constitutional design institutional choices for democracy

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Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

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Page 1: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Constitutional Design

Institutional Choices for Democracy

Page 2: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Consensual vs. Majoritarian Government

Competing goals of democracy:• Representativeness/Inclusiveness

Include all major groups in government. Give everyone a voice.Make sure each group has a fair share of power, in proportion to their numbers in society, or to their votesversus….

Page 3: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Consensual vs. Majoritarian, 2

• Efficiency and GovernabilityEfficiency= ability of voters to identify a clear choice, and to obtain alternation in governmentGovernability= the capacity of government to make and carry out decisions. Is facilitated by coherent (especially one-party) political majorities.

Page 4: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

The Trade-Off• It is impossible to maximize both

inclusiveness and efficiency. • The more political parties/voices are

included in government, the harder it is for government to achieve clear decisions

• The greater the number of political parties in parliament, and the more fragmented the power, the harder it is for voters to determine how their vote will affect who rules

Page 5: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Consensual vs. Majoritarian cont.

• A highly inclusive system may be very “fair” but prone to deadlock or slow decision-making

• Where one party has a majority in parliament, or control of the presidency and congress, the system may be very efficient, but overrun minority rights—or even the interests of a majority

Page 6: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Dimensions of Majoritarian vs. Consensus Govt.

1. One-party cabinets concentration of power

2. Fusion of power, cabinet dominance

3. Unicameral legislatureor asymmetric bicameral

4. Two-party system5. One-dimensional party

system

1. Executive power sharing (grand coalition)

2. Separation of powers3. Bicameral legislature

with balanced powers4. Multiparty system5. Multi-dimensional party

system

Page 7: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Dimensions of Majoritarian vs. Consensus Govt.

6. Majoritarian electoral system (single-member district, plurality)

7. Unitary, centralized government

8. Unwritten constitutionparliamentary sovereignty

9. Interest Group pluralism

6. Proportional representation

7. Federalism, decentralization of power

8. Written constitutionconstitutional rigidity, minority vetos

9. Interest group corporatism

Page 8: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Plurality Plurality Electoral SystemElectoral System

Proportional Proportional RepresentationRepresentation

PresidentiPresidentialal

Quasi-Quasi-majoritarian majoritarian government, government, checks and checks and balancesbalances

Less Less majoritarianmajoritarian

(potential for (potential for extreme extreme deadlock)deadlock)

ParliamenParliamen-tary-tary

Westminster Westminster modelmodel

(highly (highly majoritarian)majoritarian)

Consensus Consensus modelmodel

(coalition (coalition government)government)

Four Models of Democracy

Page 9: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Parliamentary Government

• Fuses legislative and executive power• Prime minister may be less powerful

than an executive president: no fixed term, can easily be brought down by a fragmented parliament

• Prime minister may be more powerful than an executive president… if his/her party has a majority of parliament

Page 10: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Consensus Model of Parliamentary Government, with PR

• Highly inclusive, large coalitions• But if parliament is highly

fragmented into many parties and ideologically opposed camps, may be highly fragile and volatile; can be brought down easily if a party withdraws

• Blackmail power for small parties in forming and sustaining government (secret protracted negotiations)

Page 11: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Possible adjustments to Consensus Model

• Constructive Vote of No Confidence• Direct Election of the Prime Minister• Semi-proportional (mixed electoral system)• But where divisions are territorially based,

SMD/Plurality system may fragmented parliament, consensus model (India)

Page 12: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Parliamentary vs. Presidential Government

Which is Better?Why?

Page 13: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Parliamentary vs. Presidential Govt.Critique of Presidentialism Defense of Presidendialism

1. Temporal Rigidityfixed term of president prevents adaptation to unexpected events

2. Plebiscitary characterpersonal claim to full legitimacy

3. Concentration of power and legitimacy in one office personalization of power

1. Executive Stability and predictability,and greater accountability

2. Unifying symbol for the nation

3. But pres sys= checks and balances, parl sys fuses leg and exec roles

Page 14: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Parliamentary vs. Presidential Govt.Critique of Presidentialism Defense of

Presidendialism

4. Term limits lead to chronic lame-duck status

5. Inadequate means for succession

6. Zero-sum politics with unitary executiveWinner take all

4. PM can continue in office indefinitelyPres system can be two terms

5. Succession is unstable and uncertain in parl sys

6. Ways to mitigate zero-sum character:

• run-off presidential election• preferential voting for presid• special majority requirements

Page 15: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Parliamentary vs. Presidential Govt.Critique of Presidentialism Defense of

Presidendialism

7. Zero-sum nature is bad fit for divided society

8. Absence of separate head of state who can moderate crisis

9. Danger of deadlock if pres has no Cong majority

10.Generates weak parties

7. Choose difft elec sys for presid: “vote pooling” with special majority requirements

8. Monarchy or Pres is very weak in parl sys

9. Can have majoritarian elec sys, & simultaneous elections

10.Strong parties can be too strong

Page 16: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

How to Structure a Presidential System

Term Limits? What other restraints?

