Palestinians in Jordan:Using Game Theory to Analyze the Potential

for Palestinian and Jordanian Integration

Context of Situation

The relationship of Palestinians with Transjordanians within is a side-effect of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948 and poses a serious issue to the population of Jordan. This study attempts to capture the interactions between the two ethnicities through a game theoretic analysis. The emergence of a prisoner’s dilemma and consideration of the future reveals that ethnic integration is not very probably within Jordan.

Thesis

Payoff structures identifying the interactions as prisoner’s dilemmas emerge through an examination of each group’s participation in the parliament, the educational sector as well as passport/residency status. Extending the interactions into the future develops the model of an indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma (IRPD), in which a discount factor will display why the two groups may continue to remain distinct rather than fully integrating.

UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

Palestinian Undergraduate Payoff Ranking

Ranking Justification:

5 The best situation that Palestinian undergraduates can find themselves in is to receive a public Jordanian education. Palestinians undergrads have higher scores on average, would not have to pay significantly for education, and have the chance to remain with their family.

4 The next best choice is to go abroad to a university in Egypt for example and to be able to transfer back to a Jordanian public school the next year if the government does not enforce a quota. Going to a foreign university for one year means paying more, but there is a chance for scholarships and there are several prestigious schools in other Arab nations that would make the payment for a year worth the money.

3 Remaining at home and not having expensive education costs is important. Therefore, this ranking goes to applying to a public university given that there are restrictive measures for the acceptance of Palestinians. The chances of entry are lower, but the advantages of remaining in the country are worth the risk.

2 Going to private school in Jordan for a year and then transferring to public school has received this lower ranking for several reasons. It is above just going to private school full time because there is the chance of transfer but it is worse than going to foreign schools for a year because schools abroad often offer a chance to go to better schools that do not have to attract as many students for tuition purposes.

1 Private school for four years is one of the worst options. It requires payment for four years and does not have the hope of going on to public school. On the other hand, upon graduation, the student could pursue work locally.

0 Foreign schools have the lowest payoff. This may seem contradictory based on ranking 4 and 2, however, the problem here is that the country one graduates from is often where he will go on to work. As Jordanian nationals abroad, Palestinians would have to be treated as foreigners in the work place and may get lower pay or be picked after local residents.

Jordanian University/Government PayoffRanking Justification:

3 The greatest payoff for the Jordanian government would be to have a Transjordanian majority in their undergraduate population for public universities. The remain seats could be competed for by Palestinians, and thus that competition will results in relatively high scoring Palestinians filling in the remainder of the student body.

2 The next best choice is not having to even implement a quota but finding that Palestinian students are going off to other non-public schools and thus seats are naturally filled in by more Jordanians than if Palestinians all chose to go to public school. The reason this gets the second ranking is because the government would not be able to choose which regions or types of Jordanians got more assistance in receiving university education which might hamper their effort to develop certain areas of the country.

1 This ranking goes to being able to have a quota but finding that Palestinians want to attend public universities. This is good in the sense that the govÕt/universities get to be more selective about the types of students they chose. The problem arises in the potential for unrest from Palestinians if they become privy to the exact policies that are being followed. Furthermore, there are more students in the country that may be left without an education, which may lead to future unemployment problems for the government to deal with.

0 The least favorable scenario is for the status quo to remain. The government does not get to enforce an affirmative action program, Palestinians (who have higher scores) will be more qualified and will receive higher admission and gain a majority.

The Game

Jordanian GovÕt

No Quota Quota

Private 2, 2 1, 3

Foreign 4, 2 0, 3

Palestinian Undergraduates

Public 5, 0 3, 1

Jordanian GovÕt

No Quota Quota

Foreign 4,2 0,3 Palestinian Undergraduates Public 5,0 3,1

After Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies

Parliamentary Elections

Palestinian Voter Payoff Rankings

Ranking Justifications: 4 The greatest outcome for Palestinian voters would be to elect more

Palestinians in order to have more political connections in the parliamentary system. This would also mean that they lived in voting districts where the districts were divided into regions that did not make them seem like the minority every time and reduce the value of their votes.

3 To vote based on merit and policies in districts where candidates truly represent the demographic of the district would mean that Palestinians would truly get to vote for and be represented by a more proportional number of Palestinians.

2 This ranking is assigned to the situation in which Palestinians always vote for Palestinian candidates but are divided into voting districts the favor Transjordanian votes due to gerrymandering.

1 The worst out come would be to be underrepresented because the government has divided districts in favor of Transjordanian voters. Furthermore, voting based on policy rather than just for Palestinians would perhaps be a ŅbetterÓ way to act as a voter, but it would probably mean fewer Palestinian representative in parliament.

Jordanian Gov’t Payoff RankingsRanking Justifications:

4 The ultimate goal of a Jordanian government is to maintain a parliament that truly represent Jordanian interests and does not lose sense of ŅJordanianÓ priorities. This would come through re-aligning districts such that Jordanian voters are almost guaranteed louder voices. When this is combined with Palestinian voters who do not vote solely for Palestinian candidates, Palestinian representatives do not overtake the resulting parliament.

3 This ranking goes to fair districting that represents the demographic of each region in combination with voters who vote based on merit. More competent candidates get elected to office. While the government does not get to guarantee Jordanian majorities, it does have the added option of touting a more democratic process to Western democratic nations such as the US in its constant effort to maintain good relations and garner more support from the West.

2 In this case, the government gets to keep gerrymandering to turn votes in favor of Transjordanians. However, with Palestinians voting for Palestinian candidates only, and combining this with the fact that in some districts like Amman 2 Palestinians represent 73% of candidates, the government might find that it cannot hold onto a Transjordanian majority in parliament.

