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7/28/2019 Contentious regions in the European Union : nationalist parties and the coordination of European policies in federal member states

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Acknowledgements

This book looks at how European regions, particularly those governed by nationalistparties, decide to collaborate with central governments and other regions on EU policy-making. This topic has been studied in the past, but in order to explore Europeanizationor the ability of the European Union to transform its member states. Recent literature onregions has also focused on establishing whether they, together with European insti-tutions in a multilevel setting, have eroded member states power to shape EU policies.This book, however, approaches these issues with a different aim to establish whetherregional interests as defined by nationalist parties receive more consideration frommember states, the Commission or the European Parliament than do those of other

regions. While this book makes clear that the autonomy enjoyed by nationalist party-led regions is no compensation for the lack of co-operation between wider groups ofregions, it also aims to shed new light on the difficulties of coordination within federalsystems. Finally, I examine the lesser known links between regional interests and theEuropean Parliament. Surprisingly, the European Parliament appears to be a moreeffective ally of the regions than the Commission and, even more importantly, hasfunctioned as an actor promoting agendas that overlap with those of regions and ofcultural minorities.

The policy fields discussed here audiovisual and cohesion policy as well as theregional cases from Germany, Italy, and Spain, stem from my PhD research. In thissense, this book is an abridged version of my thesis. However it represents, I hope, asignificant improvement, not only in style, but also in the analysis of the institutionalexplanatory variable the norms regulating the access of regions to the Council of theEuropean Union. I have labelled these norms coordination mechanisms, and tounderstand them better I have drawn on Renate Mayntz and Fritz Scharpfs frameworkof actor-centred institutionalism. Most of the research discussed here was conductedduring my PhD and completed in the summer of 2006. Nevertheless, I have addressedseveral important contributions to the fields of Europeanization, nationalist parties, andfederalism published after this date.

I seek here to recognize if not repay the debts to those who have made this bookpossible. Because the research and writing of this book took many years, I reliedheavily upon the support of numerous institutions and individuals. I am glad to ac-knowledge the support of the DFG, or the German Research Foundation, which fundedthe graduate program in which I participated, Das Neue Europa, at the HumboldtUniversity in Berlin. The program was later renamed the Berlin Graduate School of

Social Sciences and sponsored by the DAAD, the German Academic Exchange Ser-vice. Numerous forms of support from both the DAAD and the DFG throughout theseyears, including a fellowship, travel expenses to conduct time-consuming comparativeresearch, and funds to purchase books, are gratefully acknowledged. During the laststage of my PhD I also benefited from the Marie Curie pre-doctoral program of the

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European Commission that enabled me to spend eight months at the Centre for Com-

parative Research in Social Welfare of the University of Stirling in Scotland. Soon aftersubmitting my dissertation I began work at the Social Science Research Centre Berlin(WZB), where I spent the two following years benefitting from all the freedom ne-cessary to finish this and begin other academic projects. Subsequently I spent one yearin postdoctoral research at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) inMexico City, which allowed me to conclude my work on this manuscript.

Behind these institutions were a cast of helpful individuals who frequently wentabove and beyond the call of duty in assisting my research. Without the engagement ofGert-Joachim Glaessner and Martin Nagelschmidt, I and many others would not have

benefited from the support ofDas Neue Europa and of the Graduate School of SocialSciences at the School of Social Science of the Humboldt University. I would also liketo acknowledge the support of my supervisors, Peter A. Kraus and, most particularly,Claus Offe, who has guided me since the earliest stage of my research. Participation in

professor Offes research seminar improved my work and enriched my understandingof the social sciences. At the University of Stirling, Jochen Clasen was a most gracioushost. At the University of Stirling, I also had several invaluable opportunities forexchange with Peter Lynch. My academic home at the Berlin Social Science ResearchCenter (WZB) was the Research Unit Democracy: Structures, Performances, andChallenges. I benefited significantly from talks with virtually every member of theresearch centre. I would like, however, to specifically mention its director, WolfgangMerkel, who allowed his team members the freedom to pursue their work and to offercriticism, Christian Henkes, who was understanding and helpful in every way imagin-able, and Bernhard Wessels, who provided insightful criticism of my ideas on therepresentation of territorial interests of the European Parliament. Sonia Alonso, whogenerously shared her knowledge on nationalist parties and Basque nationalism, de-serves special mention. I would also like to mention Gudrun Mouna who was the true

core of the research area and has become, in the meantime, a loyal friend. A mostproductive post-doctoral stay at the UNAM was made possible by Gina Zabludovsky,who extended to me an invitation to carry out this and another project on the receptionof German sociology in the Spanish-speaking world. Luis E. Gmez welcomed me atthe Centro de Estudios Tericos y Multidisciplinarios en Ciencias Sociales at theSchool of Political and Social Sciences of the UNAM. I would also like to thankVernica Camero and Alfredo Andrade for helping me with logistics. They provided,together with Ral Zamorano Faras, hours of good conversation and a most valuedintroduction to Mexican academia.

Several Spanish colleagues supported my project of writing a PhD and my academiccareer from a very early stage. Among them, I would like to mention Juan Linz, ngelRivero, Fernando Vallespn, and Santiago Petschen and his Potsdamer friend Raimund

Krmer. Jos Ramn Montero facilitated my access to the superior facilities of theFundacin Juan March. As a guest of the Fundacin I benefited enormously fromcountless exchanges with other students. Ignacio Urquizu, lvaro Martnez and Al-fonso Egea read and commented on my work with intelligence and tact.

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The following persons have offered insightful criticism of my research at various

stagesGary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe, Tanja Brzel, Charalampos Koutalakis, Klausvon Beyme, Charlotte Halpern and Claire Colomb. During the last stage of writingErica McCarthy provided efficient and friendly editorial help. In the summer of 2009 Iassumed a new position at the Department of International Studies at the Centre forResearch and Teaching and Economics (CIDE) in Mexico City where I benefitted fromthe encouragement and support of my new colleagues and in particular of FerranMartnez, rika Ruiz, Lorena Ruano, and Jorge Schiavon. I would like to thank JesseRogers for reading and editing the whole manuscript, and for not losing his sense ofhumour while doing so, as well as Julia Klpfer from Nomos for attending my nu-merous requests regarding the layout of the manuscript.

The support of other individuals also deserves acknowledgment here for their if notstrictly academic contributions. Among these are the approximately one hundredtwenty people I interviewed in Mainz, Brussels, Rome, Bilbao, Florence, Madrid,

Barcelona, San Sebastin and Valencia. These individuals ranged from former Spanishministers, committee chairs, rapporteurs, committee advisors and members of theEuropean Parliament to higher officials and middle-ranks in the federal and regionaladministrations in Berlin, Madrid, and Rome as well as Tuscany, Rhineland-Palatinate,the Basque Country, Galicia, Extremadura and Catalonia. They deserve my gratitudefor finding the time to sit down for interviews, answer questions over the phone, andrespond to detailed questionnaires on the intricacies of member state agendas forcohesion policy. I hope some of them will read this book, or parts of it, and realize thattheir generosity has paid off; they may even gain a new comparative perspective onissues that are part of their daily and highly specialized work. In this context, I wouldlike to mention Arturo Garca-Tizn Lpez, who enabled me to access a group ofofficials in Spanish politics who otherwise would have been unreachable. My friendIigo Cabo and his extensive family were my hosts while conducting research in

Bilbao; they provided me with a glimpse into the wide range of political views withinthe Basque Country.

Finally, I want to acknowledge the support of friends and relatives who have sup-ported me throughout the writing of this book. Many among them are scholars, but allare close friends. Milena Bchs, Micha Maschke, Jinuk Shin, Orkan Ksemen, Jan-Henrik Meyer, Cristbal Rovira, Tomila Lankina, Mauricio Tenorio, Claire Colomb,Grete, Hans, and Ruth Misselwitz, Ulrike Meyer-Hamme, Arturo Garca-Tizn, PepeHernndez, and Alicia Fernndez. I am grateful for the assistance of my sister Mnicaand her husband, Michael Bennett, who patiently indulged my pleas for editorial helpand advice. I would also like to thank others who have given me a hand throughout theyears. Among them are ngel Laiz, Fernando lvarez and Luisa Castejn, IgnacioTriana and Silvia Morcillo as well as Rafael Morcillo and Isabel Senz, and Gonzalo

Morcillo. My beloved companion and travel mate, Marcella Dallmayer, was a constantsource of support and happiness (if there is such a thing). Two most unlike couplesshould also be mentioned here, Sofia Laiz and Jose Luis Morcillo, my parents, andConsuelo Laiz and the late Javier Cubillo. It is to both of them that this book is dedi-cated.

