consti. law. digested cases

7/27/2019 Consti. Law. Digested Cases

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Republic of the Philippines

Congress of the PhilippinesMetro Manila

Eighth Congress

Republic Act No. 6735

August 4, 1989

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND

APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled::

I.General Provisions

Section 1. Title.This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act."

Section 2. Statement of Policy.The power of the people under a system of initiative and

referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution,

laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with therequirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.

Section 3. Definiti on of Terms.

For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to

propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments

to the Constitution;

a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national

legislation; and

a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a

regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.

(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to

Congress or the local legislative body for action.


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(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through

an election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:

c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act

or law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and

c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law,

resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative

bodies.

(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.

(e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is

approved or rejected by the people.

(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required number

of signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined by and submitted to the Commissionon Elections, hereinafter referred to as the Commission.

(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.

(h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang

Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, and Sangguniang Nayon.

(i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal Mayors and

Punong Barangay, as the case may be.

Section 4. Who may exercise.

The power of initiative and referendum may be exercised byall registered voters of the country, autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities andbarangays.

Section 5. Requirements. (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten

per centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which every legislative district

is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a

petition for the purpose and register the same with the Commission.

(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per

centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every

legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registeredvoters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years

from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) yearsthereafter.

(c) The petition shall state the following:


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c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or

rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be;

c.2. the proposition;

c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;

c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which

shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.

(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the

legislative assembly of an autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly initiated

if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters inthe province or city, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least

three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein; Provided, however, That if the

province or city is composed only of one (1) legislative district, then at least eachmunicipality in a province or each barangay in a city should be represented by at least

three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.

(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be deemed

validly initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of theregistered voters in the municipality, of which every barangay is represented by at least

three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.

(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validlyinitiated if signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said

barangay.

Section 6. Special Registration.The Commission on Election shall set a special registration

day at least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or referendum.

Section 7. Veri fi cation of Signatures.The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on

the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the

immediately preceding election.

II.National Initiative and Referendum

SECTION 8. Conduct and Date of I ni tiative or Referendum.The Commission shall call and

supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum.

Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall, upon

determining the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice


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in newspapers of general and local circulation and set the date of the initiative or referendum

which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the

determination by the Commission of the sufficiency of the petition.

Section 9. Ef fectivity of I ni tiative or Referendum Propositi on. (a) The Proposition of the

enactment, approval, amendment or rejection of a national law shall be submitted to andapproved by a majority of the votes cast by all the registered voters of the Philippines.

If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a majority of thevotes cast, the national law proposed for enactment, approval, or amendment shall

become effective fifteen (15) days following completion of its publication in the Official

Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. If, as certified by theCommission, the proposition to reject a national law is approved by a majority of the

votes cast, the said national law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall become

effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of publication of the proposition and

the certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general

circulation in the Philippines.

However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be rejected oramended shall remain in full force and effect.

(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of thevotes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an

election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification

and proclamation by the Commission.

Section 10. Prohibi ted Measures. The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or

referendum petition:

(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate;

and

(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically

vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90)days after its effectivity.

Section 11. I ndirect In itiative.

Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law,may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative

bodies. The petition shall contain a summary of the chief purposes and contents of the bill that

the organization proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature.

The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any

legislative measure before the House of Representatives except that the said initiative bill shallhave precedence over the pending legislative measures on the committee.


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Section 12. Appeal.The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency or

insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court

within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.

III. Local Initiative and Referendum

SECTION 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. (a) Not less than two thousand (2,000)

registered voters in case of autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of provinces and

cities, one hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of barangays, may file apetition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative body, respectively, proposing the

adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution.

(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30) days from

its presentation, the proponents through their duly authorized and registered

representative may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the locallegislative body concerned.

(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The Secretary ofLocal Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the

formulation of the proposition.

(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.

(e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of autonomous regions,

ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of municipalities,

and thirty (30) days in case of barangays, from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof

to collect the required number of signatures.

(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated

representative, in the presence of a representative of the proponent, and a representativeof the regional assemblies and local legislative bodies concerned in a public place in the

autonomous region or local government unit, as the case may be. Signature stations may

be established in as many places as may be warranted.

(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections, through

its office in the local government unit concerned shall certify as to whether or not therequired number of signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain the required number is

a defeat of the proposition.

(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall then set a

date for the initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters

in the local government unit concerned for their approval within ninety (90) days fromthe date of certification by the Commission, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case

of autonomous regions, sixty (60) days in case of the provinces and cities, forty-five (45)

days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative


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shall then be held on the date set, after which the results thereof shall be certified and

proclaimed by the Commission on Elections.

