushed to the kitchen and found Dionisio lying face down on the kitchen floor made of bamboo slats. Julian shouted for his neighbors help but no one helped him. Immediately, thereafter, Julian brought his wounded son to the hospital for treatment but just a few minutes after arrival there, his son died.

On June 6, 1991, appellant approached Jesus Bernido, Chief of the Intelligence Section of the Sinacaban Police Station and told the latter that he was the one responsible for the killing of Dionisio Albores. In view thereof, Bernido asked appellant what prompted him to surrender and appellant told him that it was due to his guilty conscience. Consequently, Bernido, accompanied by police escorts brought appellant to the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) in Oroquieta City. SPO3 Ydulzura informed PAO Atty. Meriam Anggot that appellant wanted to make a confession of a crime he had committed.

Thereafter, in her presence, appellant was asked by the policemen if he had a lawyer and appellant replied that he had none. Appellant was also asked if he wanted to avail of the services of the PAO and he answered in the affirmative. She then inquired if appellant was not intimidated, coerced or forced and whether appellant was promised any reward. She also informed appellant that he had the right to remain silent and not to answer questions which may incriminate him and that any statement he will make may be used against him in the future. After being informed of such facts, appellant still declared that he was going to confess because he had committed a crime.

During the taking of appellants confession, in the presence and with the assistance of PAO Atty. Anggot, SPO3 Ydulzura likewise reminded appellant in the Visayan dialect, which he knew and spoke, that he had the right to remain silent and the right against self-incrimination and to secure the services of a lawyer of his own choice to assist him in the taking of his confession. Despite such reminder, appellant still agreed and accepted the appointment of PAO Atty. Meriam Anggot as his lawyer to assist him during the taking of his affidavit of confession. In his affidavit, appellant acknowledged and admitted that he was the one who shot Dionisio Albores. He declared therein that he shot Dionisio Albores because the latter threatened to kill him and because he knew that Dionisio was an ex-convict.

SPO3 Ydulzura read the contents of appellants affidavit to him, in the presence and with the assistance of PAO Atty. Anggot. Appellant signed his name on the affidavit and subscribed and swore to the veracity of his affidavit. Before signing the affidavit, Atty. Lumasag read to appellant the contents thereof and informed him of his constitutional rights to remain silent, against self-incrimination and to counsel of his own choice. Subsequently, appellant was asked if the statements in the affidavit are true and correct and he declared that the statements therein are true and correct and that he was willing to sign the affidavit on his own free will.

Issue: Whether accused-appellant validly waived his right to remain silent and, therefore, whether his confession is admissible in evidence against him.

Held: Yes. Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution provides:

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

Decisions of this Court hold that for an extrajudicial confession to be admissible in evidence, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel preferably of the confessants choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing. The Court finds that accused-appellants confession satisfies the said requirements.

First. Accused-appellants confession, as quoted in the decision of the Court of Appeals, leaves no doubt as to its voluntariness and spontaneity. Accused-appellant does not deny that he surrendered to the police on June 6, 1991, almost three months after the fatal shooting of Dionesio Albores, and confessed to the crime because he could no longer bear a guilty conscience. In his testimony before the trial court, he admitted that the signature on pages 1, 2, and 3 of his sworn confession was his without any claim that he was forced, coerced, or threatened to make the confession.

Second. Accused-appellant claims that he gave the confession without being warned of his constitutional rights. This is not true. The record shows that he was advised of his rights, particularly the right to remain silent, not only once but thrice: first, by his counsel, Atty. Meriam Anggot of Public Attorneys Office (PAO); second, by SPO3 Maharlika Ydulzura, the investigator who took accused-appellants confession; and lastly, by the branch clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Atty. Nora Montejo-Lumasag, before whom accused-appellant swore to the veracity of his confession. Each time, he was asked whether he was willing to give a statement and he said he was. This is sufficient. Contrary to accused-appellants contention, there is no need for a separate and express written waiver of his constitutional rights. Accused-appellant was not arrested. He presented himself to the authorities to confess to the crime because, he said, he was being bothered by his conscience. By voluntarily executing his extrajudicial confession, which he did in the presence of and with the assistance of counsel and after having been informed of his constitutional rights, accused-appellant effectively waived his right to remain silent.

Accused-appellant, when asked, said he wanted to have the assistance of counsel. Atty. Anggot of PAO was appointed counsel de officio to assist accused-appellant and the latter expressly accepted her appointment as his counsel before giving his confession. The assistance of a PAO lawyer in the present case satisfies the constitutional requirement of a competent and independent counsel for the accused.

Well-settled is the rule that a confession is presumed to be voluntarily and validly made unless the contrary is proven and that the burden of proof is upon the party who claims the contrary. In this case, this presumption has not been overcome.

People vs. Pablito Andan, G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997

Facts:

Pablito Andan alias "Bobby" was accused of the crime of rape with homicide.The offense was committed on February 19,1994 in Baliuag, Bulacan; the victim being Marianne Guevarra, 22 and a 2nd year student at the Fatima School of Nursing. On said day, victim left her home for her school dormitory in Valenzuela.While on her way, appellant invited her to his house. He used the pretext that the bloodpressure of his wife's grandmothershould be taken. Marianne agreed to do soas the old woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen,brought her to the kitchen and raped her. Bynight time, Marianne, who was still unconscious,was dragged by appellant to their backyard that was adjacent to a vacant lot. Appellant was to transfer Marianne to the vacant lot when she moved,prompting appellant to hit her head with a piece of concrete block. No longer moving, he dragged her to the lot and abandoned her.At 11amher body was discovered. The autopsy revealed that she died of"traumatic injuries."

Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Baliuag Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to form an investigation team. The investigation pointedto the appellant.Appellant's nearby house was searched but he wasnot there.On February 24, a police team led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They took him and brought him to the police headquarters where he was interrogated.Initially, he denied any knowledge of Marianne's death.However, when the policeconfronted him with evidence, appellant relented but implicated two of his neighbours, and that he was merely a lookout.Larin and Dizon were likewise brought there by the police.The following day a physical examination conducted on thesuspects revealed that appellant has multiple scratches on the neck, chest and back.