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Abbreviations

AEBR Association of European Border RegionsAGALEV Anders Gaan LevenAH Agrupacin Herrea IndependienteAI FAR Autonomia Integrale FedARD Arbeitsgemeinschaft der ffentlich-rechtlichen Rund-

funkanstalten der Bundesrepublik DeutschlandAER Assembly of European RegionsAREV Assemble des Rgions Europennes ViticolesBIAs Business Interest AssociationBL Basic Law, GrundgesetzBNG Bloque Nacionalista Galego

BOE Boletn Oficial del EstadoCAP Common Agricultural PolicyCARCE Conferencia para Asuntos Relacionados con las Comu-

nidades EuropeasCC Coalicin CanariaCCTV Corporaci Catalana TelevisinCDN Convergencia de Demcratas de NavarreCdP Conferenza dei Presidenti delle Regioni e delle Province

AutonomeCDU Christdemokratische UnionCES Committee on Employment and Social AffairsCHA Chunta AragonesistaCI Community InitiativeCiU Convergncia i UniCoC Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and the MediaCoM Council of MinistersCOP Coalici d'Organitzacions ProgressistesCoR Committee of the RegionsCPMR Conference of Peripheral and Maritime RegionsCPPF Consejo de Poltica Fiscal y FinancieraCRP Committee on Regional PolicyCSP Christliche-Soziale ParteiCSR Conferenza Stato-RegioniCSU Christlich-Soziale UnionCVP Christelijke VolkspartijDPS Dipartimento per le Politiche di SviluppoDG Directorate-GeneralDS Democratici di SiniestraEA Eusko AlkartasunaEAGGF European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee FundEB-IU Ezker Batua Izquierda Unida

EBU European Broadcasting UnionEC European CommunityECJ European Court of JusticeECOFIN Council of the Economics and Finance MinistersECOLO Ecologistes ConfederesEES European Employment Strategy

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EFA European Free AllianceEH Euskal Herritarrok EIRA European Industrial Regions AssociationsEiTB Euskal Irrati TelebistaELA-STV Euskal Langileen Alkartasuna Solidaridad de Traba-

jadores VascosELDR European Liberal Democrat and Reform PartyEMK EuropaministerkonferenzEP European ParliamentEPP European Popular PartyERC Esquerra Republicana de CatalunyaERDF European Regional Development FundESC Economic and Social CommitteeESF European Social FundETA Euskadi ta Askatasuna (Basque Fatherland and Freedom)EU European UnionEUZBLG Gesetz ber die Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Lndern in

Angelegenheiten der Europischen UnioFDP Freie Demokratische ParteiFIFG Financial Instrument for Fisheries GuidanceFN Front NationalFNB Front Nouveau de BelgiqueFORTA Federacin de Organismos de Radio y Televisin Au-

tonmicosGATS General Agreement on Trade in ServicesGATT General Agreement on Tariffs and TradeGP General ProvisionsHB Herri BatasunaICAA Instituto Ciencias y Artes CinematogrficasIC-V Iniciativa per Catalunya VerdsIGC Intergovernmental ConferenceIl Centro UDA Il Centro Unione democratica altoatesinaIl Centro UPD Il Centro Union Popolare Democratica

IU Izquierda UnidaLAB Lapurdi baxenabarreLadins-DPS Ladins Demokratische Partei SdtirolLOAPA Ley Orgnica de Armonizacin del Proceso AutonmicoMAP Ministerio para las Administraciones PblicasMEP Member of the European ParliamentMLG Multilevel GovernanceMS Member StateMSSD Most Similar Systems Design

NUTS Nomenclature of Territorial Units for StatisticsPA Partido AndalucistaPACTE Pacte de ProgrsPAR Partido AragonsPATT Partito Autonomista Trentino TirolesePAV Asociacin de Productores Audiovisuales ValencianosPDS Partei des Demokratischen SozialismusPES Party of European SocialistsPFF Partei fr Freiheit und FortschrittPJUPDB PJU steht fr PDB (Partei der deutschsprachigen Belgier)

+Juropa + UnabhngigePNV-EAJ Partido Nacionalista Vasco Eusko Alderdi JeltzaleaPP Partido Popular

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PR Partido RiojanoPRC Partido Regionalista de CantabriaPRL-FDF Parti Rformateur Liberal Front Dmocratique des Fran-

cophonesPS Parti SocialistePSC Parti Social ChrtienPSE Partido Socialista de EuskadiPSM-EN Partit Socialista de Mallorca Entesa NacionalistaPSOE Partido Socialista Obrero EspaolREGLEG Conference of European Regions with Legislative Power RETI European Regions of Industrial TechnologyRoP Rules of ProceduresRTVE Radio Televisin EspaolaRTVV Radio Televisin ValencianaSEA Single European ActSLL Sistemi locali di lavoroSP Sozialistische Partei

SP! AGA Socialistische Partij+Anders Gaan LevenSPJ Socialistische PartijSPD Sozialistische Partei DeutschlandsSSW Sdschleswigscher WhlerverbandSNP Scottish National PartySVP Sdtiroler VolksparteiTC-PNC Tierra Comunera-Partido Nacionalista CastellanoTEC Treaty of the European CommunityTEU Treaty of the European UnionTWF Directive Television Without FrontiersUA Unin AlavesaUF Union des FrancophonesUGT Unin General de TrabajadoresUM Uni MallorquinaUPL Unin del Pueblo LeonsURA Unin Renovadora Asturiana

USF Union fr SdtirolUV Uni ValencianaVB Vlaams Blok VLD Vlaamse Liberalen en DemocratenVLD-VU-O Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten+Volksunie+VPRT s. 56 Verband Privater Rundfunk und Telekommunikation e.V.VU-ID21 Volksunie-ID21ZDF Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen

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Chapter 1:

Introduction

The deepening of European integration, the increase in the number of federal memberstates, and the growing prominence of nationalist parties in Europe constitute a chal-lenge for European political systems and for the European Union as a whole. Thesechanges, which can be counted among the most important developments in European

politics since the fall of the Berlin Wall, have brought unwelcome consequences forregions within European member states. Federal member states constituent units havehad to accept a significant reduction of their autonomy in the face of an ever strongerEuropean Union (EU). As a result, they have been exposed to decisions taken by centralgovernments in the Council of the European Union without their participation. Simi-larly, changes have also taken place among federal member states, which have had togrant to their constituent units the formal right to participate in the European decision-making process. Through the granting of these rights regions have gained, at least intheory, access to an array of intra-state channels of interest representation, amongwhich the most important, but not necessarily the most well-researched, was the right to

participate in the meetings of the Council of the European Union (formerly Council ofMinisters, hereafter the Council Hooghe 1995; Hooghe and Marks 1996; Jeffery 2000).These changes were part of a wider transformation of domestic politics in EU memberstates widely known as Europeanization (Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Risse,Cowles et al 2001 b).

The conditions under which regions may gain access to these intra-state channels,

and even express their preferences to the central government, are set by coordinationmechanisms. Coordination mechanisms encompass the rules that regulate intergov-ernmental relations between central and regional governments within the sphere ofEuropean politics. Whereas the word coordination hints at Fritz Scharpfs work on theinstitutional preconditions of coordination, according to Charles Tilly, mechanismschange relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar waysover a variety of situations (Tilly 2000: 4; McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001: ch.1, ch. 3).Most appropriately for the context of this book, Jon Elster suggests that mechanismsarefrequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns (). They allow us toexplain but not to predict. (Elster 1998: 45, his emphasis).