Section 14. Ef fectivity of Local Propositi ons.If the proposition is approved by a majority of

the votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification by the Commission as if

affirmative action thereon had been made by the local legislative body and local executiveconcerned. If it fails to obtain said number of votes, the proposition is considered defeated.

Section 15. L imi tations on Local I ni tiatives. (a) The power of local initiative shall not beexercised more than once a year.

(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of

the local legislative bodies to enact.

(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in totothe proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such

action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner herein provided.

Section 16. L imi tations Upon Local Legislative Bodies.Any proposition or ordinance or

resolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not

be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) monthsfrom the date therefrom, and may be amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative body

within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided,

however, that in case of barangays, the period shall be one (1) year after the expiration of thefirst six (6) months.

Section 17. Local Referendum.Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof, any local

legislative body may submit to the registered voters of autonomous region, provinces, cities,municipalities and barangays for the approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly

enacted or approved.

Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission within sixty

(60) days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty(30) days in case of barangays.

The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.

Section 18. Authori ty of Courts.Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper

courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violationof the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.

IV.Final Provisions

SECTION 19. Appli cabil ity of the Omnibus Election Code.The Omnibus Election Codeand other election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all

initiatives and referenda.


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Section 20. Rules and Regulations.The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate

such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

Section 21. Appropriations. The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial

implementation of this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in the General

Appropriations Act of the current year. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the fullimplementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 22. Separabil ity Clause. If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid orunconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.

Section 23. Effectivity.This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a

newspaper of general circulation.

Approved: August 4, 1989

Lambino Vs. ComelecG.R. No. 174153Oct. 25 2006

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiativepetition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to holda plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group allegedthat the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shiftthe present bicameral- presidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary.COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitionsand invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implementthe initiative petitions.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with Section 2, ArticleXVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement theinitiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying duecourse to the Lambino Groups petition.


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Held:According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basicrequirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC didnot grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution

on Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at thetime of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive andmisleading which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revisionthrough Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment andrevision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution

may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and theexecutive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the presentpetition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with theconstitution before complying with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.

Imbong vs ComelecMANUEL B. IMBONG VS. COMELECG.R. NO. L-32432SEPTEMBER 11, 1970

FACTS:

These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant toSec. 19 of R.A. No. 6132 by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales toimpugn the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming during the oral argument that it

prejudices their rights as such candidates.

On March 16, 1967, the Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly passed ResolutionNo. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention to propose constitutionalamendments to be composed of two delegates from each representative district whoshall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen.


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After the adoption of said Res. No. 2 in 1967 but before the November elections of thatyear Congress, acting as a Legislative Body, enacted Republic Act No. 4914implementing the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 and practically restating in toto theprovisions of said Resolution No. 2.On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as aConstituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the aforesaid Resolution No.

2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention "shall be composed of 320delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts according to thenumber of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a representative district shall beentitled to at least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as thoserequired of members of the House of Representatives," 1 "and that any other detailsrelating to the specific apportionment of delegates, election of delegates to, and theholding of, the Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in an implementinglegislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of thisResolution."

On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a Legislative Body, enacted Republic Act No.

6132, implementing Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No. 4914.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not RA No. 6132 is constitutional?2. Whether or not Section 2, 5, and 8 is valid and does not prejudice the rights ofindividual embodied in the constitution?

HELD:

Issue 1:In sustaining the constitutionality of R.A. No. 4914 and R.A. No. 6132, thecourt explained the following:

1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of theConstitution, has full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or tocall a convention for the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of each House in joint sessionassembled but voting separately. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 calling for a constitutionalconvention were passed by the required three-fourths vote.

2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to call aconstitutional convention includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication, allother powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal power granted, such asthe power to fix the qualifications, number, apportionment, and compensation of thedelegates as well as appropriation of funds to meet the expenses for the election ofdelegates and for the operation of the Constitutional Convention itself, as well as allother implementing details indispensable to a fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos. 2and 4 already embody the above-mentioned details, except the appropriation of funds.


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3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the presentConstitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, thepower to enact the implementing details, which are now contained in Resolutions Nos. 2and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress acting as aConstituent Assembly. Such implementing details are matters within the competence of

Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power, which powerencompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication withdrawn orremoved by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as lone as suchstatutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the constitution, they arevalid.

4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to providefor such implementing details after calling a constitutional convention, Congress, actingas a legislative body, can enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in thegaps, which authority is expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res No. 2 as amended byRes. No. 4.