By that time, people and media representatives were alreadyat the police headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation.Mayor Trinidad arrived.Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approached himand whispered thatthey talk privately. The mayor led him to the office of the Chief of Police and there, he broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako!I will tell you the truth.I am the one who killed Marianne."The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and media representatives witness the confession.Since no lawyer was available he orderedthe proceedings photographed andvideotaped.In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and son, appellant confessed his guilt.He asked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizonwhom he falsely implicated saying he did itbecause of ill-feelings against them.He also said that the devil entered his mind because of the pornographicmagazines and tabloid he read almost everyday.After his confession,appellant hugged his wife and son and asked themayor to help him.His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide.

On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty."He testified that on said date he was at his parent's house for the birthday party of his nephew.He, his wife and son went home after 5pm, slept at 8pm, and woke up at 6am the next day.Appellant claimed that after he was picked up by the police on February 24, he was coerced to confess that he raped and killed Marianne.Fearing for his life, appellant did as he wastold. The trial court convicted the appellant and sentenced himto death.He was found guilty of the crime charged in the Information (Rape withHomicide) and penalized accordingly.Hence, theautomatic review.

Issue:

W/N the appellants confession not being assisted by a counsel is inviolation of the constitution, and is therefore inadmissible as evidence against him.

Held:

Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" overthe local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution.However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation by thelatter.In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all.No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor.It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a privatemeeting.The mayor did notknow that appellantwas going to confess his guiltto him.When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounseled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights.Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime.What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions.The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as wouldlead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily tellingthe truth.Hence we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.

Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted.The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer.We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters ona televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence.

The Court therefore held accused-appellant Pablito Andan guilty ofthe special complex crime of rape with homicide.Marcelo v. SandiganbayanG.R. No. 109242, January 26, 1999

Facts:

On February 10, 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati Central Post Office, disclosed to his chief, ProjectoTumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the pilferage of mail matter in the post office. Among those mentioned by Merete were Arnold Pasicolan, an emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in the Printed Matters Section, and RedentorAguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office. For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the National Bureau of Investigation in apprehending the group responsible for mail pilferage in the Makati Post Office.

On February 17, 1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin dispatched NBI agents toLegaspi Village following a report that the group would stage a theft of mail matter on that day. Tumagan accompanied a team of NBI agents composed of Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other agents in a private car.At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was parked in front of the Esguerra Building on Adelantado Street. Pasicolan alighted from the jeep bringing with him a mail bag. Upon reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave the mail bag to two persons, who were later identified as Ronnie Romero and petitioner Lito Marcelo. The latter transferred the contents of the mail bag to a travelling bag. Meanwhile, the NBI team led by agent Vela, upon seeing Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo St., moved their car and started towards Amorsolo St. They were just in time to see Pasicolanhanding over the mail bag to Marcelo and Romero. At that point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela arrested the two accused. The NBI agents followed the postal delivery jeep, overtook it, and arrested Pasicolan.

NBI Director Ranin allegedly saw US dollar bills in various denominations of 20, 50, and 100 dollars. Vela and the other NBI agents stated in their affidavits that there were dollar bills in the letters which, if converted to Philippine pesos, at the then exchange rate of P22 to US $1, were worth P11,000.00. 15 the addressees agreed to leave the envelopes of the letters with the NBI. Those letters which was not claimed were opened in court in the presence of the counsel for the defense. The letters were found to contain three (3) one dollar bills, one (1) five dollar bill, one (1) twenty dollar bill, a check for twenty-five dollars, and fifty (50) Saudi Arabian riyals.

The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to their headquarters. Romero, Marcelo, andPasicolan were asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes of the letters. They did so in the presence of the members of the NBI Administrative and Investigative Staff and the people transacting business with the NBI at that time. According to Director Ranin, they required the accused to do this in order to identify the letters as the very same letters confiscated from them.

A case for qualified theft was filed before the Sandiganbayan wherein the accused were declared guilty.

The petitioner contends that the Sandiganbavan erred in admitting in evidence the letters signed by him because he was asked to sign them during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel.

Issue:

Whether or not the letters signed by the petitioner were inadmissible as evidence.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the letters were valid evidence. The purpose for securing the signature of petitioner on the envelopes was merely to authenticate the envelopes as the ones seized from him and Ronnie Romero.It is known that during custodial investigation, a person has the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. Any admission or confession made in the absence of counsel is inadmissible as evidence. Furthermore, no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. In the instant case, even though the petitioner was asked to sign the letters, thelettersare still admissible as evidence because the letters were validly seized from petitioner and Romero as an incident of a valid arrest.

A ruling that petitioner's admission that the letters in question were those seized from him and his companion on February 17, 1989 is inadmissible in evidence does not extend to the exclusion from evidence of the letters themselves. The letters can stand on their own, being the fruits of the crime validly seized during a lawful arrest. That these letters were the ones found in the possession of petitioner and his companion and seized from them was shown by the testimonies of Vela and Tumagan. Indeed, petitioner and his co-accused were not convicted solely on the basis of the signatures found on the letters but on other evidence, notably the testimonies of NBI agents and other prosecution witnesses. The decision of the Sandiganbayan is affirmed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.JOEL JANSON and RICKY PINANTAO

FACTS:

In the evening of March 24, 1986, six (6) men came to the house of CesarioAlcantara allegedly robbed and raped hisdaughterMarites. The group took cash in the amount of P1,400.00, three wristwatches, one can of coffee, and one chicken.

On December 9, 1987, both accused appellants Janson and Pinantao pleaded not guilty.

Appellant JOEL JANSON, denied the accusation against him and claimed that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation. He claimed that he did not know how to read or write, and that he was made to execute a sworn statement before a certain policeman named Ulep. Only after the investigation did Atty. Zerrudo sign the document. On cross-examination, he said that he was put in jail for another crime, robbery.

Appellant RICKY PINANTAO also denied the accusation against him, saying that he did not know Marites and CesarioAlcantara. He claimed that he was arrested in March 1987 because he was implicated by appellant Janson as one of the perpetrators of the crime, per instruction of one Cristina Agio.

On September 15, 1995, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment and found accused Ricky Pinantao alias Ogco and Joel Janson guilty of the crime of Robbery with Rape beyond reasonable doubt.

Issues:

(1) Whether the guilt of appellants Janson and Pinantao proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(2) Whether the extrajudicial confession of Janson is admissible as evidence for the prosecution? and

(3) Whether said confession be used against co-accused Pinantao.

Ruling: NO. Appellants should be acquitted.