Coordination mechanisms constitute the bodies in which regions, first among them-selves and then bargaining with the central government, are able to coordinate their EUagendas. To put it another way, coordination mechanisms constitute actors by estab-

lishing who participates in sector conferences where regional ministers meet to identifycommon interests and policy goals. Coordination mechanisms also determine the ma-

jorities necessary to define a common regional position, and establish the extent towhich such a common regional position binds the member state delegation to theCouncil. These rules are crucial, as a common regional position constitutes a necessary

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condition for regional access to intra-state channels. Furthermore, coordination mech-

anisms may even determine who gains the upper hand if regional and central govern-ments advance opposing concerns. Coordination mechanisms can also be seen as aspecific type of institution that regulates the definition of common European agendasshared by the centre (i.e. central government) and the regions, and whose aim is ideallyto maximize the aggregate welfare of the member state, as I explain in the next chapter.In most member states, federalism appears associated with negotiations with the centrerather than imposition and equality among constituent units. Because of this, decisionsare taken by unanimity or by reinforced majorities and less frequently through hier-archical coordination. However, this depends on a countrys specific regulations, as Iwill argue throughout this study. Coordination mechanisms, in addition, are part ofwhat Europeanization literature calls domestic structures (Radaelli 2003, 2008) andfederalism literature labels intergovernmental relations (Agranoff 1996, 2004; Bog-danor 1993). Finally, the interaction between coordination mechanisms and actors such

as nationalist and state-wide parties can best be understood as an example of bar-gaining within an institutional setting, as proposed by Renate Mayntz and FritzScharpfs in their seminal work on actor-centered institutionalism (1995; Scharpf1997: 29-34). As actor-centered institutionalism is clearly orientated towards empirical

policy analysis, I will frequently resort to their vocabulary and conceptual distinctionsthroughout this book.

Coordination mechanisms regulate the access of regions to intra-state channels ofinterest representation, as discussed above. Among them, the most important mech-anism is the incorporation of the regions concerns into its member states bargainingstance in the Council. Second in importance is the possibility of allowing regionalrepresentatives to participate in negotiations in the Council as part of a member statesdelegation. Hence, coordination mechanisms in all member states control the relations

between central and regional governments during the EU decision-making process; at

the same time, coordination mechanisms are part of a member states domestic struc-tures and therefore vary by state. Because such mechanisms are intertwined withRadaellis domestic structure (2003, 2008), whether a region ultimately gains access tointra-state channels depends not only on the provisions regulating coordination mech-anisms, but also, and perhaps even more heavily, on the decisions of actors like centraland regional governments. These decisions are shaped by the cognitive orientations and

preferences of regional and central executives. In turn, the decisions taken by regionaland central executives are also shaped by the range of possible courses of actionestablished by coordination mechanisms. The mutually interdependent character ofinteraction among political actors driven by the interactive strategies of purposiveactors operating within institutional settings that, at the same time, enable and constrainthese strategies has been explicitly recognized by Scharpf (1997: 36). While these

terms receive further attention below, by now it may be helpful to note that two of themcognitive orientations andpreferences broadly correspond with what the literatureon Europeanization calls normative structure, which dictates how interests are definedand aggregated. In the same sense, normative structures also encompass norms, values,and discourse (Radaelli 2003: 36-37; cf. Scharpf 1997: 62-66). Given that the prefer-

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ences of nationalist parties differ from those of state-wide parties, I have identified

nationalist parties as the second explanatory variable. In this way I bring wider terri-torial conflicts back into our account of the Europeanization of federal member statesand of EU policy outputs, as recently proposed by Caitrona Carter and Andy Smith(2008). Or, to approach this issue from a different perspective, I heed Alfred Stepans

plea for linking federalism and nationalism in order to make a meaningful and power-ful statement about comparative federalism (2001: 216).

For regions, an alternative to interest representation via intra-state channels is toparticipate in European politics through extra-state means. Through this range of semi-formalized channels, European institutions are able to respond to the impact of theintegration processes upon increasingly influential and numerous regional govern-ments. Some extra-state channels, such as the Committee of the Regions for example,were created by EU law, but others are considerably more informal, such as the lobby-ing of the Commission and the European Parliament by individual regions. In contrast

to coordination mechanisms, extra-state channels like the Commission, the Parliamentor regional associations permit individual constituent units to advance their agendasseparately without cooperation between the central government and regions. Thesechannels have received substantial attention from scholars because regional impacts onEU policies through extra-state channels have reinforced multilevel governance the-ories. Such theories consider regions as actors autonomous from central governments(Bache 1998; Benz and Eberlein 1998; Constantelos 1996; Grande 2000; Hooghe1995 b; Hooghe and Marks 1996, 2001a; John and McAteer 1998; Marks 1996a;Marks, Haesly et al 2002 a; Marks, Hooghe et al 1996; Marks, Nielsen et al1996; Martinand Pearce 1999; Peters and Pierre 2001). Nonetheless, the effectiveness of thesechannels can be disputed for at least two different reasons. First, the effectiveness ofextra-state channels is dependent upon the existence of coordination mechanisms pro-moting close collaboration among regions and between regions and the respective

central government, as I will argue here. Second, extra-state channels constitute anattempt to replace formal decision-making rights granted to all regions irrespective oftheir size, political clout etc. with informal strategies such as lobbying and coordinatedaction by regions whose possibilities of access to these channels are unequal (Benz1993, 2000 a, b; Dahrendorf 1991; Jeffery 1997 a, b, 2000). In fact, the weak link

between the Commission and these regions suggests that its responsiveness to theconcerns of regions will be limited. In the case of the CoR and of regional associations,the trouble lies in their lack of formal decision-making powers. Only one of thesechannels, the European Parliament, possesses strong yet unexplored territorial linksand decision-making powers. Extra-state channels constitute an alternative, or in somecases supplementary strategy to the more demanding and formal coordination mech-anisms. Leaving aside treaty reform and history-making decisions, this book sets out to

ascertain which traits distinguish member states whose regions have been successful atachieving impacts on European policy outputs. This introductory chapter presents myhypothesis and then settles two preliminary issues the definition of a federal memberstate, and the ways in which the EU encroaches upon regions.

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My initial hypothesis is that regions impact EU policy outputs only if coordination

mechanisms provide them with access to intra-state channels of interest representation.If coordination mechanisms fail to grant regions the necessary access to intra-statechannels, they will be unable to compensate for this through extra-state channels suchas lobbying the Commission and the EP. This is because successful extra-state interestrepresentation requires regions to define a common agenda back at home first.On theother hand, when a regional impact is made on EU decisions through intra-state chan-nels, this regional success should be understood as confirming the thesis of the Euro-

peanization of federal systems. According to this thesis, regions increasingly empha-size cooperation both amongst themselves and with the centre, as this strategy makes it

possible for regions to participate successfully in the EU decision-making process(Brzel 1999, 2000, 2002).

While this hypothesis may appear self-evident at first consideration, it raises severalcontroversial implications. First, testing the hypothesis requires a careful study of

coordination mechanisms in EU member states aimed at establishing whether theyactually grant regions access to intra-state channels, the most important of which is

participation in the Council of Ministers. Such an analysis, which has not to date beenundertaken, should go beyond a mere description of the regulations in force. Instead, itshould determine whether coordination mechanisms fulfil the requisites of majoritarian

bargaining and offer the possibility of cross-sectoral dealing, issue-linkage, and side-payments. Whether a member states coordination mechanisms fulfil these requisites isdifficult to establish beforehand and this is part of what this book will try to accomplish.

The second argument, closely related to the first one, is that in order to confirm thishypothesis, the explanatory power of alternative variables, such as the range of powersheld by a region, the political entrepreneurship of regional elites or the existence of anationalist party, must be controlled for in order to establish that they are secondary, asmy hypothesis claims. Although the literature has considered some of these variables asconducive to regional leverage (Jeffery 2000; Marks, Nielsen et al 1996), my hypoth-esis implies that one of them, nationalist parties, may constitute an obstacle whenregions attempt to define common positions in coordination mechanisms in order toeventually influence European politics. Therefore, the first difficulty, establishingwhether coordination mechanisms are appropriate, cannot be resolved without firstconsidering the actors operating under the rules established by coordination mechan-isms. This requires a careful examination of nationalist parties because their prefer-ences differ from those of state-wide parties, as discussed above. Regions may thenresort to a go-it-alone method instead of the more accessible, but arguably less effect-ive, extra-state channels of interest representation. An additional argument, which hasfrequently gone unnoticed is that nationalist parties are not compelled to take intoconsideration the voters of other constituent units (Scharpf 1992b: 61-62). This makes

it possible for nationalist parties to advance solutions that may conflict with the goals ofother regions, and makes the concept of aggregate welfare less relevant for their pol-itical calculus. An examination of how nationalist parties modify the operation ofcoordination mechanisms raises many intriguing questions. For instance, if nationalist

parties do exclusively pursue the interests of voters in one region, the Spanish federal

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arrangement could hardly have become so cooperative and so Europeanized as the

German system has as the main thesis of a widely cited book on the subject suggests(Brzel 2002) simply because nationalist parties play such a prominent role in theestado de las autonomas.

