A.M. No. P-08-2519 November 19, 2008(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2155-P)

ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTY. MIGUEL MORALES, CLERK OF COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MANILA.

        and

A.M. No. P-08-2520 November 19, 2008(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P)

ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT AGAINST CLERK OF COURT ATTY. HENRY P. FAVORITO OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, CLERK OF COURT ATTY. MIGUEL MORALES OF BRANCH 17, CLERK OF COURT AMIE GRACE ARREOLA OF BRANCH 4, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER III WILLIAM CALDA OF THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT AND STENOGRAPHER ISABEL SIWA OF BRANCH 16, ALL OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, MANILA.

R E S O L U T I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court are two anonymous complaints: docketed as A.M. No. P-08-2519 charging Atty. Miguel Morales (Atty. Morales), Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 17, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila of misconduct; and A.M. No. P-08-2520 charging Atty. Morales, together with Isabel Siwa (Siwa), Court Stenographer, Branch 16; William Calda (Calda), Administrative Officer III, Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC); Amie Grace Arreola (Arreola), Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 4, and Atty. Henry P. Favorito (Atty. Favorito), Clerk of Court VI, OCC, all of the MeTC, Manila of misconduct, graft and corruption and moonlighting.

A.M. No. P-08-2519

In an unsigned and undated letter which the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received on February 24, 2005, the writers, who claim to be employees of the OCC-MeTC of Manila, allege that Atty. Morales, then detailed at the OCC, was consuming his working hours filing and attending to personal cases, such as administrative cases against employees in his old sala, using office supplies, equipment and utilities. The writers aver that Atty. Morales's conduct has demoralized them and they resorted to filing an anonymous complaint in fear of retaliation from Atty. Morales.1

Assistant Court Administrator (ACA) now Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Reuben P. dela Cruz, conducted a discreet investigation on March 8, 2005 to verify the allegations of the complaint. However, since the office of Atty. Morales was located at the innermost section of the Docket/Appeals Section of the OCC, DCA Dela Cruz failed to extensively make an observation of the actuations of Atty. Morales. On March 16, 2005, a spot investigation was conducted by DCA Dela Cruz together with four NBI agents, a crime photographer and a support staff. The team was able to access the personal computer of Atty. Morales and print two documents stored in its hard drive, a Petition for Relief from Judgment for the case entitled, "Manolo N. Blanquera, et al. v. Heirs of Lamberto N. Blanquera" in the name of Atty. Jose P. Icaonapo, Jr. (Atty. Icaonapo) filed with the Court of Appeals, and a Pre-trial Brief for the case entitled, "Pentacapital Investment Corp. v. Toyoharu Aoki, et al." also in the name of Atty. Icaonapo, which was filed before Branch 1, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila. Atty. Morales's computer was seized and taken to the custody of the OCA.2 Upon Atty. Morales's motion 

however, the Court ordered the release of said computer with an order to the Management Information Systems Office of the Supreme Court to first retrieve the files stored therein.3

Atty. Morales filed a letter-complaint addressed to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. against DCA Dela Cruz and his companions for alleged conspiracy and culpable violation of Secs. 1,4 25 & 36 of Art. III of the Constitution relative to the spot investigation. Said letter-complaint was indorsed by the Chief Justice to the Court Administrator on March 31, 2005 for appropriate action.7 Atty. Morales's wife, Francisca Landicho-Morales also filed a letter-complaint dated February 15, 2005 against Judge Crispin B. Bravo, Presiding Judge of MeTC Branch 16 Manila, Lenin Bravo, former Clerk of the said branch and Judge Cristina Javalera-Sulit, Presiding Judge of MeTC Branch 18, Manila for violations of the law and ethical standards which was indorsed by Chief Justice Davide to the Court Administrator for preliminary inquiry.8 Although diligent efforts were made to ascertain from the OCA Legal Office the current status of Atty. Morales's case against DCA Dela Cruz, the same however, could not be determined.

Parenthetically, Atty. Favorito, together with more than a hundred employees of the MeTC Manila, wrote an undated letter to Chief Justice Davide assailing the spot investigation conducted by DCA Dela Cruz.9Said letter was indorsed by Chief Justice Davide to DCA Dela Cruz on March 28, 2005 for his comment.10 No comment can be found in the records of herein administrative cases.

In a 1st Indorsement dated April 14, 2005, then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) directed Atty. Morales to comment on the undated anonymous letter-complaint.11

In his Manifestation which the OCA received on April 27, 2005, Atty. Morales alleged that: the anonymous letter-complaint should not have been given due course as there is no truth to the allegations therein; the OCA took almost a year to act on the anonymous letter-complaint which did not have the proper indorsement from the Office of the Chief Justice; even though he brought to the OCC his personal computer, such act is not prohibited; he did not use his computer to write pleadings during office hours and neither did he use paper of the OCC; the "raid" conducted by DCA Dela Cruz without search and seizure orders violated his right to privacy and the articles seized therewith should be considered inadmissible.12

In a letter dated April 12, 2005, Atty. Morales applied for optional retirement13 which the Court approved in its Resolution dated October 12, 2005 subject to the withholding of his benefits pending resolution of cases against him, the instant case included.14

A.M. No. P-08-2520

In another unsigned letter dated April 1, 2004, the writers who claim to be employees of the OCC-MeTC, Manila, charge Atty. Morales, Arreola, Atty. Favorito, Calda and Siwa of the following offenses: Atty. Morales and Arreola, who are both detailed in the OCC, leave the office after logging-in only to return in the afternoon, which acts are allowed by Atty. Favorito; Atty. Morales and Arreola were not given assignments and whenever they are at the office, they do nothing but play computer games; Siwa is also allowed by Atty. Favorito to lend money and rediscount checks during office hours using court premises; many people from different offices go to the OCC because of the business of Siwa; Atty. Favorito also allows two of Siwa's personal maids to use the OCC as their office in rediscounting checks; and Atty. Favorito and Calda charge P50.00 to P500.00 from sureties claiming said amounts to be processing fees without issuing receipts therefor.15

In the same spot investigation conducted by DCA De La Cruz on March 16, 2005, a partly hidden plastic box was discovered containing the amount of P65,390.00 and six commercial checks, which Siwa voluntarily opened to the team. These were also confiscated and turned over to the custody of the OCA.16

In a letter to then Chief Justice Davide dated April 12, 2005, Siwa requested that said money and personal belongings that were confiscated be returned to her immediately and that a formal investigation be conducted regarding DCA Dela Cruz's conduct during the spot investigation.17 The seized items were later returned to Siwa18 while her letter-complaint was indorsed by the Chief Justice to the Court Administrator on April 18, 2005 for appropriate action.19 As with the complaint filed by Atty. Morales, however, the status of Siwa's complaint could not be ascertained despite diligent efforts at inquiring about the matter from the OCA Legal Office.

In a 1st Indorsement dated April 14, 2005, the OCA directed Atty. Morales, Atty. Favorito, Calda, Arreola and Siwa to comment on the letter-complaint.20

Atty. Morales submitted the same Manifestation he submitted in A.M. P-08-2519.

Siwa in her Comment avers that: the anonymous letter-complaint should not have been given due course as it contravened Sec. 46(c) of Executive Order No. 292 and the implementing rules; it was not subscribed and sworn to by the complainant and there is no obvious truth to the allegations therein; while she admits that she is involved in the business of rediscounting checks, such is a legitimate endeavor, in fact, there are other employees of the court engaged in the same business; she is also not aware of any rule prohibiting her from engaging in said endeavor; she does not use the OCC to conduct her business and she is mindful of her duties as a government employee; thus, she has a staff to do the encashment of the checks; there were rare occasions when her staff members were stationed at the corridors to lend cash to employees but while said occasions may have occurred during office hours, her staff cannot be blamed for the same since the employees go to them; she has never neglected her duty as a court stenographer -- in fact, her last performance rating was "very satisfactory"; it is a known fact that because of the meager pay given to government employees, most augment their income by engaging in business; she should not be singled out for being enterprising and industrious; and it is unfair to accuse her of wrongdoing at a time when she has voluntarily retired from government service due to health reasons.21

A month after the incident, Siwa filed for optional retirement22 which the Court approved in its Resolution23 dated October 12, 2005, with the proviso that the amount of P30,000.00 shall be retained from the money value of her earned leave credits pending resolution of the present case.

Calda explains in his letter dated April 25, 2005 that: the fees of P50.00 and P500.00 were charged in connection with the filing of surety and cash bonds pursuant to Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court and that corresponding official receipts were issued; at nighttime, he is the one authorized to approve the filing of surety bonds since he is the highest ranking officer of a skeletal force detailed for night court duty; he has been with the MeTC for 16 years, rose in rank, was never involved in any controversy and would never tarnish his reputation.24

Arreola asserts that: her record of arrival and departure was always signed by her superiors without question because it reflected the correct entries; she is always in the office even when there is typhoon; and she has proven herself useful in the OCC by answering queries of litigants and verifications from other offices and attending to complaints.25

In compliance, Atty. Favorito adopted the comments of Atty. Morales, Calda and Arreola and denied that he committed the acts alluded to in the anonymous letter-complaint.26 Atty. Favorito also incorporated in his comment a letter of the employees of the OCC-MTC Manila disowning the alleged anonymous complaint.27

In a Resolution dated July 27, 2005, the Court, upon recommendation of the OCA, consolidated the two complaints and referred the same to the Executive Judge of the MeTC, Manila for investigation, report and recommendation.28

Report of the Investigating Judge

In her Report dated September 1, 2006, MeTC Executive Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez-Estoesta states that discreet observation of the daily working activities of Atty. Morales and Siwa could no longer be done as the two had already availed themselves of their optional retirement; thus, random interviews with employees who had proximate working activities with them were resorted to, as well as perusal of court records.29

The following employees were interviewed: Rueben Duque, Clerk of Court, Branch 16, MeTC; Beneluz Dumlao, Records Officer I; Marilou Magbag, Clerk III; Estrella Rafael, Records Officer I; Lydia dela Cruz, Records Officer III; Raymundo Bilbao, Clerk III; Marie Joy Valle, Clerk IV, and Ma. Lizabeth Marcelino, Administrative Officer II, all of the OCC; Rosie Jose, freelance bondswoman, and Norberto D. Soriano, authorized representative of the Commonwealth Insurance Company.30

After conducting her investigation, Judge Estoesta found:

Insofar as Atty. Morales, Atty. Favorito, Calda and Arreola are concerned, the investigation immediately stumbled into a dead end. No one from the OCC personnel who were interviewed would give a categorical and positive statement affirming the charges against the said personnel. While almost all confirmed that Atty. Morales maintained his own computer and printer at the OCC, nobody could state for certain that what he worked on were pleadings for private cases. Rafael, who was seated right next to Atty. Morales at the OCC merely said that what preoccupied Atty. Morales were his own administrative cases. She did not notice Atty. Morales engage in private work in his computer although she saw Atty. Icaonapo drop by the office every now and then to personally see Atty. Morales. Rafael explained however that this could be because Atty. Icaonapo was the counsel of Atty. Morales in his administrative cases. While documents referring to private cases were found in the hard drive of the computer of Atty. Morales, and while the writing style is similar to that of the Manifestation he filed in this case, still no definite conclusion could be drawn that he has composed the said pleadings at the OCC during official working hours. A close examination of the Pre-Trial Brief signed by Atty. Icaonapo and filed with the RTC Branch 1, Manila also revealed that the paper and the printer used were not the same as that used in the office of Atty. Morales.31

There was also no evidence to support charges of extortion against Atty. Favorito and Calda. Two bondsmen who were randomly interviewed denied that Atty. Favorito and Calda exacted illegal sums from them. The amounts they charged could actually refer to legal fees.32

As to Arreola, the charge against her also has no basis. The interviewees were unanimous in saying that Arreola was always around the office, and that while she fetched her son from a nearby school, she did so during lunch or after office hours. Random checks on Arreola also revealed that she was always at the OCC and at Branch 30 where she was reassigned.33

As to Siwa, she candidly admitted that she was engaged in lending and discounting activities at her station, through her own staff which she had maintained for said purpose. Because of her business, a number of 

employees, even those from other government agencies, usually huddled at her station to hold transactions. Branch Clerk of Court Ruben Duque relates that a number of people would often go to their office looking for Siwa for lending and rediscounting. Assuming that Siwa is not prohibited from engaging in said business, still it has distracted her from her duties as a stenographer. A random check on the court records of Branch 16 showed that Siwa had not yet submitted a complete transcription of 7 stenographic notes in 5 cases, 3 of which already had decisions rendered. In one case, the testimonies of two prosecution witnesses had to be re-taken to fill in the gap which not only wasted precious time of the court but also distressed the efforts of the prosecution in the presentation of its case.34

Judge Estoesta recommended as follows:

1. In OCA IPI No. 05-2155-P [now A.M. No. P-08-2519], with no substantial evidence taken to prove the charges in the anonymous letter-complaint filed against Atty. Miguel C. Morales, it is RECOMMENDED that the same be ordered dismissed;

2. In OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P [now A.M. No. P-2520], likewise, with no substantial evidence taken to prove the charges in the anonymous letter-complaint filed against Atty. Miguel C. Morales, Atty. Henry P. Favorito, William Calda and Amie Grace Arreola, it is RECOMMENDED that the same be ordered dismissed insofar as said court employees are concerned; and

3. In OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P [now A.M. No. P-08-2520] insofar as it concerns Ms. Isabel Siwa, it is RECOMMENDED that she be directed to explain why she still has stenographic notes pending for transcription despite having already availed of an optional retirement pay.35

The report was referred to the OCA for its evaluation, report and recommendation.36

OCA Report and Recommendation

The OCA, through ACA Antonio H. Dujua, in its November 7, 2007 Memorandum, states that it does not entirely concur with the findings and recommendation of Judge Estoesta.

Instead the OCA submits the following findings.

On Atty. Morales: The allegation that Atty. Morales had been using his personal computer to draft pleadings for private counsels was established in the spot inspection on March 16, 2005. The hard drive of Atty. Morales's computer yielded a pre-trial brief and a petition for relief from judgment with the name of Atty. Icaonapo. The said pre-trial brief was the same pleading that was submitted to RTC Branch 1, Manila by Atty. Icaonapo on February 10, 2003. Atty. Morales in his Manifestation dated April 25, 2005 failed to refute the evidence that emanated from his computer and instead chided the OCA for confiscating the same.

On Siwa: While she insisted that the anonymous letter should not have been given due course, she admitted in her April 28, 2005 Manifestation to being involved in the business of rediscounting checks, claiming that she was not the only employee engaged in the same, and that she maintained her own personnel to do the rediscounting which stretched to the premises of the MeTC-OCC where Atty. Favorito is the Clerk of Court.37

The OCA concluded that: Atty. Morales and Siwa should be found guilty of gross misconduct. Atty. Morales, for preparing pleadings for private counsels and litigants; and Siwa, for engaging in the business of rediscounting checks during office hours; gross misconduct carries the penalty of dismissal from the service even for the first offense, and while Atty. Morales and Siwa have already left the judiciary, the Court can still direct the 

forfeiture of their benefits; Atty. Favorito should also be held liable for neglect of duty because as Clerk of Court of the MeTC-OCC, he was negligent in allowing the nefarious activities of Atty. Morales and Siwa to happen right inside the confines of the MeTC-OCC.38

On Arreola and Calda: The OCA agrees with Judge Estoesta that the charges against them should be dismissed for lack of concrete evidence.39

The OCA then recommended:

(a) That (resigned) Clerk of Court Miguel C. Morales, Branch 17, and (retired) Court Stenographer Isabel A. Siwa, Branch 16, both of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila be found GUILTY of Gross Misconduct with forfeiture of the benefits due them excluding accrued leave credits;

(b) That Clerk of Court Henry P. Favorito of the MeTC-OCC, Manila be found GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty and suspended without pay for a period of one (1) month and one (1) day, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely; and

(c) That the charges made in the April 1, 2004 anonymous letter against Clerk of Court Amie Grace A. Arreola, Branch 4 and Administrative Officer III William Calda, OCC, both of the MeTC, Manila be DISMISSED for lack of merit.40

The Court's Ruling.

The Court partly adopts the findings and recommendations of the OCA with some modifications.

An anonymous complaint is always received with great caution, originating as it does from an unknown author. Such a complaint, however does not justify outright dismissal for being baseless or unfounded for the allegations therein may be easily verified and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated and established by other competent evidence. Indeed, complainant's identity would hardly be material where the matter involved is of public interest.41

Liability of Atty. Morales.

The two anonymous letters charge Atty. Morales with the following offenses: attending to personal cases while using official time, office supplies, equipment and utilities, leaving the office after logging-in in the morning only to return in the afternoon, and playing computer games whenever he was at the office.

It is undisputed that pleadings for private cases were found in Atty. Morales's personal computer in the MeTC-OCC and Atty. Morales could not provide any satisfactory explanation therefor. Such fact, by itself, could already make Atty. Morales liable for simple misconduct for it hints of impropriety on his part. The Court has always stressed that all members of the judiciary should be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to their duties in the judicial branch but also to their behavior outside the court as private individuals, in order that the integrity and good name of the courts of justice shall be preserved.42

Atty. Morales, in defense, argues that since the pleadings were acquired from his personal computer which DCA Dela Cruz confiscated without any valid search and seizure order, such evidence should be considered as the fruits of a poisonous tree as it violated his right to privacy.

Both the Investigating Justice and the OCA failed to discuss this matter. The Court however finds it proper to squarely address such issue, without prejudice to the outcome of the administrative case filed by Atty. Morales against DCA Dela Cruz regarding the same incident. The finding of guilt or exoneration of Atty. Morales hinges on this very crucial question: Are the pleadings found in Atty. Morales's personal computer admissible in the present administrative case against him?

The Court answers in the negative.

Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is provided for under Section 2, Article III thereof.43 The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution also bars the admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right.44 The fact that the present case is administrative in nature does not render the above principle inoperative. As expounded in Zulueta v. Court of Appeals,45 any violation of the aforestated constitutional right renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

There are exceptions to this rule one of which is consented warrantless search.46

DCA Dela Cruz in his report claims that that they were able to obtain the subject pleadings with the consent of Atty. Morales.47 The Court finds however that such allegation on his part, even with a similar allegation from one of his staff,48 is not sufficient to make the present case fall under the category of a valid warrantless search.

Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred and must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.49 It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.50 The burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given lies with the State.51 Acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed and courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.52 To constitute a valid consent or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it must be shown that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.53

In this case, what is missing is a showing that Atty. Morales had an actual intention to relinquish his right. While he may have agreed to the opening of his personal computer and the printing of files therefrom, in the presence of DCA Dela Cruz, his staff and some NBI agents during the March 16, 2005 spot investigation, it is also of record that Atty. Morales immediately filed an administrative case against said persons questioning the validity of the investigation, specifically invoking his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.

While Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting standards required of every court employee, unfortunately, the Court cannot use the evidence obtained from his personal computer against him for it violated his constitutional right.

As the Court has staunchly declared:

The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless. This 

explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on governmental power.

The right against unreasonable search and seizure in turn is at the top of the hierarchy of rights, next only to, if not on the same plane as, the right to life, liberty and property, which is protected by the due process clause. This is as it should be for, as stressed by a couple of noted freedom advocates, the right to personal security which, along with the right to privacy, is the foundation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure "includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing."

x x x x

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.54

And as there is no other evidence, apart from the pleadings, retrieved from the unduly confiscated personal computer of Atty. Morales, to hold him administratively liable, the Court has no choice but to dismiss the charges herein against him for insufficiency of evidence.

Liability of Siwa.

The Court agrees with the OCA that Siwa should be administratively disciplined for engaging in the business of lending and rediscounting checks.

Siwa admits engaging in the business of lending and rediscounting checks, claiming that it was a legitimate endeavor needed to augment her meager income as a court employee; that she is not aware of any rule prohibiting her from engaging in the business of rediscounting checks; that there are other employees engaged in the same business; and that she employs her own staff to do the encashment of the checks as she always attends to and never neglects her duties as a stenographer.55

Siwa is clearly mistaken.

Officials and employees of the judiciary are prohibited from engaging directly in any private business, vocation, or profession even outside office hours to ensure that full-time officers of the court render full-time service so that there may be no undue delay in the administration of justice and in the disposition of cases.56 The nature of work of court employees requires them to serve with the highest degree of efficiency and responsibility and the entire time of judiciary officials and employees must be devoted to government service to ensure efficient and speedy administration of justice.57 Indeed, the Court has always stressed that court employees must strictly observe official time and devote every second moment of such time to public service.58 And while the compensation may be meager, that is the sacrifice judicial employees must be willing to take.

As pronounced by the Court in Biyaheros Mart Livelihood Association, Inc. v. Cabusao, Jr.:

Government service demands great sacrifice. One who cannot live with the modest salary of a public office has no business staying in the service. He is free to seek greener pastures elsewhere. The public 

trust character of the office proscribes him from employing the facilities or using official time for private business or purposes.59

Siwa's offense is compounded by the fact that she was previously verbally instructed by her superior, MeTC Branch 16 Presiding Judge Crispin B. Bravo, to stop using court premises for her business. But she ignored the same, prompting the latter to issue a written Memorandum dated January 18, 2005 asking her to explain why she was still using the office in "transacting/attending" to her lending and rediscounting business when she was already verbally instructed to desist therefrom in December 2004.60

Siwa apologized and promised not to let it happen again, in her letter dated January 21, 2005.61 Siwa also admitted that she was using her house-helper in the rediscounting of checks and allowed the latter to use the court premises in the conduct of the same.62

Her allegation that she never neglected her duty as a stenographer is also belied by the findings of the Investigating Judge, who in her random check of records, discovered that Siwa had not yet submitted a complete transcription of 7 stenographic notes in 5 cases (3 criminal and 2 civil cases), in three of which decisions were already rendered.63 In one case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses had to be re-taken.64 Thus, contrary to Siwa's assertion, she was not able to satisfactorily perform her duties as a court stenographer while engaging in private business.

Her argument that her business is a legal endeavor also cannot excuse her from liability. Many "moonlighting" activities pertain to legal acts that otherwise would be countenanced if the actors were not employed in the public sector. And while moonlighting is not normally considered a serious misconduct, nonetheless, by the very nature of the position held, it amounts to a malfeasance in office.65

Siwa conducted her business within the court's premises, which placed the image of the judiciary, of which she is part, in a bad light. Time and again, the Court has held that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat; thus the conduct of a person serving the judiciary must, at all times, be characterized by propriety and decorum, and be above suspicion so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary.66

Siwa's infraction constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service which, under Sec. 52 A (20) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, carries the penalty of suspension of 6 months and 1 day to 1 year for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense. Since this is her first offense and considering the October 12, 2005 Resolution of the Court in A.M. No. 12096-Ret. which approved Siwa's application for optional retirement, retaining only the amount of P30,000.00 from the money value of her earned leave credits pending resolution of the instant case, the Court finds she should be imposed the penalty of fine in the amount of P30,000.00.

Liability of Atty. Favorito.

There is no evidence to show that Atty. Favorito knows or should have known that Atty. Morales had copies of pleadings for private cases in his personal computer for which Atty. Favorito could be held liable for neglect of duty as supervisor. As to Siwa's lending and rediscounting activities, however, the Court finds that Atty. Favorito was remiss in addressing said matter which activity took place in the court's premises which was under his responsibility.

Clarifications, however, should be made.

The OCA in its Memorandum dated November 7, 2007 stated that:

x x x in her April 28, 2005 Manifestation, Siwa admitted to being involved in the business of rediscounting checks, claiming that 'she is not the only employee engaged in the same business.'Respondent [Siwa] even had the audacity to admit that she 'maintained my own personnel' to do the rediscounting which stretched to the premises of the MeTC-OCC, where respondent Favorito is the Clerk of Court.67 (Emphasis supplied)

A review of the records, however, would show that what Siwa submitted is not a "Manifestation" but a "Comment" dated April 28, 2005 and there, instead of stating that her rediscounting activities stretched to the premises of the MeTC-OCC, she actually denied that she used the OCC to conduct said business. Pertinent portions of said Comment reads:

4.1. Respondent admits that she is involved in the business of rediscounting checks x x x.

x x x x

4.2. Respondent, however, denies that she uses the Office of the Clerk of Court to conduct this business x x x.

4.3. There are other occasions when the said staff will be stationed at the corridors to lend emergency cash to employees in need. The said occasions may have occurred during office hours, for which, the respondent's staff may not be blamed since it was the employees themselves who go to them. However, these instances were rare. It should also be emphasized that these transactions occurred outside of the offices and within the common or public areas.68 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Siwa never admitted that her business stretched to the premises of the OCC-MeTC but only claimed that her staff used "corridors" which were "common or public areas" for their transactions.

