JUDICIAL ELABORATION OF THE CONSTITUTION A. CONSTRUCTIONMANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS- a consti provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself.- A provision which lays down only general principles (article 2) are NOT self-executing.- Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a consti mandate, the presumption is that all provisions of the consti are self-executing.- National economy and patrimony: QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ARE PREFERRED.- STATE ACTIONthe acts of a person distinct from the government are considered STATE ACTION covered by the constitution (1) when the activity it engages is in a public function; (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action and (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action.DOMINO V. COMELEC- The Constitution is not a document reserved only for scholarly disqualification by the most eminent legal minds of the landits contents and words should be interpreted in the sense understood by the ordinary men and women who place their lives on the line in its defense and who pin their hopes for a better life on its fulfillment. [Domino vs. Commission on Elections, 310SCRA 546(1999)]PAMATONG V. COMELEC- The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the equal access provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. [Pamatong vs. Commission on Elections, 427 SCRA 96(2004)]TONDO MEDICAL V. CA- a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandateof the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing.- Examples of non-self-executing:1. sections found under Article II of the 1987 Constitution2. Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II;3. Section 13 of Article XIII; and4. Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions.5. Section 1 of Article XIII and6. Section 2 of Article XIV of the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.These provisions, which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from other constitutional provisions as non selfexecuting and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights.- constitutional provisions which are statements of principles and policies are mere directives addressed to the executive and the legislative departmentsif unheeded, the remedy will not lie with the courts but rather, the electorates displeasure may be manifested in their votes.SERRANO V. GALLANT MARITIME- The non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II of the Constitution is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have only a prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected; however, as to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof. [Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 582 SCRA 254(2009)]MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS- RESIDUAL POWERS;- constitution is understood as providing for the LIMITATIONS OF state powers and NOT grant of power.KIDA V. SENATE- president can appoint OICs based on his RESIDUAL POWERS; executive power to implement and execute the law- ra 10153 is NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL- synchronization is a recognized consti mandate. This can be gleaned from the transitory provisions of the consti.- B.Autonomy in the ARMMIt is further argued that while synchronization may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot be used to defeat or to impede the autonomy that the Constitution granted to the ARMM. Phrased in this manner, one would presume that there exists a conflict between two recognized Constitutional mandatessynchronization and regional autonomysuch that it is necessary to choose oneover the other.We find this to be an erroneous approach that violates a basic principle in constitutional constructionut magis valeat quam pereat: that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole,81 and one mandate should not be given importance over the other except where theprimacy of one over the other is clear.8 [Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines, 659 SCRA 270(2011)]- ARMM elections should be included among the term 'local election'. A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be understood in the sense that they have in common use and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. [Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines, 659 SCRA270(2011)]- PRESIDENTS CERTIFICATION ON URGENCY OF RA 10153o Presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.o purpose of the rule dapat: (1) to inform legislators of matters they shall vote on and (2) to give then notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment process- RA9333 and RA 10153 DO NOT AMEND RA 9054 as they did not change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled the gap or supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent regular elections.- EVEN ASSUMING THEY AMENDED 9054, the supermajority voting required (2/3) has to be struck down for giving 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the consti demands. (REMEMBER: under section 16 (2), article 6 of consti--'majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do business. as long as majority of the members of the house or senate are present, these bodies have quorum needed to conduct business and hold session.)in contrast, the provision in 9054 requiring 2/3 vote is HIGHER than what consti provides for passage of bills and thereby SERVES TO RESTRAIN PLEANARY POWER OF CONGRESS to amend/revise/repeal the laws passed.- OPTIONS DAW TO SYNCHRONIZE ARMM ELECTIONS (1) hold over(2) call special elections and(3) authorize president to appoint OICs- INTERIM MEASURES!i.e. those transitory measures involving transition from old constitution to the new and for the introduction of new concepts; creation of LGUs- HOLDOVER OPTION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL: Section 8, article 10 provides that the term of office of elective local officials shall be 3 years and no such official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms. since elective arrm officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the 3 year limit prescribed by the constitution. they cannot extend their term thru holdover.- principle: where the consti has itself made a determination or given its mandate--then such matter should be respected. none of teh 3 branches can deviate from such only as teh consti itself may allow.- further, to claim that the holdover is effectively another term mandated by congress-- constitutionally infirm because congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly. it cannot act in way that would effectively extend the term of incumbents. congress CANNOT create a new term and appoint the occupant. this is an act of appointment by congress and is thus an UNCONSTI INTRUSION into the consti appointment power of present.- COMELEC HAS NO AUTHORITY TO ORDER SPECIAL ELECTIONS The power to fix date of elections is essentially LEGISLATIVE in nature.when congress acted in postponing armm 2011 elections, it has made a POLICY DEICSION inthe exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing armm elections. after it has so acted, neither executive nor judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special elections at the call of comelec. it cannot do sobecause court has no power to declare act of congress null and void and to supplant the decision of congress to mandate what it should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.further, comelec has NO POWER TO CALL FOR HOLDING of special elections unless pursuant to a specific statutory grant.- COURT HAS NO POWER TO SHORTEN TERM OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALSThe power to fix term of office of elective officials (exercised only in case of barangay officials) is given to congress as provided by the constitution. TERMS FIXED BY CONSTI cannot be changed by mere statute. congress, court has NO AUTHORITY to fix terms of elective local officials in the armm for less or more than the constitutionally mandated 3 years.- PRESIDENTS POWER TO APPOINT OICS4 instances where president can appointo heads of exec departments, ambassadors, other public min and consuls, AFPofficers, other appointment are vested by constio all other officers whose apps not provided by lawo those whom PRESIDENT MAY BE AUTHORIZED BY LAW TO APPOINTo lower in rank officers whose app the congress may by law vest in president alone.- pres authority to appoint OIC emanate from ra 101433 and so it falls on the 3rd group.- RA 10153 only provides for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile PREVAIL. it is purely and simply an INTERIM MEASURE responding to the adjustments that synchronization requires. synchronization may temporarily disrupt the election process as well as community's choice of leaders but this will take place under a situation of NECESSITY and as an interim measure in the manner that interim measures have been adoptedand used in the creation of LGU and the adjustments of sub provinces to the status of provinces. besides, it is REASONABLE.- CA 588 and RAC of 1987 PROVIDES THT president is empowered to make temp apps in case vacancy may occur. while this deal only with filling of vacancies in appointive positions, however, in the ABSENCE OF ANY CONTRARY PROVISION in the LGC and in the interest of public service, we see no cogent reason why procedure thus outlined by 2 laws may not be similarly applied in the present case.