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    CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1

    FILE No. 8

    VI. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

    a. PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT

    i) Qualifications (Sections 2 and 3)

    Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is anatural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter,able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the dayof the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at leastten years immediately preceding such election.

    Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have thesame qualifications and term of office and be elected with,and in the same manner, as the President. He may beremoved from office in the same manner as the President.

    The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of theCabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.

    President Vice President

    At least 40 years old on the day ofelection

    At least 40 years old on the dayof election

    Natural-born citizen of thePhilippines Natural-born citizen of thePhilippines

    Able to read and write Able to read and write

    Register voter Register voter

    Resident of the Philippines for at Resident of the Philippines for at

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    least 10 years immediatelypreceding the election

    least 10 years immediatelypreceding the election

    Term of 6 years Term of 6 years

    Unless otherwise provided by law,term of office commence at noonof June 30 next following theelection

    Unless otherwise provided bylaw, term of office commence atnoon of June 30 next followingthe election

    Single term only; not eligible forany re-electionAny person who has succeeded asPresident, and served as such formore than 4 years shall NOT be

    qualified for election to the sameoffice at any time.

    Term limitation: 2 successiveterms.

    CASES

    Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses: "Noperson may be elected President unless he is a natural-borncitizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read andwrite, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a

    resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediatelypreceding such election."

    The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those whoare citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to performany act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Thedate, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through itshistory, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jussoli, res judicata and jus sanguinis[28] had been in vogue. Onlytwo, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being

    a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. With the adoption ofthe 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationshipwould now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.

    Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizensof the Philippines -

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    (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time ofthe adoption of this Constitution(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who,before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected topublic office in the Philippine Islands.

    (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines andupon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. (Tecson vs.COMELEC, GR 161434, March 3, 2004).

    ii) Election and Term of Office (Sections 4 and 5)

    Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall beelected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years

    which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June nextfollowing the day of the election and shall end at noon of thesame date, six years thereafter. The President shall not beeligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded asPresident and has served as such for more than four yearsshall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.

    No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successiveterms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length oftime shall not be considered as an interruption in thecontinuity of the service for the full term for which he was

    elected.

    Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election forPresident and Vice-President shall be held on the secondMonday of May.

    The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of eachprovince or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress,directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of thecertificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not

    later than thirty days after the day of the election, open allthe certificates in the presence of the Senate and the Houseof Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress,upon determination of the authenticity and due executionthereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

    The person having the highest number of votes shall beproclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an

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    equal and highest number of votes, one of them shallforthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all theMembers of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

    The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of

    the certificates.

    The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge ofall contests relating to the election, returns, andqualifications of the President or Vice-President, and maypromulgate its rules for the purpose.

    Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office,the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting Presidentshall take the following oath or affirmation:

    "I do solemnly swear [or affirm] that I will faithfully andconscientiously fulfill my duties as President [or Vice-President or Acting President] of the Philippines, preserveand defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice toevery man, and consecrate myself to the service of theNation. So help me God." [In case of affirmation, lastsentence will be omitted].

    1. Regular second Monday of May, every six years;

    2. Special

    Requisites:

    a. death, permanent disability, removal from office orresignation of both the President and the Vice President.

    b. vacancies occur more than eighteen months before the nextregular presidential election;c. a law passed by Congress calling for a special election toelect a President and Vice President to be held not earlier than45 days nor later than 60 days from the time of such call (Sec.

    10, Art VII).

    - Congress as canvassing board- Supreme Court as Electoral Tribunal

    CASES

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    The term of office of the Senators who would be elected wouldbe six years, to commence at noon on the thirtieth day of Junenext following their election and to end at noon of 30 June 2001.Protestant Santiago filed a certificate of candidacy for Senator inthe 8 May 1995 election, campaigned for such office, and

    submitted herself to be voted upon. She filed her certificate ofcandidacy for the Senate without any qualification, condition, orreservation. In so doing, she entered into a political contract withthe electorate that if elected, she would assume the office ofSenator, discharge its functions and serve her constituency assuch for the term for which she was elected. The term of office ofthe Senators elected in the 8 May 1995 election is six years, thefirst three of which coincides with the last three years of the termof the President elected in the 11 May 1992 synchronizedelections. The latter would be Protestant Santiago's term if shewould succeed in proving in the instant protest. that she was the

