constitutional law ii article iii cases

7/27/2019 Constitutional Law II Article III Cases

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

Art ic le III – B i ll of Righ ts



CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

Article III – Bill of Rights

I. Section 1

1. Purpose of the Bill of Rights

2. Three Great Powers of Government3. Police Power

4. The Seat of Police Power

MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, etc GR No. 135962, March 27, 2000

FACTS:

Respondent filed a case against petitioner enjoining them from opening the Neptune

Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court denied

issuance of a preliminary injunction. On appeal, the appellate court ruled that the MMDA

has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, and cause the demolition of its

perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by

ordinance.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the MMDA possess police power.

HELD:

NO. Not being a political subdivision but merely an executive authority, the MMDA has

no police power. Police power in Metro Manila is exercised by the cities and

municipalities hence; it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the

community. Hence, its proposed opening of Neptune Street which was not mandated by

the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City is illegal.



5. Life, Liberty, Property

6. Hierarchy of Rights

Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming

Mills Co. Inc., 51 SCRA 189

FACTS:

This is a case involving petitioners‘ claim of their civil & political rights as against

respondents claim to property rights. The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills

Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union, composed of the

employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners

Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, AsencionPaciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and

members of the petitioner Union.

Petitioners claim that they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang in

protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers

as well as those in the regular second and third shifts and that they informed the

respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.

The petitioners and their members proceeded with the demonstration, ignoring the

pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to

participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts

should be utilized for the demonstration.

Consequently, respondent Company filed on March with the respondent Court, a charge

against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them

with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section

15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.

Petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the

respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the

said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speechagainst the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass

demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against the

respondent firm.



ISSUE:

Whether or not the life and property enjoy identical protection from the Constitution.

HELD:

No. The primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized .In the hierarchy of

civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupies a preferred position

as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions.

The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is understood by the fact that a

mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and itsobject or purpose-that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive –

would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights.



Social Justice Society, et al v. Atienza, Jr., GR No. 156052, February 13,

2008

FACTS:

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. Respondent

Mayor approved the said Ordinance, pursuant to police powers delegated to the Local

Government Code, a principle prescribed as the power inherent in the government to

enact laws within a constitutional rights to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and

general welfare of the society. This is evident from Section 1 and 3 thereof, Ordinance

No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and

directed the owners and operators of the business disallowed under Section 1 to cease

and desist from operating their business within six months form the date of affectivity ofthe Ordinance. Among the business situated in the4 area are so called ―Pandacan

Terminals‖ of the oil companies Caltex, Petron and shell.

The City of Manila and the DOE entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

with the oil companies in which they agreed that ―the selling down of the Pandacan

terminals was the most visible and practicable option.‖ The Sangguniang Panlungsod

ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, The Sangguniang

directed that the MOU was effective only for a period of Six (6) months. Thereafter, on

January 30, 2006. The Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 136 exercising the validity

of Res 97 and authorize Mayor Atienza Jr to issue special business permits to the oil

companies. Meanwhile, enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal

of the terminals of the oil companies.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No.8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals and order the removal of the

Pandacan Terminals.



HELD:

Yes, Supreme Court ruled that when a mandamus proceeding concerns a public rights

and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the executionof the laws are regarded as real parties in interest and they need not allow any specific

interest in the experiment of the city‘s ordinance. Respondent never questioned the

rights of the petitioners to institute the proceeding.

On the other hand, the Local Government code imposes upon the respondent the duty

as the City Mayor, ―to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the

city. One of this is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the

duty to enforce ordinances as long as it has not been regarded or amended by the

courts , and do not violate the rights of everyone.



7. Due Process: In General

Tupas v. CA – 193 SCARA 597

FACTS:

The record shows that the petitioners received a copy of the decision of the Regional

Trial Court of Pasay City, 1989, and that the motion for reconsideration thereof was filed

fourteen days later. The order denying the motion was received by the petitioners‘

counsel on May 9, 1989. Instead of filing the petition for review with the Court of

Appeals within the remainder of the 15-day reglementary period, that is the petitioner

did so only on May 23, 1989, or 14 days later. The petition was therefore clearly tardy.

The law requires that if motion for reconsideration is denied, petitioner should file

petition for review with the Court of Appeals within the remaining period to file a petition

for review. Hence, it may be necessary to file a motion with the Court of Appeals for

extension of time to file such petition for review.

Hence, it may be necessary to file a motion with the Court of Appeals for extension of

time to file such petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner can file a petition for certiorari because they were denied

due process.

HELD:

No. The petitioners‘ counsel did not file the petition for review within the remaining

period, which he should have known was only one day. Neither did he move for an

extension that would have been granted as a matter of course.

The petition for review being indisputably late, he could not thereafter ask that it be

treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which can be filed



within a reasonable time. This remedy cannot be employed as a substitute for a lost

appeal. It follows that for having themselves forfeited the right to appeal, the petitioners

cannot now plaintively claim that they have been denied due process.

Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the

protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake tosuppose that substantive law and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as

has often been suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should never be

permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants. This is not

exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the

courts is to give effect to both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and

speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive

and procedural rights is equally guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of

such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.

The petitioners‘ argument that they should not be prejudiced by the mistakes of theircounsel because they are laymen and not familiar with the intricacies of the law is not

acceptable. If clients could dis authorize their counsel on this ground, the administration

of justice could be hopelessly encumbered. The petitioners have not shown that their

counsel was exceptionally inept or motivated by bad faith or excusably misled by the

facts. There is no reason why we should not apply the rule that clients should be bound

by the acts of their counsel, including his mistakes.



8. Procedural Due Process

In General

Banco Espanol Filipino v. Palanca 37 P 921

FACTS:

Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to

his debt. His debt amounted to P218, 294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what

he owes. Due to the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an

instrument to mortgage Engracio‘s property. Engracio however left for China and he

never returned till he died. Since Engracio is a non-resident, El Banco has to notify

Engracio about their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The

lower court further ordered the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that it‘d be

sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco‘s petition to execute

Engracio‘s property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his

administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had

been no due process as Engracio ever received the summons.

ISSUE:

Whether or not due process was observed.

HELD:

The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process

had been met, to wit;

1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear

and decide the matter before it.

2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over

the property subject of the proceedings.

3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.

Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.



Aspects of the Proceedings

Villegas v. Hui Chiong

FACTS:

This is a case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens from being employed or engages

or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether

permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the

Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00. Private respondent Hiu Chiung

Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop the enforcement of

such ordinance as well as to declare the same null and void. Trial court rendered

judgment in favor of the petitioner, hence this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal protection rule

of the Constitution.

HELD:

Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and

equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed

to get a permit from the City Mayor who may withhold or refuse it at his will is

tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a

means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit

aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without

due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of

protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons,

both aliens and citizens.



Galvez v. Court of Appeals, 237 SCRA 685

FACTS:

Petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one

Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide and two

counts of frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting to death Alvin Calma Vinculado and

seriously wounding Levi Calma Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr..Before

petitioners could be arraigned, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex Parte Motion to

Withdraw Information of the original information. This motion was granted by Judge

Villajuan and the cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. On the

same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new information against herein petitioners

for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No.

1866 for illegal possession of firearms.

Petitioners filed Motion to Quash the new information for lack of jurisdiction. At the court

session set for the arraignment of petitioners Judge Pornillos issued an order denying

the motion to quash.

In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge

Pornillos, an order was issued on January 20, 1994 by Judge Villajuan granting the

motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, ordering the reinstatement of the original

informations, and setting the arraignment of the accused therein for February 8, 1994.On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in the meanwhile,

petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with respondent

Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated January 24, 1994 issued by Judge Pornillos

which denied petitioners‘ motion to quash filed for the new information. As earlier stated,

respondent court dismissed the petition in its questioned resolution of February 18,

1994, hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ex parte motion to withdraw the original information is null and void

on the ground that there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6,

Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.



Held:

No, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the trial court petitioners

had not yet been placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and

granted before they could be arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice

and hearing thereof. In actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not thedismissal of the original three information but the filing of four new information, three of

which charge graver offenses and the fourth, an additional offense. Had this new

information not been filed, there would obviously have been no cause for the instant

petition. Accordingly, their complaint about the supposed procedural lapses involved in

the motion to dismiss filed and granted in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-93

does not impress us as a candid presentation of their real position.

Petitioner‘s contention that the dismissal of the original information and the consequent

filing of the new ones substantially affected their right to bail is too strained and tenuous

an argument. They would want to ignore the fact that had the original information beenamended so as to charge the capital offense of murder, they still stood to likewise be

deprived of their right to bail once it was shown that the evidence of guilt is strong.

Petitioners could not be better off with amended information than with the subsequent

ones. It really made no difference considering that where a capital offense is charged

and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of discretion under either

amended or new information.

Contrary to petitioners‘ submission, the absence of notice and hearing does not divest a

trial court of authority to pass on the merits of the motion. It has been held that—―The

order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing,or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive

a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its authority to

pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is

either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which

dismissed the complaint or to appeal from the dismissal and not certiorari.‖



State Prosecutors v. Muro, 236 SCRA 505

FACTS:

Respondent Judge Muro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was

charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an

with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02

of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Petitioners contend that the respondent judge gravely

erred in dismissing eleven (11) cases for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange

Restrictions against Mrs. Imelda Marcos on the basis of a mere newspaper account that

the President had announced the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions. That for the

respondent judge to take judicial notice thereof even before it is officially released by the

Central Bank and its full text published as required by law to be effective shows his

impulsive action in utter disregard of the fundamental rule of due process which the

People is also entitled to and exposes his gross ignorance of the law.

This Court issued a resolution referring the complaint to the Office of the Court

Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation, pursuant to Section 7, Rule

140 of the Rules of Court, as revised, there being no factual issues involved.

This order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of

Appeals, the appellate court found that the respondent judge acted in excess of

jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of dismissal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge‘s dismissal of a case without the benefit of a

hearing and without any notice to the prosecution violated due process.

HELD:

Yes. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law.

The very act of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven

criminal cases without even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and

without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter

by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is not only an obvious denial of due

process to the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.



The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as early as

possible is no license for abuse of judicial power and discretion, nor does such

professed objective, even if true, justify a deprivation of the prosecution‘s right to be

heard and a violation of its right to due process of law.

The lightning speed with which respondent judge resolved to dismiss the cases withoutthe benefit of a hearing and without reasonable notice to the prosecution inevitably

opened him to suspicion of having acted out of partiality for the accused. More

importantly, notwithstanding the fact that respondent was not sure of the effects and

implications of the President‘s announcement, as by his own admission he was in doubt

whether or not he should dismiss the cases, he nonetheless deliberately refrained from

requiring the prosecution to comment thereon.



Martinez v. CA, 237 SCRA 575

FACTS:

The focal issue lies on the petitioner‘s claim to dismiss the appeal on the ground that no

appeal lies from the dismissal of a criminal case, and certainly not by the private

complainant, particularly where dismissal was at the instance of the City Prosecutor

upon orders of the Department of Justice. If any remedy was available to private

complainant, it was a petition for certiorari, not an appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not complainant is allowed to file an appeal.

HELD:

YES. The right to appeal from a final judgment or order in a criminal case is granted to

"any party‖, except when the accused is placed thereby in double jeopardy. Section 2,

Rule 122 RCP ―Who may appeal. Any party may appeal from a final judgment or order,except if the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.‖

Court ruled that the word "party" must be understood to mean not only the government

and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the judgment rendered

in the criminal proceeding. Thus, the party injured by the crime has been held to have

the right to appeal from a resolution of the court which is derogatory to his right to

demand civil liability arising from the offense.

Due Process; The complainant was deprived of his day in court when the judge granted

the motion to dismiss without the prosecution having furnished him a copy of themotion.—The fault of error tainting the order of dismissal of the lower court consists in

its failure to observe procedural due process and to exercise its discretion properly and

judiciously. The trial judge granted the motion to dismiss without the prosecution having

furnished private complainant a copy of the motion despite having been ordered to do

so, thereby effectively depriving private complainant of his day in court.



Espelita v. Avelino, 62 SCRA 396

FACTS:

Shell‘s counsel Bellaflor forwarded an oral motion for the revocation of appearance of

Espleta‘s witness Montano for cross-examination and the conclusion of her testimony.

She was unable to appear in one of the trials due to her auditing job in the Department

of Local Government at the day she was supposed to finish her testimony and cross-

examination. Judge Avelino accepted this proposal and even allowed Shell to present

its rebuttal witness for Espeleta‘s testimony. The judge granted this request to the

prejudice of Espeleta. The magistrate also did not consider Espeleta‘s counsel‘s letter

for postponement. The judge told parties to submit documentary evidence afterwards

but rejected the ones from Montano‘s testimony due to her being stricken from the

records.

ISSUE:

Whether the concept of fairness that is basic to procedural due process would be

satisfied if the right to be heard of petitioner was revoked by the respondent Judge.

HELD:

No. Petition for certiorari granted. Espeleta presented Montano as an accountant to

testify for the reduced balance to Shell in the form of 14,000 from Shell‘s proposed

amount of 22,000. The deductions included payment for damage due to gasoline

leakages.

Under the circumstances, the stress on the absence of procedural due process is

understandable for as a result of the order of respondent Judge now sought to be setaside, there is more than just a probability that petitioner would be condemned to pay

before he had been fully heard. The trial didn‘t satisfy the standard for a judicious

inquiry, because there was a mockery of the requirement that the litigants should be

given full opportunity to sustain their claims and have their evidence considered and

weighted. The petitioner can assert due process.



By saying that the postponement of the counsel was a delay on the administration of

justice was not in line with Justice Carson‘s saying that ―a sound discretion in this

regard should be exercised by the trial judge, and the highly commendable desire for

the dispatch of business should not be permitted to turn the scales of justice rather than

accede to a reasonable request for a continuance. ―Due heed must be paid to

procedural due process mandate. The discretion for denying motions are allowed but

such must be exercised with a view to substantial justice. The judge in this case must

have reconsidered the denial.



Rabino v. Cruz, 222 SCRA 493

FACTS:

This case rooted between David Palmenco, et al. and Adora Cruz, et al., where hereinpetitioners, Rabino, et al. where not impleaded as defendants in said civil casesalthough they are also occupants of land in dispute. MTC decision in said case onDecember 29, 1983 was for David Palmenco, et al. to vacate the premises in questionand restore the possession thereof of the plaintiffs; also, to pay Php 6,000 as attorney‘sfees and costs. A writ of execution was issued by the MTC of Taytay Rizal but wasresisted by the defendants (David Palmenco), and filed a complaint at the Bureau ofLands, which later on rendered a decision that the defendants should file within 60 daysupon subdivision survey and approval.

Palmenco, et al. filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction at the Court of Appeals, which was denied by said court. The defendants again filed the same at RTCof Antipolo, Rizal, which was also dismissed. Again for the second time, said case wasbrought to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration which was also denied.Herein petitioners Rabino filed an opposition to the writ of demolition and an action fordamages. Palmenco, et al. also filed an action for injunction with damages at the RTC.On December 6, 1988, a temporary restraining order was issued by the trial courtdirecting the respondents and other defendants to refrain implementing alias writ ofdemolition.

For the third time, the case was brought to the Court of Appeals through the petition forcertiorari filed by Adora Cruz, with prayer to prohibit the judge of RTC Antipolo fromconducting further proceedings related to Civil Case Nos. 630 and 631.

On August 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered the previous order onDecember 6 as null and void, denying petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the writ of execution issued in Civil Cases 630 and 631 may be forcedagainst petitioners who were not impleaded as defendants but also occupants of thesaid land in dispute.

HELD:

Judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action.



This is anchored on right of person to due process of law.In order to have due process, following conditions must be met:

1. Court or tribunal with judicial power to hear and determine the matter.2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over person of defendant or

property subject of the proceedings.3. Defendant is given an opportunity to be heard.4. Judgment is rendered upon lawful hearing.Due process of law was denied to the petitioners. Hence, judgment

rendered in Civil Cases 630 and 631 cannot be enforced against them.Right to due process is one of the building blocks of the edifice of our

democratic form of government; courts must be vigilant in safeguarding it.



Gonzales v. CSC, 226 SCRA 66

FACTS:

The herein petitioner is an employee for 36 years of the Agricultural Training Institute(ATI), an agency of the Department of Agriculture. The petitioner applied for and wasgranted leaves with pay and went to the United States from February 2 to July 16, 1990.

Petitioner wrote to the Director of ATI requesting approval of a leave without pay tospend more time with his children in US and to avail of a physical check- up free ofcharge. The letter carried the petitioner‘s address in US. However, the Director of ATIdid not act on the letter request; it was neither approved nor disapproved.

ATI‘s OIC wrote to petitioner declaring him AWOL for more than 30 days and warnedhim that should he not report within 5 days from receipt of the letter, he would bedropped from the rolls. The letter was addressed to the petitioner‘s house in QuezonCity which was returned to sender (ATI). The ATI instead publish a notice in 3 differentissues of a newspaper in general circulation.

When the petitioner came back from US and reported for work on November 19, 1990,he found out that he was already dropped from the rolls and was replaced in hisposition. The petitioner protested to the CSC which referred the letter- protest to theMerit System Protection Board. The board ruled that the petitioner was duly notifiedbefore he was dropped from the roll which was also affirmed by the CSC.

Thus, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari for grave abuse of discretion before theSC. The Solicitor General ordered to comment, conceded that petitioner was denied

due process and hence, illegally dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not grave abuse of discretion was committed when the petitioner wassummarily, hastily and inordinately dropped from the rolls and his replacement hurriedlyappointed without the observance of the requisite due process.

HELD:

The petition is impressed with merit. The petitioner‘s argument where he invokes theprotection of the due process clause of the constitution should be sustained.



The records do not show that the officials of ATI denied knowledge of petitioner‘scorrect address in US which was carried in his letter request for leave without pay.Despite knowledge, the letter written by the ATI OIC, directing the petitioner to return towork within 5 days, otherwise, he would be dropped from the rolls was inexplicablymailed to his house in Quezon City, which was not received by the petitioner. They are

aware that petitioner was not momentarily staying in his address in Quezon City wherehe could receive said notice. The publication of the notice made by the respondentcommission in the 3 issues of a newspaper in general circulation might have beenproper only if the address of the petitioner were unknown. Since the officials all knewthe whereabouts of petitioner, they have no legal warrant to notify him thru newspapers.

The ATI officials did not accord fair treatment to the petitioner. ATI did not actimmediately on the request and for reasons not divulged in records, they sat on therequest. The ATI OIC declared the petitioner AWOL and ordered to return within 5 daysdue to the ―exigencies of service‖. However, the ATI OIC did not explain why all of asudden the exigencies of service required the immediate return of the petitioner. Worsestill, the order dropping petitioner from rolls was never sent to him. Petitioner did not

also know he had been replaced till he returned to the Philippines.in a setting ofscarcities, it is bad enough to lose a job: it is worse if it is taken away by governmentitself without due process of law. Our constitution abhors such arbitrariness.



Webb v. Hon. Raul De Leon, 247 SCRA 652

FACTS:

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-

complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and

six (6) other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her

mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at

BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.Forthwith, the Department of

Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor

Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.

Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail thecredibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the

inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They

criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to

clarify the alleged inconsistencies. Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de

Leon and, later, respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against

them without conducting the required preliminary examination. Petitioners complain

about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to

an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their

preliminary investigation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process

during their preliminary investigation.

HELD:

NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the

opportunities to be heard. Pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain

circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial.



Herein, however, nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the

publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and

impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Further, on the contention of the denial of their

constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial

investigation, records show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary

investigation with indecent haste. Webb, et. al. were given fair opportunity to prove lack

of probable cause against them. Still, the Supreme Court reminds a trial judge in high

profile criminal cases of his/her duty to control publicity prejudicial to the fair

administration of justice. The ability to dispense impartial justice is an issue in every trial

and in every criminal prosecution; the judiciary always stands as a silent accused. More

than convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the business of the judiciary is to

assure fulfillment of the promise that justice shall be done and is done, and that is the

only way for the judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar of public opinion.



People v. Teehankee, GR No. 111206, Oct. 6, 1995

FACTS:

Maureen Hultman, JussiLeino and Roland Chapman while walking was approached by

the accused Teehankee Jr. and after a series of events, the accused fired his gun killing

Chapman and mortally wounding Hultman and Leino, then left. Leino, though mortally

wounded mustered all his strength and called for help and noticed at least 3 people

looking on from outside their house namely Vicente Mangubat, Domingo Florece and

Agripino Cadenas. Mangubat, after the gunman sped away, ran outside his house,

helped the victims and reported the incident to the proper authorities.

During their Investigation the NBI and the Makati police asked Jussi Leino twice

regarding the person who shot them.The first instance was On July 15, 1991 while

Leino was still in the hospital, he was shown (3) pictures of different men by the

investigators. He identified Claudio Teehankee Jr. as the gunman from the pictures. In

order to confirm the identification made by Leino and other witnesses Cadenas and

Mangubat who also pointed the accused as the gunman thru a separate out-of-court

identification procedures. Leino was brought out of the laws and placed in a car with

slightly tinted windows. A group of five to six men (including the accused) then came out

of the unoccupied house, into the street. From the group, Leino identified the accusedas the gunman for the second time,3 separate criminal cases were filed against

accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for the killing

of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and

wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman subsequently

died after 97 days of confinement at the hospital and during the course of the trial, the

Information for Frustrated Murder was amended to MURDER.

The trial court convicted the accused Claudio Teehankee jr because the strength of the

testimonies of 3 eyewitnesses who positively identified him as the gunman. However, in

his appeal, he vigorously assailed the validity of the out-of-court identification by theseeyewitnesses especially the identification of JussiLeino.



ISSUE:

Whether or not the out-of-court identification in this case is a valid and licit way in the

identification of the accused.

HELD:

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru

show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for

identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to

identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect

from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court

identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the

case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the

requirements of constitutional due process.

Based on this statement given by the high court regarding the issue, we can say that

out-of the court identification of the accused is valid and licit when it is in line with the

rules that the Supreme Court have fashioned. In the case given, the authorities did not

violate anything stated in the latter; otherwise it is stated in the decision that they

violated one.

Wherefore, the out-of-court identification in this case is valid and licit which makes the

contention of the accused regarding the validity of the identification, groundless.



Ang Tibay v. CIR – 69 PHIL 635

FACTS:

Ang Tibay was a manufacturer of rubber slippers. There was a shortage of leather

soles, and it was necessary to temporarily lay off members of the National Labor Union.

According to the Union however, this was merely a scheme to systematically terminate

the employees from work, and that the shortage of soles is unsupported. It claims that

AngTibay is guilty of ULP because the owner, Teodoro, is discriminating against the

National Labor Union, and unjustly favoring the National Workers Brotherhood, which

was allegedly sympathetic to the employer.

The petitioner, AngTibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsiderationof the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and to the motion for new trial of the

respondent National Labor Union, Inc.

ISSUE:

Whether or not special courts like Court of Industrial Relations should observe due

process.

HELD:

Yes. The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules ofprocedure, and Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to justice and

equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal

evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this

character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of

the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support



thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to

adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must

consider the evidence presented. Not only must there be some evidence to support a

finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be

rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record

and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its

judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and

facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at

a decision. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions,

render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the

various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance

of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.



Rural Bank of Buhi v. CA, 162 SCRA 288

FACTS:

Buhi Bank was a rural bank. Its books were examined by the Rural Banks division of the

Central Bank. However, it refused to be examined. As a consequence, its financial

assistance was suspended. Later, a general examination of the bank‘s affairs and

operations were again conducted. The rural bank‘s division found out massive

irregularities in the operations, giving out loans to unknown and fictitious borrowers, and

sums amounting to millions past due to the Central Bank. There were also promissory

notes rediscounted with the Central Bank for cash. As a result, the Buhi Bank became

insolvent.

The division chief, Odra, recommended that Buhi be placed under receivership. Thus,

the Monetary Board adopted a Resolution # 583, placing the bank under receivership.

Odra, the division chief, was made the receiver. Odra thus implemented the resolution,

authorizing deputies to take control and possession of Buhi‘s assets and liabilities.

Del Rosario, the Buhi Bank Manager, filed an injunction against the receiver, arguing

that the resolution violated the Rural Banks Act and constitutes gadalej. The bank

claims that there was a violation of due process. They claim that the bank was not given

the chance to deny and disprove the claim of insolvency or the other grounds and that it

was hastily put under receivership. Later on, the Central Bank Monetary Board orderedthe liquidation of the Bank. The judge ruled in favor of the Bank and issued a writ of

execution. The CA however restrained the enforcement of execution, citing that the

Judge did not follow the orders, and thus required the Bank to yield to the CB.

ISSUE:

Whether or not due process was observed.



HELD:

YES. Under Sec 29 of the RA 265, on proceedings regarding insolvency, there is NO

REQUIREMENT that a hearing be first conducted before a bank may be placed underreceivership. The law explicitly provides that the Monetary Board can IMMEDIATELY

forbid a banking institution from doing business and IMMEDIATELY appoint a receiver

when: a) there has been an examination by CB, b) a report to the CB, and c) prima facie

showing that the bank is insolvent.

As to the claim that the RA 265 violates due process, the claim is untenable. The law

could not have intended to disregard the constitutional requirement of due process

when it conferred power to place rural banks under receivership.

The closure and liquidation of the bank is considered an exercise of POLICE POWER.

It may be subject to judicial inquiry and could be set aside if found to be capricious,

discriminatory, whimsical, arbitrary, etc. Due process does NOT necessarily require a

PRIOR HEARING. A hearing or an OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD may be made

SUBSEQUENT to the closure. One could just imagine the dire consequences of a prior

hearing: bank runs would happen, resulting in panic and hysteria. In that way, fortunes

will be wiped out, and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking industry.



ADMU v. Capulong – 222 SCRA 644

FACTS:

Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious

physical injuries after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also

hospitalized for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted

upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint

Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate

and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of

Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written

statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students

received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they

were placed on preventive suspension.

The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the

written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie

case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue

entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their written

answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the

charges against respondent students. The Board found respondent students guilty of

violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits

participation in hazing activities.

However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the

penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University

Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all

respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are

currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners from

dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining

order, Dean Del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing

against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out

by the respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally

unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was grantedand reinstatement of the students was ordered.

ISSUE:

Was there denial of due process against the respondent students?



HELD:

There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of

the Ateneo Law School notified and required respondent students to submit their written

statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested

through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation

were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of

notice and hearing.

Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant

petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration

first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is

accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is

when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or

not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their

dismissal from Petitioner University.

Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in

academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation

against them;

(2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance

of counsel, if desired:

(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them

(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and

(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or officialdesignated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.



Non v. Judge Dames, 185 SCRA 523

FACTS:

Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines

Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for

leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding

semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.

Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the

school, but the trial court dismissed the petition. They now petition the court to reverse

its ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also applied in the case. The court said that

petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondentcollege when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester

of school year 1988-89, which states that: The Mabini College reserves the right to deny

admission of students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to

require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose

activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college. Students,

therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of conduct and

discipline.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the students‘ right to freedom of speech and assembly was infringed.