- a vacancy creates an anomalous situation. By leaving the positions vacant for 21 months would clearly cause DISRUPTIONS AND DELASY IN TEH DELIVERY OF BASIC SERVICES to the people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional govt, and in responding to critical developments that may arise.- allowing president in the exercise of his consti-recognized appointment power to appoint OICs is a REASONABLE measure to take.- on construction of the law: provision must be construed not only to address problems of present must also to address the uncertainties or vagaries of the futureTANADA V. ANGARA- perfectionist provisions of the municipal statutes of all member states should give way to teh globalization of trade. section 10 of art. 12 must be interpreted to mean not what is only required in 1987 when it was enacted but also, it must be able to address the uncertainties of the future (when it was raised in 2000)JUDICIAL REVIEW- Based on SEPARATION OF POWERS, system of checks and balances and Interdependence among governmentANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION- Supremacy of the constitution or JUDICIAL SUPREMEACY- SC has the power or task to determine who between the EC or congress has power under the constitution.- when SC exercises judicial review, it is not acting supreme over the other branches but it is performing a duty required of it under the constitution, it being the supreme authority in the land.TAWANG MPC V. LA TRINIDAD- The Supreme Courts power of review does not permit it to rewrite Presidential Decree (P.D.) 198 in a subsequent case and breathe life to its dead provisionsonly Congress can.Since the Court, exercising itsConstitutional power of judicial review, has declared Section 47 of P.D. 198 void and unconstitutional, such section ceased to become law from the beginningMETROBANK V. TOBIAS- under separation of powers, courts have no right to directly decide matters on which full discretionary authority has been delegated to executive branch.- Finding of the existence of probable cause is an EXECUTIVE FUNCTION which discretion cannot be substituted by the court.RE: COA OPINION- By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward long and faithful service, the sale to the retired Justices of specifically designated properties that they used during their incumbency has been recognized both as a privilege and a benefit. [Re: Coa Opinion onthe Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the RetiredChief/Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 678 SCRA 1(2012)]2 concepts: PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY and CO-EQUALITYPRESUMPTION--laws subjection of JR are presumed constitutional; double negative ruleCOEQUALITY--Courts will initially refuse to exercise JR because it respects acts/exercise by co-equal branches UNLESS 4 requisites are presentCONDITIONS FOR THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW4 REQUISITES: ARELNOTE: NEVER ATTEMPT TO ANSWER THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LAW IF THERE IS NO DECIDED CASE YET. discuss requisites and then DISMISS petition.APPROPRIATE CASE OR CONTROVERSY, RIPE FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION- if there has been damage, prejudice, threatened violation or damage on the rights of the party against an act or law- SC no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief (but you can raise it on lower courts)EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY- -must not be raised too late as when issue already becomes moot or academic (court no need to decide)RAISED BY PROPER PART1. CITIZEN SUIT--public right is violated or there is IMPENDING VIOLATION WHICH can be addressed/assuaged by a favorable court decision or when court decides on the consti question; injury must be PERSONAL, MATERIAL damage or injury/threatened violation.2. TAXPAYERS SUIT--issue on constitutionality involves spending of public money (i.e. creation of public office)3. VOTERS SUIT--consti question involves right to suffrage4. LEGISLATORS SUIT--member of congress has legal standing over consti questions involving a law (i.e. as when law violates the constitution5. TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE--requisites: (1) clear consti violation; (2) case involves public expenditure and (3) there is NO OTHER PARTy to bring the consti question6. INTERGENERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY--present gen can bring case on public right violation of the consti for benefit of future genRAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY HACIENDA LUISITA V. PARC- stock distribution was made instead of land distribution- supervisory group, ambala and their leaders are real parties in interest;- consti issue: not all the requirements are satisfied. while there is indeed an actual case, it was only 14 years after approval of SDP that said plan and approving reso were sought revoked but not by FARM or any of its members but by AMBALA. latter's petition did not question consti if ra6657 sec 31. FARM only questioned it with SC WHEN ITS QUITE TOO LATE IN THE DAY. theySLEPT ON THEIR RIGHTS and even accepted benefits without any complaint on alleged unconstitutionality of section 31 upon which benefits were derived. the SC cannot now be goaded into resolving a consti issue that FARM failed to assail after lapse of a long period of time.- court will not pass upon a question of consti unless it be properly raised and presented in anappropriate case the 1st opportunity. FARM is remiss in belatedly questioning consti. the reqt that consti question should be raised at earliest possible opp is WANTING.- further, the fact that it must be the VERY LIS MOTA--does NOT also obtain. the consti issue tendered is NOT CRITICAL to the resolution of the case. the rule has been to avoid an issue assailing consti of law. if some other grounds exist by which judgment can be made without touching consti of a law, such recourse is favored.LIS MOTA--means that court will not pass upon question of unconsti if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as application of the statute or the general law. petitioner must show that case cannot be legally resolved unless consti question raised is determined.in this case, issues raised may be resolved without plunging into the constitutionality of ra 6657. the issue is not that said section is invalid but rather it is the ALLEGED APPLICATION of said provision in the SDP is FLAWED.WHEN COURT RESOLVES CONSTI ISSUES OTHERWISE MOOT AND ACADEMIC1. grave violation of consti2. exceptional character of situation and paramount public interest is involved3. consti issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guid bench, bar and public4. case is capable of repetition yet evading reviewCANDARI V. DONASCO- NO actual case or controversy; AC means there is a justiciable issue reqd to be resolved by court or + necessity of court resolution to afford parties relief based on law upon the issues raised. in this case, there was already election by general membership. so no more issue.RIPENESS/LOCUS STANDI LAMP V. SEC OF DBM l- RIPENESS: The possibility of consti violations in implementation of PDAF involves interplay oflegal rights susceptible of jud resolution. LAMP--has the right to recover pub funds misapplied by members of congress. allegations of ILLEGAL EXPENDITURE OF PUB FUNDS reflect a CONCRETE INJURY. this petition complains of ILLEGAL DISBURSEMENT OF PF derived from taxation--definite, concrete , real or substantial controversy before the court- LOCUS STANDI--rule: personal/substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained/will sustain direct injury as result of its enforcement. ; TAXPAYERS--allowed to sue where pub funds are illegally disbursed or pub money deflected to improper purpose or PF wasted thru enforcement of an invalid/unconsti law. (i.e. PDAF SCAM)- PARAMOUNT PUB INTEREST--ramification of issues re: unconsti spending of PDAF deserves consideration of court- ALLOWING DIRECT ALLOCATION AND RELEASE OF PDAF FUNDS TO CONGRESS based on their own list of projects--NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION- basis: PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY ACCORDED TO STATUTORY ACTS OF CONGRESS.This rule can be overcome only by clearest showing of infraction of the constiution.