Issue 2 Validi ty of Sectio n 2, 5 and 8

Sect ion 2: Appo rt ionment of d elegates

Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales asserts that Sec. 2 on the apportionment of delegates isnot in accordance with proportional representation and therefore violates theConstitution and the intent of the law itself, without pinpointing any specific provision ofthe Constitution with which it collides.

The apportionment provided for in Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 cannot possibly conflict withits own intent expressed therein; for it merely obeyed and implemented the intent ofCongress acting as a Constituent Assembly expressed in Sec. 1 of Res. No. 4, whichprovides that the 320 delegates should be apportioned among the existingrepresentative districts according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but fixinga minimum of at least two delegates for a representative district. The presumption isthat the factual predicate, the latest available official population census, for suchapportionment was presented to Congress, which, accordingly employed a formula forthe necessary computation to effect the desired proportional representation.

Sect ion 5: Depr ivation o f Liber ty

Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is attacked on the ground that it is an undue deprivation of libertywithout due process of law and denies the equal protection of the laws. Said Sec. 5disqualifies any elected delegate from running "for any public office in any election" orfrom assuming "any appointive office or position in any branch of the government untilafter the final adjournment of the Constitutional Convention."

As observed by the Solicitor General in his answer, the overriding objective of thechallenged disqualification, temporary in nature, is to compel the elected delegates to


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serve in full their term as such and to devote all their time to the convention, pursuant totheir representation and commitment to the people; otherwise, his seat in theconvention will be vacant and his constituents will be deprived of a voice in theconvention. The inhibition is likewise "designed to prevent popular political figures fromcontrolling elections or positions. Also it is a brake on the appointing power, to curtail

the latter's desire to 'raid' the convention of "talents" or attempt to control theconvention." (p. 10, Answer in L-32443.)

Thus the challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6132 is a validlimitation on the right to public office pursuant to state police power as it is reasonableand not arbitrary.

The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the Constitutional Convention islikewise constitutional; for it is based on a substantial distinction which makes for realdifferences, is germane to the purposes of the law, and applies to all members of thesame class. A delegate shapes the fundamental law of the land which delineates the

essential nature of the government, its basic organization and powers, defines theliberties of the people, and controls all other laws. Unlike ordinary statutes,constitutional amendments cannot be changed in one or two years. No other publicofficer possesses such a power, not even the members of Congress unless theythemselves, propose constitutional amendments when acting as a Constituent

Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the Constitution. The classification, therefore, is neitherwhimsical nor repugnant to the sense of justice of the community.

As heretofore intimated, the inhibition is relevant to the object of the law, which is toinsure that the proposed amendments are meaningful to the masses of our people andnot designed for the enhancement of selfishness, greed, corruption, or injustice.

Sect ion 8: Prohibi t ion from organizat ion and p ol i t ical party supp ort

Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is impugned by both petitioners as violative ofthe constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, freedom ofexpressions, freedom of assembly and freedom of association.

This Court ruled last year that the guarantees of due process, equal protection of thelaws, peaceful assembly, free expression, and the right of association are neitherabsolute nor illimitable rights; they are always subject to the pervasive and dormantpolice power of the State and may be lawfully abridged to serve appropriate andimportant public interests.

Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), R.A. No. 6132 prohibits:

1. any candidate for delegate to the convention

(a) from representing, or

(b) allowing himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other organization; and


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2. any political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional or other organizations ororganized group of whatever nature from

(a) intervening in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his certificate, or

(b) from giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign forelection.

While it may be true that a party's support of a candidate is not wrong per se it is equallytrue that Congress in the exercise of its broad law-making authority can declare certainacts as mala prohibita when justified by the exigencies of the times. One such act is theparty or organization support proscribed in Sec. 8(a) which ban is a valid limitation onthe freedom of association as well as expression, for the reasons aforestated.

Senator Tolentino emphasized that "equality of chances may be better attained bybanning all organization support."

We likewise concur with the Solicitor General that the equal protection of the laws is notunduly subverted in par. I of Sec. 8(a); because it does not create any hostilediscrimination against any party or group nor does it confer undue favor or privilege onan individual as heretofore stated. The discrimination applies to all organizations,whether political parties or social, civic, religious, or professional associations. The banis germane to the objectives of the law, which are to avert the debasement of theelectoral process, and to attain real equality of chances among individual candidatesand thereby make real the guarantee of equal protection of the laws.