Still, Atty. Favorito failed to address such matter and to prevent such activities from taking place, even if they were conducted in the corridors, since such areas are still part of the court's premises. As Clerk of Court of the OCC, it is Atty. Favorito's duty to plan, direct, supervise and coordinate the activities of all divisions/sections/units in the OCC.69 He should therefore be reprimanded for his failure to duly supervise and prevent such activities from happening within his area of responsibility.

Liability of Atty. Favorito and Calda on the extortion charges.

On the claim that Atty. Favorito and Caldo extorted money from sureties without issuing receipts therefor, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the Investigating Judge and the OCA.

Investigating Judge Estoesta found that:

x x x the charges of "extortion" levelled against Atty. Henry P. Favorito and Mr. William Calda x x x suffered from loose ends.

Random interviews with two (2) bondsmen denied that Atty. Favorito and Mr. Calda exacted such amounts.

The P50.00 and P500.00 specified to as "processing fee" could actually refer to the Legal Fees mandated under Section 8 (o) and Section 21 (c) of Rule 141, as follows x x x

Here, it is obvious that the anonymous letter-complainant has no understanding whatsoever of the legal fees charged by Office of the Clerk of Court.

This actually hints of the fact that said anonymous letter-complainant may not be a personnel of the Office of the Clerk of Court after all.

The extortion charge slapped against Atty. Favorito and Mr. Calda, therefore, rings empty.70

Such finding was affirmed by the OCA in its Memorandum dated November 7, 2007 which recommended the dismissal of said charges against Atty. Favorito and Calda for lack of concrete proof.71

Liability of Arreola on absence during office hours.

As with the extortion charges against Atty. Favorito and Calda, the Court finds no sufficient evidence to hold Arreola administratively liable.

As reported by Judge Estoesta:

x x x the charge against Ms. Amie Grace Arreola regarding her habit of leaving the office after logging-in found no concrete corroboration.

The interviewees were actually unanimous in saying that Ms. Arreola was not prone to such habit as she is always around the office. Ms. Arreola may have been known to fetch her son at a nearby school but she has always done so during lunch hours and after office hours.

As a matter of fact, at a time when the MeTC was stricken by a debilitating brown-out schedule in the afternoon sometime [in] July 2006, Ms. Arreola was still around, having been one of the skeletal force who volunteered to stay on. The undersigned has personally seen her around 5:30 p.m. of the same day.

As a matter of fact, several random checks on Ms. Arreola by the undersigned herself revealed that she has always been around at the OCC and at Branch 30 where she was re-assigned as Branch Clerk of Court. At times, personal visits were made, interspersed by telephone calls between 8:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. where Ms. Arreola proved herself to be always at the office.

Needless to say, therefore, the charge against Ms. Arreola is certainly without basis.72

The OCA agreed with the said finding and likewise recommended the dismissal of the charges against Arreola.73

It is well-settled that in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. That is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, what will prevail is that respondent has regularly performed his or her duties.74 Reliance on mere allegations, conjectures and suppositions will leave 

an administrative complaint with no leg to stand on, and charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence.75

Since there is no proof, apart from the allegations of the letter-complaint, to hold Atty. Favorito, Calda and Arreola liable for the afore- stated charges against them, the Court deems it proper to dismiss said charges for lack of merit.

Other matters.

In view of the initial findings of Investigating Judge Estoesta that Siwa was remiss in her duty of transcribing stenographic notes assigned to her, the OCA is hereby directed to conduct an audit investigation on Siwa's transcription of stenographic notes to determine the full extent of the notes she failed to transcribe on time. If warranted, such matter shall be treated as a separate case to be given a new docket number and assigned to another ponente for evaluation.

The OCA should also report on the status of the complaint filed by Atty. Morales which the Court received on March 31, 2005, the complaint of Isabel Siwa dated April 12, 2005, and the letter-complaint of Atty. Favorito together with other MeTC employees which the Court received on March 28, 2005, against DCA Dela Cruz, regarding the spot investigation conducted on March 16, 2005 regarding this case.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Isabel Siwa, Court Stenographer of Branch 16, Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and is FINED in the amount of P30,000.00 to be deducted from the money value of her leave credits which was set aside per Resolution dated October 12, 2005 in A.M No. 12096-Ret. entitled Application for Retirement Benefits under Section 13-A of R.A. No. 8291 of Ms. Isabel A. Siwa, Court Stenographer II, MeTC, Manila, Branch 16.

Atty. Henry P. Favorito, Clerk of Court of the Office of the Clerk of Court is REPRIMANDED for his failure to supervise the lending and rediscounting activites of Siwa which took place in the court's premises. The extortion charges against him are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The charges against Atty. Miguel Morales, former Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 17, are DISMISSEDfor insufficiency of evidence. Deputy Court Administrator Reuben de la Cruz is advised to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties.

The charges against William Calda, Administrative Officer of the Office of the Clerk of Court, and Amie Grace Arreola, formerly Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 4 now Clerk of Court of Branch 30, both of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to conduct an audit investigation on Isabel Siwa's transcription of stenographic notes in view of the finding of Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez-Estoesta in her Investigation Report dated September 1, 2006 in A.M. No. P-08-2519 and A.M. P-08-2520 (formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2155-P and A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2156-P) that Siwa has not submitted a complete transcription of stenographic notes in several cases assigned to her. Said matter shall be treated as a separate case, to be given a new docket number and assigned to a new ponentefor final resolution.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177148 June 30, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.RAUL NUÑEZ y REVILLEZA, Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 dated January 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR. H.C. No. 02420. The appellate court affirmed the Decision2 dated February 11, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36, which convicted appellant in Criminal Case No. 8614-01-C for violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, also known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659.3

On June 25, 2001, Raul R. Nuñez was formally charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended. The Information reads:

That at around 6:00 o’clock in the morning of the 24th day of April 20014 at Brgy. San Antonio, Municipality of Los Ba[ñ]os, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority of law, and in a search conducted at his residence as stated above, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody thirty[-]one (31) heat sealed transparent plastic sachets containing methamp[h]etamine hydrochloride otherwise known as "shabu", a regulated drug, with a total weight of 233.93 grams in violation of the aforementioned provision of law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

The facts are as follows:

At 6:00 a.m. on April 26, 2001, operatives of the Sta. Cruz, Laguna Police Detectives in coordination with the Los Baños Police Station (LBPS) and IID Mobile Force conducted a search in the house of Raul R. Nuñez based on reports of drug possession. The group, led by Commanding Officer Arwin Pagkalinawan, included SPO1 Odelon Ilagan, SPO3 Eduardo Paz, PO1 Ronnie Orfano, PO2 Gerry Crisostomo, PO2 Alexander Camantigue, PO2 Joseph Ortega and Senior Inspector Uriquia.

Before proceeding to appellant’s residence in Barangay San Antonio, the group summoned Barangay Captain Mario Mundin and Chief Tanod Alfredo Joaquin to assist them in serving the search warrant. Upon arriving at appellant’s house, Mundin called on appellant to come out. Thereafter, Commanding Officer Pagkalinawan showed Nuñez the warrant. SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Crisostomo then surveyed appellant’s room in his presence while his family, PO2 Ortega and the two barangay officials remained in the living room. SPO1 Ilagan found thirty-one (31) packets of shabu, lighters, improvised burners, tooters, and aluminum foil with shabu residue and a lady’s wallet containing P4,610 inside appellant’s dresser. The group also confiscated a component, camera, electric planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw, electric tester, and assorted carpentry tools on suspicion that they were acquired in exchange for shabu. Following the search, SPO1 Ilagan issued a Receipt for Property Seized6 and a Certification of Orderly Search7 which appellant signed.

In a Decision dated February 11, 2002, the RTC convicted appellant and sentenced him as follows:

WHEREFORE, this court finds the accused guilty, beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Republic Act 6425 as amended and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all its accessory penalties under the law. Accused is ordered to pay the fine of two million pesos.

SO ORDERED.8

Appellant elevated the case to this Court on appeal, but the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals on May 2, 2006, pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.9 On January 19, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming appellant’s conviction. The appellate court dismissed appellant’s defense of frame-up and upheld the credibility of SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Ortega. It observed that the inconsistencies in their testimony were minor at best, and did not relate to the elements of the crime.

The appellate court in its decision decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated February 11, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Calamba, Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.10

From the appellate court’s decision, appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. This Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desire. However, both the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the appellant manifested that they are adopting their briefs before the appellate court.

In his brief, appellant contends that

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCORDING GREATER WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION AND DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF FRAME-UP INTERPOSED BY [THE] ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE IMPUTED CRIME DESPITE THE INHERENT WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE.11

Simply, the issue is whether appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Possession of Regulated Drugs under the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Appellant insists that the shabu found in his room was planted. He points out variances in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which cast doubt on his culpability: first, SPO1 Ilagan testified that they picked up the barangay officials before going to appellant’s house but PO2 Ortega claimed that Chief Tanod Joaquin was already with them when they left the police station; second, while SPO1 Ilagan confirmed the presence of the accused during the search, PO2 Ortega related otherwise. More importantly, appellant assails the validity of the search warrant as it did not indicate his exact address but only the barangay and street of his residence. He maintains that none of the occupants witnessed the search as they were all kept in the living room. Finally, appellant questions why the prosecution did not call the barangay officials as witnesses to shed light on the details of the search.

Conversely, the OSG argues that appellant’s guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. It agrees with the trial court that appellant failed to overcome the presumption that the law enforcement agents regularly performed their duties. Further, the OSG brands the testimonies of appellant, his wife and their child as self-serving, absent ill-motives ascribed to the search team. It brushes aside appellant’s protest, on the validity of the search warrant, for having been belatedly made.

After considering carefully the contentions of the parties and the records of this case, we are in agreement that appellant’s petition lacks merit.

Appellant was indicted for possession of regulated drugs under Section 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425 as amended which provides:

SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.

To be liable for the crime, the following elements must concur: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.12 All these were found present in the instant case.

While appellant interposes the defense of frame-up, we view such claim with disfavor as it can easily be fabricated and is commonly used as a facile refuge in drug cases.13 In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.14

In this case, SPO1 Ilagan found shabu in appellant’s room; but appellant retorts that it was planted. The latter’s daughter, Liezel Nuñez, testified on the alleged planting of evidence as follows:

x x x x

Q: While you were walking towards the direction of your bath room at that time have you notice anything which catches your attention?

A: I saw a man inside the room taking a plastic from his bag, sir.

Q: Did you also notice, what did that man do with that plastic in the bag?

A: He put under the bed fronting the door, sir.

x x x x

Q: Can you describe to this Honorable Court what was that something that the man took out from his bag and placed the same underneath your parents’ bed?

A: It is a plastic containing like a tawas, sir.

Q: Have you noticed Miss Witness about how many plastic bag (sic) did the man take from his bag?

A: Only one, sir.15 [Emphasis supplied.]

x x x x

Assuming arguendo that an officer placed a sachet of shabu under appellant’s bed, appellant had not advanced any reason to account for the thirty-one (31) packets of shabu and drug paraphernalia collected from the dresser in his room. Instead, he readily signed the Receipt for Property Seized and the Certification of Orderly Search. Neither did appellant’s daughter identify the police officer who allegedly planted evidence. Absent any compelling proof why SPO1 Ilagan would falsely testify against appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty stands and we agree that his testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.16

In a further effort to impeach the credibility of the policemen, appellant questions the non-presentation of the barangay officials who purportedly observed the search. The matter of presentation of witnesses, however, is neither for accused nor even for the trial court to decide. Discretion belongs to the prosecutor as to how the State should present its case. The prosecutor has the right to choose whom he would present as witness.17 It bears stressing that by no means did the barangay officials become part of the prosecution when they were asked to witness the search. Hence, even the accused could have presented them to testify thereon.

Appellant alleges that SPO1 Ilagan verified his presence inside the room during the search in contrast to PO2 Ortega’s account. The records, however, disclose otherwise. On direct examination, PO2 Ortega recounted:

FISCAL:

Q: What did you do next?

WITNESS:

A: Capt. Mundin together with Raul and then the three of us went to the room of Raul Nuñez, sir.

x x x x

Q: So, among the group that went to the room of Raul Nuñez who went inside?

A: It was Raul Nuñez, Sgt. Ilagan, Crisostomo who are inside the room. I stayed near the door along with Brgy. Capt. Mundin and Chief Tanod who were looking at what was going on, sir.18 [Emphasis supplied.]

On cross-examination, PO2 Ortega did not falter:

x x x x

Q: Who among you went inside the room of Raul Nuñez?

A: Sgt. Ilagan, Crisostomo, Raul Nuñez, myself, Chief Tanod Alfredo and Capt. Mundin, sir.19 [Emphasis supplied.]

Besides, any objection to the legality of the search warrant and the admissibility of the evidence obtained thereby was deemed waived when no objection was raised by appellant during trial. For sure, the right to be 

secure from unreasonable searches and seizures, like any other right, can be waived and the waiver may be made expressly or impliedly.20

As regards the contradiction in the testimonies of SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Ortega as to whether they picked up Chief Tanod Joaquin at the barangay hall, the same is inconsequential. After all, the witnesses’ testimonies need only corroborate one another on material details surrounding the actual commission of the crime.21

Here, we find the testimonies of SPO1 Ilagan and PO2 Ortega believable and consistent on material points: appellant was shown the search warrant; the search was conducted in the latter’s presence; and SPO1 Ilagan found shabu in appellant’s dresser. It has been ruled that an affirmative testimony coming from credible witnesses without motive to perjure is far stronger than a negative testimony. Records show that appellant and the police officers were strangers to each other. Hence, there is no reason to suggest that the police officers were ill-motivated in apprehending appellant.22

Turning to the objects which may be confiscated during the search, Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court is pertinent:

SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. – A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:

(a) Subject of the offense;

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or

(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

As a rule, only the personal properties described in the search warrant may be seized by the authorities.23 In the case at bar, Search Warrant No. 4224 specifically authorized the taking of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and paraphernalia(s) only. By the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute describes things of a particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually be limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statement which would repel such inference.25

Thus, we are here constrained to point out an irregularity in the search conducted. Certainly, the lady’s wallet, cash, grinder, camera, component, speakers, electric planer, jigsaw, electric tester, saws, hammer, drill, and bolo were not encompassed by the word paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the use or manufacture of drugs. In seizing the said items then, the police officers exercised their own discretion and determined for themselves which items in appellant’s residence they believed were "proceeds of the crime" or "means of committing the offense." This is, in our view, absolutely impermissible.26

The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly described in the warrant is to limit the things to be taken to those, and only those particularly described in the search warrant -- to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime.27 Accordingly, the objects taken which were not specified in the search warrant should be restored to appellant.1avvphi1

Lastly, we find the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court proper. Under Section 20(3)28 of Rep. Act No. 6425 as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, possession of 200 grams or more of shabu 

(methamphetamine hydrochloride) renders the accused liable to suffer the maximum penalty under Section 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425, which is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000 to P10,000,000.

In the case at bar, appellant was found in possession of 233.93 grams of shabu. Hence there being no modifying circumstance proven, the penalty of reclusion perpetua with its accessory penalties, and P2,000,000 fine which the Court of Appeals meted on appellant is in order.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR. H.C. No. 02420 isAFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the official custodian of the objects taken during the search which are not otherwise regulated drugs or drug paraphernalia, is ORDERED to return them to appellant.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180595 March 5, 2010

ARTHUR DEL ROSARIO and ALEXANDER DEL ROSARIO, Petitioners, vs.HELLENOR D. DONATO, JR. and RAFAEL V. GONZAGA, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the need for plaintiff to state the facts constituting his cause of action and the correct forum for actions for damages arising from alleged wrongful procurement and enforcement of a search warrant issued in connection with an alleged criminal violation of the intellectual property law.

The Facts and the Case

On January 23, 2002 Philip Morris Products, Inc. (Philip Morris) wrote the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), requesting assistance in curtailing the proliferation of fake Marlboro cigarettes in Angeles City, Pampanga. After doing surveillance work in that city, respondent Hellenor Donato, Jr., the NBI agent assigned to the case, succeeded in confirming the storage and sale of such fake cigarettes at the house at 51 New York Street, Villasol Subdivision, Angeles City, that belonged to petitioner Alexander del Rosario.

On March 5, 2002 respondent Donato applied for a search warrant with Branch 57 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City to search the subject premises. But it took a week later or on March 12, 2002 for the RTC to hear the application and issue the search warrant. Although Donato felt that the delayed hearing compromised the operation, the NBI agents led by respondent Rafael V. Gonzaga proceeded to implement the warrant. Their search yielded no fake Marlboro cigarettes.

Subsequently, petitioners Alexander and Arthur del Rosario (the Del Rosarios) filed a complaint for P50 million in damages against respondents NBI agents Donato and Gonzaga and two others before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 62, in Civil Case 10584. On August 6, 2003 respondents NBI agents answered the complaint with a motion to dismiss on the grounds of: a) the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action; b) forum shopping; and c) the NBI agents’ immunity from suit, they being sued as such agents. The RTC denied the motion on March 25, 2003. The NBI agents filed a motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same on June 27, 2003.

Dissatisfied, respondents NBI agents filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 79496. On June 29, 2007 the latter court granted the petition and annulled the RTC’s orders, first, in alleging merely that the NBI agents unlawfully procured the search warrant without stating the facts that made the procurement unlawful, the complaint failed to state a cause of action; and second, the Del Rosarios were guilty of forum shopping in that they should have filed their claim for damages against the NBI agents through a motion for compensation with the court that issued the search warrant.

The Del Rosarios sought reconsideration of the decision but the CA denied it on November 19, 2007, prompting them to file this petition for review.

The Issues Presented

The petition presents two issues:

1. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the complaint of the Del Rosarios did not state a cause of action; and

2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the Del Rosarios were guilty of forum shopping.

The Court’s Rulings

One. The CA held that the Del Rosarios’ complaint before the RTC failed to state a cause of action against respondents NBI agents. Such complaint said that the NBI agents unlawfully procured and enforced the search warrant issued against the Del Rosarios but it failed to state the ultimate facts from which they drew such conclusion.

The test of sufficiency of a complaint is whether or not, assuming the truth of the facts that plaintiff alleges in it, the court can render judgment granting him the judicial assistance he seeks.1 And judgment would be right only if the facts he alleges constitute a cause of action that consists of three elements: (1) the plaintiff’s legal right in the matter; (2) the defendant’s corresponding obligation to honor or respect such right; and (3) the defendant’s subsequent violation of the right. Absent any of these, the complaint would have failed to state a cause of action.2

According to the Del Rosarios, the following allegations in their complaint state a cause or causes of action against respondents NBI agents:

2.4 On 12 March 2002, elements of the [NBI] x x x led by Defendant Rafael I. Gonzaga x x x entered by force the premises belonging to Plaintiff Alexander del Rosario situated at No. 51 New York Street, Villasol Subdivision, Angeles City, pursuant to a Search Warrant unlawfully obtained from the [RTC] of Angeles City, Branch 57 x x x.

x x x x

2.6 Contrary to the sworn statements given before the court by defendants Hellenor D. Donato Jr. x x x and contrary to the allegation in Search Warrant No. 02-09A, no ‘fake Marlboro cigarettes and their packaging’ were found at No. 51 New York Street, Villasol Subdivision, Angeles City x x x.

2.7 The inclusion of Plaintiff Arthur del Rosario in Search Warrant No. 02-09 had no factual basis considering that the premises searched is the property solely of Plaintiff Alexander del Rosario.

2.8 Worse the enforcement of Searched [sic] Warrant No. 02-09 was just part of the series of raids and searches that was conducted in Angeles City and Pampanga, which was done with much publicity in the community and had tended to include the Plaintiffs in the same category as other persons and entities who were in fact found to be dealing with fake Marlboro cigarettes.

x x x x

3.2 The baseless sworn allegations that Plaintiffs had under their control and possession counterfeit Marlboro cigarettes and packaging to obtain a search warrant, and the malicious service of the such warrant at the residential premises of Plaintiff Alexander del Rosario in full and plain view of members of the community, as part of the series of raids and operations conducted within Angeles City and Pampanga during that period, has tainted irreversibly the good names which Plaintiffs have painstakingly built and maintained over the years.

x x x x

3.4 Plaintiffs were subjected to so much humiliation and embarrassment by the raid conducted on the subject residential premises, and subjected them to much unwarranted speculation of engaging in the sale of fake merchandise.

Essentially, however, all that the Del Rosarios allege is that respondents NBI agents used an unlawfully obtained search warrant against them, evidenced by the fact that, contrary to the sworn statements used to get such warrant, the NBI agents found no fake Marlboro cigarettes in petitioner Alexander del Rosario’s premises.

But a judicially ordered search that fails to yield the described illicit article does not of itself render the court’s order "unlawful." The Del Rosarios did not allege that respondents NBI agents violated their right by fabricating testimonies to convince the RTC of Angeles City to issue the search warrant. Their allegation that the NBI agents used an unlawfully obtained search warrant is a mere conclusion of law. While a motion to dismiss assumes as true the facts alleged in the complaint, such admission does not extend to conclusions of law.3 Statements of mere conclusions of law expose the complaint to a motion to dismiss on ground of failure to state a cause of action.4

Further, the allegation that the search warrant in this case was served in a malicious manner is also not sufficient. Allegations of bad faith, malice, and other related words without ultimate facts to support the same are mere conclusions of law.5

The Del Rosarios’ broad assertion in their complaint that the search was conducted "in full and plain view of members of the community" does not likewise support their claim that such search was maliciously enforced. There is nothing inherently wrong with search warrants being enforced in full view of neighbors. In fact, when 

the respondent or his representative is not present during the search, the rules require that it be done in the presence of two residents of the same locality. These safeguards exist to protect persons from possible abuses that may occur if searches were done surreptitiously or clandestinely.

Two. Invoking Section 21 of this Court’s Administrative Matter (A.M.) 02-1-06-SC (not A.O. 01-1-06-SC as cited), the CA held that, rather than file a separate action for damages, the Del Rosarios should have filed their claim for compensation in the same proceeding and with the same court that issued the writ of search and seizure. The Del Rosarios were thus guilty of forum shopping.

A.M. 02-1-06-SC, the Rule on Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights, provides:

SEC. 21. Claim for damages. – Where the writ [of search and seizure] is discharged on any of the grounds provided in this Rule, or where it is found after trial that there has been no infringement or threat of infringement of an intellectual property right, the court, upon motion of the alleged infringing defendant or expected adverse party and after due hearing, shall order the applicant to compensate the defendant or expected adverse party upon the cash bond, surety bond or other equivalent security for any injury or damage the latter suffered by the issuance and enforcement of the writ. Should the damages exceed the amount of the bond, the applicant shall be liable for the payment of the excess.

When a complaint is already filed in court, the motion shall be filed with the same court during the trial or before appeal is perfected or before judgment becomes executory, with due notice to the applicant, setting forth the facts showing the defendant’s right to damages and the amount thereof. The award of damages shall be included in the judgment in the main case.

Where no complaint is filed against the expected adverse party, the motion shall be filed with the court which issued the writ. In such a case, the court shall set the motion for summary hearing and immediately determine the expected adverse party’s right to damages.

A judgment in favor of the applicant in its principal claim should not necessarily bar the alleged infringing defendant from recovering damages where he suffered losses by reason of the wrongful issuance or enforcement of the writ.

The damages provided for in this section shall be independent from the damages claimed by the defendant in his counterclaim.

But the subject search warrant was not issued under A.M. 02-1-06-SC, which governed the issuance of a writ of search and seizure in a civil action for infringement filed by an intellectual property right owner against the supposed infringer of his trademark or name. Philip Morris, the manufacturer of Marlboro cigarettes, did not go by this route. Philip Morris did not file a civil action for infringement of its trademark against the Del Rosarios before the RTC of Angeles City.