The trial court overlooked or misunderstood significant contrarieties in the testimony of witnesses which if considered would materially affect the result of the conviction.

The investigating police officer, P/Sgt. Pedro Idpan, admitted in open court that the sworn statement of appellant Joel Janson was taken without the presence of counsel and that this statement together with the waiver of his right to counsel, was already prepared when it was presented to Atty. Zerrudo for signing.

Clearly, the alleged extrajudicial confession of appellant Joel Janson cannot be admitted in evidence. The manner by which it was obtained violated accuseds constitutional right to counsel.

It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant.

Under the Constitution and existing law as well as jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.

The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession by coercion no matter how slight, as would lead the accused to admit something false. What is sought to be avoided is the evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter convict him. These constitutional guarantees have been made available to protect him from the inherently coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of such investigation.

While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, made in the presence and with the assistance of counsel, and it must be in writing. Indeed, any waiver of the right to counsel without the assistance of counsel has no evidentiary value.

In this case, it cannot be said that the waiver of the right to counsel was made knowingly and intelligently. Appellant Joel Janson was illiterate, and a minor of sixteen (16) years at the time of the offense. As held in the case of People v. Bonola, where the accused was unschooled and only nineteen (19) years old when arrested, it is difficult to believe that considering the circumstances, the accused made an intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. In such instances, the need for counsel is more pronounced.

It is also important to mention that the investigating officers already had a prepared statement when they went to the lawyer who is supposed to assist appellant Janson in waiving his right to counsel.

Finally, the invalid extrajudicial confession of Joel Janson cannot be used against Ricky Pinantao. An extrajudicial confession by an accused implicating another may not be utilized unless repeated in open court or when there is an opportunity for the co-accused to cross-examine the confessant on his extrajudicial statements. It is considered hearsay as against said co-accused under the res inter aliosacta rule, which ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another.

Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan

GR. NO. 148571 Sept. 24 2002

PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS:

Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion. The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion praying for his application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.

Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail

HELD:

Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court ofManila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.

i. YES.

The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended finds application only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case. Bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing

1)that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and

2)that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein

Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness.

It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Therefore, his constituents were or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case. Thus, the court ruled against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.

Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even more. Extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.

That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. VICTOR KEITH FITZGERALD, respondent.

FACTS:

An information was filed charging Fitzgerald, an Australian citizen, with Violation of Art. III, Section 5, paragraph (a), subparagraph (5) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, allegedly committed as follows:

That sometime in the month of September 1993, in the City of Olongapo, Zambales, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused VICTOR KEITH FITZGERALD, actuated by lust, and by the use of laced drugs ("vitamins") willfully, unlawfully and feloniously induced complainant "AAA,"a minor, 13 years of age, to engage in prostitution by then and there showering said "AAA" with gifts, clothes and food and thereafter having carnal knowledge of her in violation of the aforesaid law and to her damage and prejudice.After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a decision against Fitzgerald.

Meanwhile, Fitzgerald filed with the CA a Motion for Early Transmittal of the Records and for the Re-Examination of the Penalty Imposed, and a Motion for Bail.On August 31, 2001, the CA granted Fitzgerald's bail application.

Thereafter, the RTC ordered Fitzgerald's temporary release on

September 4, 2001 upon his filing a cash bond in the amount of P100,000.00.

Hence, the People filed this Petition to have the August 31, 2001 CA Resolution annulled and set aside. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in granting respondent Fitzgerald's Motion for Bail despite the fact that the latter was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of his guilt is strong.It also questions the jurisdiction of the CA to act on said Motion, considering that the case had been remanded to the RTC for new trial, In his Comment and Memorandum, respondent counters that the grant of new trial negated the previous findings of the existence of strong evidence of his guilt;and justifies his provisional release on humanitarian grounds, citing as an extraordinary circumstance his advanced age and deteriorating health.ISSUE: W/N the CA erred when it granted respondent's Motion for BailHELD:

With that procedural matter out of the way, we now focus on the substantive issue of whether the CA erred when it allowed respondent to bail.

The right to bail emenates from of the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the custody of the law who may, by reason of the presumption of innocence he enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his appearance before any court, as required under specified condition. n sum, the circumstances of the case are such, that for respondent, bail was not a matter of right but a mere privilege subject to the discretion of the CA to be exercised in accordance with the stringent requirements of Sec. 5, Rule 114. And Sec. 5 directs the denial or revocation of bail upon evidence of the existence of any of the circumstances enumerated therein such as those indicating probability of flight if released on bail or undue risk that the accused may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal.

As it is, however, the CA, in its August 31, 2001 Resolution, admitted respondent to bail based, "xxx not on the grounds stated in his Motion for Bail xxx," but "xxx primarily [on] the fact that [he] is already of old age and is not in the best of health xxx," and notwithstanding its finding that "xxx as it is, the evidence of guilt is strong xxx."The Resolution disregarded substantive and procedural requirements on bail.

It is bad enough that the CA granted bail on grounds other than those stated in the Motion filed by respondent; it is worse that it granted bail on the mere claim of the latter's illness. Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail.It may be that the trend now is for courts to permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick.There may also be an existing proposition for the "selective decarceration of older prisoners" based on findings that recidivism rates decrease as age increases. But, in this particular case, the CA made no specific finding that respondent suffers from an ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. It merely declared respondent not in the best of health even when the only evidence on record as to the latter's state of health is an unverified medical certificate stating that, as of August 30, 2000, respondent's condition required him to "xxx be confined in a more sterile area xxx."That medical recommendation was even rebuffed by the CA itself when, in its November 13, 2000 Resolution, it held that the physical condition of respondent does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while confined in prison.Moreover, there is a finding of record on the potential risk of respondent committing a similar offense. In its August 1, 1996 Order, the RTC noted that the circumstances of respondent indicate an undue risk that he would commit a similar offense, if released on bail pending appeal.

The foregoing finding was not traversed or overturned by the CA in its questioned Resolution. Such finding, therefore, remains controlling. It warranted the outright denial of respondent's bail application. The CA, therefore, erred when it granted respondent's Motion for Bail.

