Constitutional LawCase Digest

Macariola vs AsuncionPolitical Law – Abrogation

On 6 Aug 1968, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion with “acts unbecoming a judge”. The judge apparently bought a property (formerly owned by Macariola) which was involved in a civil case decided by him; and on 31 Aug 1966, the Asuncion couples conveyed their share and interest in the said property to The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. The act of Asuncion engaging in commerce is said to be a violation of pars 1 & 5, Art 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges in active service (among others) to do so within the limits of the place where they discharge their duties.HELD: Art 14 (Anti  Graft  and Corrupt Practices Act, effective Aug 1888)  of the Code of Commerce, prohibiting judges from engaging in commerce was political in nature and so was automatically abrogated with the end of Spanish rule in the country (Change of Sovereignty to the US by virtue of cession, 1898).

People v. Perfecto

"The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still in force."

public law: It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.

FACTS:

This is a case relating to the loss of some documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the Senate investigation of oil companies. The newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article about it to the effect that "the author or authors of the robbery of the records from the iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery."

Consequently, the Attorney-General, through a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate, filed an information alleging that the editorial constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code.

The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

ISSUEs:

Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was abrogated with the change from Spanish to American sovereignty

Whether or not Perfecto is guilty of libel

HELD:

It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated -- "political" being used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.

On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military Commander, and byproclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the punishment of crime (e.g. the Spanish Penal Code) were nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of things.

Article 256 was enacted by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. But with the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, was set up in the Philippines. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. Said article is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system ofgovernment. It was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands.

"From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and obedience when they are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks."

DECISION:

To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion,

although for different reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.

 Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs Pres. AquinoG.R. No. 73748May 22, 1986

 FACTS:1. On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurelwere taking power.2. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by statingthat the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the NewArmed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:WON the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate?

HELD:Yes

RATIO:The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.The Court further held that:1. the people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country;2. it is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure  government; and3. the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government

Peralta v. Director of Prisons(1945)

Petitioner, a member of the Metropolitan C o n s t a b u l a r y ,   w a s p r o s e c u t e d f o r   t h e c r i m e o f r o b b e r y   a s   d e f i n e d   b y t h e N a t i o n a l   A s s e m b l y   o f   t h e   s o - c a l l e d Republic of the Philippines. He was found guilty and sentenced to serve time by the Cour t   o f   Spec ia l  and  Exc lus ive  Cr im ina l  Jurisdiction created in sec. 1 of Ordinance no. 7 promulgated by the President of the Republic. The petition for habeas corpus is b a s e d   o n   t h e   g r o u n d   t h a t   t h e   C o u r t ’ s ex is tence   was   vo id  ab   in i t i o  because   i t was created as a political instrumentality u n d e r   t h e c o m m a n d   o f   t h e   J a p a n e s e Imperial Army; that the provisions of said ordinance violate his constitutional rights; that the penalties provided for are much more severe than the RPC. So lGen i s o f   the op in ion   tha t   the pet i t ion  shou ld  be granted because the Ordinance mentioned i n   c r e a t i n g s a i d   c o u r t   i s   “ t i n g e d   w i t h political complexion”, that the procedure does  not  a f fo rd  a   fa i r   t r i a l and  v io la tes cons t i tu t i ona l   r igh t  o f   accused  persons under a legitimate Constitution. The court is of the opinion that: As to the va l id i t y o f t he c rea t ion o f t he Cour t  o f  Spec ia l   and   Exc lus ive  Cr im ina l  Jurisdiction by Ordinance No. 7, the on ly factor to be considered is the authority of the legislative power which promulgated said law or

