SHELL ( 1 / 2 )

Genuine consultation is essential over issues of mutual interest is key to long term US-Brazil relations – CP prevents a shift away from this framework.

Peter Hakim Jan/Feb 2004, (President of Inter-American Dialogue, Foreign Affairs)This mostly encouraging news has contributed to a mainly cordial and constructive relationship with the United States over the past year -- and should help sustain it into the future. Yet there are disagreements with the Bush administration that cannot be easily reconciled, and the dangers of a more adversarial relationship are real. Brazil and the United States are involved in practical disputes over different national interests, largely because of the stark asymmetries in their respective wealth and power. Other disagreements reflect divergent political and ideological perspectives between a conservative U.S. White House and a Brazilian administration that, despite its

mainstream economic policies, brings a leftward perspective to many issues. The two countries are often finely balanced between collaboration and

contention on critical matters. The quality of their relationship in the future may depend more on their ability to tolerate conflicting approaches than on their success in pursuing mutual interests . Trade could be the make-or-break issue, because it is so central to the United States' vision of its long-term relationship with Latin America and the rest of the world, and it also matters greatly to Brazil's economic future. Washington and Brasilia have been at loggerheads over the creation of the FTAA, a 34-country free trade zone that has been in negotiation since 1994. Lula scorned the FTAA at the outset of his presidential campaign, calling it a U.S. plan to annex Latin America. Although he has tempered his rhetoric since then, his government, including the powerful Ministry of Foreign Affairs, remains openly skeptical of U.S. ambitions for the FTAA and has maintained that the economic integration of South America is a far higher priority. Lula's stance on the FTAA reflects his country's politics. No strong constituency in Brazil enthusiastically supports hemispheric free trade, and even the Brazilian business community is divided on the matter. Brazil says it will refuse to endorse the FTAA agreement unless the United States curtails huge subsidies to U.S. farmers and reconsiders its antidumping and countervailing duty policies, which put crippling barriers in the way of Brazilian exporters. These issues, however, will not be easy to iron out at the FTAA talks. Washington is bound by its political constituencies at home, which oppose lifting existing protections. It can only consider making the concessions Brazil wants in global negotiations, in tandem with Europe and Japan. Yet, multilateral negotiations failed to advance at the September 2003 meeting of the World Trade Organization in Cancun, Mexico. The conference broke up prematurely when the parties deadlocked over a range of issues, including agricultural subsidies. Robert Zoellick, the U.S. trade negotiator, and Celso Amorim, Brazil's foreign minister and top negotiator, blamed the inflexibility of each other's government for the failure. Although seasoned observers have suggested that the parties were not that far apart and could have reached agreement had they continued to negotiate, the collapse at Cancun has at least temporarily set back U.S.-Brazil trade relations and the prospects for creating the FTAA. Brazil has subsequently claimed that it wants "negotiations, not confrontation" on the trade issue, but it is proposing as a basis for discussion a skeletal version of the FTAA agreement that neither the United States nor most prospective Latin American partners find attractive. Just as the United States wants to leave agriculture to global talks, Brazil wants to do the same for some items of primary importance to the United States, such as government procurement, intellectual property, and trade in services. If the United States and Brazil, which now co-chair the FTAA negotiations, cannot broker an agreement by the current December 2004 deadline, talks are likely to be extended. Should the two countries get frustrated with each other's negotiating tactics, however, the FTAA talks could collapse in acrimony, and bilateral relations would suffer greatly. ANOTHER PRICKLY ISSUE FOR U.S.-Brazil relations is Washington's ongoing war against terrorism and rogue states. Although Brazil was supportive of the United States after September 11, 2001 -- it invoked the collective security agreement of the Organization of American States (OAS) to declare that the terrorist attacks were acts of aggression against all OAS members -- it has since become one of the region's harshest critics of the Iraq war. Last September, Lula made plain to the UN General Assembly that Brazil, like most Latin American states, opposes Washington's unrelenting unilateralism, its doctrine of military preemption, and its frequent disregard for the UN. Washington has largely ignored Brasilia's objections so far, but playing deaf will become much more difficult this year, as Brazil takes a seat on the UN Security Council for a two-year term. The key questions are whether the United States will continue to take Brazil's criticism in stride and keep it from affecting the rest of their relationship and whether Brazil will intensify its criticism or tone it down. Cuba is another issue on which the two countries do not see eye to eye. Last year, before both the UN and the OAS, Brazil refused to criticize Cuba's brutal treatment of dissidents, let alone endorse U.S. resolutions condemning Castro's appalling human rights record. During a visit to the island last September, Lula made clear that he intended to maintain his long-standing personal friendship with Castro and declined to raise any political issues with him or meet local dissidents. Lula did seem to take account of American sensibilities, however, by limiting his visit to a single day and asking that anti- American displays be avoided then. Brasilia's relations with Havana may irritate Washington, but they are not likely to cause major friction, especially as Cuba's prominence in U.S. foreign policy is waning. Brazil's involvement in Venezuela, on the other hand, is likely to be a more important feature of U.S.-Brazil relations. For the past year, Brazil has chaired the "friends of Venezuela," a six-country group that includes the United States and has urged the Venezuelan government and insurgents to resolve their political differences peaceably by holding a constitutionally authorized recall vote on President Chavez's term. At the same time, however, Lula has pursued direct negotiations with the Chavez administration, to foster bilateral economic ties and closer integration among South American states. Brazil has managed this precarious double act so far, but should the situation in Venezuela deteriorate, Brasilia might have difficulty pursuing both tracks at once without alienating Washington. The United States should be pleased with Brazil's change in approach to Colombia. Although proceeding cautiously and still wary of U.S. involvement, Brazil has shown increasing support for President Alvaro Uribe's security initiatives and grudgingly recognizes that Uribe's government may need help from the U.S. military. Moreover, with the approval of the Colombian government, Brazil has offered to host negotiations between the UN and Colombia's main guerrilla force. Brazil's policy shift largely reflects its concern about violence spreading in the Amazon region and about skyrocketing drug use and criminality in Brazilian cities. Still, Brazilian officials are wary of the presence of U.S. troops in a neighboring country, and any substantial escalation of American involvement there could turn Brazil, once again, into a severe critic of U.S. policies in Colombia. Lula signaled his concern about the U.S. role, as well as Brazil's expanding regional aspirations, when he invited Uribe to rely more on Brazil and less on the United States for help. The Lula government has also stepped up efforts to turn Brazil into a regional leader by encouraging plans to make Mercosur -- a free trade arrangement among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay -- a central pillar of Brazil's foreign policy, negotiate an EU-Mercosur trade pact, and promote the economic integration of South America. The Clinton White House was annoyed by such initiatives but largely ignored them. The Bush administration appears to recognize that Brazil, by dint of its size and influence, should indeed occupy a special place in South America. It is not yet clear, however, just how much initiative Washington will tolerate. The test will come when Brazil's ambitions directly challenge U.S. policy goals or interests in the region -- if, for example, they threaten to block an FTAA agreement, hamper resolution of the Venezuela imbroglio, or provoke wider opposition to U.S. military aid for Colombia. Many in Washington were angered by what they considered to be Brazil's spoiler role at the WTO meetings in Cancun. They were irritated as well by Lula's warm embrace of Castro and by his continuing criticism of U.S. policy in Iraq. Most Brazilians, in contrast, supported their government on all of these fronts. On issue after issue, the key questions are the same: How much dissent and independence will the United States tolerate from Brazil? And how much is Brazil prepared to accommodate U.S. views and interests? SO FAR, trade has been the only issue to provoke open and potentially damaging friction between the two countries. They have been able to cooperate, at least minimally, on thorny issues such as Venezuela and Colombia, and they have managed to swallow harsh rhetoric and avoid public quarrels on others, such as Cuba and the Iraq war. And although they have strikingly different backgrounds,

personal styles, and political perspectives, the two presidents have apparently developed sincere respect for each other. To sustain constructive ties, Washington must keep its expectations realistic. Some analysts and U.S. officials have advocated a far tighter relationship between the two countries, with more regular and structured collaboration. But Brazilians have traditionally preferred pragmatic and opportunistic cooperation with the United States on specific issues. Still somewhat distrustful of Washington, Brasilia is wary of creating the expectation that it will quasi- automatically support U.S. positions, compromise its ability to set an independent course for itself, or diminish the diversity of its other international relations. Brazil, in other words, has little interest in developing a privileged relationship with the United States of the type

Argentina once sought. That leaves Washington with having to earn Brasilia's cooperation issue by issue, without presuming it will be granted. Still, the relationship has been remarkably stable and consistent over the years. The two countries have not been steady allies or continuing adversaries, but they have usually worked productively together. Today the United States can usually count on Brazil for an important measure of collaboration on most issues

and can usually avoid its outright opposition on others. The Bush administration should continue its good start, bolstering friendly U.S.-Brazil relations. Lula's administration welcomed the White House's two invitations and U.S. recognition of Brazil's special role in South America. Washington must remain attentive to Brasilia's interests. It would be good policy to systematically solicit Brazil's views on the full range of issues relevant to the hemisphere and take serious account of them. That will require Washington to pursue a less unilateral approach, particularly in South America, and be willing to accept compromises on its policies and programs. No U.S. administration yet has been able to do this on a sustained basis, and it may be particularly difficult for the Bush White House. Brasilia's ambivalence about its regional and international roles complicates Washington's task.

Brazilian politicians have long argued that Brazil is among the world's great powers, alongside the United States, Russia, China, and India. As a result, Brazil has insisted on playing a lead part in shaping regional politics, resisting U.S. attempts to dominate them. At the same time, it subscribes to a traditional understanding of state sovereignty and frowns on intervention in a state's domestic affairs even in the name of human rights and democratization. (Lula said on his trip to

Cuba, "I don't comment on the internal policies of other countries.") That view has led Brazil almost viscerally to oppose the United States' activist agenda in the hemisphere and elsewhere. Although the United States cannot change Brazil's position, it can moderate it in specific circumstances.

Downward push in relations causes Brazilian nuclear prolif and nuclear conflict.Donald Shultz 2000 (Research Professor of National Security Policy at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA: SHAPING AN ELUSIVE FUTURE, March)

While we are in a speculative mode, it may be useful to raise the issue of whether, two or three decades from now, the United States might have to deal with a regional hegemon or peer competitor. The most obvious candidate for such a role would be Brazil, which already accounts for almost half of Latin America’s economic production and has by far the largest armed forces in the region (313,250 active troops).53 That country could very well assume a more commanding political and military role in the decades ahead. Until recently, the primary U.S. concern about Brazil has been that it might acquire nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In the 1970s, the Brazilian military embarked on a secret program to develop an atom bomb. By the late

1980s, both Brazil and Argentina were aggressively pursuing nuclear development programs that had clear military spin-offs.54 There were powerful military and civilian advocates of developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles within both countries. Today, however, the situation

has changed. As a result of political leadership transitions in both countries, Brazil and Argentina now appear firmly committed to restricting their nuclear programs to peaceful purposes. They have entered into various nuclear-related agreements with each other—most notably the quadripartite comprehensive safeguards agreement (1991), which permits the inspection of all their nuclear installations by the

International Atomic Energy Agency—and have joined the Missile Technology Control Regime. Even so, no one can be certain about the future. As

Scott Tollefson has observed: . . . the military application of Brazil’s nuclear and space programs depends less on technological considerations than on political will. While technological constraints present a formidable barrier to achieving nuclear bombs and ballistic

missiles, that barrier is not insurmountable. The critical element, therefore, in determining the applications of Brazil’s nuclear and space technologies will be primarily political.55 Put simply, if changes in political leadership were instrumental in redirecting Brazil’s nuclear program towards peaceful purposes, future political upheavals could still produce a reversion to previous orientations. Civilian supremacy is not so strong that it could not be swept away by a coup, especially if the legitimacy of the current democratic experiment were to be undermined by economic crisis and growing poverty/inequality. Nor are civilian leaders necessarily less militaristic or more committed to democracy than the military. The example of Peru’s Fujimori comes immediately to mind.