Finally, confirming this hypothesis would imply that the scholarly interest awakenedin the 1990s by extra-state channels like the lobbying of the Commission was mis-guided (Balme 1995; Constantelos 1996; Desideri 1995; Fastenrath 1990; Greenwood1997; Hooghe 1995 a, b; Hooghe and Marks 1996, 2001a; Jachtenfuchs 2001; John andMcAteer 1998; Keating and Jones 1995; Mazey and Mitchell 1993; Mazey andRichardson 1993; McAteer and Mitchell 1996). Most probably, more energy shouldhave been directed toward explaining what regions were able to achieve through intra-state channels, how they were achieving it, and whether the use was of coordinationmechanisms was a precondition for regions to make an impact through extra-statechannels. To test my hypothesis, I attempt to pinpoint the impacts that regions were able

to achieve on EU audiovisual and cohesion policy decisions in the late 1990s.A remark on my use of the term impactis required before I move on to comment on

the related scholarship and further specify my initial hypothesis. In this book I use theterm impact in different ways. In the domestic realm and in order to distinguish thedifferent degrees to which regions participate in the centres European policy, I willrefer to Herbert Kitschelts differentiation between procedural and substantive impacts(1986: 66-67). In the European arena, I use the term impact to refer to the ability ofregions either to shape specific elements in the agendas of the Commission, the Euro-

pean Parliament or the Council, or, in a weaker sense, to publicize regional concerns,incorporating them into the negotiations between the institutions. To consider mere

publicity as a form of impact appears justified, in view of the difficulties that regionsexperience in drawing the attention of European institutions or member states to their

own concerns, in particular cultural and linguistic issues (Benz and Benz 1995: 229;Hooghe and Marks 1996: 76; Jeffery 1995: 256; Kennedy 1997: 2). It should be ac-knowledged that no individual region is capable of imposing its own preferences onother actors at the bargaining table in Brussels, but in some occasions a causal relation

between a regional agenda and an EU decision can be traced. Such an overlap, however,does not imply that the regional agenda is a sufficient condition, or that it was likely theonly causal factor. These distinctions will be useful in differentiating channels ofinterest representation according to the possibilities of impacting EU decisions.

In writing this book, I have drawn extensively from multilevel governance theories,

the critics thereof, and from works by scholars of federalism, Europeanization, andEuropean integration. In this first chapter, I will attempt to frame the links between my

work and the scholarly debate on the role of regions on EU policies and on the impact ofintegration on regions. In subsequent chapters I will examine other strands of schol-arship such as the literature on multilevel governance, cultural pluralism and linguisticminorities in the EU. I will also be taking into account Europeanization, and repre-

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sentation of interests in the European Parliament. The next two pages show how my

research departs from existing scholarship.Multilevel governance (MLG) approaches contribute decisively to my book becausethey explicitly consider regions as actors in the policy-making process, even thoughthey focus on regional contributions through extra-state channels. MLG theories ap-

proach the question of how regional executives contribute to the dispersion of powerfrom the member states to the European and regional tiers of government by focusingmainly on extra-state channels. This is because extra-state channels have producedevidence undermining the liberal intergovernmentalist thesis of member states almostunrestricted control of the European integration process. Nonetheless, it seems fair torecognize that MLG also acknowledges that intra-state channels remain the most im-

portant link between regions and the European arena (Hooghe 1995 b; Hooghe andMarks 1996, 2001 a: 89, ch 5; Marks 1992: 92, 211-213, 217-218, 1993: 407).1 The factthat MLG scholarship remains fixated on extra-state channels has been criticized by

Charlie Jeffery. He argues that, the real transformation in the relative roles of sub-national authorities and the central state in EU policy-making has taken place in theintra-state arena (Jeffery 2000: 2). He then suggests that the most important vari-able explaining why some regions have impacts on EU policy outputs is constitutionalstrength, understood as the extent of powers a region holds (Marks, Nielsen et al 1996:61). Additionally, Jeffrey argues that a regions ability to influence European politicsdepends on intergovernmental relations, political entrepreneurship, and legitimacy andsocial capital (Jeffery 2000: 12-17). While drawing on Jefferys ideas, my first partialhypothesis differs from his criticism of MLG in suggesting that coordination mech-anisms, rather than constitutional strength, is the main variable explaining a regions

ability to make impacts on EU decisions.

One of the principal aims of this book is to undertake a more explicit analysis of therole of nationalist parties in accounting for a regions impacts on EU decisions. To be

sure, these types of parties were among the causes of regional interest representationexplored by Marks and his co-authors (Marks, Haesly et al 2002a; Marks, Nielsen etal 1996). In fact, they found that regional governments formed by parties other thanthose in power in the centre are more prone to using extra-state channels (Marks,

Nielsen et al 1996: 62), most probably as a strategy to avoid confronting a rival politicalpartys clout over the member states European policy. Similar ideas are also present inMichael Keatings work, which moved Jeffery to suggest that governments from re-gions with a sense of identity expressed through a distinctive party system can moreeasily bring their claims into the EU policy process (Jeffery 2000: 17; Keating 1997,1998 a). Whereas I coincide with other scholars on the significance of this explanatory

1 In at least two publications Marks and Hooghe have provided lists of channels to Europe avail-

able to regions. In one of them (Hooghe 1995 b: 179-191), Hooghe enumerate eleven channels ofwhich only four could be considered as domestic (right to be informed by the central state, formalparticipation in interest aggregation, direct presence in the Council, legislative hoops for treaties).In the second publication, Marks and Hooghe include nine channels of which three are domestic(Hooghe and Marks 2001 a: 78). From the four channels they analyse more extensively in the samebook, regional presence in the Council is the only intra-state one (Hooghe and Marks 2001 a:83-89).

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variable, I suggest that it operates in the opposite direction.Strong electoral support for

nationalist parties may create additional hurdles for the inclusion of regional interestsinto the centres agenda, a failure that subsequently prevents regions from impacting

EU decisions.

One important implication of the preceding hypothesis is that if nationalist partiesrespond to the existence of coordination mechanisms according to normative structuresor preferences of their own, they may also alter the manner in which coordinationmechanisms work. Even within the same member state, the influence of nationalist

parties varies widely, from being fundamental in some regions to irrelevant in others.Thus, the alleged homogenization of member states and their coordination mechanismsthat the literature on Europeanization emphasizes may have been overstated. In order todelve into the consequences of this particular type of actor the nationalist party onEuropeanization, a third partial hypothesis will be tested. According to some accounts,Europeanization has moved federal member states to establish new structures that

enable them to reach a goodness of fit (Brzel and Risse 2003: 5-6, 36-42; Risse,Cowles et al 2001a) between European and domestic structures and to help then betterwork with the particularities of the EU decision-making process. For instance, accord-ing to this theory Spanish regions would have adopted a cooperative federalism similarto the German model in view of a misfit between domestic and normative structures andthose valid in the European arena (Brzel 2002: 107-116, 211-212). In order to under-stand this adaptational pressure on EU member states, Brzel and Risse propose amethod that differentiates between two periods. In the first, the goodness of fit isexamined by actors, while in the second, actors react to a potential misfit between the

political opportunity structure on the one hand and norms and identities, on the other(Brzel and Risse 2003: 63, 65). These two categories were first proposed by Marchand Olsen (1989, 1998), who speak of a logic of consequentialism and a logic ofappropriateness (Brzel and Risse 2003: 34-37), corresponding to what Radaelli calls

domestic and normative structures. In a similar vein, Scharpf differentiates betweeninstitutional settings (1997: 37-43) and actors preferences, which include four com-

ponents: interests, norms, identities, and interaction orientations (1997: 63-66). Thisbook will carefully consider the ways in which both categories interact, including howformal institutions ultimately shape what regions perceive as appropriate courses ofaction (Heimer 2001; Immergut 1998; Offe 2006). Contrary to the prevailing views(Miz, Beramendi et al 2002), my hypothesis proposes that in federal member states,actors preferences and institutional settings have remained unchanged during Euro-

peanization rather than being transformed by it. Determining how actor preferencesand institutional settings interact requires further study because, among other reasons,the preferences of nationalist parties may let them approach the goodness of fit fromspecific viewpoints. As a matter of fact, the same EU decision often creates tensions

across the European territory, to which local actors respond by developing disparatestrategies (Carter and Smith 2008). Showing how a specific type of local actor, namelynationalist parties, responds to such territorial tensions produced by Europeanization isone of the primary objectives of this book.