Page 17: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Electoral System Alternatives

The basic choice:

Majoritarian vs. proportional Or something in between

Page 18: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Majoritarian Electoral System Options

Winning candidates or party receive the most votes (not necessarily the absolute majority; sometimes plurality)

Types of Majoritarian Systems:• Single Member District Plurality • Alternative Vote • Two Round System • Block Vote • Party Block Vote • Single Non-Transferable Vote

Page 19: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Single-Member District, Plurality

• in Single-member district plurality (SMDP) systems individuals cast a single vote for a candidate in a single-member district. Candidate with the most votes is elected

• E.g.: United States, Britain, Canada, India, Jamaica • Advantages:

• Simplicity; easy to administer and low in cost • Accountability • Clear majortities (see UK elections results)

• Disadvantages: • Potential for unrepresentative outcomes • Encourages strategic rather than sincere voting • May not discourage ethnic voting where ethnic groups

are territorially concentrated (Africa)

Page 20: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Alternative Vote (or Preferential Vote)

• Used in single member districts; voters mark their preferences by rank-ordering the candidates.

• Essentially, an “instant run-off.” Candidate who receives absolute majority is elected; if no candidate wins absolute majority then the candidate with fewest votes is eliminated and his/her votes are reallocated to next peferences until one candidate has an absolute majority of the valid votes remaining.

• E.g.:Australia, Fiji, Ireland Presid. elections

Page 21: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Alternative Vote:alternative views

Advantages: – Similar to SMDP; only one representative

accountability – Less strategic voting – encourages broad based appeals to gain

‘second preference votes’ of non-core voters: “vote pooling” across ethnic lines

Disadvantages: – Complicated (literacy requirement),

expensive – possible for majority of voters to prefer

alternative candidate

Page 22: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Two-Round System• Potential for two rounds of elections.

Candidates or parties are automatically elected in first round if they obtain a specified level of votes (typically majority). Otherwise second round in which parties or candidates with the most votes win.

• Ex: France (presidential [i], legislative [ii]) Argentina, Nicaragua

Page 23: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Two Round Systemtwo views

Advantages: • TRS allows voters more choice than

SMDP; voters can change their minds for second round • Less incentive for strategic voting

(e.g. France – LePen) Disadvantages:

• Costly on administration and voters (may have to vote twice) • Disproportional results; hurt minority

representation

Page 24: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Single Non-Transferable Vote

• Equivalent of SMDP in multi-member districts • Voters cast a single candidate-centered vote in

a multi-member district; individual candidates with the highest vote totals are elected

• Ex: Japan (1947-1993),Taiwanese parliament – • Advantages:

• more proportional than SMDP • better representation of small or minority parties

– • Disadvantages: • incentives for intra-party fighting and factionalization • few incentives for broad based coalition • Strategic issues for parties and voters (parties don’t want to

nominate too many candidates in district; voters want to elect as many candidates as possible from preferred party)

Page 25: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Proportional RepresentationQuota- or divisor-based electoral system employed in

multimember districts. Parties win seat shares in proportion to their shares of the vote.

Advantages over majoritarian systems:• More accurate translation of votes into seats, more

proportional • Smaller parties can win representation (minority

rep.) • Weaker incentives for strategic voting; instead,

coalition governments and power-sharing Disadvantages: • Less accountability (hard to identify policy makers,

difficult to punish parties) • Coalitions governments are more unstable; may

need to include small, extreme parties

Page 26: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

PR Type: Closed Party Lists

• The parties decide the order in which candidates receive the seats. (Party leaders and important figures will be placed at the top of the list)

• Political parties tend to be more important than

individual candidates.• Generates highly disciplined political parties

in parliament:Examples: Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Israel, South Africa.

Page 27: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Open List PR

• Open party lists: Voters determine which candidates on the party lists get the seats allocated to the party.

• In some countries like Finland, voters have to express a preference for a specific candidate.(However, in Denmark voters can vote for a party or a candidate.)

• Increases voter choice and accountability of representatives….

• But reduces the importance of party labels, and the level of party discipline.

• E.g.: Brazil, Finland, Netherlands, Sri Lanka

Page 28: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Single Transferable Vote

• Essentially the same as the Alternative Vote, but applied in multimember districts

• Candidates that get a specified quota of first-preference votes are immediately elected; in successive counts, votes from eliminated candidates and surplus votes are reallocated to the remaining candidates until all seats are filled.