How serious a threat might Brazil potentially be? It has been estimated that if the nuclear plant at Angra dos Reis (Angra I) were only producing at 30 percent capacity, it could produce five 20-kiloton weapons a year. If production from other plants were included, Brazil would have a capability three times greater than India or Pakistan. Furthermore, its defense industry already has a substantial missile producing capability. On the other hand, the country has a very limited capacity to project its military power via air and sealift or to sustain its forces over long distances. And though a 1983 law authorizes significant military manpower increases (which could place Brazil at a numerical level slightly higher than France, Iran and Pakistan), such growth will be restricted by a lack of economic resources. Indeed, the development of all these military potentials has been, and will continue to be, severely constrained by a lack of money. (Which is one reason Brazil decided to engage in arms control with Argentina

in the first place.) 56 In short, a restoration of Brazilian militarism, imbued with nationalistic ambitions for great power status, is not unthinkable, and such a regime could present some fairly serious problems. That government would probably need foreign as well as domestic enemies to help justify its existence. One obvious candidate would be the United States, which would presumably be critical of any return to dictatorial rule. Beyond this, moreover, the spectre of a predatory international community, covetous of the riches of the Amazon, could help rally political support to the regime. For

years, some Brazilian military officers have been warning of “foreign intervention.” Indeed, as far back as 1991 General Antenor de Santa Cruz Abreu, then chief of the Military Command of the Amazon, threatened to transform the region into a “new Vietnam” if developed countries tried to “internationalize” the Amazon. Subsequently, in 1993, U.S.-Guyanese combined military exercises near the Brazilian border provoked an angry response from many high-ranking Brazilian officers. 57 Since then, of

course, U.S.-Brazilian relations have improved considerably. Nevertheless, the basic U.S./ international concerns over the Amazon—the threat to the region’s ecology through burning and deforestation, the presence of narcotrafficking activities, the Indian question, etc.—have not disappeared, and some may very well intensify in the years ahead. At the same time, if the growing trend towards subregional economic groupings—in particular, MERCOSUR—continues, it is likely to increase competition between Southern Cone and NAFTA countries. Economic conflicts, in turn, may be expected to intensify political differences, and could lead to heightened politico-military rivalry between different blocs or coalitions in the hemisphere. Even so, there continue to be traditional rivalries and conflicts within MERCOSUR, especially between Brazil and its neighbors, and these will certainly complicate the group’s evolution. Among other things, the past year witnessed a serious deterioration of relations between Brazil and Argentina, the product partly of the former’s January 1999 currency devaluation, which severely strained economic ties between the two countries. In part, too, these conflicts were aggravated by Argentina’s (unsuccessful) bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which Brazilians interpreted as an attempt to gain strategic advantage. The upshot was that relations soured to the extent where questions have been raised as to the continued viability of MERCOSUR itself. In light of these problems, one cannot but wonder what impact a resurgence of Brazilian authoritarianism, combined with a push for regional hegemonic status, would have on Argentina,

currently a “non-NATO ally” of the United States. Finally, closer to home, there is the difficult problem of U.S. border defense. One suspects that the years ahead will witness growing pressure to use Department of Defense personnel and resources to bolster law enforcement agencies patrolling U.S. frontiers to prevent illegal immigration and drug smuggling. (Indeed, legislation has already been proposed authorizing the deployment of up to 10,000 more troops on the Southwest Border. In late 1998, however, the bill was rejected by the Senate.) Since 1990, the military has been engaged in several thousand operations along the frontier, running listening posts to assist the Border Patrol in tracking drugs and migrants, building fences and barriers, repairing roads, and

helping law enforcement agencies in counternarcotics operations. Yet, notwithstanding this aid, civilian agencies continue to be stretched thin. The

amount of drugs coming over the border has not been significantly reduced, and law enforcement officials often find themselves outgunned and outmanned by their adversaries. Consequently, there is an increasing temptation to look to the military for answers.

BRAZIL SAYS YES – GENERAL

BRAZIL SAYS YES TO ANYTHING, WANTS A POSITIVE AGENDA WITH THE U.S.Hirst (Executive Director, Fundación Centro de Estudos Brasileiros) 2004[Mônica, The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations p.xvii //loghry]

Relations between the United States and Brazil entered the twenty-first century facing new challenges and opportunities. Major transformations in the substance and format of bilateral ties have been connected to new landscapes in the domestic and international affairs of both countries. The combination of outstanding economic performance with an unchallenged military primacy and political leadership has allowed the United States to reaffirm hegemonic attributes, becoming the most powerful actor in the world power system. For Brazil, the impact of democratization, together with the effects of world economic globalization and the end of the Cold War, redesigned domestic and external pressures and interests. Nowadays, Brazil seeks a positive agenda with the United States, though the texture of this relationship has become more complex and difficult to categorize under a single label. The post-Cold War world poses new challenges and opportunities for the United States and Brazil. Thus, new areas of convergence and of discrepancies between the two countries have emerged, introducing new flavors to the main course.

BRAZIL SAYS YES – EMBARGO

BRAZIL OPPOSES THE EMBARGORobert E. White (staff) 3/7/2013[“After Chavez, a Chance to Rethink Relations With Cuba” online @ http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/opinion/after-chavez-hope-for-good-neighbors-in-latin-america.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, loghry]

Like its predecessors, the Obama administration has given few signs that it has grasped the magnitude of these changes or cares about their consequences. After President Obama took office in 2009, Latin America’s leading statesman at the time, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, then the president of Brazil, urged Mr. Obama to normalize relations with Cuba.Lula, as he is universally known, correctly identified our Cuba policy as the chief stumbling block to renewed ties with Latin America, as it had been since the very early years of the Castro regime.

BRAZIL SUPPORTS ENDING THE EMBARGOUnited Nations General Assembly 11/13/2012[“‘ARCHAIC, PUNITIVE’ EMBARGO MUST BE CONSIGNED TO HISTORY BOOKS, SAY SPEAKERS,” Sixty-seventh General Assembly of the U.N., online @ http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11311.doc.htm, loghry]

MARIA LUIZA RIBEIRO VIOTTI ( Brazil), speaking on behalf of Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), said that the Group had been founded on the principles of interdependence and good neighbourly relations. Alongside its Latin American neighbours, MERCOSUR showed respect for the sovereignty of States and for international law, and it viewed that the embargo ran contrary to the principles of the Unite Nations Charter and international law. In particular, she said, it violated the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other States. The embargo also ran contrary to the principles of justice and human rights, limited and delayed social and economic progress and inhibited the achievement of the Millennium Goals and other development targets.

BRAZIL SAYS YES – ETHANOL

Brazil will say yesWinter ’12 (Brian Winter, staff writer for Reuters, on September 14, 2012. Found at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/14/us-brazil-us-ethanol-idUSBRE88D19520120914) Accessed 4/7/13 GHAfter years at each other's throats, Brazil and the United States are working together to promote the use of ethanol in a collaboration that could revolutionize global markets and the makeup of the biofuel itself.¶ The breakthrough came in January when Washington allowed a three-decade-old subsidy for U.S. ethanol producers to expire and ended a steep tariff on foreign biofuels. The tariff, in particular, had poisoned diplomatic relations between the world's top two ethanol-producing countries for years.¶ Since then, industry executives and government officials from both countries have seen tangible progress in efforts to boost the production and consumption of ethanol around the world, they told Reuters.¶ The two nations have been lobbying foreign governments to create new markets in Africa and Latin America, planning joint "road shows" to attract new investments in biofuel companies, and pushing for a uniform global standard for ethanol, which could make it easier to trade the biofuel across borders. ¶ Results may still be years away, but officials say the collaboration might breathe some new life into an industry facing an uncertain future because of chronic production shortfalls and doubts about the environmental benefits of many biofuels.¶ "I think there's a clear sense now that we should be collaborating instead of fighting each other," said Terry Branstad, governor of Iowa, the top U.S. ethanol-producing state.¶ After a July meeting with senior officials in Brazil, "I was very encouraged by what I heard," he said in an interview. "The more we cooperate, the more we can grow the worldwide demand for what we produce."¶ Plinio Nastari, the head of respected Brazilian sugar analysis firm Datagro, said he was particularly encouraged by the joint efforts to develop additional ethanol producers.¶ Because Brazil and the United States account for about 85 percent of global ethanol production, one-time events like the current U.S. drought can cause wild swings in supply - and prices.¶ "That holds up ethanol from becoming a widely traded commodity," Nastari said.¶ Many of the ideas for collaboration date back to a 2007 bilateral agreement signed by previous Brazilian and U.S. governments. Yet progress was slow until this year as diplomats and other officials often spent time hashing out disputes instead of finding ways to work together.¶ "Unfortunately, the tariff issue made it impossible to move forward on many of these (subjects)," said Geraldine Kutas, head of international affairs for Unica, Brazil's main sugar cane industry association. "The conditions are right, now. This is the moment of truth."¶ THROUGHOUT THE TROPICS¶ The most promising effort is also the one that has shown the most visible progress: trying to get countries in Central America, the Caribbean and Africa to produce and consume more ethanol.¶ Officials from the U.S. Department of State, Department of Energy and the private sector, and their Brazilian equivalents, have been working together to convince other governments of ethanol's benefits.¶ "We're trying to show other nations what ethanol has meant for our economies," Iowa Governor Branstad said. "In our state, it's helped boost our farmers' income and reduce our dependency on foreign oil. Those are ideas with a lot of appeal."¶ Sugar cane, the main source of ethanol made in Brazil, already grows in many of the countries seen as potential producers of the biofuel.¶ Cane produces more energy than it consumes during the ethanol-making process, unlike corn, the basis for U.S. ethanol.¶ Homegrown ethanol holds obvious appeal for small, poor countries that import most of their energy at enormous costs. Honduras, for example, spent $2.1 billion - 12 percent of its gross domestic product - on fuel imports in 2011.¶ However, producers and other investors generally refuse to build ethanol mills and other infrastructure unless they have a guaranteed domestic market.¶ "And implementation of that framework gets to be very technical and difficult," Unica's Kutas said.¶ One example: In the 1980s, Guatemala passed a law mandating a blend of ethanol in gasoline but has rarely enforced it because of bottlenecks that include a separate law capping the amount of the sugar cane crop that can be used for biofuels.¶ To resolve such problems, the Brazilian and U.S. governments have helped finance and produce studies of the countries' ability to create and sustain ethanol production. Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador are where the most progress has been made, diplomats say.¶ "We have deep contacts in many of these countries, but the Brazilians have the expertise on sugar," said a U.S. official who requested anonymity because the negotiations are politically sensitive. "When we work together, as we have been lately ... it's pretty powerful."¶ THE NEXT FRONTIER: CUBA?¶ Brazil and the United States have stepped up their lobbying in recent months. Pilot ethanol programs to introduce the biofuel to consumers with blend requirements are

set to begin in three countries, starting in Honduras by early 2013, another U.S. official said.¶ To accelerate the process, Brazil and the United States are planning presentations in coming months to attract new investors interested in biofuel projects in the three countries, officials said.¶ Brazil's growing diplomatic clout has been critical to opening doors in countries where the nation has deep strategic or cultural connections, such as Senegal, Mozambique and Haiti. And it is uniquely equipped to exert influence in Cuba.¶ Cuba's once-mighty sugar industry has deteriorated in recent decades under communist rule, but Rice University economist Ron Soligo has said the country has the potential to become the world's No. 3 ethanol producer behind the United States and Brazil.¶ While Washington has had little diplomatic contact with Cuba in the past five decades, Brazil has a tradition of warm political and economic ties with the Caribbean nation. President Dilma Rousseff visited Havana in January and spoke of how Brazil can help Cuba develop its economy.¶ Large-scale ethanol production has been largely taboo in Cuba, in part because former President Fidel Castro has denounced it as a "sinister" idea that drives up global food prices. Yet some Brazilian officials say that stance could change dramatically once the 86-year-old leader withdraws from politics.¶ "Everybody knows that Cuba is an ethanol bonanza waiting to happen," said a Brazilian official who requested anonymity. "We'll be ready."

Brazil pushing US to open markets to Brazilian ethanol – food crisis gives momentum to an agreementMaggie Airriess. 7/15/2008 (Brazzil. Airriess is a Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Proquest)

U.S.-Brazil tension, a relatively recent development, resurfaced during the UN World Food Summit in Rome on June 3-5, encouraging the booming Brazilian sugar-based ethanol market to increase its new development projects. This rift represents a de facto counter move against the far less-efficient U.S. model predicated on corn-based ethanol production . Following the summit, Brazilian officials began a weeklong tour, stopping in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, during which they discussed a set of commercial agreements that will boost multilateral cooperation with several African countries. The trade agreements, projected to begin in 2009, include an expansion in ethanol investment, urbanism, air and sea transport, and cooperation in professional training between the two regions. In a statement that appeared in Brazzil magazine, Brazilian Secretary of Development, Ivan Ramalho, remarked that he hoped the meetings would enhance trade with other countries in order to diminish Brazil's over-reliance on the U.S. market. Brazil's recent trade initiatives with other developing countries have emerged largely due to the reluctance of some developed nations to lower trade subsidies. This impedes Brazil's ability to trade, adding significantly to the current debate over rising food prices. In an official statement released after the first set of meetings, Michel Alaby, Secretary General of the Arab Brazilian Chamber of Commerce, called for solidarity among countries suffering from rising food prices and demanded that developed countries, especially the U.S. and Europe, eliminate international trade barriers in the agricultural sector (Brazzil Magazine). With the emerging agreements, Brazilian officials hope to call attention to the U.S.' highly inefficient corn-based ethanol production at the height of a snowballing food crisis. The government aspires to be a strong actor in the midst of the food crisis and plans to show the rest of the world the benefits of Brazil's efficient sugar ethanol market, while it professes to be executing projects stalling the destruction of the Amazon rainforest.