HELD:

Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the

Constitution is similarly available to students and is well-settled in our jurisdiction.However there are limitations. The permissible limitation on Student Exercise of

Constitutional Rights within the school presupposes that conduct by the student, in

class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of

behavior should not materially disrupt classwork or must not involve substantial disorder

or invasion of the rights of others.



Guzman v. NU, 142 SCRA 699

FACTS:

Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of

respondent National University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they

describe as their school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In

their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary

mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they alleged that they were denied due to

the fact that they were active participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises

of the University.

The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners‘ failure to enroll for the

first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because of

their alleged exercise of their constitutional and human rights. That as regards to

Guzman, his academic showing was poor due to his activities in leading boycotts of

classes. That Guzman ―is facing criminal charges for malicious mischief before the

Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with the destruction of properties of

respondent University. The petitioners have ―failures in their records, and are not of

good scholastic standing.‖

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners should be refused to enroll.

HELD:

No. Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum

is the fact that they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether

or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the

university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that

disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercionand intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance

of University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for damages and

a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more,

furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also

apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly published rule of



theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic

standing.

There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of

procedural due process; and these are, that

(1) The students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation

against them;

(2) They shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of

counsel, if desired;

(3) They shall be informed of the evidence against them;

(4) They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and

(5) The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official

designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.



Alcuaz v. PSBA, 161 SCRA 7

FACTS:

Petitioners are all bona fide students of the Philippine School of Business

Administration, Quezon City. The students of the respondent school and the respondent

PSBA, Q.C. had already agreed on certain matters which would govern their activities

within the school.

On the exercise of student‘s democratic rights, it has been agreed that protest actions

can be conducted any day as long as they meet the following requirements: a) that they

be held at the PSBA quadrangle from 12:30 pm to 1:00 pm only; b) that the protest

action be removed to the PSBA parking lot if it will exceed the 1:00 time limit; c) that if

the protest move exceeds 1:00 it will be limited only up to 2:30 pm; d) However, before

any action is taken the organizers of the protest action should secure a permit 6 days

before, or if on the same day, it still be under the „first-come-first-served‟ basis in the

use of facilities, volume of sound system shall be adjusted so as not to disturb classes.―

It is the firm stand of the administration of PSBA that it will not allow the students to

directly participate in the policy-making body of the school. In spite of the above-stated

agreement, petitioners felt the need to hold dialogues and demanded the negotiation of

a new agreement, which demand was turned down by the school, resulting in mass

assemblies and barricades of school entrances. During the regular enrolment period,

petitioners and other students similarly situated were allegedly blacklisted and denied

admission for the second semester of school year 1986 – 1987 which prompted thePresident of the Student Council to file a complaint with the Director of the MECS

against the PSBA for barring the enrolment of the Student Council Officers and student

leaders.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there has been deprivation of due process for petitioners-students who

have been barred from re-enrollment and for intervenor-teachers whose services have

been terminated as faculty members, on account of their participation in thedemonstration or protest charged by respondents as ―anarchic‖ rallies, and a violation of

their constitutional rights of expression and assembly.



HELD:

No. It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered

enrolled for one semester. It is provided in Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations for

Private Schools, that when a college student registers in a school, it is understood that

he is enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual that the―written contracts‖ required for college teachers are for ―one semester.‖ It is thus evident

that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing

contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers.



Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359

FACTS:

Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of respondent University. They

sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting from 8:00

A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other

students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science

basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court

as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in

vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the

Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same day, they marched

toward the Life Science Building and continued their rally. It was outside the area

covered by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the period allowed. They were asked

to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an illegal

assembly.

Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were under preventive

suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly. The validity

thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First Instance of Rizal

against private respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports.

Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal assembly which

was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance of

classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its

cognate right of free speech.



HELD:

Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective

if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But

with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear

and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the

taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork or involves

substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."

The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of

educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their

welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or

subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a

substantive evil that the state, has a right to present. As a corollary, the utmost leeway

and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The

peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder

under the name of dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to

correction through the ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in school premises,

permit must be sought from its school authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny

such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be

conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or

stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be violationsof its terms, the penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.



UP Board of Regents v. Telan, GR 110280, Oct. 21, 1996

FACTS:

The UP Board of Regents imposed on Nadal the penalties of suspension for one year,

non-issuance of any certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or as

long as Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12%

interest per annum and non-issuance of his transcript of records until he has settled his

financial obligations with the university. The disciplinary action is meted after finally

rendering a guilty verdict on Nadal‘s alleged willful withholding of the following

information in his application for scholarship tantamount to acts of dishonesty, viz: (1)

that he has and maintains a car and (2) the income of his mother in the USA in support

of the studies of his brothers. Nadal complained that he was not afforded due process

when, after the Board Meeting on his case on March 28, 1993 that resulted in a decision

of ―NOT GUILTY‖ in his favor, the Chairman of the UP Board of Regents, without notice

to the petitioner, called another meeting the following day to deliberate on the

Chairman‘s Motion for Reconsideration, which this time resulted in a decision of

―GUILTY.‖ Upon petition, Nadal was granted his action for mandamus with preliminary

injunction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Nadal was denied due process.

HELD:

No. It is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with the sending of notice

of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting. University rules do not require the attendance in

BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the

Board. At no time did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any ofthe regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation.



This is not exclusive of students whose disciplinary cases have been appealed to the

Board of Regents as the final review body. At no time did respondent complain of lack

of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings where his

case was up for deliberation. He would make an exception of the March 29, 1993

meeting for it was ―supposed to reconsider the decision made on March 28, 1993

exonerating respondent Nadal from all administrative charges against him.‖



Lao Gi Alias Chia, Jr. V. CA – 180 SCRA 756

FACTS:

Herein petitioner faces a charge for deportation when a judgment was rendered

cancelling his citizenship (obtained from a prior judgment) on the ground that it was

founded on fraud and misrepresentation. Petitioners were required to register as aliens

but refused. They filed a motion for reconsideration of the order directing them to

register as aliens and to oppose the motion for their arrest but were denied by Acting

Commissioner Nituda. Petitioners filed for certiorari in the CFI of Manila which was

dismissed for lack of legal basis. Petition for certiorari was also dismissed on appeal in

the CA and a motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUES:

What kind of due process is required is required in deportation proceedings?

HELD:

Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action,

the consequences can be as serious as those of a criminal prosecution. Thus, the

provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are

applicable to deportation proceedings.



Radio Communicattions v. NTC – 184 SCRA 517

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or

restraining order seeking to annul and set aside the order of the National

Telecommunications Commission and to prohibit respondent Commission from taking

cognizance of, and assuming jurisdiction over the ―Application for Approval of Rates for

Digital Transmission Service Facilities‖ of the Philippine Long Distance and Telephone

Company (PLDT, for brevity), private respondent herein, for lack of jurisdiction.

Private respondent PLDT filed an application with respondent Commission for the

Approval of Rates for Digital Transmission Service Facilities under NTC Case No. 84-003. The respondent Commission provisionally approved and set the case for hearing

within the prescribed 30-day period allowed by law.

In the aforementioned notice of hearing, herein petitioners except Philippine Telegraph

and Telephone Corporation were not included in the list of affected parties. At the

hearing, petitioner PT & T Co., along with other petitioners which came to know of the

pending petition through the former, appeared and moved for some time within which to

file an opposition or reply to said application. Petitioners alleged that neither respondent

Commission nor private respondent PLDT informed them of the existence of this

provisional authority.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the NTC gravely abused its discretion in issuing a provisional authority

in favor of PLDT without prior notice to the petitioners.

HELD:

No, as it is impossible for the respondent Commission to give personal notice to all

parties affected, not all of them being known to it.



More than that, there is no dispute that the notice of hearing was published and as

admitted by petitioners, one of them received the notice which in turn informed the

others. In fact, the petitioners have timely opposed the petition in question, so that lack

of notice was deemed cured. Under the circumstances, the Commission may be

deemed to have substantially complied with the requirements. In any event, the

provisional nature of the authority and the fact that the primary application shall be given

a full hearing are the safeguards against its abuse.



Maceda v. ERB – 199 SCRA 454

FACTS:

Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on August 1990, private respondent oil

companies filed with the ERB their respective applications on oil price increases. ERB

then issued an order granting a provisional increase of P1.42 per liter. Petitioner

Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition seeking to nullify said increase.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the decisions of the Energy Regulatory Board should be subject to

presidential review.

HELD:

Pursuant to Section 8 of E.O. No. 172, while hearing is indispensable, it does not

preclude the Board from ordering a provisional increase subject to final disposition of

whether or not to make it permanent or to reduce or increase it further or to deny the

application. The provisional increase is akin to a temporary restraining order, which is

given ex-parte.

The Court further noted the Solicitor General‘s comments that ―the ERB is not averse to

the idea of a presidential review of its decision,‖ except that there is no law at present

authorizing the same. The Court suggested that it will be under the scope of the

legislative to allow the presidential review of the decisions of the ERB since, despite its

being a quasi- judicial body, it is still ― an administrative body under the Office of the

President whose decisions should be appealed to the President under the established

principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies,‖ especially on a matter as

transcendental as oil price increases which affect the lives of almost all Filipinos.



Abalos v. Civil Service Commission, 196 SCRA 81

FACTS:

Shortly after assuming office as Provincial Governor of Lanao Del Norte, the petitioner,

by resolution of the provincial board, filed with the Tanodbayan a complaint for

malversation against his predecessor, Arsenio A. Quibranza, for having used for

personal purposes several bulldozers belonging to the province. The private

respondents were informed in another memorandum that formal charges for "dishonesty

and intentionally making false statements in material facts" had been filed against them

which they should answer within 72 hours. Curiously, however, they were informed in aseparate memorandum issued on that same date that their services as equipment

operators had been terminated.

The problem with this argument is that the private respondents have rejected their

supposed confession as having been extracted from them without benefit of legal

assistance. The results of the proceedings before the Ombudsman are, of course, not

decisive of the administrative charges. Nevertheless, the private respondents should

have been given a chance to prove in an investigation duly called that they did not

execute the affidavits against former Governor Quibranza and that they were tricked

into admitting the offense imputed to them. They were not accorded this opportunity.Instead they were simply informed that, in view of the charge and their supposed

admission thereof, they were being summarily dismissed from the service.

The petitioner also invokes Section 40 of P.D. No. 807 and argues that in view of the

private respondents' admission of the charge against them, they could be summarily

dismissed under this section which provides that ―No formal investigation is necessary

and the respondent may be immediately removed or dismissed if any of the following

circumstances is present. When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is

strong.‖



ISSUE:

Whether or not the private respondent was denied due process though the latter had

initially admitted his guilt.

HELD:

We do not have to rule at this time on the degree of the offense imputed to the private

respondents. But we will say here that, in view of their rejection of the confessions

supposedly made by them, the evidence of their guilt cannot by any standard be

regarded as strong. Indeed, that guilt had yet to be established by preponderant

evidence, especially against the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the perjury charge

against them. Consequently, we cannot find that Item (a) of Section 40 could be validly

applied against the private respondents to justify their summary dismissal.

The Court had earlier entertained serious misgivings about the constitutionality of

Section 40 as against strong protests that it was violative of due process in so far as it

deprived the civil servant of the right to defend himself against the ex parte decision to

dismiss him. While it is true that this section had been upheld in earlier decisions (albeit

not very categorically), there was a growing sentiment that the law should be re-

examined more closely in deference to the right to a hearing that it was foreclosing.

The right to be heard is one of the brightest hallmarks of the free society. We should be

proud that in this jurisdiction every person who may be involved in controversy is

entitled to present his side, no less than his adversary, at a hearing duly called for thatpurpose.



GSIS v. CA, 201 SCRA 661

FACTS:

Respondent Evelyn Kintanar was ―summarily dismissed‖ from service as Control Clerk

at the Cebu City Branch office of the petitioner GSIS. The case started when in 1979,

two (2) members of GSIS, in separate affidavits, complained that they had not received

their policy loan checks. Several employees were investigated, including respondent

Evelyn. Meanwhile, in a letter dated 16 October 1979 addressed to the Officer-in-

Charge of the Department of Investigation, GSIS, Manila, respondent Evelyn requested

another and separate investigation. The Department of Investigation thereafter sent

Atty. Elpidio Divina to Cebu City. Curiously enough, Evelyn Kintanar was never

considered for investigation, although she had requested such re-investigation.

Based on the affidavits of the five (5) other employees who were investigated, Atty.

Divina had concluded that the loss of the two (2) checks occurred while they were in the

custody of Evelyn Kintanar. Atty. Divina therefore did not try to secure Evelyn's

statement, as he had intended to file formal charges against her, at which time Evelyn

would have the opportunity to refute the charges against her. However, Atty. Divina's

suggestion that charges be filed against Evelyn Kintanar was turned down by his

superiors in Manila.

And on 9 May 1980, petitioner GSIS, through Board Resolution No. 310 adopted by itsBoard of Trustees, resolved, upon recommendation of the Officer-In-Charge,

Department of Investigation, summarily to dismiss respondent Evelyn from the service.

On 3 June 1980, Evelyn Kintanar filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission,

contending that her summary dismissal was a violation of her right to security of tenure

and of the constitutional guarantee of due process The Civil Service Commission

endorsed the appeal to GSIS President and General Manager Roman A. Cruz who in

turn informed respondent Evelyn that she was "summarily dismissed from the service as

mandated under [paragraph a] of Sec. 40 of Presidential Decree No. 807 or the Civil

Service Decree.



ISSUE:

Whether or not the Evelyn Kintanar was denied due process by GSIS.

HELD:

Yes, the Court found that respondent Evelyn was denied due process by petitioner

GSIS. In the case at bar, there is no question that no charges had been filed before

respondent Evelyn Kintanar was dismissed from the service. She simply was not

informed of any charges against her; she was not even interviewed by the lawyer sentby the GSIS to look into the matter.

The Court held that that what the opening sentence of Section 40 of PD 807 is saying is

that an employee may be removed or dismissed even without formal investigation, in

certain instances. It is equally clear t that an employee must be informed of the charges

preferred against him, and that the normal way by which the employee is so informed is

by furnishing him with a copy of the charges made against him. This is a basic

procedural requirement that a statute cannot dispense with and still remains consistent

with the constitutional provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is

that the employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have areasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses

against the charges leveled against him and to present evidence in support of his

defenses. The ordinary way by which a Civil Service employee is given this opportunity

is by holding an investigation, in the course of which the employee may assert his

defenses and present his supporting evidence.



Hellenic Philippine Shipping Inc v. Siete, 195 SCRA 179

FACTS:

Private respondent Epifanio Siete was employed as Master of M/V Houda G by Sultan

Shipping Co. Ltd. Through its crewing agent, petitioner Hellenic Philippine Shipping. He

boarded the vessel on May 24, 1985 at Cyprus. The vessel sailed to El Ferrol Spain

where it loaded cargo that it subsequently discharged at Tripoli, Libya. Then proceeded

back to Cyprus, arriving there on. Wilfredo Lim boarded the vessel and advised Siete

that he had instructions from the owners to take over its command.

These instructions were later confirmed by a telex sent by Sultan Shipping to Siete.

Neither Lim nor the telex indicated the reason for Siete‘s dismissal. Siete claims that

this information was also withheld from him by petitioner Hellenic Shipping upon his

repatriation to Manila. Siete filed with the POEA a complaint against the petitioner for

illegal dismissal and non-payment of his salary and other benefits under their

employment contract.

In its Answer, petitioner alleged that Siete had been dismissed because of his failure to

erase the timber load line on the vessel, as instructed, and for his negligence in

supervising the discharge of cargo at Tripoli that resulted in the replacement of certain

damaged equipment. POEA Administrator Tomas Achacoso dismissed the complaint

for lack of merit and held that there was valid cause for Siete‘s removal, based on the

communication presented in evidence by Hellenic Shipping.

The NLRC reversed the POEA Administrator, holding that the dismissal violated due

process and that the documents submitted by petitioner were hearsay, self-serving and

unverified. Petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari, contending that

Siete had not been denied due process, considering the summary nature of the

proceeding that had to be taken in view of the nature of his position. Moreover,

petitioner avers that Siete is a managerial employee and may be dismissed on the basis

of loss of confidence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent was illegally dismissed.



HELD:

YES. Substantial evidence has been established that the private respondent was

indeed not notified of the charges against him and that no investigation was conductedto justify his dismissal. Moreover, the petitioner has failed to prove that Siete had been

instructed to erase the timber load lines and that he had been negligent in the cargo

unloading at Tripoli.

The Court noted that the reports submitted by the petitioner to prove its charges were all

prepared after the fact of Siete‘s dismissal and were signed by its own employees. Their

motives are necessarily suspected. The excuse of the petitioner that it itself did not

know why Siete was dismissed, being only a crewing agent of Sultan Shipping,

deserves no comment The Labor Code provides that ―no worker shall be dismissed

except for a just or authorized cause provided by law and after due process‖.

Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating

the particular act or omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal. The employee

may answer the allegation stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a

reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall immediately notify a

worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons. It is not correct

to say that managerial employees may be arbitrarily dismissed at any time and without

just cause as established in an appropriate investigation. Managerial employees, no

less than rank-and-file laborers, are entitled to due process.



Salaw v. NLRC, 202 SCRA 7

FACTS:

Salaw, was employed by the private respondents as a credit investigator-appraiser. The

CIS of the Philippine Constabulary extracted from Salaw without the assistance of

counsel a Sworn Statement which made it appear that Salaw, in cahoots with a co-

employee, Madrigal, a supervisor in charge of the acquired assets of respondent

Associated Bank, sold twenty sewing machines and electric generators which had been

foreclosed by the respondent bank from Worldwide Garment and L.P. Money Garment

Salaw was requested by private respondent Tuazon, the bank manager, to appear

before the bank's PDIC which would be meeting the following day. Salaw was

terminated from his employment for alleged serious misconduct or willful disobedience

and fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed on him by the private respondents. Salaw

filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent Bank, Tengco,

and Tuazon. Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissal of complainant.

private respondents appealed the labor arbiter's decision to the National Labor

Relations Commission (NLRC) who reversed and dismissed the case for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioner by the private respondents was legally

justified though he was denied assistance of counsel during investigation.

HELD:

Under the Labor Code, as amended, the requirements for the lawful dismissal of an

employee by his employer are two-fold: the substantive and the procedural. Not only

must the dismissal be for a valid or authorized cause as provided by law (Articles 279,

281, 282-284, New Labor Code), but the rudimentary requirements of due process — notice and hearing — must also be observed before an employee may be dismissed.

One does not suffice; without their concurrence, the terminate would, in the eyes of the

law, be illegal.

The inviolability of notice and hearing for a valid dismissal an employee cannot be over-

emphasized. Those twin requirements constitute essential elements of due process in

cases employee dismissal. The requirement of notice is intended inform the employee



concerned of the employer's intent dismiss him and the reason for the proposed

dismissal; on other hand, the requirement of hearing affords the employ the opportunity

to answer his employer's charges against him and accordingly to defend himself

therefrom before dismissal effected. Neither one of these two requirements can be

dispensed with without running afoul of the due process requirement of the Constitution.

The investigation of petitioner Salaw by the respondent Bank' investigating committee

violated his constitutional right to due process, in as much as he was not given a

chance to defend himself, as provided in Rule XIV, Book V of the Implementing Rules

and Regulations of the Labor Code governing the dismissal of employees. Section 5 of

the said Rule requires that "the employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be

heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.

―Here petition was perfunctorily denied the assistance of counsel during investigation to

be conducted by the PDIC. No reasons preferred which vitiated the denial with

irregularity and unfairness.



Macayayong v. Ople – 204 SCRA 372

FACTS:

Petitioner Macayayong had been detailed with the various offices in the Office of the

President from 1968 up to the time he was dropped from the roster of the Department of

Labor. The Chairman, Board of Liquidators, Office of the President, requested extension

of petitioner's detail with said office until after the cases he was handling are terminated.

Notwithstanding the request, the Secretary of Labor in a telegram manifested that the

detail of Atty. Macayayong was not sanctioned by his Office, therefore, the recall order

still stood with a warning that unless he reported to his home office within 72 hours fromnotice, he would be dropped from the rolls of personnel.

In obedience thereto, Macayayong reported to the Bureau of Labor Standards and

rendered service therein, when he applied for a leave of absence. The Secretary of

Labor notified Macayayong that his services would be terminated effective January 31,

1976 by reason of his failure to report back to his Office which urgently needed his

services. And on January 23, 1976, the Secretary issued an order dropping

Macayayong from the roster of the Department of Labor for "Abandonment of Post."

Petitioner appealed to the CSC but it affirmed the order of respondent Ople. The

petitioner filed another appeal with the Office of the President from Resolution of CSC,

but again it was denied. Petitioner contends that he was denied due process because

he was not given enough time to obey said recall. He alleges that the January 5 and 19

letters sent to him were received together with the order of the Secretary of Labor on

January 30, 1976 (Friday), which was the eve of the effectivity of his dismissal on

January 31, 1976. Hence, he was not given the opportunity to be heard.

On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was never denied due process. In

fact, he was sent the necessary notifications and was given an ultimatum to report back

to his home office which he disregarded. This may be considered as substantial

compliance with the due process rule.



ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner's summary dismissal is in violation of the due process of law.

HELD:

The court ruled in favor of the respondent. The petition is without merit. Petitioner's

contention is untenable. The records show that before petitioner was dropped from the

roster of the Department of Labor, he was notified twice by his home office to report

back to work, on January 5 and on January 19, 1976. And even assuming that

petitioner's contentions as to his date of receipt of notices were true, it is well settled

that due process contemplates freedom from arbitrariness and what is required is

fairness or justice, the substance rather than the form being paramount. An allegationbased solely on the lack of opportunity to be heard without notice does not per se merit

unconditional approval.



Alonzo v. Capulong, 244 SCRA 80

FACTS:

Private respondent Juliet Fajardo is manager of the Administrative Services Department

of the Home Development Mutual Fund, otherwise known as the Pag-ibig Fund

Foundation. On December 17, 1992 Celeste G. Al-Jawazneh, lodged a complaint

stating that Fajardo had took advantage of her position.

After finding prima facie evidence, a formal charge was filed against private respondent

for dishonesty, misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, contracting of loans of

money or other property from persons with whom the office of the employee concerned

had business relations, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.Private respondent was required to answer the charges and indicate whether she

desired to have a formal investigation. Meanwhile, she was placed under preventive

suspension for 90 days. Private respondent complained that the order of preventive

suspension was issued without giving her the right to be heard.

The respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner from

―executing and/or enforcing the order of preventive suspension.

Petitioner contends that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of his discretion in

taking cognizance of the case and stopping the preventive suspension of private

respondent whom he ordered to be allowed to continue in office. She contends that the

investigation being conducted by her office was purely an administrative one and that

private respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies by appealing to the Civil

Service Commission.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the preventive suspension of a civil service employee or officer can be

ordered even without a hearing.

HELD:

Prior notice and hearing was not required. It is now settled that the preventive

suspension of a civil service employee or officer can be ordered even without a hearing



because such suspension is not a penalty but only a preliminary step in an

administrative investigation. The movant/petitioner having shown that the invasion of the

right to be protected is material and substantial; that her right is clear and unmistakable.

As Chief Executive Officer of the Home Development Mutual Fund, petitioner is the

proper disciplining authority. Indeed her power to order the preventive suspension ofany employee under her is not denied by private respondent. What private respondent

contends is that she was suspended on the basis of an unverified letter and without first

giving her the right to be heard in her defense.



CHR v. CSC, 227 SCRA 42

FACTS:

Atty. Elias Pacete, a permanent appointee since February 1, 1988 to the position of

Division Chief of Region IX of the Commission of Human Rights (CHR) based in

Zamboanga City, filed an application for optional retirement. However, Pacete sent a

notice of withdrawal of his application for retirement.

Pacete was informed by the Chairman of the CHR through a telegram of the

acceptance and approval of his application for optional retirement effective and theappointment of Atty. Rodrigo Roy as his successor. (GSIS) informed private

respondent that his application for optional retirement cannot be favorably considered

due to his failure to meet the condition provided for in Section 12 (c) of Rep. Act No.

1616 which provides requirement of three (3) years of continuous service preceding

retirement. Consequently, the GSIS advised the CHR to allow Pacete to continue in the

service to complete the said requirement.

Accordingly, Pacete requested the CHR that he be reinstated to his former position with

back wages and allowances and the recall of the appointment of his successor, Atty.

Roy. The GSIS denied his request and instead formally charged him withincompetence, gross inefficiency in the performance of official duty and failure to

account for public funds.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner justified in refusing to allow Pacete to continue rendering

service to fulfill the requirements under Rep. Act No. 1616.

HELD:

Petitioner cites paragraph (d) of Section 12 of Com. Act 186 as basis for its power of

removal of its personnel on grounds of inefficiency and incompetence which provides

that ―The employer concerned may request the retirement of any such employee

described in the preceding subsection who, by reason of a disqualification, is unable to



perform satisfactorily and efficiently the duties of his position or some other position of

the same grade or class as that occupied by the employee and to which he could be

assigned, but such request shall be submitted to the Civil Service Board of Appeals only

after the said employee had been notified in writing of the proposed retirement.

No such employee, however, shall be so retired unless the Civil Service Board of Appeals has given him a hearing and found him after examination that he is so

disqualified. The decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals as to whether or not the

said employee shall be retired under this sub-section shall be final and conclusive.‖

The above provision recognizes the discretion of the head of office in the approval of an

employee‘s optional retirement, but such discretion must be exercised without violating

the tenets of administrative due process.

We find that there was a glaring disregard of this procedure laid down in the law. In fact,

the October 18, 1989 resolution of the CHR denying him reinstatement for failure to

fulfill the three-year requirement of continuous service preceding retirement was

reached without notice and hearing. Much less was there any request for optional

retirement of private respondent from the CHR to the Civil Service Board of Appeals

based on incompetence and inefficiency. Although he was furnished a copy of the

resolution denying his application for reinstatement with the attendant charges against

him, he was not afforded the opportunity to refute them prior to the promulgation of the

said resolution.



People v. Nazario – 165 SCRA 136

FACTS:

Respondent Eusebio Nazario, an owner and operator of a fishpond situated in the barrio

of Pinagbayanan, was charged in violation of the crime of Violation of Municipal

Ordinance 4, Series of 1995, as amended, for willful, unlawful, and felonious refusal to

pay the municipal taxes in the total amount of P362.62 required of him inspite of

repeated demands made upon him to pay the same.

The years in question of failure to pay were for 1964, 1965, and 1966. Nazario did not

pay because he was not sure if he was covered under the ordinance. He was found

guilty, thus this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ordinance said is null and void for being vague and hence violative of

due process.

HELD:

No. In no way may the ordinance at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of

vagueness. It is unmistakable from its very provisions that the appellant falls within its

coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term ―manager.‖

To be declared null and void, the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it

cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction.



