contemporary financial intermediation

27
Contemporary Financial Intermediation Chapter 2. The Nature and Variety of Financial Intermediation “Don’t it always seem to go that you don’t know what you’ve got ’til it’s gone?” Joni Mitchell

Upload: filia

Post on 06-Jan-2016

68 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

DESCRIPTION

“ Don’t it always seem to go that you don’t know what you’ve got ’til it’s gone?” Joni Mitchell. Contemporary Financial Intermediation. Chapter 2. The Nature and Variety of Financial Intermediation. Key Questions. What are financial intermediaries (F.I.s)? - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Chapter 2. The Nature and Variety of Financial Intermediation

“Don’t it always seem to go that you don’t know what you’ve got ’til it’s gone?”

Joni Mitchell

Page 2: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

2

Key Questions

• What are financial intermediaries (F.I.s)?

• Why do we have F.I.s? What do F.I.s do that could not be done without them?

• What services do F.I.s provide?

• What is the scope of the financial services industry?

• How do we classify different types of F.I.s?

Page 3: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

3

Definition of F.I.s

• Financial intermediaries (F.I.s) are entities that intermediate between providers and users of financial capital. (from surplus side to deficit side)

• In contrast with nonfinancial firms,– F.I.s hold relatively large quantities of

financial claims (contracts of the indebtedness of their clients) as assets

– F.I.s tend to be more leveraged

– Have no physical inventories

Page 4: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

4

Why do we have F.I.s?

• Key informational problems that make the role of F.I.s necessary

Pre-contract Information

al Asymmetry

Duplicated

Screening

Post-contract

Informational

Asymmetry

Moral Hazard

Adverse Selection

An FI can help avoid duplicated screening by individuals by exploiting the power of information reusability.

Page 5: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

5

Why do we have F.I.s?

• Information-based financial services produced by F.I.s:– “Brokerage” – joining unfamiliar but well-

suited and complementary transactors in financial claims (much like the marriage broker would)

– “Qualitative asset transformation” (QAT) – allocating credit presumably to its highest and best uses while reconfiguring the attributes of the financial claims held by its clienteles

Brokerage QAT

Financial Intermediation Services

Page 6: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

6

The Brokerage Function

• An important component of financial intermediation services:– Bringing together transactors in financial

claims with complementary needs (compensated with a fee for performing this service)

– A broker’s stock-in-trade is information

• Two advantages of a broker as an information processor:– Specific skills in interpreting subtle (not

readily observable) signals– Cross-sectional (across customers) and

intertemporal (through time) information reusability e.g. a real estate broker typically has better information than the average home buyer or seller about supply and demand conditions and is able to reuse this information

Page 7: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

7

The Brokerage Function

• The broker helps resolve problems that arise from informational asymmetry– Pre-contract informational asymmetry:

adverse selection and duplicated screening

– Post-contract informational asymmetry: moral hazard

Page 8: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

8

Adverse Selection

• Akerlof (1970): used car example (Chapter 1)

• An example in lending:– Borrowers wish to overstate their credit

worthiness lenders increase loan interest rate to compensate higher credit risk low-credit-risk borrowers drop out lenders left with high-credit-risk borrowers

• Solution: F.I.s perform the brokerage function of credit analysis to sort out borrowers of different credit risks and minimize adverse selection problems

Page 9: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

9

Duplicated Screening: Information Reusability and Brokerage

• An example of marriage broker– Before there is a marriage broker:

• 100 men and 100 women searching for the “perfect” marriage partner, x = 100

• Cost of evaluating one person, c = $25

• Total evaluation cost= $25 2 100 100= $500,000= 2cx2

– Now, enter the broker who needs to evaluate each man and woman only once:

• Total evaluation cost= $25 2 100= $5,000= 2cx

– Savings, S = $495,000 = 2cx(x – 1)

Page 10: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

10

Duplicated Screening (cont.)

• Continue with the example– The savings with broker arise due to cross-

sectional reusability of information• A peculiarity of information: its use does

not result in its consumption

– Assume the broker has a relative advantage in information evaluation:

• Cb = broker’s evaluation cost

• Co = others’ evaluation cost

• Co > Cb

• Savings due to the broker, S = 2x[xCo – Cb],

which grows with the gap, Co – Cb

– Also, savings increase as the grid size x increases

Page 11: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

11

Information Reusability

• Two types of information reusability– Cross-sectional: the same information can

be utilized across different users

– Intertemporal: the same information can be reused through time

• To summarize:– For a given attribute, the larger the grid, the

more compelling the need for the broker

– For a given size grid, the less readily observable the attribute (the more subtle the signal), the more important the skills and reputation of the broker, e.g., phone books vs. security analysts or loan officers or choosing thoroughbred horse