Lula push for US to open markets to Brazilian ethanol – food prices provide momentumMaggie Airriess. 7/15/2008 (Brazzil. Airriess is a Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Proquest)One main concern over how biofuel policy disrupts the market is the current excessive power that interest groups have in the debate on subsidies in developed nations (Runge). Instead of catering to special interests, U.S. politicians would be well advised to cooperate with other countries. While the UN works diligently to halt the growing food shortage, world leaders refuse to amend restrictions on food exports. This negligence is inexcusable on both economic and humanitarian grounds. Not All Ethanol is The Same In defense of sugar-based ethanol, President Lula stated that the U.S. misguidedly produces corn for ethanol instead of other agricultural products, while keeping subsidies high to benefit U.S. multinational companies. Lula argues that this is another case where the U.S. keeps developing countries from playing an influential role in the world economy. He claimed, "I am sorry to see that many of those who blame ethanol, including from sugarcane, for the high price of food are the same ones who for decades have maintained protectionist policies to the detriment of farmers in poor countries and of consumers in the entire world." In comparison with corn-based ethanol, sugar-based ethanol is more efficient, cheaper to produce, and uses less valuable land. According to the World Bank's, Biofuels: the Promises and the Risks, the U.S. ethanol industry currently uses 10 million hectares, while Brazil only uses 3.6 million of such terrain and produces eight to ten times more energy than that produced from corn. Brazil does not subsidize sugar, which helps sustain global sugar prices. Whereas corn prices have surged 65% in the last five years, which many argue is the result of U.S. subsidies. Brazilian ethanol also yields 8.3 times more energy than the fossil fuels used to produce it, while corn ethanol yields only 1.5 times the energy it consumes.

BRAZIL SAYS YES – LIFTING TARIFF ( 1 / 1 )

BRAZIL HATES THE SUGAR TARIFFHirst (Executive Director, Fundación Centro de Estudos Brasileiros) 2004[Mônica, The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations p.27 //loghry]

U.S. trade policies have represented a continuous source of friction for Brazil. Though the United States has one of the lowest tariff systems in world trade-4.5 percent is the average-discriminatory measures have led to the application of an average tariff of 45.6 percent on the fifteen top Brazilian exports to the U.S. market. These fifteen products represent 36.4 percent of Brazilian total exports. 7 The average tariff imposed on the fifteen most important U.S. exports to Brazil does not surpass 14.3 percent.Brazilian agricultural products represent only 0.2 percent of total U.S. agricultural imports (see Table 2.8). An interesting parallel can be made with Mexico, which now represents over 40 percent of U.S. agricultural imports.The U.S. tariff rate quota system has affected Brazilian products such as sugar, which has been excluded from the General System Preference since 1989, and tobacco. As a consequence of U.S. quota policies, tariffs imposed upon Brazilian sugar were 236 percent, and 350 percent on tobacco.

Brazil will say yes they want the ethanol tariff removedThe Times, Tom Hennigan, 3/9/2007, “Brazil to press Bush for cut in US ethanol tariff,” Times Online, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/markets/united_states/article1489935.ece

President Lula da Silva will demand that the United States lower tariffs on its environmentally friendly ethanol fuel when he meets President Bush in São Paulo today. Brazil is the world’s biggest exporter of ethanol and is promoting it around the globe as a cleaner alternative to petrol. Last year the US imported about half of all Brazilian ethanol exports, but it is expected that an increase in local production will lead to a fall in Brazilian imports this year.

CONSULTATION SOLVES RELATIONS ( 1 / 2 )

BRAZIL WANTS CONSULTATION, SEES IT AS CRUCIAL FOR RELATIONSHirst (Executive Director, Fundación Centro de Estudos Brasileiros) 2004[Mônica, The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations p.37 //loghry]

The granting of TPA by the U.S. House of Represetatives in December 2001 deepened discrepancies in U.S.-Brazil trade talks even more. The new congressional authorization included conditions that were considered unacceptable and were interpreted by the Brazilian government as an obstacle to further FTAA negotiations. Brazil became particularly concerned with two TPA clauses-one that previewed consultation by the U.S. government on currency mechanisms adopted by others if considered a threat to U.S. competitiveness, and another that listed 293 products to be excluded from negotiations, including an extensive list of agricultural goods. This meant that the United States could maintain subsidies for most of the agricultural products it exported to Latin America and would not have to touch antidumping legislation that restricted the entrance of many Latin American exports to the United States. Political leaders in Brazil, from the Left to the Right, and Cardoso himself, condemned the contents of the authorization.

Policy making absent consultation destroys US-Brazil Relations Washington Post, May 15, 2001, “Brazil's 'Destiny': An Obstacle to Free Trade?”

Both sides should work to avoid this looming contest. The United States should make it a priority to restore the traditional intimacy between the two countries. It needs to move its dealings with Brazil to the highest levels of its government and to display greater sensitivity to the pride and dignity of a society on the verge of becoming a major power. This implies restraint on hortatory rhetoric and on the attempt to impose every U.S. preference via sanctions. It also requires a commitment to resolve the bitter trade disputes over Brazilian sugar, citrus and steel exports. For its part, Brazil should remember that the historical style of consultations of Western Hemisphere diplomacy is at variance with the confrontational style of European balance-of-power diplomacy. Moreover, a confrontational course is likely to threaten the cohesion of Mercosur, none of whose members is prepared to give up direct access to the United States on behalf of Mercosur.

CONSULTATION SOLVES RELATIONS ( 2 / 2 )

Consultation is key to US-Brazil RelationsJames Carragher Oct 29, 2002 (Director of Brazilian and Southern Cone Affairs at US State Department. Federal News Service)

We consider Brazil a regional partner, and we consult on hemispheric challenges. We will continue to consider Brazil a regional partner. We will continue to consult with them on hemispheric challenges. Brazil and we are two of the largest and therefore, both for geographic and numerical side, most important democracies in the hemisphere. It is important, it is natural, and it will continue to be the case that we have broad consultations across the board. We've worked on major regional security issues, including the border dispute between Peru and Ecuador; stability of democratic institutions in Paraguay; and the near coup in Ecuador. There are tactical differences. There always will be tactical differences. What we share and what we will continue to share for the next four years and, I believe, for the foreseeable future is a dedication to preserving democratic -- preserving and expanding democratic governance in the hemisphere. I think it's important to note too that we work closely -- the two countries -- together and have joint programs in areas not often in public view, prominently in public view. And that would be, for example, areas of health, science, technology and education. And we would like to see more public attention to those areas and others where we work well together. And six weeks into the job, don't raise your hand, please, and ask me, "What are those areas?" I'll just refer you to the desk officers, and they can give you more details. Thank you very much. First, the first meeting of the senior consultative panel on science and technology, for one example, was held in Brasilia in July. We have regular mechanisms to strengthen and deepen our relationship, regular meetings, the last one of which was last week, the most recent one of which -- sorry -- between our political undersecretaries in our two foreign ministries, law enforcement communities, the defense departments, among others. We also on October 22nd, which was when we had the bilateral consultations, tried a first -- for the first time a trilateral consultation as well, with Mexico, Brazil and the United States. I think Ambassador Barbosa and his colleague was there. All sides felt that was a beneficial thing to do, and I think all sides agreed that it would be beneficial to do it in the end -- in the future, as well. Now if I could look just briefly to the future, we do expect change in Brazil's foreign policy. This is a new administration. New administrations bring changes. They bring changes domestically. They bring changes in foreign policy. Just as with a change in our administrations, even the most dramatic changes at times, we think that probably much of the change will be tone and style, rather than substance. We noted that in his speech after election, the president-elect said Brazil will negotiate FTAA with sovereign determination and seeking to elect protectionism. He also, if I recall correctly, has characterized the United States in the past as a negotiating style of aggressiveness in defending its own interest. That's exactly what democracies are supposed to do. I don't think there's a single person in this room that would trade -- that would not trade the world we have today for a world in which we had 160 democracies who were aggressively defending and negotiating their positions. We expect that from democracies, and we look forward to doing so with the da Silva administration. We think, talking about tone and style, that we will have perhaps to work harder with a da Silva administration to gain support on some of the issues we will be pursuing in multilateral fora. However, I would note that on Colombia, the president- elect opposes outside military intervention, the same position as the Cardoso government has held. The comment -- and this is a playoff of Ambassador Harrington's remark -- the view that he is close to President Chavez of Venezuela and to Fidel Castro -- note, however, that the PT has urged Chavez and the opposition to engage in constructive dialogue, and Lula himself has personally called on President Castro to hold -- the self- designated President Castro to hold free elections. I don't want to get into a bottom line and characterize our bilateral relationship with a da Silva administration vis-a-vis a President Cardoso's administration. We will be working as hard as we possibly can on a number of fronts to -- and I don't think I'm going too far here - - to improve what I think is an excellent bilateral relationship. We recognize the importance of Brazil to the hemisphere. President-elect da Silva and his party and his coalitions of parties recognize, we believe, the importance of Brazil's relationship with the United States and our role and interest in the hemisphere. This realization on both sides will lead us, I believe, to continue to consult each other constantly, in a broad variety of fora, and to work together in a constructive, not necessarily fully agreement manner, but always in a constructive manner in which, as two democracies should, we will be able to sit down and clearly lay out our agreements, our areas of agreement and our areas of differences, and work at ways to bridge those differences.

CONSULT SOLVES (LAUNDRY) ( 1 / 1 )

Consultations bolster overall US-Brazilian relations - key to trade liberalization, environmental protection, counter terrorism, and the global economy Public Papers of the Presidents, 6/23/2003

The United States and Brazil resolve to create a closer and qualitatively stronger relationship between our two countries. It is time to chart a newly purposeful direction in our relationship, guided by a shared vision of freedom, democracy, peace, prosperity, and well- being for our peoples, in order to promote hemispheric and global cooperation. We are among the most populous democracies in the world. Forged from diverse cultures, proving that diversity is our strength. Continental in size and immigrant in origin, we share the fundamental belief that freedom, democracy, and social justice are universal aspirations, essential for peace and prosperity and unconstrained by either culture or level of economic development. Our commitment to human rights for all people in every nation is strong and unwavering. We agree that representative democracy and the rule of law are indispensable to building modern economies and political systems that promote growth, accountability, transparency, and stability, and encourage economic opportunity without favor or prejudice. Democracy is essential to sustainable development. In the same way, reducing inequality and improving social justice contribute to stability and international security. We affirm that countries should embrace policies that promote growth and social inclusion, which are the key to increasing incomes, improving standards of living, and ending poverty and hunger. We share the conviction that governments should work to empower their people through good governance, fighting corruption, ensuring personal security, encouraging enterprise, and providing all citizens access to high- quality education, adequate health, and nutritional care. We agree that free trade furthers prosperity and development, contributes to the promotion of entrepreneurial initiative and to the strengthening of the private sector, with positive social impact. We also agree that trade liberalization can contribute to dynamic growth, technological innovation, and to individual and collective advancement over the long term. We therefore reaffirm our commitment to fighting protectionism. We have built creative, entrepreneurial societies. Regionally as well as globally, we have important responsibilities in areas such as commerce, science and technology, energy, environmental protection, education, and health. The currents of commerce and culture that link our societies run strong and deep. Our partnership of shared values leads us to seek a natural partnership of shared endeavors. As two nations recognizing both the promise and desperate poverty of Africa, and the strong ties and African heritage of many of our citizens, we commit ourselves to working together for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity. We intend to pursue this goal through our diplomacy and the promotion of projects that reinforce economic, commercial, social, and cultural ties with the countries of Africa. Therefore, the United States and Brazil will engage in regular consultations, working together for prosperity, democratic governance, and peace in the hemisphere and beyond. Reaffirming our commitment to advance common values, we will continue to work together to protect and advance democracy, human rights, tolerance, religious freedom, free speech and independent media, economic opportunity, and the rule of law. We will cooperate on issues of mutual interest that contribute to the defense and security of the hemisphere, bolstering joint efforts to counter terrorism, narcotics trafficking and consumption, trafficking in persons, and other transnational criminal challenges to regional peace. Our strength lies in the ability of our people to shape their destiny and to realize their aspirations for a better life. That is why the United States and Brazil are and will remain allies in the cause of democracy. We will share our experience in nurturing and strengthening democratic institutions the world over, thereby fighting challenges to the democratic order from poverty, illiteracy, intolerance, and terrorism. Moreover, we recognize that successfully addressing the hemisphere's challenges requires collaborative and cooperative efforts and, to that end, we will work together to strengthen the Organization of American States, the bulwark of regional cooperation, including through implementation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. We need to reinforce the U.N. system, especially by exploring ways to make the Security Council and other U.N. bodies more effective and more responsive to current international challenges and realities. We have much to learn from each country's unique experience in modernizing our economies; achieving advances in science, technology, and medicine; finding solutions to pressing environmental problems; addressing energy challenges and needs; and advancing quality education and expanding enrollments in primary education. We are committed to working together to find concrete ways to extend the benefits of these reforms to all our people. We will cooperate, including through direct contacts between the business communities of our countries, to advance U.S.-Brazilian economic, trade, and investment relations; and recognizing our responsibility as co-chairs of the negotiations, to successfully conclude the negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas by January 2005. We will work together to preserve and promote stability and growth in the global economy. Opening trade and resisting protectionism are essential for meeting that challenge. We support an open, equitable, transparent, and rules-based multilateral trading system, and we will work together to strengthen it, especially by working for a successful completion of the WTO negotiations of the Doha Development Agenda by January 2005. Today, we pledge to deepen the U.S.-Brazilian partnership in mutually positive ways, always seizing opportunities to advance the diversified interests we have in common, always seeking to reconcile differences through dialogue and engagement. Our constructive partnership is not an end in itself, but a means to all these ends. It is reinforced by, inter alia, academic, cultural and commercial ties, and increasing kinship among our people. In this process of further enhancing our bilateral relations, we have decided to give special attention to the following areas:

science and technology, energy, education, health, economic growth, and agriculture. As further indication of our close ties, U.S. and Brazilian advisors will consult often, maintaining a dialogue on these matters of mutual interest. We have also agreed on a framework for high-level consultations and joint working groups across the broad spectrum of areas in which we are determined to institutionalize our enhanced cooperation.