Estate of Francisco v. CA – 199 SCRA 595

FACTS:

Basilan Municipal Mayor Benjamin Valencia summarily ordered the demolition of anantiquated and dilapidated quonset warehouse situated in Port Area, Strong Boulevard,IsabelA, Basilan, outside the zone for warehouses. The legal possessor of the Quonsetsought the prohibition of the Order but was denied by the RTC. The CA originallyoverturned the RTC but subsequently reversed itself. In question in this case is thevalidity of such order by the Municipal Mayor, which was in effect an abatementof nuisance, without prior judicial authority.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Respondent Mayor could summarily and extra-judicially order thedemolition of petitioner's quonset building.

HELD:

NO. Ordinance No. 147 relied upon by Respondents should not be interpreted asauthorizing the summary removal of a non-conforming building by the municipalgovernment. For if it does, it must be struck down for being in contravention of therequirements of due process, as originally held by the Court of Appeals.

Moreover, the enforcement and administration of the provisions of the Ordinanceresides with the Zoning Administrator. It is said official who may call upon the City Fiscalto institute the necessary legal proceedings to enforce the provisions of the Ordinance.

And any person aggrieved by the decision of the Zoning Administrator regarding theenforcement of the Ordinance may appeal to the Board of Zoning Appeals.

Violation of a municipal ordinance neither empowers the Municipal Mayor to avail ofextra-judicial remedies. On the contrary, the Local Government Code imposes upon himthe duty "to cause to be instituted judicial proceedings in connection with the violation ofordinances".



Misamis Occidental Association V. DOF – 238 SCARA 63

FACTS:

Petitioner Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. is a domestic corporation

whose members, individually or collectively, are engaged in the buying and selling of

copra in Misamis Oriental. On the other hand, respondents represent departments of

the executive branch of government charged with the generation of funds and the

assessment, levy and collection of taxes and other imposts.

It alleges that prior to the issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) 47-91 on

June 11, 1991, which implemented Value Added Tax (VAT) Ruling 190-90, copra was

classified as agricultural food product under Section 103(b) of the National InternalRevenue Code and, therefore, exempt from VAT at all stages of production or

distribution.

Likewise, petitioner claims that RMC No. 47-91 is discriminatory and violative of the

equal protection clause of the Constitution because while coconut farmers and copra

producers are exempt, traders and dealers are not, although both sell copra in its

original state. Petitioners add that oil millers do not enjoy tax credit out of the VAT

payment of traders and dealers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RMC No. 47-91 is violative of the equal protection clause.

HELD:

The argument has no merit. There is a material or substantial difference between

coconut farmers and copra producers, on the one hand, and copra traders and dealers,

on the other. The former produce and sell copra, the latter merely sell copra. TheConstitution does not forbid the differential treatment of persons so long as there is a

reasonable basis for classifying them differently. It is not true that oil millers are exempt

from VAT. Pursuant to § 102 of the NIRC, they are subject to 10% VAT on the sale of

service.



Medenilla v. Civil Service Commission – 194 SCRA 278

FACTS:

Petitioner was a contractual employee at the Department of Public Works and Highways

(DPWH) as Public Relations Officer II (PRO II). Medenilla was promoted to the position

of Technical Assistant in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administration and

Manpower Management. Petitioner Medenilla was appointed as supervising Human

Resource Development Officer. Respondents Dellosa, et al. protested the appointment

of the petitioner to the position through the DPWH Task Force. Their contention was

that since they are the next-in-rank employees, they should be appointed and not thepetitioner. However, the said protest was dismissed on August 2, 1989. The matter was

then brought to the Civil Service Commission.

The CSC decided that, Medenilla, being contractual and considering her eligibility is

non-eligible for the said position. A motion for reconsideration by the petitioner was filed,

which was later on denied by the CSC. Thus, the matter was brought to the Supreme

Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner was denied due process of law by the CSC not giving

notice to the petitioner the existence of an appeal filed in the CSC.

HELD:

Petitioner‘s contention is without merit. She was not deprived of due process since shepetitioned a motion for reconsideration. Due process abhors not lack of previous notice

but the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. The essence of due process is the

opportunity to be heard. The presence of a party is not always the cornerstone of due

process. In the case at bar, any defect was cured by the filing of a motion for

reconsideration.



Mendiola v. CSC, 221 SCRA 295

FACTS:

The petitioner, an employee of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau was

terminated from service on the ground of E.O. 127 issued by Pres. Aquino mandating

the reorganization of the Department of Finance. The petitioner appealed to the

Chairman of Appeals Board alleging that he was not informed of the cause of his

dismissal and denied due process of law. His appeal was denied, thus, he subsequently

appealed to the Civil Service Commission. The Commission resolved the case in

petitioner‘s favor and ordered that the petitioner be appointed to his previous position orto position of comparable or equitable rank without loss of seniority and with payment of

back salaries.

The petitioner filed a motion for execution base on the Resolution of the Commission.

However, the motion was left un acted upon. Petitioner then found out that the Bureau

filed a motion for reconsideration on the resolution. The commission, giving due courses

to the motion for reconsideration set aside its previous resolution. Petitioner filed his

Omnibus Motion for reconsideration with the Commission praying that the motion for

reconsideration of the Bureau be stricken off the records and the Commission‘s

Resolution on the motion for reconsideration be set aside. The Commission however,denied the Omnibus Motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was denied due process when the commission heard the

Bureau‘s motion for reconsideration without notice to him.

HELD:

With respect to petitioner‘s contention that he was denied due process when the

commission heard the bureau‘s motion for reconsideration without notice to him, the

highest tribunal agree with the respondent bureau‘s argument that the defect was cured



by the filing by the petitioner of his omnibus motion. Thus, in Medenilla v. CSC, lack of

notice to petitioner regarding the pending appeal and the hearing of said appeal was

cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Denial of due process cannot be

successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for

reconsideration.



Rodriguez v. Project 6 Market Service Coop., Inc et al, GR 79968

FACTS:

The instant petition stems from Civil Case No. Q-45781 filed in 1984 by the Cooperativeagainst petitioner with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 39, Quezon City. TheCooperative sought to eject petitioner from his market stall and recover from him arrearsin his monthly rent over the property. Judgment was rendered by the MTC on November28, 1985 ordering petitioner to vacate the leased premises and pay rent in arrears anduntil such time as he vacates the leased property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of procedural due process when an order

was issued without hearing, and though petitioner had subsequently moved for

reconsideration.

HELD:

Petitioner contends that he was deprived of procedural due process when the trial court

issued the order of August 31, 1987 without any hearing and without him having been

furnished a copy of the Cooperative's opposition to his motion to quash. However,

petitioner admits that when he moved for reconsideration of said order, he received his

copy of the opposition and respondent judge conducted a hearing on his motion. 17

Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was

given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.



Lazo v. CSC, 236 SCRA 469

FACTS:

The Civil Service Commission received a letter from a certain Efren L. Pagurayan,reporting that petitioner Dennis C. Lazo had boasted to him that he had bought hiscareer service (subprofessional) eligibility from the Civil Service Commission for acertain amount. Acting on the report, the CSC directed its Regional Office atTuguegarao, Cagayan to investigate the matter. The Regional Office found that thecomplainant was a fictitious individual and there being no witnesses to support theallegation in the letter, the Regional Office recommended dismissal of the matter.Considering the seriousness of the allegation in the letter, however, the CSC orderedthe examination answer sheets of petitioner retrieved and hand-checked by the Office ofRecruitment, Examination and Placement. Upon discovery in anomaly (he actually got a

failing grade), the CSC charged petitioner with dishonesty, grave misconduct andconduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service, and ordered the Regional Officeto conduct anew a formal investigation of the case. The case was again dismissed forlack of evidence; they had dismissed the administrative charge against him but had alsorevoked his eligibility for being null and void as Resolution No. 92-837. Petitioner askedfor reconsideration, alleging that Resolution No. 92-837 was issued in violation of hisright to due process and that the CSC had found him to have failed the Civil ServiceExaminations without evidence being presented to support the finding.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion and denied petitioner'sright to due process by unilaterally revoking petitioner's eligibility without a formalinvestigation or an opportunity given to him to examine and go over his answer sheet inthe Civil Service Examination.

HELD:

Under the Constitution, the Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency ofthe government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of meritand fitness of those appointed to the civil service. Its power to issue a certificate ofeligibility carries with it the power to revoke a certificate for being null and void.



The argument is made, however, that the CSC cannot motu propio revoke a certificateof eligibility without notice and hearing to the examinees concerned. While this is true asa general proposition, in the context of this case, which simply involves the recheckingof examination papers and nothing more than a re-evaluation of documents already inthe records of the CSC according to a standard answer key previously set by it, notice

and hearing was not required. The question before the CSC did not require anyevidentiary hearing. Instead, what applied was the rule of res i psa loquitur. Petitionercould have examined the rechecking of his examination papers and, if he foundanything wrong, he could have asked for reconsideration. But, while he filed one in thiscase, he did not show that his score was really 76.46%. He simply argued that heshould not be made to answer for an irregularity in which he had no participation and,on this basis, asked the CSC for a formal investigation.

The filing of the motion for reconsideration remedied whatever defect there might havebeen in rechecking the examination papers of petitioner without hispresence.

3 Petitioner was given the right to be heard, but, as already said, he did not

make good use of it by showing that his actual score was 76.46%, and not 34.48%. Forthat matter, even here petitioner does not allege that his grade in the civil serviceexamination is 76.46% and not 34.48%. All he is alleging is that he should have bengiven a chance to see the examination sheet himself.



Stronghold Insurance v. CA – 205 SCRA 605

FACTS:

The petitioner invokes due process to escape liability on a surety bond executed for theprotection of a Filipino seaman. Acting on behalf of its foreign principal, Qatar NationalFishing Co., Pan Asian Logistics and Trading, a domestic recruiting and placementagency, hired Adriano Urtesuela as captain of the vessel M/V Oryx for the stipulatedperiod of twelve months. The required surety bond, in the amount of P50,000.00, wassubmitted by Pan Asian and Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc., the herein petitioner, toanswer for the liabilities of the employer.

Urtesuela assumed his duties on April 18, 1982, but three months later his serviceswere terminated and he was repatriated to Manila. He thereupon filed a complaintagainst Pan Asian and his former employer with the Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration for breach of contract and damages. In due time, the POEA rendered adecision in his favor for the amount of P6,374.94, representing his salaries for theunexpired portion of his contract and the cash value of his unused vacation leave, plusattorney s fees and costs, which the respondents were required to pay. The judgmenteventually became final and executory, not having been appealed on time. Pursuantthereto, a writ of execution was issued against Pan Asian but could be enforced onlyagainst its cash bond of P10,000.00, the company having ceased to operate. Urtesuelathen filed a complaint with the Insurance Commission against Stronghold on the basisof the aforementioned surety bond and prayed for the value thereof plus attorney's feesand litigation costs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was lack of due process for Stronghold Insurance.

HELD:

No. Stronghold agreed to answer for whatever decision might be rendered against the

principal, whether or not the surety was impleaded in the complaint and had theopportunity to defend itself. Petitioner agreed to ―answer for all liabilities‖ that ―may beadjudged or imposed by the POEA against the principal.‖

The right to be head is as often waived as it is invoked, and validly as long as the partyis given an opportunity to be heard on his behalf. Due process is not violated where aperson is not heard because he has chosen, for whatever reason, not to be heard. Itshould be obvious that if he opts to be silent where he has a right to speak, he cannotlater be heard to complain the he was unduly silenced.



Feeder International Line v. CA – 197 SCRA 842

FACTS:

The M/T "ULU WAI" foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated byFeeder International Shipping Lines of Singapore, left Singapore on May 6, 1986carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to FarEast Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines. On May 14, 1986, the vesselanchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notifying the Iloilo customsauthorities. The presence of the vessel only came to the knowledge of the Iloiloauthorities by information of the civilian informer in the area. Acting on said information,the Acting District Collector of Iloilo dispatched a Customs team on May 19, 1986 toverify the report.

The Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on board the required shipand shipping documents, except for a clearance from the port authorities of Singaporeclearing the vessel for "Zamboanga." In view thereof, the vessel and its cargo were heldand a Warrant of Seizure and Detention over the same was issued after dueinvestigation. The petitioner then filed its Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Warrantsof Seizure and Detention contending that the sworn statements of Deposa and Torreswere taken without assistance of counsel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sworn statements of Deposa and Torres were taken withoutassistance of counsel in violation of their constitutional right thereto.

HELD:

The fact that the testimonies of Deposa and Torres were given without the assistance ofcounsel may not be considered an outright violation of their constitutional right to beassisted by counsel. The right to the assistance of counsel is not indispensable to dueprocess unless required by the Constitution or a law. Exception is made in the charteronly during the custodial investigation of a person suspected of a crime, who may notwaive his right to counsel except in writing and in the presence of counsel, and duringthe trial of the accused, who has the right "to be heard by himself and counsel," eitherretained by him or provided for him by the government at its expense.



These guarantees are embodied in the Constitution, along with the other rights of theperson facing criminal prosecution, because of the odds he must contend with to defendhis liberty (and before even his life) against the awesome authority of the State.

In other proceedings, however, the need for the assistance of counsel is not as urgentnor is it deemed essential to their validity. There is nothing in the Constitution that saysa party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and thatwithout such representation he will not be bound by such proceedings. The assistanceof lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engraftedin the due process clause such that without the participation of its members thesafeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless thathe cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.

Besides, if ever there was any doubt as to the veracity of the sworn statements ofDeposa and Torres, they should have been presented during any appropriate stage ofthe proceedings to refute or deny the statements they made. This was not done bypetitioner. Hence, the presumption that official duty was regularly performed stands. In

addition, petitioner does not deny that Torres is himself a lawyer. Finally, petitionersimply contends that the sworn statements were taken without the assistance ofcounsel but, however, failed to allege or prove that the same were taken underanomalous circumstances which would render them inadmissible as evidence againstpetitioner. We thus find no compelling reason to doubt the validity or veracity of the saidsworn statements.



Alba v. Hon. Deputy Ombudsman, GR 120223 March 13, 1996

FACTS:

Private respondents were among the twenty five (25) graduating students of the Arriesgado Institute of Medical Sciences Foundation, Inc. (AIMSFI) in Tagum, Davaowho sought the intervention of petitioner in settling a dispute with the said school arisingfrom the implementation of certain school policies. On March 20, 1994, petitionerscheduled a meeting with the students which led the private respondents and the othercomplaining students travelled all the way from Tagum, Davao to the DECS Office inDavao City on the said date, However, instead of conferring with the aggrievedstudents, petitioner instead met with the Arriesgado spouses-owners of AIMSFI - whoadmittedly did not even have a previous appointment with petitioner with the result thatthe students were left waiting at the anteroom for several hours.

Anent this apparent incident, the students contacted respondent Deputy Ombudsmanfor Mindanao, Cesar E. Nitorreda who was impelled to proceed to the DECS Office toadmonish petitioner for not conferring with both parties at the same time in order to hearboth sides of the controversy. Therefore, petitioner presided over the conferencebetween the Arriesgados and the aggrieved students. On March 29, 1994, petitionersubmitted to the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao (Office of the Ombudsman), areport on the said conference wherein he claimed that he had succeeded in facilitatingan amicable settlement between the parties

After both parties failed to attend the preliminary conference scheduled by the GraftInvestigating Officer assigned to the case, a resolution dated April 28, 1995 was

rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman finding petitioner guilty of violating Section4(b), (c) and (e) of R.A. 6713. When petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration of theforegoing resolution was denied, he filed an ―Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/orProhibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of PreliminaryProhibitory Injunction‖ (petition). In a Resolution dated June 27, 1995, the said petitionwas dismissed on the ground that it was moot and academic because the questionedsuspension of petitioner which was effective from May 26, 1995 to June 24, 1995 hadalready expired or became functus oficio on June 28, 1995 when the petition was filed.

Alleging,first and foremost, a misreading of the correct date of filing of the said petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the thirty (30)-day suspension of Petitioner, without pay is unappealable.



HELD:

The motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated June 27, 1995 ishereby denied. The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is

merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and inaccordance with‖ the provisions of the law. The constitutional requirement of dueprocess may be satisfied notwithstanding the denial of the right to appeal for theessence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence insupport of one‘s case.



Telan v. CA – 202 SCRA 534

FACTS:

Pedro rented a 750 sq. m lot from Luciano Sia. He set up an eatery and vulcanizingshop. His cousins, Roberto, Vicente and Virginia followed suit by setting up their ownbusinesses. His cousins executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with Siaover the lot shared by Pedro and wife. Pedro received a Notice to Vacate from DPB anda demand letter from his cousin ordering the same. Roberto was able to secure a TCTunder his name. With this new TCT, they filed a complaint against Pedro. Pedro andwife hired an attorney to defend them

Lower court awarded possession of property to cousins. Pedro and his wife wanted toappeal but lawyer did not agree so they asked another person to sign the appeal forthem. Pedro and wife met a certain Ernesto Palma in the eatery who pretended to be alawyer.CA dismissed case because Pedro and wife was not able to file an appeal withinthe period required.

Pedro and wife found out about the dismissal. Pedro and wife couldn‘t find the fakelawyer and filed a case against him. The judge of lower court issued a WRIT ofDEMOLITION, writ for certiorari filed by Pedro with Urgent Prayer for TRO.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the representation of the petitioner by a fake lawyer amounts to adeprivation of his right to counsel and hence a lack of due process.

HELD:

YES. They lost their right to appeal when they lost their counsel. In criminal cases, the

right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable. There isno reason why the rule in criminal cases has to be different in civil cases. Thepreeminent right to due process of law applies not only to life and liberty but also toproperty. There can be no fair hearing unless a party, who is in danger of losing hishouse in which he and his family live and in which he has established a modest meansof livelihood, is given the right to be heard by himself and counsel.



The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all time. A client is generallybound by the action of his counsel in the management of a litigation even by theattorney‘s mistake or negligence in procedural technique. But how can be therenegligence by the counsel in the case at bar when the ―lawyer‖, turned out to be a fake?The affidavit of the petitioner, the sworn Petition, the Certifications of the Bar

Confidant‘s Office and the IBP, and the submitted records of criminal case against fakelawyer more than sufficiently establishes the existence of the fake lawyer.



Aris (Phils) Inc. v. NLRC – 200 SCRA 246

FACTS:

Private respondents, who were employees of petitioner, aggrieved by management'sfailure to attend to their complaints concerning their working surroundings which hadbecome detrimental and hazardous, requested for a grievance conference. As nonewas arranged, and believing that their appeal would be fruitless, they grouped togetherafter the end of their work that day with other employees and marched directly to themanagement's office to protest its long silence and inaction on their complaints.

The management issued a memorandum to each of the private respondents, who wereidentified by the petitioner's supervisors as the most active participants in the "rally",requiring them to explain why they should not be terminated from the service for theirconduct. Despite their explanation, private respondents were dismissed for violation ofcompany rules and regulations, more specifically of the provisions on security andpublic order and on inciting or participating in illegal strikes or concerted actions.

Private respondents lost no time in filing a complaint for illegal dismissal againstpetitioner and Mr. Gavino Bayan with the regional office of the NLRC at the NationalCapital Region, Manila. After due trial the labor arbiter ordered Aris (Phils.), Inc. toreinstate Leodegario de Guzman and company to their former respective positions orany substantial equivalent positions if already filled up, without loss of seniority right andprivile,de Guzman and company filed a Motion For Issuance of a Writ of Executionpursuant to Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 which provides that ―In any event, the decision

of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, in so far as thereinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pendingappeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms andconditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of theemployer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shallnot stay the execution for reinstatement provided therein."

Petitioner filed its Appeal. On 26 July 1989, the complainants, except Flor Rayos DelSol, filed a Partial Appeal. On 10 August 1989, complainant Flor Rayos Del Sol filed aPartial Appeal. On 29 August 1989, petitioner filed an Opposition to the motion forexecution alleging that Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 on execution pending appeal cannot

be applied retroactively to cases pending at the time of its effectivity. Petitionersubmitted a Rejoinder to the Reply on 5 September 1989. On 5 October 1989, theLabor Arbiter issued an Order granting the motion for execution and the issuance of apartial writ of execution "as far as reinstatement of herein complainants is concerned inconsonance with the provision of Section 2 of the rules particularly the last sentencethereof."



ISSUE:

Whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction whenit relied on the constitutionality of the amendment introduced by Section 12 of Republic

Act No. 6715 to Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the NLRC and dismissed the petition for lack ofmerit. The SC held that execution pending appeal is interlinked with the right to appeal.One cannot be divorced from the other. The latter may be availed of by the losing partyor a party who is not satisfied with a judgment, while the former may be applied for by

the prevailing party during the pendency of the appeal. The right to appeal, however, isnot a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory originand, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute. The law may then validlyprovide limitations or qualifications thereto or relief to the prevailing party in the event anappeal is interposed by the losing party. Execution pending appeal is one such relieflong recognized in this jurisdiction. The Revised Rules of Court allows executionpending appeal and the grant thereof is left to the discretion of the court upon goodreasons to be stated in a special order.

Before its amendment by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6716, Article 223 of the Labor Codealready allowed execution of decisions of the NLRC pending their appeal to the

Secretary of Labor and Employment. These provisions are the quintessence of theaspirations of the workingman for recognition of his role in the social and economic lifeof the nation, for the protection of his rights, and the promotion of his welfare. Thecharge then that the challenged law as well as the implementing rule is unconstitutionalis absolutely baseless. Laws are presumed constitutional.



Rivera v. CSC, 240 SCRA 43

FACTS:

Petitioner George I. Rivera was the Manager of Corporate Banking Unit I of the LandBank of the Philippines ("LBP"). On the basis of the affidavits of William Lao and JesusC. Perez, petitioner was charged, on 01 February 1988, by the LBP President withhaving committed dishonesty, receiving gifts in the course of official duties, committingacts punishable under the Anti-Graft laws, violation of CSC rules and regulations, andviolation of Res. 87-A, R.A. No. 337; resulting to misconduct and conduct prejudicial tothe best interest of the service.

Once the charges were filed, Rivera was placed under preventive suspension (effective19 February 1988). After a formal investigation, the LBP held Rivera guilty of gravemisconduct and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service in acceptingemployment from a client of the bank and in thereby receiving salaries and allowancesin violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII, of the Revised Civil Service Rules. He was alsofound to have transgressed the prohibition in Section 3, paragraph (d), of the Anti-Graftand Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended). The penalty of forcedresignation, without separation benefits and gratuities, was thereupon imposed onRivera.

On appeal, the decision was modified by the MPSB. The LBP filed a motion for thereconsideration of MSPB's decision, of which the latter denied the motion. TheCommission resolves to dismiss the appeal of Respondent George Rivera. Moreover,the Commission finds him guilty of Grave Misconduct for which he is meted out thepenalty of dismissal from the service.

ISSUE:

WON the CSC committed grave abuse or discretion in imposing the capital penalty ofdismissal on the basis of unsubstantiated finding and conclusions.

HELD:

The Court resolved to dismiss the petition for petitioner's failure to sufficiently show thatCSC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its questioned resolution. Riverafiled a motion for reconsideration of the Court's dismissal of the petition, now strongly



asserting that he was denied due process when Hon. Thelma P. Gaminde, who earlierparticipated in her capacity as the Board Chairman of the MSPB when the latter hadtaken action on LBP's motion for reconsideration, also took part, this time as a CSCCommissioner, in the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the CSC.The Court, in its resolution of 05 July 1994, resolved to grant the motion, to reinstate the

petition and to require respondents to comment thereon.

In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be afarce, then reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision isunder review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no realreview of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view;inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that hewas mistaken in his first view of the case. Given the circumstances in the case atbench, it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally fromany participation in resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to give full meaning andconsequence to a fundamental aspect of due process. The argument thatCommissioner Gaminde did not participate in MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990 is

unacceptable. It is not denied that she did participate, indeed has concurred, in MSPB'sresolution of 03 March 1994, denying the motion for reconsideration of MSPB's decisionof 29 August 1990.



Central Bank v. CA, 220 SCRA 536

FACTS:

Based on examination reports submitted by the Supervision and Examination Sector

(SES), Department II, of the Central Bank (CB) "that the financial condition of TSB is

one of insolvency and its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its

depositors and creditors," the Monetary Board (MB) issued on 31 May 1985 Resolution

No. 596 ordering the closure of TSB, forbidding it from doing business in the

Philippines, placing it under receivership, and appointing Ramon V. Tiaoqui as receiver.

On 1 July 1985, the trial court temporarily restrained petitioners from implementing MB

Resolution No. 596 "until further orders", thus prompting them to move for the quashal

of the restraining order (TRO) on the ground that it did not comply with said Sec. 29,

i.e., that TSB failed to show convincing proof of arbitrariness and bad faith on the part of

petitioners;' and, that TSB failed to post the requisite bond in favor of Central Bank.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner was denied substantive due process.

HELD:

Contrary to the notion of private respondent, Sec. 29 does not contemplate prior notice

and hearing before a bank may be directed to stop operations and placed under

receivership. When par. 4 (now par. 5, as amended by E.O. 289) provides for the filing

of a case within ten (10) days after the receiver takes charge of the assets of the bank,

it is unmistakable that the assailed actions should precede the filing of the case. Plainly,

the legislature could not have intended to authorize "no prior notice and hearing" in the

closure of the bank and at the same time allow a suit to annul it on the basis of absence

thereof.

"The charge of lack of due process in the complaint may be taken as constitutive of

allegations of arbitrariness and bad faith. This is not of course to be taken as meaning

that there must be previous hearing before the Monetary Board may exercise its powers

under Section 29 of its Charter. Rather, judicial review of such action not being



foreclosed, it would be best should private respondent be given the chance to show and

prove arbitrariness and bad faith in the issuance of the questioned resolution, especially

so in the light of the statement of private respondent that neither the bank itself nor its

officials were even informed of any charge of violating banking laws.

Respondent judge acted in plain disregard of the fourth paragraph of Section 29 of theCentral Bank Act when he restrained the petitioners from closing and liquidating the

Rural Bank of Libmanan, prevented them from performing their functions, and ordered

them to return the management and control of the rural bank to its Board of Directors

without receiving convincing proof that the action of the Central Bank was plainly

arbitrary and made in bad faith



Philippine Merchant Marine School v. CA L 112844 June 2, 1995

FACTS:

DECS received reports that petitioner enrolled freshmen for its maritime programswhich were ordered phased out effective SY 1989-1990 and was thus without priorgovernment authorization and/or in violation of any of the terms and conditions of saidpermit or recognition; directed that in accordance with the phase-out order, petitioner'sManila campus is allowed to operate only the 2nd, 3rd and 4th years of the authorizedmaritime programs which shall be gradually phased out; and, required petitioner tocomment on the reported unauthorized enrolment.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration stating that the finding that it had not complied withthe minimum requirements was that as early as 21 June 1989 it filed a letter requestingreconsideration and that since there was no reply it believed that the letter order wasreconsidered sub-silencio and that petitioner was allowed to enrol 1st year students forSY 1989-1990; and, that it had undertaken improvements in all of its facilities incompliance with DECS requirements. In this regard, it requested another inspection ofits premises. Petitioner failed another inspection made thus petitioner moved toreconsider the phase-out order in its letter of 21 May 1990, which request was deniedby the DECS

Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed the matter to respondent Office of the

President which the latter opined ―Mere alleged efforts to improve the facilities andequipment do not warrant the reversal of our previous resolution. It bears stressing asthe records may show that the phase-out order of DECS was based not only onPMMSI's failure to provide adequate equipment and facilities but also on PMMSI'sfailure to comply with the standard requirements prescribed for a school site.