Instead, Philip Morris sought assistance from the NBI for the apprehension and criminal prosecution of those reportedly appropriating its trademark and selling fake Marlboro cigarettes. In turn, the NBI instituted a police action that included applying for a search and seizure warrant under Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure (not under the provisions of A.M. 02-1-06-SC) against the Del Rosarios upon the belief that they were storing and selling fake Marlboro cigarettes in violation of the penal provisions of the intellectual property law.

The proceeding under Rule 126, a limited criminal one, does not provide for the filing of counterclaims for damages against those who may have improperly sought the issuance of the search warrant. Consequently, the Del Rosarios had the right to seek damages, if the circumstances warranted, by separate civil action for the wrong inflicted on them by an improperly obtained or enforced search warrant. Unfortunately, their complaint, as worded, failed to state a proper cause of action.1avvphi1

Petitioner Arthur del Rosario claims that respondents NBI agents wrongfully included him as respondent in their application for a search warrant since he neither owned the house at 51 New York Street nor resided in it. But the rules do not require respondents in search warrant proceedings to be residents of the premises to be searched. If this were the case, criminals in possession of illegal articles could simply use other people’s residence for storing such articles to avoid being raided and searched.

The Del Rosarios raise a number of procedural issues: a) the supposed failure of respondents NBI agents to file their motion for reconsideration of the RTC order denying their motion to dismiss within 15 days of receipt of the order; b) their resort to a special civil action of certiorari to challenge the RTC’s denial of their motion to dismiss; c) the propriety of their inclusion of a motion to dismiss in their answer; d) the CA’s grant to them in 2003 of a 15-day extension to file a petition for certiorari after the lapse of 60 days when the Court did not yet come out with a ruling that barred such extension; and e) their being represented by private counsel rather than by the Office of the Solicitor General.

With the Court’s rulings in the principal issues raised in this case, it finds no sufficient reason to further dwell on the lesser issues that the Del Rosarios raise above. Besides, the Court finds no error in the CA’s disposition of the same.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 79496 dated June 29, 2007 and its Resolution dated November 19, 2007 for the reasons stated in this Decision, with the MODIFICATION that Civil Case 10584 is DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176066               August 11, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.ESTELA TUAN y BALUDDA, Accused-Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For review is the Decision1 dated September 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00381, which affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated April 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Baguio City, finding accused-appellant Estela Tuan y Baludda guilty in Criminal Case No. 17619-R, of illegal possession of marijuana under Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as "The Dangerous

Drugs Act of 1972," as amended; and in Criminal Case No. 17620-R, of violating Presidential Decree No. 1866, otherwise known as the "Illegal Possession of Firearms," as amended.

On April 5, 2000, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC against accused-appellant for illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of firearm. The Informations read:

Criminal Case No. 17619-R

The undersigned Public Prosecutor accuses ESTELA TUAN Y BALUDDA of the crime of VIOLATION OF SEC. 8, ART. II OF REPUBLIC ACT 6425, AS AMENDED (Illegal Possession of Marijuana), committed as follows:

That on or about 24th day of January 2000, at Barangay Gabriela Silang, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully and unlawfully have in her possession, custody, and control the following, to wit:

a) Nine (9) bricks of dried Marijuana leaves with an approximate total weight of 18.750 kgs., and

b) One (1) plastic bag containing dried Marijuana leaves weighing approximately .3 kg.

without any authority of law to do so in violation of the above-cited provision of law.3

Criminal Case No. 17620-R

The undersigned Public Prosecutor accuses ESTELA TUAN Y BALUDDA of the crime of VIOLATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1866, AS AMENDED (Illegal Possession of Firearm), committed as follows:

That on or about the 24th day of January 2000, at Barangay Gabriela Silang, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully and unlawfully have in her possession, custody, and control one (1) Cal. .357 S & W revolver, a high-powered firearm, without any license, permit or authority duly issued by the government to possess or keep the same in violation of the above-cited law.4

Upon her arraignment on April 18, 2000, accused-appellant, assisted by her counsel de parte, pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to both charges.5 Pre-trial and trial proper then ensued.

During trial, the prosecution presented four witnesses: Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Modesto F. Carrera (Carrera), Police Officer (PO) 2 Jaime Chavez (Chavez), SPO2 Fernando Fernandez (Fernandez), and Forensic Chemist II Marina Carina Madrigal (Madrigal).

The events, as recounted by the prosecution, are as follows:

At around nine o’clock in the morning on January 24, 2000, two male informants namely, Jerry Tudlong (Tudlong) and Frank Lad-ing (Lad-ing) arrived at the office of the 14th Regional CIDG (Criminal Investigation and Detention Group) at DPS Compound, Marcoville, Baguio City, and reported to SPO2 Fernandez, Chief of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU), that a certain "Estela Tuan" had been selling marijuana at Barangay Gabriela Silang, Baguio City. Present at that time were Police Superintendent Isagani Neres, Regional Officer of the 14th Regional CIDG; Chief Inspector Reynaldo Piay, Deputy Regional Officer; and other police officers.6

SPO2 Fernandez set out to verify the report of Tudlong and Lad-ing. At around one o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, he gave Tudlong and Lad-ing P300.00 to buy marijuana, and then accompanied the two informants to the accused-appellant’s house. Tudlong and Lad-ing entered accused-appellant’s house, while SPO2 Fernandez waited at the adjacent house. After thirty minutes, Tudlong and Lad-ing came out of accused-appellant’s house and showed SPO2 Fernandez the marijuana leaves they bought. After returning to the CIDG regional office, SPO2 Fernandez requested the laboratory examination of the leaves bought from accused-appellant. When said laboratory examination yielded positive results for marijuana, SPO2 Fernandez prepared an Application for Search Warrant for accused-appellant’s house.

SPO2 Fernandez, together with Tudlong and Lad-ing, filed the Application for a Search Warrant before Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (Judge Cortes) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Baguio City, Branch IV, at about one o’clock in the afternoon on January 25, 2000. Two hours later, at around three o’clock, Judge Cortes personally examined SPO2 Fernandez, Tudlong, and Lad-ing, after which, she issued a Search Warrant, being satisfied of the existence of probable cause. The Search Warrant read:

TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:

GREETINGS:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned of the existence of facts upon which the application for Search Warrant is based, after personally examining by searching questions under oath SPO2 Fernando V. Fernandez of the CAR Criminal Investigation and Detection Group with office address at DPS Compound, Utility Road, Baguio City and his witnesses namely: Frank Lad-ing of Happy Hallow, Baguio City and Jerry Tudlong, of Barangay Kitma, Baguio City, after having been duly sworn to, who executed sworn statements and deposition as witneses, that there is a probable cause to believe that a Violation of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659 has been committed and that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that Estela Tuan, has in her possession and control at her resident at Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, the following:

- Undetermined Quantity of Marijuana Dried Leaves and/or Marijuana Hashish

x x x x

which are subject of the offense which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at anytime in the day the house of the accused Estela Tuan at Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, and forthwith seize and take possession of the following:

- Undetermined Quantity of Marijuana Dried Leaves and/or Marijuana Hashish

x x x nothing follows x x x

and bring said items to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.

This Search Warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from date of issue, thereafter, it shall be void.

The officers must conduct the search and seize the above-mentioned personal items in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of her family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.

The officers seizing the items must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the house in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such occupant, must, in the presence of the 2 witnesses mentioned, leave a receipt in the place in which the seized items were found; thereafter, deliver the items seized to the undersigned judge together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath.

Baguio City, Philippines, this 25th day of January, 2000.

(SGD)ILUMINADA CABATO-CORTESExecutive Judge

MTCC, Branch IV7

Upon receipt of the Search Warrant, SPO2 Fernandez, his team supervisor Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo Castel, SPO1 Carrera, Police Senior Inspector Ricarte Marquez and PO2 Chavez implemented the warrant. Before going to the accused-appellant’s house, SPO2 Fernandez invited barangay officials to be present when the Search Warrant

was to be served, but since no one was available, he requested one Eliza Pascual (Pascual), accused-appellant’s neighbor, to come along.

The CIDG team thereafter proceeded to accused-appellant’s house. Even though accused-appellant was not around, the CIDG team was allowed entry into the house by Magno Baludda (Magno), accused-appellant’s father, after he was shown a copy of the Search Warrant. SPO2 Fernandez and Police Senior Inspector Ricarte Marquez guarded the surroundings of the house,8 while SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez searched inside.

SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez began searching the rooms on the first floor in the presence of Magno and Pascual. They continued their search on the second floor. They saw a movable cabinet in accused-appellant’s room, below which they found a brick of marijuana and a firearm. At around six o’clock that evening, accused-appellant arrived with her son. The police officers asked accused-appellant to open a built-in cabinet, in which they saw eight more bricks of marijuana.9 PO2 Chavez issued a receipt for the items confiscated from accused-appellant10 and a certification stating that the items were confiscated and recovered from the house and in accused-appellant’s presence.

The nine bricks of marijuana were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination.

The defense, on the other hand, had an entirely different version of what transpired that day. It presented four witnesses, namely, accused-appellant herself; Beniasan Tuan (Beniasan), accused-appellant’s husband; Magno, accused-appellant’s father; and Mabini Maskay (Maskay), the Barangay Captain of Barangay Gabriela Silang. 1avvphi1

In her testimony, accused-appellant declared that she worked as a vendor at Hangar Market. Sometime in January 2000, while she was selling vegetables at Hangar Market, her son arrived with two police officers who asked her to go home because of a letter from the court.11 At about six o’clock in the afternoon, she and her husband Beniasan reached their residence and found a green paper bag with marijuana in their sala. According to the police officers, they got the bag from a room on the first floor of accused-appellant’s house. Accused-appellant explained that the room where the bag of marijuana was found was previously rented by boarders. The boarders padlocked the room because they still had things inside and they had paid their rent up to the end of January 2000.12 The police officers also informed accused-appellant that they got a gun from under a cabinet in the latter’s room, which accused-appellant disputed since her room was always left open and it was where her children play.13 Accused-appellant alleged that a Search Warrant was issued for her house because of a quarrel with her neighbor named Lourdes Estillore (Estillore). Accused-appellant filed a complaint for the demolition of Estillore’s house which was constructed on the road.14

Beniasan supported the testimony of his wife, accused-appellant. He narrated that he and accused-appellant were at their Hangar Market stall when two police officers came and asked them to go home. Beniasan and accused-appellant arrived at their residence at around six o’clock in the evening and were shown the marijuana the police officers supposedly got from the first floor of the house. The police officers then made Beniasan sign a certification of the list of items purportedly confiscated from the house.15

Magno testified that he resided at the first floor of accused-appellant’s residence. He was present when the search was conducted but denied that the Search Warrant was shown to him.16 He attested that the confiscated items were found from the vacant room at the first floor of accused-appellant’s house which was previously occupied by boarders. Said room was padlocked but was forced open by the police officers. In the course of the police officers’ search, they pulled something from under the bed that was wrapped in green cellophane, but Magno did not know the contents thereof.17 The police officers also searched the rooms of accused-appellant and her children at the second floor of the house, during which they allegedly found a gun under the cabinet in accused-appellant’s room. Magno claimed that he did not personally witness the finding of the gun and was merely informed about it by the police officers.18

Maskay, the Barangay Captain of Barangay Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, was the last to testify for the defense. He corroborated accused-appellant’s allegation that the latter had a quarrel with Estillore, and this could be the reason behind the filing of the present criminal cases. He further remembered that the members of the CIDG went to his office on January 24, 2000 to ask about the location of accused-appellant’s house.19

The RTC, in its Decision dated April 9, 2002, found accused-appellant guilty as charged and adjudged thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 17619-R, the Court finds the accused Estela Tuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of marijuana (nine [9] bricks of dried marijuana leaves with an approximate weight of 18.750 kilograms and the one [1] plastic bag containing the dried marijuana weighing about .3 kilograms) in violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act 7659 as charged in the information and sentences her to the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine ofP500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The nine (9) bricks of dried marijuana leaves with an approximate weight of 18.750 kilograms and one (1) plastic bag containing dried marijuana leaves weighing approximately .3 kilograms (Exhibit F, F-1, F-1-A to F-1-J) are ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the State to be destroyed immediately in accordance with law.

The accused Estela Tuan being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of her preventive imprisonment in the service of her sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code; and

2. In Criminal Case No. 17620-R, the Court finds the accused Estela Tuan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms (one [1] caliber .357 S & W revolver), a high powered firearm, without any license, permit or authority issued by the Government to keep the same in violation of Section 1, Republic Act No. 8294 which amended Section 1 of PD 1866 as charged in the information and hereby sentences her, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to imprisonment ranging from 4 years 9 months and 10 days of prision correccional in its maximum period as Minimum to 6 years and 8 months of prision mayor in its minimum period as Maximum and a fine of P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The firearm caliber .357 S & W revolver without serial number is ordered forfeited in favor of the State to be disposed of immediately in accordance with law.

The accused Estela Tuan being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of her preventive imprisonment in the service of her sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.20

The records of the two criminal cases were forwarded to this Court by the RTC, but the Court issued a Resolution21 dated October 13, 2004 transferring said records to the Court of Appeals pursuant to People v. Mateo.22

On September 21, 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision.

The Court of Appeals held that the contested search and consequent seizure of the marijuana bricks were done pursuant to the Search Warrant validly issued by the MTCC. There was no showing of procedural defects or lapses in the issuance of said Search Warrant as the records support that the issuing judge determined probable cause only after conducting the searching inquiry and personal examination of the applicant and the latter’s witnesses, in compliance with the requirements of the Constitution. Hence, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal possession of marijuana.

The Court of Appeals, however, modified the appealed RTC judgment by acquitting accused-appellant of the charge for illegal possession of firearm. According to the appellate court, the records were bereft of evidence that the gun supposedly confiscated from accused-appellant was unlicensed. The absence of a firearm license was simply presumed by the police officers because the gun was a defective paltik with no serial number. That the said condition of the gun did not dispense with the need for the prosecution to establish that it was unlicensed through the testimony or certification of the appropriate officer from the Board of the Firearms and Explosives Bureau of the Philippine National Police.

In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 6, dated April 9, 2002, is hereby MODIFIED such that the conviction of accused-appellant for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, RA 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED while her conviction for Violation of PD 1866, as amended, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant is accordingly ACQUITTED of the latter offense.23

In its Resolution dated October 20, 2006, the Court of Appeals gave due course to accused-appellant’s Partial Notice of Appeal and accordingly forwarded the records of the case to this Court.

This Court then issued a Resolution24 dated February 28, 2007 directing the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30 days from notice. Accused-appellant25 opted not to file a supplemental brief and manifested that she was adopting her arguments in the Appellant’s Brief since the same had already assiduously discussed her innocence of the crime charged. The People26 likewise manifested that it would no longer file a supplemental brief as the issues have all been addressed in its Appellee’s Brief.

Accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors in her Brief: 27

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE OFFICERS.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING AS VOID THE SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Given that accused-appellant was already acquitted of the charge of violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 on the ground of reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 17620-R, her instant appeal relates only to her conviction for illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs in Criminal Case No. 17619-R. The Court can no longer pass upon the propriety of accused-appellant’s acquittal in Criminal Case No. 17620-R because of the rule that a judgment acquitting the accused is final and immediately executory upon its promulgation, and that accordingly, the State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy. Such acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial court or on appeal at the Court of Appeals.28

In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, such as Criminal Case No. 17619-R, a case becomes a contest of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. In such a situation, this Court generally relies upon the assessment by the trial court, which had the distinct advantage of observing the conduct or demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. Hence, its factual findings are accorded respect – even finality – absent any showing that certain facts of weight and substance bearing on the elements of the crime have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.29

The Court finds no reason to deviate from the general rule in the case at bar.

Illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs is committed when the following elements concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug.30

All the foregoing elements were duly proven to exist in Criminal Case No. 17619-R. The search conducted by SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez in accused-appellant’s house yielded nine bricks of marijuana. Marijuana is a prohibited drug, thus, accused-appellant’s possession thereof could not have been authorized by law in any way. Accused-appellant evidently possessed the marijuana freely and consciously, even offering the same for sale. The bricks of marijuana were found in accused-appellant’s residence over which she had complete control. In fact, some of the marijuana were found in accused-appellant’s own room.

Accused-appellant challenges the judgment of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, finding her guilty of illegal possession of marijuana, by pointing out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses that supposedly manifested their lack of credibility, i.e., the date of the test buy and the manner by which the doors of the rooms of the house were opened.

These alleged inconsistencies and contradictions pertain to minor details and are so inconsequential that they do not in any way affect the credibility of the witnesses nor detract from the established fact of illegal possession of

marijuana by accused-appellant at her house. The Court has previously held that discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility. Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the principal occurrence.31

Inconsistencies as to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor the veracity or weight of their testimonies. Such minor inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen their credibility as they negate any suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed.32

Accused-appellant further questions the non-presentation as witnesses of Lad-ing and Tudlong, the informants, and Pascual, the neighbor who supposedly witnessed the implementation of the Search Warrant, during the joint trial of Criminal Case Nos. 17619-R and 17620-R before the RTC. This Court though is unconvinced that such non-presentation of witnesses is fatal to Criminal Case No. 17619-R.

The prosecution has the exclusive prerogative to determine whom to present as witnesses. The prosecution need not present each and every witness but only such as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed with if they are merely corroborative in nature. The Court has ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative witnesses does not constitute suppression of evidence and is not fatal to the prosecution’s case.33

Although Criminal Case No. 17619-R involves illegal possession of marijuana, the following pronouncement of this Court in People v. Salazar,34 relating to the illegal sale of the same drug, still rings true:

Neither is her right to confront witnesses against her affected by the prosecution's failure to present the informer who pointed to her as a drug pusher. The presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative. In a case involving the sale of illegal drugs, what should be proven beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of the sale itself. Hence, like the non-presentation of the marked money used in buying the contraband, the non-presentation of the informer on the witness stand would not necessarily create a hiatus in the prosecutions' evidence. (Emphasis ours.)

Lastly, accused-appellant insists that the items allegedly seized from her house are inadmissible as evidence because the Search Warrant issued for her house was invalid for failing to comply with the constitutional and statutory requirements. Accused-appellant specifically pointed out the following defects which made said Search Warrant void: (1) the informants, Lad-ing and Tudlong, made misrepresentation of facts in the Application for Search Warrant filed with the MTCC; (2) Judge Cortes of the MTCC failed to consider the informants’ admission that they themselves were selling marijuana; and (3) the Search Warrant failed to particularly describe the place to be searched because the house was a two-storey building composed of several rooms.

The right of a person against unreasonable searches and seizure is recognized and protected by no less than the Constitution, particularly, Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III which provide:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

SEC. 3. x x x

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Emphases ours.)

Accordingly, Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure laid down the following requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant:

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. – The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.

Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.35

There is no dispute herein that the second and third factors for a validly issued search warrant were complied with, i.e., personal determination of probable cause by Judge Cortes; and examination, under oath or affirmation, of SPO2 Fernandez and the two informants, Lad-ing and Tudlong, by Judge Cortes. What is left for the Court to determine is compliance with the first and fourth factors, i.e., existence of probable cause; and particular description of the place to be searched and things to be seized.

In People v. Aruta,36 the Court defined probable cause as follows:

Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.

It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in abundance. The same quantum of evidence is required in determining probable cause relative to search. Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be searched.

A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.37 Such substantial basis exists in this case.

Judge Cortes found probable cause for the issuance of the Search Warrant for accused-appellant’s residence after said judge’s personal examination of SPO2 Fernandez, the applicant; and Lad-ing and Tudlong, the informants.

SPO2 Fernandez based his Application for Search Warrant not only on the information relayed to him by Lad-ing and Tudlong. He also arranged for a test buy and conducted surveillance of accused-appellant. He testified before Judge Cortes:

COURT:

Q. You are applying for a Search Warrant and you alleged in your application that Estela Tuan of Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, is in possession of dried marijuana leaves and marijuana hashish, how did you come to know about this matter?

A. Through the two male persons by the name of Frank Lad-ing and Jerry Tudlong, Your Honor.

Q. When did these two male persons report to your office?

A. January 22, Your Honor.

Q. This year?

A. Yes, your honor.

Q. To whom did they report?

A. To me personally, Your Honor.

Q. How did they report the matter?

A. They reported that a certain Estela Tuan is selling dried Marijuana leaves and marijuana hashish, Your Honor.

Q. What else?

A. She is not only selling marijuana but also selling vegetables at the Trading Post in La Trinidad, Your Honor.

Q. They just told you, she is selling marijuana and selling vegetables, that is already sufficient proof or sufficient probable cause she is in possession of marijuana, what else did they report?

A. That they are also selling marijuana in large volume at their house.

Q. What did you do when you asked them regarding that matter?

A. They had a test buy and they were able to buy some commodities yesterday, Your honor.

Q. Who bought?

A. Tudlong and Lad-ing, Your Honor.

Q. How did you go about it?

A. I accompanied the said persons and kept watch over them and gave them money after which, they were able to purchase and when they purchased the said items or drugs, they were even informed that if you wanted to sell then you could come and get. Your Honor.

COURT:

Q. Where is that P300.00?

A. It is with them, Your Honor.

Q. You did not entrap her?

A. No, Your Honor, because it is only a test buy.

Q: And that was January 22. Why did you not apply immediately for search warrant?

A: Because we still have to look at the area and see to it that there are really some buyers or people who would go and leave the place, Your Honor.

Q: What did you observe?

A: Well, there are persons who would go inside and after going inside, they would come out bringing along with them something else.

Q: Did you not interview these people?

A: No, Your Honor. We did not bother.38

Lad-ing and Tudlong affirmed before Judge Cortes that they were the ones who informed SPO2 Fernandez that accused-appellant was keeping and selling marijuana at her house, and that they took part in the test buy.

Lad-ing narrated:

COURT:

Q: Mr. Lad-ing, you said that you are working at the Trading Post. What kind of work do you have there?

A: I am a middleman of the vegetable dealers, Your Honor.

COURT:

Q: Did you come to know of this person Estela Tuan?

A: Yes, Your Honor, because there was an incident wherein we were conducting our line of business when they came and joined us and we became partners, Your Honor.

Q: You said, they, how many of you?

A: A certain Jerry Tudlong, Estela Tuan and myself, Your Honor.

Q: In other words, Estela Tuan went with you and later on she became your partner in that business?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: And so what happened when she became a partner of your business?

A: When we were about to divide our profit, we then went at their residence at Gabriela Silang, Baguio City, Your Honor.

Q: What happened?

A: While we then sitted ourselves at the sala, she told us that if we wanted to earn some more, she told us that she has in her possession marijuana which could be sold, Your Honor.

Q: And so, what happened?

A: After which, she showed the marijuana, Your Honor.

Q: Where was the marijuana?

A: It was placed in a cellophane, in a newspaper, Your Honor.

Q: How big?

A: A dimension of 10 x 4 inches, Your Honor.

Q: With that size, where did she show you the box of this cellophane?

A: At the place where we were sitted at the receiving room, Your Honor.

Q: In other words, she went to get it and then presented or showed it to you?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Where did she go, if you know?

A: Because at the sala, there is a certain room located at the side that is the place where she got the same, Your Honor.

Q: Where is this house of Estela Tuan located, is it along the road or inside the road or what?

A: It is near the road but you have to walk in a little distance, Your Honor.

Q: Will you describe the place where Estela Tuan is residing?

A: Well, it is a two storey house, the walls are made of galvanized iron Sheets, Your Honor.

COURT:

Q: Do you know who are staying there?

A: I do not know who is living with her, however, that is her residence, Your Honor.

Q: How many times did you go there?

A: It was my second time to go at that time we were sent by PO Fernandez to purchase marijuana, Your Honor.

Q: Where is the marijuana now?

A: It is in the possession of PO Fernandez, Your Honor.

Q: Where is the marijuana placed?

A: In a newspaper, Your Honor.

Q: What happened next?

A: We handed to her the amount of P300.00, your Honor.

Q: And she gave you that marijuana?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

x x x x

Q: How many rooms are there in the first floor of the house of Estela Tuan?

A: Three rooms, Your Honor, it has a dining room and beside the place is the receiving room where we sitted ourselves, Your Honor.

Q: When you already bought marijuana from her, what did she tell you, if any?

A; Well, if we would be interested to buy more, I still have stocks here, Your Honor.39

Tudlong recounted in more detail what happened during the test buy:

COURT:

Q: My question is, when she told you that she has some substance for sale for profit and you mentioned marijuana, did you talk immediately with Frank or what did you do?