INTERNAL POLITICS AFFECT NEGOTS.

INTERNAL POLITICS CAN AND DO AFFECT TRADE NEGOTIATIONSHirst (Executive Director, Fundación Centro de Estudos Brasileiros) 2004[Mônica, The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations p.32 //loghry]

Negotiations regarding the FTAA have gained enormous importance in U.S.-Brazil relations, as they are part of a broader process of redefining foreign trade arrangements in which regionalism has tended to assume a new role. In both cases, these negotiations depend upon domestic support provided by political parties, business sectors, and labor organizations. In the United States, the early stage of regional trade talks took place during the administration of George H. W. Bush (1989-93); they deepened during the two administrations of Bill Clinton (1993-2001) and continue during the present administration of George W. Bush. In Brazil, negotiations first took place during the government of Collor, continued with Franco, deepened with the Cardoso administrations, and will conclude during the Lula administration. While internal politics have always been a crucial aspect of foreign trade policies in the United States, domestic political involvement and pressure regarding trade negotiations in Brazil represent a very recent phenomenon linked to the consolidation of democracy. Never before have trade negotiations been so politicized within the Brazilian society-especially those regarding the FTAA.

2NC: MUST READ ( 1 / 1 )

BRAZIL IS THE FULCRUM OF ANY SUCCESSFUL U.S. POLICY INITIATIVE IN LATIN AMERICA. CONSULTATION WITH BRAZIL ON TRADE ISSUES IS KEY TO SOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION AND TO THE FUTURE OF THE ECONOMY IN THIS HEMISPHERE—CAN’T IGNORE WHAT THEY HAVE TO SAY****Hirst (Executive Director, Fundación Centro de Estudos Brasileiros) 2004[Mônica, The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations p.60-61 //loghry]

According to Brazilian diplomats, relations with the United States have finally achieved “political maturity.” Bilateral political communications have become straightforward, and they avoid problematic areas such as trade disputes, which contaminate the relationship as a whole. There is also a strong perception among Brazilian officials that political commonalties have expanded ever since Brazilian democracy consolidated.

U.S. government perceptions are that Brazil, like the rest of South American countries, has made major changes that should contribute to strengthening the relationship on both sides. As stated by a U.S. government official in 1997, “The U.S. relationship with South America goes far beyond trade and economics, of course. Our policy in the region aims to keep the United States economically strong and internationally competitive, to promote the principles of democracy, and to increase the level of regional cooperation to more easily deal with transnational threats of narcotrafficking, environmental degradation, and international crime.” 61 Yet in the United States there is a frequent perception among the public concerned with hemispheric affairs that “Brazil has a way to go before necessary reforms are deepened and institutionalized to the point that they provide a really firm, substantially irreversible guarantee of positive performance in the future.” 62

An evaluation of the relations with Brazil was prepared by a group of experts from the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations for the current Bush administration in February 2001 in which Brazil was considered “the fulcrum of any successful U.S. policy initiative in South America.” 63 Relations with Brazil were perceived as essential to influencing the economic and political future of the hemisphere. This task force also acknowledged that to deepen understanding between the two countries it would be necessary to review U.S. policy toward Brazil so as to “work together on vital matters such as trade, drugs, and regional security and move thereafter to engage in a high-level sustained and cooperative strategic dialogue with Brazilian leaders.” 64

Among its most relevant suggestions, the report stresses the importance of understanding mutual differences and it urges the United States to discard a policy of benign neglect toward Brazil. The importance of relations with Brazil was grounded in four criteria: “economic power; its central location within South America; its status as a trading partner and the recipient of U.S. investment; and its diplomatic role within South America and the international agencies.” 65 The study also warned both the United States and Brazil about the risk of missing the moment to build up a positive agenda. Though trade negotiations with the United States could be replaced by negotiations with the European Union, Brazil could not afford to lose preferential access to the American market. As well, both countries are perceived to play complementary roles in the promotion of economic reform and democratic stabilility in South America.

2NC: NUKE WAR POD ( 1 / 1 )

relations prevent US/Brazilian nuclear warDonald E. Schulz, Chairman of the Political Science Department at Cleveland State University, March 2000, “The United States and Latin America: Shaping an Elusive Future,” Strategic Studies Institute, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?pubID=31

Put simply, if changes in political leadership were instrumental in redirecting Brazil’s nuclear program towards peaceful purposes, future political upheavals could still produce a reversion to previous orientations. Civilian supremacy is not so strong that it could not be swept away by a coup, especially if the legitimacy of the current democratic experiment were to be undermined by economic crisis and growing poverty/inequality. Nor are civilian leaders necessarily less militaristic or more committed to democracy than the military. The example of Peru’s Fujimori comes immediately to mind. How serious a threat might Brazil potentially be? It has been estimated that if the nuclear plant at Angra dos Reis (Angra I) were only producing at 30 percent capacity, it could produce five 20-kiloton weapons a year. If production from other plants were included, Brazil would have a capability three times greater than India or Pakistan. Furthermore, its defense industry already has a substantial missile producing capability. On the other hand, the country has a very limited capacity to project its military power via air and sealift or to sustain its forces over long distances. And though a 1983 law authorizes significant military manpower increases (which could place Brazil at a numerical level slightly higher than France, Iran and Pakistan), such growth will be restricted by a lack of economic resources. Indeed, the development of all these military potentials has been, and will continue to be, severely constrained by a lack of money. (Which is one reason Brazil decided to engage in arms control with Argentina in the first place.) 56 In short, a restoration of Brazilian militarism, imbued with nationalistic ambitions for great power status, is not unthinkable, and such a regime could present some fairly serious problems. That government would probably need foreign as well as domestic enemies to help justify its existence. One obvious candidate would be the United States, which would presumably be critical of any return to dictatorial rule. Beyond this, moreover, the spectre of a predatory international community, covetous of the riches of the Amazon, could help rally political support to the regime. For years, some Brazilian military officers have been warning of “foreign intervention.” Indeed, as far back as 1991 General Antenor de Santa Cruz Abreu, then chief of the Military Command of the Amazon, threatened to transform the region into a “new Vietnam” if developed countries tried to “internationalize” the Amazon. Subsequently, in 1993, U.S.-Guyanese combined military exercises near the Brazilian border provoked an angry response from many high-ranking Brazilian officers. 57 Since then, of course, U.S.-Brazilian relations have improved considerably. Nevertheless, the basic U.S./ international concerns over the Amazon—the threat to the region’s ecology through burning and deforestation, the presence of narcotrafficking activities, the Indian question, etc.—have not disappeared, and some may very well intensify in the years ahead. At the same time, if the growing trend towards subregional economic groupings—in particular, MERCOSUR—continues, it is likely to increase competition between Southern Cone and NAFTA countries. Economic conflicts, in turn, may be expected to intensify political differences, and could lead to heightened politico-military rivalry between different blocs or coalitions in the hemisphere. Even so, there continue to be traditional rivalries and conflicts within MERCOSUR, especially between Brazil and its neighbors, and these will certainly complicate the group’s evolution. Among other things, the past year witnessed a serious deterioration of relations between Brazil and Argentina, the product partly of the former’s January 1999 currency devaluation, which severely strained economic ties between the two countries. In part, too, these conflicts were aggravated by Argentina’s (unsuccessful) bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which Brazilians interpreted as an attempt to gain strategic advantage. The upshot was that relations soured to the extent where questions have been raised as to the continued viability of MERCOSUR itself. In light of these problems, one cannot but wonder what impact a resurgence of Brazilian authoritarianism, combined with a push for regional hegemonic status, would have on Argentina, currently a “non-NATO ally” of the United States. Finally, closer to home, there is the difficult problem of U.S. border defense. One suspects that the years ahead will witness growing pressure to use Department of Defense personnel and resources to bolster law enforcement agencies patrolling U.S. frontiers to prevent illegal immigration and drug smuggling. (Indeed, legislation has already been proposed authorizing the deployment of up to 10,000 more troops on the Southwest Border. In late 1998, however, the bill was rejected by the Senate.) Since 1990, the military has been engaged in several thousand operations along the frontier, running listening posts to assist the Border Patrol in tracking drugs and migrants, building fences and barriers, repairing roads, and helping law enforcement agencies in counternarcotics operations. Yet, notwithstanding this aid, civilian agencies continue to be stretched thin. The amount of drugs coming over the border has not been significantly reduced, and law enforcement officials often find themselves outgunned and outmanned by their adversaries. Consequently, there is an increasing temptation to look to the military for answers.

2NC: AMAZON DEFO POD ( 1 / 1 )

cooperation is key to Amazon preservationUS Department of State, 6/26/2003, “Environmental Cooperation Between the United States and Brazil,” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/21986.htm

The United States and Brazil enjoy a long, rich history of environmental cooperation ranging from management of parks to technical cooperation on forests, remote sensing, and fire science. We hope to make that relationship even stronger in the coming years. We look forward to discussing our many bilateral environmental interests during a high-level Common Agenda on the Environment meeting later this year in Brasilia, and to further strengthening our already strong partnership to protect and manage important natural resources. The U.S. and Brazil plan to encourage the use of renewable energy and energy efficiency through workshops, information exchanges, technical assistance, and training. Our recent bilateral energy discussions helped strengthen our joint commitment to clean energy efforts, while a new energy strategy developed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) holds the potential for additional bilateral collaboration with NGOs and the private sector. Working together, we have installed hybrid-renewable village power systems in the Amazon, and we are beginning to build partnerships with universities to look at biomass resources and develop markets for clean energy. Officials of the state of São Paulo are working with the U.S. to promote technologies that can mitigate local air quality problems and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The U.S. and Brazil hope to collaborate closely to promote sustainable forest management, particularly in the area of reduced impact logging. USAID partners look forward to working with Brazil to develop forest management tracking technologies involving fire-detecting satellites operated by the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Global Positioning Systems (GPS) for forest management, modeling of logging damage in disturbed forests, and Landsat-based maps reflecting compliance with Brazil's Forest Code. A consortium of Brazil-based institutions, together with USAID and the U.S. Forest Service, have created a new "Natural Ecosystems Sustained" program for forest management in Brazil that includes marketing of environmental goods and services and landscape-level planning and policy. Brazil and the U.S. now coordinate closely on initiatives such as satellite technology to detect forest fires. Conservation of migratory birds is another key issue for cooperation. The U.S. looks forward to working with Brazil, and more broadly with the region, in a workshop this October to begin developing a framework for a Western Hemisphere strategy to conserve migratory birds - a response to the Summit of the Americas in 2001. Recognizing Brazil's critical role in regional environmental issues across South America, the U.S. Department of State established one of the first of twelve regional environmental "Hub" offices around the world at the U.S. Embassy in Brasilia in 1999.

AND, environmental destruction causes extinctionPaul Warner, American University, Dept of International Politics and Foreign Policy, August, Politics and Life Sciences, 1994, p 177

Massive extinction of species is dangerous, then, because one cannot predict which species are expendable to the system as a whole. As Philip Hoose remarks, "Plants and animals cannot tell us what they mean to each other." One can never be sure which species holds up fundamental biological relationships in the planetary ecosystem. And, because removing species is an irreversible act, it may be too late to save the system after the extinction of key plants or animals. According to the U.S. National Research Council, "The ramifications of an ecological change of this magnitude [vast extinction of species] are so far reaching that no one on earth will escape them." Trifling with the "lives" of species is like playing Russian roulette, with our collective future as the stakes.