Rodriguez vs Presiding Judge

483 Scra 290 (2006)

FACTS: After the arrest of petitioners Eduardo Tolentino Rodriguez and Imelda Gener Rodriguez, they applied for bail which the trial court granted on September 25, 2001. They posted cash bonds for the bail set for P1M for each. The US government moved for reconsideration of the grant of bail which was denied. The US government filed a petition for certiorari entitled Govt of the USA v. Hon. Ponferrada where the court directed the trial court to resolve the matter of bail guided by this courts ruling on Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan. The lower court, without prior notice and hearing, cancelled the cash bond of the petitioners and ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners filed a very urgent motion for the reconsideration of the cancellation of their bail which was denied. Hence, this special civilaction for certiorari and prohibition directed against the order for cancellation of cash bond and issuance of a warrant of arrest. ISSUE: Whether or NOT there should be notice and hearing before the cancellation of bail HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED IN PART. SET ASIDE for petitioner IMELDA GENER RODRIGUEZ. The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to prove her right to be on bail, that she is no flight risk, and the trial court had already exercised its sound discretion and had already determined that under the Constitution and laws in force, co-petitioner is entitled to provisional release. Under these premises, co-petitioner Imelda Gener Rodriguez has offered to go on voluntary extradition; that she and her husband had posted a cash bond of P1 million each; that her husband had already gone on voluntary extradition and is presently in the USA undergoing trial; that the passport of co-petitioner is already in the possession of the authorities; that she never attempted to flee; that there is an existing hold-departure order against her; and that she is now in her 60s, sickly and under medical treatment, we believe that the benefits of continued temporary liberty on bail should not be revoked and their grant of bail should not be cancelled, without the co-petitioner being given notice and without her being heard why her temporary liberty should not be discontinued. Absent prior notice and hearing, the bails cancellation was in violation of her right to due process. We emphasize that bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear and convincing showing that: 1) he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and 2) there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

Govt of Hong Kong vs. Olalia,

G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007

This case discusses whether the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extradite in an extradition1 proceeding.

On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.

The Petitioner is the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice

The Respondents are Judge Felix Olalia and Juan Antonio Muoz

Facts: Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.

Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was granted by respondent judge.

Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.

Held: No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the

potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing

PP VS SANDIGANBAYAN, VALERO VS CA

TRILLANES VS. PIMENTEL

GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008

Facts:

July 27, 2003- more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.

Later that day, Former President GMA issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.

Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d'etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.

June 30, 2007 - petitioner, who has remained in detention, won a seat in the Senate

June 22, 2007 - petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests" (Omnibus Motion). Among his requests were:

(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the Senate

(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention

(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area

(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions and/or opinions to the press or the media

(e) To be allowed to receive reporters and other members of the media

(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of officers of the Senate and related activities

July 25, 2007 - the trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which he waived his requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to three.

- September 18, 2007 - trial court just the same denied the motion, citing the Jalosjos case

Trillanes petitioned for certiorari on the following grounds

- The jurisprudence cited by the honorable court is inapplicable

a. The accused in the Jalosjos case was already convicted. He was not, therefore he still enjoys the presumption of innocence

b. Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving moral turpitude. He was charged with "coup d'etat," a political offense

c. Jalosjos attempted to flee. He did not.

- The recommendation to allow the petitioner to attend the senate sessions was not overruled

- His election by the people as senator provides the proper justification to allow him to work and serve his mandate

-

- There are enough precedents to allow liberal treatment of detention prisoners who are held without bail

a. Joseph Estrada

b. Nur Misuari

Issue: Whether or not the contentions of Trillanes are tenable

Ruling: No. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided bylaw. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. All prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention.

Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

ATTY. FRANKLIN G. GACAL vs JUDGE JAIME I. INFANTE

Facts:

An information for murder was filed and raffled in the sala of Judge Infante. Said information contained a recommendation for bail in the amount of P400,000.

Based on the said information, without the accused filing a petition for bail and without hearing, Judge Infante issued twin orders, one granting bail to the accused and another releasing the accused from custody.

Atty. Gacal, private prosecutor, upon learning the orders, made a very urgent motion to cancel the bailbond and to enforce or re-issue a new warrant of arrest but the same was denied by Judge Infante on the ground that it was a pro forma, without conformity coming from the public prosecutor, and that he was not authorized to act as such under Section of 5 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. He further directed that the bail issue be held in abeyance awaiting the comment of the public prosecutor.

The public prosecutor, in his comment, stated that the bail and the releasing of the accused was proper based on his recommendation and that such recommendation was in effect a waiver of the public prosecutors right to bail hearing.

Atty. Gacal then filed an administrative complaint against Judge Infante, that the granting of bail without a petition for bail being filed by the accused or a hearing being held for that purpose constituted gross ignorance of the law and the rules.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Infante is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and the rules.

Held:

Judge Infante is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Judge Infante disregarded basic but well-known rules and guidelines on the matter of bail: (1) in case no application for bail is filed, bail hearing was not dispensable; and (2) public prosecutors failure to oppose application for bail or to adduce evidence did not dispense with hearing.

Every judge should be faithful to the law and should maintain professional competence. His role in the administration of justice requires a continuous study of the law and jurisprudence, lest public confidence in the Judiciary be eroded by incompetence and irresponsible conduct.

In that light, the failure of Judge Infante to conduct a hearing prior to the grant of bail in capital offenses was inexcusable and reflected gross ignorance of the law and the rules as well as a cavalier disregard of its requirement. He well knew that the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong was a matter of judicial discretion, and that the discretion lay not in the determination of whether or not a hearing should be held, but in the appreciation and evaluation of the weight of the Prosecutions evidence of guilt against the accused. His fault was made worse by his granting bail despite the absence of a petition for bail from the accused. Consequently, any order he issued in the absence of the requisite evidence was not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.

COMENDADOR vs. DE VILLA

200 SCRA 80; 2 AUG 1991

G.R. No. 93177, No. 95020, No. 96948, No. 97454Facts:

These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and related issues arising from the same incident.

The petitioners, who are officersof the AFP, were directed to appearin personbefore the Pre-Trial InvestigatingOfficersfor the alleged participation the failedcoup d' etaton December 1 to 9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trialinvestigation ofthe charges as mandated by Article of War 71. The charges against them are violation of AW 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman), and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the RPC (Murder).

Before the charges were referred to General Court-Martial (GCM) No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel had been constituted to investigate the petitioners. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the petitioners.

On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.

At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing. This was done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal. The PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days from notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.