The freedom of association also implies the liberty not to associate or join with others orjoin any existing organization. A person may run independently on his own meritswithout need of catering to a political party or any other association for support. And he,as much as any candidate whose candidacy does not evoke sympathy from any politicalparty or organized group, must be afforded equal chances. As emphasized by SenatorsTolentino and Salonga, this ban is to assure equal chances to a candidate with talentand imbued with patriotism as well as nobility of purpose, so that the country can utilizetheir services if elected.

Gonzales Vs. Comelec Case Digest

Gonzales Vs. Comelec27 SCRA 835G.R. L-27833April 18, 1969

Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nominationof candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activitywas challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free


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speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked tonullify the act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbentcouncilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate forVice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967;petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter in the

City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. There was the further allegationthat the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign arematters of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulateor curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding oragreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking thepolice power, in the absence of clear and present danger to the state, would render theconstitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M.Taada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 couldindeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, ofassembly and of association. He did justify its enactment however under the clear andpresent danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for

national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning,excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only ofefficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the CivilLiberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle wererequested to give their opinions. Respondents contend that the act was based on thepolice power of the state.

Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply anacceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are theclear and present danger rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means thatthe evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and thedegree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The dangerto be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has theadvantage of establishing according to the above decision a definite rule inconstitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly established.The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that If the words uttered create a dangeroustendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It isnot necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulnessbe advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is itnecessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts offorce, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probableeffect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative bodyseeks to prevent.

The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practicesprohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to avalid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Taadaclearly explained, such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and


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parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and presentdanger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessivepartisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariablymarred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country.

The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of itscitizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition forredress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to belimited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of asubstantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.

The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding ofinterviews for or against the election of any party or candidate for public office and theprohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, againstthe solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of anycampaign literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is repugnant to

a constitutional command.

OCCENA VS. COMELEC

SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELECG.R. NO. L-34150APRIL 2, 1981

FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gozales instituted a prohibitingproceedings against the validity of three batasang pambansa resolutions (Resolution

No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippinesnaturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposeswas approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, thePrime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commissionon Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.) The petitioners contends that suchresolution is against the constitutions in proposing amendments:

ISSUE: Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional?

HELD: In dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the court ruled the following:

1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its amendments and how itmay be exercised was validly obtained. The 1973 Constitution in its TransitoryProvisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to proposeamendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of itsmembers to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments similar with theinterim and regular national assembly. 15 When, therefore, the Interim Batasang


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Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, metas a constituent body it acted by virtue of such impotence.

2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in character as to amountto a revision rather than amendments. To dispose this contention, the court held that

whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitutionor entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitutionbased on an ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment, because thesame will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereignpeople, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact thatthe present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no argumentagainst the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or totaloverhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merelyamended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment thesame is ratified by the sovereign people."

3. That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as wellas the standard for proper submission. The language of the Constitution supplies theanswer to the above questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as aconstituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote isneeded. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votesrequired when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened asthe agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement asfar as a constitutional convention is concerned. Further, the period required by theconstitution was complied as follows: "Any amendment to, or revision of, thisConstitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscitewhich shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment orrevision." 21 The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansasitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the BatasangPambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the90-day period provided by the Constitution.

Tolentino vs COMELEC

41 SCRA 702

Facts

The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent Commission on Elections "from

undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional

amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines

to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution

No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by

declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law for being violative of the

Constitution of the Philippines. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of


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two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly

convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution

namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17,

1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention were all elected under and by virtue of said

resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132.

Issue

Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a plebiscite for

the ratification of the proposed amendment/s?

Held

The Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the people in a single

"election" or plebiscite. We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the

same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV

of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction

are null and void. lt says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a

convention called for the purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution,". The same

provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution

when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are

submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many

"elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed by the

same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says "anelection" which means only one.

The petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971

and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding

of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying

therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec,

Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby

enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar

circumstances of this case, the Court declares this decision immediately executory.

SANIDAD vs. COMELEC Case Digest

SANIDAD vs. COMELEC181 SCRA 529

Facts: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for the CordilleraAutonomous Region) was enacted into law. The plebiscite was scheduled 30 January


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1990. The Comelec, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, theOmnibus Election Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other pertinent election laws,promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the saidOrganic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspapercolumnist of Overview for the Baguio Midland Courier assailed the constitutionality of

Section 19 (Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers) of the saidresolution, which provides During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day beforeand on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer orpersonality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or againstthe plebiscite issues.

Issue: Whether columnists are prohibited from expressing their opinions, or should beunder Comelec regulation, during plebiscite periods.