While said phase-out may not be final and executory, there was no reason for PMMSI tooffer maritime courses without the requisite prior authority of the DECS. PMMSIpossessed no valid permit prior to the issuance of the phase-out.

Petitioner asseverates that the DECS denied its right to a hearing on the supposeddeficiencies which allegedly justified denial of its request for issuance of a renewal

permit. Likewise, the DECS denied petitioner the opportunity to correct suchdeficiencies. The Office of the President totally ignored supervening events properlybrought to its attention in the letters of petitioner dated 2 and 3 October 1992.



ISSUE:

WON petitioner was denied due process as it was not provided a chance to explainitself.

HELD:

The assertion of petitioner that it was deprived of its right to a hearing and anyopportunity whatsoever to correct the alleged deficiencies readily collapses. The earliernarration of facts clearly demonstrates that before the DECS issued the phase-out andclosure orders, petitioner was duly notified, warned and given several opportunities tocorrect its deficiencies and to comply with pertinent orders and regulations.

Petitioner has gone all the way up to the Office of the President to seek a reversal of thephase-out and closure orders. There is thus no reason to complain of lack of opportunityto explain its side as well as to comply with the alleged deficiencies.

As long as the parties were given opportunity to be heard before judgment wasrendered, the demands of due process were sufficiently met.



Concerned Officials of MWSS v. Vasquez, 240 SCRA 502

FACTS:

MWSS conducted bidding for two projects concerning its water dis tribut ion system inMetro Manila. The Philippine Large Diameter Pressure Pipes Manufacturers‘

Association (PLDPPMA) then questioned the award of the projects with the Office of theOmbudsman (Vasquez), charging an ―apparent plan‖ on the part of the MWSS tofavor certain suppliers (those offering fiberglass pipes over those offering steel pipes)through the technical specifications, and urging the Ombudsman to conduct aninvestigation thereon and hold in abeyance the award of the contracts. TheOmbudsman then issued the assailed order, directing the MWSS to: ―set aside therecommendation of an MWSS committee to award the contact to a contractor offering

fiberglass pipes‖, and ―award the subject contract to a complying and responsivebidder‖- the officials of MWSS filed the instant petition with the SC, contending that theombudsman acted beyond the competence of his office when he assumed jurisdictionover the complaint, when the same is clearly among the excepted cases enumerated inthe Ombudsman Act. Also, that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretionby arbitrarily and capriciously interfering with the exercise of sound discretion of theMWSS.

ISSUE:

WON the Ombudsman had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint filed by thePLDPPMA and correspondingly issue the challenged orders.

HELD:

NO. Reasoning on the basis of all the provisions regarding the Office of the Ombudsman,Solicitor-General insists that the authority of the Ombudsman is sufficiently broadenough to cloth it with sufficient power to look into the alleged irregularities in thebidding conducted by the MWSS- ―The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman inthe 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulatesaid office from the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' andfiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, andthrough the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismissinvestigations into malfeasances and misfeasance committed by public officers.



It was deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office to investigate all criminalcomplaints against public officers regardless of whether or not the acts or omissionscomplained of are related to or arise from the performance of the duties of their office.The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsmanencompasses 'all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been

committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during histenure of office.‖- the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman have generallybeen categorized into: Investigatory Power; Prosecutory Power; Public AssistanceFunctions; Authority to Inquire and Obtain Information; and Function to Adopt, Instituteand Implement.

While the broad authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission which "appears illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient" may be yielded, it is difficult to equallyconcede, however, that the Constitution and the Law have intended to likewise conferupon it veto or revisory power over an exercise of judgment or discretion by an agencyor officer upon whom that judgment or discretion is law fully vested. It seems that theOmbudsman, in issuing the challenged orders, has not only directly assumed

jurisdiction over, but likewise pre-empted the exercise of discretion by, the Boardof Trustees of MWSS. Indeed, there commendation of the MWSS Committee to awardthe contract appears to be yet pending consideration and action by the MWSS Board ofTrustees. We can only view the assailed order to be more of an undue interference inthe adjudicative responsibility of the MWSS Board of Trustees rather than a meredirective requiring the proper observance of and compliance with the law.



American Inter-Fashion Corp. v. Office of the President, 197 SCRA 409

FACTS:

This case arose from an April 24, 1984 ruling of the GTEB that respondent Glorious Sunwas guilty of misdeclaration of imported raw materials resulting in dollar salting abroadand, therefore, its export quotas should be cancelled. Its quotas were given to twonewly-formed corporations-De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation (De Soleil andthe American Inter-Fashion Corporation (AIFC). These two corporations were jointventures of the Hongkong investors and majority stockholders of Glorious Sun on onehand and, allegedly, a member of the family and a crony of President Marcos on theother. The Office of the President set aside the GTEB decision and remanded the case

for genuine hearings where due process would be accorded both parties. The petitionernow alleges that the GTEB decision is res judicata and that Glorious Sun was givenevery opportunity to be heard by the Board.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Malacañang decision suffers from grave abuse of discretion.

HELD:

The cancellation of the export quotas of the private respondent was a violation of its

constitutional right to due process by GTEB. Before the cancellation in 1984, private

respondent had been enjoying export quotas as early as 1977.

In effect, the private respondent is export quota allocation which was initially a privilege

evolved into some form of property right which should not be removed from it arbitrarily

and without due process only to hurriedly confer it to another. While it is true that such

allocations were mere privileges which it can revoke and cancel as it may deem fit, the

privileges have been accorded to private respondent for so long that they have become

impressed with property rights especially since not only do these privileges determine

the continued existence of private respondent but also the livelihood of its workers



Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148560 (Nov. 19, 2001)

FACTS:

Petitioner Joseph Estrada, prosecuted under An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crimeof Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectivelyfashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from theconstitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said lawthat it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt"standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of men‘s real in crimesalready punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates thefundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged―vagueness‖ of the law in the terms it uses. Particularly, these terms are: combination,

series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on thevalidity of the mentioned law.

ISSUE:

W/N the assailed law is vague and therefor invalid.

HELD:

It is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligencemust necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnantto the Constitution in two respects: it violates due process for failure of the conduct toavoid and it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provision andbecomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

The plunder Law under which Estrada is being prosecuted is not vague .The words

series and combination of crimes can be understood in their ordinary meaning.



CIR v. CA – 261 SCRA 236

FACTS:

A task force was created to investigate tax liabilities of manufacturers engaged in taxevasion schemes. The CIR issued Rev. Memo Circ. No. 37-93 which reclassified certaincigarette brands manufactured by private respondent Fortune Tobacco Corp. (Fortune)as foreign brands subject to a higher tax rate. On August 3, 1993, Fortune questionedthe validity of said reclassification as being violative of the right to due process andequal protection of laws. The CTA, on September 8, 1993 resolved that saidreclassification was of doubtful legality and enjoined its enforcement.

Fortune was assessed deficiency income, ad valorem and VAT for 1992 with paymentdue within 30 days from receipt. Private respondent moved for reconsideration of saidassessment. Meanwhile, the Commissioner filed a complaint with the DOJ againstprivate respondent Fortune, its corporate officers and 9 other corporations and theirrespective corporate officers for alleged fraudulent tax evasion for non-payment of thecorrect income, ad valorem and VAT for 1992. The complaint was referred to the DOJTask Force on revenue cases which found sufficient basis to further investigate thecharges against Fortune.

ISSUE:

Whether the basis of private respondent‘s tax liability first be settled before anycomplaint for fraudulent tax evasion can be initiated.

HELD:

Fraud cannot be presumed. If there was fraud on willful attempt to evade payment of advalorem taxes by private respondent through the manipulation of the registeredwholesale price of the cigarettes, it must have been with the connivance of cooperationof certain BIR officials and employees who supervised and monitored Fortune‘sproduction activities to see to it that the correct taxes were paid. But there is noallegation, much less evidence, of BIR personnel‘s malfeasance at the very least, thereis the presumption that BIR personnel performed their duties in the regular course inensuring that the correct taxes were paid by Fortune. Before the tax liabilities of Fortuneare finally determined, it cannot be correctly asserted that private respondents havewillfully attempted to evade or defeat any tax under Sects. 254 and 256, 1997 NIRC, thefact that a tax is due must first be proved.



Conti v. NLRC – 271 SCRA 114

FACTS:

Petitioners were employees of Corfarm Holdings Corp. who operates and manages theManila Electric Company commissary. Petitioners‘ contract was coterminous with theeffectivity of the contract executed by and between Corfarm and MERALCO.Thecontract between Corfarm and MERALCO expired, however, Corfarm continued tooperate the MERALCO commissary without renewing the contract.

Petitioner s received a memorandum on January 13, 1993 dated January 12, 1993terminating their services on the said date for 2 reasons: 1) the expiration of theiremployment contracts, these being coterminous with the management contractbetween Corfarm and MERALCO, and; 2) the on-going evaluation of their pastperformances, and investigation of the internal auditor of Corfarm of certain anomaloustransactions involving the petitioners. The latter contend that they were denied with dueprocess when they were dismissed without a written notice and a hearing as required bylaw.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners were denied of due process.

HELD:

The court consistently held that the twin requirements of notice and hearing constituteessential elements of due process in the dismissal of employees. As to the requirementof notice, it has been held that the employer must furnish the worker with two writtennotices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (a) notice whichapprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is

sought, and; (b) subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer'sdecision to dismiss him.

With regard to the requirement of a hearing, this Court has held that the essence of dueprocess is simply an opportunity to be heard, and not that an actual hearing shouldalways and indispensably be held.



Joson v. Executive Secretary – 290 SCRA 279

FACTS:

The case at bar involves the validity of the suspension from office of petitioner EduardoNonato Joson as Governor of the province of Nueva Ecija. On July 11, 1997, onrecommendation of DILG Secretary Barbers, Executive Secretary Ruben Torres issuedan order, by authority of the President, placing petitioner under preventive suspensionfor sixty (60) days pending investigation of the charges against him.

On September 17, 1996, private respondents filed with the Office of the President aletter-complaint dated September 13, 1996 charging petitioner with grave misconductand abuse of authority.

On June 24, 1997, petitioner, through counsel, filed a "Motion to Dismiss." Petitioneralleged that the letter-complaint was not verified on the day it was filed with the Office ofthe President; and that the DILG had no jurisdiction over the case and no authority torequire him to answer the complaint. Likewise, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari andprohibition with the Court of Appeals challenging the order of preventive suspension andthe order of default.

ISSUE:

W/N the rules of procedure & evidence should be applied in the administrativedisciplinary & clearly punitive proceeding?

HELD:

Yes, the Court ruled that the rules of procedure and evidence should also be applied inadministrative disciplinary & clearly punitive proceedings. Administrative disciplinaryproceedings against elective local officials are governed by the Local Government Codeof 1991, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991,and Administrative Order No. 23 entitled "Prescribing the Rules and Procedures on theInvestigation of Administrative Disciplinary Cases Against Elective Local Officials ofProvinces, Highly Urbanized Cities, Independent Component Cities, and Cities andMunicipalities in Metropolitan Manila." In all matters not provided in A.O. No. 23, theRules of Court and the Administrative Code of 1987 apply in a suppletory character.

In the instant case, petitioner Joson is an elective official of the province of NuevaEcija. The letter-complaint against him was therefore properly filed with the Office of thePresident. According to petitioner, however, the letter-complaint failed to conform with



the formal requirements set by the Code. He alleges that the complaint was not verifiedby private respondents and was not supported by the joint affidavit of the two witnessesnamed therein.

But even assuming, that the letter-complaint was unverified when submitted to the

Office of the President, the defect was not fatal. The requirement of verification wasdeemed waived by the President himself when he acted on the complaint.

Marcos v. Sandigabayan – 12 LR 6 N’98



FACTS:

The former first lady Imelda Marcos was found guilty by the First Division of theSandiganbayan of violating 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Afterconviction she filed a "Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad" to seek diagnostictests and treatment by practitioners of oriental medicine in China allegedly because of"a serious and life threatening medical condition" requiring facilities not available in thePhilippines that was denied. Then she again filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion forPermission to Travel abroad" to undergo diagnosis and treatment in China. This wassupported by several medical reports that were prepared by her doctor Roberto

Anastacio.

Again another Motion to leave was filed by Mrs. Marcos to US and Europefor treatment of several Heart diseases alleging that the tests were not available here.The presiding justice, Garchitorena, contacted Dr. Gregorio B. Patacsil, Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine Heart Center, and later wrote him a letter, asking for "expertopinion on coronary medicine". The court still found no merit to allow the petitionersmotion to leave and denied all of the motions.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a "Motion to Admit Clinical Summaryand to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration." Attached was a recent medical report andletters of Vice President Joseph E. Estrada offering to be guarantor for the return ofpetitioner and those of twenty four members of the House ofRepresentatives requesting the court to allow petitioner to travel abroad. This was alsodenied by the Court also stating their express disapproval of the involvement of the VPand the Cabinet members so as to influence the resolutions, decisions or orders or any

judicial action of respondent court.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the Sandiganbayan erred in disallowing the Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad because it (1) disregarded the medical findings (2) it motu propio contacted athird party asking the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medicalfindings (3) said that there was no necessity to get medical treatment abroad.

HELD:

No. The contention of the petitioner that was invalid to contact a third party asking thelatter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings was erroneous.Respondent court had to seek expert opinion because petitioner's motion was based onthe advice of her physician. The court could not be expected to just accept the opinionof petitioner's physician in resolving her request for permission to travel. What would be



objectionable would be if respondent court obtained information without disclosing itssource to the parties and used it in deciding a case against them.

In disregarding the medical reports, the petitioner failed to prove the necessity for a tripabroad. It should be emphasized that considering the fact that she is facing charges

before the courts in several cases, in two of which she was convicted although thedecision is still pending reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right toleave the country and the burden was on her to prove that because of danger to healthif not to her life there was necessity to seek medical treatment in foreign countries.

On the third issue, the Court ordered petitioner to undergo several tests whichsummarily states that the required medical treatment was available here inthe Philippines and that the expertise and facilities here were more than adequate tocater to her medical treatment. The heart ailments of the petitioner were not as severeas that was reported by Dr. Anastacio.

Pafianco v. Moral, 322 SCRA 439



FACTS:

Former DECS Secretary filed an administrative complaint against respondent fordishonesty. She was dismissed. Respondent filed a petition for mandamus to compel

petitioner to furnish her a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report. It wasdenied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a respondent in an administrative case is entitled to be informed of thefindings and recommendations of the investigating committee.

HELD:

A respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings andrecommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filedagainst him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision and a reasonableopportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented during the hearings of theinvestigation committee. Respondent had been accorded these rights.



Roxas v. CA – 321 SCRA 106

FACTS:

Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of threehaciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in theMunicipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. Congress passed the Comprehensive AgrarianReform Law (CARL) of 1988. Before the law's effectivity, petitioner filed with respondentDAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No.229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition byrespondent DAR in accordance with the CARL. Petitioner applied with the DAR forconversion of Haciendas Palico and Banilad from agricultural to non-agricultural landsunder the provisions of the CARL. Despite petitioner's application for conversion,

respondent DAR proceeded with the acquisition of the two Haciendas. The LBP trustaccounts as compensation for Hacienda Palico were replaced by respondent DAR withcash and LBP bonds. On October 22, 1993, respondent DAR registered Certificate ofLand Ownership Award and they were distributed to farmer beneficiaries.

Petitioner, sent a letter to the Secretary of respondent DAR withdrawing its VOS(voluntary offer to sell) of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu,Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway fromagricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that itwas applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses.Respondent DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a reclassification of the land wouldnot exempt it from agrarian reform, hence it denied the withdrawal. On August 24, 1993,petitioner instituted a Case with respondent DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) prayingfor the cancellation of the CLOA‘s issued by respondent DAR in the name of severalpersons. Petitioner alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas arelocated, had been declared a tourist zone, that the land is not suitable for agriculturalproduction, and that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified the land tonon-agricultural. On October 29, 1993, petitioner filed with the CA questioning theexpropriation of its properties under the CARL and the denial of due process in theacquisition of its landholdings, but it was denied.

ISSUE:

WON respondent DAR failed to comply the requisites of due process in the acquisitionproceedings.



HELD:

Yes. For a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices are required: (1) theNotice of Coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the

landowner, the representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and otherinterested parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989; and (2) the Notice of

Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL. The procedure in thesending of these notices is important to comply with the requisites of due processespecially when the owner, as in this case, is a juridical entity. Petitioner is a domesticcorporation, and therefore, has a personality separate and distinct from itsshareholders, officers and employees. The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Noticeof Coverage and the letter of invitation to the conference, and its actual conduct cannotbe understated. They are steps designed to comply with the requirements ofadministrative due process.

The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State‘s police power and thepower of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to thelandowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property inaccordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, the ownersare deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also ataking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a merelimitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to andphysical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner infavor of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of Rights provides that ―no person shall bedeprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.‖ The CARL was notintended to take away property without due process of law. The exercise of the power of

eminent domain requires that due process be observed in the taking of private property.In the entire acquisition proceedings, respondent DAR disregarded the basicrequirements of administrative due process.



Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita – 330 SCRA 153, GR 130442, April 6, 2000

FACTS:

Respondent was charged with 12 administrative complaints which were consolidatedinto one major complaint, which is, conduct unbecoming of a police officer. TheSummary Dismissal Board suspended respondent from service for 20 days, for ―simpleirregularity in the performance of service‖. The Board later found respondent to havecommitted a breach of internal discipline by taking alcoholic drinks while on duty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Simple Irregularity in the Performance of Duty of having alcohol inhis breadth is proper.

HELD:

NO. While the definition of the more serious offense is broad and almost allencompassing a finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how light for which one is notproperly charge and tried cannot be countenanced without violating the rudimentaryrequirements of due process.



Sec. of Justice v. Lantion, 343 SCRA 377, GR. 139465, Oct. 17, 2000

FACTS:

The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs a requestfor the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand JuryIndictment, the warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for saidextradition were attached along with the request. Charges include:

1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US

2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax

3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television

4. False statement or entries

5. Election contribution in name of another

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded withthe technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which they foundhaving matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of allthe documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time toassess it.

The Secretary of Justice denied request.

ISSUE:

WON an extradite has a right of access to the evidence against him.

HELD:

During the executive phase of an extradition proceeding, an extradite does not have theright to access the evidence in the hands of the government. But during the JudicialPhase, he has.



Government of the USA v. Purganan – 389 SCRA 623 Sept. 24, 2002

FACTS:

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested theextradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether a warrant ofarrest should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowedJimenez to post bail for his provisional liberty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not extradite is entitled to notice and hearing before issuance of warrant of

arrest.

HELD:

It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accusedas guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does notinvolve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocencewill be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule,

constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of anaccused cannot be invoked by an extradite.

In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice ofhearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with therationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarilyto present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant ofarrest, what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage-- if he so desires -- in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure couldconvert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entireproceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is alsoanathema to the summary nature of extraditions. That the case under consideration isan extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set ofprocedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure were called for atall, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of respondent‘sdemonstrated predisposition to flee.



Lazaro v. CA – 330 SCRA 208 April 6, 2000

FACTS:

Herein petitioner Marlyn Lazaro received from complainant Rudy Chua the amount ofNinety Thousand (P90,000.00) Pesos as advance payment for deliveries of sugar,cigarettes and luncheon meat ordered by the latter from Lazaro who is abusinesswoman.

Petitioner made a partial delivery of the ordered goods worth Eighteen Thousand (Pl8,000.00) Pesos. Petitioner was unable to deliver, the rest of goods ordered by Chua.Petitioner, as a refund of the amount of Seventy-Two Thousand (P72,000.00) Pesos,issued Prudential Bank Check No. 599175 dated 28 October 1989 for theaforementioned amount, complainant Chua deposited the check in his account. Thecheck was dishonored by the bank and stamped "Account Closed."

To make up for the dishonor, Lazaro indorsed Trader's Royal Bank Check No. 393173by a certain Lolita Soriano and payable "to cash". The check which was dated 18November 1989 was likewise dishonored and marked "Account Closed."

Chua then sent, demand latter to Lazaro asking for the payment of the Seventy-TwoThousand (P72, 000.00) Pesos covered by the first check within five (5) days fromreceipt of the letter.For failure of the accused to pay the amount, Chua filed complaintsfor estafa and violation of B.P. 22 against Lazaro.of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22,otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 86, Quezon City rendered a joint decision finding theaccused, MARLYN LAZARO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violationof B.P. 22. On appeal, the Court of Appeals in a decision ** dated 31 March 1992affirmed the trial court decision in toto. A motion for reconsideration was denied on 15May 1992.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to denyingpetitioner's due process of law in disregarding the fact that the amount which is coveredby (the) check in question has already been paid by petitioner when she executed adeed of sale in favor of private complainant of her car.



HELD:

Petitioner's argument is without merit. In prosecutions for violation of BP 22, prejudice ordamage is not a pre-requisite for conviction.

That the obligation of Marlyn Lazaro to complainant Chua has been extinguished by theconveyance by the former of her car to Chua does not also justify the cancellation of theindemnity awarded. It should be noted that BP 22 provides that a fine of not less thanbut not more than double the amount of the dishonored check may be imposed by thecourt. This is the only logical conclusion since the law does not require that there bedamage or prejudice to the individual complainant by reason of the issuance of theworthless check.



Agabon v. NLRC – 442 SCRA 573, GR 158693, Nov. 17, 2004

FACTS:

Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business ofselling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitionerVirgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work.Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter rendered adecision declaring the dismissal illegal. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decisionbecause it found that the petitioners had abandoned their work and were not entitled toback wages and separation pay. The Court of Appeals in turn ruled that the dismissal ofthe petitioners was not illegal because they had abandoned their employment.

The Agabons further appealed to the SC, disputing the finding of abandonment, andclaiming that the company did not comply with the twin requirements of notice andhearing.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.

HELD:

The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitionersabandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however, didnot follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the lastknown addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore.Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the lawmandates the twin notice requirements to the employee‘s last known address. Thus, it

should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of dueprocess.



When the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should notnullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer shouldindemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights.

The petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 23, 2003,in CA-G.R. SP No. 63017, finding that petitioners‘ Jenny and Virgilio Agabonabandoned their work, and ordering private respondent to pay each of the petitionersholiday pay for four regular holidays from 1996 to 1998, in the amount of P6,520.00,service incentive leave pay for the same period in the amount of P3,255.00 and thebalance of Virgilio Agabon‘s thirteenth month pay for 1998 in the amount of P2,150.00 is

AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that private respondent Riviera HomeImprovements, Inc. is further ORDERED to pay each of the petitioners the amount ofP30,000.00 as nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process.



9. Substantive Due Process

US v. Toribio – 15 Phil. 85

FACTS:

Appellant slaughtered for human consumption a carabao without a permit from themunicipal treasurer of the municipality where it was slaughtered, therefore violatingsections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an act regulating the registration, branding andslaughter of large cattle. It was found out that there is no municipal slaughterhouse inCarmen, Bohol, where the animal was slaughtered. Appellant‘s contention was thatsince there was no slaughterhouse in said place, neither prohibition nor the penalty isapplicable to cases of slaughter of large cattle without a permit in that municipality.

The purpose Act 1147 is to prevent thieves to dispose the large cattle easily. Also, it isto prevent the slaughter for food of the carabaos fit for agricultural and draft purposes,and all animals unfit for human consumption. The appellant did apply for permit but wasdenied because the animal was not unfit for agricultural work or draft purposes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the laws which interfere with life, liberty, or property satisfy substantivedue process.

HELD:

To justify the State in interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear thatthe interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular classrequire such interference, that the means are reasonably necessary for theaccomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon the individuals.



Churchill v. Rafferty – 32 Phil. 580

FACTS:

The case arises from the fact that defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, would liketo destroy or remove any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, forthe sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be offensive to thesight. The plaintiffs allege otherwise.

ISSUE:

W/N there is a valid exercise of police power in this case.

HELD:

Yes. Police power rests upon public necessity and upon the right of the State and of thepublic to self-protection.



People v. Fajardo – 104 Phil. 443

FACTS:

Herein appellant filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permitto construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered inFajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plazaby a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others that theproposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. Defendantsreiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down therequest.

Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit,because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having beendestroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property.Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequentlyconvicted.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD:

No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable andoppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use theirown property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a takingof appellant‘s property without just compensation.We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification ofneighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents.

As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land,

regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question,because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. Theappellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused forthe obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legallyachieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation andan opportunity to be heard.



Ermita-Malate Hotel & Operator v. City of Manila – 20 SCRA 849

FACTS:

The Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760 which has thefollowing provisions:

1. It would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of ahotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest orcustomer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without filling upthe prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times..

4. It prohibits a person less than 18 years old (minor) from being accepted in suchhotels, motels, lodging houses, and tavern or common inn unless accompanied byparents or a lawful guardian.

5. It makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representativeof such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24hours. With this, Petitioners who were operators of hotels and motels filed a petitionagainst respondent assailing the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 4760.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the police power is valid.

HELD:

No. Police power has been characterized as the most essential, insistent and the leastlimitable of powers extending as it does to all the great public needs. Negatively it hasbeen defined as that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibitall that is hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare society.



Ynot v. Intermediate Court of Appeals – 148 SCRA 659

FACTS:

Petitioner assails constitutionality of E.O. No. 626-A prohibiting the interprovincial

movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos. E.O. No. 626-A was held

unconstitutional for violating the due process clause. Petitioner Restituto Ynot had

transmitted 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were

confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac for violating Executive Order

No. 626-A- Executive Order No. 626-A prohibits the interprovincial movement ofcarabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos. Carabao/carabeef transported in violation of

E.O. 626-A shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be

distributed to charitable institutions as Chairman of National Meat Inspection may see fit

(carabeef) and to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit

(carabao).This amended E.O. 626; the latter prohibiting only the slaughter of carabaos

of age.

Petitioner sued for recovery; RTC issued writ of replevin after petitioner filed supersedes

bond of P 12,000.00. Trial Court confiscation of carabaos—sustained; ordered

confiscation of the bond; declined to rule on the constitutionality of the E.O. for lack ofauthority and its presumed validity.

Issue:

Whether or not EO 626-A is constitutional.

Held:

The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the

people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons

on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as

weapons, must be a promise of protection. Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby

declared unconstitutional.



Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195

FACTS:

Leovillo Agustin, the owner of a Beetle, challenged the constitutionality of Letter ofInstruction 229 and its implementing order No. 1 issued by LTO Commissioner RomeoEdu. His car already had warning lights and did not want to use this.

The letter was promulgation for the requirement of an early warning device installed ona vehicle to reduce accidents between moving vehicles and parked cars.

The LTO was the issuer of the device at the rate of not more than 15% of the acquisitioncost. The triangular reflector plates were set when the car parked on any street orhighway for 30 minutes and it was mandatory.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Is the constitutional.