- in this case, there was no convincing proof that there were direct releases of funds to members of congress who actually spend them accdg to their sole discretion. court cannot declare unconstitutionality of the PDAF enforcement (at that time; with teh NAPOLES ISSUE now, i think the legality of PDAF may be duly struck down!)BUDGETING AND APPROPRIATION PROCESS1. BUDGET PREPARATION--each agency submits agency budget estimates (consideration: general ceilings set by DBCC, available revenues, borrowing limits)2. LEGISLATIVE AUTHORIZATION--congress deliberates/acts on budget proposals of the president and congress FORMULATES appropriation act3. BUDGET EXECUTION--executive; covers various OPERATIONAL ASPECTS of budgeting; establishment of obligation authority ceilings, evaluation of work/financial plans for indvl activities, continuing review of govt fiscal position, regulation of funds releases, implementation of cash payment skeds; ALLOCATION AND RELEASE OF FUNDS EARMARKED FOR VARIOUS PROJECTS4. BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY--evaluation of actual performance and initially approved work targets, obligations incurred, personnel hired and work accomplished are COMPARED with the targets set at the time the agency budgets were approved.POWER OF APPROPRIATION--vested in LEGISLATURE; appropriation bills originate EXCLUSIVE in the HOUSE. senate to propose/concur with amendmentsBUDGETARY PROCESS--commences from proposal submitted by PRESIDENT. CONGRESS-- concludes the exercise by crafting and APPROPRIATION ACT based on its own judgment/wisdom/purposes.APPROPRIATION ACT--may be objected to by way of PRESIDENTIAL VETO.EXECUTIVE JOB--from regulation of fund releases--implementation of payment skeds and up toACTUAL SPENDING OF FUNDS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW.a. DBM--lays down guidelines for the disbursement of the fund.b. congress requested by president to recommend projects which may be funded from PDAFc. list submitted by congress is endorsed by Speaker to the DBM which reviews the same.RULE: MEMBERS OF CONGRESS MAY PROPOSE AND SELECT PROJECTS TO BE FUNDED BY PDAF but there must be NO SHOWING OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION OF LEGISLATORS IN TEH ACTUAL SPENDING OF BUDGET because to do otherwise will VIOLATE the constitutional boundaries between the executive and legislative in the budgetary process.the PROPOSALS/IDENTIFICATIONSmade by congress are MERELY RECOMMENDATORY and that the president, after due examination shall implement them.direct particiaption of members of congress in PDAF implementation RUNS AFOUL against the principle fo SEPARATION OF POWERS because in receiving and thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, congress INTRUDES INTO AN EXECUTIVE FUNCTION. they cannot directly spend the funds, the appropriation for which was made by them. congress cannot dictate upon executive how to spend taxpayers money. the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation.THERE IS NO CLEAR PROOF in this case that there was direct releases of funds to congress who actually spent them accdg to their discretion. there was (as yet no) ILLEGAL MISUSE of the PDAF in the form of kickbacks.evidence: NAPOLES and the COA REPORT.source of PDAF: SPECIAL PURPOSE FUND (PDAF of 25.240M is only 8% of the total)rule: PDAF ALLOCATIONS ARE NOT ACTUALLY RELEASED TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS;rather, it is coursed via implementing agencies of the govt for 'soft' and hard projectsDELA LLANA V. CHAIRPERSON- on lifting of pre-audit on govt transactions.- petitioner HAS LEGAL STANDING on a TAXPAYERS SUIT. discuss requisites.- issuance of COA CIRCULAR has led to dissipation of public funds through numerous irregularities in govt financial transactions which has been LEFT UNCHECKED by the lifting of the COA pre-audit which is supposed to be coa's consti duty. petitioner then has legal standing since as taxpayer, he would be adversely affected by the illegal use of public money.CONDITIONS FOR PRE-AUDIT(1) proposed expenditure complies with an appropriation law(2) sufficient funds available for the purpose(3) prosed expenditure not unreasonable or extravagant; unexpended balance of appropriations is sufficient to cover entire amount of expenditure(4) transaction approved by proper authority; claim supported by authentic underlying evidence- HOWEVER, CONDUCT OF PRE-AUDIT IS NOT A MANDATORY DUTY OF COA. COA has exclusive authority to define scope of its audit and examination. consti provides that post-audit is mandated for certain govt or private entities with state subsidy or equity and ONLY when the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate.- in this case, COA MAY ADOPT MEASURES, including temporary or special pre-audit to correct deficiencies. therefore, pre audit is only DISCRETIONARY. when language of law is clear and explicit, there is NO ROOM FOR INTERPRETATION, only application. SCOPE OF PROVISION CANNOT BE UNDLY ENLARGED.GALICTO V. AQUINO- on the EO controlling grant of excessive salaries/allowances to GOCC and GFI employees and effect of enactment of RA 10149 (GOCC Governance act of 2011; section 11 thereof authorized president to fix compensation framework of GOCC and GFI's)GALICTO HAS NO LOCUS STANDI. (actual threatened injury; traceable to challenged action; injury likely redressed by favorable action; 'real interest'--present substantial interest as distinguished from mere expectancy)in this case, he is NOT a real party in interest since future increases in salaries and other benefits are merely contingent events or expectancies. he has NO VESTED RIGHTS to salary increases.PETITION MOOTED BY SUPERVENING EVENTS. lapse of the suspension of allowances and bonuses; enactment of RA 10149 amending the provision in the charters of GOCCs empowering their board of directors to determine their own compensation system, in favor of the grant of authority to the PRESIDENT to perform this act. with enactmetn of the new law, president is now authorized to fix teh compensation frameowrk of GOCCs aand GFIs. this means tat PRESIDENT CAN NOW REISSUE AN EO CONTAINING THESE SAME PROVISIONS without any legal constraints. to still rule on the supposed constitutionality of EO 7 will merely be an academic exercise; issue is MOOT ON ITS FACE in light of enactment of RA 10149. there is no longer FLESH AND BLOOD case for court to resolve.MOOT CASE--one that ceases to present justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events that a declaration thereon is of no practical use or value; dispute resolvedIDEALS VS. PSALM- iSSUE ON WATER RIGHTS VIOLATION has NOT BECOME MOOT. if impending sale violates the constitution, it is duty of court to ANNUL THE CONTRACT AWARD as well as its implementation, supervening events cannot prevent the court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the constitution.+ LEGAL STANDING AS CITIZENS AND TAXPAYERS. continued availability of potable water might be compromised if PSALM proceeds with privatization of the hydroelec power plant-- substantial interest.FUNA V. VILLAR- member of COA who was appointed as member then chairman during the 7 year term. when he becomes chairman, is it Fresh 7 years or unexpired term? but during the transition, he RESIGNED when Aquino assumed presidency. CASE IS MOOT but SC DECIDED ON THE CASE. Discuss exceptions. -This case calls for promulgation of principles that will GUID THE BENCH, BAR AND PUBLIC.in this case, COA Chairman shall be appointed by president for term of 7 years and if + served full term--no reappointment. but this rule does not prohibit a PROMOTIONAL APPOINTMENT from commissioner to chairman as long as commissioner has not served the full term of 7 years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the COA.in no case can one be a COA member, either as chairman or commissioner or a mix of both positions, for aggregate term of more than 7 years. a contrary view would allow circumvention of the aggregate 7 year service limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of succession.in this case however, the PROMOTIONAL APPOINTMENT WAS NOT VALID. villar served 4 out of 7 years as commissioner. he cannot be appointed as chair when such position became vacant as a result of expiration of the 7 yr term of his predecessor. such appointment to a full term is NOT VALID as appointee will be allowed to serve MORE than 7 years under the consti ban. BUT if commissioner who resigned BEFORE his 7 year term can be extended an appointment to the position of chairman for the unexpired period.CAPALLA V. COMELEC--transcendental importance used.CHAVEZ V. JBC--on JBC MEMBERS--1 member of HR and senate with 1 vote each or 1/2 vote?CHAVEZ HAS LEGAL STANDING. the claim that composition of JBC is illegal is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post but for all citizens who have the right to seek jud intervention for rectification of legal blunders.HE SUES AS TAXPAYER. since JBC derives financial support for its operations from taxes paid, he possesses as taxpayer both right and legal standing to demand that JDBC proceedings are not tainted with illegality and its composition and actions do not violate the consti.COMPOSTION OF JBCex officio members:1. Chief Justice of SC2. Sec of justice3. A rep of congressRegular members1. professor of law2. IBP rep3. private sector rep4. retired SC justice.ONLY A SINGULAR REPRESENTATIVE MAY ABE ALLOWED TO SIT IN TEH JBC. Besides, JBC must be composed of 7 members only. to allow congress to have more quantitative influence in the JBC would negate principle of equality among the 3 branches of govt.OPERATIVE FACT doctrine applies. notwithstanding unconsti in the current JBC composition, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.court cannot determine who should remain as sole representative of congress in the JBC. this determination is best left to congress.FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEWCHECKING/NEGATIVE-declaring law unconsti LEGITIMATING/POSITIVE--exercise of JR; not unconsti SYMBOLIC/TEACHINGALL COURTS CAN EXERCISE JUDICIAL REVIEW.but lower courts, must avoid ruling so if it can be