    true winner in the 1992 elections.In assuming the office of Senatorthen, the Protestant has effectively abandoned or withdrawn thisprotest. Such abandonment or withdrawal operates to rendermoot the instant protest. Another reason why this case shouldnow be dismissed is the fact that the Protestant has decided towaive the revision of the remaining unrevised ballots from 4,017precincts out of the 17,527 precincts of the designated three pilotareas. This is an unabashed reversal from her original stand in herMotion and Manifestation dated 18 October 1993. Until thepresent, however, the Protestant has not informed the Tribunalwhether after the completion of the revision of the ballots from

    her pilot areas, she still intends to present evidence in connectiontherewith. This failure then, is nothing short of a manifestindication that she no longer intends to do so. All told, a dismissalof this election protest is inevitable (Defensor-Santiago vs. Ramos, PETCase No. 001, Feb. 13, 1996).

    iii) Privileges (Section 6)

    Section 6. The President shall have an official residence. Thesalaries of the President and Vice-President shall be

    determined by law and shall not be decreased during theirtenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effectuntil after the expiration of the term of the incumbent duringwhich such increase was approved. They shall not receiveduring their tenure any other emolument from theGovernment or any other source.

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    Official residence

    Salary

    Official salaries are determines by law. Salaries cannot be decreased during the TENURE of the President

    and the Vice-President

    Increases take effect only after the expiration of the TERM of theincumbent during which the increase was approved.

    Prohibited from receiving any other emolument from thegovernment of any other source during their TENURE.

    Presidential Immunity

    CASES

    It is elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune fromsuit or from being brought to court during the period of theirincumbency and tenure (In re: Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160).

    The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of

    immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential dutiesand functions free from any hindrance or distraction, consideringthat being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that,

    aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demandsundivided attention. But this privilege of immunity from suit,pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may beinvoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other personin the President's behalf Thus, an accused in a criminal case inwhich the President is complainant cannot raise the presidentialprivilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceedingagainst such accused. Moreover, there is nothing in our laws thatwould prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if sominded the President may shed the protection afforded by theprivilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of

    whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely thePresident's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumedand imposed by any other person (Beltran vs. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393).

    Issue: Is the President's right to safeguard certain information,

    using his "executive privilege" confidentiality power, entirelyimmune from judicial review? No. The Court held that neither thedoctrine of separation of powers, nor the generalized need for

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    confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, cansustain an absolute, unqualified, presidential privilege. The Courtgranted that there was a limited executive privilege in areas ofmilitary or diplomatic affairs, but gave preference to "thefundamental demands of due process of law in the fair

    administration of justice." Therefore, the president must obey thesubpoena and produce the tapes and documents. Nixon resignedshortly after the release of the tapes (US vs. Nixon, 418 US 683, 41L.Ed. 2D 1039).

    The President's absolute immunity is a functionally mandatedincident of his unique office, rooted in the constitutional traditionof the separation of powers and supported by the Nation's history.Because of the singular importance of the President's duties,diversion of his energies by concern with private lawsuits wouldraise unique risks to the effective functioning of government.

    While the separation-of-powers doctrine does not bar everyexercise of jurisdiction over the President, a court, beforeexercising jurisdiction, must balance the constitutional weight ofthe interest to be served against the dangers of intrusion on theauthority and functions of the Executive Branch. The exercise ofjurisdiction is not warranted in the case of merely private suits fordamages based on a President's official acts. Pp. 748-754.

    The President's absolute immunity extends to all acts within the

    "outer perimeter" of his duties of office. A rule of absoluteimmunity for the President does not leave the Nation without

    sufficient protection against his misconduct. There remains theconstitutional remedy of impeachment, as well as the deterrenteffects of constant scrutiny by the press and vigilant oversight byCongress. Other incentives to avoid misconduct may include adesire to earn reelection, the need to maintain prestige as anelement of Presidential influence, and a President's traditionalconcern for his historical stature (Nixon vs. Fitzgerald, 457 US 731).

    The court explained that the President, like other officials, is

    subject to the same laws that apply to all citizens, that no casehad been found in which an official was granted immunity fromsuit for his unofficial acts, and that the rationale for officialimmunity is inapposite where only personal, private conduct by aPresident is at issue. Moreover, immunities for acts clearly withinofficial capacity are grounded in the nature of the functionperformed, not the identity of the actor who performed it. Theseparation of powers doctrine does not require federal courts tostay all private actions against the President until he leaves office.