A: We reported the matter to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, your Honor.

x x x x

Q: What time?

A: We went to the office at 9:00 – 9:30 o’clock in the morning, Your Honor.

Q: When you went there, what did you do?

A: The amount of P300.00 was given to Frank and we were instructed to purchase, Your Honor.

Q: Did you go?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

x x x x

Q: Will you tell what happened when you went to the house of the woman?

A: Well, we were allowed to go inside the house after which, we were made to sit down at the receiving area or sala, Your Honor.

Q: When you went there, you were allowed to enter immediately?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Who allowed you to enter?

A: The female person, Your Honor.

Q: What happened when you were asked to be sitted?

A: During that time, Frank and the female person were the ones conferring, Your Honor.

Q: Did you hear what they were talking about?

A: That Frank was purchasing marijuana, Your Honor.

Q: What did the woman tell you?

A: After we handed the money, a plastic which was transparent, was then handed to Frank, it was a plastic and there was a newspaper inside, Your Honor.

x x x x

Q: So, you did not actually see what is in the newspaper?

A: No, Your Honor, however, I know that that is marijuana.

Q: Why?

A: Because that was our purpose, to buy marijuana, Your Honor.

Q: And you have not gotten marijuana without Estela Tuan informing you?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: Will you tell us what kind of materials were used in the house of Estela Tuan?

A: Two storey, the walls are made of GI sheets, Your Honor.\

Q: Is the house beside the road or do you have to walk?

A: It is near the road. Upon reaching the road, you still have to walk a short distance, Your Honor.

Q: Where did Estela Tuan get the newspaper placed in a transparent plastic?

A: She got it from a room because were then made to wait at the sala, Your Honor.

Q: Did she tell you how much she can sell marijuana?

A: She told us, Your Honor.

Q: What?

A: Well, the marijuana that we purchased was worth P300.00[.] However, we could divide it into two small packs and we could sell it at P20.00 per piece so that you can also have some gain.

COURT:

Q: After that, to whom did you sell?

A: We did not sell the marijuana, Your Honor.

Q: I thought you are going to sell marijuana and so you went there?

A: We were just instructed by PO Fernandez to verify what we are telling him was true, Your Honor.40

Accused-appellant’s contention that MTCC Judge Cortes failed to consider the informants’ admission that they themselves were selling marijuana is utterly without merit. First, even after carefully reviewing the testimonies of Lad-ing and Tudlong before Judge Cortes, this Court did not find a categorical admission by either of the two informants that they themselves were selling marijuana. In fact, Tudlong expressly denied that he and Lad-ing sold the marijuana, having only bought the same from the accused-appellant for the test buy. Moreover, even if the

informants were also selling marijuana, it would not have affected the validity of the Search Warrant for accused-appellant’s house. The criminal liabilities of accused-appellant and the informants would be separate and distinct. The investigation and prosecution of one could proceed independently of the other.

Equally without merit is accused-appellant’s assertion that the Search Warrant did not describe with particularity the place to be searched.

A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.41 In the case at bar, the address and description of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific enough. There was only one house located at the stated address, which was accused-appellant’s residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and composed of several rooms.

In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the validity of the Search Warrant for accused-appellant’s house issued by MTCC Judge Cortes, and any items seized as a result of the search conducted by virtue thereof, may be presented as evidence against the accused-appellant.

Since it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the accused-appellant is, indeed, guilty of violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the Court shall now consider the appropriate penalty to be imposed upon her.

Article II, Section 8, in relation to Section 20(3), of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, provides:

SEC. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs.- The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof. (As amended by R.A. 7659)

Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. - The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:

1. 40 grams or more of opium;

2. 40 grams or more of morphine;

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;

4. 40 grams or more of heroin;

5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana;

6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or

8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose. (Emphasis supplied.)

Pursuant to Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, illegal possession of 750 grams or more of the prohibited drug marijuana is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Accused-appellant had in her possession a total of 19,050 grams of marijuana, for which she was properly sentenced to reclusion perpetua by the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

In the same vein, the fine of P500,000.00 imposed upon accused-appellant by the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is also correct, as the same is still within the range of fines imposable on any person who possessed prohibited drugs without any authority, under Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00381, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 171980 October 6, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.OLIVE RUBIO MAMARIL, Accused-Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

PEREZ, J.:

For review through this appeal1 is the Decision2 dated 31 August 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 28482 which affirmed the conviction of herein accused-appellant OLIVE RUBIO MAMARIL of possession of dangerous drugs in violation of Section 11, Article II3 of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The challenged judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED.4

The affirmed disposition reads:

WHEREFORE, upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, this court sentences accused Olive Rubio Mamaril to suffer an indeterminate prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20) years as maximum and a fine of P300,000 for violation of Section 11, Article II, of R.A. 91655.

The facts as presented by the prosecution before the appellate court follow:

On 25 March 2003, at 9:30 o’clock in the evening, SPO4 Alexis Gotidoc, along with the members of Intel Operatives of Tarlac City Police Station and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), implemented Search Warrant No. 144C dated 18 March 2003 issued by Judge Alipio Yumul of Branch 66, Regional Trial Court, Capas, Tarlac against the appellant in her residence at Zone 1, Barangay Maliwalo, Tarlac City, Province of Tarlac.6

Prior to the search, the police team invited Barangay Kagawad Oscar Tabamo of Barangay Maliwalo to witness the conduct of the search and seizure operation in the appellant’s house. With Barangay Kagawad Tabamo, 

the police team presented the search warrant to appellant and informed her of the purpose of the search and her constitutional rights.7

Afterwards, SPO4 Gotidoc, the designated searcher, started searching the appellant’s house, in the presence of the appellant and Kagawad Tabamo. During his search, he found on the top cover of the refrigerator one (1) plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. Thereafter he prepared a Certificate of Good Search and Confiscation Receipt which the appellant refused to sign.8

The plastic sachet was brought to the Tarlac Provincial Crime Laboratory located at Tarlac Provincial Hospital for qualitative examination. The examination conducted by Engr. Marcene G. Agala, the Forensic Chemist who tested the white crystalline substance, yielded positive results for 0.055 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, a dangerous drug.9

The factual version presented by the defense is:

On 25 March 2003, at 9:30 o’ clock in the evening the police officers arrived at appellant’s house and showed her a search warrant. Thereafter, the policemen searched her house but found nothing. Then a certain Police Officer Pangilinan asked her where she was sleeping. When she replied that she was inside the hut, the police officers proceeded to and searched the place and found the plastic sachet containing the shabu.10

Thereafter, she was brought to the sub-station at Maliwalo and was told, particularly by SPO4 Gotidoc and a certain Ma’am Dulay that in exchange of P20,000.00, no case would be filed against her. When she told them that she did not have money, she was detained.11 However, on cross-examination, the appellant admitted that the alleged extortion of P20,000.00 was not reported to the higher ranking police officers.12

Appellant claims that the police officers framed her up and planted the shabu inside her house because of her refusal to give them money.13

Eventually, an Information was filed against the appellant which reads:

That on March 25, 2003 at around 9:30 o’clock in the evening at Tarlac City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally have in her possession and control Methamphetamine Hydrochloride known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, weighing more or less 0.055 gram, without being authorized by law.

CONTRARY TO LAW14

Upon arraignment, the appellant, assisted by the de-officio counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.

On 21 April 2004, the trial court found the accused-appellant guilty of violation of Section 11, Article II, of R.A. 9165.15

On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the evidence for the prosecution fully proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements necessary to successfully prosecute a case for illegal possession of a regulated drug, namely, (a) the accused is in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug, (b) such possession is not authorized by law and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed said drug.16

Centered on the conduct of the search of appellant’s house that yielded the prohibited substance, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court on the finding that "after a careful evaluation and analysis of the arguments presented by the prosecution and the defense, we hold that the search conducted by the INTEL Operatives of Tarlac City Police Station, in coordination with the PDEA, on the residence of the accused-appellant on 25 March 2003 at Zone 1, Barangay Maliwalo, Tarlac City and the seizure therein of one (1) plastic pack of white crystalline substance of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" weighing 0.055 gram are legal. As a consequence of the legal search, the said methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" seized on the occasion thereof, is admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant."17

In this appeal, accused-appellant, through her new counsel from the Public Attorney’s Office, goes further back, presenting new arguments, that (1) the search warrant was not based on probable cause, hence, the evidence allegedly obtained through it may not be admitted to support the accused-appellant’s conviction;18 and (2) the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by public officers cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence.19

We first deal with the original position of the accused which, in this petition, begins with the contention of non-compliance with all the requisites of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. We agree with the rulings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that there was indeed full satisfaction of the requisites for the conviction of the accused.

The trial court found that the evidence presented by the prosecution was not adequately defeated. Re-stating that in illegal possession of prohibited drugs, there are only three (3) elements to secure conviction: (1) accused is in possession of the prohibited drugs; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) accused consciously and freely possessed the prohibited drugs,20 the trial court held that all these were established beyond doubt. It determined that appellant failed to proffer evidence enough to discredit the prosecution and render doubtful his guilt.21

The Court of Appeals found no reason to overturn the finding of the trial court. It held that:

After a careful evaluation and analysis of the arguments presented by the prosecution and the defense, we hold that the search by the INTEL Operatives of Tarlac City Police Station, in coordination with the PDEA, on the residence of the accused-appellant on March 25, 2003 at Zone 1, Barangay Maliwalo, Tarlac City and the seizure therein of one (1) plastic pack of white crystalline substance of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" weighing 0.055 gram are legal. As a consequence of the legal search, the said methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" seized on the occasion thereof, is admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant.22

We will not reverse this holding. The repeated contentions of frame-up of the accused-appellant23 and that the dangerous drug of methamphetamine hydrochloride was planted by the police officers do not deserve further considerations by this Court. While We are aware that in some cases, law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence in order that to, inter alia, harass, nevertheless the defense of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the police officers performed their duties regularly and that they acted within the bounds of their authority.24

Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by the Court because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. It is a common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.25And so is the likewise repeated referral to the primacy of the constitutional presumption of innocence over the presumption of regularity in the performance of public functions,26 the contention being that the frame-up argument is supported by the constitutional presumption of innocence.

The argument is without merit.

Indeed it is a constitutional mandate27 that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocentuntil the contrary is proved and that on the other hand, it is in the Rules of Court28 that. –

"The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

"xxx

"m. That official duty has been regularly performed; (Emphasis supplied)

xxx"

In the case at hand, the so-called frame-up was virtually pure allegation bereft of credible proof. The narration29of the police officer who implemented the search warrant, was found after trial and appellate review as the true story. It is on firmer ground than the self-serving statement of the accused-appellant of frame-up.30 The defense cannot solely rely upon the constitutional presumption of innocence for, while it is constitutional, the presumption is not conclusive. Notably, the accused-appellant herself stated in her brief that31 "no proof was proffered by the accused-appellant of the police officers’ alleged ill motive."

Stated otherwise, the narration of the incident by law enforcers, buttressed by the presumption that they have regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary, must be given weight.32

We now deal with the late submission about the validity of the search warrant.

A party cannot change his theory on appeal nor raise in the appellate court any question of law or of fact that was not raised in the court below or which was not within the issue raised by the parties in their pleadings.33

In a long line of cases, this Court held that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court ordinarily will not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.34

We opt to get out of the ordinary in this case. After all, technicalities must serve, not burden the cause of justice. It is a prudent course of action to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice. 35

We thus allow the new arguments for the final disposition of this case.

The contention of the accused-appellant, as asserted through the Public Attorney’s Office, is that the issued search warrant was not based on probable cause.36 The accused-appellant relied heavily on its argument that SPO4 Gotidoc, as the applicant of the search warrant, did not testify on facts personally known to him but simply relied on stories that the accused- appellant was peddling illegal drugs.37

The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses 

testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.38

On the other hand, probable cause means such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.39

Based on the records, the Court is convinced that the questioned search warrant was based on a probable cause. A portion of the direct testimony of SPO4 Gotidoc is hereby quoted:

Q: What is your basis for applying for search warrant against the accused?

A: Because there were many persons who were going to her place and we’ve been hearing news that she is selling prohibited drugs and some of them were even identified, sir.

Q: But you did not conduct any surveillance before you applied for search warrant?

A: Prior to the application for search warrant, we conducted surveillance already.

Q: Because personally you heard that the accused was dealing prohibited drugs and that was the basis for you to apply for search warrant with Branch 66?

A: Yes, sir. 40(Emphasis supplied)

x x x

Section 6, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that:

If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules. (Emphasis supplied)

There is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the findings or opinion of the judge conducting the examination.41

It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrate’s determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid with great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination.42

The defense’s reliance of the quoted testimony of the police officer alone, without any other evidence to show that there was indeed lack of personal knowledge, is insufficient to overturn the finding of the trial court. The accused-appellant, having failed to present substantial rebuttal evidence to defeat the presumption of regularity of duty of the issuing judge, will not be sustained by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 28482 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 174570               February 22, 2010

ROMER SY TAN, Petitioner, vs.SY TIONG GUE, FELICIDAD CHAN SY, SY CHIM, SY TIONG SAN, SY YU BUN, SY YU SHIONG, SY YU SAN and BRYAN SY LIM, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1 dated December 29, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81389 and the Resolution2 dated August 18, 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The antecedents are as follows:

On January 11, 2006, an Information3 for the crime of Robbery was filed against respondents Sy Tiong Gue, Felicidad Chan Sy, Sy Chim, Sy Tiong Yan, Sy Yu Bun, Sy Yu Siong, Sy Yu San, Bryan Sy Lim, Sy Yu Hui-Pabilona, Police Officer 1 (PO1) Mamerto J. Madronio, and PO1 Marvin Sumang for the alleged taking of P6,500,000.00 cash, 286 postdated checks, five boxes of Hennessy Cognac, a television set, a computer set, and other documents from the Guan Yiak Hardware, committed as follows:

That on or about April 15, 2003, in the city of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and by means of violence against or intimidation of persons and force upon things, to wit: by forcibly entering the Office of Guan Yiak Hardware located at 453-455 Tomas Pinpin Street, Binondo, Manila, while being armed with guns, and thereafter, take rob and carry away cash in the amount of P6,500,000.00 from the vault; 286 postdated checks with total face value of P4,325,642.00 issued by several customers payable to Guan Yiak Hardware, Five (5) boxes of Hennessy XO Cognac valued at P240,000.00 more or less; a television set valued at P20,000.00 more or less; Computer set valued at P50,000.00 more or less and other papers/documents or all valued at P11,135,642.00 more or less belonging to SY SIY HO AND SONS, INC. (Guan Yiak Hardware) represented by Romer S. Tan, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid owner in the total amount of P11,135,642.00 more or less, Philippine Currency.

Contrary to law.4

Consequently, on April 22, 2003, Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Edgar A. Reyes filed two separate applications for the issuance of a search warrant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Manila. The applications were later docketed as Search Warrant Case Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 and raffled off to Branch 7, RTC, Manila.

In the said applications, P/Insp. Reyes alleged that he had personal knowledge that respondent Felicidad Chan Sy had in her possession five boxes of Hennessy XO, as well as 286 company checks taken from Guan Yiak Hardware. He prayed that the court issue a search warrant authorizing him or any other agent of the law to take possession of the subject property and bring them before the court.

In support of the applications, P/Insp. Reyes submitted the sworn statements of petitioner Romer Sy Tan5 and witnesses Maricho Sabelita6 and Anicita Almedilla.7 On April 22, 2003, presiding Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas posed searching questions to the applicant and his witnesses to determine if probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the search warrants.

Thereafter, or on April 22, 2003, Judge Lanzanas issued Search Warrant Nos. 03-36118 and 03-3612,9 directing any peace officer to make an immediate search of the 8th floor, 524 T. Pinpin, Binondo, Manila for five boxes of Hennessy XO; and the 7th floor, 524 T. Pinpin, Binondo, Manila for various checks payable to the Guan Yiak Hardware, respectively; and, if found, to take possession thereof and bring the same before the court.

The warrants were later served in the afternoon of April 22, 2003. Under Search Warrant No. 03-3611, three boxes containing twelve Hennessy XOs and one box containing seven Hennessy XOs, were seized. However, the enforcement of Search Warrant No. 03-3612 yielded negative results.

On May 21, 2003, respondents filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrants,10 which petitioner opposed.11

On September 1, 2003, the RTC issued an Order12 denying the motion. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 but it was denied in the Order14 dated October 28, 2003.

Aggrieved, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari15 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA arguing that:

I.

The respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he refused to quash the subject search warrants, notwithstanding the manifest absence of probable cause.

II.

There is no appeal, nor any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law from the assailed Orders.16

On December 29, 2005, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of the respondent court in Search Warrant Case Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Motion to Quash Search Warrant Case Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.17

The CA opined that quashing the search warrants for lack of personal knowledge was unwarranted. It added that the description of the items to be seized complied with the requirement of particularity. Moreover, the CA found the inquiries made by the judge to be sufficiently probing. However, the CA agreed with the respondents and concluded that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the subject search warrants; thus, respondents’ motion to quash should have been granted by the RTC.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in the assailed Resolution dated August 18, 2006.

Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:

A

The honorable Court of Appeals committed error of law and error of jurisdiction in setting aside the search warrants issued by honorable executive judge enrico a. lanzanas of rtc 7, manila.

B

The honorable court of appeals committed error of law and error of jurisdiction in granting the petition for certiorari filed with it by the respondents, despite lack of showing that honorable executive judge enrico a. lanzanas of rtc 7, manila, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its orders (annexes "l" and "p") denying respondents’ motion to quash search warrants and motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner argues that there was substantial basis for the findings of facts and circumstances, which led the issuing court to determine and conclude that the offense of robbery had been committed by the respondents. Petitioner insists that there was probable cause, which justified the issuing judge to issue the questioned search warrants. Petitioner maintains that the RTC issued the search warrants after determining the existence of probable cause

based on the Sinumpaang Salaysay of the affiants and the testimonies given by them during the hearing of the applications for search warrant.

On their part, respondents maintain that the CA’s finding that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants was in accordance with the facts and the law. Respondents contend that the CA correctly appreciated the numerous statements and admissions of petitioner and his witnesses, all of which, taken together, clearly negate any finding of probable cause for the issuance of the subject search warrants.

The sole issue to be determined in the instant action is whether or not there was probable cause warranting the issuance by RTC of the subject search warrants. We answer in the affirmative

A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and to bring it before the court.18 The issuance of a search warrant is governed by Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, the relevant sections of which provide:

Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. 1avvphi1

Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with the affidavits submitted.

Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules.

Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.19

In the case at bar, the CA concluded that the RTC did not comply with any of the requisites required for the issuance of the subject search warrants. The CA ratiocinated that although the RTC judge personally determined if probable cause existed by examining the witnesses through searching questions, and although the search warrants sufficiently described the place to be searched and things to be seized, there was no probable cause warranting the issuance of the subject search warrants. We do not agree.

Jurisprudence dictates that probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. Probable cause requires facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.20 In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc.,21 this Court stressed that:

The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.

Applying these set standards, this Court finds that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC judge in issuing the subject search warrants.

A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay22 and the Transcript of Stenographic Notes23 reveals that Judge Lanzanas, through searching and probing questions, was satisfied that there were good reasons to believe that respondents, accompanied by five maids, took five boxes of Hennessy XO owned by the Guan Yiak Hardware and brought them to the 8th floor of 524 T. Pinpin St., Binondo, Manila; and that a person named "Yubol" took various checks from the company’s vault, which was later brought to the 7th floor of 524 T. Pinpin St., Binondo, Manila. When they entered the premises, Felicidad Chan Sy was accompanied by two policemen, which stunned Romer Sy Tan, so that he was not able to do anything in the face of the calculated and concerted actions of his grandmother, Felicidad Chan Sy, and her seven companions. Based on the foregoing circumstances, Romer Sy Tan believed that the crime of robbery was committed by the respondents.24

The power to issue search warrants is exclusively vested in the trial judges in the exercise of their judicial functions.25 A finding of probable cause, which would merit the issuance of a search warrant, needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused.26 The determination of whether probable cause exists as to justify the issuance of a search warrant is best left to the sound discretion of a judge.27 Apparent in the case at bar and as aptly found by the RTC judge, there was probable cause justifying the issuance of the search warrants. This was established by the Sinumpaang Salaysay and the testimonies, consisting of no less than 37 pages, given by witnesses who had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the crime of robbery had been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense were in the place sought to be searched. The facts narrated by the witnesses while under oath, when they were asked by the examining judge, were sufficient justification for the issuance of the subject search warrants.

A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction, or to prevent it from committing such grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.28 This Court finds nothing irregular, much less, grave abuse of discretion, committed by the RTC judge in issuing the subject search warrants. The RTC judge complied with all the procedural and substantive requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. This Court is, therefore, bound by the RTC judge’s finding of probable cause for issuing Search Warrant Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612.

It is to be noted, however, that while this Court affirms the sufficiency of probable cause in the issuance of the search warrants in connection with the crime of robbery allegedly committed by the respondents, the guilt of the accused still remains to be determined in the appropriate criminal action against them, not in the present case which is limited only to the propriety of the issuance of the subject search warrants by the RTC.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated December 29, 2005 and August 18, 2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81389 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the RTC dated September 1, 2003 and October 28, 2003 are REINSTATED. The validity of Search Warrant Nos. 03-3611 and 03-3612 is SUSTAINED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 194062               June 17, 2013

REPUBLIC GAS CORPORATION, ARNEL U. TY, MARI ANTONETTE N. TY, ORLANDO REYES, FERRER SUAZO and ALVIN U. TV, Petitioners, vs.PETRON CORPORATION, PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, and SHELL INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM COMPANY LIMITED, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners seeking the reversal of the Decision1 dated July 2, 2010, and Resolution2 dated October 11, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106385.

Stripped of non-essentials, the facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

Petitioners Petron Corporation ("Petron" for brevity) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation ("Shell" for brevity) are two of the largest bulk suppliers and producers of LPG in the Philippines. Petron is the registered owner in the Philippines of the trademarks GASUL and GASUL cylinders used for its LGP products. It is the sole entity in the Philippines authorized to allow refillers and distributors to refill, use, sell, and distribute GASUL LPG containers, products and its trademarks.

Pilipinas Shell, on the other hand, is the authorized user in the Philippines of the tradename, trademarks, symbols or designs of its principal, Shell International Petroleum Company Limited, including the marks SHELLANE and SHELL device in connection with the production, sale and distribution of SHELLANE LPGs. It is the only corporation in the Philippines authorized to allow refillers and distributors to refill, use, sell and distribute SHELLANE LGP containers and products. Private respondents, on the other hand, are the directors and officers of Republic Gas Corporation ("REGASCO" for brevity), an entity duly licensed to engage in, conduct and carry on, the business of refilling, buying, selling, distributing and marketing at wholesale and retail of Liquefied Petroleum Gas ("LPG").

LPG Dealers Associations, such as the Shellane Dealers Association, Inc., Petron Gasul Dealers Association, Inc. and Totalgaz Dealers Association, received reports that certain entities were engaged in the unauthorized refilling, sale and distribution of LPG cylinders bearing the registered tradenames and trademarks of the petitioners. As a consequence, on February 5, 2004, Genesis Adarlo (hereinafter referred to as Adarlo), on behalf of the aforementioned dealers associations, filed a letter-complaint in the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") regarding the alleged illegal trading of petroleum products and/or underdelivery or underfilling in the sale of LPG products.

Acting on the said letter-complaint, NBI Senior Agent Marvin E. De Jemil (hereinafter referred to as "De Jemil") was assigned to verify and confirm the allegations contained in the letter-complaint. An investigation was thereafter conducted, particularly within the areas of Caloocan, Malabon, Novaliches and Valenzuela, which showed that several persons and/or establishments, including REGASCO, were suspected of having violated provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 33 (B.P. 33). The surveillance revealed that REGASCO LPG Refilling Plant in Malabon was engaged in the refilling and sale of LPG cylinders bearing the registered marks of the petitioners without authority from the latter. Based on its General Information Sheet filed in the Securities and Exchange Commission, REGASCO’s members of its Board of Directors are: (1) Arnel U. Ty – President, (2) Marie Antoinette

Ty – Treasurer, (3) Orlando Reyes – Corporate Secretary, (4) Ferrer Suazo and (5) Alvin Ty (hereinafter referred to collectively as private respondents).