avoided. remember tripartite govt. SC LANG DAPAT ULTIMATE MAG-RULE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LAW.BROKENSHIRE V. MINISTER OF LABOR--quasi-judicial agencies do not have the power to declare an act or law as unconstitutional. they do not have judicial power. DOLE or NLRC cannot declare wage orders as unconstitutional.EFFECTS OF DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITYoperative fact doctrine applies and traditional view:TRADITIONAL VIEW--when the law was effective and there was violation committed and that law was subsequently annulled--damage or violation corrected as law was never considered effective OPERATIVE FACT--when law was effective and there was NO VIOLATION of rights--if law subsequently annulled, operative fact doctrine applies.COCOFED V. REPUBLIC--Operative fact doctrine not only applies to laws or statutes but also in EXECUTIVE ORDERS. However, in this case, OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY TO THE UCPB SHARES due to inequity. public funds which were supposed given utmost safeguard were haphazardly distributed to private individuals based on EO that was found constitutionally infirm.recipients of UCPB shares may not actually be the intended beneficiaries of said benefit. to apply theOFD would be INIQUITOUS and serve INJUSTICE to govt.also discussed 2 tests of delegation of legis power:COMPLETENESS TEST--when it sets forth the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by delegateSUFFICIENT STANDARD--provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. to be sufficient-- standard must specify the limits of delegates authority, announce legis policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.HACIENDA LUISITA V. PARC- the operative fact doctrine does not only apply to laws subsequently declared unconstitutional or unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts subsequently declared as invalid. As We have discussed in Our July 5, 2011 Decision: That the operative fact doctrine squarely applies to executive actsin this case, the approval by PARC of the HLI proposal for stock distributionis well-settled in our jurisprudence. Bearing in mind that PARC Resolution No. 89-12-210an executive actwas declared invalid in the instant case, the operative fact doctrine is clearly applicable. [Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, 660 SCRA525(2011)]- Significantly, a decision made by the President or the administrative agencies has to be complied with because it has the force and effect of law, springing from the powers of the President underthe Constitution and existing laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decision, it may have produced acts and consequences in conformity to and in reliance of said decision, which must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. [Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, 660 SCRA525(2011)]POLITICAL vs. JUSTICEABLE QUESTIONPOLITICAL--question by which people in their sovereign capacity will have to decide or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to legis/exec branch. it is concerned with issues on WISDOM of a particular measure (not its legality)JUSTICEABLEquestion rightful for court to decide onVINUYA V. ROMULO--mandamus case compelling govt to file claim against japan in the ICJ re: comfort women case--> NOT COMPELLABLE BY MANDAMUS. The issue is POLITICAL in nature. the conduct of foreign relations of our govt is committed to executive and legislative (politcal depts of govt) and thepropriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is NOT SUBJECT to judicial inquiry or legislation. the issue is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed NOT TO COURTS but to the EXECUTIVE DEPT who has already decided to waive all claims of its nationalsfor reparations against japan in the treaty of peace in 1951. the wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.IDEALS VS. PSALM- the political question doctrine applies when the question calls for a ruling on the wisdom, and not the legality, of a particular governmental act or issuance.- The political question doctrine has no application in the case here. In the privatization of AHEPP, PSALMs discretion is circumscribed not only by the provisions of EPIRA and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), but also by pertinent laws that are consequential and relevant to its mandate of privatizing the power generation assets of NPC. Needless to stress, PSALM is duty bound to abide by the parameters set by the Constitution. In case it violates any existing law or the Constitution, it cannot hide behind the mantle of the political question doctrine, because such violation inevitably calls for the exercise of judicial review by this Court. [Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. (IDEALS, INC.) vs. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) , 682 SCRA 602(2012)]COMELEC V. CRUZ- Congress has plenary authority under the Constitution to determine by legislation not only the duration of the term of barangay officials but also the application to them of a consecutive term limit. Whatever Congress in its wisdom decides on the term of office and term limitation are political questions beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny.THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATEPHILIPPINE TERRITORYSabah claim falls within the phrase 'those territories which Philippines would exercise sovereignty and jurisdiciton'. claim is not largely based on historic/legal title.EEZ--first 12 nautical miles is part of PHIL TERRITORY; outside of 12 NM up to 200 NM--part of EEZ and not phil territoryviolations within 12 NM--violation of philippine lawsviolation outside 12 NM and within 200--Violation fo UNCLOSEEZ--reserved for EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION AND EXPLORATION.PEOPLE AND CITIZENSHIP-It was only during phil bill of 1902 (july 2, 1902) that the term 'citizens of phils' came about-child born between April 11, 1899-july 1, 1902--citizens under principle of JUS SOLI--jones law--citizens ung inhabitants of phils as of april 11, 1899 and continues to reside therein including children born subsequent thereto; includes Spaniards who remained there--1935 consti CITIZENS (fil citizens at time of adoption of PC, born of foreigner parents but who at adoption of 1935 consti was ELECTED TO PUB OFFICE; those father are citizens, mothers are citizens/foreigner father but elected fil cit at majority; naturalized citizens)--same citizens under 1987 and 1973 (just memorize those in 1935)8 POSITIONS REQUIRING NAT BORN CITIZENS (pres, VP, members of congress, justices of SC and lowe courts; OMB and deputies; ConCom members; Monetary board; CHR)--NATURAL BORN cits first defined in 1973 consti--those children who had to elect fil cit under 1935 consti is NATURAL BORN (curative law applied retroactively)--FERNANDO POE CASE--born of filipino mother and foreigner father. since he was illegitimate, he follows cit of mother during his minority. once he reaches majority, he has to ELECT what citizenship. However, since in 1935, those born of Filipino fathers are considered natural born, that provision prevails. So he follows the citizenship of his FATHER. Therefore, he is natural born.HOW TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP (formal mode on CA 625)1. execute SOWRN STATEMENT or affidavit of fact of election2. oath of allegiance3. registration of these documents with LCRWHEN TO ELECT? upon REASONABLE time after attaining age of majority (i.e. 3 years) IN RE: CHING- legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines. [- The 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citi-zenship should be made; The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority; As held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule.- based on the interpretation of the phrase upon reaching the age of majority, Chings election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege.In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty- five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority.REP V. LIM- no need to elect cit if he was born of filipino mother and he was illegitimate; child follows cit of mother- he constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children.Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent whowas concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. [Republic vs. Lim, 419 SCRA 123(2004)]- The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. [Republic vs. Lim, 419 SCRA 123(2004)]-MA V. FERNANDEZ- failure to register in LCR of documents in election of cit DOES NOT AFFECT a valid election. registration is not the fact of election.-- The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.- Same; Same; Same; The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the elections should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.- The instant case presents a different factual setting. Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It was only the registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done. We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election.