The petitioners moved for reconsideration of the foregoing denial of the motion, allegingdenialof due process. They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that no prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits.

One of the petitioners applied for bail on June 5, 1990, butthe applicationwas denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petitionfor certiorari and mandamus with prayer forprovisionalliberty and a writ of preliminaryinjunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisionalliberty. However he was not released immediately.

The petitioners in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC apetitionfor habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. Thepetitionwas referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

Issues:

WON there was adenialof due process.

WON there was a violation of the accuseds right to bail. **

Held:

NOdenialof due process.

Petitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the pre-trialinvestigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after thedenialof their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, tosubmittheir counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked tosubmitin writing. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure tosubmitcounter-affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right tosubmit controverting evidence." They chose not to heed the warning. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.

No. The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.

The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail. National security considerations should also impress that release on bail of petitioners constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000 accused soldiers roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail. They could freely resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government and justice.

The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated, and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.

ASWAT vs. GALIDO

G.R. No. 88555 November 21, 1991

Facts:

Petitioner Eduardo Aswat and Felix Nebres were both enlisted men of the AFP respectively holding the ranks Private First Class and Corporal. Aswat and Nebres were assigned to the SOLCOM but Aswat was detailed as caretaker of Brigadier General Galido's Baguio resthouse while Nebres was assigned to act as a personal driver of Galido's wife. On December 29, 1988, Aswat was involved in a shooting incident at Baguio City, which resulted in the death of Nebres.

Records disclose that Aswat voluntarily surrendered to the Baguio City police authorities and was briefly incarcerated at the Baguio City Jail until he was transferred to a SOLCOM detention cell on December 31, 1988. Aswat has been detained at the SOLCOM Headquarters in Lucena City since then.

On April 20, 1989, petitioner was charged before a SOLCOM General Court-Martial with violation of Article 94 of the Articles of War (AW). the specification being homicide.

While the court-martial proceedings were going on, petitioner filed the instant petition, contending: (1) that the specification of homicide with which he was charged was committed outside a military installation and hence the offense was cognizable by a regular, civilian court; (2) that he is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right pursuant to Sec. 13, Art. III of the Constitution; and (3) that he should be given his due base pay and other pay, aside from the allowances he has been receiving, computed from the time of commencement of his detention.

Petitioner seeks to make a distinction between offenses committed outside and those committed inside a military installation or reservation. He assails the jurisdiction of the SOLCOM-GCM, alleging that the specification of homicide was committed in Baguio City and in an area outside any military installation or reservation.

Issues:

WON Aswat shall be tried in a regular, civilian court;

WON he is entitled to be released on a bail as a matter of right pursuant to Sec. 13, Art. III of the Constitution.

Held:

NO. The distinction upon which petitioner anchors his argument was obliterated sometime ago.

Article 94 of the AW, in its original form, did refer only to offenses committed inside a Philippine military reservation as falling within the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In 1948, however, R.A. No. 242 amended Article 94:

Art 94. Various Crimes. Any person subject to military law who commits any felony, crime, breach of law or violation of municipal ordinances which is recognized as an offense of a penal nature and is punishable under the penal laws of the Philippines or under municipal ordinances,(A) inside a reservation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or (B)outside any such reservation when the offended party(and each one of the offended parties if there be more than one)is a person subject to military law, shall be punished as a court-martial may direct xxx

There is no question that both petitioner and the deceased Nebres were subject to military law at the time the latter was shot and killed. Moreover, when the petitioner asked for the affirmative relief of bail from the SOLCOM-GCM, he in effect recognized the jurisdiction of the General Court-Martial. Hence, petitioner is properly deemed estopped to deny such jurisdiction.

NO. Although the right to bail applies to "all," the Court has very recently ruled inComendador vs.De Villa that the guarantee is not without any exception. It has been held thatthe right to has traditionally not been recognized andis not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.

Under Article 70, A.W., "any person subject to military law charged with crime or with a serious offense under these article shall be placed in confinement or in arrest, as circumstances may require." Confinement is one way of ensuring presence during sessions of the General Court-Martial; the more important reason underlying the authority to impose confinement is the need to enable the proper military authority to instill discipline with the command and thereby achieve command efficiency. By confining the petitioner, petitioner's unmilitary conduct may be curtailed from spreading within the ranks of the command. The necessity for such confinement is a matter properly left to the sound discretion of petitioner's superior officers.

VILLASEOR VS. HON. ABAO, ET AL SANCHEZ,

FACTS

-Petitioner, a mere government employee, earning but a monthly salary, of P210.00, and the sole breadwinner of a family of five, was charged with themurder of a Boac police sergeant. He was admitted to a P60k bail which was reduced to P40k. The petitioner on May 29 posted a property bond and wasset at provisional liberty. However, respondent Provincial Fiscal amended theinformation, now accusing the petitioner with DirectAssault Upon an Agent of a Person in Authority withMurder" before the arraignment on the murdercharge. So on August 7, respondent judge cancelledthe petitioners bond and ordered his immediatearrest.-On September 9 upon petitioners motion toreconsider, the respondent judge resolved to admitpetitioner to bail provided he puts up a cash bond of P60k.

On September 15, on petitioners motion thatoriginal bond previously given be reinstated,respondent judge resolved to fix "the bond anew inreal property in the amount of P60,000, but to beposted only by residents of the province of Marinduque actually staying, therein" with propertieswhich "must be in the possession and ownership of said residents for five years."-On October 1, petitioner filed a prayer for preliminary junction to SC, seeking to set aside respondent judge orders of August 7, September 9 and 15, andto reinstate the bail bond approved on May 29(original bond), charging the respondent judge of having acted w/o and/or in excess of his jurisdictionand w/grave abuse of discretion, and w/ violation of the Consti and the ROC in issuing the disputed orders-Oct 3: the Court issued a writ of preliminaryinjunction upon a P1k bond.-Nov 5: SC allowed continuation of the proceedings of the criminal case to avoid delay in its prosecution.

ISSUE

Whether or notthe P60K bond fixed by respondent judgetransgress the constitutional injunction that excessive bail shall not be required?

RULING:

NO, the principal factor considered, to thedetermination of which most other factors aredirected, is the probability of the appearance of theaccused, or of his flight to avoid punishment.