De Jemil, with other NBI operatives, then conducted a test-buy operation on February 19, 2004 with the former and a confidential asset going undercover. They brought with them four (4) empty LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks of SHELLANE and GASUL and included the same with the purchase of J&S, a REGASCO’s regular customer. Inside REGASCO’s refilling plant, they witnessed that REGASCO’s employees carried the empty LPG cylinders to a refilling station and refilled the LPG empty cylinders. Money was then given as payment for the refilling of the J&S’s empty cylinders which included the four LPG cylinders brought in by De Jemil and his companion. Cash Invoice No. 191391 dated February 19, 2004 was issued as evidence for the consideration paid.

After leaving the premises of REGASCO LPG Refilling Plant in Malabon, De Jemil and the other NBI operatives proceeded to the NBI headquarters for the proper marking of the LPG cylinders. The LPG cylinders refilled by REGASCO were likewise found later to be underrefilled.

Thus, on March 5, 2004, De Jemil applied for the issuance of search warrants in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, in the City of Manila against the private respondents and/or occupants of REGASCO LPG Refilling Plant located at Asucena Street, Longos, Malabon, Metro Manila for alleged violation of Section 2 (c), in relation to Section 4, of B.P. 33, as amended by PD 1865. In his sworn affidavit attached to the applications for search warrants, Agent De Jemil alleged as follows:

"x x x.

"4. Respondent’s REGASCO LPG Refilling Plant-Malabon is not one of those entities authorized to refill LPG cylinders bearing the marks of PSPC, Petron and Total Philippines Corporation. A Certification dated February 6, 2004 confirming such fact, together with its supporting documents, are attached as Annex "E" hereof.

6. For several days in the month of February 2004, the other NBI operatives and I conducted surveillance and investigation on respondents’ REGASCO LPG refilling Plant-Malabon. Our surveillance and investigation revealed that respondents’ REGASCO LPG Refilling Plant-Malabon is engaged in the refilling and sale of LPG cylinders bearing the marks of Shell International, PSPC and Petron.

x x x.

8. The confidential asset and I, together with the other operatives of the NBI, put together a test-buy operation. On February 19, 2004, I, together with the confidential asset, went undercover and executed our testbuy operation. Both the confidential assets and I brought with us four (4) empty LPG cylinders branded as Shellane and Gasul. x x x in order to have a successful test buy, we decided to "ride-on" our purchases with the purchase of Gasul and Shellane LPG by J & S, one of REGASCO’s regular customers.

9. We proceeded to the location of respondents’ REGASCO LPG Refilling Plant-Malabon and asked from an employee of REGASCO inside the refilling plant for refill of the empty LPG cylinders that we have brought along, together with the LPG cylinders brought by J & S. The REGASCO employee, with some assistance from other employees, carried the empty LPG cylinders to a refilling station and we witnessed the actual refilling of our empty LPG cylinders.

10. Since the REGASCO employees were under the impression that we were together with J & S, they made the necessary refilling of our empty LPG cylinders alongside the LPG cylinders brought by

J & S. When we requested for a receipt, the REGASCO employees naturally counted our LPG cylinders together with the LPG cylinders brought by J & S for refilling. Hence, the amount stated in Cash Invoice No. 191391 dated February 19, 2004, equivalent to Sixteen Thousand Two Hundred Eighty-Six and 40/100 (Php16,286.40), necessarily included the amount for the refilling of our four (4) empty LPG cylinders. x x x.

11. After we accomplished the purchase of the illegally refilled LPG cylinders from respondents’ REGASCO LPG Refilling Plant-Malabon, we left its premises bringing with us the said LPG cylinders. Immediately, we proceeded to our headquarters and made the proper markings of the illegally refilled LPG cylinders purchased from respondents’ REGASCO LPG Refilling Plant-Malabon by indicating therein where and when they were purchased. Since REGASCO is not an authorized refiller, the four (4) LPG cylinders illegally refilled by respondents’ REGASCO LPG Refilling Plant-Malabon, were without any seals, and when weighed, were underrefilled. Photographs of the LPG cylinders illegally refilled from respondents’ REGASCO LPG Refilling Plant-Malabon are attached as Annex "G" hereof. x x x."

After conducting a personal examination under oath of Agent De Jemil and his witness, Joel Cruz, and upon reviewing their sworn affidavits and other attached documents, Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 24, in the City of Manila found probable cause and correspondingly issued Search Warrants Nos. 04-5049 and 04-5050.

Upon the issuance of the said search warrants, Special Investigator Edgardo C. Kawada and other NBI operatives immediately proceeded to the REGASCO LPG Refilling Station in Malabon and served the search warrants on the private respondents. After searching the premises of REGASCO, they were able to seize several empty and filled Shellane and Gasul cylinders as well as other allied paraphernalia.

Subsequently, on January 28, 2005, the NBI lodged a complaint in the Department of Justice against the private respondents for alleged violations of Sections 155 and 168 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines.

On January 15, 2006, Assistant City Prosecutor Armando C. Velasco recommended the dismissal of the complaint. The prosecutor found that there was no proof introduced by the petitioners that would show that private respondent REGASCO was engaged in selling petitioner’s products or that it imitated and reproduced the registered trademarks of the petitioners. He further held that he saw no deception on the part of REGASCO in the conduct of its business of refilling and marketing LPG. The Resolution issued by Assistant City Prosecutor Velasco reads as follows in its dispositive portion:

"WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the undersigned finds the evidence against the respondents to be insufficient to form a well-founded belief that they have probably committed violations of Republic Act No. 9293. The DISMISSAL of this case is hereby respectfully recommended for insufficiency of evidence."

On appeal, the Secretary of the Department of Justice affirmed the prosecutor’s dismissal of the complaint in a Resolution dated September 18, 2008, reasoning therein that:

"x x x, the empty Shellane and Gasul LPG cylinders were brought by the NBI agent specifically for refilling. Refilling the same empty cylinders is by no means an offense in itself – it being the legitimate business of Regasco to engage in the refilling and marketing of liquefied petroleum gas. In other words, the empty cylinders were merely filled by the employees of Regasco because they were brought precisely for that purpose. They did not pass off the goods as those of complainants’ as no other act was done other than to refill them in the normal course of its business.

"In some instances, the empty cylinders were merely swapped by customers for those which are already filled. In this case, the end-users know fully well that the contents of their cylinders are not those produced by complainants. And the reason is quite simple – it is an independent refilling station.

"At any rate, it is settled doctrine that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its stockholders as in the case of herein respondents. To sustain the present allegations, the acts complained of must be shown to have been committed by respondents in their individual capacity by clear and convincing evidence. There being none, the complaint must necessarily fail. As it were, some of the respondents are even gainfully employed in other business pursuits. x x x."3

Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, respondents sought recourse to the CA through a petition for certiorari.

In a Decision dated July 2, 2010, the CA granted respondents’ certiorari petition. The fallo states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition filed in this case is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution dated September 18, 2008 of the Department of Justice in I.S. No. 2005-055 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.4

Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated October 11, 2010.

Accordingly, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues for our resolution:

Whether the Petition for Certiorari filed by RESPONDENTS should have been denied outright.

Whether sufficient evidence was presented to prove that the crimes of Trademark Infringement and Unfair Competition as defined and penalized in Section 155 and Section 168 in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293 (The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines) had been committed.

Whether probable cause exists to hold INDIVIDUAL PETITIONERS liable for the offense charged.5

Let us discuss the issues in seriatim.

Anent the first issue, the general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a certiorari petition may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.6

However, this rule is not absolute as jurisprudence has laid down several recognized exceptions permitting a resort to the special civil action for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration, viz.:

(a) Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;

(b) Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court.

(c) Where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is perishable;

(d) Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;

(e) Where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;

(f) Where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;

(g) Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;

(h) Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and,

(i) Where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.7

In the present case, the filing of a motion for reconsideration may already be dispensed with considering that the questions raised in this petition are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and passed upon by the Secretary of Justice in her assailed resolution.

Apropos the second and third issues, the same may be simplified to one core issue: whether probable cause exists to hold petitioners liable for the crimes of trademark infringement and unfair competition as defined and penalized under Sections 155 and 168, in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293.

Section 155 of R.A. No. 8293 identifies the acts constituting trademark infringement as follows:

Section 155. Remedies; Infringement. – Any person who shall, without the consent of the owner of the registered mark:

155.1 Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of a registered mark of the same container or a dominant feature thereof in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, advertising of any goods or services including other preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or

155.2 Reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark or a dominant feature thereof and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action for infringement by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter set forth: Provided, That the infringement takes place at the moment any of the acts stated in Subsection 155.1 or this subsection are committed regardless of whether there is actual sale of goods or services using the infringing material.8

From the foregoing provision, the Court in a very similar case, made it categorically clear that the mere unauthorized use of a container bearing a registered trademark in connection with the sale,

distribution or advertising of goods or services which is likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception among the buyers or consumers can be considered as trademark infringement.9

Here, petitioners have actually committed trademark infringement when they refilled, without the respondents’ consent, the LPG containers bearing the registered marks of the respondents. As noted by respondents, petitioners’ acts will inevitably confuse the consuming public, since they have no way of knowing that the gas contained in the LPG tanks bearing respondents’ marks is in reality not the latter’s LPG product after the same had been illegally refilled. The public will then be led to believe that petitioners are authorized refillers and distributors of respondents’ LPG products, considering that they are accepting empty containers of respondents and refilling them for resale.

As to the charge of unfair competition, Section 168.3, in relation to Section 170, of R.A. No. 8293 describes the acts constituting unfair competition as follows:

Section 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulations and Remedies. x x x.

168.3 In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:

(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;

x x x x

Section 170. Penalties. Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000), shall be imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in Section 155, Section 168 and Subsection 169.1.

From jurisprudence, unfair competition has been defined as the passing off (or palming off) or attempting to pass off upon the public of the goods or business of one person as the goods or business of another with the end and probable effect of deceiving the public.10

Passing off (or palming off) takes place where the defendant, by imitative devices on the general appearance of the goods, misleads prospective purchasers into buying his merchandise under the impression that they are buying that of his competitors. Thus, the defendant gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of his competitor with the intention of deceiving the public that the goods are those of his competitor.11

In the present case, respondents pertinently observed that by refilling and selling LPG cylinders bearing their registered marks, petitioners are selling goods by giving them the general appearance of goods of another manufacturer.

What's more, the CA correctly pointed out that there is a showing that the consumers may be misled into believing that the LPGs contained in the cylinders bearing the marks "GASUL" and "SHELLANE"

are those goods or products of the petitioners when, in fact, they are not. Obviously, the mere use of those LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks "GASUL" and "SHELLANE" will give the LPGs sold by REGASCO the general appearance of the products of the petitioners.

In sum, this Court finds that there is sufficient evidence to warrant the prosecution of petitioners for trademark infringement and unfair competition, considering that petitioner Republic Gas Corporation, being a corporation, possesses a personality separate and distinct from the person of its officers, directors and stockholders.12Petitioners, being corporate officers and/or directors, through whose act, default or omission the corporation commits a crime, may themselves be individually held answerable for the crime.13 Veritably, the CA appropriately pointed out that petitioners, being in direct control and supervision in the management and conduct of the affairs of the corporation, must have known or are aware that the corporation is engaged in the act of refilling LPG cylinders bearing the marks of the respondents without authority or consent from the latter which, under the circumstances, could probably constitute the crimes of trademark infringement and unfair competition. The existence of the corporate entity does not shield from prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally caused the corporation to commit a crime. Thus, petitioners cannot hide behind the cloak of the separate corporate personality of the corporation to escape criminal liability. A corporate officer cannot protect himself behind a corporation where he is the actual, present and efficient actor.14

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED and the Decision dated July 2, 2010 and Resolution dated October 11, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106385 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 181881 October 18, 2011

BRICCIO "Ricky" A. POLLO, Petitioner, vs.CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, DIRECTOR IV RACQUEL DE GUZMAN BUENSALIDA, DIRECTOR IV LYDIA A. CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III ENGELBERT ANTHONY D. UNITE AND THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was charged administratively and eventually dismissed from the service. The employee’s personal files stored in the computer were used by the government employer as evidence of misconduct.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1dated October 11, 2007 and Resolution2 dated February 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 98224) filed by petitioner Briccio "Ricky" A. Pollo to 

nullify the proceedings conducted by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which found him guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 and penalized him with dismissal.

The factual antecedents:

Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the "Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na" program of the CSC.

On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David which was marked "Confidential" and sent through a courier service (LBC) from a certain "Alan San Pascual" of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, was received by the Integrated Records Management Office (IRMO) at the CSC Central Office. Following office practice in which documents marked "Confidential" are left unopened and instead sent to the addressee, the aforesaid letter was given directly to Chairperson David.

The letter-complaint reads:

The ChairwomanCivil Service CommissionBatasan Hills, Quezon City

Dear Madam Chairwoman,

Belated Merry Christmas and Advance Happy New Year!

As a concerned citizen of my beloved country, I would like to ask from you personally if it is just alright for an employee of your agency to be a lawyer of an accused gov’t employee having a pending case in the csc. I honestly think this is a violation of law and unfair to others and your office.

I have known that a person have been lawyered by one of your attorny in the region 4 office. He is the chief of the Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na division. He have been helping many who have pending cases in the Csc. The justice in our govt system will not be served if this will continue. Please investigate this anomaly because our perception of your clean and good office is being tainted.

Concerned Govt employee3 Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically "to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions."4After some briefing, the team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office at Panay Avenue, Quezon City. Upon their arrival thereat around 5:30 p.m., the team informed the officials of the CSC-ROIV, respondents Director IV Lydia Castillo (Director Castillo) and Director III Engelbert Unite (Director Unite) of Chairperson David’s directive.

The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal Services Division (LSD) was witnessed by several employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely monitored said activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text messages to petitioner and the head of LSD, who were both out of the office at the time, informing them of the ongoing copying of computer files in their divisions upon orders of the CSC Chair. The text messages received by petitioner read:

"Gud p.m. This is Atty. Unite FYI: Co people are going over the PCs of PALD and LSD per instruction of the Chairman. If you can make it here now it would be better."

"All PCs Of PALD and LSD are being backed up per memo of the chair."

"CO IT people arrived just now for this purpose. We were not also informed about this.

"We can’t do anything about … it … it’s a directive from chair."

"Memo of the chair was referring to an anonymous complaint"; "ill send a copy of the memo via mms"5

Petitioner replied also thru text message that he was leaving the matter to Director Unite and that he will just get a lawyer. Another text message received by petitioner from PALD staff also reported the presence of the team from CSC main office: "Sir may mga taga C.O. daw sa kuarto natin."6 At around 10:00 p.m. of the same day, the investigating team finished their task. The next day, all the computers in the PALD were sealed and secured for the purpose of preserving all the files stored therein. Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or letters7 in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order8 dated January 11, 2007, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.

Evaluating the subject documents obtained from petitioner’s personal files, Chairperson David made the following observations:

Most of the foregoing files are drafts of legal pleadings or documents that are related to or connected with administrative cases that may broadly be lumped as pending either in the CSCRO No. IV, the CSC-NCR, the CSC-Central Office or other tribunals. It is also of note that most of these draft pleadings are for and on behalves of parties, who are facing charges as respondents in administrative cases. This gives rise to the inference that the one who prepared them was knowingly, deliberately and willfully aiding and advancing interests adverse and inimical to the interest of the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government tasked to discipline misfeasance and malfeasance in the government service. The number of pleadings so prepared further demonstrates that such person is not merely engaged in an isolated practice but pursues it with seeming regularity. It would also be the height of naivete or credulity, and certainly against common human experience, to believe that the person concerned had engaged in this customary practice without any consideration, and in fact, one of the retrieved files (item 13 above) appears to insinuate the collection of fees. That these draft pleadings were obtained from the computer assigned to Pollo invariably raises the presumption that he was the one responsible or had a hand in their drafting or preparation since the computer of origin was within his direct control and disposition.9

Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint which had no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he "lawyering" for people with cases in the CSC. He accused CSC officials of conducting a "fishing expedition" when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer, and subsequently asking him to submit his comment which violated his right against self-incrimination. He asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave, citing the letter dated January 8, 2007 in which he informed Director Castillo that the files in his computer were his personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and 

that he is not authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. He pointed out that though government property, the temporary use and ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum of Receipt (MR) is ceded to the employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use for personal purposes. As to the anonymous letter, petitioner argued that it is not actionable as it failed to comply with the requirements of a formal complaint under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACC). In view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer without his consent is thus inadmissible as evidence, being "fruits of a poisonous tree."10

On February 26, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 07038211 finding prima facie case against the petitioner and charging him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). Petitioner was directed to submit his answer under oath within five days from notice and indicate whether he elects a formal investigation. Since the charges fall under Section 19 of the URACC, petitioner was likewise placed under 90 days preventive suspension effective immediately upon receipt of the resolution. Petitioner received a copy of Resolution No. 070382 on March 1, 2007.

Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court. Petitioner reiterated that he never aided any people with pending cases at the CSC and alleged that those files found in his computer were prepared not by him but by certain persons whom he permitted, at one time or another, to make use of his computer out of close association or friendship. Attached to the motion were the affidavit of Atty. Ponciano R. Solosa who entrusted his own files to be kept at petitioner’s CPU and Atty. Eric N. Estrellado, the latter being Atty. Solosa’s client who attested that petitioner had nothing to do with the pleadings or bill for legal fees because in truth he owed legal fees to Atty. Solosa and not to petitioner. Petitioner contended that the case should be deferred in view of the prejudicial question raised in the criminal complaint he filed before the Ombudsman against Director Buensalida, whom petitioner believes had instigated this administrative case. He also prayed for the lifting of the preventive suspension imposed on him. In its Resolution No. 07051912 dated March 19, 2007, the CSC denied the omnibus motion. The CSC resolved to treat the said motion as petitioner’s answer.

On March 14, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Petition13 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 98224, assailing both the January 11, 2007 Show-Cause Order and Resolution No. 070382 dated February 26, 2007 as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or total absence of jurisdiction. Prior to this, however, petitioner lodged an administrative/criminal complaint against respondents Directors Racquel D.G. Buensalida (Chief of Staff, Office of the CSC Chairman) and Lydia A. Castillo (CSC-RO IV) before the Office of the Ombudsman, and a separate complaint for disbarment against Director Buensalida.14

On April 17, 2007, petitioner received a notice of hearing from the CSC setting the formal investigation of the case on April 30, 2007. On April 25, 2007, he filed in the CA an Urgent Motion for the issuance of TRO and preliminary injunction.15 Since he failed to attend the pre-hearing conference scheduled on April 30, 2007, the CSC reset the same to May 17, 2007 with warning that the failure of petitioner and/or his counsel to appear in the said pre-hearing conference shall entitle the prosecution to proceed with the formal investigation ex-parte.16 Petitioner moved to defer or to reset the pre-hearing conference, claiming that the investigation proceedings should be held in abeyance pending the resolution of his petition by the CA. The CSC denied his request and again scheduled the pre-hearing conference on May 18, 2007 with similar warning on the consequences of petitioner and/or his counsel’s non-appearance.17 This prompted petitioner to file another motion in the CA, to cite the respondents, including the hearing officer, in indirect contempt.18

On June 12, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 07113419 denying petitioner’s motion to set aside the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings and to inhibit the designated hearing officer, Atty. Bernard G. Jimenez. The hearing officer was directed to proceed with the investigation proper with dispatch.

In view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.

On July 24, 2007, the CSC issued Resolution No. 071420,20 the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby finds Briccio A. Pollo, a.k.a. Ricky A. Pollo GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of Republic Act 6713. He is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all its accessory penalties, namely, disqualification to hold public office, forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of civil service eligibilities and bar from taking future civil service examinations.21

On the paramount issue of the legality of the search conducted on petitioner’s computer, the CSC noted the dearth of jurisprudence relevant to the factual milieu of this case where the government as employer invades the private files of an employee stored in the computer assigned to him for his official use, in the course of initial investigation of possible misconduct committed by said employee and without the latter’s consent or participation. The CSC thus turned to relevant rulings of the United States Supreme Court, and cited the leading case of O’Connor v. Ortega22 as authority for the view that government agencies, in their capacity as employers, rather than law enforcers, could validly conduct search and seizure in the governmental workplace without meeting the "probable cause" or warrant requirement for search and seizure. Another ruling cited by the CSC is the more recent case of United States v. Mark L. Simons23 which declared that the federal agency’s computer use policy foreclosed any inference of reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of its employees. Though the Court therein recognized that such policy did not, at the same time, erode the respondent’s legitimate expectation of privacy in the office in which the computer was installed, still, the warrantless search of the employee’s office was upheld as valid because a government employer is entitled to conduct a warrantless search pursuant to an investigation of work-related misconduct provided the search is reasonable in its inception and scope.

With the foregoing American jurisprudence as benchmark, the CSC held that petitioner has no reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the computer he was using in the regional office in view of the CSC computer use policy which unequivocally declared that a CSC employee cannot assert any privacy right to a computer assigned to him. Even assuming that there was no such administrative policy, the CSC was of the view that the search of petitioner’s computer successfully passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the aforecited authorities. The CSC stressed that it pursued the search in its capacity as government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving work-related misconduct, which exempts it from the warrant requirement under the Constitution. With the matter of admissibility of the evidence having been resolved, the CSC then ruled that the totality of evidence adequately supports the charges of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of R.A. No. 6713 against the petitioner. These grave infractions justified petitioner’s dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties.

In his Memorandum24 filed in the CA, petitioner moved to incorporate the above resolution dismissing him from the service in his main petition, in lieu of the filing of an appeal via a Rule 43 petition. In a subsequent motion, he likewise prayed for the inclusion of Resolution No. 07180025 which denied his motion for reconsideration.

By Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents CSC officials. The CA held that: (1) petitioner was not charged on the basis of the anonymous letter but from the initiative of the CSC after a fact-finding investigation was conducted and the results thereof yielded a prima facie case against him; (2) it could not be said that in ordering the back-up of files in petitioner’s computer and later confiscating the same, Chairperson David had encroached on the authority of a judge in view of the CSC computer policy declaring the computers as government property and that employee-users thereof have no reasonable expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer system; and (3) there is nothing contemptuous in CSC’s act of proceeding with the formal investigation as there was no restraining order or injunction issued by the CA.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brought this appeal arguing that –

I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED SERIOUS IRREGULARITY AND BLATANT ERRORS IN LAW AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT IS ACTIONABLE UNDER E.O. 292 WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT THE CONTRARY IS EXPLICITLY PROVIDED UNDER 2nd PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 8 OF CSC RESOLUTION NO. 99-1936, WHICH IS AN [AMENDMENT] TO THE ORIGINAL RULES PER CSC RESOLUTION NO. 94-0521;

II

THE HONORABLE COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED PALPABLE ERRORS IN LAW AMOUNTING TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER CANNOT INVOKE HIS RIGHT TO PRIVACY, TO UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE, AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION, BY VIRTUE OF OFFICE MEMORANDUM NO. 10 S. 2002, A MERE INTERNAL MEMORANDUM SIGNED SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY BY RESPONDENT DAVID AND NOT BY THE COLLEGIAL COMMISSION CONSIDERING THAT POLICY MATTERS INVOLVING SUB[S]TANTIAL RIGHTS CANNOT BE COVERED BY AN OFFICE MEMORANDUM WHICH IS LIMITED TO PROCEDURAL AND ROUTINARY INSTRUCTION;

III

THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT MEMO SEARCH DATED JANUARY 3, 2007 AND THE TAKING OF DOCUMENTS IN THE EVENING THEREOF FROM 7:00 TO 10:00 P.M. IS NOT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION LIMITING THE DEFINITION [OF] GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO ONE INVOLVING AND TAINTED WITH PERSONAL HOSTILITY. IT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DATA STORED IN THE GOVERNMENT COMPUTERS ARE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES INCLUDING THE PERSONAL FILES WHEN THE CONTRARY IS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 14 OF OM. 10 s. 2002. AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED STILL WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT DAVID BY VIRTUE OF O.M. 10 DID NOT ENCROACH ON THE DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF A JUDGE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION;

IV

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER ALL OTHER NEW ARGUMENTS, ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE HEREUNTO SUBMITTED AS WELL AS ITS FAILURE TO EVALUATE AND TAKE ACTION ON THE 2 MOTIONS TO ADMIT AND INCORPORATE CSC RESOLUTION NOS. 07-1420 DATED 

JULY 24, 2007 AND CSC RESOLUTION 07-1800 DATED SEPTEMBER 10, 2007. IT DID NOT RULE LIKEWISE ON THE FOUR URGENT MOTION TO RESOLVE ANCILLARY PRAYER FOR TRO.26

Squarely raised by the petitioner is the legality of the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files without his knowledge and consent, alleged as a transgression on his constitutional right to privacy.