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The last partial hypothesis explores which extra-state channels permit regions to

impact EU decisions. As I have mentioned, extra-state channels, and in particular thelinks between regions and the Commission, occupy a prominent place in multilevelgovernance approaches to the EU (Benz 2000b; Bomberg and Peterson 1998; Hoogheand Marks 1996, 2001 a; Jeffery 1997 a; Jones 2000; Loughlin 1996; Marks 1996a;Mazey and Richardson 1993; Morata and Muoz 1996; Tmmel 1998), but theireffectiveness has been disputed (Jeffery 2000: 2). Here I will seek to determine whetherthe European Parliament rather than the Commission is the institution through which

some regions actually shape EU decisions. Even though the incorporation of regionalconcerns to EU policies varies widely across the policy field, the expansion of EP

powers and the territorial links of its members suggest that Members of the EuropeanParliament (MEPs) and regional governments may hedge coincident agendas.

Federalism in EU Member States

Although in the preceding pages I used the adjective federal to refer to Spain andItaly, this usage is not always universally accepted. Throughout this book I will use theterm federal to refer to six member states: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain andthe United Kingdom.2 The termfederalis most appropriate for explaining the variety ofinstitutional arrangements inside this group of six member states because they all arecomposed of two levels of government endowed with final decision making powers. Atthe same time, these federal countries differ regarding other important features such asthe remit of the regional legislative competences, the intensity and style of intergov-ernmental relations, and political majorities at both member state and regional level.

Admittedly, to classify some of these six countries as federal is not uncontroversial.

Yet, such an option is sustained by several authorities in the subfield of comparativefederalism (Elazar 1991: 12; Riker 1975: 101; Watts 2000: 10, 18). These three scholarsdefine federal political systems as those where final decision-making is divided be-tween the federal and the regional executives according to a catalogue of subjects. Thedefinition of federalism proposed by William Riker, classic in its simplicity, is asfollows:

Federalism is a political organization in which the activities of government aredivided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that

2 The UK, however, is home to only one region with legislative powers, Scotland. Apart from thesesix countries, in Portugal and Finland quasi-federal arrangements exist, but I have not further

considered them in my research. Azores and Madeira possess elected parliaments, but their exec-utives are appointed by the central government in Lisbon (Pereira 1995). By contrast, lan is thesingle Finnish region benefiting from a federal arrangement according to my definition (Gustafsson1981; Auffermann 1999; Fagerholm 1999; Paasi 1999). However, encompassing a single con-stituent unit, its belated date of accession (1995), and the reduced size of its only regional legislativepowers, I have opted not to include this member state in my analysis which focuses on decisionstaken in the years following Finlands accession.

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each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions

(Riker 1975: 101).Similarly, the definition of federalism by Daniel Elazar, the founder ofPublius: The

Journal of Federalism reads:

The simplest possible definition is self-rule plus shared rule. Federalism thusdefined involves some kind of contractual linkage of a presumably permanentcharacter that (1) provides for power sharing, (2) cuts around the issue ofsovereignty, and (3) supplements but does not seek to replace or diminish priororganic ties where they exist (Elazar 1991: 12).

Finally, Stepans more recent definition directs attention to the electoral aspects and theformation of legislatures in federal systems:

Democratic political systems probably should not be called federal systems unlessthey meet two criteria. First, within the state there must exist some territorial

political subunits whose electorate is exclusively drawn from citizens of the sub-unit andwhich have areas of legal and policy making autonomy and sovereigntythat are constitutionally guaranteed. Second, there must be a statewide politicalunit which contains a legislature elected by the statewide population, and whichhas some law and policy making areas that are constitutionally guaranteed to fallwithin the sovereignty of this state body (Stepan 2001: 325-326).

In other words, in these six federal member states, authoritative decision-makingpowers are territorially divided between the elected governments of the federal centreand the constituent units. Yet, federal arrangements concern not only self-rule, but alsoshared-rule. Self-rule means that for some matters the regions may authoritativelydecide while others the centre has the final word. Shared rule implies that mechanismsexist to resolve problems that affect the whole federal system. A further property of

federal systems implied in Elazars definition (permanent character) is that theyguarantee the existence of their constituent units. To achieve this, federal constitutionsregulate the fundamental elements of a federal system. They protect both the unity ofthe system, the existence of the constituent units and the assignment of a minimum ofautonomy to the regional tier. The juridical expression of this commitment to perman-ence is the regional constitution, which in the United States is called a state constitution,in GermanyLandesverfassungand in Spain estatuto de autonoma. Similarly, in Italy

bothstatuti ordinari andspeziali exist. Regions in Belgium, Austria, and the UnitedKingdom enjoy parallel protection.3 Eternity clauses (art.79 BL), reinforced majoritiesin the Italian constitution (art. 138) or improbable requisites for constitutional reform(art. 168 SC) guarantee the existence of regions as autonomous political institutions. InSpain, regional constitutions dictating the catalogue of powers over which the regiondecides can only be reformed with the consent of both the regional and federal parlia-ments. It is precisely this impossibility of the centre infringing on the powers of con-

3 In the first country directly derived from the Belgian constitution, in Austria from theLandesver-fassung, and in the United Kingdom from the corresponding statutes, like the Scotland Act 1998.

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stituent units that constitutes the distinguishing trait of federal systems for Robert Dahl

(1986: 114).In fact, scholars of federalism are very conscious of the differences in levels ofdecentralization in federal systems. For example, in the late 1980s Daniel Elazar dis-tinguished between federal systems such as Austria and Germany and political systemswith federal arrangements. In this second category he included Belgium, Italy, Spainand the UK (Elazar 1991: 43-46). In contrast, Watts includes Austria, Belgium, Ger-many and Spain in his category federation and labels Italy and pre-devolution UnitedKingdom as decentralized unions (Watts 2000: 13). After the publication of bothclassifications, important reforms have strengthened the federal nature of Belgium,Italy, Spain and the UK, reinforcing the appropriateness of considering them as federalmember states. In 2001 Alfred Stepan did not hesitate in considering Spain and Bel-gium as both multinational and federal (2001: 315).

More recently, other scholars have crafted indexes of territorial decentralization

confirming both the federal character of these six federal systems and the differencesamong them. Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Erssons index appears dated, at least forcountries like Spain and Italy, because the authors rely on information from the 1980s(Lane and Ersson 1994: 224). Since then, levels of decentralization have undergone

profound changes in both countries. Additionally, in a subsequent study the sameauthors conclude that it is necessary to distinguish between different degrees of thetraditional federal European countries mainly Germany and Switzerland and semi-federal ones like Belgium and Spain (Lane and Ersson 2000: 88). In our context, themore recent Regional Authority Index by Hooghe, Marks, Schakel is more authorita-tive, as it offers more differentiated and up-to-date information on individual memberstates. With the exception of the UK, my selection of six federal member states co-incides with the EU-15 countries scoring six or more in the ten-point Regional Au-thority Index (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 193-194; Hooghe, Schakel et al. 2008:

262-266; Marks, Hooghe et al. 2008 a, b).Although I am using the term region as interchangeable with that of constituent

unit widespread in the literature on federalism, its meaning is impregnated with thoseused by authors writing on other topics and therefore requires further clarification.During the last twenty-five years, the burgeoning scholarship on regions and region-alism has used the term in numerous ways. These reflect a multiplicity of understand-ings as well as political and scholarly interests accommodated under the same termin-ological roof (Anderson 1994: 9). Nonetheless, I do not intend to engage in an ex-haustive discussion of the literature on regions. Instead, I want to spell out my as-sumptions about what is common to the regions that form part of the six federal memberstates that I discuss in this work. A definition of regions will be instrumental in deter-mining to which member states my findings apply.