Trivially observable Elevating the importance of broker skills

p. 47

Page 12: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

12

Moral Hazard

• Moral hazard: situations in which the incentives of principal and agent diverge (See Chapter 1)– One party of the transaction can take

actions at the expense of the other party– These actions are “hidden” from the

injured party and cannot be directly controlled or prevented

• Examples:– In insurance, the insured may underinvest

in costly efforts to prevent adverse outcomes

– In banking, borrowers may choose excessively risky projects (asset substitution)

Page 13: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

13

Moral Hazard

• Solution: F.I.s’ special skills in monitoring attenuate moral hazard

• Examples:– Banks periodically examine borrowers’

business and financial condition and intervene in operating strategy if necessary

– Insurance contracts use ex post pricing adjustments to deter moral hazard

– Venture capitalists threaten entrepreneurs the transfer of control

Adjust ex-post insurance premium considering the customer’s deeds

Page 14: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

14

Qualitative Asset Transformation (QAT)

• F.I.s need not expose their own capital to risk to perform the brokerage function– The processing of risk is not central to the

production of brokerage services

• But, some financial intermediation activities require F.I.s to expose their capital to risk – this is when F.I.s perform Qualitative Asset Transformation (QAT)

Page 15: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

15

An Example of QAT

• QAT transforms the nature of financial claims

Home Mortgage

Home Mortgage S & LS & L DepositsDeposits

Home Mortgages

•Illiquid

•Default Risk

•Prepayment Risk

•Interest Rate Risk

Deposits

•Infinitely Divisible

•Highly Liquid

•Little Default Risk

Page 16: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

16

QAT and Risk

• Every QAT requires a mismatch on the F.I.’s balance sheet

• Such a mismatch reflects an acceptance of some type of risk exposure by the F.I., for example:– Holding assets of longer duration than its

liabilities

– Reducing unit size of clients’ claims by holding assets of larger unit size than liabilities (“lot breaking”)

– Enhancing liquidity of clients’ claim by holding assets less liquid than liabilities

– Numeraire (currency identity)

Page 17: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

17

QAT and Risk

• Hence, risk is integral to QAT

• Three alternatives available to F.I.s to manage this risk:– Accept risk passively

– Diversify and reduce risk

– Shift risk to others through the use of claims such as swaps, forward contracts, futures, options, swaptions, etc.

The more risk-shifting, the more the QAT reverts to brokerage

Page 18: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

18

Service Provided by F.I.s

Page 19: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

19

The Variety of F.I.s

• Depository F.I.s– F.I.s that finance (at least partly) with

deposits

• Nondepository F.I.s– F.I.s that do not finance with deposits

• The Government• F.I.s on the periphery

• Blurring distinctions:– Between banks and other depository F.I.s

– Between depository and nondepository F.I.s

– Between investment banks and commercial banks

Page 20: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

20

Market Share

• Commercial banks are still the biggest in the consumer loan market

Other Finance

Savings Institutions

Insurance and Pension Funds

Commercial Banks

GSEs; Agency- and GSE-backed Mortgage Pools; and ABS issuers

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Page 21: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

21

Depository F.I.s

• Depository F.I.s operate with high leverage even a small return on total assets translates into a high return of equity

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

Bank Equity Capital as a % of Total Assets

Page 22: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

22

Depository F.I.s

• Return on assets and return on equity at commercial banks:

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

1.6

1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

ROA ROE

Page 23: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

23

Depository F.I.s

• Commercial Banks– Widely considered as the center of the financial

intermediation universe– Twin roles as distributor of currency and as

producer and servicer of demand deposits– Hold a great variety of earning assets– All shareholder owned

• Thrifts– More narrowly specialized asset portfolios:

residential mortgage loans, consumer savings, marketable securities, etc.

– Substantially mutual

• Credit Unions– Specialized in consumer savings– Exclusively mutual

Page 24: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

24

Nondepository F.I.s

• Venture capitalists

• Finance companies

• Insurance companies

• Pensions

• Mutual funds

• Hedge funds

• Investment banking

Page 25: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

25

The Role of Government

• Vast government enterprises that routinely provide a wide variety of financial services, for example:– Old Age

– Survivors and Disability Insurance

– Workers’ Compensation

– Medicare

– Housing agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae)

– …

• The U.S. government is far and away the largest F.I. in the country and arguably in the world

Page 26: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

26

F.I.s on the Periphery

• Gambling

• Pawnbrokers

• Payday Lending

• Title Lenders

• Loan Sharks

Page 27: Contemporary Financial Intermediation

Contemporary Financial IntermediationStuart I. Greenbaum and Anjan V. Thakor

27

Conclusion

• The deposit revolution continues to reshape deposit-dependent F.I.s; depository F.I.s are very likely to be fundamentally restructured in the next 5 years.

• Major competitors for commercial banks and thrifts include insurance companies, finance companies, pensions, and mutual funds.

• One can never forget the role of the government in the financial services industry.