- Where as in petitioners case, the election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of election beyond the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done- It is not the registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners; Registration is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed. [Ma vs. Fernandez, Jr., 625 SCRA566(2010)]- The failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and resultingly negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. [Ma vs. Fernandez, Jr., 625 SCRA566(2010)]REP V. SAGUN- There is NO PROCEEDING established by law for the jud declaration of citizenship fo an individual.- this Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. There is no specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry- courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power.- t is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality. Being a legitimate child, respondents citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship.- in making a valid election of Philippine citizenship, follow the 3 requirements + compliance with ALIEN REGISTRATION ACT. he must be required to register first as alien. file petition in bureau of immigration for cancellation fo ACR. then same is elevated to DOJ for final determination and review. thus, no specific rule on going to courts in this matter.- It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts. The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for by the respondent. Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial courts conclusion that respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably show that respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary evidence submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondents oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the nearest local civil registry. [Republic vs. Sagun, 666 SCRA 321(2012)]VILANDO V. HRET- Limkaichong is QUALIFIED to sit as congressman. he is a NATURAL BORN CITIZEN. since his father was conferred the status of naturalized Filipino, it follows that he was born a Filipino citizen born to Filipino parents.- An application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenshipfor renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express.Obtaining an ACR by Limkaichongs mother was not tantamount to a repudiation of her original citizenship. Neither did it result in an acquisition of alien citizenship. In a string of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an application for, and the holding of, an alien certificate of registration is not an act constituting renunciation of Philippine citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. Such express renunciation is lacking in this case. Accordingly, Limkaichongs mother, being a Filipino citizen, can transmit her citizenship to her daughter. [Vilando vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 656 SCRA 17(2011)]INFORMAL MODE OF ELECTIONIN RE MALLARE and CO case--obiter dictum provided that even if no compliance with documentary eivdinces, election can be had informally as shown in the CONDUCT of the person.BUT ONLY FORMAL MODE IS ALLOWED TO ELECT FIL CIT. NATURALIZATION AND DENATURALIZATIONNATURALIZATION PROCEDINGS--judicial (CA 473) and administrative (RA 9139)Judicial naturalization (CA 473; June 17, 1939)--ARCPEN (substantive)procedural reqts:1. filing of declaration of intention at least 1 year before the filing of petition2. hearing3. decision (does not become effective until after 2 years waiting period)4. ACR cancellation5. issuance of cert of naturalizationDERIVATIVE CIT--wife and minor children will be fil cit too (must prove no disqualifications)CHILDREN--if born and here during the grant (automatic); born here but outside during grant(must execute document electing FC); not born here and outside during grant (must file documents before got office that they want to become FC) ; Born AFTER grant--citizens; born BEFORE grant--NOT natural bornADMINISTRATIVE NAT (RA 9139 June 8, 2001)--covers those born in phils as foreigners substantive: AR-18-CPENProcedural:1. no declaration of intention needed2. file petition with the special commission on naturalization in ODJ3. payment of feesIMPORTANT POINTS- Who are qualified to be naturalized- Declaration of intention- Procedure- When decision EXECUTORY:- REPUBLIC ACT NO. 530 AN ACT MAKING ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS FOR NATURALIZATIONSection 1. The provisions of existing laws notwithstanding, no petition for Philippine citizenship shall be heard by the courts until after six months from the publication of the application required by law, nor shall any decision granting the application become executory until after two years from its promulgation and after the court, on proper hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his representative, is satisfied, and so finds, that during the intervening time the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines, (2) has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession, (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules, (4) or committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Governmentannounced policies.Section 2. After the finding mentioned in section one, the order of the court granting citizenship shall be registered and the oath provided by existing laws shall be taken by the applicant, whereupon, and not before, he will be entitled to all the privileges of a Filipino citizen.-DENATURALIZATION1. if person goes back to his country of origin and stays there for 1 year or 2 years if other country AND2. acts done WITHIN the 5r period from grant of naturalization statusCO V. CIVIL REGISTER- Section 15 of CA No. 473, which extends the grant of Philippine citizenship to the minor children of thosenaturalized thereunder, should be similarly applied to the minor children of those naturalized under LOI No. 270, like the petitioners in this case. [- Requisites.It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of naturalization of their father, Co Boon Peng, and of his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They are likewise mandated to prove the following material allegations in their petition:(a) that they are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng; (b) that they were born in the Philippines; and,(c) that they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen.REPUBLIC V. ONG- Granting of petition for naturalization DOES NOT PRECLUDE reopening of that case and giving govt another opportunity to present new evidence. nat proceeding is so infused with pub interest that a GRANT of citizenship does NOT constitute res judicata to any matter supporting asubsequent judgmetn canceling the same i.e. illegally or fraudulently procured. in this case, there is proof that ong has not proven his possession of known lucrative trade, profession,etc. (even if not raised in the RTC, such questions may be entertained on appeal before SC)FACT OF NAT BORN--refers to fact of citizenship and not to the fact of performing an act to perfect/acquire citBASTA if 1 parent is filipino--NATURAL BORN (even if later he needs to elect)if no Filipino parent--not natural born (even if subsequently, parents eventually became filipinos)LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP1. Naturalization in foreign countrya. REPUBLIC V. DELA ROSA" Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which he believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between an applicantwho was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien. [" Failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law rendered null and void the proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and oath of allegiance taken" The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character, (2) that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the justification therefor. The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition" A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation, counted from the date of receipt by the Solicitor General of hiscopy of the decision." A decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall not be executory until after two years from its promulgation. [Republic vs. De la Rosa,232 SCRA 785(1994)]2. express renunciation or EXPATRIATIONa. YU V. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO" Petitioners act of applying for a Portuguese passport despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen, and his act of declaring his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents, constitute an express renunciation of his Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. [Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago, 169SCRA 364(1989)]" hilippine citizenship is not a commodity or ware to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient. [Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago, 169 SCRA364(1989)]b. AZNAR V. COMELEC" In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modesprovided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship. [Aznar vs. Commission on Elections, 185 SCRA 703(1990)]3. oath of allegiance to foreign countryREACQUISTION OF CITIZENSHIP1. RA 8171)-nat born fil women who married foreigners-poltiical or economic necessity2. RA 9225 (Dual citizenship)AASJS V. DATUMANONG- What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who has lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance; By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizen-shipLOPEZ V. COMELEC- R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines, i.e., that they make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. [Lopez vs. Commission on Elections, 559 SCRA696(2008)]JACOT V. DAL- Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and swornrenunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.DE GUZMAN V. COMELEC- Who may be allowed to re-acquire and retain Philippine Citizenship.R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to have reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.