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,27 which provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of "unreasonable" searches and seizures.28 But to fully understand this concept and application for the purpose of resolving the issue at hand, it is essential that we examine the doctrine in the light of pronouncements in another jurisdiction. As the Court declared in People v. Marti29 :

Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as follows:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec. 1[3], Article III)

was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.30

In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States,31 the US Supreme Court held that the act of FBI agents in electronically recording a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a "search and seizure". Because the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth Amendment extends to such area. In the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, it was further noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).32

In Mancusi v. DeForte33 which addressed the reasonable expectations of private employees in the workplace, the US Supreme Court held that a union employee had Fourth Amendment rights with regard to an office at union headquarters that he shared with other union officials, even as the latter or their guests could enter the office. The Court thus "recognized that employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police."

That the Fourth Amendment equally applies to a government workplace was addressed in the 1987 case of O’Connor v. Ortega34 where a physician, Dr. Magno Ortega, who was employed by a state hospital, claimed a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights when hospital officials investigating charges of mismanagement of the psychiatric residency program, sexual harassment of female hospital employees and other irregularities involving his private patients under the state medical aid program, searched his office and seized personal items from his desk and filing cabinets. In that case, the Court categorically declared that "[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private employer."35 A plurality of four Justices concurred that the correct analysis has two steps: first, because "some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable", a court must consider "[t]he operational realities of the workplace" in order to determine whether an employee’s Fourth Amendment rights are implicated; and next, where an employee has a legitimate privacy expectation, an employer’s intrusion on that expectation "for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances."36

On the matter of government employees’ reasonable expectations of privacy in their workplace, O’Connor teaches:

x x x Public employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation. x x x The employee’s expectation of privacy must be assessed in the context of the employment relation. An office is seldom a private enclave free from entry by supervisors, other employees, and business and personal invitees. Instead, in many cases offices are continually entered by fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for conferences, consultations, and other work-related visits. Simply put, it is the nature of government offices that others – such as fellow employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general public – may have frequent access to an individual’s office. We agree with JUSTICE SCALIA that "[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches by the government does not disappear merely because the government has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as employer," x x x but some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable. x x x Given the great variety of work environments in the public sector, the question of whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.37 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

On the basis of the established rule in previous cases, the US Supreme Court declared that Dr. Ortega’s Fourth Amendment rights are implicated only if the conduct of the hospital officials infringed "an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider as reasonable." Given the undisputed evidence that respondent Dr. Ortega did not share his desk or file cabinets with any other employees, kept personal correspondence and other private items in his own office while those work-related files (on physicians in residency training) were stored outside his office, and there being no evidence that the hospital had established any reasonable regulation or policy discouraging employees from storing personal papers and effects in their desks or file cabinets (although the absence of such a policy does not create any expectation of privacy where it would not otherwise exist), the Court concluded that Dr. Ortega has a reasonable expectation of privacy at least in his desk and file cabinets.38

Proceeding to the next inquiry as to whether the search conducted by hospital officials was reasonable, the O’Connor plurality decision discussed the following principles:

Having determined that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, the Court of Appeals simply concluded without discussion that the "search…was not a reasonable search under the fourth 

amendment." x x x "[t]o hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by [public employers] is only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing such searches…[W]hat is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place. x x x Thus, we must determine the appropriate standard of reasonableness applicable to the search. A determination of the standard of reasonableness applicable to a particular class of searches requires "balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." x x x In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance the invasion of the employees’ legitimate expectations of privacy against the government’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.

x x x x

In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer wished to enter an employee’s office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related purpose would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be unduly burdensome. Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures in such cases upon supervisors, who would otherwise have no reason to be familiar with such procedures, is simply unreasonable. In contrast to other circumstances in which we have required warrants, supervisors in offices such as at the Hospital are hardly in the business of investigating the violation of criminal laws. Rather, work-related searches are merely incident to the primary business of the agency. Under these circumstances, the imposition of a warrant requirement would conflict with the "common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter." x x x

x x x x

The governmental interest justifying work-related intrusions by public employers is the efficient and proper operation of the workplace. Government agencies provide myriad services to the public, and the work of these agencies would suffer if employers were required to have probable cause before they entered an employee’s desk for the purpose of finding a file or piece of office correspondence. Indeed, it is difficult to give the concept of probable cause, rooted as it is in the criminal investigatory context, much meaning when the purpose of a search is to retrieve a file for work-related reasons. Similarly, the concept of probable cause has little meaning for a routine inventory conducted by public employers for the purpose of securing state property. x x x To ensure the efficient and proper operation of the agency, therefore, public employers must be given wide latitude to enter employee offices for work-related, noninvestigatory reasons.

We come to a similar conclusion for searches conducted pursuant to an investigation of work-related employee misconduct. Even when employers conduct an investigation, they have an interest substantially different from "the normal need for law enforcement." x x x Public employers have an interest in ensuring that their agencies operate in an effective and efficient manner, and the work of these agencies inevitably suffers from the inefficiency, incompetence, mismanagement, or other work-related misfeasance of its employees. Indeed, in many cases, public employees are entrusted with tremendous responsibility, and the consequences of their misconduct or incompetence to both the agency and the public interest can be severe. In contrast to law enforcement officials, therefore, public employers are not enforcers of the criminal law; instead, public employers have a direct and overriding interest in ensuring that the work of the agency is conducted in a proper and efficient manner. In our view, therefore, a probable cause requirement for searches of the type at issue here would impose intolerable burdens on public employers. The delay in correcting the employee misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to the agency’s work, and ultimately to the public interest. x x x

x x x x

In sum, we conclude that the "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement make the…probable-cause requirement impracticable," x x x for legitimate, work-related noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will neither unduly burden the efforts of government employers to ensure the efficient and proper operation of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of public employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct,should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable:

"Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider ‘whether the…action was justified at its inception,’ x x x ; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,’" x x x

Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be "justified at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. x x x The search will be permissible in its scope when "the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of …the nature of the [misconduct]." x x x39 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Since the District Court granted summary judgment without a hearing on the factual dispute as to the character of the search and neither was there any finding made as to the scope of the search that was undertaken, the case was remanded to said court for the determination of the justification for the search and seizure, and evaluation of the reasonableness of both the inception of the search and its scope.

In O’Connor the Court recognized that "special needs" authorize warrantless searches involving public employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which government interests are weighed against the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are related to law enforcement.40

O’Connor was applied in subsequent cases raising issues on employees’ privacy rights in the workplace. One of these cases involved a government employer’s search of an office computer, United States v. Mark L. Simons41where the defendant Simons, an employee of a division of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was convicted of receiving and possessing materials containing child pornography. Simons was provided with an office which he did not share with anyone, and a computer with Internet access. The agency had instituted a policy on computer use stating that employees were to use the Internet for official government business only and that accessing unlawful material was specifically prohibited. The policy also stated that users shall understand that the agency will periodically audit, inspect, and/or monitor the user’s Internet access as deemed appropriate. CIA agents instructed its contractor for the management of the agency’s computer network, upon initial discovery of prohibited internet activity originating from Simons’ computer, to conduct a remote monitoring and examination of Simons’ computer. After confirming that Simons had indeed downloaded pictures that were pornographic in nature, all the files on the hard drive of Simon’s computer were copied from a remote work station. Days later, the contractor’s representative finally entered Simon’s office, removed the original hard drive on Simon’s computer, replaced it with a copy, and gave the original to the agency security officer. Thereafter, the agency secured warrants and searched Simons’ office in the evening when Simons was not around. The search team copied the contents of Simons’ computer; computer diskettes found in Simons’ desk drawer; computer files stored on the zip drive or on zip drive diskettes; 

videotapes; and various documents, including personal correspondence. At his trial, Simons moved to suppress these evidence, arguing that the searches of his office and computer violated his Fourth Amendment rights. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion and Simons was found guilty as charged.

Simons appealed his convictions. The US Supreme Court ruled that the searches of Simons’ computer and office did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights and the first search warrant was valid. It held that the search remains valid under the O’Connor exception to the warrant requirement because evidence of the crime was discovered in the course of an otherwise proper administrative inspection. Simons’ violation of the agency’s Internet policy happened also to be a violation of criminal law; this does not mean that said employer lost the capacity and interests of an employer. The warrantless entry into Simons’ office was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment standard announced in O’Connor because at the inception of the search, the employer had "reasonable grounds for suspecting" that the hard drive would yield evidence of misconduct, as the employer was already aware that Simons had misused his Internet access to download over a thousand pornographic images. The retrieval of the hard drive was reasonably related to the objective of the search, and the search was not excessively intrusive. Thus, while Simons had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, he did not have such legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the files in his computer.

x x x To establish a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, Simons must first prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or the item seized. x x x And, in order to prove a legitimate expectation of privacy, Simons must show that his subjective expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. x x x

x x x x

x x x We conclude that the remote searches of Simons’ computer did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights because, in light of the Internet policy, Simons lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the files downloaded from the Internet. Additionally, we conclude that Simons’ Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by FBIS’ retrieval of Simons’ hard drive from his office.

Simons did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the record or fruits of his Internet use in light of the FBIS Internet policy. The policy clearly stated that FBIS would "audit, inspect, and/or monitor" employees’ use of the Internet, including all file transfers, all websites visited, and all e-mail messages, "as deemed appropriate." x x x This policy placed employees on notice that they could not reasonably expect that their Internet activity would be private. Therefore, regardless of whether Simons subjectively believed that the files he transferred from the Internet were private, such a belief was not objectively reasonable after FBIS notified him that it would be overseeing his Internet use. x x x Accordingly, FBIS’ actions in remotely searching and seizing the computer files Simons downloaded from the Internet did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

x x x x

The burden is on Simons to prove that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office. x x x Here, Simons has shown that he had an office that he did not share. As noted above, the operational realities of Simons’ workplace may have diminished his legitimate privacy expectations. However, there is no evidence in the record of any workplace practices, procedures, or regulations that had such an effect. We therefore conclude that, on this record, Simons possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office.

x x x x

In the final analysis, this case involves an employee’s supervisor entering the employee’s government office and retrieving a piece of government equipment in which the employee had absolutely no expectation of privacy – equipment that the employer knew contained evidence of crimes committed by the employee in the employee’s office. This situation may be contrasted with one in which the criminal acts of a government employee were unrelated to his employment. Here, there was a conjunction of the conduct that violated the employer’s policy and the conduct that violated the criminal law. We consider that FBIS’ intrusion into Simons’ office to retrieve the hard drive is one in which a reasonable employer might engage. x x x42 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

This Court, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board43 which involved the constitutionality of a provision in R.A. No. 9165 requiring mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, have also recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees’ privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company’s work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld. (Emphasis supplied.)

Applying the analysis and principles announced in O’Connor and Simons to the case at bar, we now address the following questions: (1) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer reasonable in its inception and scope?

In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider include "(1) the employee’s relationship to the item seized; (2) whether the item was in the immediate control of the employee when it was seized; and (3) whether the employee took actions to maintain his privacy in the item." These factors are relevant to both the subjective and objective prongs of the reasonableness inquiry, and we consider the two questions together.44 Thus, where the employee used a password on his computer, did not share his office with co-workers and kept the same locked, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy and any search of that space and items located therein must comply with the Fourth Amendment.45

We answer the first in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like friends, associates and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request. He described his office as "full of people, his friends, unknown people" and that in the past 22 years he had been discharging his functions at the PALD, he is "personally assisting incoming clients, receiving documents, drafting cases on appeals, in charge of accomplishment report, Mamamayan Muna Program, Public Sector Unionism, Correction of name, accreditation of service, and hardly had anytime 

for himself alone, that in fact he stays in the office as a paying customer."46 Under this scenario, it can hardly be deduced that petitioner had such expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable.

Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the aforementioned factual circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims, such is negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office computers, as in Simons.

Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 "Computer Use Policy (CUP)" explicitly provides:

POLICY

1. The Computer Resources are the property of the Civil Service Commission and may be used only for legitimate business purposes.

2. Users shall be permitted access to Computer Resources to assist them in the performance of their respective jobs.

3. Use of the Computer Resources is a privilege that may be revoked at any given time.

x x x x

No Expectation of Privacy

4. No expectation of privacy. Users except the Members of the Commission shall not have an expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer system.

The Head of the Office for Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall select and assign Users to handle the confidential examination data and processes.

5. Waiver of privacy rights. Users expressly waive any right to privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer through the Internet or any other computer network. Users understand that theCSC may use human or automated means to monitor the use of its Computer Resources.

6. Non-exclusivity of Computer Resources. A computer resource is not a personal property or for the exclusive use of a User to whom a memorandum of receipt (MR) has been issued. It can be shared or operated by other users. However, he is accountable therefor and must insure its care and maintenance.

x x x x

Passwords

12. Responsibility for passwords. Users shall be responsible for safeguarding their passwords for access to the computer system. Individual passwords shall not be printed, stored online, or given to others. Users shall be responsible for all transactions made using their passwords. No User may access the computer system with another User’s password or account.

13. Passwords do not imply privacy. Use of passwords to gain access to the computer system or to encode particular files or messages does not imply that Users have an expectation of privacy in the material they create or receive on the computer system. The Civil Service Commission has global passwords that permit access to all materials stored on its networked computer system regardless of whether those materials have been encoded with a particular User’s password. Only members of the Commission shall authorize the application of the said global passwords.

x x x x47 (Emphasis supplied.)

The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes.

One of the factors stated in O’Connor which are relevant in determining whether an employee’s expectation of privacy in the workplace is reasonable is the existence of a workplace privacy policy.48 In one case, the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit held that a state university employee has not shown that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer files where the university’s computer policy, the computer user is informed not to expect privacy if the university has a legitimate reason to conduct a search. The user is specifically told that computer files, including e-mail, can be searched when the university is responding to a discovery request in the course of litigation. Petitioner employee thus cannot claim a violation of Fourth Amendment rights when university officials conducted a warrantless search of his computer for work-related materials.49

As to the second point of inquiry on the reasonableness of the search conducted on petitioner’s computer, we answer in the affirmative.

The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly "lawyering" for individuals with pending cases in the CSC. Chairperson David stated in her sworn affidavit:

8. That prior to this, as early as 2006, the undersigned has received several text messages from unknown sources adverting to certain anomalies in Civil Service Commission Regional Office IV (CSCRO IV) such as, staff working in another government agency, "selling" cases and aiding parties with pending cases, all done during office hours and involved the use of government properties;

9. That said text messages were not investigated for lack of any verifiable leads and details sufficient to warrant an investigation;

10. That the anonymous letter provided the lead and details as it pinpointed the persons and divisions involved in the alleged irregularities happening in CSCRO IV;

11. That in view of the seriousness of the allegations of irregularities happening in CSCRO IV and its effect on the integrity of the Commission, I decided to form a team of Central Office staff to back up the files in the computers of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) and Legal Division;

x x x x50

A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.51 Thus, in the 2004 case decided by the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit, it was held that where a government agency’s computer use policy prohibited electronic messages with pornographic content and in addition expressly provided that employees do not have any personal privacy rights regarding their use of the agency information systems and technology, the government employee had no legitimate expectation of privacy as to the use and contents of his office computer, and therefore evidence found during warrantless search of the computer was admissible in prosecution for child pornography. In that case, the defendant employee’s computer hard drive was first remotely examined by a computer information technician after his supervisor received complaints that he was inaccessible and had copied and distributed non-work-related e-mail messages throughout the office. When the supervisor confirmed that defendant had used his computer to access the prohibited websites, in contravention of the express policy of the agency, his computer tower and floppy disks were taken and examined. A formal administrative investigation ensued and later search warrants were secured by the police department. The initial remote search of the hard drive of petitioner’s computer, as well as the subsequent warrantless searches was held as valid under the O’Connor ruling that a public employer can investigate work-related misconduct so long as any search is justified at inception and is reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified it in the first place.52

Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioner’s computer was justified at its inception and scope. We quote with approval the CSC’s discussion on the reasonableness of its actions, consistent as it were with the guidelines established by O’Connor:

Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in the mind of the Commission that the search of Pollo’s computer has successfully passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as enunciated in the above-discussed American authorities. It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its capacity as a government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving a work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At the inception of the search, a complaint was received recounting that a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was "lawyering" for parties having pending cases with the said regional office or in the Commission. The nature of the imputation was serious, as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in the practice of "lawyering" for parties with pending cases before the Commission would be a highly repugnant scenario, then such a case would have shattering repercussions. It would undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render it less effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of administrative justice. It is settled that a court or an administrative tribunal must not only be actually impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the general public would not have any trust and confidence in it.

Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the complaint was received, a search was forthwith conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned regional office. That it was the computers that were subjected to the search was justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and store documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files, that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to comply with the probable cause requirement would invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-related investigation.

Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission effected the warrantless search in an open and transparent manner. Officials and some employees of the regional office, who happened to be in the vicinity, were on hand to observe the process until its completion. In addition, the respondent himself was duly notified, through text messaging, of the search and the concomitant retrieval of files from his computer.

All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless search done on computer assigned to Pollo was not, in any way, vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of the managerial prerogative of the Commission as an employer aimed at ensuring its operational effectiveness and efficiency by going after the work-related misfeasance of its employees. Consequently, the evidence derived from the questioned search are deemed admissible.53

Petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. His other argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under the aforecited authorities. We likewise find no merit in his contention that O’Connor and Simons are not relevant because the present case does not involve a criminal offense like child pornography. As already mentioned, the search of petitioner’s computer was justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation being conducted by CSC as government employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This situation clearly falls under the exception to the warrantless requirement in administrative searches defined in O’Connor.

The Court is not unaware of our decision in Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila54 involving a branch clerk (Atty. Morales) who was investigated on the basis of an anonymous letter alleging that he was consuming his working hours filing and attending to personal cases, using office supplies, equipment and utilities. The OCA conducted a spot investigation aided by NBI agents. The team was able to access Atty. Morales’ personal computer and print two documents stored in its hard drive, which turned out to be two pleadings, one filed in the CA and another in the RTC of Manila, both in the name of another lawyer. Atty. Morales’ computer was seized and taken in custody of the OCA but was later ordered released on his motion, but with order to the MISO to first retrieve the files stored therein. The OCA disagreed with the report of the Investigating Judge that there was no evidence to support the charge against Atty. Morales as no one from the OCC personnel who were interviewed would give a categorical and positive statement affirming the charges against Atty. Morales, along with other court personnel also charged in the same case. The OCA recommended that Atty. Morales should be found guilty of gross misconduct. The Court En Banc held that while Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting standards required of every court employee, the Court cannot use the evidence obtained from his personal computer against him for it violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court found no evidence to support the claim of OCA that they were able to obtain the subject pleadings with the consent of Atty. Morales, as in fact the latter immediately filed an administrative case against the persons who conducted the spot investigation, questioning the validity of the investigation and specifically invoking his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure. And as there is no other evidence, apart from the pleadings, retrieved from the unduly confiscated personal computer of Atty. Morales, to hold him administratively liable, the Court had no choice but to dismiss the charges against him for insufficiency of evidence.

The above case is to be distinguished from the case at bar because, unlike the former which involved a personal computer of a court employee, the computer from which the personal files of herein petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued computer, hence government property the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate and monitor. Such relationship of the petitioner with the item seized (office 

computer) and other relevant factors and circumstances under American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, notably the existence of CSC MO 10, S. 2007 on Computer Use Policy, failed to establish that petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the office computer assigned to him.

Having determined that the personal files copied from the office computer of petitioner are admissible in the administrative case against him, we now proceed to the issue of whether the CSC was correct in finding the petitioner guilty of the charges and dismissing him from the service.

Well-settled is the rule that the findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies, like the CSC, are accorded not only respect but even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might conceivably opine otherwise.55

The CSC based its findings on evidence consisting of a substantial number of drafts of legal pleadings and documents stored in his office computer, as well as the sworn affidavits and testimonies of the witnesses it presented during the formal investigation. According to the CSC, these documents were confirmed to be similar or exactly the same content-wise with those on the case records of some cases pending either with CSCRO No. IV, CSC-NCR or the Commission Proper. There were also substantially similar copies of those pleadings filed with the CA and duly furnished the Commission. Further, the CSC found the explanation given by petitioner, to the effect that those files retrieved from his computer hard drive actually belonged to his lawyer friends Estrellado and Solosa whom he allowed the use of his computer for drafting their pleadings in the cases they handle, as implausible and doubtful under the circumstances. We hold that the CSC’s factual finding regarding the authorship of the subject pleadings and misuse of the office computer is well-supported by the evidence on record, thus:

It is also striking to note that some of these documents were in the nature of pleadings responding to the orders, decisions or resolutions of these offices or directly in opposition to them such as a petition for certiorari or a motion for reconsideration of CSC Resolution. This indicates that the author thereof knowingly and willingly participated in the promotion or advancement of the interests of parties contrary or antagonistic to the Commission. Worse, the appearance in one of the retrieved documents the phrase, "Eric N. Estr[e]llado, Epal kulang ang bayad mo," lends plausibility to an inference that the preparation or drafting of the legal pleadings was pursued with less than a laudable motivation. Whoever was responsible for these documents was simply doing the same for the money – a "legal mercenary" selling or purveying his expertise to the highest bidder, so to speak.

Inevitably, the fact that these documents were retrieved from the computer of Pollo raises the presumption that he was the author thereof. This is because he had a control of the said computer. More significantly, one of the witnesses, Margarita Reyes, categorically testified seeing a written copy of one of the pleadings found in the case records lying on the table of the respondent. This was the Petition for Review in the case of Estrellado addressed to the Court of Appeals. The said circumstances indubitably demonstrate that Pollo was secretly undermining the interest of the Commission, his very own employer.

To deflect any culpability, Pollo would, however, want the Commission to believe that the documents were the personal files of some of his friends, including one Attorney Ponciano Solosa, who incidentally served as his counsel of record during the formal investigation of this case. In fact, Atty. Solosa himself executed a sworn affidavit to this effect. Unfortunately, this contention of the respondent was directly rebutted by the prosecution witness, Reyes, who testified that during her entire stay in the PALD, she never saw Atty. Solosa using the computer assigned to the respondent. Reyes more particularly stated that she worked in close proximity with Pollo and would have known if Atty. Solosa, whom she personally knows, was using the 

computer in question. Further, Atty. Solosa himself was never presented during the formal investigation to confirm his sworn statement such that the same constitutes self-serving evidence unworthy of weight and credence. The same is true with the other supporting affidavits, which Pollo submitted.

At any rate, even admitting for a moment the said contention of the respondent, it evinces the fact that he was unlawfully authorizing private persons to use the computer assigned to him for official purpose, not only once but several times gauging by the number of pleadings, for ends not in conformity with the interests of the Commission. He was, in effect, acting as a principal by indispensable cooperation…Or at the very least, he should be responsible for serious misconduct for repeatedly allowing CSC resources, that is, the computer and the electricity, to be utilized for purposes other than what they were officially intended.

Further, the Commission cannot lend credence to the posturing of the appellant that the line appearing in one of the documents, "Eric N. Estrellado, Epal kulang ang bayad mo," was a private joke between the person alluded to therein, Eric N. Estrellado, and his counsel, Atty. Solosa, and not indicative of anything more sinister. The same is too preposterous to be believed. Why would such a statement appear in a legal pleading stored in the computer assigned to the respondent, unless he had something to do with it?56

Petitioner assails the CA in not ruling that the CSC should not have entertained an anonymous complaint since Section 8 of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936 (URACC) requires a verified complaint:

Rule II – Disciplinary Cases

SEC. 8. Complaint. - A complaint against a civil service official or employee shall not be given due course unless it is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant. However, in cases initiated by the proper disciplining authority, the complaint need not be under oath.