In the context of this study, four main strands of literature on regions are relevant,though unequally so. First, in the early 1980s, scholars researching regionalism weremostly attracted by the social mobilization processes localized in certain areas ofWestern Europe (Bourdieu 1991; Gerdes 1985; Tarrow 1977). Simultaneously, a se-cond group of scholars analysed regional mobilization in those European areas as signs

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of nationalist contention against the nation-state. These authors tried to assess the

possibilities of a "Europe of the Regions" turning into a viable alternative to the divisionof the European territory in nation-states (Keating 1985 a, 2000; Nitschke 1999). Fur-ther, a third group of researchers studied regionalism from the point of view of eco-nomic policy, economic geography and planning (Hudson and Williams 1999; Rhodes1995). A fourth group of literature attempted to understand regionalism as a top-down

process of decentralizing competences from the centre to the periphery of a nation-state. These studies were concerned with the reorganization of the administration, andwere close to a comparative government orRegierungslehre perspective (Keating1985 b; Mny 1985; Mny and Knapp 1998).

My own definition of region combines elements taken from scholars of the secondand fourth group. These emphases correspond with my focus on regional governmentsand parties rather than on social movements and economic planning. The main elem-ents of my definition derive from the idea of federalism presented in the preceding

section. Accordingly, a region is a politically driven structure of authoritative decision-making integrated into the second-level tier of government in a federal member-state.Regions possess their own executive branch and parliament and a range of powers forwhich they have the authority to make final decisions. This territorial division of

powers should not be able to be easily altered by the central government, but should berather protected by constitutional provisions regulating the procedure of reform. As Ihave mentioned at the beginning of the section, in the EU the Austrian, Belgian,German, Italian and Spanish regions plus Scotland and the Finnish archipelago lanfulfil these conditions.

The Impact of the European Union on Regions

Understanding how the EU impacts regions is a precondition for gauging how regionalgovernments and parties set and advance their European agendas. According to thewording of the European treaties, regions would not take part in the European inte-gration process, at least not during treaty making and modification. Indeed, in theEuropean treaties there is almost no talk of regional governments.4 Irrespective of thissilence, since the Single European Act (1986) regions have increasingly become con-cerned with the integration process. The main reason for this is that the progress of theEuropean project relies on the transfer of competences to the European institutions.This reallocation of powers impinges on regions in three ways. First, regions have beendeprived of some of their powers, which have been transferred to the EU . While thecentral government acquired the possibility of exerting those powers in the Councilregional governments lost the ability to decide how to exercise them. Secondly, while

4 Article 263 TEC refers to the Committee of the Regions and speaks of regional bodies. The secondreference to the regions is implicit: art. 203 TEC was changed in order to allow regional ministers torepresent their respective member state in the CoM. Further, the TEC refers to regions as policy-takers on issues such as cohesion (art. 158), regional imbalance, and declining industrial regions(art. 160).

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regions must also abide by EU law, during the implementation process they have fewer

chances of appealing to European institutions than they do of influencing the decisionsof the central government. As a consequence, regions are relegated to serving as en-forcers of EU decisions. Thirdly, regional governments must cover additional financialexpenses derived from European legislation, even if they have not participated in thedecision-making process. Finally, regions try to wield influence on European policieswith redistributive or distributive effects such as cohesion or research policy (Grote1993; Hooghe 1996; Leonardi 1993).

A clarification of the implications of the Single European Act (SEA)for regionsshould serve to substantiate the preceding argument. By expanding European compe-tences first, the SEA and afterwards the Maastricht Treaty created an overlap betweenregional and European domains. In fact, scholars coincide in pointing out this decisionand the late 1980s as the turning point in which integration began to affect regionsintensively (Bullmann and Eiel: 4, 14; Hooghe and Marks 1996; Jeffery 1997 a, b,

2002 b; Keating 1998 a; Marks 1993, 1996 b; Marks, Hooghe et al 1996; Mazey andMitchell 1993). For two main reasons, the SEA had forced regions to give increasedattention to the European community. On the one side, it transferred to the EC powersformerly assigned to the regional tier or for which theLnderand Spanish autonomouscommunities, among others, were responsible. Among the policy sectors covered bythe SEA that affect the regions we find local economic development (and the attractionof foreign investment), vocational training and language teaching, local transport [],the supply of public utilities, environmental health policies, anti-pollution control,health and safety in the workplace, and consumer protection law" (Mazey and Mitchell1993: 100-101). Apart from this, the SEA also cut across regions educational policies(Jeffery 1997 a: 58) and the audiovisual powers of regions (Collins 1994). Moreover,the SEA granted the EC the power to enact more directly binding legislation, which inGermany theLnderhad hitherto be able to influence through the federal chamber; they

are also responsible for its execution (Jeffery 1997a: 59). During the debates in thefederal chamber over the SEA, the Lnderbegan to perceive integration as a threat(Bundesrat 1988: 323).

On the other hand, the SEA dealt another blow to the regional economies by makingthem adapt to the new conditions of enhanced competition in an integrated market. Infact, some scholars have claimed that regionalization was actually a strategy to managethe challenges of the single market (Balme 1995: 169). An even more important corol-lary of the SEA was the allocation of significant resources to a revitalized regional

policy and the expansion of the structural funds after 1988 (Jones 2000: 88; Marks1992: 194, 1993). In summary, the SEA affected regions because it restricted their

powers (competition, media policy), imposed tight implementation duties (education,vocational training) and new financial duties (environmental health, pollution), and

turned the EC into a source of funding for regions (cohesion and research policies).In order to test my hypotheses, I compare how regions used both intra- and extra-

state channels to influence the 1999 reform of EU cohesion policy and the Europeanaudiovisual policy. In doing this, I proceed as follows. In chapter two I explore my

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explanatory variables and select regional cases and policy fields according to them. To

be more precise, after identifying six federal member states where regions hold finaldecision-making powers Germany, Italy, Spain, Austria, Belgium, and the UK I thenexamine the division of European powers in the first three of these countries. Theresults of this analysis, combined with the overall support for nationalist parties, are thetwo indicators I used to choose my regions. The second chapter will also briefly touchon the short history of the selected regions.

In chapter three, the audiovisual policy study focuses on the interest representationefforts of the Basque Country, the Rhineland-Palatinate, and Valencia aimed at influ-encing the revision of the Television Without Frontiers Directive, the application of theAmsterdam Protocol on Public Service Broadcasting, and the MEDIA programme.Whereas this third chapter concentrates on whether the interaction of coordinationmechanisms and nationalist parties made it possible for constituent units to compel thecentre to take up regional concerns into its own agenda, chapter four examines how

regions have advanced their concerns through extra-state channels and particularlylooks at the impact of regions lobbying of the EP on audiovisual policy. To explore the1999 reform of the structural policy, I take a look in chapter five at the Basque Country,the Rhineland-Palatinate, and Tuscany. This time my analysis focuses on the frame-work regulation, the European Regional Development Fund, and the European SocialFund. This chapter reconstructs the regional agendas for the reform and the subsequentnegotiations between the centre and the periphery to set common objectives; it places

particular emphasis on the role of coordination mechanisms and nationalist parties inboth processes. Chapter six rounds out the preceding analysis by determining whichchanges to the regulations proposed by the Commission the regions achieved throughextra-state channels and, in particular, which kinds of amendments the EP obtainedfrom Commission and Council. Finally, in chapter seven I, reassess my initial hypoth-esis and discuss the implications of my findings for current scholarship.