- The filing of a certificate of candidacy does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225BENGZON V. HRET--when repatriation under 8171 is made, he acquires his former status as natural born.CONDON V. COMELEC- RA 9225 allows retention and reacquisition of fil cit for nat born cits who have lost their phil cit by taking an oath of allegiance to the republic.- in this case, when she took the oath, she reacquired her fil cit and became a DUAL CITIZEN.- ON RENUNCIATION OF FOREIGN CIT WHEN SEEKING PUBLIC OFFICE--but for renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before officer of law authorized toadminister oath stating in clear unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.- In this case, the renunciation was NOT UNDER OATH. such defect was as if no personal and sworn renunciation of foreign cit was made. HENCE, CONDON CANNOT CURE THE DEFECT OF HER CANDIDACY AS SUCH additional qualification for elec office is the operative act which will restore her right to run for pub office.ALTEREJOS V. COMELEC- In addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen- hile Republic Act No. 8171 has impliedly repealed Presidential Decree No. 725, the Courts ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727 (1996), that repatriation retroacts to the date of filing of ones application for repatriation subsists and applies to repatriation under R.A. No. 8171. [TABASA V. CA- Republic Act No. 8171; Persons Entitled to Repatriation Under Republic Act No. 8171.The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.- Same; Same; Same; The privilege of repatriation under Republic Act No. 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinosto claim the benefit of Republic Act No. 8171, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who hadrenounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a situation where a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship: the children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos.- To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents.- In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still a minor, his father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative naturalization, petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to believe that he is entitled to automatic repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to political or economic necessity. This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation on June 13, 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation. Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or economic necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by economic or political reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parents and not his. The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political and economic reasons, and extendedindirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation [Tabasa vs. Court of Appeals, 500 SCRA9(2006)]DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO NATIONAL INTEREST and NOT dual citizenship.when dual citizenship may arise:--application of laws of 2 states--marriage to foreigner--children born of that marriage--child born of Filipino parents in country following jus soliSOVEREIGN IMMUNITYInstances WHEN SUIT IS AGAINST THE STATE:--republic sued by name--suit vs. unincorporated entity--pub off sued in official capacityTEST: when case makes government APPROPRIATE FUNDS from the public treasuryPROFESSIONAL VIDEO V. TESDA- An unincorporated instrumentality operating under a specific charter, it is equipped with both express and implied powers.Under these terms, both constitutional and statutory, we do not believe that the role and status of TESDA can seriously be contested: it is an unincorporated instrumentality of the government, directly attached to the DOLE through the participation of the Secretary of Labor as its Chairman, for the performance of governmental functionsi.e., the handling of formal and non-formal education and training, and skills development. As an unincorporated instrumentality operating under a specific charter, it is equipped with both express and implied powers, and all State immunities fully apply to it.- The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various forms.The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on various forms, namely: a suit against the Republic by name; a suit against an unincorporated government agency; a suit against a government agency covered by a charter with respect to the agencys performance of governmental functions; and a suit that on its face is against a government officer, but where the ultimate liability will fall on the government. In the present case, the writ of attachment was issuedagainst a government agency covered by its own charter. As discussed above, TESDA performs governmental functions, and the issuance of certifications is a task within its function of developing and establishing a system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country. From the perspective of this function, the core reason for the existence of state immunity appliesi.e., the public policy reason that the performance of governmental function cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor can these suits control the use and disposition of the means for the performance of governmental functions.- Even assuming that Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) entered into a proprietary contract with Professional Video, Inc. (PROVI) and thereby gave its implied consent to be sued, TESDAs funds are still public in nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subjectof a writ of garnishment or attachment; Public funds cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged- Absent any actual disbursement, these funds form part of and Technical Education and Skills Development Authoritys (TESDAs) public funds, and TESDAs failure to pay Professional Video, Inc. (PROVI) the amount stated in the Certificate cannot be construed as an act of fraudulent misapplication or embezzlement.HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN V. ATO- State Immunity; Where the Director General of Air Transportation Office had informed the landowners that the funding for the initial payment for the acquisition of their property was alreadyappropriation required by law in order that the landowners may be paid just compensation long due them.ATO V. RAMOS- The immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the State, as a sovereign, can do no wrong. [Air Transportation Office vs. Ramos, 644 SCRA 36(2011)]- An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty.. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business. [- The Court of Appeals (CA) correctly appreciated the juridical character of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) as an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function. but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the States immunity from suit.- The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs property.- The issue of whether or not the Air Transportation Office (ATO) could be sued without the States consent has been rendered moot by the passage of Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008CHINA NATIONAL V. SANTAMARIA--application of Doctrine of state immunity has been RESTRICTED TO SOVEREIGN or govtl activities and cannot be extended to commercial/private and proprietary acts. in this case, although CNMEG claims to be a GOCC, it failed to adduce evidence that it has not consented to be sued under Chinese law. IT CANNOT CLAIM IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. in the absence of evidence to the contrary, ti is presumed a GOCC WITHOUT an original charter. as a result, it has the capacity to sue and be sued under the corporation code.HEIRS OF GAMBOA V. TEVES--view that govt, by concluding sale, has descended to the level of an oridnary citizen and stripped itself of the vestiges of immuity that is availbe in teh performance of govtl acts.the indirect sale of PLDT common shares to foreign investors partook of a PROPRIETARY BUSINESS TRANSACITON of the govt which was not undertaken as incident to a govtl function. accordingly, govt is vulnerable to estoppel . govt is PRECLUDED FFOM PENALIZEING these alien investors for an act performed upon its guarantee, through its facilities and with its imprimartur.CONSENT TO BE SUEDHow given: express or impliedEXPRES CONSENT:1. money claims arising from contract (CA 3039, 327 and PD 1415)a. SAYSON V. SINGSON-- Action against the government auditors to approve payment to petitioner is a suit against the State and may not prosper without the latters consent. Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State * * *. In other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com.Act 327 * * * which prescribe the conditions under which money claim against the government may be filed * * * [Sayson vs. Singson, 54 SCRA 282(1973)]--claims must be submitted to COA first and if it does not have money to pay, file case in court2. Incorporation of GOCC (with original charter)a. NHA V. GUIVELONDO-- Generally, funds and properties of the government cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged.The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not beseized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.38However, if the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or controlled corporation which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from that of the government, then its funds are not exempt from garnishment.39 This is so because when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereigncapacity and is to be treated like any other corporation.40In the case of petitioner NHA, the matter of whether its funds and properties are exempt from garnishment has already been resolved. Having a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government, the funds of such government-owned and controlled corporations and non-corporate agency, although considered public in character, are not exempt from garnishment.the funds of petitioner NHA are not exempt from garnishment or execution.IMPLIED CONSENT1. Govt enters into business contracts (proprietary acts i.e. public utilities; they are not necessary and only for convenience)2. inequitable to claim immunity (i.e. non payment of just compensation in expropriation cases; property owner files INVERSE CONDEMNATION ACTION--DOES NOT PRESCRIBE)3. govt initiates a complaint and thereby opens itself to counterclaimWHEN GOVT ENTER INTO BUSINESS CONTRACTSPTA V. PGDEI--application of state immunity is proper only when proceedings arise out of sovereign transactions cannot in cases of commercial activities or econ affairs. the state, in entering into a business contract, descends to the level of individual and is deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. since the intramural golf course expansion projects partakes of PROPRIETARY CHARacter entered by PTA and philgolf, PTA CANNOT AVOID ITS FINANCIAL LIABILITY by merely invoking immunity from suit.ROYAL PREROGATIVE OF DISHONESTY--used when state erroneously claims immunity because it is dishonest for it to claim the same. thus, when the court finds it inequitable, the court will rule that there has been consent or waiver.INEQUITABLE TO CLAIM IMMUNITYEPG CONSTRUCTION V. VIGILAR- To our mind, it would be the apex of injustice and highly inequitable for us to defeat petitioners- contractors right to be duly compensated for actual work performed and services rendered,where both the government and the public have, for years, received and accepted benefits from said housing project and reaped the fruits of petitioners-contractors honest toil and labor- The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently hide under the States cloak ofinvincibility against suit, considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions. True enough, the rule, in any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued under any circumstance. the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.- The Supreme Courtas the staunch guardian of the citizen rights and welfare-cannot sanction an injustice so patent on its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof [EPG Construction Co. vs. Vigilar, 354 SCRA 566(2001)]REPUBLIC V. UNIMEX- Although it may be gainsaid that the satisfaction of respondents demand will ultimately fall on the government, and that, under the political doctrine of state immunity, it cannot be held liable for governmental acts (jus imperii), we still hold that petitioner cannot escape its liability. The circumstances of this case warrant its exclusion from the purview of the state immunity doctrine.- Justice and equity now demand that the States cloak of invincibility against suit and liability be shredded. as the staunch guardian of the peoples rights and welfare, cannot sanction an injustice so patent in its face, and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is inconvenient and contrary to reason is not allowed in law. Justice and equity now demand that the States cloak of invincibility against suit and liability be shreddedGOVT INITIATES A COMPLAINT; OPEN TO COUTNERCLAIMFROILAN V. PAN ORIENTAL- The filing by the Government of a complaint in intervention is in effect a waiver of its right of nonsuability. [Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., 95 Phil. 905(1954)]REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN- When the State, through its duly authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a private party, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may have against it.In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit. As argued, the order for it to pay the value of the delinquent shares would fix monetary liability on a government agency, thus necessitating the appropriation of public funds to satisfy the judgment claim. But, as private respondent Benedicto correctly countered, the PCGG fails to take stock of one of the exceptions to the state immunity principle, i.e., when the government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034. Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit cannot be effectively invoked. [Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), 484SCRA 119(2006)]SCOPE OF CONSENTUNDER ACT 3083COMMISSIONER V. SAN DIEGO - Doctrine of immunity from suit does not apply to expropriation proceedings.It is elementary thatin expropriation proceedings, the state precisely submits to the courts jurisdiction and asks the court to affirm its lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated for the public use or purpose described in its complaint and to determine the amount of just compensation to be paid therefore. The doctrine of immunity of the state from suit does not apply.- While the State has given its consent to be sued in compensation cases, the pauper-claimant therein must look specifically to the Compensation Guarantee Fund provided by the Workmens Compensation Act for the corresponding disbursement in satisfaction of his claim, since the State in Act 3083, the general law waiving its immunity from suit upon any money claim involving liability arising from contract express or implied, imposed the limitation in Sec. 7 thereof that no execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of the (Philippines) under the provisions of this Act; and that otherwise, the claimant would have to prosecute his money claim against the State under Commonwealth Act 327. [Commissioner of Public Highways vs. San Diego, 31 SCRA 616(1970)]- PNB V. CIR

UNDER A CHARTEREXECUTIONit is only valid if strictly a suit against the state. if there was valid consent, it will be valid from initiation only up to rendition of judgment and DOES NOT EXTEND TO EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT. judgment must be presented to COA to determine if there is money. if none, the claim will be submitted to congress for allocation in the appropriations bill. congress may fund or not fund it.EXEUCTION MAY NOT ISSUE UPON SUCH JUDGMETN because statues waiving non-suability do not authorize seizure of property so statisy jdugetns recored from such action. statutes only convey an implication that congress will recognize such judgmetn as final and make provisions for its full satisfaction.DFA V. NLRC- Except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form. The Banks officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government which must be respected. [Department of Foreign Affairs vs. NLRC, 262 SCRA39(1996)]REPUBLIC V. HIDALGO- No costs shall be allowed against the government of the Philippine Islands where the government is the unsuccessful party [Republic vs. Hidalgo, 477 SCRA 32(2005)]- It is settled that when the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent to an unrestrained execution against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the state has a liability. In Republic v. Villasor this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and executory judgment, has explained, thus. . . The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimants action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.REPUBLIC V. NLRC- Proclamation No. 50s provision that the APT, among other things, can sue and be suedindubitably shows that APT can be haled to court- When the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby necessarily consent to an unrestrained execution against itSUABILITY V. LIABILITY--If there was waiver of consent by the state--YOU CAN SUE. but it does not mean that state is liable. proof must be adduced still.