No anonymous complaint shall be entertained unless there is obvious truth or merit to the allegation therein or supported by documentary or direct evidence, in which case the person complained of may be required to comment.

x x x x

We need not belabor this point raised by petitioner. The administrative complaint is deemed to have been initiated by the CSC itself when Chairperson David, after a spot inspection and search of the files stored in the hard drive of computers in the two divisions adverted to in the anonymous letter -- as part of the disciplining authority’s own fact-finding investigation and information-gathering -- found a prima facie case against the petitioner who was then directed to file his comment. As this Court held in Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals57 --

Under Sections 46 and 48 (1), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V of E.O. No. 292 and Section 8, Rule II of Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, a complaint may be initiated against a civil service officer or employee by the appropriate disciplining authority, even without being subscribed and sworn to. Considering that the CSC, as the disciplining authority for Dumlao, filed the complaint, jurisdiction over Dumlao was validly acquired. (Emphasis supplied.)

As to petitioner’s challenge on the validity of CSC OM 10, S. 2002 (CUP), the same deserves scant consideration. The alleged infirmity due to the said memorandum order having been issued solely by the CSC Chair and not the Commission as a collegial body, upon which the dissent of Commissioner Buenaflor is partly anchored, was already explained by Chairperson David in her Reply to the Addendum to Commissioner 

Buenaflor’s previous memo expressing his dissent to the actions and disposition of the Commission in this case. According to Chairperson David, said memorandum order was in fact exhaustively discussed, provision by provision in the January 23, 2002 Commission Meeting, attended by her and former Commissioners Erestain, Jr. and Valmores. Hence, the Commission En Banc at the time saw no need to issue a Resolution for the purpose and further because the CUP being for internal use of the Commission, the practice had been to issue a memorandum order.58 Moreover, being an administrative rule that is merely internal in nature, or which regulates only the personnel of the CSC and not the public, the CUP need not be published prior to its effectivity.59

In fine, no error or grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA in affirming the CSC’s ruling that petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violation of R.A. No. 6713. The gravity of these offenses justified the imposition on petitioner of the ultimate penalty of dismissal with all its accessory penalties, pursuant to existing rules and regulations.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated October 11, 2007 and Resolution dated February 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98224 are AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 188526 November 11, 2013

CENTURY CHINESE MEDICINE CO., MING SENG CHINESE DRUGSTORE, XIANG JIAN CHINESE DRUG STORE, TEK SAN CHINESE DRUG STORE, SIM SIM CHINESE DRUG STORE, BAN SHIONG TAY CHINESE DRUG STORE and/or WILCENDO TAN MENDEZ, SHUANG YING CHINESE DRUGSTORE, and BACLARAN CHINESE DRUG STORE, Petitioners, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LING NA LAU, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated March 31, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88952 and the Resolution2 dated July 2, 2009, which denied reconsideration thereof. The CA reversed the Order3 dated September 25, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 143, Makati City, quashing Search Warrants Nos. 05-030, 05-033, 05-038, 05-022, 05-023, 05-025, 05-042 and 05-043, and the Order4 dated March 7, 2007 denying reconsideration thereof.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Respondent Ling Na Lau, doing business under the name and style Worldwide Pharmacy,5 is the sole distributor and registered trademark owner of TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya whitening soap as shown by Certificate of Registration 4-2000-009881 issued to her by the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) for a period of ten years from August 24, 2003.6 On November 7, 2005, her representative, Ping Na Lau, (Ping) wrote a letter7addressed to National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, through Atty. Jose Justo Yap and Agent Joseph G. Furing (Agent Furing), requesting assistance for an investigation on several drugstores which were selling counterfeit whitening papaya soaps bearing the general appearance of their products.

Agent Furing was assigned to the case and he executed an affidavit8 stating that: he conducted his own investigation, and on November 9 and 10, 2005, he, together with Junayd Esmael (Esmael), were able to buy whitening soaps bearing the trademark "TOP-GEL", "T.G." & "DEVICE OF A LEAF" with corresponding receipts from a list of drugstores which included herein petitioners Century Chinese Medicine Co., Min Seng Chinese Drugstore, Xiang Jiang Chinese Drug Store, Tek San Chinese Drug Store, Sim Sim Chinese Drug Store, Ban Shiong Tay Drugstore, Shuang Ying Chinese Drugstore, and Baclaran Chinese Drug Store; while conducting the investigation and test buys, he was able to confirm Ping's complaint to be true as he personally saw commercial quantities of whitening soap bearing the said trademarks being displayed and offered for sale at the said drugstores; he and Esmael took the purchased items to the NBI, and Ping, as the authorized representative and expert of Worldwide Pharmacy in determining counterfeit and unauthorized reproductions of its products, personally examined the purchased samples, and issued a Certification9 dated November 18, 2005 wherein he confirmed that, indeed, the whitening soaps bearing the trademarks "TOP-GEL", "T.G." & "DEVICE OF A LEAF" from the subject drugstores were counterfeit.

Esmael also executed an affidavit10 corroborating Agent Furing's statement. Ping's affidavit11 stated that upon his personal examination of the whitening soaps purchased from petitioners bearing the subject trademark, he found that the whitening soaps were different from the genuine quality of their original whitening soaps with the trademarks "TOP-GEL", "T.G." & "DEVICE OF A LEAF" and certified that they were all counterfeit.

On November 21, 2005, Agent Furing applied for the issuance of search warrants before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 143, Makati City, against petitioners and other establishments for violations of Sections 168 and 155, both in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. Section 168, in relation to Section 170, penalizes unfair competition; while Section 155, in relation to Section 170, punishes trademark infringement.

On November 23, 2005, after conducting searching questions upon Agent Furing and his witnesses, the RTC granted the applications and issued Search Warrants Nos. 05-030, 05-033, and 05-038 for unfair competition and Search Warrants Nos. 05-022, 05-023, 05-025, 05-042 and 05-043 for trademark infringement against petitioners.

On December 5, 2005, Agent Furing filed his Consolidated Return of Search Warrants.12

On December 8, 2005, petitioners collectively filed their Motion to Quash13 the Search Warrants contending that their issuances violated the rule against forum shopping; that Benjamin Yu (Yu) is the sole owner and distributor of the product known as "TOP-GEL"; and there was a prejudicial question posed in Civil Case No. 05-54747 entitled Zenna Chemical Industry v. Ling Na Lau, et al., pending in Branch 93 of the RTC of Quezon City, which is a case filed by Yu against respondent for damages due to infringement of trademark/tradename, unfair competition with prayer for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary prohibitory injunction.

On January 9, 2006, respondent filed her Comment/Opposition14 thereto arguing the non-existence of forum shopping; that Yu is not a party- respondent in these cases and the pendency of the civil case filed by him is immaterial and irrelevant; and that Yu cannot be considered the sole owner and distributor of "TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF." The motion was then submitted for resolution in an Order dated January 30, 2006. During the pendency of the case, respondent, on April 20, 2006, filed a Submission15 in relation to the Motion to Quash attaching an Order16 dated March 21, 2006 of the IPO in IPV Case No. 10-2005-00001 filed by respondent against Yu, doing business under the name and style of MCA Manufacturing and Heidi S. Cua, proprietor of South Ocean Chinese Drug Stores for trademark infringement and/or unfair competition and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction. The Order approved therein the parties' Joint Motion To Approve Compromise Agreement filed on March 8, 2006. We quote in its entirety the Order as follows:

The Compromise Agreement between the herein complainant and respondents provides as follows:

1. Respondents acknowledge the exclusive right of Complainant over the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF for use on papaya whitening soap as registered under Registration No. 4-2000-009881 issued on August 24, 2003.

2. Respondents acknowledge the appointment by Zenna Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. of Complainant as the exclusive Philippine distributor of its products under the tradename and trademark TOP GEL MCA & MCA DEVICE (A SQUARE DEVICE CONSISTING OF A STYLIZED REPRESENTATION OF A LETTER "M" ISSUED " OVER THE LETTER "CA") as registered under Registration No. 4-1996-109957 issued on November 17, 2000, as well as the assignment by Zenna Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. to Complainant of said mark for use on papaya whitening soap.

3. Respondents admit having used the tradename and trademark aforesaid but after having realized that Complainant is the legitimate assignee of TOP GEL MCA & MCA DEVICE and the registered owner of TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF, now undertake to voluntarily cease and desist from using the aforesaid tradename and trademark and further undertake not to manufacture, sell, distribute, and otherwise compete with Complainant, now and at anytime in the future, any papaya whitening soap using or bearing a mark or name identical or confusingly similar to, or constituting a colorable imitation of, the tradename and trademark TOP GEL MCA & MCA DEVICE and/or TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF as registered and described above.

4. Respondents further undertake to withdraw and/or dismiss their counterclaim and petition to cancel and/or revoke Registration No. 4-2000-009881 issued to Complainant. Respondents also further undertake to pull out within 45 days from approval of the Compromise Agreement all their products bearing a mark or name identical or confusingly similar to, or constituting a colorable imitation of, the tradename and trademark TOP GEL MCA & MCA DEVICE and/or TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF, from the market nationwide.

5. Respondents finally agree and undertake to pay Complainant liquidated damages in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (Php500,000.00) PESOS for every breach or violation of any of the foregoing undertakings which complainant may enforce by securing a writ of execution from this Office, under this case.

6. Complainant, on the other hand, agrees to waive all her claim for damages against Respondents as alleged in her complaint filed in the Intellectual Property Office only.

7. The Parties hereby agree to submit this Compromise Agreement for Approval of this Office and pray for issuance of a decision on the basis thereof.

Finding the Compromise Agreement to have been duly executed and signed by the parties and/or their representatives/counsels and the terms and conditions thereof to be in conformity with the law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy, the same is hereby APPROVED. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is DISMISSED as all issues raised concerning herein parties have been rendered MOOT AND ACADEMIC.

SO ORDERED.17

On September 25, 2006, the RTC issued its Order18 sustaining the Motion to Quash the Search Warrants, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding that the issuance of the questioned search warrants were not supported by probable cause, the Motion to Quash is GRANTED. Search warrants nos. 05-030, 05-033, 05-038, 05-022, 05-023, 05-025, 05-042, 05-043 are ordered lifted and recalled.

The NBI Officers who effected the search warrants are hereby ordered to return the seized items to herein respondents within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.

So Ordered.19

In quashing the search warrants, the RTC applied the Rules on Search and Seizure for Civil Action in Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights.20 It found the existence of a prejudicial question which was pending before Branch 93 of RTC Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-54747, on the determination as to who between respondent and Yu is the rightful holder of the intellectual property right over the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF; and there was also a case for trademark infringement and/or unfair competition filed by respondent against Yu before the IPO which was pending at the time of the application for the search warrants. It is clear, therefore, that at the time of the filing of the application for the search warrants, there is yet no determination of the alleged right of respondent over the subject trademark/tradename. Also, the RTC found that petitioners relied heavily on Yu's representation that he is the sole owner/distributor of the Top Gel whitening soap, as the latter even presented Registration No. 4-1996-109957 from the IPO for a term of 20 years from November 17, 2000 covering the same product. There too was the notarized certification from Zenna Chemical Industry of Taiwan, owner of Top Gel MCA, with the caveat that the sale, production or representation of any imitated products under its trademark and tradename shall be dealt with appropriate legal action.

The RTC further said that in the determination of probable cause, the court must necessarily resolve whether or not an offense exists to justify the issuance of a search warrant or the quashal of the one already issued. In this case, respondent failed to prove the existence of probable cause, which warranted the quashal of the questioned search warrants.

On November 13, 2006, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Release of Seized Evidence.21

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in its Order22 dated March 7, 2007.

Respondent then filed her appeal with the CA. After respondent filed her appellant's brief and petitioners their appellee's brief, the case was submitted for decision.

On March 31, 2009, the CA rendered its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us GRANTING the appeal filed in this case and SETTING ASIDE the Order dated March 7, 2007 issued by Branch 143 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Makati City in the case involving Search Warrants Nos. 05-030, 05-033, 05-038, 05-022, 05-023, 05-025, 05-042, 05-043.23

In reversing the RTC's quashal of the search warrants, the CA found that the search warrants were applied for and issued for violations of Sections 155 and 168, in relation to Section 170, of the Intellectual Property Code and that the applications for the search warrants were in anticipation of criminal actions which are to be instituted against petitioners; thus, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure was applicable. It also ruled that the basis for the applications for issuance of the search warrants on grounds of trademarks infringement and unfair competition was the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF; that respondent was the registered owner of the said trademark, which gave her the right to enforce and protect her intellectual property rights over it by seeking assistance from the NBI.

The CA did not agree with the RTC that there existed a prejudicial question, since Civil Case No. 05-54747 was already dismissed on June 10, 2005, i.e., long before the search warrants subject of this appeal were applied for; and that Yu's motion for reconsideration was denied on September 15, 2005 with no appeal having been filed thereon as evidenced by the Certificate of Finality issued by the said court.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 2, 2009. Hence, this petition filed by petitioners raising the issue that:

(A) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND HELD THAT THE LATTER APPLIED THE RULES ON SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN CIVIL ACTIONS FOR INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS.24

(B) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT BASED ITS RULING ON THE ARGUMENT WHICH WAS BROUGHT UP FOR THE FIRST TIME IN RESPONDENT LING NA LAU'S APPELLANT'S BRIEF.25

Petitioners contend that the products seized from their respective stores cannot be the subject of the search warrants and seizure as those Top Gel products are not fruits of any crime, infringed product nor intended to be used in any crime; that they are legitimate distributors who are authorized to sell the same, since those genuine top gel products bore the original trademark/tradename of TOP GEL MCA, owned and distributed by Yu. Petitioners also claim that despite the RTC's order to release the seized TOP GEL products, not one had been returned; that one or two samples from each petitioner’s' drugstore would have sufficed in case there is a need to present them in a criminal prosecution, and that confiscation of thousands of these products was an overkill.

Petitioners also argue that the issue that the RTC erred in applying the rules on search and seizure in anticipation of a civil action was never raised in the RTC.

The issue for resolution is whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's quashal of the assailed search warrants.

We find no merit in the petition.

The applications for the issuance of the assailed search warrants were for violations of Sections 155 and 168, both in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. Section 155, in relation to Section 170, punishes trademark infringement; while Section 168, in relation to Section 170, penalizes unfair competition, to wit:

Sec 155. Remedies; Infringement. – Any person who shall, without the consent of the owner of the registered mark:

155.1 Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of a registered mark or the same container or a dominant feature thereof in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, advertising of any goods or services including other preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or

While

Sec. 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and Remedies. –

x x x x

168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:

(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;

And

SEC. 170. Penalties. - Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) shall be imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in Section 155 [Infringement], Section 168 [Unfair Competition] and Subsection 169.1 [False Designation of Origin and False Description or Representation].

Thus, we agree with the CA that A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC, which provides for the Rules on the Issuance of the Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights, is not applicable in this case as the search warrants were not applied based thereon, but in anticipation of criminal actions for violation of intellectual property rights under RA 8293. It was established that respondent had asked the NBI for assistance to conduct investigation and search warrant implementation for possible apprehension of several drugstore owners selling imitation or counterfeit TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya whitening soap. Also, in his affidavit to support his application for the issuance of the search warrants, NBI Agent Furing stated that "the items to be seized will be used as relevant evidence in the criminal actions that are likely to be instituted." Hence, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure applies.

Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, which governs the issuance of the assailed Search Warrants, provides, to wit:

SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. - A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:

(a) Subject of the offense;

(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or

(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with the affidavits submitted.

A core requisite before a warrant shall validly issue is the existence of a probable cause, meaning "the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched."26 And when the law speaks of facts, the reference is to facts, data or information personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he may present. Absent the element of personal knowledge by the applicant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified, the warrant is deemed not based on probable cause and is a nullity, its issuance being, in legal contemplation, arbitrary.27 The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.28 As implied by the words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man,29 not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.30

The RTC quashed the search warrants, saying that (1) there exists a prejudicial question pending before Branch 93 of the RTC of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-54747, i.e., the determination as to who between respondent and Yu is the rightful holder of the intellectual property right over the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF; and there was also a case for trademark infringement and/or unfair competition filed by respondent against Yu pending before the IPO, docketed as IPV Case No. 10-2005-00001; and (2) Yu's representation that he is the sole distributor of the Top Gel whitening soap, as the latter even presented Registration No. 4-1996-109957 issued by the IPO to Zenna Chemical Industry as the registered owner of the trademark TOP GEL MCA & DEVICE MCA for a term of 20 years from November 17, 2000 covering the same product.

We do not agree. We affirm the CA's reversal of the RTC Order quashing the search warrants.

The affidavits of NBI Agent Furing and his witnesses, Esmael and Ling, clearly showed that they are seeking protection for the trademark "TOP GEL T.G. and DEVICE OF A LEAF" registered to respondent under Certificate 

of Registration 4-2000-009881 issued by the IPO on August 24, 2003, and no other. While petitioners claim that the product they are distributing was owned by Yu with the trademark TOP GEL MCA and MCA DEVISE under Certificate of Registration 4-1996-109957, it was different from the trademark TOP GEL T.G. and DEVICE OF A LEAF subject of the application. We agree with the CA's finding in this wise:

x x x It bears stressing that the basis for the applications for issuances of the search warrants on grounds of trademark infringement and unfair competition is the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF. Private complainant-appellant was issued a Certificate of Registration No. 4-2000-009881 of said trademark on August 24, 2003 by the Intellectual Property Office, and is thus considered the lawful holder of the said trademark. Being the registrant and the holder of the same, private complainant-appellant had the authority to enforce and protect her intellectual property rights over it. This prompted her to request for assistance from the agents of the NBI, who thereafter conducted a series of investigation, test buys and inspection regarding the alleged trademark infringement by herein respondents-appellees. Subsequently, Ping Na Lau, private complainant-appellant’s representative, issued a certification with the finding that the examined goods were counterfeit. This prompted the NBI agents to apply for the issuances of search warrants against the respondents-appellees. Said applications for the search warrants were granted after by Judge Laguilles after examining under oath the applicant Agent Furing of the NBI and his witnesses Ping Na Lau and Junayd R. Ismael.

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the requisites for the issuance of the search warrants had been complied with and that there is probable cause to believe that an offense had been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense were in the places to be searched. The offense pertains to the alleged violations committed by respondents-appellees upon the intellectual property rights of herein private complainant-appellant, as holder of the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF under Certificate of Registration No. 4-2000-009881, issued on August 24, 2003 by the Intellectual Property Office.31

Notably, at the time the applications for the issuance of the search warrants were filed on November 21, 2005, as the CA correctly found, Civil Case No. Q-05-54747, which the RTC found to be where a prejudicial question was raised, was already dismissed on June 10, 2005,32 because of the pendency of a case involving the same issues and parties before the IPO. Yu's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order33 dated September 15, 2005. In fact, a Certificate of Finality34 was issued by the RTC on January 4, 2007.

Moreover, the IPO case for trademark infringement and unfair competition and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction filed by respondent against Yu and Heidi Cua, docketed as IPV Case No. 10-2005-00001, would not also be a basis for quashing the warrants.1avvphi1 In fact, prior to the applications for the issuance of the assailed search warrants on November 21, 2005, the IPO had issued an Order35 dated October 20, 2005 granting a writ of preliminary injunction against Yu and Cua, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION is hereby issued against Respondent, Benjamin Yu, doing business under the name and style of MCA Manufacturing and Heidi S. Cua, Proprietor of South Ocean Chinese Drug Store, and their agents, representatives, dealers and distributors and all persons acting in their behalf, to cease and desist using the trademark "TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF" or any colorable imitation thereof on Papaya whitening soaps they manufacture, sell, and/or offer for sale, and otherwise, from packing their Papaya Whitening Soaps in boxes with the same general appearance as those of complainant's boxes within a period of NINETY (90) DAYS, effective upon the receipt of respondent of the copy of the COMPLIANCE filed with this Office by the Complainant stating that it has posted a CASH BOND in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Php100,000.00) together with the corresponding Official Receipt Number and date thereof. Consequently, complainant is directed to inform this Office of actual date of receipt by Respondent of the aforementioned COMPLIANCE.36

To inform the public of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, respondent's counsel had the dispositive portion of the Order published in The Philippine Star newspaper on October 30, 2005.37 Thus, it was clearly stated that Yu, doing business under the name and style of MCA Manufacturing, his agents, representatives, dealers and distributors and all persons acting in his behalf, were to cease and desist from using the trademark "TOP GEL & DEVICE OF A LEAF" or any colorable imitation thereof on Papaya Whitening soaps they manufacture, sell and/or offer for sale. Petitioners, who admitted having derived their TOP GEL products from Yu, are, therefore, notified of such injunction and were enjoined from selling the same.

Notwithstanding, at the time of the application of the search warrants on November 21, 2005, and while the injunction was in effect, petitioners were still selling the alleged counterfeit products bearing the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF. There exists a probable cause for violation of respondent's intellectual property rights, which entitles her as the registered owner of the trademark TOP GEL and DEVICE OF A LEAF to be protected by the issuance of the search warrants.

More importantly, during the pendency of petitioners' motion to quash in the RTC, respondent submitted the Order dated March 8, 2006 of the IPO in IPV Case No. 10-2005-00001, where the writ of preliminary injunction was earlier issued, approving the compromise agreement entered into by respondent with Yu and Cua where it was stated, among others, that:

1. Respondents acknowledge the exclusive right of Complainant over the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF for use on papaya whitening soap as registered under Registration No. 4-2000-009881 issued on August 24, 2003.

2. Respondents acknowledge the appointment by Zenna Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. of Complainant as the exclusive Philippine distributor of its products under the tradename and trademark TOP GEL MCA & MCA DEVICE (A SQUARE DEVICE CONSISTING OF A STYLIZED REPRESENTATION OF A LETTER "M" OVER THE LETTER "CA") as registered under Registration No 4-1996-109957 issued on November 17, 2000, as well as the assignment by Zenna Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. to Complainant of said mark for use on papaya whitening soap.

3. Respondents admit having used the tradename and trademark aforesaid, but after having realized that Complainant is the legitimate assignee of TOP GEL MCA & MCA DEVICE and the registered owner of TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF, now undertake to voluntarily cease and desist from using the aforesaid tradename and trademark, and further undertake not to manufacture, sell and distribute and otherwise compete with complainant, now and at anytime in the future, any papaya whitening soap using or bearing a mark or name identical or confusingly similar to, or constituting a colorable imitation of the tradename and trademark TOP GEL MCA & MCA DEVICE and/or TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF as registered and described above.38

Hence, it appears that there is no more controversy as to who is the rightful holder of the trademark TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF. Therefore, respondent, as owner of such registered trademark has the right to the issuance of the search warrants.

Anent petitioners' claim that one or two samples of the Top Gel products from each of them, instead of confiscating thousands of the products, would have sufficed for the purpose of an anticipated criminal action, citing our ruling in Summerville General Merchandising Co. v. Court of Appeals,39 is not meritorious.

We do not agree.

The factual milieu of the two cases are different. In Summerville, the object of the violation of Summerville's intellectual property rights, as assignee of Royal playing cards and Royal brand playing cards case, was limited to the design of Summerville's Royal plastic container case which encased and wrapped the Crown brand playing cards. In the application for the search warrant which the RTC subsequently issued, one of the items to be seized were the Crown brand playing cards using the copyright plastic and Joker of Royal brand. Thus, numerous boxes containing Crown playing cards were seized and upon the RTC's instruction were turned over to Summerville, subject to the condition that the key to the said warehouse be turned over to the court sheriff. Respondents moved for the quashal of the search warrant and for the return of the seized properties. The RTC partially granted the motion by ordering the release of the seized Crown brand playing cards and the printing machines; thus, only the Royal plastic container cases of the playing cards were left in the custody of Summerville. The CA sustained the RTC order. On petition with us, we affirmed the CA. We found therein that the Crown brand playing cards are not the subject of the offense as they are genuine and the Crown trademark was registered to therein respondents’ names; that it was the design of the plastic container/case that is alleged to have been utilized by respondents to deceive the public into believing that the Crown brand playing cards are the same as those manufactured by Summerville. We then said that assuming that the Crown playing cards could be considered subject of the offense, a sample or two are more than enough to retain should there have been a need to examine them along with the plastic container/case; and that there was no need to hold the hundreds of articles seized. We said so in the context that since what was in dispute was the design of the Royal plastic cases/containers of playing cards and not the playing card per se, a small number of Crown brand playing cards would suffice to examine them with the Royal plastic cases/containers. And the return of the playing cards would better serve the purposes of justice and expediency. However, in this case, the object of the violation of respondent's intellectual property right is the alleged counterfeit TOP GEL T.G. & DEVICE OF A LEAF papaya whitening soap being sold by petitioners, so there is a need to confiscate all these articles to protect respondent's right as the registered owner of such trademark.