ordinance. It is well established in   In te rnat iona l  Law  tha t   "The  c r im ina l   jurisdiction established by the invader in t h e   o c c u p i e d   t e r r i t o r y f i n d s   i t s   s o u r c e ne i the r i n the laws o f the conquer ing o r conquered  s ta te ,  —   i t   i s  d rawn  en t i re l y f r o m   t h e   l a w   m a r t i a l   a s   d e f i n e d   i n   t h e u s a g e s   o f   n a t i o n s .   T h e   a u t h o r i t y   t h u s der i ved  can  be  asser ted  e i the r   th rough spec ia l   t r i buna ls ,   whose   au thor i t y  and procedure is defined in the military code o f   the   conquer ing   s ta te ,   o r   th rough   the o r d i n a r y   c o u r t s   a n d   a u t h o r i t i e s   o f   t h e occupied district." (Taylor, InternationalPublic Law, p. 598.) The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being  a governmental  instrumentality  of the  be l l ige rent  occupan t ,   had   the re fore the power or was competent to create the Cour t  o f  Spec ia l   and   Exc lus ive  Cr im ina l Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to w h e t h e r   o r   n o t   a   c o u r t   i s   o f   a   p o l i t i c a l complexion, for it is mere governmental agency charged with the duty of applying t h e   l a w   t o   c a s e s   f a l l i n g   w i t h i n   i t s   jurisdiction. Its judgments and sentences may be o f a po l i t i ca l complex ion o r no t depending upon the nature or character of the law so app l ied . There i s no room fo r doubt, therefore, as to the validity of the creation of the court in question.

The validity of the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal  J u r i s d i c t i o n   w h i c h   i m p o s e s   l i f e imprisonment upon the herein petitioner, depends upon the competence or power of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Ac t No . 65 wh ich pun ishes the c r ime o f  which said petitioner was  convicted.

I t   a p p e a r s   c l e a r   t h a t   i t   w a s   w i t h i n   t h e power and competence of the belligerent o c c u p a n t   t o   p r o m u l g a t e ,   t h r o u g h   t h e N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y   o f   t h e   s o - c a l l e d Republic of the Philippines, Act No. 65 of the  sa id  Assembly , wh ich  pena l i zes   the crimes of robbery and other offenses by imprisonment ranging from the maximum period of the imprisonment prescribed by the laws and ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic as minimum, to life imprisonment or death as m a x i m u m .  

A l t h o u g h   t h e s e   c r i m e s   a r e defined in the Revised Penal Code, they were altered and penalized by said Act No.65 with different and heavier penalties, as new c r imes  and   o f fenses   demanded  by military necessity, incident to a state of war, and necessary for the control of the country by the belligerent occupant, the p r o t e c t i o n   a n d s a f e t y   o f   t h e   a r m y   o f   occupation, its support and efficiency, and the success of its operations. 

The last question is the legal effect of ther e o c c u p a t i o n   o f   t h e   P h i l i p p i n e s   a n d r e s t o r a t i o n   o f   t h e   C o m m o n w e a l t h Government ; tha t i s , whe ther o r no t , by the principle of postliminy

(the right by which persons and things taken in war are restored to their former status when  coming againunder the power of the nation to which they belonged,)the punitive sentence which petitioner is now serving fe l l   th rough  o r   ceased t o   be   va l id f rom that time.W e   h a v e   a l r e a d y   h e l d   i n   o u r   r e c e n t decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs.Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra, that all   j udgment   o f   po l i t i ca l   comp lex ion  o f the courts during the Japanese regime, ceased t o   b e   v a l i d   u p o n   r e o c c u p a t i o n   o f   t h e islands by virtue of the principle or right of postliminium. Applying that doctrine to the p r e s e n t   c a s e ,   t h e   s e n t e n c e   w h i c h conv ic ted the pe t i t i oner o f a c r ime o f a political  complexion  must be considered as hav ing ceased to be va l id ipso fac to upon the reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by General Douglas MacArthur

Laurel vs. Misa

Topic: Treason Laurel vs. Misa 77 Phil. 856

FACTS: The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused adhered t o   t h e   e n e m y   b y   g i v i n g   t h e   l a t t e r   a i d   a n d comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims tha t  he canno t  be t r i ed under  a  change o f   sovere ign ty  over   the   count ry   s ince  h is  ac ts were against the Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic.