--SUABILITY--fact of having been opportunity to sue the state; dependent on presence of consent--LIABILITY--dependent on facts/evidence applicable to the laws of the caseQUASI DELICT COMMITTED BY SPECIAL AGENTMERTITT V. GOVT--a special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the govt for an alleged quasi delictMUNICIPALITY V. JUDGE--municipality CANNOT be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee engaged in the discharge of GOVTL functions. the death of the passenger imposed NO duty to pay monetary compensationMUN V. DUMDUM--Consent is IMPLIED when govt enters into business contracts or it may be EMBODIED IN GEN/SPECIAL LAW i.e LCG which vests LGUs with certain corporate powers--to sue and be sued. further, writ of attachment is useless since property of municipality MAY NOT BE SUBJECTED TO WRITS OF EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENT UNLESS THERE HAS BEEN A CORRESPONDING APPROPRIATION PROVIDED BY LAW.SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF FOREIGN STATES--There has to be consent first.--officers--> personal capacity (allowed); official functions (consent required)1963 VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC OFFICIALS --covers HEADS OF MISSION and ambassadors (ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY)--Consuls (relative immunity only; if not related sa official functions--they can b sued)IMMUNITY BY REASON OF AGREEMENT/TREATIES UN (in re: WW II)--absolute immunityNGO--relativeADB--immune except when it relates to banking functionsIMMUNITY OF CERTAIN GOVT OFFICERSIMPEACHABLE OFFICERS--i.e. SC justice, president,THEY ARE IMMUNE ONLY DURING THEIR INCUMBENCYCOMPOSITION/QUALIFICATIONS/TERM--Know the principles in domicile

LEGISLATIVEMITRA V. COMELEC--comelec determined fitness of a dwelling based on very personal/subjectvie assessment standards when teh law is replete with standards that can be used; when dwelling qulifies as residence, his capacity to decorate the place or lack of it is IMMATERIAL.ASSISTIO V. AGUIRRE--to effect a NEW domicile: animus manendi coupled with animus non reertendi. (3 requisites to effect a transfer)TALAGA V. COMELEC--No local elec official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same position. --to avoid the evil of a a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial juris as a result of a prolonged stay in the office.SABILI V. COMELEC--To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of the intention to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode. it is not required that candidate should have his own house in order to establish his residence in a place. it is enough tht he should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative.APPORTIONMETN/DISTRICTSSEMA V. COMELEC- The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress.- An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body. [Sema vs. Commission on Elections, 558 SCRA700(2008)]- Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress. [Sema vs. Commission on Elections, 558 SCRA 700(2008)]ALDABA V. COMELEC- Under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 135, the population indicators Congress used to measure Malolos Citys compliance with the constitutional limitation are unreliable and non-authoritative [Aldaba vs.Commission on Election, 615 SCRA 564(2010)]- this fell short of EO 135s requirements that (a) for intercensal years, the certification should be based on a set of demographic projections and- 566-- 566- SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED- Aldaba vs.Commission on Election- estimates declared official by the National Statistical and Coordination Board (NSCB); (b) certifications on intercensal population estimates will be as of the middle of every year; and (c) certifications based on projections or estimates must be issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. [Aldaba vs.Commission on Election, 615 SCRA 564(2010)]- The Liga ng Barangay is not authorized to conduct population census much less during off- census years. [Aldaba vs.Commission on Election, 615 SCRA 564(2010)]NAVARRO V. ERMITA- The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code. Any derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. [Navarro vs. Ermita, 612 SCRA 131(2010)]- Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, defined gerrymandering as the formation of one legislative district out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party. [Navarro vs. Ermita, 612 SCRA 131(2010)]AQUINO V. COMELEC- There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district- While Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its population by another250,000 to be entitled to an additional districtPARTY LIST SYSTEMLAYUG V. COMELEC--members of HR are 2 kinds (those elected from legis districts and those elected thru a partylist system of registered national/regional and sectoral parties. brother mike, 5th nominee did not get a seat in the partylist systema nd has not become member of HR. thus, HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue of his qualifications. neither does HRET have juris over qualificaitons of buhay party list, as it is vested by law upon the OCMELEC.ANG ATONG PAGLAUM V. COMELEC:--party list system INCLUDES NON-SECTORAL parties.--it is composed of 3 groups (national parties/orgs, regional parties and sectoral parties)--POLITICAL PARTY--organized group of citizens acdvocating an ideolgoy or platform, principles and policies for the gen conduct of govtSECTORAL--org group of citizens belonging to any of teh sectors enumerated in section 3 whoseprincipal advocacy pertains to the special interst and concerns of their sector.--RA 7941 does not required national and regional parties to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. a political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent andy particular sector. it is sufficient that it consists of cits who advocate same ideology REGARDLESS OF THERI ECONOMIC STATUS AS CITIZENS--Marginialized/underrep--those who fall in the low income grup as classified by national stats coor board. (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, IP, handicapped, veterans, overseas) . It does not eman one must wallow in poverty/destitution/infirmity; its sufficient that his sector is below the middle class--NOMINEES of the sectoral party--either belongs to the sector or must have a TRACK RECORD OF ADVOCACY for the sector represented.--major political parties can participate in party list elections to encourage them to wok assiduously inextending their constituencies to the marginalized/underrep and those who lack well-defined political constituencies. they must organize a SECTORAL WING--independent sectoral party linked to a major political party thru a coalition. must have its own consti and by laws, program of got, officers/members,etc.--partylist shall not be DQ if some of its nominees are disqualified, provided ast least one is qualified.RESIDENCE REQT of partylist members--not required to be residents of the district but of thePHILIPPINES.YOUTH SECTOR REPS--Amores v. HRET--> Must be up to the age of 30 only. but Villanueva in this case was allowed to finish his term.BANAT V. COMELEC--know the new procedure for filling in party list seats. even those not reaching 2%may be entitled to 1 seat.ISSUE: in 2007, dili sila entitled; in 2009, they were entitled. in such case, is it covered na as '1 term' and thereby falls on the 3-term limitation rule? for me YES. they are no longer entitled for another term as they have already served a few years in that specific term.ABAYON v. hret/ layug v. comelec--know jursidiction of comelec and hret. know the PENDING case of reyes and velasco on that matter.REYES V. VELASCO-- comelec had lost jurisdiction ot the HRET once a winning candidate has been proclaimed winner in the congressional race. one DOES not become a member of the house on the first day of session but on the day of PROCLAMATION. the SC and COMELEC should allow the HRET to exercise it exclusive mandate to hear elec protest against members of congress. SC CANNOT ENCROACH on the powers of the HRET. that is very clear in the consti which created Hret.not hret because issue does not involve an election protest.ELECTION--There is a need to CALL for SPECIAL ELEC if there is vacancy (but not within 18 mos before regular elections; in that case, isabay nalang xa sa regular elections)--NO NEED FOR NOTICE in case there is special elections to fill vacancy for the SENATE (not HR) because the special elec was conducted/simultaneously with teh regular elections. since regular elec is already covered by law and the consti, there is NO NEED FOR PRIOR OTICE to the public.SALARIES/PRIVILEGES AND DQSALARIES--there is no prohibition on the DECREASE of salaries DURING term; prohibited: INCREASE DURING term. ; but a law increasing salaries is okay but prohibited if law will take effect during their term. term of all the members of senate approving the increase will have to expire first before the increase of their salaries will have to take effect.PRIVILEGES--Freedom from arrest--if NOT more than 6 years imprisonment lang ang immunity from arrest. if more than 6 years, then he cannot claim parliamentary immunity.--SPEECH AND DEBATE CLAUSE--Osmena v. Pendatun: whie parliamentary immunity guarantees legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in crim/civil actions before the courts or any other forum OUTSIDE congress, oit does NOT protect him from responsibility before the congress itself whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. for unparliametnary conduct, he can be censured/c