HELD:

Yes on both. Petition dismissed. Police power is nothing more or less than the power ofgovernment inherent in every sovereignty. There was no factual foundation on petitionerto refute validity. There was no constitutional basis for petitioner because the lawdoesn‘t violate any constitutional provision.

LOI 229 doesn‘t force motor vehicle owners to purchase the reflector from the LTO. Itonly prescribes the requirement from any source.

The objective is public safety.



Balacuit v. CFI – 163 SCRA 182

FACTS:

Petitioners are Carlos Balacuit, Lamberto Tan, and Sergio YU caral, managers of

Mayor and Dalisay theaters, the crown theater, and the Diamond theater,

respectively, aggrieved by the effect ordinance No. 640, they filed a complaint

before the court of First Instance of Agusan Del Norte and Butuan City, praying

that the Ordinance No. 640 be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and

uncomfortable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

HELD:

No. For the benefit of parents that the cost is passed on to cinema owner‘s .There is nodiscernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety,

morals, and the general welfare.



National Development Co. and New Agrix v. Phil. Vet. Bank – 192 SCRA 257

FACTS:

The particular enactment in question is Pres. Decree No. 1717, which ordered therehabilitation of the Agrix Group of Companies to be administered mainly by theNational Development Company. The law outlined the procedure for filing claimsagainst the Agrix companies and created a Claims Committee to process these claims.Especially relevant to this case, and noted at the outset, is Sec. 4(1) thereof providingthat "all mortgages and other liens presently attaching to any of the assets of thedissolved corporations are hereby extinguished."

Earlier, the Agrix Marketing, Inc. (AGRIX) had executed in favor of private respondentPhilippine Veterans Bank a real estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978, over three (3)parcels of land situated in Los Baños, Laguna. During the existence of the mortgage,

AGRIX went bankrupt. It was for the expressed purpose of salvaging this and the other Agrix companies that the aforementioned decree was issued by President Marcos.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PD 1717 is a valid regulation.

HELD:

The contention is that this inherent power of the state may be exercised at any time forthis purpose so long as the taking of the property right, even if based on contract, isdone with due process of law. The police power is not a panacea for all constitutionalmaladies. Neither does its mere invocation conjure an instant and automatic justificationfor every act of the government depriving a person of his life, liberty or property.

A legislative act based on the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subjectand a lawful method. In more familiar words, a) the interests of the public generally, as

distinguished from those of a particular class, should justify the interference of the state;and b) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of thepurpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

Applying these criteria to the case at bar, the Court finds first of all that the interests ofthe public are not sufficiently involved to warrant the interference of the government withthe private contracts of AGRIX.



Maranaw Hotel v. NLRC – 238 SCRA 190

FACTS:

Eddie Damalerio, a room attendant of the Century Park Sheraton Hotel, operated byMaranaw Hotel and Resort Corporation, was seen by hotel guest Jamie Glaser with lefthand inside the latter‘s suitcase. Confronted with what he was doing, Damalerioexplained that he was trying to tidy up the room. Not satisfied with the explanation ofDamalerio, Glaser lodged a written complaint before William D. Despuig, shift-in-chargeof security of the hotel. Damalerio was given a Disciplinary Action Notice (DAN). Thenext day, an administrative hearing was conducted on the matter. Taking the witnessstand on his own behalf, Damalerio denied the accusation against him.

Damalerio received a memorandum issued by the Floor Supervisor, bearing theapproval of the Executive Housekeeper, stating that he (Damalerio) was found to havecommitted qualified theft in violation of House Rule No. 1, Section 3 of Hotel Rules andRegulations. The same memorandum served as a notice of termination of hisemployment. On May 19, 1992, Damalerio filed with the Labor Arbiter a Complaint forillegal dismissal against the petitioner who ordered the respondents to reinstate him tohis former or equivalent position without loss of seniority rights and with back wagesfrom April 15, 1992 when he was preventively suspended up to actual reinstatementand other benefits.

From the aforesaid Labor Arbiter‘s disposition, the petitioner appealed to the NLRC,

which modified the appealed decision by giving petitioner the option of payingDamalerio a separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service,instead of reinstating him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack of jurisdiction in holding that petitioner failed to adduce conclusive evidence insupport of its version of the incident.

HELD:

The petition is barren of merit. Records disclose petitioner‘s failure to substantiate suchimputation against the private respondent. During the investigation presided over by the



Labor Arbiter, Damalerio narrated a plausible and satisfactory explanation for hisbehavior complained of.

Although it was not completely proper for Damalerio to be touching the things of a hotelguest while cleaning the hotel rooms, the dismissal of Damalerio was unwarranted. Tobe sure, the investigation held by the hotel security people did not unearth enoughevidence of culpability. It bears repeating that subject hotel guest lost nothing. Albeitpetitioner may have reasons to doubt the honesty and trustworthiness of Damalerio, asa result of what happened, absent sufficient proof of guilt, he (Damalerio), who is arank-and-file employee, cannot be legally dismissed. Unsubstantiated suspicions andbaseless conclusions by employers are not legal justification for dismissing employees.The burden of proving the existence of a valid and authorized cause of termination is onthe employer. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the employee, in keeping withthe principle of social justice enshrined in the Constitution.



Magtajas v. Pryce Properties – 234 SCRA 255

FACTS:

There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino inCagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The troublearose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCORdecided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. The reaction of theSangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353 and on January 4, 1993, it adopted a sternerOrdinance No. 3375-93. Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals,

where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Theirchallenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared theordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 are valid exercises of police powerby the Local Government.

HELD:

No. Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent orsuppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously,this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in factpermitted by law. The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should notcontravene a statute is obvious. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. Thisdecree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mereordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan

de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for theoperation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos.For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and thepublic policies announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.



Bennis v. Michigan – No. 94-8729 March 4, 1996

FACTS:

Bennis‘ husband was convicted of gross indecency following his sexual activity with aprostitute in the couple's jointly-owned car. The local county prosecutor filed a complaintalleging the car was a public nuisance subject to abatement (i.e., to eliminate orconfiscate the car). The Circuit Court entered the abatement order, but the AppealsCourt reversed. After granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan reversedthe appellate court's decision and re-entered the abatement order. Bennis appealed tothe Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the abatement order entered against Bennis‘ car constitute a taking ofprivate property for public use in violation of the property clauses of the Fifth andFourteenth Amendments.

HELD:

Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist held that the abatement order against Bennis's cardid not violate the takings clause. Her innocence and lack of knowledge concerning herhusband's illegal and indecent activity, in the couple's jointly owned car, could not serve

as a defense against her vehicle's forfeiture. Furthermore, under the presentcircumstances, the vehicle's forfeiture did not violate Bennis's property rights withoutdue process. Michigan's abatement policy, aimed at deterring criminal uses of property,lawfully transferred he‘s vehicle to the state. As such, Michigan is not required tocompensate Bennis for the vehicle's forfeiture.



Cruzan v. Dir. Missouri – No. 88-1503 June 25 1990

FACTS:

Petitioner was involved in a car accident, which left her in a ―persistent vegetative state.‖In order to feed her and to facilitate her recovery, surgeons implanted into her agastronomy feeding and hydration tube. After it become apparent that Cruzan hadvirtually no chance for recovery, Petitioners, Cruzan‘s parents, asked hospitalemployees to terminate the life support procedures. The State hospital employeesrefused to honor this request without court approval. After trial, on appeal, the MissouriSupreme Court refused to order termination of the life-support, because clear and

convincing evidence was not produced to show that Cruzan herself would have chosento refuse treatment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cruzan have a right under the United States Constitution that wouldrequire the hospital to withdraw life-sustaining treatment.

HELD:

No and No. The Missouri Supreme Court is affirmed. Prior decisions support theprinciple that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest inrefusing medical treatment under the Due Process Clause. But incompetent persons donot enjoy the same rights, because they cannot make voluntary and informed decisions.

The right to terminate life-sustaining treatment of an incompetent, if it is to be exercised,must be done for such incompetent by a surrogate. Missouri‘s interest in thepreservation of life is unquestionably a valid State interest. The Due Process Clauseprotects an interest in life as well as a right to refuse life-saving treatment. Missouri may

legitimately safeguard these personal decisions by imposing heightened evidentiaryrequirements.

Moreover, even when available, family members will not always act in the best interestsof a patient. The State is entitled to safeguard against such abuses.



JMM Promotion and Management Inc. v. CA – 260 SCRA 319

FACTS:

Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment ofperforming artists to Japan and other destinations. This was relaxed however with theintroduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a planto POEA to screen and train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to theproposal POEA and the Secretary of DOLE sought a 4-step plan (to realize the plan)which included an Artist‘s Record Book which a performing artist must acquire prior tobeing deployed abroad. The Federation of talent Managers of the Philippines assailedthe validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to travel, abridge existingcontracts and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM intervened tobolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.

HELD:

The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of policepower. Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere withpersonal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the commongood. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that theburden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARBrequirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily orunreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women wasparamount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute banagainst the deployment of performing artists to ―high risk‖ destinations, a measure which

would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very leastrationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonableeducational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individualsadequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. Itcannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation byunscrupulous individuals and agencies.



Corona v. United Harbor – 283 SCRA 31

FACTS:

The case arose when Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) General Manager issued an Administrative order No. 04-92, whose avowed policy was to instill effective disciplineand thereby afford better protection to the ports users‘ trough improvement of pilot ageservices. Where all existing regular appointments to harbor pilot positions shall remainvalid only up to December 30 of the current year and that henceforth all appointments toharbor pilot positions shall be only a term for one year from date of effectivity, subject toyearly renewal or cancellation by the PPA after conduct of rigid evaluation ofperformance. Pilotage as a profession may be practiced only by duly licensedindividuals, who have to pass five government professional examinations.

The Harbor Pilot Association challenged the validity of the said order arguing that itviolated the harbor pilots right to exercise their profession and their right to due processof law and that the said administrative order was issued without prior notice andhearing. But the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal AffairsRenato C. Corona dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlieron the ground that PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise byharbor pilots of their profession in PPA jurisdictional area. Consequently, respondentsfiled a petition for certiorari before the RTC Manila, and ruled that AO No. 04-92 isdeclared null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not (PPA AO 04-92) violated the due process of pilots.

HELD:

The right of the pilots to due process was violated. The court held that pilotage as aprofession is a property right protected by guarantee of due process. The pre-evaluationcancellation of the licenses of the harbor pilots every year is unreasonable and violatedtheir right to substantive due process. The issuance of Administrative Order also

violated procedural due process, since no prior public hearing was conducted.



Kelly v. Johnson – 425 US 238

FACTS:

Kelley was a police officer who wanted to wear his hair in a length and style contrary tolocal police standards. Kelley brought an action to invalidate the local regulation. Thelower courts sustained the attack, requiring the police department to establish a―genuine public need‖ for the regulation.

ISSUE:

Whether the hair-grooming and hair-length regulations at issue violated Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by infringing upon liberty interests.

HELD:

The Court upheld the grooming regulations for police officers, thereby limiting the scope

of privacy concerns. The Court‘s holding established that there is no protected libertyunder the Fourteenth Amendment when it comes to personal appearance,distinguishing the case from those that impact an individual‘s choice with respect tobasic and fundamental matters of procreation, marriage, sexual relations, and familylife.



Chavez v. Romulo – 431 SCRA 534 (2004)

FACTS:

President Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of the PNP stressing the needfor a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents. Shedirected the then respondent PNP Chief, to suspend the issuance of Permits to CarryFire arms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR), thus: Acting on President Arroyo‘sdirective, respondent issued the assailed guidelines in the implementation of the ban onthe carrying of firearms outside of residence.

Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has beenissued, requested the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) toreconsider the implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request wasdenied. Thus, he filed the present petition. He contends that the PNP Guidelines violatethe due process clause of the Constitution because: 1. the right to own and carryfirearm is necessarily intertwined with the people‘s inherent right to life and to protectlife: and 2. the ownership and carrying of firearms are constitutionally protected propertyrights which cannot be taken without due process of law and without just cause.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the PNP Guidelines violate the due process clause of the constitution.

Held:

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that ―no person shall be deprivedof life, liberty or property without due process of law.‖ In evaluating a due process claim,the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interestexists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a certainprivilege is neither a property nor property right.

Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields,may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personalprivilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter bereasonably imposed.

A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fitto impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revokedby the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation ofit does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within themeaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights.



10. Equal Protection of the Law

People v. Cayat – 68 PHIL. 12, 18

FACTS:

The accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province was sentenced by

the justice of the peace of court of Baguio for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3).

At the trial, Cayat admitted all the facts alleged in the information that on or about the

January 25, 1937, in the City of Baguio, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the

accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did receive, acquire, and

have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A gin, an

intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the membersof such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act

No. 1639, but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer

and submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime

charged and sentenced him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a prohibition classification.

HELD:

No, but the classification must be reasonable, must rest on substantial distinctions, must

be germane to the purpose of the law, must not be limited to existing conditions only,

must apply equally to all members of the same class.



Ichong v. Hernandez – 101 PHIL. 1155

FACTS:

Petitioner is questioning the validity and constitutionality of a legislative enactment,fundamental and far-reaching in significant. The enactment poses questions of dueprocess, police power and equal protection of the laws.

The legislation in question is RA 1180 entitled ―An Act to Regulate the Retail Business,‖which provides, among others, that (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of thePhilippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of whichare not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectlyin the retail trade.

Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending, among others, that: RA1180 denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of theirliberty and property without due process of law.

For their part, respondents argues that ) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of thepolice power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interestof national economic survival.

ISSUE:

W/N RA 1180 violates the constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

HELD:

No. The Court ruled that the Act is valid and does not violate the constitutional guarantyof equal protection of laws and of due process.

According to the Court, the Act in question was approved in the exercise of the police

power of the State. Police power and the constitutional guarantees to equal protectionof laws and of due process are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or,shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations ofany democratic society.



There can be no absolute power, whoever exercises it, for that would be tyranny. Yetthere can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So theState can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process oflaw; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is giventhe equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or classprivilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is notintended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directedor by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality amongresidents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under likecircumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.



Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho – 86 SCRA 270

FACTS:

An ordinance of the City of Manila prohibited the employment of aliens in any

occupation or business unless they first secured a permit from the Mayor of Manila and

paid a fee of P500. Respondent, an alien, employed in Manila, brought suit and

obtained judgment from the CFI declaring the ordinance null and void.

ISSUE:

WON said ordinance is valid

HELD:

No. The ordinance is a tax measure. In imposing a flat rate of P500, it failed to consider

substantial differences in situations among aliens and for that reason violates the rule

on uniformity of taxation. It also lays down no guide for granting/denying the permit and

therefore permits the arbitrary exercise of discretion by the Mayor. The Court explainedthat the ordinance did not provide a standard for the classification of aliens between

those who could avail of permits and those who could not. The Supreme Court further

held that the equal protection act can be violated when a governmental act fails to

classify. Finally, the ordinance denies aliens due process and the equal protection of the

laws.



Dumlao v. COMELEC – 96 SCRA 392

FACTS:

Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office andhe has been receiving retirement benefits there from. He filed for re-election to thesame office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BPaverring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was joined by Atty.Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. Dumlao invokedequal protection in the eye of the law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Batas Blg. 52 section 4 is valid.

HELD:

The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection isneither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subjectto rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and realdifferentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class.For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age have been validly classified

differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject tocompulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidatesshould not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable toeveryone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the SolicitorGeneral has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence ofyounger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be thatpersons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.

Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification

for elective local officials. For one thing, there can alsobe retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither bereasonable to disqualify retirees; aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a goodlocal official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree. But, in the case of a 65-year oldelective local official (Dumlao), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office,there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he hadretired, as provided for in the challenged provision.



Goesart v. Cleary - 335 US 464

FACTS:

A Michigan state law provided that no women could obtain a bartender‘s license unless

she was the wife or daughter of the male owner.

This law was challenged under equal protection.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the law violates equal protection.

HELD:

No. Michigan could ban all women from being bartenders if it wished. The Constitution

does not require legislatures to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards,

any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific standards. Since

there may be a reasonable and valid desire in the legislature to protect female

bartenders, the court cannot second-guess the legislature and decide that the real

purpose here was for male bartenders to monopolize the industry.



Ormoc Sugar Central v. Ormoc City – Feb. 7, 1968

FACTS:

Ormoc City passed a bill which read: ―There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on anyand all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar CompanyIncorporated, in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) perexport sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries.‖

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

HELD:

N0, should another sugar central arise in Ormoc City, the ordinance would bediscriminatory against Ormoc Sugar Central which alone comes under the ordinance.



Sison, Jr. v. PAGCOR – May 14, 1991

FACTS:

On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under Presidential Decree 1869, pursuant tothe policy of the government, ―to regulate and centralize through an appropriateinstitution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law.‖This was subsequently proven to be beneficial not just to the government but also to thesociety in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash-strappedGovernment.

Petitioners filed an instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR because it is allegedlycontrary to morals, public policy and public order, among others.

ISSUES:

Whether PD 1869 is unconstitutional because:

1.) It is contrary to morals, public policy and public order;

2.) It constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to improve taxes and legalfees; and that the exemption clause in PD 1869 is violative of constitutional principle ofLocal Autonomy;

3.) it violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution in that it legalizes gamblingthru PAGCOR while most other forms are outlawed together with prostitution, drugtrafficking and other vices; and

4.) It is contrary to the avowed trend of the Cory Government, away from monopolisticand crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization.

HELD:

1.) Gambling, in all its forms, is generally prohibited, unless allowed by law. But the

prohibition of gambling does not mean that the government cannot regulate it in theexercise of its police power, wherein the state has the authority to enact legislation thatmay interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.

2.) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal Corporation has no inherent right toimpose taxes. Its charter was created by Congress, therefore subject to its control. Also,local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government.



3.) Equal protection clause of the Constitution does not preclude classification ofindividuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law, provided it is notunreasonable or arbitrary. The clause does not prohibit the legislature from establishingclasses of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate.

4.) The Judiciary does not settle policy issues which are within the domain of thepolitical branches of government and the people themselves as the repository of allstate power.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, thus, to be nullified; itmust be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. In thiscase, the grounds raised by petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption.Therefore, petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.



Republic v. Sandiganbayan – 230 SCRA 711

FACTS:

The PCGG issues a search and seizure order which have all the features of a search

warrant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the seizure it is valid.

HELD:

No, because only a judge may issue a search warrant.



Himagan v. People – 237 SCRA 538

FACTS:

Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for

the murder of Benjamin Machitar Jr. and for the attempted murder of Benjamin‘s

younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into

suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that ―Upon the filing of a

complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP

for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or

more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is

terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within

ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan assailed the suspension

averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should

be limited to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of

over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his

constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

ISSUE:

Whether Sec 42 of Ra 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the constitution.

HELD:

No. Members of the PNP are treated differently from other classes of men charged

criminally or administratively in so far as the application of the preventive suspension is

concerned because policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be

used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them. If a suspended policemen

criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while the case is

pending, his victims and witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threatand thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the suspect is in uniformed and

armed.



Almonte v. Vasquez – 244 SCRA 286

FACTS:

This is a case wherein respondent Ombudsman, requires petitioners Nerio Rogado and

Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic

Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to

Personal Services Funds for the year 1988" and all evidence such as vouchers from

enforcing his orders. Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while

Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division.

The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his

investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings fromunfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have

been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed to the

Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished to several government offices, including the

Office of the Ombudsman.

In his comment on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied all the allegations

written on the anonymous letter. Petitioner moves to quash the subpoena and the

subpoena duces tecum but was denied. Disclosure of the documents in question is

resisted with the claim of privilege of an agency of the government on the ground that

"knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its plantillawill necessarily lead to knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and

tactics and the whole of its being" and this could "destroy the EIIB."

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection of laws.



HELD:

YES. .The Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB were

filled by fictitious persons and that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used forillegal purposes. The plantilla and other personnel records are relevant to his

investigation as the designated ―protectors of the people‖ of the Constitution.

Nor is there violation of petitioners' right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners

complain that "in all forum and tribunals ,the aggrieved parties , can only hale

respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully

disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous

letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can be no objection to this

procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second place, it is

apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner," theframers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people

which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings.



Telebap v. COMELEC – 289 SCRA 337

FACTS:

TELEBAP is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies.

GMA Network Inc., a broadcasting station, operates throughout the Philippines with a

franchise granted by Congress.RA 6646 prohibits sale or donation of print space or air

time for political ads, except to COMELEC. As cited in Osmeña v COMELEC, ―part and

parcel of a regulatory scheme designed to equalize the opportunity of candidates in an

election in regard to the use of mass media for political campaigns. The law in question

prohibits mass media from selling or donating print space or air time to the candidates

and requires COMELEC instead to procure print space or air time for allocation to the

candidates.

The petitioners‘ contention is that the said law denies the radio and TV companies the

equal protection of laws because the said law is not applicable to print media;

Therefore, the unequal treatment between print media and the radio & TV media.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 6646 prevents radio and TV broadcast companies from exercising

their right to due process and equal protection if the law.

HELD:

Petitioners‘ contention is without merit. There are important differences in

characteristics between two media, which justify differential treatment between the two.

Government spends public funds for allocation of and regulation of broadcast industry,

which it does not do in case of print media. To provide free air time for COMELEC time

is a fair exchange for what the industry gets. Also, radio and TV broadcast has wider

reach compared to print media, which is why it needs to be regulated during the election

campaign period.



Tiu v. CA – GR 127410 Jan. 20, 1999

FACTS:

On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval of the President, passed into law RA

7227 which provides for the Conversion of Military Reservations into Subic Special

Economic and Free Port Zone. Under the said law, the president is granted the authority

to issue a proclamation defining the metes and bounds of the zone.

On June 19, 1993, then President Ramos issued E.O. No. 97-A. According to the said

Order, the grant of enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives authorized under R.A. No.

7227 were limited to the business enterprises and residents within the fenced-in area of

the Subic Special Economic Zone.

The petitioner challenged the constitutionality of E.O No. 97-A contending that it violates

the right to equal protection of the laws. However, the CA ruled in favour of the

constitutionality of the said E.O.Thus, the petitioner filed a petition for review with the

SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 7227 is valid.

HELD:

The Constitution does not require absolute equality among residents. The real concernis to convert the lands formerly occupied by the US military bases into economic or

industrial zone. In furtherance of such objective, Congress deemed it necessary to

extend economic incentives to attract and encourage investors both local and foreign.



Aguinaldo v. COMELEC – GR 132774 June 21, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioners, at the time of the filing of the petition, were incumbent provincial or

municipal officials in Cagayan. Petitioner Rodolfo Aguinaldo was governor; Florencio L.

Vargas, vice governor; Romeo I. Calubaquib, member of the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan; Amado T. Gonzales, member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; Silverio

C. Salvanera, member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan; Alberta O. Quinto, mayor of

the municipality of Peña Blanca; and Aurora V. Estabillo, mayor of the municipality of

Sta. Praxedes.

Petitioners seek to prevent the COMELEC from enforcing during the 1998 electionsSection 67 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) ―in accordance with its own

tenor or as modified by paragraph 3 of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436.‖

ISSUE:

Whether or not the classification in Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is

violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

HELD:

No, the court held that Section 67 is not violative of the Constitution as it does not

unduly cut short the term of office of local officials. The situation that results with the

application of Section 67 is covered by the term ―voluntary renunciation‖.

According to the doctrine laid down in Cayat, for a classification to be valid, (1) it must

be based upon substantial distinctions, (2) it must be germane to the purpose of thelaw, (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) it must apply equally to

all members of the same class.



De Guzman v. COMELEC – 336 SCRA

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary

restraining order assails the June 15, 2007 Resolution of the First Division of

COMELEC, disqualifying ROSELLER DE GUZMAN from running as vice-mayor in the

May 14, 2007 elections. Petitioner was a naturalized American. However, on January

25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship under RA 9225. Upon approval of his

application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on

September 6, 2006. Having reacquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise

full civil and political rights. As such,qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva

Ecija.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva

Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American

Citizenship in accordance with RA 9225.

HELD:

We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of his failure

to renounce his American citizenship. RA 9225 was enacted to allow reacquisition and

retention of Philippine citizenship for:

1. Natural born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their

naturalization as citizens of a foreign country;

2. Natural born citizens of the Philippines who after the effectivity of the law,

becomes citizens of a foreign country.

The law provides that they are not deemed to have reacquired or retained their

Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.



Petitioner‘s oath of allegiance and certificate of candidacy did not comply with

section(5)2 of RA 9225 which further requires those seeking elective public office in the

Philippines to make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner

failed to renounce his American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running for

vice mayor.



People v. Mercado – GR 116239, Nov. 29, 2000

FACTS:

The foregoing discussion and finding the guilt of both accused to be proven beyond

reasonable doubt, while the undersigned Presiding Judge does not believe in the

imposition of the law which is his duty to uphold, the Court hereby sentences both

accused, ELPIDIO MERCADO y HERNANDO and AURELIO ACEBRON y ADORA, to

death, to proportionately indemnify the heirs of the deceased Richard Buama in the sum

of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00); to pay the sum of fifty two thousand six hundred

eighty pesos (P52,680.00) as expenses incident to the burial; and the further sum of

one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) by way of moral and exemplary damage,

all without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. Accused-

appellants further argue that Republic Act. No. 7659 denies equality before the law.

They cite studies here and abroad against the poor.‖ This statement is too sweeping to

merit further serious consideration. Anyone, regardless of how economic status in life,

may commit a crime. While there may be perceived imbalances in the imposition of

penalties, there are adequate safeguards in the Constitution, the law, and procedural

rules to ensure due process and equal protection of the law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not R.A. No. 7659 impugns the constitutional right to equality before

international law.

HELD:

The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City, finding accused-

appellant Elpidio Mercado y Hernando and Aurelio Acebron y Adora guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping with murder and imposing upon each ofthem the DEATH PENALTY, is ARRIEMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the awards

of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages

are DELETED and accused-appellants are ORDERED to pay jointly and severally to

Lourdes Vergara the amount of P3,510.00 as reimbursement for the expenses she

incurred for the victim‘s wake and funeral.



People v. Jalosjos – 324 SCRA 689

FACTS:

The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is

confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of

lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he

be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at

legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the

first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need

for his constituents to be represented.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member

of House of Representatives

HELD:

Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, in spite of its

importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged

or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members ofthe House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege

has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as

a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may

not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.



The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the

operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot

compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate

one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by

imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has

constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions

and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man

with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only

elevates accused-appellant‘s status to that of a special class, it also would be a

mockery of the purposes of the correction system.



People v. Piedra – 350 SCRA 163

FACTS:

Maria Lourdes Modesto and Nancy Araneta together with her friends Jennelyn Baez,

and Sandra Aquino went to the house of Jasmine Alejandro, after having learned that a

woman is there to recruit job applicants for Singapore. Carol dela Piedra was already

briefing some people when they arrived. Jasmine, on the other hand, welcomed and

asked them to sit down. They listened to the ―recruiter‖ who was then talking about the

breakdown of the fees involved: P30, 000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and

P5,000 as placement fee and for the processing of the papers. The initial payment was

P2, 000, while P30, 000 will be by salary deduction. The recruiter said that she was

―recruiting‖ nurses for Singapore.

Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine

Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified

woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs.

Carol Figueroa. Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the

Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter.

A surveillance team was then organized to confirm the report. After which, a raid was

executed.

Consequently, Carol was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal recruitment.

Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and

assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not accused was denied equal protection and therefore should be

exculpated.



HELD:

For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining

―recruitment and placement‖ is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due processclause. Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently

explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them

liable to its penalties.

The absence of such records notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a

reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law and

drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a

―perfectly vague act‖ whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein

is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is

not void for vagueness.

The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, is

not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by

officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are

entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to

be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. But a

discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of ―clear and

intentional discrimination.‖

In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to show that, in charging her, there was a

―clear and intentional discrimination‖ on the part of the prosecuting officials.

Furthermore, the presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed their

duties, and this presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere

speculation. As said earlier, accused has not presented any evidence to overcome this

presumption. The mere allegation that dela Piedra, a Cebuana, was charged with the

commission of a crime, while a Zamboangueña, the guilty party in appellant‘s eyes, was

not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant

equal protection of the laws.



International School v. Quisumbing – June 1, 2000

FACTS:

Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to

Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for

dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. To enable

the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of

instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own

teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from

Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicablelaws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be

enacted for the protection of employees.

Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty,

classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School grants

foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing,

transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires

are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School

justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have

to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure.

ISSUE:

WON the grants provided by the school to foreign hires and not to local hires

discriminative of their constitutional right to the equal protection clause.

HELD:

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored

legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal

qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid



similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international character"

notwithstanding.

The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform

work equal to that of foreign-hires. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an

employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that theseemployees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human

experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that

employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would

be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is

for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.

The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their

welfare," "to afford labor full protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to

regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely

contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collectivebargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. In this case, we find

the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in

the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is

no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-

hires.



Central Bank Employees Assn. v. BSP – 446 SCRA 299

II. Section 2

FACTS:

A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys andsubject to the Board·s approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of theBangko Sentral‘s human resource development program: Provided, That the MonetaryBoard shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principlesprovided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided,however, that compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall

under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed underRepublic Act No. 6758." The Association alleges that the proviso makes anunconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSPofficers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL)(exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file(Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those notexempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that thisclassification is ´a classic case of class legislation,µ allegedly not based on substantialdistinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel‘sposition

ISSUE:

Whether or not the rank-and-file employees of the BSP are unduly discriminated uponby exempting BSP officers (SG 20 and above) from the Salary Standardization Law.

HELD:

Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. The equalprotection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those personsfalling within a specified class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial

distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulateddifferently from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of thelaw and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.

The exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address theBSP‘s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives.It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the end-result did in factlead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of



salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is notpalpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. However, while RA 7653started as a valid measure well within the legislature‘s power, the enactment ofsubsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other Government FinancialInstitutions (GFIs) leeched all validity out of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of

RA 7653.

Even the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was granted the same blanketexemption from the SSL in 2000.The prior view on the constitutionality of RA 7653 wasconfined to an evaluation of its classification between the rank-and-file and the officersof the BSP, found reasonable because there were substantial distinctions that madereal differences between the two classes. The subsequent enactments, however,constitute significant changes in circumstance that considerably alter the reasonabilityof the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of RA 7653,thereby exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates tothe constitutionality of the classification - albeit made indirectly as a consequence of thepassage of eight other laws - between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the seven other

GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to allmembers of the class. The proviso may be fair on its face and impartial in appearancebut it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjustdistinctions between persons who are without differences. The disparity of treatmentbetween BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs definitelybears the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination - no one can, with candor andfairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and totalexemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld



1. Requisites of a Valid Warrant

People v. Veloso – 48 Phil. 169

FACTS:

The building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by anorganization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time amember of the House of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also themanager of the club. The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-calledParliamentary Club was nothing more than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923,J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to the club and verified thisfact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service ofthe City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduño ofthe municipal court. Thus provided, the police attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club

a little after three in the afternoon of the date above- mentioned. They found the doorsto the premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of police including policemanRosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the house. Otherpolicemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the outer door.-Once inside theParliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of themwas the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the lattershowed him the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he wasRepresentative Veloso and not John Doe, and that the police had no right to search thehouse. Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe.

ISSUE:

WON the search warrant and the arrest of Veloso were valid.

HELD:

Yes. It is provided, among other things, in the Philippine Code on Criminal Procedurethat ―a search warrant shall not be issued except for probable cause and uponapplication supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and theperson of thing to be seized.‖ The name and description of the accused should beinserted in the body of the warrant and where the name is unknown there must be such

a description of the person accused as will enable the officer to identify him when found.



A warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the nameof "John Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in unknown," is void, withoutother and further descriptions of the person to be apprehended, and such warrant willnot justify the officer in acting under it. Such a warrant must, in addition, contain the bestdescription personae possible to be obtained of the person or persons to be

apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the properperson or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should state hispersonal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, andany other circumstances by means of which he can be identified. In the first place, theaffidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the building to besearched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands."This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched. As thesearch warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in thebuilding occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this JohnDoe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doeas Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.



Alvarez v. CFI – 64 Phil. 33

FACTS:

The chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board presented to Judge David,presiding judge of CFI of Tayabas, alleging that according to reliable information, thepetitioner is keeping in his house in Infanta, Tayabas documents, receipts, lists, chitsand other papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money lendercharging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law.

In his oath the chief of the secret service did not swear to the truth of his statementsupon his knowledge of the facts but the information received by him from a reliableperson. Upon this questioned affidavit, the judge issued the search warrant, orderingthe search of the petitioners house at any time of the day or night, the seizure of thebooks and documents and the immediate delivery of such to him (judge). With saidwarrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store andresidence at 7 o'clock of the night and seized and took possession of various articlesbelonging to the petitioner.

The petitioner asks that the warrant of issued by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas,ordering the search of his house and the seizure, at any time of the day or night, ofcertain accounting books, documents, and papers belonging to him in his residencesituated in Infanta, Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date, authorizing the agentsof the Anti-Usury board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside,and prays that all the articles in question be returned to him.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the seizure of evidence to use in an investigation is constitutional.

HELD:

A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of thePhilippine Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peaceofficer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. Ofall the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace

and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of hisprivate affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others. While thepower to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercisedand the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights or citizen, for theenforcement of no statue is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basisprinciples of government.



Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace against which the constitutionalguarantee affords full protection. The term "unreasonable search and seizure" is notdefined in the Constitution or in General Orders No. 58, and it is said to have no fixed,absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has been defined in generallanguage. All illegal searches and seizure are unreasonable while lawful ones are

reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in anyparticular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of thecircumstances involved, including the purpose of the search, the presence or absenceor probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place orthing searched, and the character of the articles procured.

The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now questionthe validity of the search warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuancethereof, because he has waived his constitutional rights in proposing a compromisewhereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose of evading the criminalproceeding or proceedings. We are of the opinion that there was no such waiver, first,

because the petitioner has emphatically denied the offer of compromise and, second,because if there was a compromise it referred but to the institution of criminalproceedings fro violation of the Anti-Usury Law. The waiver would have been a gooddefense for the respondents had the petitioner voluntarily consented to the search andseizure of the articles in question, but such was not the case because the petitionerprotested from the beginning and stated his protest in writing in the insufficient inventoryfurnished him by the agents.



Stonehill v. Diokno – June 19, 1967

FACTS:

Upon application of the officers of the govt (resp. prosecutors), several judges (resp. judges) issued a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners &/ or the corporations ofw/c they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the perons named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses, and/ or residences, and to seize severalpersonal prop. as the "subject of the offense; stolen or embezelled or the fruits of theoffense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense" asviolation of CB Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws (TCC), NIRC and the RPC." Allegingthat the aforementioned search warrants are null & void, said petitioners filed w/ the SCthis orig. action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus & injunction. The writ was partially

lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents, and things seized from the officersof the corporations; but the injunction was maintained as regards those found & seizedin the residences of petitioners.

ISSUES:

(1) With respect to those found & seized in the offices of the corporations, w/npetitioners have cause of action to assail the validity of the contested warrants. (

2) In connection w/ those found & seized in the residences of petitioners, w/n the search

warrants in question and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereofare valid.

(3) If the answer in no. 2 is no, w/n said documents, papers and things may be used inevidence against petitioners.

HELD:

(1) No. Petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contestedwarrants and the seizure made in pursuance thereof because said corporations havetheir respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of petitioners.The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have beenimpaired thereby and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purelypersonal and cannot be availed of by 3rd parties.

a. Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus,illegal or being general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did notparticularly specify the things to be seized. The purpose of the requirement is to



avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication andcorrespondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.

b. Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruitof a poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by thecircumstances.

c. Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of thosetaken from the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated aspersonality different from that of the corporation.



Bache & Co. v Ruiz – 37 SCRA 823

FACTS:

Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz requestingthe issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of theNIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72, 73,208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and filethe application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, deLeon and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time JRuiz was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerkof Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session hadadjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the depositions had already been taken. Thestenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz askedrespondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found tobe false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed deLeon‘s application for search warrant and Logronio‘s deposition. The searchwassubsequently conducted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.

HELD:

The SC ruled in favour of Bache on three grounds.

1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary toenable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause.

2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The

search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax

Code. As ruled in Stonehill ―Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in

connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend

Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that ‗a search warrant shall not issue

but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.‘ Not satisfied with this

qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that ‗no search warrant

shall issue for more than one specific offense.



3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. The

documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the

Search Warrant.―Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnar,

receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received;

certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and

coded messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checksand check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances,

covering the years 1966 to 1970.‖

The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, andof Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularlydescribe the things to be seized.

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized whenthe description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or whenthe description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officermay be guided in making the search and seizure or when the things described are

limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is beingissued.



Placer v. Villanueva – 126 SCRA 463

FACTS:

Petitioners filed information in the city court and they certified that Preliminary

Investigation and Examination had been conducted and that prima facie cases have

been found. Upon receipt of said information, respondent judge set the hearing of the

criminal cases to determine propriety of issuance of warrants of arrest. After the

hearing, respondent issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to the court affidavits

of prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the information

to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable

cause by petitioners. Petitioners petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to compel

respondent to issue warrants of arrest. They contended that the fiscal‘s certification in

the information of the existence of probable cause constitutes sufficient justification forthe judge to issue warrants of arrest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest,

compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary

evidence presented during the preliminary investigation.

HELD:

Judge may rely upon the fiscal‘s certification for the existence of probable cause and on

the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such certification does not bind the

judge to come out with the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial

function; it calls for the exercise of judicial discretion on the part of issuing magistrate.

Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the judge must satisfy himself of the

existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the face of the

information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal‘scertification and require submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at

the conclusion as to existence of probable cause.



Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP – 133 SCRA 800

FACTS:

Petitioners assail the validity of 2 search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by

respondent Judge Cruz-Pano of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, under which

the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D,

RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan

Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing

machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the

printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous

papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession

and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum‖ newspaper,

were seized.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the 2 search warrants were validly issued and executed.

HELD:

The broad statements in the application and joint affidavit are mere conclusions of law

and do not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Deficient of such particulars as

would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve

as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent

judge to have done so. In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this Court ruled that "the

oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the

petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing

magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the

warrant, of the existence of probable cause." Another factor which makes the

search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in thenature of general warrants. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the

search warrants in question are too general.The closure of the premises subjected to

search and seizure is contrary to the freedom of the press as guaranteed in our

fundamental law. The search warrants are declared null and void.



Corro v. Lising – 137 SCRA 541

FACTS:

Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the seizure of articles allegedly used bypetitioner in committing the crime of Sedition. Seized were printed copies of thePhilippine times, newspaper dummies, typewriters, mimeographing machines and taperecorders, video machines and tapes. The petitioner moved to quash the warrant but hismotion was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search warrant is valid.

HELD:

Yes. The statements made in the affidavits are mere conclusions of Law and do notsatisfy the requirement of probable cause. The language used is all embracing as toinclude all conceivable words and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether theyare legal or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of ageneral warrant which is objectionable.

Probable cause means for a search warrant means such facts and circumstances whichwould have a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has beencommitted and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the placesought to be searched.

In the light of the 1987 Philippine Constitution Section 2 article 3 relays that searchwarrant n order to be valid there must be a probable cause and determined personallyby the judge as one of the requisites. The affidavits executed by Col. Castillo and Lt.

Ignacio only contains articles tending to incite distrust and hatred for the governmentwhich does not constitute the crime of Sedition but only a mere conclusions of law



Soliven v. Makasiar – 167 SCRA 394

FACTS:

In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not

petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed against them

although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the

Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the

constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a

warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if

any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue

moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners'

motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice

sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second

motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of

Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary,

affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for

reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these

developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative

remedies available under the law has lost factual support.

Petitioner contends that the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the

deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other

responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner

Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the

complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance

of warrants of arrest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the word ―personally‖ requires the judge to personally examine the

complainant and his witnesses.



HELD:

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the

issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himselfof the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is

not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following

established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the

supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause

and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds

no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of

supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the

existence of probable cause.



Salazar v. Achacoso – 183 SCRA 145

FACTS:

This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants ofarrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment. Acomplaint was filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)against petitioner Hortencia Salazar. Having ascertained that the petitioner had nolicense to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent POEA Administrator TomasD. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO.1205.Petitioner filed this instant petition with the SC which the high court considered asone for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.

ISSUE:

W/N the POEA may validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?

HELD:

No, the Court ruled that it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest.

The 1987 Constitution states that: ―no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issueexcept upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examinationunder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, andparticularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.―The Court further reiterates that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may nolonger issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the

judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code,unconstitutional and of no force and effect.



Board of Comm. (CID) v. De la Rosa – 197 SCRA 853

FACTS:

Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureauof Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural motherMariana Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, Willian, then twelve years old, arrives in Manilafrom Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. They had with themcertificate of registration and identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkongbased on a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs,Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens.

On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipinocitizens and issued an identification certificate to William. The boarf of commissionerswaws directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all cases where entry was allowed

on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen such included the case of William. As a result of the decision of the board of special inquiry which recommended for thereversal of the decision of the Board of Commissioners? Acting commissioner issued anorder affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.

On August 15, 1990, the Commission on Immigration and Deportatiion ordered thearrest of William and was released upon posting P 200,000 cash bond. Thus on the29thof the same month, he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC ofManila. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Commissioners on Immigration may issue warrant of arrest.

HELD:

Since the Commissioner on Immigration is not a judge, he may not issue warrant ofarrest in aid merely of his investigatory power. However, he may order the arrest of an

alien for the purpose of carrying out a deportation order that has already become final.



Lim, Sr. v. Judge Felix – Feb. 19, 1991

FACTS:

Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts were attacked and killed bya lone assassin. An investigation of the incident then followed. Thereafter, and for thepurpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, filed an amendedcomplaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others, VicenteLim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate, Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez,Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor AntonioKho of the crime ofmultiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident. Afterconducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order dated July 31, 1989stating therein that: ―. . . after weighing the affidavits and answers given by the

witnesses for the prosecution during the preliminary examination in searching questionsand answers, concludes that a probable cause has been established for the issuance ofa warrant of arrest of named accused in the amended complaint, namely, JimmyCabarles, Ronnie Fernandez, Nonilon Bagalihog, Jolly Fernandez, FlorencioFernandez, Jr., Vicente Lim, Sr., Susana Lim, Nestor Lim, Antonio Kho, Jaime Liwanag,Zaldy Dumalag and Rene Tualla alias Tidoy.‖

Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court severalmotions and manifestations which in substance prayed that an order be issued requiringthe transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conductedby the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment regarding theexistence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as the determination ofthe existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that nowarrant shall be issued unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personallyconvinced of such probable cause.- In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated thatthe court conduct a hearing to determine if there really exists a prima facie case againstthem in the light of documents which are recantations of some witnesses in thepreliminary investigation.- It should also be noted that the Lims also presented to therespondent Judge documents of recantation of witnesses whose testimonies were usedto establish a prima facie case against them.-On July 5, 1990, the respondent courtissued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issuedwarrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein.

ISSUE:

WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on theprosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.



HELD:

The questioned Order of respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix of Branch 56, RegionalTrial Court of Makati dated July 5, 1990 is declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE. A

Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. TheProsecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of theevidence. However, there should be necessary documents and a report supporting theFiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge. We cannot determinebeforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. Usually, thisdepends on the circumstances of each case. The Judge has to exercise sounddiscretion; after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by theConstitution. However, to be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutor'scertification and investigation report whenever necessary. As mentioned in the facts(stated above), the Lim‘s presented documents of recantations of the witnesses.

Although, the general rule is that recantations are not given much weight in the

determination of a case and in the granting of a new trial the respondent Judge beforeissuing his own warrants of arrest should, at the very least, have gone over the recordsof the preliminary examination conducted earlier in the light of the evidence nowpresented by the concerned witnesses in view of the ―political undertones" prevailing inthe cases. In making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded fromrelying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of thereliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge'ssound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidencebefore him, he issues a warrant of arrest. Indubitably, the respondent Judge (Felix)committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor‘s certification andissued the questioned Order dated July 5,1990 without having before him any other

basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause.



Silva v. Pres. Judge of RTC of Negros Or. – 203 SCRA 140

FACTS:

In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioners seek the nullification of SearchWarrant 1 issued by respondent judge as well as the return of money in the amount ofP1, 231.00 seized from petitioner Antonieta Silva. The respondent judge issued SearchWarrant for the petitioner upon receiving an application along with the deposition ofwitness on June 13, 1986 for violation of Republic act 6425, otherwise known as theDangerous Drugs Act of 1972. In the search warrant items to be search are cited suchas marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, and joint. In the course of the search, the servingofficers aside from the items listed also seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva inthe amount of Php 1,231.00.

The latter then filed a motion for the return of the said amount on grounds that searchwarrant only authorized seizure of marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes and joint. Theherein respondent issued an order holding in abeyance the disposition of said amountpending the filing of appropriate charges in connection with the search warrant.Subsequently, petitioners filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 1. However, theirmotion was denied due to lack of merit by respondent trial court through Judge Cruzwho then replaced the retire Judge Ontal.

Another motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner dated Sept. 1, 1987, butwas likewise denied by Judge Cruz in an order dated Oct. 19, 1987. Hence, this specialcivil action for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not issuance of Search Warrant No. 1 was tainted with irregularity.

HELD:

YES. The petition is granted. Search Warrant No. 1 is hereby declared null and void.Respondent judge of RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch XXXIII is directed to return topetitioner Antonieta Silva the amount of Php 1,231.00 which was earlier been seizedfrom her by virtue of the Illegal Search Warrant. The decision is immediately executoryat no costs.



In issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional andstatutory requirement that he must determine the existence of probable cause bypersonally examining the applicant and witnesses in form of searching questions andanswer. His failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse ofdiscretion. The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their authority

when they seized the money of Antonieta Silva. This is highly irregular considering thatshe was not even named as one of the respondents and that the warrant did notindicate the seizure of money but only marijuana leave, cigarettes and joints.



Allado v. Diokno – 232 SCRA 192

FACTS:

Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, alumni of the College of

Law, University of the Philippines, are partners of the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez

and Allado. In the practice of their profession, and on the basis of an alleged

extrajudicial confession of a security guard, they have been accused of the heinous

crime of kidnapping with murder by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC)

and ordered arrested without bail by respondent judge.

The petitioner Allado contends that the respondent Judge acted in excess of Jurisdiction

in holding that there is probable cause against them without determining the

admissibility of the evidence against them and without even stating the basis of his

findings. Thus, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion against the respondent judge.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of

jurisdiction in holding that there is probable cause against petitioners without

determining the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners and without even

stating the basis of his findings.

HELD:

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, lays down the requirements for the

issuance of a warrant of arrest, i.e., a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon probable

cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or

affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Probable cause is a

reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded, such a

state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution

and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so.The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute

certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of

probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to

procure a conviction. It is enough that it is it believed that the act or omission

complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the

reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.



Ortiz v. Palaypayon – 234 SCRA 391

FACTS:

Judge Lucio Palaypayon of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur isadministratively charged with gross ignorance of the law tainted with vindictiveness andoppression relative to a criminal case pending before respondent judge. The chargestemmed from a complaint for damage to property thru reckless imprudence filed beforethe respondent's sala on May 19, 1993 involving a collision between a Toyota Corollaowned by one Rosalinda Tanay and then driven by her husband, Roberto Tanay, and amini-truck owned by one Juliana Lu which was entrusted to herein complainant, andthen driven by one Rodrigo Vasquez.

It appears that on May 19, 1993, respondent judge issued an order for the arrest ofaccused Juliana Lu, Rodrigo Vasquez and herein complainant, David Ortiz, on the basisof mere affidavits by the offended party and without conducting the preliminaryinvestigation required by Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondent judge islikewise charged with fixing and imposing a grossly excessive bond amounting to P30,000.00 for the accused's provincial liberty in violation of Article 365 of the Revised PenalCode and Department of Justice Circular No. 10 dated July 3, 1987 which provides thatfor crimes punishable only by fine, the amount of the bail shall be equal to three-eighths(3/8) of the amount of the fine but shall not exceed P6, 000.00. Furthermore, it isalleged in the administrative complaint that herein complainant was wrongfully includedas one of the accused even if there existed no basis for his indictment of the criminal actas he was not among the nine (9) passengers nor was he the driver of the mini-truck.

Respondent judge, instead of filing his comment on the complaint, filed a Motion toDismiss alleging lack of factual or legal basis. He contends that Section 3, Rule 112 ofRevised Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure, was substantially, if not entirely,complied with. He claims that pursuant to the said rule, he personally examined inwriting and under oath the private complainant and his witnesses by asking the samequestions propounded to them in their sworn statements and the same answers weregiven. At the same time, respondent judge maintains that it is customary for him toadopt the sworn statements of the complainant and the witnesses if he is satisfied of theexistence of probable cause. This practice, he claims, will expedite the proceedings andsave the party litigants' time and money.

ISSUE:

WON the warrant of arrest issued to the petitioner is unconstitutional.



HELD:

The respondent judge's action clearly violates constitutional provisions and establishedrules of procedure. From the foregoing factual and legal milieu, it is evident that there

was no preliminary investigation conducted. Respondent judge did not personallyexamine the complainant and her witnesses by asking searching questions andanswers to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause as mandated by law. Hesimply ignored the constitutional requirement of procedural due process. This Courtcannot countenance such blatant practice of disregarding fairly elementary legalprinciples and substituting it with an unorthodox and highly irregular practice whichappears convenient only to respondent judge.

Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

"no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to bedetermined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of thecomplainant and the witnesses he may procedure .In relation thereto, Rule 112, Section6 (b) of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides:

(b) By the Municipal Trial Court. - If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminaryinvestigation is satisfied after as an examination in writing and under oath of thecomplainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that aprobable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent underimmediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrantof arrest."



People v. Martinez – 235 SCRA 171

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Alexander Martinez, alias Abelardo Martinez y Montesor, was

charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 otherwise known as

the Dangerous Drugs Act and violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for

illegal possession of firearms before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City.

Appellant with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on the

above charges. But eventually, the court rendered its decision finding the accused-

appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

In his appeal, accused-appellant argues that he is not the person named in the search

warrant issued in connection with the buy-bust operation, his name being Abelardo

Martinez and not Alexander Martinez. That being the case, all things seized by virtue of

the said warrant are inadmissible in evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search warrant is invalid because of the discrepancy regarding the

name of the accused and that stated in the search warrant.

HELD:

No. The discrepancy regarding the name of accused-appellant and that stated in the

search warrant cannot militate against his positive identification by the poseur-buyer. Ithas been consistently held that ―greater weight is given to the positive identification of

the accused by the prosecution witnesses than accused‘s denial concern ing the

commission of the crime. Granting arguendo that the search warrant issued against

accused-appellant was invalid because his true name is Abelardo Martinez and not

Alexander Martinez as stated in the search warrant, the same cannot render the articles

seized inadmissible as evidence in court. As a matter of fact the information filed

identifies him as ―Alexander Martinez alias Abelardo Martinez y Montesor, accused.‖

The accused-appellant was arrested as a result of a ―buy-bust‖ operation and the

ensuing search of the premises was made as an incident to a lawful arrest. It is

therefore clear that regardless of the alleged defect of the search warrant in erroneously

designating his first name, the seized articles may still be used as evidence against

accused-appellant, having been obtained from him and as such, fruits of a lawful search

incidental to a valid arrest.



Webb v. De Leon – 247 SCRA 652

FACTS:

On June 19, 1994, the NBI filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint charging petitionerWebb et al with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her motherEstrelita Nicolas-Vizconde, and sister Anne Marie Jennifer Vizconde in their house at#80 W Vinzons Street, BF Homes, Parañaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.

DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst. Chief State Prosecutor, JovericioR. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.

The focal point of the case lies on the contention of the petitioner that the respondent judges issued warrant of arrest against the former without conducting the required

preliminary examination.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judges gravely abused their discretion when they failedto conduct a preliminary examination before issuing the arrest warrant against thepetitioner

HELD:

The court held that the respondent judges did not gravely abuse their discretions. In

arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that there must be a crime committed andthat the person sought to be arrested committed it. (The DOJ Panel found a probablecause in the case.) Sec 6 of Rule 112 provides that ―upon filling information, the RTCmay issue a warrant to arrest the accused. Clearly, the law repudiates the submission ofthe petitioner that the respondent judges should have conducted ―searchingexaminations‖ of the witnesses prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest.



People v. Woolcock – 244 SCRA 235

FACTS:

Accused-appellants Deborah Woolcock, George Williams, Jacqueline Ann Daughtryand Evans Asare were indicted for allegedly conspiring with each other in delivering,giving away, distributing, dispatching in transit or transporting approximately 3,328.58grams* of heroin in Pasay City and other parts of Metro Manila. At the arraignment,appellants, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, hence trial on the meritsproceeded. Subsequently, appellants filed a motion to quash the search warrants beforeJudge Antonio J. Fineza of the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 131, who had issued thesame, contending that said warrants were issued without probable cause and only forthe purpose of fishing for evidence. Judge Fineza denied the motion, holding that thesame should be resolved by the Pasay court where the principal case was pending.Under date of March 26, 1993 appellants filed another motion to quash the warrants

before the latter court on the same grounds. The court, through Judge Baltazar Dizon,without categorically ruling on said motion rendered a judgment of conviction andsentenced each of the appellants to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of P20,000.00.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in not resolving appellants' motion to quash thesearch warrants.

HELD:

The remedy for questioning the validity of a search warrant can only be sought in thecourt that issued it, not in the sala of another judge of concurrent jurisdiction. Whatappellants would downgrade but could not suppress is the fact that such police missionproceeded with commendable precision and resulted in total success and that the policeacted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information.

Besides, even if the search warrants ex concessis were disregarded, a warrantlesssearch could be justified. The Court held that in light of such circumstances, to deprivethe agents of the ability and facility to promptly accordingly, including searching withouta warrant would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to

the detriment of society.