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    Even accepting the unique importance of the Presidency in theconstitutional scheme, it does not follow that that doctrine wouldbe violated by allowing this action to proceed. The doctrineprovides a self executing safeguard against the encroachment oraggrandizement of one of the three co equal branches of

    Government at the expense of another (Clinton vs. Jones, 520 US 681,May 27, 1997).

    Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being

    brought to court during the period of their incumbency andtenure" but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstancethat the impeachment process against the petitioner has beenaborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estradacannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminalprosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in theimpeachment proceedings. As to the scope of immunity that can

    be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filedagainst petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involveplunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of theimagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries thedeath penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of anon-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of thisCourt licensing the President to commit criminal acts andwrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will beanomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability forunlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts ofpublic officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts

    illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing asany trespasser (Estrada vs. Arroyo, GR 146738, March 2, 2001).

    Section 3 (7) of Article XI of the Constitution conveys two

    uncomplicated ideas: first, it tells us that judgment inimpeachment cases has a limited reach. . .i.e., it cannot extendfurther than removal from office and disqualification to hold anyoffice under the Republic of the Philippines, and second, it tells usthe consequence of the limited reach of a judgment inimpeachment proceedings considering its nature, i.e., that theparty convicted shall still be liable and subject to prosecution, trial

    and punishment according to law. No amount of manipulation willjustify petitioners non sequitur submission that the provisionrequires that his conviction in the impeachment proceedings is acondition sine qua non to his prosecution, trial and punishment forthe offenses he is now facing before the respondent Ombudsman.Petitioner contends that the private and public prosecutors walkout from the impeachment proceedings should be consideredfailure to prosecute... amounts to an acquittal for purposes of

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    applying the rule against double jeopardy. However, the Courtrules that without ruling on the nature of impeachmentproceedings, it rejects petitioners submission. Double jeopardyattaches only: (1) upon a valid complaint; (2) before a competentcourt; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been

    entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convictedor the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without theexpress consent of the accused. Assuming arguendo that the firstfour requisites of double jeopardy were complied with, petitionerfailed to satisfy the fifth requisite for he was not acquitted nor wasthe impeachment proceeding dismissed without his expressconsent. Petitioner stubbornly clings to the contention that he isentitled to absolute immunity from suit, and oes a step furtherand avers that even a non-sitting President enjoys immunity fromsuit during his term of office. Petitioner, however, fails todistinguish between term and tenure. The term means the time

    during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right,and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shallsucceed one another. The tenure represents the term duringwhich the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may beshorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power ofthe incumbent. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers isclear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrentonly with his tenure and not his term (Estrada vs. Arroyo, GR 146738,Motion for Recon., April 3, 2001).

    iv)Prohibitions and inhibitions (Section 13)

    Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of theCabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unlessotherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other officeor employment during their tenure. They shall not, duringsaid tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any otherprofession, participate in any business, or be financiallyinterested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or specialprivilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-

    owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. Theyshall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of theiroffice.

    Prohibited from:

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    Holding any office or employment during their tenure, UNLESS:otherwise provided in the Constitution (e.g. VP can be appointed aCabinet Member, Sec. of Justice sits on Judicial and Bar Council); orthe positions are ex-officio and they do not receive any salary ofother emoluments therefore (e.g. Sec. of Finance is head of

    Monetary Board).

    Practicing, directly or indirectly, any other profession duringtheir tenure;

    Participating in any business;

    Being financially interested in any contract with, or in anyfranchise, or special privilege granted by the government or anysubdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including GOCCs ortheir subsidiaries.

    v) Presidential Succession (Section 7,8,9,10 and12)

    Section 7. The President-elect and the Vice President-electshall assume office at the beginning of their terms.

    If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-electshall act as President until the President-elect shall havequalified.

    If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have beenchosen and qualified.

    If at the beginning of the term of the President, thePresident-elect shall have died or shall have becomepermanently disabled, the Vice President-elect shall becomePresident.

    Where no President and Vice-President shall have beenchosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have diedor become permanently disabled, the President of the Senateor, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives, shall act as President until a President or aVice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.

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    The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in whichone who is to act as President shall be selected until aPresident or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case ofdeath, permanent disability, or inability of the officialsmentioned in the next preceding paragraph.