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Chapter 2:

Coordination Mechanisms and Nationalist Parties in the EU

Until now, two fundamental concepts namely coordination mechanisms and nation-alist parties have remained somewhat unspecified. Yet, these two variables, whichform the core of my research, are not uninspected premises (Becker 1998: 7). Instead,these concepts reflect a conscious decision on my part as to the scope of the facts I wantto explain. These conceptual choices and their implications for the scope of my re-search, together with the selection of policies and regional cases, are the subject of the

present chapter.I break this chapter into four sections in order to facilitate the discussion of coord-

ination mechanisms and nationalist parties. In sections one and two, I will attempt toprovide a clear definition of these two variables. In section three, I will explain themethods behind my research design, case selection, and selection of policy fields. In thefinal section, I will briefly summarize the history of audiovisual and cohesion policy inthe selected regions.

Coordination Mechanisms in Six Member States

When the second tier of government holds a significant range of powers, as occurs inthe case of federal member states, EU decisions will often affect not only central, butregional governments as well. Regional governments, however, do not have direct

access to the Council, where member states are represented. Such a division oflabour, whose origin is the traditional allocation of foreign policy powers in the handsof the centre in federal systems, constitutes a particular challenge for federal memberstates. This is because constituent units hold extensive domestic competences whosedemocratic legitimacy is derived from elected regional parliaments. Furthermore, infederal member states where regional parties represent national or linguistic minorities,this problem is compounded. Not only are regions deprived of their powers, but alsotheir political distinctiveness disappears in the European arena. The Art. 203 of theTreaty of the European Community (TEC) provides a partial solution to this challenge:it allows regional ministers to participate in the Council representing the whole memberstate. However, the use of this and other intra-state channels requires that federalmember states establish coordination mechanisms. The main objective of coordinationmechanisms is to combine in a single European agenda the concerns of the centre andthe regions, making it possible to jointly defend the concerns of the whole country in theCouncil and simultaneously operate as a unitary actor. In order to achieve this, coord-ination mechanisms must first create the institutional environment necessary for re-gions to define a common position. In the second place, they must regulate for the

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subjects, majorities, and the measure in which a common regional position binds the

central government. Finally, coordination mechanisms establish whether the repre-sentation of the member states in the Council is entrusted to regional governments.Whereas the previous chapter explored conditions common to the six federal mem-

ber states, this second chapter highlights the differences among their coordinationmechanisms. Usually, federal systems are classified according to aspects such as howthe centre and the federal constituent units divide self- and shared powers, who holdsthe residual competences, the array of powers each tier controls, asymmetry, or theorganization of the judiciary (Duchacek 1970: 188-275; Watts 2000: 17-18). Nonethe-less, since I hypothesized in the introduction that coordination mechanisms constitutethe key to understanding regions ability to shape EU decisions, I have classifiedfederal member states according to their coordination mechanisms. This analysis isuseful to understanding how bargaining positions in the Council are defined and willallow me to undertake the selection of cases in chapter two.

As I stated in the introduction, I use the term coordination mechanisms to denote aspecific form of intergovernmental relations (Agranoff 1996, 2004; Bogdanor 1993) orof domestic structures (Radaelli 2003, 2008) that regulate regional access to intra-statechannels. Although coordination mechanisms serve the same purpose in each memberstate, the fact that the specific rules regulating coordination mechanisms differ signifi-cantly among member states makes their classification and comparison difficult. A

preliminary attempt to classify coordination mechanisms may be found in Table 1. Theinfluence of regions on treaty-making power and their effect on constitutional reformappears to be connected to the characteristics of coordination mechanisms. Thus, thefirst row shows how regions participate in the treaty ratification process. In federalmember states, coordination mechanisms were developed as a response to the un-remitting transfer of powers first to the EC and then to the EU as regions demanded aright to shape the respective member states European policy. This is why, broadly

speaking, coordination mechanisms give regions a greater chance to shape the memberstates bargaining position, providing that these same constituent units participate in theratification of the European treaties or in the constitutional reforms necessary to adaptthe respective fundamental law to them.

In Table 1, the second and subsequent rows explore the ways in which regions maycontribute to decision-making in the Council, the most important intra-state channel forregions to shape EU decisions. To use this channel, however, centres and regions mustset common objectives because the votes of the member state in the Council may not bedivided among the different constituent units, making the effectiveness of this intra-state channel dependent, therefore, on a unitary approach to negotiations. For thisreason, one of the mechanisms' functions is to help regions to define common positionsand to specify to what extent the centre is obligated to adopt them. Whether this takes

place in parliamentary or intergovernmental bodies has been previously used to classifycoordination mechanisms (Kerremans 2000). Irrespective of where negotiations takeplace, to benefit from coordination mechanisms, regions from a member state must becapable of defining a common agenda among themselves, either unanimously or by amajority, which is what the fourth row indicates. Regions must subsequently negotiate

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with the central government, but coordination mechanisms differ significantly in this

respect. Whereas some of them require a unanimous agreement between the regionsand the centre, others recognize the prominence of the regional or of the central agendasdepending on the issue at stake. Another significant function of coordination mech-anisms is to establish whether a regional minister can be part of the member statesdelegation to the Council or participate in negotiations. The fifth row indicates theexistence of such a possibility, which would permit regional representatives to monitorwhether the central government actually defends the regional concerns in the Council.

A final set of more secondary aspects determines whether coordination mechanismsregulate the participation of regional officials in the Councils working groups and inthe committees of the Commission, the so-called comitology, as well as the presence ofregional officials in the member states permanent representation. They facilitate re-gions access to information and subsequently the formation of their own agendas.

Tanja Brzel proposes an alternative classification of federal systems in her study of

the Europeanization of member states federal systems. She starts with a broad cat-egorization of federal countries as a dual or cooperative federalism (Brzel 2000, 2002:53, 93). Her underlying criterion, one with deep roots in federalism scholarship, iswhether powers are clearly divided between the central and the regional executives, asin the case of U.S. dual federalism, or shared by them, as in the case of Germancooperative federalism. In the case of cooperative federalism, the centre is typically incharge of framework legislation while the regions are in charge of specifying this lawand implementing them; such a procedure requires intense intergovernmental cooper-ation. In principle, Spain and Belgium are closer to dual federalism, which appears tofunction better in countries where intergovernmental relations are characterized bycompetitiveness among actors (Brzel 2000: 23, 2002: 107-116). Nonetheless, ac-cording to Brzels argument, Spain has gradually developed a system of intergov-ernmental relations since the early 1980s, mostly to satisfy the necessities of coordin-

ation derived from Spains accession to the European Community (Brzel 2000: 27-31,2002: 116-134). Intergovernmental cooperation encompasses approximately two-dozen different conferencias sectoriales in charge of environment, agriculture, energy,and EU-related aspects of the sector as well as a cross-sectoral conference for Europeanaffairs (see below). How these sector conferences perform as coordination mechanismsor, in her vocabulary, contribute to intergovernmental cooperation, differs widely fromone policy sector to another.

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Thus, Brzel developed the three following criteria to establish the institutional-

ization level of sector conferences: the existence of a legal basis, rules of procedure, andsecond-level bodies supporting the conference. She determines the effectiveness ofpolicy-making according to the number of meetings a conference held and to its outputin terms of joint plans and programs, harmonization of law, and funding regimes, orconvenios (Brzel 2000: 33-34; Ministerio para las Administraciones Pblicas 1996).This approach permitted Brzel to argue that the necessity of cooperation on European

policy and its implementation led to the irregular cross-sectoral growth of cooperationroutines between the centre and the regions. According to Brzel, these developmentseventually transformed the Spanish dual, competitive federalism into cooperative fed-eralism (Brzel 2000: 40, 2002: 147).

The classification displayed in Table 1 and the previous characterization by Brzel,however, may not be sufficient for our purposes here. The classification used in Table 1explores both the range issues regulated by and the origins of coordination mechan-

isms, but says nothing about how the regional and central governments decisions mayinfluence their performance. Brzels classification is more precise, but seems to have

been developed ad-hoc to analyse Spains coordination mechanisms and never appliedto other countries; how the specificities of an actors agenda may bear on a govern-ments performance receives limited attention. Furthermore, coordination mechanismsmust also be examined even more closely. As I will argue throughout this study, whilecoordination mechanisms fulfil similar functions in all member states, their specifi-cities determine disparate regions chances of influencing on EU decisions. Relying onScharpfs actor-centered institutionalism, I propose a different classification of mem-

ber states according to their coordination mechanisms, which in turn is based onScharpfs concepts of modules, interaction orientations, and modes of interaction. Thissame classification will be used afterwards for the case selection.