• Very complex but many of the advantages of the AV system, yet more proportional.

• E.g.: Ireland, Malta, Australia

Page 29: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Mixed Electoral SystemsPlurality Plus PR

• Voters elect representatives through two different systems, one majoritarian and one proportional.

• Majoritarian rules may be used in one electoral tier, and proportional rules in another electoral tier. Most mixed systems have multiple tiers.

• Mixed electoral systems come in two types: Independent & Dependent

Page 30: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Independent Mixed System(or Parallel Mixed System)

• Voters cast two ballots, one for a party list, one for a candidate in their district.

• The majoritarian and proportional components of the electoral system are implemented independently of one another.

• E.g.: Japan Diet: 300 seats from SMPD, and 200 from closed-list PR seats (later reduced to 180)

• Minor parties usually only win PR seats

Page 31: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Dependent Mixed Electoral Systems(Mixed Member Proportional)

• In most dependent mixed systems, individuals have two votes (eg. Germany, New Zealand). One vote is for the representative at the district level (candidate vote). One vote is for the party list in the higher electoral tier (party vote).

• After the winners in the districts are established, each party wins seats from its party lists sufficient to give it an overall share of seats in parliament proportional to its party-list vote.

Page 32: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Problems with Mixed Systesm (dependent)

• Two issues come up with dependent mixed systems

1. Some candidates compete for constituency seats but are also placed on the party list.

2. Some parties win more constituency seats than is justified by their party list vote. This leads to Overhang Seats.

Page 33: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

The degree of proportionality in PR systems

PR systems vary in their degree of proportionality. This is shaped by several factors:

1. The electoral threshold2. District magnitude (how many

members per district)3. The technical electoral formula for

allocating seats to votes

Page 34: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Electoral ThresholdsThe minimum percentage of the vote a party

must win in order to have representation in parliament

• Germany requires that parties win 5% of the national vote or at least 3 constituency seats to be eligible to receive votes from the upper tier. – Turkey has a 10% threshold, while Poland has a 5% threshold

for parties but an 8% threshold for coalitions.

• “Pure PR”: No electoral districts and no threshold: Since there is only one district in the Netherlands, there is a natural threshold of 0.67% of the votes i.e. 100% divided by 150 legislative seats.

• In Jan 2005, Iraq also opted for no districts and no thresholds (switched to districts in Dec 2005)

Page 35: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Side-Effects of Thresholds

• Can reduce the fragmentation of parliament into many parties, but can also produce majoritarian outcomes.

• In the Turkish legislative elections of 2002, so many parties failed to surpass the 10% threshold that fully 46% of all votes cast in these elections were wasted. Only two parties won seats. In 2007, only three parties won seats. AKP won 62% of seats with 47% of the vote.

• In the Polish legislative elections of 1993, fully 34% of the votes were wasted because of the 5% threshold for parties and 8% threshold for coalitions. In the Polish case, these wasted votes were crucial in allowing the former communists to return to power.

Page 36: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

District Magnitude• Average District Magnitude is the key

characteristic that determines how proportional or permissive an electoral system will be.

• In PR systems, the bigger the district, the more proportional the system. In a three-seat district, a party would need to win +25% of the vote to guarantee getting a seat. In a nine-seat district, a party would need to win only +10% of the vote to get at least one seat.

• District magnitude: number of members elected from the district. One nationwide district in: Netherlands (150), Israel (120), Iraq-Jan 2005 (275).

Page 37: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

District Magnitude cont.

• In Majoritarian systems, the bigger the district, the more disproportional the outcome. E.g.: U.S. States vs. Congressional districts.

• California has 2 Democrats elected to the Senate, but 33 Dems and 20 Repubs to Congress (in 2003).

Page 38: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Why Iraq needed and now has electoral districts

• Purely national lists privilege national-level ethnic and sectarian identities

• Districts give voters the option to vote for local notables and independent candidates

• Districts promote more local-level accountability in the voting decision

• Districts enable voters to know who their representatives are in Parliament (same problem in South Africa)

Page 39: Constitutional Design Institutional Choices for Democracy

Two (or more) Tiered PR Systems

• Local tier: Divide the country up into districts of moderate size (e.g. 3 to 15 members). Most of the seats (e.g. 70-80%) are drawn from the districts.

• National tier: Then parties draw from national lists to “top off” their parliamentary delegations and achieve greater proportionality.

• Iraq system, Dec 2005: 230 district seats (based in provinces), 45 seats (16% of total) from national lists.