1 The least desirable outcome for the Jordanian government would be to have to overhaul the district division system, which would probably be costly, potentially be exposed as an authoritarian sort of government, and have Palestinians represented more accurately while voting for Palestinian candidates. Essentially, this would entail losing any guaranteeing factor of greater Transjordanian representation.

The Game

Jordanian Government

No

gerrymandering Gerrymandering

Vote based on merit/best

policy 3 , 3 1, 4

Palestinian Voters

Vote for ethnicity

4 , 1 2 , 2

Residency

Palestinian Immigrant Payoff Rankings

Rankings Justifications: 4 The greatest payoff to Palestinians would be derived from being treated as a

Jordanian with respect to national and residential rights without having to actually revoke Palestinian identity.

3 Although revoking Palestinian identity may be abhorrent, to gain a livelihood for oneÕs family, a home to call oneÕs own, and accessibility to services is a valuable gain.

2 Getting few rights places Palestinians on the lower part of the payoff spectrum. However, if Palestinian nationalism does not have to be given up in the process, it gives Palestinians a sense of self that allows them to persevere and provides people with incentive to keep trying to make a living.

1 The worst ending a Palestinian could meet in Jordan would be to revoke Palestinian identity without even getting the rights of a Jordanian in return. This truly contributes to a loss of identity.

Jordanian Government Payoff Rankings

Rankings Justifications: 4 The greatest payoff to the government would be to maintain as high of a

Transjordanian presence as possible and to solidify Jordanian identity. Limiting residency rights to Palestinians and maintaining a sense of being Jordanian rather than just Transjordanian allows the government to ensure that its people do not lose jobs or homes to Palestinians entering the country.

3 While it may not be fully desirable to get more immigrants from Palestine, to provide them with rights and have them assimilate in return does boost the Jordanian population. The competition does not become between two ethnicities and Transjordanians do not find themselves having to compete for greater relative gains.

2 Limiting residency that is provided to Palestinians who refuse to integrate ensures that Transjordanians are not simply crowded out. However, unemployment and friction between the ethnicities would increase.

1 The worst result for the government would be to provide full rights to incoming Palestinians but find no cooperation or desire to integrate into a Jordanian in return. This exacerbates the tensions between Palestinians and Jordanian both vying for the same space/jobs.

The Game

Jordanian Government

Provide Full Residency

Limited residency/

accessibility to services

Assimilate

3,3 1,4 Palestinian

DonÕt Assimilate

4,1 2,2

General Interactions

Palestinian Payoff Rankings

Rankings Justifications: 4 Retaining Palestinian identity, holding on to Palestinian nationalism and

gaining the advantage of being welcomed into Jordan and accepted. It is essentially the equivalent of moving to Jordan and blending in without engaging in any concessions on their part.

3 Accepting Jordanian identity but being accepted in return. This may be seen as unlikely as many Palestinians are staunchly nationalistic Ševen if not publicly so Š but this emerges as a survival tactic when it comes to finding a job, educating oneÕs children, and finding a home for the family.

2 To face rejection and thus be discriminated against results in a low ranking. However, as long as Palestinians can maintain identity, can keep their businesses, and maintain allegiance with home nation, this group of Palestinians has a higher rank.

1 To accept Jordanians and be discriminated against in society. Loss of identity and rejection from new ŅhomeÓ results in identity crises as outlined in Laurie BrandÕs paper, and implies marginalization by both native nation and new nation alike.

Transjordanian Payoff Rankings

Rankings Justifications: 4 To Transjordanians, keeping Jordan as ŅJordanianÓ as possible is the ultimate

goal. Thus, rejecting the infiltration of Palestinian customs and developing a sole Jordanian population earns the highest rank.

3 The formulation of a unified population in which both sides make concessions does not top the list of preferences where Transjordanian identity is seen as the pinnacle. However, the creation of a new Jordanian identity that is unified wins over a divided nation always facing internal ethnic competition.

2 Having a split nation in which each ethnicity keeps to its customs is not high on the list of preferences but is definitely more preferable to losing Jordanian identity altogether.

1 Having Jordan become a sort of ŅNew PalestineÓ is the ultimate loss of control over Jordan and thus earns the lowest rank.

The Game

Transjordanians

Accept Reject

Accept 3,3 1,4 Palestinian Jordanians

Reject 4,1 2,2

Finding A Discount Factor

Strategy: Trigger strategy (Tr)Expected payoffs under cooperation and defection given Trigger strategy:EP(C|Tr) = R + R + 2R + 3R + … = R + R*(1/(1-)) EP(D|Tr) = P + P + 2P + 3P + … = P + P*(1/(1-))Solving for equilibrium discount factor:

R + R*(1/(1-) = P + P*(1/(1-)) * = (T-R/T-P)

Discount Factor of Education:

Undergraduates: 5-4/5-3 = ｽJordanian Gov’t: 3-2/3-1 = ｽ

Discount Factor of Parliament Elections:

Palestinian Voter: 4-3/4-2 = ｽJordanian Gov’t: 4-3/4-2 = ｽ

Discount Factor of Residency:

Palestinian Immigrant: 4-3/4-2 = ｽJordanian Government: 4-3/4-2 = ｽ

Discount Factor of General Interactions:

Palestinian Jordanians: 3-2/3-1 = ｽTransjordanians: 3-2/3-1 = ｽ

The Private Economic Sector

QuickTime™ and a decompressor

are needed to see this picture.

Potential for Deadlock

Transjordanian

Joint Sole Joint 1.7,1.7 1.7, 8.3 Palestinian Sole 8.3, 1.7 5.4,2.9