Held: Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec wasthe power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or

other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media ofcommunication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and theright to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public informationcampaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. Neither Article IX-C of theConstitution nor Section 11-b, 2nd paragraph of RA 6646 (a columnist, commentator,announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take aleave of absence from his work during the campaign period) can be construed to meanthat the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exerciseby media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods.Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods areneither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidatesinvolved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 has nostatutory basis.

Javellana vs. The Executive Secretary

The Facts:

Sequence of events that lead to the filing of the Plebiscite then Ratification Cases.

The Plebiscite Case

On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by

Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments

to the Constitution of the Philippines.

Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24,

1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said Convention was held on

November 10, 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1,

1971.


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While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No.

1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law.

On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the

Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential

Decree No. 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the

Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds

therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution

on January 15, 1973.

On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of

the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from implementing

Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court," upon the grounds, inter

alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law because the calling ... of such

plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be

used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the

purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress ...," and "there is no proper submission

to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech,

press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof."

On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of

Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution.

On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or

rejection of the Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973,

when General Order No. 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January

15, 1978, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order No. 20, moreover, "suspended in the

meantime" the "order of December 17, 1972, temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No.

1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution."

Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court

deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date

nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then,

again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January

22, 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was that the President does not

have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress

unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the

President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission

on Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases.

"In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No.L-35948 filed an "urgentmotion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15,


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1973."

The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring the

respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said "urgent motion" and "manifestation," "not later

than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973." Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the

petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a "supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order

and inclusion of additional respondents," praying:

"... that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on Elections, as

well as the Department of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roo; the Department of

Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating

Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all

other officials and persons who may be assigned such task, from collecting, certifying, and announcing

and reporting to the President or other officials concerned, the so-called Citizens' Assemblies

referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the period

comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of

this Supplemental Urgent Motion."

On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case

G.R. No. L-35948 to file "file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16,

1973," and setting the motion for hearing "on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m." While the case was being

heard, on the date last mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this

opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to

him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President.

Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No.

L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and the public there present

that the President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said

Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning.

Thereupon, the writer read Proclamation No. 1102 which is of the following tenor:

____________________________

"BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

"PROCLAMATION NO. 1102

"ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE

1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.

"WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional Convention

is subject to ratification by the Filipino people;

"WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards in

chartered cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31, 1972, composed of all

persons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least six months, fifteen years of age or

over, citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly members kept by

the barrio, district or ward secretary;

"WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the base of citizen


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participation in the democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express their

views on important national issues;

"WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86-A, dated

January 5, 1973, the following questions were posed before the Citizens Assemblies or Barangays: Do

you approve of the New Constitution? Do you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new

Constitution?

"WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty-one (14,976,561)

members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution,

as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (743,869) who voted for its

rejection; while on the question as to whether or not the people would still like a plebiscite to be called

to ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million two hundred ninety-eight thousand eight hundred

fourteen (14,298,814) answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of the

Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite;

"WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the members

of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution, the Katipunan ng Mga

Barangay has strongly recommended that the new Constitution should already be deemed ratified by

the Filipino people;

"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in

me vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution proposed by the

nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an

overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies)

throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect.

"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the

Philippines to be affixed.

"Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and

seventy-three.

(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS"President of the Philippines"By the President:

"ALEJANDRO MELCHOR"Executive Secretary"_________________________________

The Ratification Case

On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the Executive Secretary and the

Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents "and theirsubordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found

in the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935. The petition therein, filed by Josue Javellana, as a

"Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter" and as "a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all

citizens and voters similarly situated," was amended on or about January 24, 1973. After reciting in

substance the facts set forth in the decision in the plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the President

had announced "the immediate implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents


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including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said

proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed

Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are

without power to approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to

proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election

held to ratify the proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void."

The Issue:

1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-

justiciable, question?

2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with

substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory

provisions?

3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by

the people? (acquiesced - "permission" given by silence or passiveness. Acceptance or agreement by

keeping quiet or by not making objections.)

4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?

5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?

The Resolution:

Summary:

The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when the crucial

question of whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court (Justices Makalintal,

Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. Concepcion, together

Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, voted to grant the relief being sought, thus upholding the

1973 Constitution.

Details:

1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore non-

justiciable, question?

On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,

Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of

Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and Castro

did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second question.

Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by the


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people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually been such an

approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will,

but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV

of the 1935 Constitution been complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3)

members of the Court hold that the issue is political and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry."

2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with

substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory

provisions?