Petitioners next contend that the CA's ruling on the applicability of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court that the search warrants were issued in anticipation of a criminal action was only based on respondent's claim which was only brought for the first time in her appellant's brief.

We are not persuaded.

We find worth quoting respondent's argument addressing this issue in its Comment, thus:

In the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals found that the Rule correctly applicable to the subject search warrants was Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners fault the appellate court for ruling that the Regional Trial Court incorrectly applied the Rules on Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights on the basis of an argument that private respondent brought up for the first time in her Appellant's Brief.

A cursory perusal of the Appellant's Brief shows that the following issues/errors were raised, that: (1) the Honorable Trial Court erred in holding that the "Rules on Search and Seizure for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights" apply to the search warrants at bar; (2) x x x.

It must be remembered that there was no trial on the merits to speak of in the trial court, and the matter of the application of the wrong set of Rules only arose in the Order dated 25th September 2006 which sustained the Motion to Quash. A thorough examination of the Appellee's Brief filed by petitioners (respondents-appellees in the Court of Appeals) reveals, however, that petitioners NEVER assailed the first issue/error on the ground that the same was raised for the first time on appeal. It is only now, after the appellate court 

rendered a Decision and Resolution unfavorable to them, that petitioners questioned the alleged procedural error. Petitioners should now be considered in estoppel to question the same.40

Indeed, perusing the appellee's (herein petitioners) brief filed with the CA, the matter of the non-applicability of the rules on search and seizure in civil action for infringement of intellectual property rights was never objected as being raised for the first time. On the contrary, petitioners had squarely faced respondent's argument in this wise:

Appellant (herein respondent) contends that the rule (SC Adm. Memo 1-06, No. 02-1-06, Rule on Search and Seizure in Civil Actions for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights) does [not] apply to the search warrants in the [case] at bar, for the reason that the search warrants themselves reveal that the same were applied for and issued for violations of "Section 155 in relation to Section 170 of RA 8293" and violations of "Section 168 in relation to Section 170 of RA 8293," and that a perusal of the records would show that there is no mention of a civil action or anticipation thereof, upon which the search warrants are applied for.

Appellees (herein petitioners) cannot agree with the contention of the appellant.1âwphi1 Complainant NBI Agent Joseph G. Furing, who applied for the search warrants, violated the very rule on search and seizure for infringement of Intellectual Property Rights. The search warrants applied for by the complainants cannot be considered a criminal action. There was no criminal case yet to speak of when complainants applied for issuance of the search warrants. There is distinction here because the search applied for is civil in nature and no criminal case had been filed. The complaint is an afterthought after the respondents-appellees filed their Motion to Quash Search Warrant before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 24. The grounds enumerated in the rule must be complied with in order to protect the constitutional mandate that "no person shall be deprived of life liberty or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law." Clearly, the application of the search warrants for violation of unfair competition and infringement is in the nature of a civil action.41

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated March 31, 2009 and the Resolution dated July 2, 2009 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 88952, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 161106 January 13, 2014

WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION and CHERRYLL L. YU, Petitioners, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 161266

PLANET INTERNET CORP., Petitioner, vs.PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

SERENO, CJ:

Petitioners filed the present Petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Decision1 dated 20 August 2003 and the Resolution2 dated 27 November 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing the quashal of the search warrants previously issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special Operations Office (RISOO) of the Philippine National Police filed applications for warrants3 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 78, to search the office premises of petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC)4 located at the 11th floor, IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon City, as well as the office premises of petitioner Planet Internet Corporation (Planet Internet)5 located at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City. The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).6

On 25 September 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing on the applications for search warrants. The applicant and Jose Enrico Rivera (Rivera) and Raymund Gali (Gali) of the Alternative Calling Pattern Detection Division of PLDT testified as witnesses.

According to Rivera, a legitimate international long distance call should pass through the local exchange or public switch telephone network (PSTN) on to the toll center of one of the international gateway facilities (IGFs)7 in the Philippines.8 The call is then transmitted to the other country through voice circuits, either via fiber optic submarine cable or microwave radio using satellite facilities, and passes the toll center of one of the IGFs in the destination country. The toll center would then meter the call, which will pass through the PSTN of the called number to complete the circuit. In contrast, petitioners were able to provide international long distance call services to any part of the world by using PLDT’s telephone lines, but bypassing its IGF. This scheme constitutes toll bypass, a "method of routing and completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenna and/or wave or frequency which connects directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the originating country or the country where the call is originated."9

On the other hand, Gali claimed that a phone number serviced by PLDT and registered to WWC was used to provide a service called GlobalTalk, "an internet-based international call service, which can be availed of via prepaid or billed/post-paid accounts."10 During a test call using GlobalTalk, Gali dialed the local PLDT telephone number 6891135, the given access line. After a voice prompt required him to enter the user code and personal identification number (PIN) provided under a GlobalTalk pre-paid account, he was then requested to enter the destination number, which included the country code, phone number and a pound (#) sign. The call was completed to a phone number in Taiwan. However, when he checked the records, it showed that the call was only directed to the local number 6891135. This indicated that the international test call using GlobalTalk bypassed PLDT’s IGF.

Based on the records of PLDT, telephone number 6891135 is registered to WWC with address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City.11 However, upon an ocular inspection conducted by Rivera at this address, it was found that the occupant of the unit is Planet Internet, which also uses the telephone lines registered to WWC.12 These telephone lines are interconnected to a server and used as dial-up access lines/numbers of WWC.

Gali further alleged that because PLDT lines and equipment had been illegally connected by petitioners to a piece of equipment that routed the international calls and bypassed PLDT’s IGF, they violated Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 401 as amended,13 on unauthorized installation of telephone connections. Petitioners also committed theft, because through their misuse of PLDT phone lines/numbers and equipment and with clear intent to gain, they illegally stole business and revenues that rightly belong to PLDT. Moreover, they acted contrary to the letter and intent of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7925, because in bypassing the IGF of PLDT, they evaded the payment of access and bypass charges in its favor while "piggy-backing" on its multi-million dollar facilities and infrastructure, thus stealing its business revenues from international long distance calls. Further, petitioners acted in gross violation of Memorandum Circular No. 6-2-92 of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) prohibiting the use of customs premises equipment (CPE) without first securing type approval license from the latter.

Based on a five-day sampling of the phone line of petitioners, PLDT computed a monthly revenue loss ofP764,718.09. PLDT likewise alleged that petitioners deprived it of foreign exchange revenues, and evaded the payment of taxes, license fees, and charges, to the prejudice of the government.

During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the office premises/units to be searched, as well as their floor plans showing the location of particular computers and servers that would be taken.14

On 26 September 2001, the RTC granted the application for search warrants.15 Accordingly, the following warrants were issued against the office premises of petitioners, authorizing police officers to seize various items:

1. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3856,16 issued for violation of paragraph one (1) of Article 308 (theft) in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code against WWC, Adriel S. Mirto, Kevin L. Tan, Cherryll L. Yu, Carmelo J. Canto, III, Ferdinand B. Masi, Message One International Corporation, Adriel S. Mirto, Nova Christine L. Dela Cruz, Robertson S. Chiang, and Nolan B. Sison with business address at 11/F IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Cyberpark Libis, Quezon City:

a) Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting information, applying the process of the information and supplying the results of this process;

b) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording or storing information; and c) Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing statements, receipts, contracts, communications and documents relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or equipment.

2. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3857,17 issued for violation of P.D. 401 against Planet Internet Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki S. Chiang, Maria Sy Be Chiang, Ben C. Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with business address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City:

a) Modems or Routers or any equipment or device that enables data terminal equipment such as computers to communicate with other data terminal equipment via a telephone line;

b) Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting information applying the prescribed process of the information and supplying the results of this process;

c) Lines, Cables and Antennas or equipment or device capable of transmitting air waves or frequency, such as an IPL and telephone lines and equipment;

d) Multiplexers or any equipment or device that enables two or more signals from different sources to pass through a common cable or transmission line;

e) PABX or Switching Equipment, Tapes or equipment or device capable of connecting telephone lines;

f) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording or storing information; and

g) Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing statement, receipts, contracts, checks, orders, communications and documents, lease and/or subscription agreements or contracts, communications and documents relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or equipment.

3. Search Warrant No. Q-01-3858,18 issued for violation of paragraph one (1) of Article 308 (theft) in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code against Planet Internet Corporation/Mercury One, Robertson S. Chiang, Nikki S. Chiang, Maria Sy Be Chiang, Ben C. Javellana, Carmelita Tuason with business address at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City:

a) Modems or Routers or any equipment or device that enables data terminal equipment such as computers to communicate with other data terminal equipment via a telephone line;

b) Computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting information applying the prescribed process of the information and supplying the results of this process;

c) Lines, Cables and Antennas or equipment or device capable of transmitting air waves or frequency, such as an IPL and telephone lines and equipment;

d) Multiplexers or any equipment or device that enables two or more signals from different sources to pass through a common cable or transmission line;

e) PABX or Switching Equipment, Tapes or equipment or device capable of connecting telephone lines;

f) Software, Diskettes, Tapes or equipment or device used for recording or storing information; and

g) Manuals, application forms, access codes, billing statement, receipts, contracts, checks, orders, communications and documents, lease and/or subscription agreements or contracts, 

communications and documents relating to securing and using telephone lines and/or equipment.

The warrants were implemented on the same day by RISOO operatives of the National Capital Region Police Office.

Over a hundred items were seized,19 including 15 central processing units (CPUs), 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a laptop computer.20 Planet Internet notes that even personal diskettes of its employees were confiscated; and areas not devoted to the transmission of international calls, such as the President’s Office and the Information Desk, were searched. Voltage regulators, as well as reserve and broken computers, were also seized. Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu,21 and Planet Internet22 filed their respective motions to quash the search warrants, citing basically the same grounds: (1) the search warrants were issued without probable cause, since the acts complained of did not constitute theft; (2) toll bypass, the act complained of, was not a crime; (3) the search warrants were general warrants; and (4) the objects seized pursuant thereto were "fruits of the poisonous tree."

PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition23 to the motions to quash.

In the hearing of the motions to quash on 19 October 2001, the test calls alluded to by Gali in his Affidavit were shown to have passed the IGF of Eastern Telecommunications (Philippines) Inc. (Eastern) and of Capital Wireless (Capwire).24 Planet Internet explained that Eastern and Capwire both provided international direct dialing services, which Planet Internet marketed by virtue of a "Reseller Agreement." Planet Internet used PLDT lines for the first phase of the call; but for the second phase, it used the IGF of either Eastern or Capwire. Planet Internet religiously paid PLDT for its domestic phone bills and Eastern and Capwire for its IGF usage. None of these contentions were refuted by PLDT.

The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued were in the nature of general warrants.25 Thus, the properties seized under the said warrants were ordered released to petitioners.

PLDT moved for reconsideration,26 but its motion was denied27 on the ground that it had failed to get the conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing the motion, as required under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

THE CA RULING

PLDT appealed to the CA, where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 26190. The CA reversed and set aside the assailed RTC Resolutions and declared the search warrants valid and effective.28

Petitioners separately moved for reconsideration of the CA ruling.29 Among the points raised was that PLDT should have filed a petition for certiorari rather than an appeal when it questioned the RTC Resolution before the CA. The appellate court denied the Motions for Reconsideration.30

Rule 45 Petitions were separately filed by petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu,31 and Planet Internet32 to assail the CA Decision and Resolution. The Court consolidated the two Petitions.33

ISSUES

I. Whether the CA erred in giving due course to PLDT’s appeal despite the following procedural infirmities:

1. PLDT, without the conformity of the public prosecutor, had no personality to question the quashal of the search warrants;

2. PLDT assailed the quashal orders via an appeal rather than a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

II. Whether the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause, considering that the acts complained of allegedly do not constitute theft.

III. Whether the CA seriously erred in holding that the assailed search warrants were not general warrants.

OUR RULING

I.

1. An application for a search warrant is not a criminalaction; conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary togive the aggrieved party personality to question an orderquashing search warrants.

Petitioners contend that PLDT had no personality to question the quashal of the search warrants without the conformity of the public prosecutor. They argue that it violated Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor.

The above provision states the general rule that the public prosecutor has direction and control of the prosecution of "(a)ll criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information." However, a search warrant is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or an information, but by the filing of an application therefor.34

Furthermore, as we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,35 an application for a search warrant is a "special criminal process," rather than a criminal action:

The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.

For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.

In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search warrants, such warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities herein.36 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action. Meanwhile, we have consistently recognized the right of parties to question orders quashing those warrants.37 Accordingly, we sustain the CA’s ruling that the conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary before an aggrieved party moves for reconsideration of an order granting a motion to quash search warrants.

2. An order quashing a search warrant, which was issuedindependently prior to the filing of a criminal action, partakesof a final order that can be the proper subject of an appeal.

Petitioners also claim that since the RTC ruling on the motions to quash was interlocutory, it cannot be appealed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. PLDT should have filed a Rule 65 petition instead. Petitioners cite, as authority for their position, Marcelo v. de Guzman.38 The Court held therein as follows:

But is the order of Judge de Guzman denying the motion to quash the search warrant and to return the properties seized thereunder final in character, or is it merely interlocutory? In Cruz vs. Dinglasan, this Court, citing American jurisprudence, resolved this issue thus:

Where accused in criminal proceeding has petitioned for the return of goods seized, the order of restoration by an inferior court is interlocutory and hence, not appealable; likewise, a denial, by the US District Court, of defendant's petition for the return of the articles seized under a warrant is such an interlocutory order. (56 C.J. 1253).

A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined; on the other hand an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done upon its merits. Tested against this criterion, the search warrant issued in Criminal Case No. 558 is indisputably of interlocutory character because it leaves something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused therein.39

Petitioners’ reliance upon Marcelo is misplaced.

An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in a main criminal case already filed in court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed.40 Whether the criminal case (of which the search warrant is an incident) has already been filed before the trial court is significant for the purpose of determining the proper remedy from a grant or denial of a motion to quash a search warrant.

Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, as it was in Marcelo, the quashal of a search warrant is merely interlocutory. There is still "something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the accused therein."41

In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a criminal case yet to be filed, the order quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion for reconsideration of the grant) ends the judicial process. There is nothing more to be done thereafter.

Thus, the CA correctly ruled that Marcelo does not apply to this case. Here, the applications for search warrants were instituted as principal proceedings and not as incidents to pending criminal actions. When the search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the search warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken therefrom.

II.

Trial judges determine probable cause in the exercise of theirjudicial functions. A trial judge’s finding of probable causefor the issuance of a search warrant is accorded respect byreviewing courts when the finding has substantial basis.

Petitioners claim that no probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the search warrants.

The rules pertaining to the issuance of search warrants are enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)

In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires "such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched."42

There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause43 in the issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial judges in the process of exercising their judicial function.44 They determine probable cause based on "evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed" by the offender.45

When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial judge, the finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts:

x x x. It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.46

The transcript of stenographic notes during the hearing for the application for search warrants on 25 September 2001 shows that Judge Percival Mandap Lopez asked searching questions to the witnesses and particularly sought clarification on the alleged illegal toll bypass operations of petitioners, as well as the pieces of evidence presented. Thus, the Court will no longer disturb the finding of probable cause by the trial judge during the hearing for the application for the search warrants.

However, petitioners insist that the determination of the existence of probable cause necessitates the prior determination of whether a crime or an offense was committed in the first place. In support of their contention that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants, petitioners put forward the adage nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege – there is no crime when there is no law punishing it. Petitioners argue that there is no law punishing toll bypass, the act complained of by PLDT. Thus, no offense was committed that would justify the issuance of the search warrants.

According to PLDT, toll bypass enables international calls to appear as local calls and not overseas calls, thus effectively evading payment to the PLDT of access, termination or bypass charges, and accounting rates; payment to the government of taxes; and compliance with NTC regulatory requirements. PLDT concludes that toll bypass is prohibited, because it deprives "legitimate telephone operators, like PLDT… of the compensation which it is entitled to had the call been properly routed through its network."47 As such, toll bypass operations constitute theft, because all of the elements of the crime are present therein.

On the other hand, petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu argue that there is no theft to speak of, because the properties allegedly taken from PLDT partake of the nature of "future earnings and lost business opportunities" and, as such, are uncertain, anticipative, speculative, contingent, and conditional. PLDT cannot be deprived of such unrealized earnings and opportunities because these do not belong to it in the first place.

Upon a review of the records of the case, we understand that the Affidavits of Rivera and Gali that accompanied the applications for the search warrants charge petitioners with the crime, not of toll bypass perse, but of theft of PLDT’s international long distance call business committed by means of the alleged toll bypass operations.

For theft to be committed in this case, the following elements must be shown to exist: (1) the taking by petitioners (2) of PLDT’s personal property (3) with intent to gain (4) without the consent of PLDT (5) accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or the use of force upon things.48

Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu only take issue with categorizing the earnings and business as personal properties of PLDT. However, in Laurel v. Abrogar,49 we have already held that the use of PLDT’s communications facilities without its consent constitutes theft of its telephone services and business:

x x x "[I]nternational long distance calls," the matter alleged to be stolen in the instant case, take the form of electrical energy, it cannot be said that such international long distance calls were personal properties belonging to PLDT since the latter could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim that such telephone calls were taken without its consent.

It is the use of these communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful taking of the telephone services and business.

Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone service are personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act of engaging in ISR is an act of "subtraction" penalized under said article. However, the Amended Information describes the thing taken as, "international long distance calls," and only later mentions "stealing the business from PLDT" as the manner by which the gain was derived by the accused. In order to correct this inaccuracy of description, this case must be remanded to the trial court and the prosecution directed to amend the Amended Information, to clearly state that the property subject of the theft are the services and business of respondent PLDT. Parenthetically, this 

amendment is not necessitated by a mistake in charging the proper offense, which would have called for the dismissal of the information under Rule 110, Section 14 and Rule 119, Section 19 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. To be sure, the crime is properly designated as one of theft. The purpose of the amendment is simply to ensure that the accused is fully and sufficiently apprised of the nature and cause of the charge against him, and thus guaranteed of his rights under the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)

In Laurel, we reviewed the existing laws and jurisprudence on the generally accepted concept of personal property in civil law as "anything susceptible of appropriation."50 It includes ownership of telephone services, which are protected by the penal provisions on theft. We therein upheld the Amended Information charging the petitioner with the crime of theft against PLDT inasmuch as the allegation was that the former was engaged in international simple resale (ISR) or "the unauthorized routing and completing of international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency and connecting these calls directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where destined."51 We reasoned that since PLDT encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits telephone calls using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities, the use of these communications facilities without its consent constitutes theft, which is the unlawful taking of telephone services and business. We then concluded that the business of providing telecommunications and telephone services is personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and that the act of engaging in ISR is an act of "subtraction" penalized under said article.

Furthermore, toll bypass operations could not have been accomplished without the installation of telecommunications equipment to the PLDT telephone lines. Thus, petitioners may also be held liable for violation of P.D. 401, to wit:

Section 1. Any person who installs any water, electrical, telephone or piped gas connection without previous authority from the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company , or the Manila Gas Corporation, as the case may be, tampers and/or uses tampered water, electrical or gas meters, jumpers or other devices whereby water, electricity or piped gas is stolen; steals or pilfers water, electric or piped gas meters, or water, electric and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes or conduits; knowingly possesses stolen or pilfered water, electrical or gas meters as well as stolen or pilfered water, electrical and/or telephone wires, or piped gas pipes and conduits, shall, upon conviction, be punished with prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from two thousand to six thousand pesos, or both . (Emphasis supplied)

The peculiar circumstances attending the situation compel us to rule further on the matter of probable cause. During the hearing of the motions to quash the search warrants, the test calls conducted by witnesses for PLDT were shown to have connected to the IGF of either Eastern or Capwire to complete the international calls.

A trial judge’s finding of probable cause may be set aside and the search warrant issued by him based on his finding may be quashed if the person against whom the warrant is issued presents clear and convincing evidence that when the police officers and witnesses testified, they committed a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth on matters that are essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause.52 In that case, the finding of probable cause is a nullity, because the trial judge was intentionally misled by the witnesses.53

On the other hand, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of witnesses will not cause the quashal of a search warrant.54 In this case, the testimonies of Rivera and Gali that the test calls they conducted did not pass through PLDT’s IGF are true. They neglected, however, to look into the possibility that the test calls may have passed through other IGFs in the Philippines, which was exactly what happened. Nevertheless, 

the witnesses did not commit a deliberate falsehood. Even Planet Internet stated that the conclusion that the test calls bypassed all IGFs in the country was made "carelessly and haphazardly."55

On this score, the quashal of the search warrants is not in order. It must be noted that the trial judge did not quash the warrants in this case based on lack of probable cause. Instead, the issue before us is whether the CA erred in reversing the RTC, which ruled that the search warrants are general warrants.

III.

The requirement of particularity in the description of things tobe seized is fulfilled when the items described in the searchwarrant bear a direct relation to the offense for which thewarrant is sought.

Petitioners claim that the subject search warrants were in the nature of general warrants because the descriptions therein of the objects to be seized are so broad and all-encompassing as to give the implementing officers wide discretion over which articles to seize. In fact, the CA observed that the targets of the search warrants were not illegal per se, and that they were "innocuous goods." Thus, the police officers were given blanket authority to determine whether the objects were legal or not, as in fact even pieces of computer equipment not involved in telecommunications or Internet service were confiscated.

On the other hand, PLDT claims that a search warrant already fulfills the requirement of particularity of description when it is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow.56 Furthermore, it cites Kho v. Makalintal,57 in which the Court allowed leeway in the description of things to be seized, taking into consideration the effort and the time element involved in the prosecution of criminal cases.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment58 filed with the CA, likewise prayed for the reversal of the quashal of the search warrants in view of the OSG’s position that the scheme was a case of electronic theft, and that the items sought to be seized could not be described with calibrated precision. According to the OSG, assuming that the seized items could also be used for other legitimate businesses, the fact remains that the items were used in the commission of an offense.

A general warrant is defined as "(a) search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person to be arrested or the property to be seized."59 It is one that allows the "seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another" and gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take.60

Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued, vulnerable to abuses.1âwphi1Our Constitution guarantees our right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and safeguards have been put in place to ensure that people and their properties are searched only for the most compelling and lawful reasons.

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no such search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.In furtherance of this constitutional 

provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, amplify the rules regarding the following places and items to be searched under a search warrant:

SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:

a) Subject of the offense;

b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or

c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

Within the context of the above legal requirements for valid search warrants, the Court has been mindful of the difficulty faced by law enforcement officers in describing the items to be searched, especially when these items are technical in nature, and when the extent of the illegal operation is largely unknown to them. Vallejo v. Court of Appeals61 ruled as follows:

The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision of description is not required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. If this were the rule, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things to look for. Any description of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer making the search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient. (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, the Court also had occasion to rule that the particularity of the description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized is required "wherever and whenever it is feasible."62 A search warrant need not describe the items to be seized in precise and minute detail.63 The warrant is valid when it enables the police officers to readily identify the properties to be seized and leaves them with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized.64

In this case, considering that items that looked like "innocuous goods" were being used to pursue an illegal operation that amounts to theft, law enforcement officers would be hard put to secure a search warrant if they were required to pinpoint items with one hundred percent precision. In

People v. Veloso, we pronounced that "[t]he police should not be hindered in the performance of their duties, which are difficult enough of performance under the best of conditions, by superficial adherence to technicality or far-fetched judicial interference."65

A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the things to be seized when the things described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.66

To our mind, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched as identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone services and business. Prior to the application for the search warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the premises of petitioners a d was then able to confirm that they had utilized various telecommunications equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment, a d support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass operations."67

In HPS Software and Communication Corp. v. PLDT,68 we upheld a s milady worded69 description of items to be seized by virtue of the search warrants, because these items had been sufficiently identified physically and s own to bear a relation to the offenses charged. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision dated 20 August 2003 and Resolution dated 27 November 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26190 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.