Tambasen v. People – 246 SCRA 184

FACTS:

On August 31, 1988, P/Sgt. Natuel applied at the MTCC for issuance of search warrantfor petitioner who allegedly holds in his possession some firearms with ammunitions,explosives, and subversive documents. The same day, the search warrant wasgranted.On September 9, 1899, the police team searched the house of the petitionerand seized the following items:

Php 14,000 cash (in two envelops)

AR 280 handset with antennae

YAESU Transreceiver with antennae

Academy Notebook and Assorted Papers

4 handset battery packsOn September 19, 1988, the petitioner‘s urgent motion for the return of seized articlesand to make a return of search warrant was ordered by the MTCC. The petitioner lateron filed a motion praying that the search and seizure be declared illegal. However, theBacolod City Police earmarked the Php 14,000 as payment of allowance of Armed CityPartisan (ACP) and other ―known NPA personalities‖. On December 23, 1988, MTCC issued an order to return the money seized to thepetitioner. It opined that any seizure should be limited to the specific items covered bythe warrant. It said that the money could not be considered as ―subversive documents‖.

ISSUE:

Whether or not warrant issued was valid and seizure of said money (Php 14,000) wasvalid evidence kept in custodia legis.

HELD:

Issuance of search warrant for more than one specific offense is prohibited by theRevised Rules of Court, which in this case, Anti-Subversion Law and illegal possessionof firearms, ammunition and explosives. Therefore, the warrant was a ―scattershotwarrant‖, and totally null and void. Also, things to be seized should be particularlydescribed in the search warrant.

Although public welfare is the foundation of the power to search and seize, such powermust be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rightsof the citizen.



Columbia Pictures v. CA – 262 SCRA 219

FACTS:

Alfredo Ramos, an intelligence officer of the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB),

applied for and was granted by the RTC Br. 168 of Pasig a Search Warrant against the

respondent Jose Jinco for violation of Section 56 of PD No. 49 as amended. However,

private respondent filed an urgent motion to lift the search warrant and for the return of

the seized articles on the ground that the SW was issued without probable cause.

The then new presiding judge of RTC Br. 168 granted the motion to quash and ordered

the return of all articles seized to private respondent. The court used as its justification

the fact that as the master copies were not presented to the court, there was noprobable cause to issue the SW.

Petitioners appealed to the CA, which affirmed the order of the trial court in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search warrant was issued without probable cause.

HELD:

The SC ruled that the SW was issued with probable cause. It is evidently incorrect to

suggest that in copyright infringement cases, the presentation of master tapes of the

copy right films is always necessary to meet the requirement of probable cause for the

issuance of SW. It does not rule out the use of testimonial or documentary evidence,

depositions, admissions or other classes of evidence tending to prove the factum

probandum especially where the production in court of object evidence would result in

delay, inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to its evidentiary rule.

From the records, it is clear that the judge who issued the SW observed all the

requirements necessary before the SW was issued: he heard the testimonies andstudied the deposition of the witnesses for the petitioners on the existence of probable

cause.



20th Century Fox Film v. CA – 164 SCRA 655

FACTS:

Petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation sought the assistance of the NBI in

conducting searches and seizures in connection with the NBI‘s anti -film piracy

campaign. Petitioner alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are

engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in violation of PD

No. 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law).

The NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the

petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants against the

video outlets owned by the private respondents. The lower court issued the desired

search warrants. The NBI, accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video

outlets and seized the items described in the three warrants.Private respondents later

filed a motion to lift the search warrants and release the seized properties, which was

granted by the lower court. Petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration was denied by the

lower court. The CA affirmed the trial court.

ISSUE:

Did the judge properly lift the search warrants he issued earlier?

HELD:

YES, the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued earlier.The lower court

lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of probable cause that

the private respondents violated P.D. 49. NBI agents who acted as witnesses during the

application for search warrant did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of

their testimony, which was the alleged commission of the offense of piracy by the

private respondents. Only the petitioner‘s counsel who was also a witness during the

application stated that he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by

the private respondents were pirated tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the

petitioner. The lower court lifted the warrants, declaring that the testimony of petitioner‘scounsel did not have much credence because the master tapes of the allegedly pirated

tapes were not shown to the court during the application.



The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films, from which the pirated

films were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against

those who have in their possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the

effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be

necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of

whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrants is

not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate or copied tapes were

necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.

The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity

of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must

present to the court the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence

of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized

reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must

be established to satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the

existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search

warrant.



Ho vs. People – 280 SCRA 365

FACTS:

The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, represented by its chief prosecutor Atty.

Reynaldo L. Bagatsing, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint againstDoris Teresa Ho, Rolando S. Narciso, Anthony Marden, Arsenio Benjamin Santos and

Leonardo Odoño. The complaint was for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic

Act 3019 prohibiting a public officer from entering into any contract or transaction on

behalf of the government if it is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the latter,

whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

Such contract was entered into despite their full knowledge that the rate they have

agreed upon was much higher than those offered by the Loadstar Shipping Company,

Inc. (LSCI) and Premier Shipping Lines, Inc. (PSLI), in the public bidding, thereby giving

unwarranted benefits to the National Marine Corporation.

Ho and Narciso alleged that the Sandiganbayan, in determining probable cause for the

issuance of the warrant for their arrest, merely relied on the information and the

resolution attached thereto, filed by the Ombudsman without other supporting evidence,

in violation of the requirements of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, and settled

jurisprudence.

ISSUE:

May a judge determine probable cause and issue a warrant of arrest solely on the basis

of the resolution of the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, without

having before him any of the evidence which may have been submitted at the

preliminary investigation?

HELD:

NO. The word ―personally‖ does not appear in the corresponding provisions of our

previous Constitutions. This emphasis shows the present Constitution‘s intent to place agreater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than that imposed under the previous

Charters,the public respondent relied fully and completely upon the resolution of the

graft investigation officer and the memorandum of the reviewing prosecutor, attached to

the information filed before it, and its conjecture that the Ombudsman would not have

approved their recommendation without supporting evidence. It had no other documents

from either the complainant (the Anti-Graft League of the Philippines) or the People



from which to sustain its own conclusion that probable cause exists. Respondent Court

palpably committed grave abuse of discretion in ipso factoissuing the challenged

warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the prosecutor‘s findings and recommendation,

and without determining on its own the issue of probable cause based on evidence

other than such bare findings and recommendation.



Gozos v. Tac-an – GR 123191, Dec. 17, 1998

FACTS:

The officials, teachers, and students of the Concepcion Aguila Memorial College

organized a school party. While the party was going on, the principal, Felizardo Aguila,was informed that several men, who appeared to be drunk, were trying to force their

way through the main gate. One of the men seemed armed with a handgun. After

calling the police, Aguila went to the main gate, where he asked the men what their

business was. At this point, private respondents Blanco and Atienza arrived at the

school. They were shortly joined by private respondents Pedro Castillo, Sulit, and

Ildefonso Castillo, who were all members of the Philippine National Police of San Jose,

Batangas. They demanded from the man armed with the handgun, who later

turned out to be the victim Gilbert Dyogi, that he surrender his gun and go with them to

the station. Gilbert Dyogi gave the handgun to the respondents, who then asked to seehis license. He produced a sheet of paper from his wallet which he handed to private

respondents. After allowing them to inspect the weapon and the alleged license, Gilbert

Dyogi asked the private respondents to give them back to him. However, private

respondent Blanco who had the handgun refused to do so. Before long the two were

grappling for possession of the gun. Apparently, Blanco pulled out his sidearm and fired

at Gilbert Dyogi twice. Subsequently respondent judge issued the questioned warrant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issuance of warrant is valid.

HELD:

Respondent Judge conducted an inquiry, not only for the purpose of determining

whether there was probable cause to order the arrest of private respondents Blanco,

Pedro Castillo, Sulit, Atienza, and Ildefonso Castillo, but for the purpose of determining

whether there was sufficient evidence to prosecute them as well.

The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and

exhaustive display of the parties‘ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence

only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and

that the accused is probably guilty thereof.



Hence, notwithstanding the contrary opinion of the judge regarding the designation of

the offense committed, for as long as he finds probable cause for the offense charged,

he should issue a warrant of arrest against the accused for the crime charged in the

information. The petition is hereby granted and the orders, dated October 18, 1995,

November 22, 1995, and January 3, 1996, of respondent Judge Paterno Tac-an are

ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.



Flores v. Sumaljag – 290 SCRA 568

FACTS:

This is an administrative case against Judge Antonio C. Sumaljag, for gross ignorance

of the law in connection with the preliminary investigation of three criminal cases and

the arrest of complainants. Complainants were charged with three counts of falsification

of public document. Respondent judge conducted a preliminary examination, during

which the complainant, Gualberto Parmis, and his witness, Diego Cala, Jr., testified in

each of the criminal cases. Thereafter, respondent judge ordered the arrest of herein

complainants. By virtue of warrants of arrest, the herein complainants were arrested

and detained. They were later released on bail.

The complainants instituted this administrative case against respondent judge asserting

that the testimonies during the preliminary examinations failed to establish probable

cause; Complainants claim that, contrary to Rule 112, §6(b) of the Rules on Criminal

Procedure, respondent did not ask the complainant and the witnesses searching

questions but mainly questions designed to make them merely affirm what they had

previously stated in their affidavits. Deputy Court Administrator Abesamis notes that the

questions asked by the respondent were leading and ―revealed the latter‘s apparent

knowledge of the case which the witness testifying had only to confirm with a ‗Yes,

Judge.‘‖

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent complied with his duty under the Rules of Court.

HELD:

The transcript of the preliminary investigation shows that some of the questions asked

by the respondent were indeed leading. It is evident, however, that he was dealing with

witnesses who were reticent and had to be prodded if their examination was to be

searching. Most of the time, complainant Gualberto Parmis and his witness Diego Cala,

Jr. merely said ―Yes, Judge‖ in answer to questions put to them. The only way to make

them explain was to ask them leading questions.

Deputy Court Administrator Abesamis contends that the respondent revealed his

apparent knowledge of the facts of the case which the witness testifying before him only

needed to confirm with a ―Yes, Judge.‖ Obvious ly, this is because the judge based his

questions on the allegations of the complaint and the affidavits of the complainant and

the witnesses. In fact, the first questions he asked concerned the execution of affidavits.

If the only way to make the witnesses give details was to ask questions based on their



complaints and affidavits, we see no reason why this should be considered improper.

After all, the witnesses could deny what the judge asked them if it was not true.

While some of the questions of the judge clearly suggested the answers, nonetheless it

is clear that the answers were still those of the witnesses and not those of the judge.

We are satisfied that as far as the duty to ask ―searching questions‖ is concerned,respondent complied with his duty under the Rules of Court.



People v. CA – 291 SCRA 400

FACTS:

A petition for certiorari has been filed to invalidate the order of Judge Casanova which

quashed the search warrant issued by Judge Bacalla and declared inadmissible for any

purpose the items seized under the warrant.

An application for a search warrant was made by S/Insp Brillantes against Mr. Azfar

Hussain who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety

Store, Apt 1207 Area F. Bagon Buhay Avenue, Sarang Palay, San Jose Del Monte,

Bulacan. The following day Search Warrant No. 1068 was issued but was served not at

Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent to Abigail Variety Store

resulting in the arrest of 4 Pakistani nationals and the seizure of a number of different

explosives and firearms.

ISSUE:

WON a search warrant was validly issued as regard to the apartment in which private

respondents were then actually residing, or more explicitly, WON that particular

apartment had been specifically described in the warrant.

HELD:

The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of

minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the

Judge issuing the same. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a

place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually

searched — although not that specified in the warrant — is exactly what they had in

view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting

evidence.



What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant

itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs

they submitted to the court issuing the warrant.

The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by

the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in

support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the

Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the

place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to

police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that

delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process,

and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution

has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to

be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; itcannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.



Kho v. Makalintal – GR 94902-06, April 21, 1999

FACTS:

On May 15, 1990, NBI Agent Max B. Salvador applied for the issuance of search

warrants by the respondent Judge against Banjamin V. Kho (petitioner) at his residence

at BF Homes, Paranaque. On the same day, Eduardo T. Arugay, another NBI agent,

applied with the same court for the issuance of search warrants against the said

petitioner in his house at 326 McDivitt St. Brgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque. The search

warrants were applied for after teams of NBI agents had conducted a personal

surveillance and investigation in the two houses referred to on the basis of confidential

information they received that the said places were being used as storage centers for

unlicensed firearms and ―chop-chop‖ vehicles. On the same day, the respondent Judge

conducted the necessary examination of the applicants and their witnesses, after whichhe issued Search Warrant Nos. 90-11, 90-12, 90-13, 90-14, and 90-15. NBI agents

searched subject premises at BF Homes, Paranaque, and they recovered various high-

powered firearms and at the house at No. 326 McDivitt St. Bgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque,

yielded several high-powered firearms with explosives and more than a thousand

rounds of ammunition.

The petitioners presented a Motion to Quash the said Search Warrants, contending

that: 1. The subject search warrants were issued without probable cause; 2. The same

search warrants are prohibited by the Constitution for being general warrants; 3. The

said search warrants were issued in violation of the procedural requirements set forth bythe Constitution; 4. The search warrants aforesaid were served in violation of the

Revised Rules of Court; and 5. The objects seized were all legally possessed and

issued.

They contend that the surveillance and investigation conducted by NBI agents within the

premises involved, prior to the application for the search warrants under controversy,

were not sufficient to vest in the applicants personal knowledge of facts and

circumstances showing or indicating the commission of a crime by them (petitioners).

ISSUE

WON the warrants were issued without probable cause.



HELD:

Petitioners‘ contention is untenable. Records show that the NBI agents who conducted

the surveillance and investigation testified unequivocally that they saw guns beingcarried to and unloaded at the two houses searched, and motor vehicles and spare

parts were stored therein. In a similar case, it was held that it held that the existence of

a probable cause depends to a large extent upon the finding or opinion of the judge who

conducted the required examination of the applicants and the witnesses.

Respondent judge had the singular opportunity to assess their testimonies and to find

out their personal knowledge of facts and circumstances enough to create a probable

cause. The Judge was the one who personally examined the applicants and witnesses

and who asked searching questions vis-a-vis the applications for search warrants. He

was thus able to observe and determine whether subject applicants and their witnessesgave accurate accounts of the surveillance and investigation they conducted at the

premises to be searched. In the absence of any showing that respondent judge was

recreant of his duties in connection with the personal examination he so conducted on

the affiants before him, there is no basis for doubting the reliability and correctness of

his findings and impressions.



Paper Industries v. Asuncion – GR 122092, May 19, 1999

FACTS:

On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search

warrant before the RTC of Quezon City, stating: 1. That the management of Paper

Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound, is in possession

or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the

subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and

which . . . are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in the premises described; 2. That a Search

Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and bring

to the described properties.

After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued

the contested search warrant. On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search

warrant at the PICOP compound and seized a number of firearms and explosives.

Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed

a ―Motion to Quash‖ before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a ―Supplemental

Pleading to the Motion to Quash‖ and a ―Motion to Suppress Evidence.‖ On March 23,

1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners‘ motions. On

August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order denying petitioners‘

Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search warrant was valid

HELD:

The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such

presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses

he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath

or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to



them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things

to be seized. In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial

court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3

Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search

warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the

subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described with particularity.



Malalaon v. CA – 232 SCRA 249

FACTS:

The crime alleged is a violation of PD 1866. The officers applied for a search warrant in

Kalookan City. However, the place to be searched was in Quezon City. The officers

executed the search and seized several firearms. After the search and seizure was

conducted, the accused are now assailing the validity of the search warrant since they

claim that it was void for lack of jurisdiction. The accused buttresses their claim arguing

that the criminal case was filed in the Quezon City RTC, not in Kalookan City.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search warrant was valid.

HELD:

Yes, the search warrant was valid. A warrant merely constitutes criminal process. It is

not a criminal action. The requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a

search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.

Moreover, no law or rule imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same

manner that no such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest.



2. Particularity of Description

Yousef Al-Ghoul v. CA – GR 126859, Sept. 4, 2001

FACTS:

Presiding judge of the RTC of Kalookan City, issued search warrants for the search and

seizure of certain items in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road,

Kalookan City. The police searched Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and found

one (1) .45 caliber pistol. Found in Apartment No. 2 were 2 M-16 rifles with 2 magazines

and 20 live M-16ammunitions, among others. Petitioners were charged before the

Regional Trial Court information accusing them with illegal possession of firearms,

ammunitions and explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree No.1866. Thereafter,petitioners were arrested and detained. At the hearing for bail, the RTC denied

petitioners' motion for bail earlier filed for the accused are being charged of two criminal

offenses and both offenses under Presidential Decree1866, Sections 1 and 3 thereof

prescribe the penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period to Reclusion

Perpetua. Under Rule 114 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by Supreme

Court Administrative Circular No. 12-94, particularly Section 7 thereof, no person

charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong shall be admitted to bail regardless of

the stage of the criminal prosecution. Petitioners contend that the search and seizure

orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights as well as Section 3 of Rule 126 of

the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure because the place searched and articles

seized were not described with particularity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion when it

ruled that the search and seizure orders in question were valid and the objects seized

admissible in evidence



HELD:

The place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by the police.

Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing so,care must be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded.

Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the

constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, we are

constrained to declare that the search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45

caliber pistol taken thereat is inadmissible in evidence against petitioners. Now, in

contrast, the search conducted at Apartment No. 2 could not be similarly faulted. The

search warrants in question specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2. The search was

done in the presence of its occupants, herein petitioners, in accordance with Section 7

of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court. Petitioners allege lack of particularity in the

description of objects to be seized pursuant to the warrants. That the articles seizedduring the search of Apartment No. 2 are of the same kind and nature as those items

enumerated in the search warrant appears to be beyond cavil. The items seized from

Apartment No. 2 were described with specify in the warrants in question. The nature of

the items ordered to be seized did not require a technical description. Moreover, the law

does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute

details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities, otherwise,

it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search warrant as they

would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Substantial similarity of

those articles described as a class or species would suffice.



Uy v. BIR – 344 SCRA 36

FACTS:

In Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of UPC reported to the BIR that Uy

Chin Ho aka Frank Uy, manager of UPC, was selling thousands of cartons of cannedcartons without issuing a report. This is a violation of Sec 253 & 263 of the Internal

Revenue Code. In Oct 1993, the BIR requested before RTC Cebu to issue a search

warrant. Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a warrant on the same day. A second warrant was

issued which contains the same substance but has only one page, the same was dated

Oct 1st 2003. These warrants were issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Sec 253. A

third warrant was issued on the same day for the alleged violation of Uy of Sec 238 in

relation to sec 263. On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied

by members of the PNP, on 2 Oct 1993, searched the premises of the UPC. They

seized, among other things, the records and documents of UPC. A return of said search

was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. UPC filed a motion to quash thewarrants which was denied by the RTC. They appealed before the CA via certiorari. The

CA dismissed the appeal for a certiorari is not the proper remedy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.

HELD:

The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a way for it ordered the return of the seized

items but sustained the validity of the warrant. The SC ruled that the search warrant

issued has not met some basic requisites of validity. A search warrant must conform

strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions.

These requirements, in outline form, are:

(1) The warrant must be issued upon probable cause;

(2) The probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the

applicant or any other person;

(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or

affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and



(4) The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons

or things to be seized.

The SC noted that there has been an inconsistency in the description of the place to be

searched as indicated in the said warrants. Also the thing to be seized was not clearly

defined by the judge. He used generic itineraries. The warrants were also inconsistentas to who should be searched. One warrant was directed only against Uy and the other

was against Uy and UPC. The SC however noted that the inconsistencies were cured

by the issuance of the latter warrant as it has revoked the two others.



3. Warrantless Searches and Seizures

When is a search a “search”?

Valmonte v. General de Villa – 178 SCRA 211 (Main) and 185 SCRA 655 (MR)

FACTS:

The National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to

Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the

mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral

areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace

and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political

development of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace andorder, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of

Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the

arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints,

considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and

check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or

court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988,

Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela, Bulacan, was

gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the

checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusingto submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning

shots fired in the air.

ISSUE:

WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of the people against

unreasonable searches and seizures.

HELD:

Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the militarymanning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se,

illegal. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their

routine checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners‘ rights

against unlawful search and seizure of other rights.



The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right

invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed.

Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not

forbidden. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a

security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective

territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.

Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the

govt, in the interest of public security. Between the inherent right of the state to protect

its existence and promote public welfare and an individual‘s right against a warrantless

search w/c is, however, reasonably conducted, the former should prevail. True, the

manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the

same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of

occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints

during these abnormal times, when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part of the

price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community.



Guazon v. De Villa – 181 SCRA 623

FACTS:

The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that were

conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged that there

is no specific target house to be search and that there is any search warrant or warrant

of arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without

nameplates or identification cards. The residents were rudely roused from their sleep by

banging on the walls and windows of their houses. The residents were at the point of

high-powered guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs

for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents complained that their homes

were ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying their valuables. Some of their

money and valuables had disappeared after the operation. The residents also reported

incidents of mauling, spot-beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained also

suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical informations.

The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents contend that the

Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements

for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target zoning were intended to

flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the communities were the said

drives were conducted. They said that they have intelligently and carefully planned

months ahead for the actual operation and that local and foreign media joined theoperation to witness and record such event.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the saturation drive committed consisted of violation of human rights.

HELD:

It is not the police action per se which should be prohibited rather it is the procedure

used or the methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities‖.



Based on the facts stated by the parties, it appears to have been no impediment to

securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or

individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no showing that the objectives

sought to be attained by the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as the rights of

the squatters and low income families are fully protected. However, the remedy should

not be brought by a taxpayer suit where not one victim complaints and not one violator

are properly charged. In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring

soldier or policeman whom the court can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts

no permanent relief can be given.

In the meantime where there is showing that some abuses were committed, the court

temporary restraint the alleged violations which are shocking to the senses. Petition is

remanded to the RTC of Manila.



People v. Saycon – 236 SCRA 329

FACTS:

On or about 8 July 1992, at about 6:00 in the morning, the Coastguard personnel

received information from NARCOM agent Ruben Laddaran that a suspected "shabu"

courier by the name of Alvaro Saycon was on board the MV Doña Virginia, which was

arriving at that moment in Dumaguete City. Upon receipt of the information, the

Coastguard chief officer CPO Tolin, instructed them to intercept the suspect. A

combined team of NARCOM agents and Philippine Coastguard personnel consisting of

CPO Tolin, a certain Miagme, and Senior Police Officers Ruben Laddaran and

Winifredo Noble of NARCOM posted themselves at the gate of Pier 1. The MV Doña

Virginia docked at 6:00 a.m. that same morning at Pier 1 in Dumaguete City. Alvaro

Saycon alighted from the boat carrying a black bag and went through the checkpointmanned by the Philippine Coastguard where he was identified by police officer

Winifredo Noble of NARCOM.

Saycon was then invited to the Coastguard Headquarters at the Pier area. He willingly

went with them. At the headquarters, the coastguard asked Saycon to open his bag,

and the latter willingly obliged. In it were personal belongings and a maong wallet.

Inside that maong wallet, there was a Marlboro pack containing the suspected "shabu".

When police officer Winifredo Noble asked Saycon whether the Marlboro pack

containing the suspected "shabu" was his, Saycon merely bowed his head. Then

Saycon, his bag and the suspected "shabu" were brought to the NARCOM office forbooking. When Alvaro Saycon was arrested, the NARCOM agents did not have a

warrant of arrest. The PNP's Forensic Analyst declared in court that she had conducted

an examination of the specimens and found out that the specimens weighed 4.2 grams

in total, consisted of methamphetamine hydrochloride, more widely known as "shabu."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arrest was valid

HELD:

The warrantless search was valid, as the accused was a passenger of a motor vehicle.

There was probable cause to believe that the accused was carrying prohibited drugs.

Three weeks earlier, agents of the Narcotics Command bought methamine

hydrochloride from him. An agent of the Narcotics Command reported that the accused

would be arriving on board the vessel and carrying methamphetamine hydrochloride



with him. Drug couriers do not go about their trade with some external sign indicating

that they are transporting prohibited drugs. This must be taken into account in

determining probable cause.



People v. CFI – 101 SCRA 86

FACTS:

One week beforeFeb.9, 1974 the Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center (RASAC) was

informed by a disclosed that a shipment of highly dutiable goods would be transported

to Manila from Angeles City on a dodge car. Spurred by such lead, RASAC agents

ARTHUR Manuel and Macario Sabado on said date and upon order of the chief of

intelligence Operations branch RASAC-MBA Col. Antonio Abad Jr. stationed

themselves in the vicinity of the tollgate of the North Divisoria Road at Balintawak,

Quezon City. A light blue dodge car entered the toll gate driven by Sgt. Jessie Hope

accompanied by Medina that‘s the RASAC agents gave a chase and overtook Sgt.

Hope‘s car. Agent Sabado blew his whistle and signaled Sgt. Hope to stop but the latter

instead of heeding made a U-turn back to North Divisoria Road, but he could not get othrough because of the buses in front of his car. At this point the agents succeeded in

blocking Sgt. Hope car and the latter stopped. Manuel and Sabado who were in

civilian clothes showed their identification card to Hope and Medina and introduced

themselves as RASAC agents. The agents saw 4 boxes on the back seat of the dodge

and upon inquiry Sgt. Hope answered ―I do not know‖. Further, Hope and Medina were

asked where they were bringing the boxes, Medina replied they will bring it to Tropical

Hut at EDSA. Agent Sabado boarded the dodge car with Hope and Medina while

agent Manuel took their own car and both cars drove towards Tropical Hut making a

brief stop at the Boranza where agent Manuel called up Col. Abad by telephone driving

at the tropical Hut, the party together with Col. Abad waited for the man who accordingto Medina was supposed to receive the boxes. As the man did not appear Col. Abad

called off the mission and brought respondents and their car to Camp Aguinaldo. Upon

inspection, 11 boxes revealed 4,441 wrist watches of assorted brands and 1,075 watch

bracelets of assorted brands supposedly untaxed. RASAC Chairman Gen. Pelagio Cruz

requested the Bureau of Customs to issue a warrant of seizure and detention against

the articles.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the seizure was valid even after the collector of customs declared theseized articles not subject to forfeitures.

HELD:

It is not accurate to say that the collector of customs made no findings that the articles

were smuggled .In fact what the collector stated was that the prosecution failed to

present the quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant the forfeiture of subject articles .In



general sense, this does not necessarily exclude the possibility of smuggling .The

decision of collector of customs as in other seizure proceedings concerns the res rather

than the persons.

In the light of the 1987 Philippine Constitution one of the valid reasons for warrants the

search and seizure. Customs search or seizure of goods concealed availing theseduties as in the case of Papa vs. Magno under Article 3 Section 2 Enforcement of Laws

on Tariff and Customs Code to include searches inside a dwelling need not necessary

for a search warrant.



Roan v. Gonzales – 145 SCRA 687

FACTS:

A search warrant was issued by herein respondent Judge Gonzales on May 10, 1984.