AMAZON – RELATIONS INTERNALS ( 1 / 1 )

Good relations keep satellite sharing high – key to solve destruction of the AmazonHugh Biggar Dec 3, 2003 (Media Associate at Defender of Wildlife http://www.stanford.edu/dept/news/pr/03/agulogging114.html)

The Amazon is the world's largest rain forest and home to an untold number of species and natural resources. It also provides a vital means for removing an important greenhouse gas from the atmosphere. All of this is in danger, as the Amazon is rapidly shrinking. Greg Asner, a faculty scientist with the Carnegie Institution at Stanford, is working with a multinational team to reverse this trend. Using both high-tech and low-tech tools, the researchers hope to safeguard the Amazon from one of its biggest threats -- rampant logging by small operators who essentially poach timber. In Brazil, for example, loggers often take patches of trees without first obtaining permits from that country's environmental protection agency. While the practice, known as selective logging, may be sustainable, it has dire consequences. Asner will present his team's findings Dec. 10 and 11 at this year's San Francisco meeting of the American Geophysical Union, an international scientific society with more than 35,000 members dedicated to advancing the understanding of the Earth and its environment. "[Selective logging] acts like a net -- when you take down one tree, you end up taking five to 20 other trees around it," as the trees are often intertwined or connected by vines, said Asner, an assistant professor, by courtesy, in the Stanford Department of Geological and Environmental Sciences. Only a small portion of this felled wood becomes harvested timber; the rest turns to waste. Selective logging dominates current landscape use in Brazil and is also among the biggest threats to the global environment. At the same time, people involved in the timbering process -- clearing land and removing wood with tractors -- further denude the landscape. That landscape of destruction attracts ranchers and farmers, who move into the newly opened space and frequently expand it, thereby accelerating the rate of deforestation. By burning forest to clear it, they release carbon into the atmosphere. These activities slow reforestation. "For the first time, all of this is being observed by satellite," said Asner. He and his team -- including a Brazilian nongovernmental organization, Brazil's environmental protection agency, NASA and the U.S. Forest Service have spent five years developing a remote-sensing system for measuring timber harvests and deforestation. Satellite images focus on biophysical and biochemical changes in the forest canopy and provide a broad picture of how the Amazon is being thinned. The information is then shared with the environmental protection agency to help it better target illegal loggers. "It provides extraordinary detail of the thinning of the Amazon basin," Asner said. Asner and his team are working against time as the rate of the Amazon rain forest's disappearance quickens. Annually, roughly 15,000 square kilometers of forest are lost to clear cutting and cattle pasturing alone u an amount of territory the size of the state of Massachusetts. Another 7,000 to 15,000 square kilometers is lost to timber harvesting, resulting in up to 30,000 square kilometers of forest degradation each year. "This is much larger than previously thought," says Asner. Forest isn't the only thing that's lost. The region's vast warehouse of natural resources is being stripped before it has been fully audited. So far, scientists estimate its trees and other plants provide between 20 to 50 percent of the world's oxygen as well as ingredients vital to the manufacture of medicine and other products. The Amazon is also home to almost one-third of the world's species. All of this is in danger, and in ways that could have global ramifications, Asner said.

AMAZON – IMPACT EXT. ( 1 / 2 )

US/Brazil cooperation is key to the Amazon and human survivalCouncil on Hemispheric Affairs, Hampden Macbeth, Philip Morrow, and Joseph Taves, 5/25/2005, “Amazon Rainforest, Barbados and Haiti and the Bolton Nomination,” http://www.coha.org/2005/05/amazon-rainforest-barbados-and-haiti-and-the-bolton-nomination/

News reports on May 19 announced that more than 10,000 square miles of the Amazon rainforest had been deforested over the last year – an area the size of Massachusetts. Not only is the Amazon rainforest an area of breathtaking beauty and unparalleled biodiversity, through the process of photosynthesis it also ensures the survival of the human race, with its billions of trees producing much of the world’s supply of oxygen. While ultimately Brazil’s progressive president, Luiz Inacio “Lula”da Silva, bears the brunt of this fiasco, the U.S. and European nations also generously share in the responsibility for the destruction of vast swaths of the country’s rainforest. They have promoted the neo-liberal economic polices that persuaded Brazil to rely on the strength of its constantly expanding agricultural sector to pay down its suffocating international debt. As a result, loggers have felled hundreds of thousands of hectares of trees and farmers have cleared vast tracks of the rainforest to grow crops. Just as was the case under former President Henrique Cardosa, the negative repercussions which result from this arboreal homicide, were relatively mild because – despite presidential declarations to the contrary – Brazil’s environmental polices under Lula have been much more bark than bite. Brasilia, under the “people’s president” has failed to fulfill its commitment to prevent further destruction of the Amazon rainforest as promised last year when Lula announced a $140 million campaign to preserve and ensure better policing of the fragile habitat. However, external economic factors also have certainly played a role in persuading the government to turn a blind eye to the desecration of its own rainforest. It is critical to our common planet’s survival that the U.S. and the EU develop a comprehensive plan with teeth, in cooperation with Brazil, in order to provide the financial incentives necessary to preserve the rainforest, while also strengthening Brazil’s competitiveness in the global economy. The U.S. and the EU would be wise to accept this responsibility in order to temper the dangerous extremes involved in their push for globalization and the maximization of free trade that threatens the very integrity of the environment, if not the very survival of the human race.

AMAZON – IMPACT EXT. ( 2 / 2 )

Amazon destruction will cause planetary extinctionDavid Takacs 96, Instructor in Department of Earth Systems Science and Policy at California State-Monterey Bay. Philosophies of Paradise, http://www.dhushara.com/book/diversit/restor/takacs.htm

As we might expect, ecologists and conservation biologists proclaim biodiversity's ecological value. These ecological arguments can be interpreted as human-value-centered and selfish or nonhuman-value-centered and unselfish, or some permutation of these. "Ecosystem services" may have value of and for themselves-in other words, it may be argued that keeping ecosystems healthy and functioning has value apart from any human valuer or any value humans may obtain from them. We may thus value biodiversity because we value the continued healthy functioning of ecosystems as such, regardless of any services biodiversity performs for us. More often, however, humans are said to benefit from such ecosystem services. Half a century ago, Aldo Leopold warned: "Recent discoveries in mineral and vitamin nutrition reveal unsuspected dependencies in the up-circuit: incredibly minute quantities of certain substances determine the value of soils to plants, of plants to animals. What of the down-circuit? What of the vanishing species, the preservation of which we now regard as an esthetic luxury. They helped build the soil; in what unsuspected ways may they be essential to its maintenance?" More recently, Jane Lubchenco feels very strongly that people are in fact much more dependent on ecosystem services that are provided by both managed and unmanaged ecosystems than is generally perceived to be the case. So I think it's sheer folly for us to act in ways that are undermining the ability of both managed and unmanaged ecosystems to provide these services that we're depen dent on. And that we're doing that more and more as we pollute and destroy habitats, or alter habitats in one fashion or another. And I guess the bottom line is that we're changing the environment faster than our ability to understand the consequences of how we're changing it." Most predictions of eco-doom are predicated on this argument, and many are stated in much more dramatic terms than those Lubchenco employs. As the argument runs, a myriad of organisms, especially "little things," comprise ecosystems that provide countless services that keep the Earth's biotic and abiotic processes up and running.' According to Souls, "Many, if not all, ecological processes have thresholds below and above which they become discontinuous, chaotic, or suspended." Biodiversity may regulate these processes; among its many talents, biodiversity is said to create soil and maintain its fertility, control global climate, inhibit agricultural pests, maintain atmospheric gas balances, process organic wastes, pollinate crops and flowers, and recycle nutrients.' Confusion in this line of argumentation ties back into why the concept of biodiversity has risen to prominence. Remember that biologists have scant understanding of the roles that species or populations play in maintaining ecosystems. In interviews, Lovejoy, Falk, and Ray confessed that you can strip away many species from an ecosystem without loss of ecosystem function. Ehrlich points out that by the time a species is endangered, it has probably stopped playing an important role in keeping the system functioning anyway." Furthermore, it is not clear whether we should focus on species as functional cogs in the ecosystem wheel, or whether ecological services are emergent properties of ecosystems themselves. With the biodiversity concept, these dilemmas become nearly moot. Biodiversity embraces lists of species, lists of ecosystems, the interactions of species within ecosystems, and the processes that species may maintain or control. When arguing on behalf of bio-diversity, one need not focus on the specifics-specifically, the specifics of what we don't know. It is enough to explicate some of the functions that keep ecosystems running, or that ecosystems provide for us, and then extrapolate to the dangers associated with declining biodiversity. Peter Raven bases his thinking on Leopold's observation "To keep every cog and wheel is the first precaution of intelligent tinkering": "In every sense, in the sense of communities that will preserve soil, promote local climate, keep the atmosphere, preserve water, and every thing else, the first rule of being able to put together communities well or have the world go on functioning well, or to keep climates as they are, or to retard disease, to produce products we want sustainably, be cause, after all, plants, algae, and photosynthetic bacteria are the only device we have to capture energy from the sun effectively-in all those senses, and in the sense that we're losing the parts so rapidly, I consider the loss of biological diversity to be the most serious problem that we have-far more serious than global climate change or stratospheric ozone depletion, or anything else." "Habitat destruction and conversion are eliminating species at such a frightening pace that extinction of many contemporary species and the systems they live in and support ... may lead to ecological disaster and severe alteration of the evolutionary process," Terry Erwin writes." And E. 0. Wilson notes: "The question I am asked most frequently about the diversity of life: if enough species are extinguished, will the ecosystem collapse, and will the extinction of most other species follow soon afterward? The only answer anyone can give is: possibly. By the time we find out, however, it might be too late. One planet, one experiment."" So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value in and for itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with

global ecology and human futures: "It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable climate, and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion human beings perished. And if our species is very unlucky, the famines could lead to a thermonuclear war, which could extinguish civilization.""

2NC: ECON IMPACT POD ( 1 / 1 )

Relations are key the Brazilian economyPeter Hakim, President- Inter-American Dialogue, Jan/Feb 2004, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040101faessay83111/peter-hakim/the-reluctant-partner.html

Washington needs Brasilia's cooperation to make progress on critical regional issues, such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), Venezuela's worsening political confrontation, and Colombia's criminal violence and guerrilla warfare. Brazil's voice also carries weight on broader international issues such as global trade negotiations and the struggle against AIDS. Just as surely, Brazil needs U.S. cooperation to advance its domestic and international agendas, particularly the central challenge of economic growth, which requires dependable access to U.S. markets, capital, and technology. Brazil needs the United States to have any chance of energizing its long-stagnant economy, expanding job opportunities, and accelerating social development. An adversarial relationship would be extremely damaging to U.S. policy and interests in Latin America, more so than ever given the region's unsettled politics and uneasy relations with the United States.

AND, Brazilian economic collapse would destroy the US economyPeter Hakim, President of Inter America Dialogue, 12/30/2007, “Latin America: the next U.S. President’s agenda,” Inter America Dialogue, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Peter%20Hakim%20-%20Great%20Decisions%202008.pdf

By any quantitative measure, what happens elsewhere in Latin America is less important to the U.S. The rest of the region is not central to U.S. security; it is neither a source of nor a target for international terrorism. Economic relations with South and Central America are expanding, but they are modest compared to Mexico. All of South America’s trade with the U.S., including the oil from Venezu- ela, amounts only to about 40% of U.S. commerce with Mexico alone. Trade with Brazil, the second-largest U.S. partner in Latin America, accounts for little more than 1% of U.S. trade worldwide. Still, an economic crisis in Brazil, the eighth-largest economy in the world, would have destructive spillover effects across the region, which could importantly damage the U.S. economy. And Brazil is a country that could become much more eco- nomically consequential to the U.S.— if it sustains a healthy rate of growth and continues to open its economy.

AND, ExtinctionLt. Col, Tom Bearden, PhD Nuclear Engineering, April 25, 2000, http://www.cheniere.org/correspondence/042500%20-%20modified.htmJust prior to the terrible collapse of the World economy, with the crumbling well underway and rising, it is inevitable that some of the [wmd] weapons of mass destruction will be used by one or more nations on others. An interesting result then---as all the old strategic studies used to show---is that everyone will fire everything as fast as possible against their perceived enemies. The reason is simple: When the mass destruction weapons are   unleashed at all, the only chance a nation has to survive is to desperately try to destroy its perceived enemies before they destroy it. So there will erupt a spasmodic unleashing of the long range missiles, nuclear arsenals, and biological warfare arsenals of the nations as they feel the economic collapse, poverty, death, misery, etc. a bit earlier.   The ensuing holocaust is certain   to immediately draw in the major nations also, and literally a hell on earth will result. In short, we will get the great   Armageddon we have been fearing since the advent of the nuclear genie. Right now, my personal estimate is that we have about a 99% chance of that scenario or some modified version of it, resulting.

