Constructing Gender:Self-Stereotyping in Dictator GamesAnne Boschini, Astri Muren and Mats PerssonDepartment of Economics and Institute for International Economic Studies,Stockholm University

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Priming

• activating certain associations in memory, thus affecting our thinking

• A striking example: Steele and Aronson (1995) primed racial identity by asking participants to indicate their race before answering a difficult verbal test

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Effects on behaviour

• African Americans in the race prime condition did less well in the test than others

Priming activated stereotypes in the minds of subjects, and this affected their behavior

(In Steele and Aronson’s case the stereotype was negative for test performance: an example of stereotype threat)

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Stereotypes

• A stereotype is a generalization about the personal characteristics of a group of people, often held in common by many

• Gender stereotypes for– Men: competitive, independent, aggressive– Women: emotional, caring, agreeable

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We test the effect of gender priming in a dictator game

• Law students at Stockholm University

• 161 women, 100 men

• Three dictator games, differing in the price of money reaching the recipient, p = 1, 2,½

• The recipient was a randomly selected and anonymous course-mate

• The dictator had 500 crowns

• 20% of participants were paid

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The dictator chose one alternative in each game. For p = 1:

Alternative You keep The other person gets

A 500 kr 0 kr

B 450 kr 50 kr

C 400 kr 100 kr

D 350 kr 150 kr

E 300 kr 200 kr

F 250 kr 250 kr

G 200 kr 300 kr

H 150 kr 350 kr

I 100 kr 400 kr

K 50 kr 450 kr

L 0 kr 500 kr

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3 treatments:

• Post: Men and women were seated in a big lecture hall. After choosing alternatives in all games they were asked to indicate their sex.

• Pre: Same as above but the question about sex came before playing the games.

• Homogenous: Men and women were seated in separate rooms. The question about sex came after the games.

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(Introduction: …)

Indicate your sex here: Woman: Man:

(…. several pages with the games ….)

Concluding questions:

Indicate your age here:

How many terms have you studied at university/college before this term?

Thank you for your participation!

The questionnaire in the Pre treatment:

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Post at p = 1, women (0) and men (1)

0.0

05

.01

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5

0 100 200 300 400 500 0 100 200 300 400 500

0 1

De

nsity

given1Graphs by sexnum

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0.0

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.01

5

0 100 200 300 400 500 0 100 200 300 400 500

0 1

De

nsity

given1Graphs by sexnum

Pre at p = 1, women (0) and men (1)

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0.0

05

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.01

5

0 100 200 300 400 500 0 100 200 300 400 500

0 1

De

nsity

given1Graphs by sexnum

Homogenous at p = 1, women (0) and men (1)

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05

.01

.01

5

0 100 200 300 400 500 0 100 200 300 400 500

0 1

De

nsity

given1Graphs by sexnum

0.0

05

.01

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5

0 100 200 300 400 500 0 100 200 300 400 500

0 1

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nsity

given1Graphs by sexnum

0.0

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0 100 200 300 400 500 0 100 200 300 400 500

0 1D

ens

ity

given1Graphs by sexnum Pre

Post Homogenous

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Means of amount given for p = 1

Post Pre Homogenous

Men 129 58

140

Women 98 119 142

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With gender priming in Pre

• There is a statistically significant gender difference in the gender primed treatment Pre

• With gender priming, men donate less than women

• This difference is consistent with gender stereotypes

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In Post and Homogenous

• No gender differences in Post or Homogenous

• Men: similar in Post and Homogenous

• Women: more generous in Homogenous

• Post or Homogenous as control group (?)

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Effects of gender priming

• Self-stereotyping: thinking that you are like the stereotype for your group

• Gender stereotypes in dictator games: Aguiar et al. (2008) find that there is an expectation that women will give more

• In our experiment this happens in Pre, but not otherwise

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Means and medians of amount given for all prices

Post Pre Homogenous

p = 1 p = 2 p = ½ p = 1 p = 2 p = ½ p = 1 p = 2 p = ½

Men Mean Median

129125

1000

176125

580

630

146100

140150

710

204150

Women Mean Median

9850

980

147100

119100

1080

164150

142175

11450

162150

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Significant gender differences in amounts given

Post Pre Homogenous

p = 1 p = 2 p = ½ p = 1 p = 2 p = ½ p = 1 p = 2 p = ½

t test No No No Yes** Yes* No No No No

WMWtest

No No No Yes** Yes* No No Yes* No

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Implications

Gender priming affects dictator game decisions

• Inadvertent gender priming in experiments?

• Gender priming in other economic decisions?– Charitable giving– Investment– Consumption– Bargaining