Reasoning

Guidelines in fixing bail: (1) ability of theaccused to give bail; (2)) nature of the offense; (3)penalty for the offense charged; (4) character andreputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused;(6) character and strength of the evidence; (7)probability of the accused appearing at trial; (8)forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accusedwas a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial inother cases.-

Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court (definitionof bail):

"the security required and given for therelease of a person who is in the custody of the law,that he will appear before any court in which hisappearance may be required as stipulated in the bailbond or recognizance."-Circular 47 of the Department of Justice, reiteratedin Circular 48, directed prosecuting attorneys torecommend bail at the rate of P2,000.00 per year of imprisonment, corresponding to the medium periodof the penalty prescribed for the offense charged,unless circumstances warrant a higher penalty. Here,petitioner is charged with a capital offense, directassault upon an agent of a person in authority withmurder. A complex crime, it may call for theimposition of capital punishment.

De la Camara vs. Enage

Facts:

Mayor de la Camara was arrested and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co. 18 days later, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed cases of multiple frustrated murder and for multiple murder against petitioner, his co-accused Tagunan and Galgo. On January 14, 1969 an application for bail was filed by petitioner which was granted and the amount was fixed at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the amount of the bailbond is excessive

HELD:

Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the amount of P1,195,200.00 is clearly violative of this constitutional provision under the circumstances.

YAP JR VS CA

FACTS:

Facts: The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed conditions on change of residence and travel abroad. For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa and was sentenced to four years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, in addition to one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed twenty (20) years. He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings.

Issue: Was the condition imposed by the CA on accuseds bail bond violative the liberty of abode and right to travel?

Held: Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioners right to bail.

Manotoc vs. CA

FACTS:

Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management Inc. and the Manotoc Securities Inc. (stock brokerage house).He was in US for a certain time, went home to file a petition with SEC for appointment of a management committee for both businesses.Such was granted.However, pending disposition of a case filed with SEC, the latter requested the Commissioner of Immigration not to clear him for departure.Consequently, a memorandum to this effect was issued.

There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc which was suspected to be fake.6 of its clients filed separate criminal complaints against the petitioner and Leveriza, President and VP respectively.He was charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail.

Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to leave the country stating his desire to go to US relative to his business transactions and opportunities.Such was opposed by the prosecution and was also denied by the judges.He filed petition for certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders and the SEC communication request denying his leave to travel abroad.

According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts that granted him bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

ISSUE:WON petitioners constitutional right to travel was violated.

HELD:NO.The court has power to prohibit person admitted to bail from leaving the country because this is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his constitutional right to travel.In case he will be allowed to leave the country without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of courts.

Furthermore, petitioner failed to satisfy trial court and CA of the urgency of his travel, duration thereof, as well as consent of his surety to the proposed travel.He was not able to show the necessity of his travel abroad.He never indicated that no other person in his behalf could undertake such business transaction.

Article 3 Sec6: The liberty of abode and of changing the same shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.According to SC, the order of trial court in releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the provision on right to travel.

SANTIAGO VS VASQUEZ, SILVERIO VS CAPP VS DONATO, LARDIZABAL VS REYESWaiver of the Right to Bail

People Versus Sergio and Ramil Manes

G.R. No.122737 February 17, 1999Facts: The above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another to better realize their purpose armed with a knife and a .38 caliber revolver respectively, with treachery and/or evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack, stab and shut Nicanor Tamorite with the knife and .38 caliber revolver with which they were then provided, inflicting upon the said Nicanor Tamorite stab wounds and gun shot wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death immediately thereafter.

The prosecution recommended no bail for the provisional liberty of the accused.The trial court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused. the accused filed a petition for bail, which was opposed by the prosecution.

The trial court, however, did not hear the petition for bail. Neither did the accused invoke the right to bail at any stage of the trial and the trial court rendered judgment and convicted both the accuse guilty of the crime.

In the appeal, accused questioned the trial court's failure (a) to hear the petition for bail; (b) to consider defense of relative in favor of Ramil Manes; and (c) to take note that Sergon Manes was a mere victim of Tamorite's unlawful aggression.The appeal has no merit. The trial court did not err in finding appellants guilty of murder.Issue: Whether or not both the accused should be granted the right to bail?

Ruling: No, both the accused should not be granted the right to bail.

Under the law, in offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death, the accused has no right to bail when evidence of guilt is strong. The court must hear a petition for bail to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong before deciding to grant or deny bail to the accused. While the accused can apply for bail and have the court hear his application summarily and promptly, such right may be waived expressly or impliedly.

In this case, the trial court proceeded to try the case without resolving the petition for bail that appellants filed. However, the latter did not call the attention of the trial court to their unresolved application for bail. It was only in the appeal that they raised this issue. Thus, for failure to bring to the attention of the trial court at the earliest opportune time, appellants are deemed to have waived their right to bail.

What is more, the issue has been rendered academic by the conviction of the accused. When an accused is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment or death, and evidence of guilt is strong, bail must be denied, as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1999/feb1999/gr_122737_1999.html

Due Process in Criminal

Alonte Versus Savellano

G.R. No. 131652 March 9, 1998Facts: Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonetes house who was then the mayor of Bian, Laguna. The case was brought before RTC Bian.

The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue was done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte.The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion.

Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.Issue: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.Ruling: NO. Alonte was not being denied of criminal due process.

Petitioners-accused were each represented during the hearing on 07 November 1997 with their respective counsel of choice. None of their counsel interposed an intention to cross-examine rape victim Juvielyn Punongbayan, even after she attested, in answer to respondent judge's clarificatory questions, the voluntariness and truth of her two affidavits one detailing the rape and the other detailing the attempts to buy her desistance; the opportunity was missed/not used, hence waived. The rule of case law is that the right to confront and cross-examine a witness "is a personal one and may be waived." (emphasis supplied) it should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the waiver must be positively demonstrated.

The standard of waiver requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.

This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings. And, since the case would have to be sent back to the court a quo, this ponencia has carefully avoided making any statement or reference that might be misconstrued as prejudgment or as pre-empting the trial court in the proper disposition of the case. The Court likewise deems it appropriate that all related proceedings therein, including the petition for bail, should be subject to the proper disposition of the trial court.

The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case due to animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified.Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1998/mar1998/gr_131652_1998.htmlVIII - Rights During Trial

Due Process in Criminal Cases

People V. Macarang

FACTS:

Two separate informations were filed charging appellant, Ariel Macarang, with the crime of qualified rape of his own daughter; one when she was 12, the other when she was 13. He was sentenced to suffer the ultimate penalty of death in each of the criminal cases.