    Section 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removalfrom office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpiredterm. In case of death, permanent disability, removal fromoffice, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of hisinability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shallthen act as President until the President or Vice-Presidentshall have been elected and qualified.

    The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve asPresident in case of death, permanent disability, orresignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until thePresident or the Vice-President shall have been elected andqualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powersand disqualifications as the Acting President.

    Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of theVice-President during the term for which he was elected, thePresident shall nominate a Vice-President from among theMembers of the Senate and the House of Representatives

    who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority voteof all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, votingseparately.

    Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morningof the third day after the vacancy in the offices of thePresident and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordancewith its rules without need of a call and within seven days,enact a law calling for a special election to elect a Presidentand a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-fivedays nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The

    bill calling such special election shall be deemed certifiedunder paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitutionand shall become law upon its approval on third reading bythe Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall becharged against any current appropriations and shall beexempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25,Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening of the Congresscannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No

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    special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs withineighteen months before the date of the next presidentialelection.

    Section 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the

    public shall be informed of the state of his health. Themembers of the Cabinet in charge of national security andforeign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces ofthe Philippines, shall not be denied access to the Presidentduring such illness.

    1. Vacancies at the beginning of the term.

    Vacancy SuccessorPresident-elect fails to qualify orto be chosen

    VP-elect will be Acting Presidentuntil someone is qualified /

    chosen as President.President-elect dies or ispermanently disabled.

    VP becomes President.

    Both President and VP-elect arenot chosen or do not qualify orboth die, or both becomepermanently disabled.

    1) Senate President or2) In case of his inability, theSpeaker of the House shall act asPresident until a President or a VPshall have been chosen andqualified. In case of death ordisability of (1) and (2) Congressshall determine, by law, who will

    be the acting President.

    2. Vacancies after the office is initially filled:

    Vacancy SuccessorPresident dies, is permanentlydisabled, is impeached, orresigns.

    Vice-President becomes Presidentfor the unexpired term.

    Both President and Vice-President die, becomepermanently disabled, are

    impeached, or resign.

    1. Senate President or2. In case of his inability, the

    Speaker of the House shall act

    as President until the Presidentor VP shall have been electedand qualified.

    3. Vacancy in office of Vice-President during the termfor which he was elected:

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    a) President will nominate new VP from any member of either Houseof Congress.b) Nominee shall assume office upon confirmation by majority vote ofALL members of both Houses, voting separately. (Nominee forfeitsseat in Congress).

    4. Election of President and Vice-President aftervacancy during term.

    a) Congress shall convene 3 days after the vacancy in the office ofboth the President and the VP, without need of a call. The conveningo Congress cannot be suspended.b) Within 7 days after convening, Congress shall enact a law callingfor a special election to elect a President and a VP. The specialelection cannot be postponed.c) The special election shall be held not earlier than 45 days not laterthan 60 days from the time of the enactment of the law.

    d) The 3 readings for the special law need not beheld on separate days.

    e) The law shall be deemed enacted upon itsapproval on third reading.

    BUT: No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurswithin 18 months before the date of the next presidential election.

    5. Temporary Disability of the President: The temporary inability ofthe President to discharge his duties may be raised in either of twoways:a) By the President himself, when he sends a written declaration to

    the Senate President and the Speaker of the House. In this case, theVice-President will be Acting President until the President transmits awritten declaration to the contrary.b) When a majority of the Cabinet members transmit to the SenatePresident and the Speaker their written declaration.i. The VP will immediately be Acting

    President.ii. BUT: If the President transmits a written declaration that he is notdisabled, he reassumes his position.iii. If within 5 days after the President re-assumes his position, themajority of the Cabinet retransmits their written declaration, Congress

    shall decide the issue. In the event, Congress shall reconvene within48 hours if it is not in session, without need of a call.iv. Within 10 days after Congress is required to assemble, or 12 daysif Congress is not in session, a 2/3 majority of both Houses, votingseparately, is needed to find the President temporarily disabled, inwhich case, the VP will be Acting President.