To begin with, it is necessary to identify two bargaining modules or two games in the

causal chain connecting regional agendas with access to intra-state channels.10 The firstmodule, which I will call regional, encompasses the negotiations among the differentconstituent units in order to define a common regional position; the second module,which I will call region-centre, is defined by negotiation between the regions and thecentral government. In the first module, common regional positions represent theoutcome of a negotiated agreement between a plurality of actors (Scharpf 1997: 7, 116).Every concern from region A that is taken up into the common regional position is a

payoff for A, and the addition of these payoffs constitutes the aggregate welfare effectfor regions. In the second module, the common regional position and the centresagenda are aggregated or not into the member states bargaining stance in theCouncil, which represents the aggregate welfare for the member state as a whole. If thecentre takes up the common regional position without altering its contents, the welfare

9 If the constituent units appoint their representatives to the member state's permanent representa-tion + appears.

10 A third module exists, of course, at the European stage of the decision-making process, but itsinstitutional setting, modes of interaction, and actors are different ones. They will be analyzed inchapter four and six, but outside of the framework of actor-centred institutionalism.

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effect for regions would become part of the aggregate welfare effect for the member

state.For both modules, coordination mechanisms define the way in which actors andagendas relate to each other. They subject all actors to diverse modes of interaction unanimous or consensual negotiated agreement, majority vote, and hierarchical dir-ection depending on the specific country and subject under negotiation. Modes ofinteraction differ from each other with respect to the way in which collective decisionsare made, either unanimously, by a majority, or due to an actors ability to changeanother actors choices (Scharpf 1997: 72).

These differences constrain the institutional settings in which interactions takeplace, as shown in Figure 1. This is because negotiated agreements require, by defin-ition, the consent of every actor. As a result, they produce high transaction costs andrequire an appropriate institutional setting. However, even more demanding than ne-gotiated agreements in terms of the institutional setting are majority vote and hier-

archical direction. In these two modes of interaction, an actors will may be overridden.As a consequence, the institutional setting must provide some guarantee that the actorwill collaborate or at least not disturb the implementation of an agreement that the actorrejected. The second of the institutional settings displayed in Figure 1, networks,regimes, and joint-decision systems, which is based on unanimous decision-making,can be broken down into different three subtypes. Two of the subtypes regime and

joint decision are extremely relevant at the time of understanding differences in theregional modules in Germany, Spain, and Italy, as Figure 2 shows. The fourth institu-tional setting listed in Figure 1, hierarchical organization and the state, is vital tounderstanding negotiations between the state and the regions. From the combinationsof institutional settings and modes of interaction that are theoretically possible, onlytwo are relevant for our purposes, as marked in bold in Figure 1 (Scharpf 1997: 47).

In addition to establishing rules of decision-making and reducing transaction costs,

institutional settings also constitute actors and influence their preferences, althoughthey do not determine them. In other words, institutional settings define actor con-

stellations, which describe the players involved, their strategy options, the outcomesassociated with strategy combinations, and the preferences of the players over theseoutcomes (Scharpf 1997: 44). Further differences among coordination mechanismsare born out of the interaction orientations of actors involved in the policy process:individualism, solidarity, competition, altruism, hostility (Scharpf 1997: 85-89). Theywill be analysed below where I explore the distinctive behaviour of regional parties.

To summarize the preceding paragraphs, coordination mechanisms encompass twobargaining modules in which regional and central governments seek to combine theirindividual concerns into a bargaining stance that increases both parties aggregatewelfare. In the two modules, actors negotiate according to three different modes of

interaction (negotiated agreement, majority vote, and hierarchical direction) in twodifferent institutional settings networks, regimes, and joint-decision systems, on theone hand, and hierarchical organization and the state, on the other. By combining modesof interaction, institutional settings, and two subtypes thereof, regimes and joint deci-sion systems, coordination mechanisms in Germany, Italy, and Spain bear decisively on

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regions chances of shaping the member states bargaining stance. Since actor-centered

institutionalism permits us to distinguish among the different elements of this ex-planatory variable, Scharpfs approach will be used here to scrutinize some memberstates coordination mechanisms and then to conduct my case selection.

German coordination mechanisms present the peculiarity of combining intergov-ernmental with parliamentary elements. Accordingly, the required majorities change.To be more precise, in theLandesministerkonferenzen,or sector conferences, where theregional premiers meet, agreements are defined by unanimity. These are then con-firmed by a qualified majority in theBundesrat. The conditions under which the com-mon regional position expressed by theBundesratbinds the federal government to theregional interest are established in paragraph 23.5 of the German constitution: in thecase that the federal chamber holds the power to intervene in a domestic decision thathas been later transferred to the EU or in so far as the constituent units rather than thefederal government have the jurisdiction to make the decision, the federal chamber will

prepare a statement before negotiations at the European level begin (Jeffery 1997 a:61-63; Klatt 1999: 56-57). The statement of theBundesratbinds the federal govern-ment in different degrees, depending on the competence affected. If the issue at stake isan exclusive federal competence but affects the regions' interests or if the legislativecompetence belongs to the federal executive but regions consider they have an interestin the issue, the federal executive must simply take the statement of theBundesratintoconsideration. This means that while the federal government must justify why theGerman position in the Council deviates from the common regional position, thefederal government will not be held accountable, i.e. in front of the ConstitutionalCourt.

On the other hand, if the topic affects exclusive legislative powers held by theregions, their agencies, or their administrative processes, the position of the federalchamber binds the central government decisively. The implication of this is that the

federal government must adopt a bargaining stance consistent with the common re-gional position. Berlin can only avoid this obligation by presenting concrete reasonsrelated to its power of leading German foreign policy. If the centre does not respectthese provisions, including attempts to deny that an EU decision concerns regionalcompetences and interests, theLndermay, as they have actually done, ask the con-stitutional court to declare the nullity of federal decisions on European politics (Knotheand Bashayan 1997).

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Figure 1: Modes of Interaction and Institutional Settings

Modes ofInteraction

Institutional Setting

AnarchicField

Networks, regimes,and joint decisions

Associations, con-stituencies, and repre-sentative assemblies

HierarchicalOrganizations and the

State

UnilateralAction

X X X X

NegotiatedAgreement

(X) X X X

Majority Vote -- -- X X

HierarchicalDirection

-- -- _ X

Source: Own elaboration based on (Scharpf 1997)

Figure 2: Modes of Interaction and Institutional Settings Regional Module

Modes ofInteraction


Network Regime Jointdecision

Hierarchical organizationand the state

NegotiatedAgreement (Unanimous)

(X)X

Spain, ItalyX X

NegotiatedAgreement (Consensual)

(X) XX

GermanyX


HierarchicalDirection

-- -- _ X


Figure 3: Modes of Interaction and Institutional Settings Region-Centre Module

Modes of Interaction


Network Regime Joint decision Hierarchical organization andthe state

NegotiatedAgreement

(Unanimous)(X) X X

XGermany, and Spain (sharedpowers) Italy (shared and ex-

clusive powers)

NegotiatedAgreement

(Consensual)(X) X X X


HierarchicalDirection -- -- _

XGermany and Spain

(regional exclusive powers)


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According to Scharpfs actor-centered institutionalism, the preceding analysis could

be broadly summarized as follows: for any subject matter, the mode of interaction in theregional module is negotiated agreement, even though the rule according to whichdecisions are taken changes from unanimity in the sector conferences to consensus intheBundesrat. Accordingly, actors in sector conferences will first make an effort todefine a common regional agenda supported unanimously by all regions. However,renitent regions know that they risk being overridden by a reinforced majority in the

Bundesratat a later stage and that without a common regional agenda constituent unitsare unable to shape the bargaining stance of the member state unilaterally. Such aninstitutional setting is known as joint decision (Scharpf 1988: 267, 1997: 143). Itsdefining traits are a relatively

contentious regions in the european union : nationalist parties and the coordination of european...

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