Ariel filed an appeal against the fact that the trial court had considered appellant to have waived his right to present his evidence without any showing that the latter was fully aware of the consequences of such waiver.

The trial court, apparently irked by the numerous postponements of the cases, issued a warning that if in the next scheduled hearing, he would not still be ready to present evidence, he would be deemed to have waived his right to do so. Despite warning, accused was still not able to present evidence, therefore he was declared as deemed to have waived his right.

ISSUE: WON the appellant was deprived of his right to due process in such criminal case.

HELD:YES. In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, the presiding judge is called upon to see to it that the accused is made aware of the consequences of not heeding the warning given by the trial court.It must be noted that the waiver of the right to present defense evidence in the present cases was not even voluntary nor upon the instance of the appellant but imposed by the trial court, apparently to penalize appellant, after he and his counsel repeatedly moved for the postponements of the scheduled hearings.

As stated by the trial court, appellant manifested in open court that he was still not ready to do so, that is, that he was not ready to present his evidence.Appellant never said that he did not wish to present evidence.It should have been clear to the trial court that appellant never intended to waive his right to present his evidence.Thus, a simple forewarning to the appellant that the next time that he would not be ready with his defense evidence, he would be deemed to have waived his right to present it, did not satisfy appellants constitutional right to due process.The trial court should have first apprised appellant or explained to him in clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a waiver.The trial court should have satisfied itself that appellant understood the real import of the courts action if it would consider him as having waived his right to present his evidence if he would not be ready to do so the next time the case would be called for trial.

Moreover, in the same Order declaring appellant to have waived his right to present evidence, the trial court granted the motion of appellants counsel to withdraw his appearance.Appellant, therefore, had no more counsel.The trial court did not ask him if he would wish to solicit the services of another counselde parteor want the court to designate ade oficiocounsel for him.Consequently, appellants inaction should not be taken against him.It did not justify the trial court to render judgment against him without first ensuring that appellant was aware of the consequences of the waiver of his right to present his evidence, and without exerting any effort to ask him if he would like to be represented by another lawyer of his own choice or through the assistance of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) or through a counselde oficioappointed by the court.

Dimarucut V. People

FACTS:

The accused was charged with Frustrated Murder in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan for allegedly hitting a certain Angelito Rosini on his head with an iron pipe. After trial, he was charged of the lesser penalty of frustrated homicide.

While still at the trial stage, petitioners motion to admit and demurrer to evidence was denied as it was not seasonably filed (petitioner was granted fifteen (15) days from August 8, 2001 within which to file demurrer to evidence but filed his motion to dismiss only on September 4, 2001), in accordance with Section 23, Rule 119 of theRevised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended.[16]Before the CA, petitioner and his counsel filed no less than four (4) motions for extension to file brief, his counsel admitting that he was at fault in failing to file the appellants brief due to personal problems emanating from his [counsels] wifes recent surgical operation.but which was never filed nor attached. The last extension given expired onJune 6, 2007, without any brief submitted by petitioner or his counsel.

He filed the Omnibus Motion onMay 8, 2008, asking for another 30 days to file the appeal brief, reiterating that his failure to file was due to the fault of his lawyer who is suffering from personal problems and depression.He also cited his advanced age of almost 76 and medical condition (hypertension with cardiovascular disease and pulmonary emphysema.) But even as he did, still no appellants brief was attached by petitioner. This was denied; thus, the appeal. ISSUE: WON petitioner was denied due process of law given that he was not served with a notice requiring him to show cause?HELD:No. Under Section 8, paragraph 1, Rule 124 of theRevised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a criminal case may be dismissed by the CAmotu proprioand with notice to the appellant if the latter fails to file his brief within the prescribed time.The phrase with notice to the appellant means that a notice must first be furnished the appellant to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed.[13]In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner was served with a notice requiring him to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file appellants brief.The purpose of such a notice is to give an appellant the opportunity to state the reasons, if any, why the appeal should not be dismissed because of such failure, in order that the appellate court may determine whether or not the reasons, if given, are satisfactory.

Notwithstanding such absence of notice to the appellant, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA in considering the appeal abandoned with the failure of petitioner to file his appeal brief despite four (4) extensions granted to him and non-compliance to date.Dismissal of appeal by the appellate courtsansnotice to the accused for failure to prosecute by itself is not an indication of grave abuse.Thus, although it does not appear that the appellate court has given the appellant such notice before dismissing the appeal, if the appellant has filed a motion for reconsideration of, or to set aside, the order dismissing the appeal, in which he stated the reasons why he failed to file his brief on time and the appellate court denied the motion after considering said reasons, the dismissal was held proper.Likewise, where the appeal was dismissed without prior notice, but the appellant took no steps either by himself or through counsel to have the appeal reinstated, such an attitude of indifference and inaction amounts to his abandonment and renunciation of the right granted to him by law to prosecute his appeal.

Here, the Court notes the repeated non-observance by petitioner and his counsel of the reglementary periods for filing motions and perfecting appeal.Having been afforded the opportunity to seek reconsideration and setting aside of themotu proprio dismissal by the CA of his appeal for non-filing of the appeal brief, and with his subsequent inaction to have his appeal reinstated after the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner cannot impute error or grave abuse on the CA in upholding the finality of its dismissal order. Non-compliance with the requirement of notice or show cause order before themotu propriodismissal under Section 8, paragraph 1 ofRule 124had thereby been cured.[17]Under the circumstances, the petitioner was properly declared to have abandoned his appeal for failing to diligently prosecute the same.Negligence of counsel is not a defense for the failure to file the appellants brief within the reglementary period.Thus, we explained inRedea v. Court of Appeals:[21]In seeking exemption from the above rule, petitioner claims that he will suffer deprivation of property without due process of law on account of the gross negligence of his previous counsel.To him, the negligence of his former counsel was so gross that it practically resulted to fraud because he was allegedly placed under the impression that the counsel had prepared and filed his appellants brief.He thus prays the Court reverse the CA and remand the main case to the court of origin for new trial.Admittedly, this Court has relaxed the rule on the binding effect of counsels negligence and allowed a litigant another chance to present his case (1) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice so require.None of these exceptions obtains here.For a claim of counsels gross negligence to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the clients cause must be shown.Here, petitioners counsel failed to file the appellants brief.While this omission can plausibly qualify as simple negligence, it does not amount to gross negligence to justify the annulment of the proceeding below. (Emphasis supplied.)