On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,

Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the

1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the

1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in

accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters.

Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been

validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding

the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in the

manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In

view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there

was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution

without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am constrained to

hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be deemed to have

cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of them by Article XV,

hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after all, said Article has

been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been constitutionally

ratified."

Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view

there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid

ratification.

3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by

the people?

On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed

Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court.

Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the people

have already accepted the 1973 Constitution."

Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free

expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the

Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law. Justice


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Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the

effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced

in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that

such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of

ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a

concomitant feature of martial law." 88

Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the

question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Under

a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted,

(they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted

the Constitution."

4. Are petitioners entitled to relief?

On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro,

Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so

voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is

the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than

judicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this Court, 90 are relevant and unavoidable." 91

Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to

deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.

5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?

On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force:

Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is

in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof;

Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no

vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with

judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and

Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed

by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not enough votes to

declare that the new Constitution is not in force.

ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo,

Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices

Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the

vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in

force and effect.

It is so ordered.


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SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC Case Digest

SANTIAGO VS. COMELECG.R. NO. L-44640OCTOBER 12, 1976

FACTS: On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with publicrespondent Commission on Elections a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift TermLimits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition) whereinDelfin asked the COMELEC for an order

1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;

2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition forInitiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;

3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assistPetitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the datesdesignated for the purpose.

Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People'sInitiative, a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalizepeople power; that he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend toexercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted underSection 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall beconducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, asrequired in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all

over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verifythe signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and othervolunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates to bedesignated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; andthat to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewisenecessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall beaffixed, be published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the controland supervision of the COMELEC.

The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended areSections 4 and 7 of Article VI, 7 Section 4 of Article VII, 8 and Section 8 of Article X 9 of

the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletionfrom the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with thefollowing proposition:

DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVEGOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7


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OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OFTHE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?

According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people,and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters

in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.

On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago,Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action forprohibition raising the following arguments:

(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can onlybe implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; infact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution

Amendments by People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional

Amendments.

(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiativeon the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provideany subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, whichare specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omissionindicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to somefuture law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in hisprivilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: "There is not a single word in thatlaw which can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative].Such implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.

(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in printmedia. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendmentsbecause the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after publication.

(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "theconduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national andlocal laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution isconcerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for theexercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorizedby the Constitution to pass the implementing law.

(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revisionthereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outsidethe power of the people's initiative.

(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither theCOMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has realigned fundsfor the purpose.


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ISSUES:

1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative andReferendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover

initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded,adequately covers such initiative.

2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules andRegulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative andReferendum on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative onamendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specificprovisions on the conduct of such initiative.

HELD:

Issue 1Whether R.A. No. 6735 is sufficient to cover the peoples initiative topropose amendments?

R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ONAMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM. Curiously, while R.A. No. 6735 exertedutmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the implementation of initiativeand referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them special attention, itfailed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to theConstitution. R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms andconditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions,to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority underno. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showingthat the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, settingforth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and(b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficientstandard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundariesand specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under whichthe legislative command is to be effected.

Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No.6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. Thedelegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.

Issue 2 Validi ty o f Com elec Resolut ion 2300


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It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations toimplement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to theConstitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No.6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power is misplaced, for the laws and regulationsreferred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of

Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorizedand which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.

Lozano vs Nograles

Facts:

The two petitions, filed by their respective petitioners in their capacities as concerned citizens and

taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled A Resolution Calling upon

the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the

Constitution, Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress. Both petitions seek to triggera justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive interpretation by the Court of Section 1, Article

XVII, which provides for the procedure for amending or revising the Constitution. The petitioners alleged

that HR 1109 is unconstitutional for deviation from the prescribed procedures to amend the

Constitution by excluding the Senate of the Philippines from the complete process of proposing

amendments to the Constitution and for lack of thorough debates and consultations.

Issue:

Whether or not the Congress committed a violation in promulgating the HR1109.

Held:

No, the House that the Congress ought to convene into a Constituent Assembly and adopt some Rules

for proposing changes to the charter. The House has said it would forward H.Res.1109 to the Senate for

its approval and adoption and the possible promulgation of a Joint and Concurrent Resolution convening

the Congress into a Constituent Assembly. Petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or

hardship from the act complained of. House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of

Representatives shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to

the Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no rules of procedure have yet been

adopted. No proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse ofdiscretion has yet taken place. House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential example of an

uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The

House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant an intervention from this Court. Judicial

review is exercised only to remedy a particular and concrete injury.

The petitions were dismissed.

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