2NC: NPT POD ( 1 / 2 )

Strong relations are crucial to prevent Brazilian nuclearization.Claudia Patterson is a COHA Research Associate, 12/14/2004, “For Nuclear Brazil, It’s Good to Have Friends in High Places,” http://www.coha.org/2004/12/14/for-nuclear-brazil-it%E2%80%99s-good-to-have-friends-in-high-places/)Secrecy shrouding Brazil’s nuclear capabilities, suspected technological advances and provocative statements made by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva during his presidential campaign alarmed U.S. nuclear control advocates. But, according to

Secretary of State Colin Powell, future nuclear weapons proliferation by Brasilia no longer is a distinct possibility. Could Haiti be the missing ingredient?The Bush administration now vehemently denies accusations by notable critics, like the Washington Post, which questioned why Brazil feels a need to hide some of its nuclear facilities from inspection. Some also

speculate that Secretary Powell’s readiness to accept Brasilia’s intentions may be a payback for Lula’s rescuing the U.S. from its embarrassingly contradictory Haiti policy, by agreeing to head the UN peacekeeping mission in the country.The recent strengthening of U.S.-Brazilian relations may be linked to Brasilia’s desire to gain more prestige in the hemisphere and the world by becoming a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, for which it will now likely receive U.S. backing.In the last quarter century, Brazil has engaged in back-door, even covert business arrangements to acquire nuclear technology on the world market by increasing its conventional weapons trade with rogue nations and evading inspections by international nuclear weapons authorities. In the 1980s, Brazil was a United Nations problem child due to its flirtation with

nuclear proliferation. Now, however, the country has utilized its increasing diplomatic leverage to negotiate a deal that appeases the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) without exposing its unique nuclear technology that Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim claims the country possesses, and that Washington believes is only “producing enriched uranium for pacific purposes.” The exact reason for Washington’s recent strong support of Brazil, despite its past turbulent relationship with the emerging South American giant, is not fully clear, but Brasilia’s desire for a greater role in the global community is no doubt a contributing factor as is Washington’s relative deference to the hemisphere’s candidate for major

power status. Even though lately Brazil has cost the White House a good deal of grief over trade-related issues, and in spite of U.S. accusations over Brazil’s nuclear intent and its past disputes with Washington over the issue, the fact that Lula agreed to head the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti and supply over 1,000 troops to the efforts—by far the largest contingent—has won the Brazilian leader a heavy draught of amnesia on the nuclear front. Critics would say that in this respect, Lula entered into a humiliating arraignment with Dr. Faustus. Whether or not Brazil currently has the capabilities to develop nuclear weapons is unknown. The IAEA said, at the conclusion of its investigation, that a report on Brazil’s recent nuclear developments would be ready by the end of November, but no report as of yet has been released. A Questionable History During Brazil’s 1964-1985 era of military rule, episodic remarks, usually made off the record by both military and civilian figures, indicated that Brazil was attempting to develop nuclear technology for military purposes. In 1975, the Brazilian military government abandoned an UN-approved nuclear information and technology sharing agreement with the U.S. in order to receive nuclear

technology from West Germany, which allowed for more Brazilian-made components to be incorporated in the nuclear power plants it was installing at the time. Although West Germany was a NATO ally, Washington was less than enthusiastic over the arrangement. Prior to 1975, Brazil’s nuclear technology was used solely to produce nuclear energy, but when Brazil began its association with the West German Kraftwerk Union—a Siemens affiliate that did not require IAEA safeguards until U.S. pressure forced the company to adopt them—the South American country began a secret program to conceivably develop an atomic device, which in 1987, observers foresaw as occurring by 2000. In addition to its nuclear program, Brazil was a major conventional arms exporter during the 1980s. Because Brasilia was indiscriminate in seeking out clients for its military products, the country was arguably the world’s leading arms trader to human rights violators and rogue nations during this period . In 1984,

Brazil’s arms sales hovered around $3 billion, which represented a 600 percent increase over 1980. Along with West German nuclear technology, Washington feared the ramifications of Brazil’s possible exporting of nuclear weapons to countries like Libya and Iraq, both significant customers of Brazil’s conventional arms trade. Even after the military government stepped down in

1985 and Brazil began the transition towards democracy, the selling of weapons to Iraq continued.

Recent speeches by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva are reminiscent of the country’s past dark days. During his 2002 campaign, he expressed his unhappiness over the Non-

Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which lists Brazil as one of the world’s182 non-nuclear weapon states (non-NWS). Speaking in his man-of-the-people guise, Lula asked, “If someone asks me to disarm and keep a slingshot while he comes at me with a cannon, what good does that do?” As presidential candidate, Lula explained how developing countries who are signatories of the NPT are disadvantaged by its conditions. Whereas NWS are allowed to keep the nuclear technology they already possess, non-nuclear countries are prohibited from developing technology that covertly could be used in nuclear weapons programs, leaving them, in Lula’s words, holding a slingshot and looking down the barrel of a cannon. Is Brazil Hiding Something? During Lula’s campaign, a number of members of the U.S. Congress wrote to President Bush “to express [their] concern regarding Mr. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva … and his recent public statement criticizing Brazil’s

adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).” The U.S. legislators concluded by requesting that the president direct the State Department to investigate the “potentially serious national security matter” developing in Brazil. The Bush administration chose to ignore the letter, deciding instead to initiate a new diplomatic relationship with Lula centering on Brazil’s decision to lead the UN mission to Haiti. Renewed suspicion about the nature of Brasilia’s nuclear aspirations arose in 2003 when the Brazilian president refused to allow a comprehensive IAEA inspection of the Resende nuclear facility. Lula said at the time that the denial was merely to protect his government’s coveted technological innovations from theft by outsiders, claiming that these facilities will enrich uranium more efficiently and will operate longer and

more economically than other plants. In a November 17 report by National Public Radio’s Morning Edition, a number of specialists denied that Brazil had the means to develop its own advanced enriching technology. Furthermore, nuclear experts like Henry Sokolski, director of the Non-proliferation Policy

Education Center, believe that Brasilia may have received its centrifuge from the black market and may want to conceal this. However, Brazilian nuclear scientists stand by their claim that their centrifuge is more technologically advanced than any other currently available, despite withering international skepticism that it is even Brazilian-made. Brazil is Definitely Hiding Something

In October, after several months of negotiations, Brazil’s Ministry of Science and Technology finally reached an accord with the IAEA to allow for complete inspection of the country’s nuclear facilities, with the exception of the Resende Plant centrifuge. The plant at Resende enriches uranium that the Ministry says fuels Brazil’s two nuclear power plants, which together provide 4.3 percent of the country’s electricity. While

Brazil does mine uranium, it is also home to an established reserve of oil and natural gas. These traditional fuels are providing an increasingly reliable source for much of Brazil’s energy needs instead of the interrupted power produced by Brazil’s first nuclear plant, the long-troubled Angra I, or “Firefly.” Despite the questionable virtues of Brazil’s alleged new

type of centrifuge, the IAEA and Lula were able to agree on a plan that allowed inspectors to check the pipes leading into and out of the centrifuge, but not the facility itself. Before IAEA inspectors arrived in Brazil, Secretary of State Colin Powell visited President Lula and Foreign Minister Amorim. In the meeting, Powell announced that they “talked about things having to do with the IAEA, the nuclear issue that has come up in the course of the day. And I

reaffirmed to the President and to the Minister that the United States has absolutely no concerns about Brazil doing anything with its nuclear program except developing power in a most controlled, responsible manner.” Upon his return to the United States, Powell

reiterated that: “We know for sure that Brazil is not thinking about nuclear weapons in any sense.” In its desire to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Brasilia seems to have won the favor of the United States with only limited kowtowing to the Bush administration through its welcomed role in leading the UN mission to Haiti.

2NC: NPT POD ( 2 / 2 )

AND, That destroys nonproliferation completely.Brad Roberts, 1999, Researcher @ Institute for Defense Analysis, Research Staff, Institute for Defense Analysis, Chair Research Advisory Council for the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, The Nonproliferation Review, Fall, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol06/64/robert64.pdf

One category consists of states with the ability but not the will to acquire weapons of mass destruction or to engage in arms races with neighbors. The latent capabilities of these states should be very much in the mind of the policymaker. All have unexploited NBC weapons capabilities. Among these are many “repentant proliferants” (in Sandy Spector’s term) that have abandoned strategic weapons or their development programs (e.g., South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Ukraine, Belarus, and !Kazakhstan).These countries are rightly a focus of proliferation concern for a number of reasons. Only one is the ease with which disinterest might again become interest. Many receive transfers of militarily sensitive technology, and some are conduits for further trade. These states are also essential to the promulgation of international norms about weapons and war and the functioning of multilateral regimes reflecting those norms. Without their participation in the effort to combat proliferation, the response to proliferation will be limited to a few countries, mostly those of the developed world, with deleterious consequences.

AND, Proliferation causes extinction – nuclear arms races and miscalculated nuclear war.Utgoff, 2002 (Deputy Director of the Strategy Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses, Victor, “Proliferation, Missile Defence, and American Ambitions,” Survival, Volume 44, Number 2, Summer)

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the, late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations

A2: CONSULT = NORMAL MEANS (GENERAL) ( 1 / 2 )

Its not normal means – the CP is key to restore consultation framework.Henry Kissinger May 6, 2001 (Former National Security Adviser under Nixon and Ford San Diego Union-Tribune)

A "special relationship" between the United States and Brazil emerged in the Americas not unlike that practiced by the United States with Britain in Europe after World War II. A Brazilian division fought in Italy at our side in World War II; Brazilian troops joined U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic in 1965. As late as the presidency of Gerald Ford, the United States formally accorded Brazil a special consultative status. The relationship began to atrophy soon afterward. In the United States, there was concern about the military government then ruling in Brazil; in Brazil, irritation mounted regarding U.S. trade legislation considered protectionist. While the concerns about Brazil's domestic circumstances evaporated with the restoration of democracy in the 1980s, the economic disagreements intensified as Brazil's economy gathered momentum. Brazilian officials frequently emphasize that FTAA will provide relatively few benefits to Brazil's agricultural sector so long as the United States farm-support programs confer undue advantages to U.S. domestic producers. Finally, the FTAA would imply the dismantling or, at a minimum, significant reduction of tariff barriers that Brazil has set up to nurture manufacturing and high-tech industries. This does not sit well with some of Brazil's leading industrialists. In the light of these controversies, the FTAA is perceived by many in Brazil as designed for the benefit of the United States; concerns about environmental conditions are interpreted as a subterfuge for diminishing Brazilian sovereignty, while U.S. antidumping policies and labor standards are castigated as pretexts for protectionism. Therefore, Brazil has apparently decided that the vagaries of U.S. domestic and international politics prohibit, and Brazil's growing strength no longer requires, a special status in essence bestowed by the United States. Brazil henceforth seeks to rely on the vibrancy of its economy, the size of its population and the partners it is able to enlist in Mercosur to forge a dominant position in Latin America. As Brazil emerges as one of the major economic and political countries of the 21st century, it has concentrated on slowing down the FTAA in order to solidify Mercosur; on binding Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay to its conception of Latin America's future; and on obliging the United States to deal with a regional bloc rather than with individual countries. And beyond the Atlantic, Europe beckons with a comparable seduction. On a visit to Latin America in March 1997, French President Jacques Chirac identified the future of Latin America not with the "north," meaning NAFTA and the United States, but with Europe. Mercosur could orient itself as a distinct entity toward Europe and in institutional rivalry with NAFTA and the United States. This would not be simply a setback to U.S. economic prospects in a market of 400 million people, accounting for 20 percent of its overseas trade. Above all, it challenges the United States' historic position in the hemisphere and its aspiration for a world order based on a growing community of democracies in the Americas. Both sides should mount major efforts to avoid this looming contest. The United States should make it a national priority to restore the traditional intimacy between the two countries. It needs to move its dealings with Brazil to the highest levels of its government and to display greater sensitivity to the pride and dignity of a society on the verge of becoming a major power. This also requires a commitment to resolve the bitter trade disputes over Brazilian sugar, citrus and steel exports.