    6. Presidential illness :

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    a) If the President is seriously ill, the public must beinformed thereof.

    b) Even during such illness, the National Security Adviser, theSecretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Chief of Staff of the AFP reentitled to access to the President.

    vi)Removal of the President

    CASES

    Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffersfrom a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office ofthe President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took heroath as President. The issue then is whether the petitioner

    resigned as President or should be considered resigned as ofJanuary 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th

    President of the Public. Resignation is not a high level legalabstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyondquibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must becoupled by acts of relinquishment.78The validity of a resignation isnot government by any formal requirement as to form. It can beoral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As longas the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. n sum,we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted.It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release

    containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit withreservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leavingthe Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace andin order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not sayhe was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that hewas going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disabilitydisappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for theopportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to thepast opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) heassured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may

    come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner'sreference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of thepresident which he has given up; and (5) he called on hissupporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive nationalspirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spiritof reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did notgive up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's

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    valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in thepart tense(Estrada vs. Arroyo, GR 146738, March 2, 2001).

    Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to

    determine whether the President is incapable of performing his

    functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII.The recognition of respondent Arroyo as our de jure presidentmade by Congress is unquestionably a political judgment. It issignificant that House Resolution No. 176 cited as the bases of itsjudgment such factors as the peoples loss of confidence on theability of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectivelygovern and the members of the international community hadextended their recognition of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines and it has aconstitutional duty of fealty to the supreme will of the people x xx. This political judgment may be right or wrong but Congress is

    answerable only to the people for its judgment. Its wisdom is fitto be debated before the tribunal of the people and not before acourt of justice. Needles to state, the doctrine of separation ofpower constitutes an inseparable bar against this courtsinterposition of its power of judicial review to review the judgmentof Congress rejecting petitioners claim that he is still thePresident, albeiton leave and that respondent Arroyo is merely anacting President (Estrada vs. Arroyo, GR 146738, Motion for Recon., April 3,2001).

    b. PRESIDENTIAL POWERS

    i) Executive Power

    Power to enforce and administer laws.

    President shall have control of all executive departments, bureausand offices. He shall ensure that laws are faithfully executed (Sec.17, Art. VII).

    Section 17. The President shall have control of all theexecutive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensurethat the laws be faithfully executed.

    Until and unless a law is declared unconstitutional, the Presidenthas a duty to execute it regardless of his doubts as to its validity(faithful execution clause) (Sec.1 and 17, Art. VII).

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    Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in thePresident of the Philippines.

    CASES

    The Organic Act vests "the supreme executive power" in the

    Governor- General of the Philippine Islands. In addition tospecified functions,he is given "general supervision and control ofall the departments and bureaus of the government of thePhilippine Islands as far as is not inconsistent with the provisionsof this act. "He is also made "responsible for the faithful executionof the laws of the Philippine Islands and of the United Statesoperative within Philippine Islands."The authority of the Governor-General is made secure by the important proviso "that all

    executive functions of Government must be directly under theGovernor-General or within one of the executive departmentsunder the supervision and control of the Governor-General."(Organic Act, secs. 21, 22.) By the Administrative Code, "theGovernor-General, as chief Executive of the Islands, is chargedwith the executive control of the Philippine Government, to beexercised in person or through the Secretaries of Departments, orother proper agency, according to law." It may finally be inferredfrom the books that the appointment of public officials is generallylooked upon as properly an executive function. The power ofappointment can hardly be considered a legislative power.

    Appointments may be made by the Legislature of the courts, butwhen so made be taken as an incident to the discharge offunctions properly within their respective spheres. The OrganicAct of August 29, 1916, included what follows on the subject ofappointments. The governor-General "shall, unless otherwiseherein provided, appoint, by and with the consent of the PhilippineSenate, such officers as may now be appointed by the Governor-General,or such as he is authorized by law to appoint." (OrganicAct, sec. 21.) The exception to the general grant is that thePhilippine Legislature "shall provide for the appointment andremoval of the heads of the executive departments by the

    Governor-General." (Organic Act, sec. 22.) Each House of thePhilippine Legislature may also elect a presiding officer, a clerk, asergeant at arms, and such other officers and assistants as maybe required. (Organic Act, sec. 18.) The Philippine Legislature isauthorized to choose two Resident commissioners to the UnitedStates. (Organic Act, sec. 20.)