HELD/RATIO:The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes abso lu te  and   permanent  a l l eg iance   to  h is g o v e r n m e n t   o r   s o v e r e i g n .   N o t r a n s f e r   o f   sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the Ph i l i pp ine  government   s t i l l   had   the  power . Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended; it is either s u b s i s t i n g   o r   e l i m i n a t e d   a n d   r e p l a c e d . Sovereignty per se wasn’t suspended; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty that was suspended.  T h u s ,   t h e r e   i s   n o   s u s p e n d e d   a l l e g i a n c e . Regarding the c h a n g e   o f   g o v e r n m e n t ,   t h e r e   i s   n o   s u c h c h a n g e   s i n c e   t h e   s o v e r e i g n   –   t h e   F i l i p i n o people – is still the same. What happened was a mere change of name of government, from Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines.

DISSENT:During the long period of Japanese occupation, all the political laws of the Philippines were  suspended .   Thus ,   t reason  under   the Rev ised  Pena l   Code  canno t  be  pun ishab le where the laws of the land are momentarily halted. Regarding the change of sovereignty, it is true that the Philippines wasn’t sovereign at the time of the Commonwealth since it was under the United States. Hence, the acts of treason done cannot carry over to the new Republic where the Philippines is now indeed sovereign.

Co Kim Chan v Valdez Tan Keh

Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).The court resolved three issues:1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation;2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could continue hearing the cases pending before them.

Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war.Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them.The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts during the Japanese military occupation.IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law.A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.”Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the

dockets and violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of any other governments.”In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government.

DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.Summary of ratio:1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during occupation unless repealed.2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful government)through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force)through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state)

Government vs Monte de Piedad

On June 3, 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The Spanish Dominions then provided $400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it was received by the Philippine Treasury. Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left untouched; it was then invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which in turn invested the amount in jewelries. But when the Philippine government later tried to withdraw the said amount, the bank cannot provide for the amount. The bank argued that the Philippine

government is not an affected party hence has no right to institute a complaint. Bank argues that the government was not the intended beneficiary of the said amount.ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against the respondent bank?HELD: The Philippine government is competent to institute action against Monte de Piedad, this is in accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the protector of the rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has been entrusted with such right hence as “parents” of the people the government has the right to take back the money intended for the people.

Summary: ACCFA vs. CUGCO (GR L-21484, 29 November 1969) 

The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) vs.Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), etc.[GR L-21484, 29 November 1969]; also The Agricultural Credit Administration(ACA) vs. ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA), etc. [GR L-23605]En Banc, Makalintal (J): 7 concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 concurs in separate opinion

Facts: On 4 September 1961 a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which was to be effective for a period of 1 year from 1 July 1961, was entered into by and between the Unions and the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA). A few months thereafter, the Unions started protesting against alleged violations and non-implementation of said agreement. Finally, on25 October 1962 the Unions declared a strike, which was ended when the strikers voluntarily returned to work on 26 November 1962. On 30 October 1962 the Unions, together with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations against the ACCFA (Case 3450-ULP) for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practice, namely: violation of the CBA in order to discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to self-organization, discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions, and refusal to bargain. The ACCFA denied the charges and interposed as affirmative and special defenses lack of jurisdiction of the CIR over the case, illegality of the bargaining contract, expiration of said Contract and lack of approval by the office of the President of the fringe benefits provided for therein. Brushing aside the foregoing defenses, the CIR in its decision dated 25 March1963 ordered the ACCFA (1) to cease and desist from committing further acts tending to discourage the members of complainant unions in the exercise of their right to self organization; (2) to comply with and implement the provision of the collective bargaining contract executed on 4 September 1961, including the payment of P30.00 a month living allowance; and (3) to bargain in good faith and expeditiously with the herein complainants. ACCFA moved to reconsider but was turned down in a resolution dated 25 April 1963 of the CIR en banc. Thereupon it brought the appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court (GR L-21484). During the pendency of the ACCFA's case, specifically on 8 August 1963, the President of the Philippines signed into law the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act 3844),which among other things required the reorganization of the administrative machinery of the Agricultural

Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration(ACCFA) and changed its name to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA). On 17March 1964 the ACCFA Supervisors' Association and the ACCFA Workers' Association filed a petition for certification election with the Court of Industrial Relations (Case 1327-MC) praying that they be certified as the exclusive bargaining agents for the supervisors and rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the ACA. The trial Court in its order dated 30 March 1964 directed the Manager or Officer-in-Charge of the ACA to allow the posting of said order "for the information of all employees and workers thereof," and to answer the petition. Incompliance therewith, the ACA, while admitting most of the allegations in the petition, denied that the Unions represented the majority of the supervisors and rank-and-file workers, respectively, in the ACA. It further alleged that the petition was premature, that the ACA was not the proper party to be notified and to answer the petition, and that the employees and supervisors could not lawfully become members of the Unions, nor be represented by them. However, in a joint manifestation of the Unions dated 7 May 1964, with the conformity of the ACA Administrator and of the Agrarian Counsel in his capacity as such and as counsel for the National Land Reform Council, it was agreed "that the union in this case represent the majority of the employees in their respective bargaining units" and that only the legal issues raised would be submitted for the resolution of the trial Court. Finding the remaining grounds for ACA's opposition to the petition to be without merit, the trial Court in its order dated 21 May 1964 certified the ACCFA Workers' Association and the ACCFA Supervisors' Association as the sole and exclusive bargaining representatives of the rank-and-file employees and supervisors, respectively, of ACA. Said order was affirmed by the CIR en banc in its resolution dated 24 August 1964. On 2 October 1964 the ACA filed in the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari with urgent motion to stay the CIR order(GR L-23605). In a resolution dated 6 October 1964, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for 'lack of adequate allegations," but the dismissal was later reconsidered when the ACA complied with the formal requirement stated in said resolution. As prayed for, the Court ordered the CIR to stay the execution of its order of 21 May 1964.

Issue: Whether the ACA is engaged in governmental or proprietary functions.

Held: The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions. These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"), such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of  justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people — these latter functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government. The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter

optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals" continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Hereof course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice. It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, say, the establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when, aside from the governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of the land reform program of the State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt as to the governmental character of its functions disappears. In view of the foregoing premises, the Unions are not entitled to the certification election sought in the lower Court. Such certification is admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of the employees with respect to terms and conditions of employment, including the right to strike as a coercive economic weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike in 1962 against the ACCFA (GR L-21824). This is contrary to Section 11 of Republic Act 875. With the reorganization of the ACCFA and its conversion into the ACA under the Land Reform Code and in view of the Court's ruling as to the governmental character of the functions of the ACA, the decision of the lower Court, and the resolution en banc affirming it, in the unfair labor practice case filed by the ACCFA, which decision is the subject of the present review in GR L-21484, has become moot and academic, particularly insofar as the order to bargain collectively with the Unions is concerned.

PVTA v CIR Digest

Facts:This case involves the expanded role of the government necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare.1.  In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services and the petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with CA No. 444. 2. Petitioner denied the allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.  Judge Martinez issued an order, directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt from Commonwealth Act No. 444. 

3. PVTA contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.

Issue: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.

YES. But the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government has become obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing for a distinction between constituent and the ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of the present time: “The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete.” 

The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant consideration.There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As such, the petitioner can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA case.  The objection of private respondents with its overtones of the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. Nacoco, is futile. It does not necessarily follow, that just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive.

A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 renders clear the differentiation that exists. If as a result of the appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not have required private respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that one of its chief problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore, that such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court must be sustained.