Two days later the house was searched but none of the articles listed in the search

warrant was discovered. However, the officers found in the premises one (1) Colt

Magnum revolver and eighteen (18) live bullets which they confiscated. The articles

seized from him are sought to be used as evidence in his prosecution for illegal

possession of firearms.

The petitioner claims that he was the victim of an illegal search and seizure conducted

by the military authorities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search warrant made was illegal.

HELD:

The instant case does not come under any of the accepted exceptions. The

respondents cannot even claim that they stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the

fact is that these things were deliberately sought and were not in plain view when they

were taken. Hence, the rule having been violated and no exception being applicable,

the conclusion is that the petitioner's pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and

therefore are protected by the exclusionary principle.



Nolasco v. Mago – GR 27360

FACTS:

This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction, filed by

petitioners against private respondent Remegio Mago, praying for the annulment of the

order issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance

of Manila under date of March 7, 1967, which authorized the release under bond of

certain goods which were seized and held by petitioners in connection with the

enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code.

In the afternoon of November 4.1966, based on reliable information received the day

prior, elements of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department headed

by petitioner Martin Alagao, apprehended and seized two (2) truckloads of cargo which

came from the customs zone in the port of Manila. The shipment which was labelled as

containing personal effects, were allegedly misdeclared and undervalued. The police

operation was conducted upon the orders of Manila Police Chief and Deputy agent of

Bureau of Customs, petitioner Ricardo Papa.

Among the arguments raised by respondent Mago is that the goods were seized by the

Manila Police Department without a search warrant issued by a competent.

ISSUE:

W/N the seizure was valid.

HELD:

Yes, the Court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure in the case at the bar is

valid. The Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for

the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are

actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had

previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and

forfeiture proceedings.



The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The

Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and

Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store

or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any

vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or

stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or

conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to

law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases.



People v. Lo Ho Wing – 193 SCRA 122

FACTS:

Peter Lo , together with co-accused Lim Cheng Huat alias Antonio Lim and Reynaldo

Tia, were charged with a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, for the transport of

metamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu". Upon arrival at NAIA`

and after boarding a taxi, defendants vehicle was stopped by the PC after a tip from a

―deep penetration agent‖ of the arrival of the defendants with shabu . Defendants allege

that it is an illegal search as the PC knew two days in advance of her arrival and yet did

not obtain a search warrant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search and seizure was legal.

HELD:

Yes, it is a legal search falling under the exception of search of a moving vehicle.



People v. Malmstedt – 198 SCRA 401

FACTS:

Accused is a Swedish national arrested for carrying Hashish, a form of marijuana during

a NARCOM inspection. He was tried and found guilty in violation of Dangerous Drugs

Act. He contends that the arrest was illegal without the search warrant.

ISSUE:

WON the arrest made was illegal in the absence of a search warrant.

HELD:

NARCOM operation was conducted with a probable cause for a warrantless search

upon information that prohibited drugs are in the possession of the accused and he

failed to immediately present his passport.

A warrantless arrest may be lawfully made:

(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actuallycommitting, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of

facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal

establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while

his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to

another.



Posadas v. CA – 188 SCRA 288

FACTS:

Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned

with the Intelligence Task Force, Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar conducted

surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City. While in the vicinity of Rizal Memorial

Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting

suspiciously. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of

the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was unsuccessful. They

then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith

& Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38

caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber

gun. They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In thecourse of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority

to possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He

was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered

from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for

illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao

City.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the warrantless search is valid.

HELD:

Yes. In the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is reasonable considering

that it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when

the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a

probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right

and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. It is too much indeed to require the

police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall

have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be

useless, futile and much too late. Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained

under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee

against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated.



Bagalihog v. Fernandez – 198 SCRA 614

FACTS:

On March 17, 1989, Rep. Moises Espinosa was shot to death shortly after disembarking

at the Masbate Airport. Witnesses said one of the gunmen fled on a motorcycle. On the

same day, the petitioner's house, which was near the airport, was searched with his

consent to see if the killers had sought refuge there. The search proved fruitless. Two

days later, Capt. Julito Roxas and his men from the Philippine Constabulary seized the

petitioner's motorcycle and took it to the PC headquarters in Masbate. They had no

search warrant. The motorcycle was impounded on the suspicion that it was one of the

vehicles used by the killers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction in holding that the

motorcycle can be seized without a warrant

HELD:

For all his strong conviction about the guilt of the petitioner, the private respondent

must still abide by the Constitution and observe the requirements of the Bill of Rights. Article III, Section 2, provides: ―The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever

nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of

arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge

after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he

may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or

things to be seized.‖ The provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent

but also those who appear to be guilty but are nevertheless to be presumed innocent

until the contrary is proved. The mere fact that in the private respondent's view the

crime involved is "heinous" and the victim was "a man of consequence" did notauthorize disregard of the constitutional guaranty. Neither did "superior orders" condone

the omission for they could not in any case be superior to the Constitution.



People v. Cuachon – 238 SCRA 540

FACTS:

On 20 November 1988, a confidential informant reported to the police that was rampant

selling of shabu in the residence of Romeo Cuachon. Forthwith, a team of police officers

was formed to conduct a buy-bust operation against the accused. As planned, Pat.

Uggadan and the informant proceeded to the residence of their quarry while Pat. Reyes

and other members of the team posted themselves in strategic places. After a few

minutes, Uggadan together with the informant reported to Reyes that he had succeeded

in buying shabbu from the accused at the same time presenting the merchandise to the

latter. After determining it was shabu, Reyes and his men immediately proceeded to the

residence of Cuachon and found in one of the rooms several men seated around a

table, engaged in pot session and several paraphernalia. Uggadan pointed Cuachon toReyes as the person who earlier sold shabu to him. Thereupon, Reyes frisked Cuachon

and found in his person the two P100 bills that he gave Uggadan as a buy-bust money.

He also found a quantity of shabu contained in the plastic bag.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure justified.

HELD:

The Court justified the warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of

Court on warrantless arrest and the obligation of the police to apprehend even without a

warrant. Pat. Uggandan witnessed the illegal act of selling shabu on the occasion of the

buy-bust operation in front of the room of the accused. He did not make the arrest right

then and there because there were only himself and the informant as against the

different male and female voices he heard from both rooms of Cuachon‘s house.

Considering that the operation took place inside the house of the appellant,understandably Pat. Uggadan and his informant had to get of the house and inform their

backup that the sale had been consummated. Furthermore, weighty consideration is the

fact that, as previously stated, Uggadan immediately gave the shabu to Reyes who was

only a block away and after thelatter had determined that it was shabu, which only took

a few minutes, they all immediately proceeded to the house of Cuachon and arrested

him.



It was a continuing buy-bust operation which, as the phrase connotes, commenced with

buying shabu and culminates in Cuachon‘s arrest. Since his arrest was lawful, it follows

that the incidental search was also valid.16.Peoplevs.Medel(One kilo of marijuana;

accused carrying red travelling bag; acting suspiciously; arrest was based on suspicion;

where there is urgency; compared to The answer of the Court is in the affirmative. The

contention of the accused is devoid of merit. The judgment of conviction by the trial

court is AFFIRMED.



People v. De Garcia – 233 SCRA 540

FACTS:

The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d‘etat staged in

December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces

Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the Government.

At around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching team led by F/Lt. Virgilio Babao

raided the Eurocar Sales Office. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence

reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid,

there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was

fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military

operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite

requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. The

Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or

arsenal which is the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily

and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of

high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably

explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of

simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp

Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas

were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were

deserted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure.

HELD:

Yes. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is the Court‘s considered opinion that the

instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless

search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining

in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There

was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action.

Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to

apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself

manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was

closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could

lawfully be dispensed with.



People v. De Lara – 236 SCRA 291

FACTS:

After surveillance conducted, a buy-bust operation was conducted by the police, and as

a consequence of which, the accused was arrested in his residence. The accused

admitted that he kept prohibited drugs in his house. He even showed the arresting

officers a blue plastic bag containing prohibited drugs. During the investigation, when

asked to write a statement, the accused refused to do so. He contended that his arrest

and the seizure of the blue plastic bag containing prohibited drugs were null and void,

on the ground that there were no warrants of arrest and search presented during his

arrest and the search.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arrest of the accused and the seizure of the blue plastic bag were

valid

HELD:

Yes. The accused was caught in flagrante s a result of the buy-bust operation. There

was no need of an arrest warrant. The policemen‘s entry to his house without an arrest

warrant was in a hot-pursuit of a person caught committing an offense in flagrante. The

arrest that followed the hot-pursuit was valid. The seizure of the blue plastic bag, on theother hand, was the result of the accused‘s arrest in the house. A contemporary search

may be conducted upon the person arrested and the immediate vicinity where the arrest

was made.



Aniag v. COMELEC – 237 SCRA 424

FACTS:

In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issued

Resolution No. 2323, ―Gun Ban‖, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing,

carrying and transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security personnel or

bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations,

and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period.

COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification

of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing

special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints.

Pursuant to the ―Gun Ban‖, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of

Representatives, wrote petitioner for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the

House of Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the

firearms from petitioner‘s house and return them to Congress. The PNP set up a

checkpoint. When the car driven by Arellano approached the checkpoint, the PNP

searched the car and found the firearms. Arellano was apprehended and detained. He

then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that Arellano was only

complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not a security officer or a bodyguard.

Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information

against petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, and for

petitioner to show because why he should not be disqualified from running for an

elective position.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return the

firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant less

search of his car.

HELD:

A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriateauthority. However, a warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long

as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the

inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns

were not tucked in Arellano‘s waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly

packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these



circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the car lawfully as well as

the package without violating the constitutional injunction.

Absent any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner

and Arellano, the search could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms

obtained from the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in anyproceeding. It was also shown in the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of

the purpose of setting up the checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among those charged

by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. He was not informed by the

City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation. Such

constituted a violation of his right to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that

petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was

not informed that he was himself a respondent in the case.

Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms

seized during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against thepetitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside.



People v. Barros – 231 SCRA 557

FACTS:

While on a bus from Bontoc, Mountain Province to Nacagang, Mountain Province,

Barros was caught in possession of 4kgs of dried Marijuana which was intended for

distribution and sale at Baguio City, knowing that said Marijuana is a prohibited drug.

Petitioner was charged in violation of RA 6425, Dangerous Drugs Act. RTC sentenced

him to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of Php 20,000.

ISSUE:

Whether there was due process by the court a quo, ignoring manifest absence ofmandatory warrant in arrest and search of the accused.

HELD:

The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a

judicial warrant; otherwise such search and seizure becomes ―unreasonable‖ within the

meaning of Section 2 of the Bill of Rights. The evidence secured will be inadmissible for

any purpose in any proceeding.The exception to this rule is when a search is done in

moving vehicles, upon probable cause. In carrying out warrantless searches of moving

vehicles, however, peace officers are limited to visual inspection.

In the case at bar, peace officers did not receive any prior information or ―tip off‖. Also,

they did not contend that they had detected the odor of Marijuana. There is no indication

of probable cause for the search.

The non-admissibility of evidence secured through a disregard of the constitutional right

of the accused against unreasonable searches and seizures is the sanction imposed by

the Constitution for disregard of such right; the sanction is a powerful one, for it renders

inutile the work done by police officers, by the prosecutor and by the trial court. It is asanction which this Court has no other choice but to apply in the instant case.

RTC decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. The

evidence lawfully before trial courts no being sufficient to establish guilt thereof beyond

reasonable doubt.



People v. Tabar – 222 SCRA 144

FACTS:

The appellant was convicted by the RTC Br. 15 of Cebu City for violation of R.A, 6425

(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) as amended. In the course of the trial, the factsrevealed that the police operatives conducted a buy bust operation and successfully

arrested the nephew of the appellant for selling sticks of marijuana. The appellant

however, was also arrested when she hurriedly left her shanty after noticing the arrest

of her nephew while holding pair of white pants. When the officers ask her to spread the

rolled pants, they found other marijuana sticks which were confiscated.

The appellant filed a petition for appeal contending that the arrest was a violation of her

rights against unreasonable searches and seizure since it was effected without the

virtue of a search warrant.

ISSUE:

W/N the warrantless search and seizure made against the appellant valid.

HELD:

The SC ruled in affirmative. When the appellant was asked by the police operatives to

spread out the rolled pair of pants, which she voluntarily did, the package containing thepacks of marijuana sticks were thus exposed in plain view to the members of the team.

A crime was thus committed in the presence of the policemen. Pursuant to Sec. 15, rule

113 and sec. 12 Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, she could lawfully be arrested

and searched for anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense

without the corresponding arrest and search warrants. The appellant had effectively

waived her constitutional right relative thereto by voluntarily submitting to the search

and seizure. The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be

waived and such waiver may be made expressly or impliedly.



Manlavi v. Gacott – 244 SCRA 50

FACTS:

Complainant, a senior police officer, charged respondent with partiality, miscarriage of

justice and knowingly rendering an unjust decision in connection with the dismissal of

Criminal Cases Nos. 9210 (Illegal Possession of Explosives Intended for Illegal Fishing)

and 9211 (Illegal Possession of Illegally Caught Fish). The cases were consolidated for

trial.

The accused moved to quash Criminal Case No. 9210 on the ground that the evidence

of the prosecution was the product of a warrantless and illegal search and seizure.

Respondent granted the motion in the Order dated July 9, 1992, citing the admission ofthe prosecution that the search and seizure was not covered by a search warrant, and

that the search warrant presented in court was issued after the fact. Complainant

contended that the confiscation of the fish in the absence of a search warrant was

allowed under Circular No. 130 (s. 1967) of the Office of the President.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent judge indeed acted with partiality resulting to miscarriage

of justice and knowingly rendered an unjust decision

HELD:

In the case at bench, the accused moved for the quashal of the criminal cases after

their arraignment. As a general rule, an accused can move for the quashal of the

information on any ground before arraignment (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 117, and

Sec. 1). However, the rule admits of some exceptions such as where there is no offense

charged (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 117, Section 8; Cruz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,

194 SCRA 145 [1991]), for what controls is not the designation of the offense charged in

the information but the allegations of the constitutive elements of the offense. Any

ambiguity in the information shall be resolved in favor of the accused.

Well-settled is the rule that the acts of a judge which pertain to his judicial capacity are

not subject to disciplinary power, unless when they are committed with fraud,

dishonesty, corruption or bad faith (Abiera v. Maceda; 233 SCRA 520 [1994]).



People v. Leangsiri – 252 SCRA 213

FACTS:

Suchinda Leangsiri was arrested in the NAIA in the act of bringing into the country

approximately more than kilo of heroin. In his arrest, he informed the arresting officers

that the heroin is meant to deliver to three other people in Las Palmas Hotel in Manila.

Immediately, the NARCOM formed a group for a follow up operation in the said Hotel. In

the accused‘s cooperation, he was allowed to check in to Room 504, where the others

will meet him to give the drugs. Around 10 pm, Amidu two other co-appellants entered

Room 504 and Leagsiri gave them the drugs, before the appellants leave the room, the

NARCOM officers barged in and arrested the appellants. Amidu, told the officers that he

is staying in Room 413 and that the two others are in Royal Palm Hotel. The officers

then went to the room of Amidu, searching for evidence and subsequently confiscated atelephone address bearing the name of Leangsiri, other possessions and documents of

Amidu were also confiscated.

In the case of the two other, the police confiscated a suit case and masking tape and

empty transparent bag, allegedly will be used in transporting the drugs. The appellants

were charged and were convicted in conspiring to transport heroin violative of RA 6425.

Hence this petition, alleging that the search is illegal being conducted not in the direct

premises of the arrest.

ISSUE:

Whether the articles sought in the other room and hotel, outside the direct premises of

the arrest admissible as evidence?

HELD:

No. those articles are inadmissible as evidence as it was obtained neither in plain view

nor within the direct premises of the arrest. The plain view doctrine applies to OBJECTS

OF THE PLAIN VIEW OF AN OFFICER WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO BE IN THE

POSITION TO HAVE THAT VIEW ARE SUBJECT TO SEIZURE AND MAYBE

PRESENTED AS EVIDENCE. Thus, what can be admitted are evidences seized within

the direct premise where the accused has an immediate control which should only be

Rm. 509. In the case at bar, appellants were arrested in Room 504 of the Las Palmas

Hotel. The piece of paper bearing Leangsiri's name was obtained through a warrantless

search of Room 413 of the same hotel, and found tucked within the pages of appellant

Amidu's telephone and address book. Clearly, the warrantless search is illegal and the

piece of paper bearing Leangsiri's name cannot be admitted as evidence against



appellants. The in admissibility of this evidence will not, however, exculpate appellants.

Its exclusion does not destroy the prosecution's case against appellants. The remaining

evidence still established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt

Note: Plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not, searching for

evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an

incriminating object. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following

limitations on the application of the doctrine. What the "plain view" cases have in

common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion

in the course of which he came in advertently across a piece of evidence incriminating

the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification.



United Laboratories v. Isip – GR 163858 (June 28, 2005)

FACTS:

Petitioner UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place reported to be

manufacturing fake UNILAB products, especially revicon multivitamins. The agent took

some photographs where the marked manufacturing operation was taking place.

UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the

issuance of search warrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding probable cause, the court

issued a search warrant directing the police to seize ―finished or unfinished products of

UNILAB, particularly revicon multivitamins.‖ No fake revicon was however found;

instead, sealed boxes were seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of

Disudrin and 200mg tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed

that some of the sized items be turned over to the custody of the Bureau of Food andDrugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the motion. The respondents then

filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the

seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible

for any purpose in any proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the

boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain view doctrine. The court,

however, granted the motion of the respondents.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin

syrup and Inoflox, were valid under the plain view doctrine.

HELD:

It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view

doctrine. However, seized things not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as

plain view. The State must adduce evidence to prove that the elements for the doctrine

to apply are present, namely: (a) the executing law enforcement officer has a prior

justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can

view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence

inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items theyobserve may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure It was

thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on

plain view. In sum then, the Court finds and so hold that the petitioner and the NBI failed

to prove the essential requirements for the application of the plain view doctrine.IN

LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.



Malacat v. CA – 283 SCRA 159

FACTS:

On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., in response to bomb threats reported seven

days earlier, Police officer Yu and company were on foot patrol (all of them in uniform)

along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza

Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group,

comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon

Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with their

eyes,moving very fast. "Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic

points and observed both groups for about thirty minutes. The police officers then

approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen

gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner,Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner's "front waist line. Yu's

companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a

.38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police

Station No. 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter

gave it to his commander. The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from

petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner "later voluntarily admitted

such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store,"

concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioner's guilt beyond

reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest.

HELD:

Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and

search of petitioner were invalid. The general rule as regards arrests, searches and

seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The

Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to

those affected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions.



People v. Encinada – 280 SCRA 72

FACTS:

In this case, Bolonia received at 4:00 p.m. on May 20, 1992 an intelligence report that

appellant who was carrying marijuana would arrive the next morning aboard the M/V

Sweet Pearl. Although such report could have been the basis of probable cause,

Bolonia explained that he could not secure a warrant because the courts in Surigao City

were already closed for the day. Thus, he and the other lawmen had no choice but to

proceed the next morning to the port area. After appellant disembarked from the ship

and rode a motorela, Bolonia stopped the motor vehicle and conducted the search. He

rummaged through the two strapped plastic baby chairs which were held by appellant

and found inserted between them a package of marijuana wrapped in a small plastic

envelope.

Appellant contended before the lower court that the warrantless search of his

belongings was proscribed by the Constitution. But the trial judge rejected this

contention, opining that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto at the time of his

arrest. Hence, it concluded that the warrantless search conducted after his ―lawful

arrest‖ was valid and that the marijuana was admissible in evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether the arrest and search of the accused without a warrant would fall under the

doctrine of warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest; and, (2) Whether thesubject marijuana is admissible in evidence against the accused.

HELD:

Appellant claims that the prosecution failed to prove his possession and ownership of

the plastic baby chairs. He contends that the testimonies of Bolonia and Iligan

conflicted as to the number of passengers riding the motorela. Such alleged conflict is

peripheral and irrelevant. Hence, it deserves scant consideration. Appellant adds that

such testimonies also conflicted as to the place where appellant sat inside the motorela.

This claim, aside from being flimsy, is also not supported by the transcript of

stenographic notes.

Based on the foregoing discussion, appellant‘s conviction could have been affirmed by

this Court. However, the very evidence implicating him -- the prohibited drugs found in

his possession -- cannot be used against him in this case or, for that matter, in ―any

proceeding.



In acquitting the appellant, the Court reiterates the constitutional proscription that

evidence (in this case, prohibited drug) seized without a valid search warrant is

inadmissible in any proceeding. A yield of incriminating evidence will not legitimize an

illegal search. Indeed, the end never justifies the means.



Mustang Lumber v. CA – 257 SCRA 430

FACTS:

On 1 April 1990, acting on information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and

slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, theSAID organized a team of foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at

the said lumberyard. In the course thereof, the team members saw coming out from the

lumberyard the petitioner's truck loaded with lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted

sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the required invoices and

transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and impounded

them at the DENR compound. The team was not able to gain entry into the premises

because of the refusal of the owner. The team was able to secure a search warrant

from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio of the RTC.

By virtue thereof, the team seized on that date from the petitioners lumberyard fourtruckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a negligible number of narra lumber;

and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of various species including

almaciga and supa.

The following day, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in

Valenzuela and placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of

remaining lumber because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the

corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery

receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of

their source and origin.

The petitioner questioned therein the seizure on 1 April 1990, without any search and

seizure order issued by a judge, of its truck.

ISSUE:

WON the search and seizure made during inspection of the moving vehicle without a

search warrant was unconstitutional.

HELD:

No. The trial court held that the warrantless search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of thepetitioner's truck, which was moving out from the petitioner's lumberyard loaded with

large volumes of lumber without covering document showing the legitimacy of its source

or origin did not offend the constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be

supported by a valid warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled and accepted

exceptions where warrantless search and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving

vehicle.



People v. Gatward – 267 SCRA 785

FACTS:

At about 3:00 p.m. of 1 September 1994, Gatward‘s luggage was brought back to the

NAIA from Bangkok through the Thai airways, pursuant to the request of Erece. Upon

its retrieval, the law enforcers subjected the bag to x-ray examinations in the presence

of Gatward and some Customs officials. It was observed to contain some powdery

substance. Inside the bag were two improvised envelopes made of cardboard each

containing the powdery substance, together with many clothes. The envelopes were

hidden inside the bag, one at the side in between a double-wall, the other inside a

partition in the middle. Upon its examination by Chemists Ayonon and Advincula

pursuant to the request of Police Senior Inspector John Campos of the NARCOM, the

powdery substance contained in the two cardboard envelopes, with a net weight of5,237.70 grams, was found to be heroin. Nigel Richard Gatward was charged with

violating Section 4 of Republic Act 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972

(transporting); while U Aung Win was charged for transgressing Section 3 of the

Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (importing). Gatward pleaded not guilty of the charge

when arraigned, while U Aung Win pleaded guilty of the crime charged upon his

arraignment. On 3March 1995, the trial court found both guilty of the crime charged.

ISSUE:

Whether Gatward‘s and U Aung Win‘s suitcases may be searched without warrant.

HELD:

While no search warrant had been obtained for that purpose, when Gatward checked in

his bag as his personal luggage as a passenger of KLM Flight 806 he thereby agreed to

the inspection thereof in accordance with customs rules and regulations, an

international practice of strict observance, and waived any objection to a warrantless

search. His subsequent arrest, although likewise without a warrant, was justified since it

was effected upon the discovery and recovery of the heroin in his bag, or in flagrante

delicto. The conviction of U Aung Win is likewise unassailable. His culpability was not

based only upon his plea of guilty but also upon the evidence of the prosecution, thepresentation of which was required by the lower court despite said plea. The evidence

thus presented convincingly proved his having imported into this country the heroin

found in his luggage which he presented for customs examination upon his arrival at the

international airport. There was, of course, no showing that he was not authorized by

law to import such dangerous drug, nor did he claim or present any authority to do so.



People v. Lacerna – 278 SCRA 561

FACTS:

On September 12, 1992, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Carlito P. Valenzuela, a member of the

Mobile Patrol Division of the Western Police District (WPD), was assigned to man the

checkpoint and patrol the area somewhere along the side streets of Radial Road near

Moriones Street. Appellant was seated beside the taxi driver while co-accused was

seated at the left back seat of the taxi. When PO3 Valenzuela looked at the occupants

of said taxi, the latter bowed their heads and slouched, refusing to look at him. Feeling

that something was amiss, PO3 Valenzuela and his companion stopped the vehicle,

signaling the driver to park by the side of the road. PO3 Valenzuela and his co-police

officer asked permission to search the vehicle. As the occupants readily agreed, the

police officers went about searching the luggage in the vehicle which consisted of aknapsack and a dark blue plastic grocery bag. They asked appellant what the contents

of the plastic bag were. Co-accused Noriel Lacerna immediately answered that the bag

contained his vomit. Skeptical of what appellant and co-accused disclosed as regards

the contents of the plastic bag, PO3 Valenzuela made a hole in the bag and peeped

inside. He found several blocks wrapped in newspaper, with the distinct smell of

marijuana emanating from it. PO3 Valenzuela opened one of the boxes and saw dried

marijuana leaves. He told appellant and co-accused that the contents of the bag were

marijuana, which co-accused readily affirmed. According to both Lacernas, the bag was

a ‗padala‘ of their uncle. Specifically, they claimed that the bag was sent by their uncle,

who happened to be in Baguio City, for shipment to Iloilo.

After thorough investigation, the appellant was judged guilty for the crime of violation of

Section 4 of RA 6425 as amended, and was sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay

a fine of P20, 000.00. The appellant invoked his right against warrantless searches and

seizures because when the vehicle was searched, and the marijuana was seized, there

was no valid warrant presented to them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant can invoke his right against warrantless search and

seizure.



HELD:

No. The appellant and his baggage were validly searched because he freely consented

to the search. True, appellant and his companion were stopped by PO3 Valenzuela on

mere suspicion -- not probable cause -- that they were engaged in a felonious

enterprise. But Valenzuela expressly sought appellant‘s permission for the search.Only after appellant agreed to have his person and baggage checked did the actual

search commence. It was his consent which validated the search, waiver being a

generally recognized exception to the rule against warrantless search.

But court a quo observed that appellant could not be convicted of ―delivering‖ prohibited

drugs because the Information did not allege that he knowingly delivered marijuana.

Neither could he be convicted of ―transporting or dispatching in transit‖ such prohibited

drugs because these acts were not alleged in the Information. The trial court mused

further that appellant could not be convicted of ―selling‖ marijuana because the

elements constituting this crime were not proven. However, the Information chargedappellant with ―giving away to another‖ prohibited drugs, a charge which was different

from ―delivery‖ defined under Section 2 (f) of R.A. 6245, as amended.

The Court modified the assailed decision. Appellant is convicted of illegal possession of

prohibited drugs under Section 8 of R.A. 6425; sentenced, in accordance with the

Indeterminate Sentence Law, to eight (8) years as minimum to twelve (12) years as

maximum; and ordered to pay a fine of twelve thousand pesos (P12, 000.00).

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