A2: CONSULT = NORMAL MEANS (GENERAL) ( 2 / 2 )

Consultation framework is dead – CP is key to restore itHenry Kissinger, May 6, 2001 (Former National Security Adviser under Nixon and Ford, San Diego Union-Tribune)

A "special relationship" between the United States and Brazil emerged in the Americas not unlike that practiced by the United States with Britain in Europe after World War II. A Brazilian division fought in Italy at our side in World War II; Brazilian troops joined U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic in 1965. As late as the presidency of Gerald Ford, the United States formally accorded Brazil a special consultative status. The relationship began to atrophy soon afterward. In the United States, there was concern about the military government then ruling in Brazil; in Brazil, irritation mounted regarding U.S. trade legislation considered protectionist. While the concerns about Brazil's domestic circumstances evaporated with the restoration of democracy in the 1980s, the economic disagreements intensified as Brazil's economy gathered momentum. Brazilian officials frequently emphasize that FTAA will provide relatively few benefits to Brazil's agricultural sector so long as the United States farm-support programs confer undue advantages to U.S. domestic producers. Finally, the FTAA would imply the dismantling or, at a minimum, significant reduction of tariff barriers that Brazil has set up to nurture manufacturing and high-tech industries. This does not sit well with some of Brazil's leading industrialists. In the light of these controversies, the FTAA is perceived by many in Brazil as designed for the benefit of the United States; concerns about environmental conditions are interpreted as a subterfuge for diminishing Brazilian sovereignty, while U.S. antidumping policies and labor standards are castigated as pretexts for protectionism. Therefore, Brazil has apparently decided that the vagaries of U.S. domestic and international politics prohibit, and Brazil's growing strength no longer requires, a special status in essence bestowed by the United States. Brazil henceforth seeks to rely on the vibrancy of its economy, the size of its population and the partners it is able to enlist in Mercosur to forge a dominant position in Latin America. As Brazil emerges as one of the major economic and political countries of the 21st century, it has concentrated on slowing down the FTAA in order to solidify Mercosur; on binding Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay to its conception of Latin America's future; and on obliging the United States to deal with a regional bloc rather than with individual countries. And beyond the Atlantic, Europe beckons with a comparable seduction. On a visit to Latin America in March 1997, French President Jacques Chirac identified the future of Latin America not with the "north," meaning NAFTA and the United States, but with Europe. Mercosur could orient itself as a distinct entity toward Europe and in institutional rivalry with NAFTA and the United States. This would not be simply a setback to U.S. economic prospects in a market of 400 million people, accounting for 20 percent of its overseas trade. Above all, it challenges the United States' historic position in the hemisphere and its aspiration for a world order based on a growing community of democracies in the Americas. Both sides should mount major efforts to avoid this looming contest. The United States should make it a national priority to restore the traditional intimacy between the two countries. It needs to move its dealings with Brazil to the highest levels of its government and to display greater sensitivity to the pride and dignity of a society on the verge of becoming a major power. This also requires a commitment to resolve the bitter trade disputes over Brazilian sugar, citrus and steel exports.

A2: CONSULT = NORMAL MEANS (BIOFUELS) ( 1 / 1 )

CONSULTATION WITH BRAZIL ON BIOFUELS IS NOT NORMAL MEANS – HAS NEVER HAPPENED BEFOREVELASCO (chief U.S. representative for the Brazilian Sugar Cane Industry Association (UNICA) 2008[Joel, “BIOFUELS: UNICA's Velasco gives Brazilian sugarcane industry's take on food-to-fuel, RFS” E&ETV's OnPoint Vol. 10 No. 9, Lexis, 13 May 2008//loghry]

Joel Velasco: The conversations between the U.S. and Brazil are very good, but they're not focused on the commercial aspects of this. There's a memorandum of understanding between Brazil and the United States and it's focused in three areas, basic cooperation on basically advanced technology, second-generation technologies; helping other countries outside the United States and Brazil identify ways to pro-duce biofuels locally. We're primarily focused in Central American countries right now, both countries. And then a lot of this is done through these exchanges of scientists. And then, finally, we're working on global standards for ethanol so that there one day can truly be a global market of ethanol as there is of petroleum products. That discussion is ongoing. It's very good. Sometimes I think from the perspective of the industry we wish it went faster, but we'll leave government officials to work at their own rate. The discussion about tariffs and subsidies and market issues has never come out between this thing and I think it's rightfully so. It's an area of disagreement and the governments are trying to focus on the positives.

NORMAL MEANS IS . . .

economic relations with brazil are negotiated by the dept. of commerce, the dept. of treasury or the u.s. trade repHirst (Executive Director, Fundación Centro de Estudos Brasileiros) 2004[Mônica, The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations p.19 //loghry]

SINCE THE MID-1970S, U.S.-BRAZIL ECONOMIC RELATIONS HAVE evolved against a continuously tense background. Because of its debt crisis and new global financial circumstances, Brazil became more exposed to international economic pressures. Hence, due to increases in both its asymmetrical interdependence and its external economic vulnerability, Brazil has lost bargaining power vis-à-vis the United States and has become subordinated to a more complex set of interests and pressures.

Meanwhile, the democratization process in Brazil has generated new trends in domestic politics in which a variety of political and economic interests exert their influence on internal and external affairs. Democratic consolidation has constrained the relative autonomy of the executive power, as business segments, political parties, and even trade unions have expanded their influence, especially in congressional politics. The Foreign Ministry remains the main state agency in charge of bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade negotiations dealing with a variety of domestic pressures, but it shares growing responsibilities with other agencies, especially the Ministries of Development and Agriculture, while monetary and financial external matters are handled by the Ministry of the Economy. In the United States, economic relations with Latin America countries are a result of three government agencies: the Department of the Treasury, which handles financial and monetary affairs, and the Department of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative, which together handle bilateral and regional trade matters.

A2: PERMS ( 1 / 1 )

ANYTHING SHORT OF BINDING CONSULTATION SNOWBALLS BRAZIL’S PREVIOUS FRUSTRATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES – FRACTURES RELATIONSHirst (Executive Director, Fundación Centro de Estudos Brasileiros) 2004[Mônica, The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations p.68-9 //loghry]

As expectations regarding economic and political matters are never totally fulfilled, they generate waves of frustration. Hence, one could detect a cyclical movement triggered by renewed waves of positive expectations. In Brazil, perceptions regarding bilateral relations follow a similar pattern to those applied to the country's identity, which combines the notion of uniqueness with that of a promising future. Brazil has repeatedly made explicit its expectations that the United States should acknowledge its distinctive identity both in Latin America and in the international system. As well, the idea of the inauguration of “new eras”-frequently applied domestic politics-has been recurrent in Brazil's relationship with the United States. Undoubtedly, change can be perceived in the different phases-alliance, alignment, autonomy, and adjustment-that characterized bilateral relations throughout the twentieth century. Yet in all cases, a basic pattern repeats itself, leading to renewed frustrations. It is also interesting to note that while responsibility for change has always been placed more on Brazil's side, unmet expectations are mutual.At present, U.S.-Brazil relations could once again be initiating a phase of unmet expectations. The inauguration of the government of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in Brazil was strongly associated with the idea of change. Relations with the United States could be initiating a new stage characterized by more affirmative stances by the new Brazilian government.The international priorities put forward by the administration of George W. Bush since September 11, 2001, brought in new security variables that will also inevitably impact the near future of bilateral ties. How much change is there to be expected in U.S.-Brazil relations in the near future? Probably less that both sides would wish.“We shall try to share with the United States a mature partnership based upon reciprocal interest and mutual respect”-this was the only statement in Lula's inauguration speech, on January 1, 2003, 1 that referred to Brazil's relationship with the United States. Though brief, this message can be understood from two standpoints. A more concrete dimension relates to the shared responsibilities in the Free Trade Agreement for the Americas (FTAA) process through 2003-2004, as both countries cochair the ongoing negotiations. A more generic interpretation alludes to Brazil's recurring aspiration for political acknowledgment and economic reciprocity on the part of the United States.According to the U.S. ambassador to Brazil, Donna Hrinak, Brazilian frustrations have a point, and their continuous nature leads to more frustration. From her perspective, bilateral relations could and should be more intensive and balanced. One major reason pointed out for Brazil's irrelevance in U.S. foreign policy, compared to that of China and Russia, would be its nonnuclear status. This insignificance worsened after September 11, 2001, which “moved Latin America behind the stage.” 2 In this context, the ambassador's recommendations were that common interests be upgraded by both sides, particularly those regarding defense of democracy, human rights, hemispheric cooperation, and the fight against transnational crime and narcotrafficking. The major developments in bilateral collaboration in many of these fields have been covered in chapter 3.

A2: LIE PERMS ( 1 / 1 )

brazil is highly perceptive of the united state’s actions – nothing goes unnoticed Hirst (Executive Director, Fundación Centro de Estudos Brasileiros) 2004[Mônica, The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations p.40 //loghry]

Two aspects are crucial when focusing on U.S.-Brazil interstate political relations: the first relates to the a priori power structure to which bilateral relations are subordinated; the second refers to the bureaucratic apparatus where decision making takes place.The most important shaping factor in U.S.-Brazil political relations is its asymmetric power structure. For the United States, the importance of Brazil in world politics and international security matters quite little, especially when compared to crucial allies such as Canada and Great Britain, to other world powers such as Germany and Japan, or even former enemies such as Russia. Yet, the reverse does not apply; Brazil keeps a permanent watch on the United States in world politics, and its foreign policy decisions consistently measure the costs and benefits of convergence or discrepancy with the United States.In the post-Cold War period, such caution has increased in the face of unipolar world politics, particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Discrepancies regarding U.S. intervention in world and regional crises have been discretely revealed in episodes such as the Persian Gulf War (1991), the crisis in Haiti (1994), and the Kosovo tragedy (1998). In all cases, the United States would have welcomed Brazil's full support. Even more, Brazil's choice not to join the U.S. bandwagon has contrasted with Argentina's full-scope alignment with the United States after the end of the Cold War. 1 Convergence between Argentina and the United States in international security and world politics was not only a factor of tension in Argentine-Brazilian relations but also helped to mislead official U.S. expectations toward Brazil.

Genuine consultation is the foundation for US-Brazillian relationsH. E. Rubens Barbosa July 26, 2000 (Brazilian Ambassador to US, FDCH Political Transcripts)

So I think that the -- the relationship between Brazil and United States and our view and our common view in the hemisphere were -- are shared and the increased consultations between our two countries in this frank and transparent way, problem all this areas, are good and -- and are positive, fruitful to our two countries. And I think that the title of our -- of this hearing, "Strategic -- Brazil: Strategic Partners or Regional Competitors?" as I -- as we see it, we see United States as s -- as strategic partner, and we would like to have the same view from United States because the stakes between Brazil and United States are -- are the sort that there's no alternative to strategic partnership.

A2: BRAZIL WON’T PROLIFERATE ( 1 / 2 )

strong u.s.—brazil relations crucial to allay the brazilian military’s distrust of america and subsequent nuclear proliferationHirst (Executive Director, Fundación Centro de Estudos Brasileiros) 2004[Mônica, The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations p.44-45 //loghry]

In defense matters, Brazilian military officials have not left behind strong nationalistic feelings that contribute to a defensive posture in negotiations with the United States. However, after a period of great resistance, closer relations have been accomplished. Besides regular bilateral military exercises, the creation of a Brazilian Defense Ministry in 1998 met long-held U.S. expectations. A Bilateral Working Group for Defense was inaugurated in 1999, and Brazilian authorities hosted and actively participated at the Fourth Defense Ministerial of the Americas (2000).The creation of the Brazilian Defense Ministry has in fact eased U.S.-Brazil understandings in security matters. At first, Brazilian authorities strongly resisted the idea, which in the 1990s was one of the issues on the shopping list of security matters in U.S. talks with Brazil. The resistance mainly came from the military, which would not agree to subordinate its forces to a single civil authority. However, at the start of its second term, the Cardoso administration finally managed to enforce the initiative, which immediately led to a serious debate among the military, academics, and politicians regarding the future of Brazil's defense policy. As the ministry took on the task of preparing a white paper as its first important mission, it opened an internal debate on defense policy. The result, in general terms, was that different positions were taken by the military, the Foreign Ministry, the presidency, and the legislative branch. Nationalistic and anti-American stances have been more frequent among the military-particularly the army-and in the Brazilian Congress, regardless of party affiliation. Less nationalistic and more cooperative stances toward the United States were shared by the Foreign Ministry and Cardoso.Improvements were also made in U.S.-Brazil negotiations over sensitive technology. This had been a taboo subject for both countries since the misunderstandings of the mid-1970s, when the United States opposed Brazil's nuclear agreement with Germany. Twenty-five years later, an agreement was reached for U.S. companies to use an equatorial launching site at a base on the northeastern Brazilian coast. For the Cardoso government, even though this agreement did not give Brazil access to technology, it opened up an opportunity for the country to participate in the international aerospace market. 6 These negotiations helped dissipate U.S. concerns regarding the agreement Brazil had reached with the Ukraine for the supply of rocket technology, while Brazilian officials expected to start a more enduring relationship with the United States in an area that had been a source of mistrust for almost three decades.