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    The Administrative Code provides the following: "In addition to hisgeneral supervisory authority, the Governor-General shall havesuch specific powers and duties as are expressly conferred orimposed onhim by law and also, in particular, the powers andduties set forth," including th special powers and duties "(a) To

    nominate and appoint officials, conformably to law, to positions inthe service of the Government of the Philippine Islands. (b) Toremove officials from office conformably to law and to declarevacant the offices held by such removed officials. For disloyalty tothe Government of theUnited States, the Governor-General mayat any time remove a personfrom any position of trust or authorityunder the Government of the Philippine Islands." (Sec. 64 [a], [b].)The Administrative Code lists the officers appointable by theGovernor-General (Sec. 66.) (Springer vs. Government, 50 Phil 259).

    Article VII of the Constitution begins in its section 1 with thedeclaration the "The Executive power shall be vested in aPresident of the Philippines." All executive authority is thus vestedin him, and upon him devolves the constitutional duty of seeingthat the laws are "faithfully executed." (Art. VII, sec. 11, subsec. 1,last clause.) In the fulfillment of this duty which he cannot evade,he is granted specific and express powers and functions. (Art. VII,sec. 11.) In addition to these specific and express powers andfunctions, he may also exercise those necessarily implied andincluded in them. The National Assembly may not enact lawswhich either expressly or impliedly diminish the authorityconferred upon the President of the Constitution. The Constitutionprovides that the President "shall have control of all the executivedepartments, bureaus, and offices" (Art. VII, sec. 11 [1], firstclause) and shall "exercise general supervision over all locationgovernments as may be provided by law" ( Ibid, second clause).This power of control and supervision is an importantconstitutional grant. The President in the exercise of the executivepower under the Constitution may act through the heads of theexecutive departments. The heads of the executive departmentsare his authorized assistants and agents in the performance of hisexecutive duties, and their official acts, promulgated in the

    regular course of business, are presumptively his acts. The powerof removal which the President may exercise directly and thepractical necessities of efficient government brought about byadministrative centralization easily make the President the headof the administration. Independently of any statutory provisionauthorizing the President to conduct an investigation of the natureinvolved in this proceeding, and in view of the nature andcharacter of the executive authority with which the President of

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    the Philippines is invested, the constitutional grant to him ofpower to exercise general supervision over all local governmentsand to take care that the laws be faithfully executed must beconstrued to authorized him to order an investigation of the act orconduct of the petitioner herein. Supervision is not a meaningless

    thing. It is an active power. It is certainly not without limitation,but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and conditionsin order to render the power real and effective. If supervision is tobe conscientious and rational, and not automatic and brutal, itmust be founded upon a knowledge of actual facts and conditionsdisclosed after careful study and investigation (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil259).

    The President has the exclusive power to remove executive

    branch officials, and does not need the approval of the Senate orany other legislative body. Chief Justice William Howard Taft,

    writing for the Court, noted that the Constitution does mention theappointment of officials, but is silent on their dismissal. Anexamination of the notes of the Constitutional Convention,however, showed that this silence was intentional: the Conventiondid discuss the dismissal of executive-branch staff, and believed itwas implicit in the Constitution that the President did hold theexclusive power to remove his staff, whose existence was anextension of the President's own authority (Myers, Administratrix vs.US, 272 US 52).

    ii) Legislative Powers

    CASES

    Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President

    Ferdinand E. Marcos on February 17, 1978 in the due exercise oflegislative power vested upon him by Amendment No. 6introduced in 1976. Being a valid act of legislation, saidProclamation may only be amended by an equally valid act oflegislation. Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of

    legislation. After the so-called bloodless revolution of February1986, President Corazon Aquino took the reigns of power under arevolutionary government. On March 24, 1986, she issued herhistoric Proclamation No. 3, promulgating the ProvisionalConstitution, or more popularly referred to as the FreedomConstitution. Under Article II, Section 1 of the FreedomConstitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislativepower until a legislature is elected and convened under a new

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    constitution. Then came the ratification of the draft constitution,to be known later as the 1987 Constitution. When Congress wasconvened on July 26, 1987, President Aquino lost this legislativepower under the Freedom Constitution. Proclamation No. 164,amending Proclamation No. 1716 was issued on October 6, 1987

    when legislative power was already solely on Congress. Becausethis unauthorized act by the then president constitutes a directderogation of the most basic principle in the separation of powersbetween the three branches of government enshrined in ourConstitution, we cannot simply close our eyes and rely upon theprinciple of the presumption of validity of a law. There is a longstanding principle that every statute is presumed to be valid.However, this rests upon the premise that the statute was dulyenacted by legislature. This presumption cannot apply when thereis clear usurpation of legislative power by the executive branch(Municipality of San Juan vs. CA, Sept. 29, 1997).

    Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrativeorder but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President toissue. While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, thePresident executes the laws. The executive power is vested in thePresident. It is generally defined as the power to enforce andadminister the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws intopractical operation and enforcing their due observance. Thus, heis granted administrative power over bureaus and offices underhis control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying

    policies and enforcing orders as determined by propergovernmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniformstandard of administrative efficiency and check the officialconduct of his agents. 22 To this end, he can issue administrativeorders, rules and regulations. Prescinding from these precepts,we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is notappropriate to be covered by an administrative order. Anadministrative order is an ordinance issued by the Presidentwhich relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation ofgovernment. It must be in harmony with the law and should be forthe sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the

    legislative policy (Ople vs. Torres, GR 127685, July 23, 1998).

    iii)Residual Powers

    Whatever is not judicial, whatever is not legislative is residualpower exercised by the President (Marcos v. Manglapus, 178 SCRA760)

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    CASES

    As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive

    power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII,Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by "executivepower" although in the same article it touches on the exercise ofcertain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over allexecutive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to executethe laws, the appointing power, the powers under thecommander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves,commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with theconcurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guaranteeforeign loans, the power to enter into treaties or internationalagreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the

    power to address Congress [Art. VII, Secs. 14-23].

    The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certainpowers of the President did the framers of the Constitution intendthat the President shall exercise those specific powers and noother? Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said tobe limited only to the specific powers enumerated in theConstitution. In other words, executive power is more than thesum of specific powers so enumerated.

    Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow

    the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, underthe Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles inarriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend anduphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation underthe Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare andadvance the national interest.

    To the President, the problem is one of balancing the generalwelfare and the common good against the exercise of rights ofcertain individuals. The power involved is the President's residualpower to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded

    on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. Toparaphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of thePresident but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by theConstitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand. It isa power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend theConstitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in thePresident's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed[see Hyman, The American President, where the author advances

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    the view that an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidablein any government and is best lodged in the President (Marcos vs.Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668).

    Power to Determine National Policy

    CASES

    To avert a nationwide strike of steel workers in April 1952,

    which he believed would jeopardize national defense, thePresident issued an Executive Order directing the Secretary ofCommerce to seize and operate most of the steel mills. Underprior decisions of this Court, there is doubt as to the right torecover in the Court of Claims on account of properties unlawfully

    taken by government officials for public use. The Court held thatthe Executive Order was not authorized by the Constitution orlaws of the United States, and it cannot stand. There is no statutewhich expressly or impliedly authorizes the President to takepossession of this property as he did here. In its consideration ofthe Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, Congress refused to authorizegovernmental seizures of property as a method of preventingwork stoppages and settling labor disputes. Authority of thePresident to issue such an order in the circumstances of this casecannot be implied from the aggregate of his powers under ArticleII of the Constitution. The Order cannot properly be sustained as

    an exercise of the President's military power as Commander inChief of the Armed Forces. Nor can the Order be sustainedbecause of the several provisions of Article II which grantexecutive power to the President. The power here sought to beexercised is the lawmaking power, which the Constitution vests inthe Congress alone, in both good and bad times. Even if it be truethat other Presidents have taken possession of private businessenterprises without congressional authority in order to settle labordisputes, Congress has not thereby lost its exclusive constitutionalauthority to make the laws necessary and proper to carry out allpowers vested by the Constitution "in the Government of the

    United States, or any Department or Officer thereof (Youngstown Co.vs. Sawyer, 343 US 579 ).

    Prosecution of Crimes

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    CASES

    Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty

    assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicialfunction, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and

    legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimesappertains to the executive department of government whoseprincipal power and responsibility is to see that our laws arefaithfully executed. A necessary component of this power toexecute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The rightto prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretionthe discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exerciseof which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are bestappreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is notconstitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine who

    can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be grantedimmunity from prosecution. Section 9 of Rule 119 does notsupport the proposition that the power to choose who shall be astate witness is an inherent judicial prerogative. Under thisprovision, the court, is given the power to discharge a statewitness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over thecrime and the accused. The discharge of an accused is part of theexercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherentjudicial function. Moreover, the Rules of Court have never beeninterpreted to be beyond change by legislation designed toimprove the administration of our justice system (Webb vs. De Leon,

    247 SCRA 652).