The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process.It is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in accordance with the law.The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules.Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.[22]EUGENIO V. PEOPLE

FACTS:

Petitioner Lolita Eugenio is a commissioned agent of respondent Alfredo Mangali in his check re-discounting and lending business. Eugenio persuaded Mangali to extend separate loans to Saquitan and Ty (the borrowers). Two parcels of land, covered by TCT No. 171602 and TCT No. 92585, were offered as securities for the loans. With regards to TCT No. 171602, its validity was confirmed with the Register of Deeds of Manila. With this assurance, Respondent Mangali extended loans with a condition that the borrowers shall execute Deed of Sale.

The loans lapsed and remained unpaid. Respondent Mangali inquired from the Register of Deeds the status of TCT Nos. 171602 and 92585. He found out that TCT No. 171602 had been cancelled in 1995 while TCT No. 92585 is not registered with the Register of Deeds. Mangali sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and an entrapment operation was conducted. A Complaint for Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents was filed against Eugenio. The RTC convicted Eugenio of one count of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the filing of this petition.

Petitioner denied taking part in any conspiracy to swindle Mangali. Petitioner claimed that since 1993, Mangali had sought her services to run errands for him in the titling of lots and follow-up of a Social Security System claim. Afterwards, Mangali recruited her as his commissioned agent in Mangalis check re-discounting and lending businesses. Thus, even before 14 November 1995, petitioner had brokered check rediscounting and loan deals with Mangali.

Petitioner Eugenio avers that the prosecution failed to prove that there was conspiracy between her and the borrowers to defraud Mangali. She further avers that the entrapment operation was illegal due to some irregularities which attended her arrest.

ISSUE:

Whether the inference for Petitioners innocence must prevail

HELD:

YES. While it is true that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence as the same can be inferred from the concerted acts of the accused, this does not dispense with the requirement that conspiracy, like the felony itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the presence of a reasonable doubt as to the existence of conspiracy suffices to negate the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense.

In determining petitioners participation in the events leading to her arrest, the following unrefuted facts must be considered: (1) petitioner works for Mangali, on commission basis, in the latters check re-discounting and lending businesses and (2) the Civil Register of Manila certified as true copy the photocopy of TCT No. 171602.

As Mangalis agent, petitioner is obliged to bring prospective borrowers to Mangali; otherwise, she will not earn commissions. This also explains why she was present in all the ocassions Mangali met the borrowers, Saquitan and Ty she was pecuniarily interested in seeing to it that the deals she brokered were consummated to enable her to receive commission from Mangali.

Regarding the validity of TCT No. 171602, petitioner merely relied on the certification by the Register of Deeds of Manila that the photocopy of TCT No. 171602 she brought with her was a true copy of the title on file in that office.

On petitioners alleged liability for Estafa in using the allegedly falsified TCT No. 92585, the trial court anchored its finding on the presumption that petitioner was party to its falsification because she had possession of such title. However, as pointed out by petitioner, it was Ty who brought with her what she represented to be her owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 92585 and which she presented to Mangali. For the presumption of authorship of falsification to apply, the possessor must stand to profit or had profited from the use of the falsified document. Here, the prosecution failed to show any proof that petitioner received a portion of the loan Mangali extended to Ty, just as there is no proof on record that she received any share from the loan Mangali extended to Saquitan. Petitioner is not a party to any of the documents Mangali, Ty, and Saquitan signed.

In sum, the lower courts rulings are based on a misapprehension of facts justifying reversal on review. Indeed, when, as here, the circumstances surrounding the alleged commission of crimes are capable of two inferences, one favoring the innocence of the accused and the other her guilt, the inference for her innocence must prevail, consistent with the Constitutional presumption of her innocence.

BIRAOGO V PHIL TRUTHLEJANO VS PP, DEL CASTILLO VS PPG.R. No. 153414 June 27, 2006

VICTORIA G. CALLANGAN,Petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,*Respondent.

Callangan was found guilty of the crime of perjury. She then filed a motion for new trial on the ground that she was deprived of her day in court because of the gross negligence of her counsel, Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte, and his utter lack of diligence in the performance of his duty to represent her in every stage of the suit. She attributed the following omissions to her counsel:

1. failure to file the demurrer to evidence despite leave of court previously granted;

2. failure to inform his client of the April 14, 1999 order of the court considering the intended demurrer to evidence as abandoned;

3. failure to attend the hearing for the reception of the evidence for the defense (i.e., petitioner) despite notice, which failure was deemed by the MTC as a waiver of petitioners right to present her evidence;

4. failure to seek proper relief from the adverse effects of said orders and

5. failure to appear on the promulgation of judgment.

The MTC denied the motion for new trial. It held that the ground invoked by petitioner was not among those provided in the Rules of Court for new trial in criminal cases. Upon appeal, the MTC decision was affirmed.

Issue: Whether Callangans right to be heard was violated. No

Ruling: True, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC when it issued the order denying petitioners motion for new trial. The records of the case are bereft of any indication that Judge Cornejo arbitrarily, despotically or deliberately failed to afford petitioner her constitutionally mandated right to be heard. The cause of petitioners travails and misfortune was the negligence of her own counsel.

However, in view of the circumstances of this case, outright deprivation of liberty will be the consequence of petitioners criminal conviction based solely on the evidence for the prosecution. Thus, to prevent a miscarriage of justice and to give meaning to the due process clause of the Constitution, the Court deems it wise to allow petitioner to present evidence in her defense.

The rule that the negligence of counsel binds the client admits of exceptions. The recognized exceptions are: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property or (3) where the interests of justice so require. In such cases, courts must step in and accord relief to a party-litigant.

The omissions of petitioners counsel amounted to an abandonment or total disregard of her case. They show conscious indifference to or utter disregard of the possible repercussions to his client. Thus, the chronic inaction of petitioners counsel on important incidents and stages of the criminal proceedings constituted gross negligence.

The RTC itself found that petitioner never had the chance to present her defense because of the nonfeasance (malfeasance, even) of her counsel. It also concluded that, effectively, she was without counsel.Considering these findings, to deprive