A2: BRAZIL WON’T PROLIFERATE ( 2 / 2 )

New international and domestic realities have reshaped perceptions in brazil – the military would prefer a multipolar world, has the impetus to challange u.s. primacyHirst (Executive Director, Fundación Centro de Estudos Brasileiros) 2004[Mônica, The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations p.64 //loghry]

On Brazil's side, perceptions regarding the United States usually involve defensive considerations. Governmental and nongovernmental actors share the idea that the United States represents more a source of concern than of opportunity for the country, and that U.S. hegemony imposes more costs than benefits. The U.S. presence as a superpower has been a fact of life for Brazil since the end of World War II, and throughout the second half of the twentieth century the United States was perceived by Brazilian elites as the most important power factor in world affairs. The strategic constraints imposed by a bipolar system down-played the identification of the United States as an adversary, though in many occasions more was expected regarding economic support for Brazil. Hence, anti-American sentiments have been linked mostly to economic nationalism.Nevertheless, the emergence of new international and domestic realities have reshaped perceptions in Brazil. A combination of contributing factors should be pointed out: the end of the Cold War, the expansion of economic exposure caused by financial and trade globalization, and the growing importance of domestic public opinion as a consequence of the deepening of democracy. In this context, the consolidation of U.S. leadership in the world since the end of the Cold War has deepened concerns among political, bureaucratic, academic, business, and social organizations as well as the military in Brazil. In the Foreign Ministry the dominant perception is that a multipolar world order, sustained upon effective and bilateral institutions, would offer more opportunities and fewer constraints than the present unipolar momentum based on U.S. primacy.

A2: NO WAR OVER TRADE ( 1 / 1 )

trade issues spillover to security issuesHirst (Executive Director, Fundación Centro de Estudos Brasileiros) 2004[Mônica, The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations p.39-40 //loghry]

A possible, though not wholly satisfactory, hierarchy differentiates first-tier and second-tier political issues. The first is concerned with the state-to-state agenda, addressing world and regional politics and international security matters; the second encompasses the agenda of “global issues” set by societal movements, nongovernmental actors, and public opinion. The interaction between Brazilian democratization, on the one side, and the expanded community of nongovernmental actors attentive to world affairs in the United States, on the other, has had a major effect upon U.S.-Brazilian political relations. Though the erosion of the boundary between domestic and international pressures is a common trait in both first- and second-tier issues, it tends to be more visible in the latter.

The issues on the first-tier agenda deal with interstate relations. They include diplomatic affairs, as well as international, regional, and bilateral security matters, and evolve according to world events and crises in light of the permanent national security interests of both countries. Although the second-tier agenda also involves interstate interaction, it is essentially set by nongovernmental actors and interests. It is, by definition, an open and extensive agenda in which Brazilian and U.S. societal movements and organizations aim, in the first place, to broaden perceptions and approaches in bilateral relations and, second, to push for change in Brazilian state policies. The core issues of this agenda have been human rights and the environment. In both cases, there has been a permanent spillover into new and related topics, as the mobilization of different groups and organizations takes place. Immigration, media, and public opinion have also been included in the second-tier agenda.

AFF

CONSULT DEFENSE ( 1 / 1 )

Brazil does not want a formal alliance – only risks relations being hurt – no offense for the counterplanPeter HAKIM, Jan/Feb 04, President of Inter-American Dialogue “The reluctant partner,” Foreign Affairs

To sustain constructive ties, Washington must keep its expectations realistic. Some analysts and U.S. officials have advocated a far tighter relationship between the two countries, with more regular and structured collaboration. But Brazilians have traditionally preferred pragmatic and opportunistic cooperation with the United States on specific issues. Still somewhat distrustful of Washington, Brasilia is wary of creating the expectation that it will quasi-automatically support U.S. positions, compromise its ability to set an independent course for itself, or diminish the diversity of its other international relations. Brazil, in other words, has little interest in developing a privileged relationship with the United States of the type Argentina once sought. That leaves Washington with having to earn Brasilia's cooperation issue by issue, without presuming it will be granted. Still, the relationship has been remarkably stable and consistent over the years. The two countries have not been steady allies or continuing adversaries, but they have usually worked productively together. Today the United States can usually count on Brazil for an important measure of collaboration on most issues and can usually avoid its outright opposition on others

LIE PERM SOLVENCY ( 1 / 1 )

Perm – do the plan and tell Brazil we are consulting them about it, No risk of leaksRichard REEVES, Correspondent with the Universal Press Syndicate, 12-24-2002 [Tulsa World]

Sound of silence from the White House is deafening to correspondents WASHINGTON -- "If Reagan was the Teflon president, Bush is the leak-proof one," said a White House correspondent who has covered both men. "Nothing gets in and, sure as hell, nothing gets out." There was great and grudging respect in that complaint. Bush or his people know the secret: If you keep your mouths shut, there's not much the Washington press can do to you. Howell Raines, now the executive editor of The New York Times, once growled that being a White House correspondent was not much different from stenography. But at least in those days -- Raines covered the Reagan presidency -- there were two things to transcribe, official leaks and unofficial leaks. The official ones from "a high source" were part of governance, often trial balloons floated to test public opinion. The unofficial or unauthorized stream was an approximation of what was really going on, who was doing what to whom and why. The unofficial stuff, which usually goes from stream to flood when Democrats are in the White House, was the key to understanding a president and his works. But that has pretty much dried up these days. We are watching, but not hearing, a new peak in news management -- or, at least, noise management. These folks are not squealing on each other. It is not a question of "spin"; it is a question of silence.

A2: BRAZIL PROLIF ( 1 / 1 )

no way brazil will proliferate, it recognizes the force of multilateralism and is party to the mtcr and nptHIRST (Executive Director, Fundación Centro de Estudos Brasileiros) 2004[Mônica, The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations p.42-43 //loghry]

Since the mid-1990s, Brazilian foreign policy has developed a positive agenda regarding the international security expectations of the United States, particularly regarding adherence to international nonproliferation regimes. In 1994, Brazil joined the Missile Technology Control Regime, and in 1997 it ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the same time, Brazil has also supported the enhancement of multilateral initiatives, particularly the expanded role of the United Nations in world politics, while its increased participation in UN peacekeeping operations has meant that it has worked more with the United States in world affairs. Brazil participated in the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador, the UN Observer Mission in Mozambique, and the UN Mission in Angola (where it sent 1,300 soldiers, the largest military force it has sent abroad since World War II). Brazil also contributed police forces to the 1999 UN peace operation in East Timor.

LEADERSHIP TURN ( 1 / 1 )

a stronger brazil will unify south america into a single bloc that will destabilize the u.s.’ trade and security prominenceHirst (Executive Director, Fundación Centro de Estudos Brasileiros) 2004[Mônica, The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations p.46 //loghry]

Nevertheless, however discretely, concerns have been raised in the United States regarding the possibility that a more active Brazil could assemble South America into a single bloc that would destabilize U.S. preeminence in the Western Hemisphere. As Brazil aims to become more active in regional affairs, discrepancies with the United States in regional trade and security issues tend to politicize U.S. hemispheric affairs, and the idea that Brazil could be forging a “unified regional front in negotiations with the United States” has gained impetus within South American diplomatic and political circles. 11 Hence, Brazil's initiative to call a South American presidential summit was perceived as an attempt to “blunt Washington's strategy in trade talks of favoring bilateral agreements in which it has the upper hand.” 12 Meanwhile, countries like Argentina and Chile have also manifested more caution than enthusiasm toward Brazilian diplomatic moves in South America.Brazil has been reluctant to follow the U.S. drive to revitalize its inter-American leadership. Though the essence of this agenda consists of a hemispheric free trade agreement, it has spilled over to other issues such as defense of democracy, regional security, and common social policies. In this context, Brazil has been perceived by U.S. officials and scholars as an obstructive actor that has impeded the United States from freely setting and commanding the agenda. 13 However, tensions between the United States and Brazil were more visible before and during the 1994 Miami Summit than at the 1998 Santiago Summit or the 2001 Quebec Summit. A plausible explanation for this is that the United States did not hold the same vigorous position at the Santiago Summit that it did in Miami, due to the missing fast-track authority needed by U.S. president Bill Clinton to carry out the FTAA negotiations. At the Quebec Summit, full convergence was reached regarding the political agenda, especially with respect to defense of democracy. Meanwhile, however, discrepancies on free trade negotiations became particularly thorny.

THIS CAUSES MULTIPLE NUCLEAR WARS, SYSTEMIC GLOBAL INSTABILITY, AND MAGNIFIES ALL IMPACTSFERGUSON—2004 [Naill, Professor, History, School of Business, New York University and Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, September-October “A World Without Power” – Foreign Policy http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3009996.html]

So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous--roughly 20 times more--so friction between the world's disparate "tribes" is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization--the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital--has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization--which a new Dark Age would produce--would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy--from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai--would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and

Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony--its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier--its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity--a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.

relations alt cause: colombia ( 1 / 1 )

relations alt cause: u.s. intervention in colombia is a constant strain on relationsHirst (Executive Director, Fundación Centro de Estudos Brasileiros) 2004[Mônica, The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations p.47 //loghry]

The main source of difficulties in U.S.-Brazil regional politics at present stems from the delicate situation in Colombia, as growing U.S. military involvement in support of the Colombian government in combating drug traffickers and guerrillas has had a negative impact on the security conditions in the Amazon region near Brazil's borders. 15 Brazil is particularly concerned with Colombia's political future and the possibility that it has become tied to a deepening U.S. political and military presence.Brazilian apprehensions have dramatically increased since the U.S. Congress approved Plan Colombia in 2000, which commits 1.3 billion dollars to fight drug trafficking in that country. 16 The connection between defense policy and the protection of the Amazon has increasingly led the Brazilian military, politicians, and government officials to fear the effects of U.S. intervention in the area. Meanwhile, the increased presence of Brazilian military on the border with Colombia has expanded budgetary needs and enhanced the importance of defense policy in Brazil's regional agenda. The Querari Operation, launched in 1999, became Brazil's largest military operation in the Amazon region. It involved 5,000 men with the collaboration of the navy and the air force, with a jungle brigade formed by specially trained indigenous soldiers. The government has also substantially increased the budget of the Amazon region's Calha Norte Project, which gives high priority to social work and infrastructure initiatives in areas inhabited by poor populations as well as indigenous communities. While Brazilian military and police forces have demonstrated their intention to assume defense measures against narcoguerrilla activities in the Amazon, they face a dramatic lack of resources to meet their needs.

consult shunning internal ( 1 / 1 )

shunning—the u.s. state department still reports on brazil’s OCCURRING human rights abusesHirst (Executive Director, Fundación Centro de Estudos Brasileiros) 2004[Mônica, The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations p.54-55 //loghry]

While recent U.S. Department of State reports acknowledge government efforts to improve the human rights conditions, they also point out the overall limited results. A sense of disappointment is transmitted regarding judiciary action on police violence and the enforcement of local legislation. 37 These reports also illustrate the growing concern among U.S. and Brazilian NGOs toward the protection of two minority groups, indigenous people and Afro-Brazilians. The greatest problem faced by the indigenous population has been to secure exclusive use of the lands and natural resources of the reservation areas. Brazilian constitutional law is quite explicit regarding cultural and patrimonial rights in reservation areas. Brazilian indigenous policies have been a matter of domestic debate and transnational campaigns. 38 This mobilization has been motivated by two factors: the connections of indigenous rights movements with the landless peasant group in the northern part of Brazil, and the merging of indigenous rights with environmental protection in the Amazon region.

consult agenda pltx links ( 1 / 1 )

consultation with brazil includes presidential diplomacyHIRST (Executive Director, Fundación Centro de Estudos Brasileiros) 2004[Mônica, The United States and Brazil: A Long Road of Unmet Expectations p.41 //loghry]

It is important to keep in mind that there is a striking difference between the interbureaucratic realm in charge of bilateral relations in Brazil and in the United States. On the American side, interstate relations are carried forward by a bureaucratic mélange essentially conducted by the U.S. State Department, the National Security Council, and the U.S. Trade Representative. In Brazil, they are centralized at the Foreign Ministry, referred to as Itamaraty, which follows the general guidelines and political preferences made explicit by the presidency. Fine-tuning among the presidency, the Foreign Ministry, and the Brazilian embassy in Washington, D.C., has always been the bureaucratic mix that has taken care of U.S.-Brazil relations. In the United States, less centralized foreign policy decisions have on many occasions facilitated an unlinked negotiation process, unlike in Brazil, where the role played by the Foreign Ministry has stimulated a convergent line of action among different areas of negotiation. More recently, a particular effort has been made to use presidential diplomacy as an instrument for improving U.S.-Brazil political communications on global and regional matters.