Philosophy East & West, 63:3, 2013, 322-334

Contradictions in Dgen

Koji Tanaka*

Department of Philosophy

University of Auckland k.tanaka@auckland.ac.nz

Abstract

In their article The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism, Deguchi, Garfield

and Priest argue that some (though not all) of the contradictions that appear in Buddhist texts

should be accepted. An examination of their argument depends on what sort(s) of negation is

(are) used in the texts. In order to see apparently contradictory statements as affirmations of

true contradictions, we must assume that not' (or its variance) is used as a contradiction

forming operator. In this paper, I examine the conception of negation(s) that is (are) salient in

the writings of D gen and argue that he would not agree that his sentences are to be

considered, and accepted, as contradictory.

1. Contradictions in Buddhism

There are a number of texts in the Buddhist traditions that contain apparently contradictory

statements. In their article The Way of the Dialetheist: Contradictions in Buddhism,

Deguchi, Garfield and Priest (DGP) argue that some (though not all) of the contradictions

that appear in Buddhist texts should be accepted. Armed with modern developments in paraconsistent logics,

1 they argue that one need not draw the conclusion that these

contradictions signify irrationalism. They contend that Buddhist thinkers themselves seem to

* I would like to thank Yasuo Deguchi, Jay Garfield and Graham Priest for their rigorous comments

on the version of this paper I presented in the workshop held at Kyoto University. I would also like to

thank Yasuo Deguchi for organising the workshop. Many thanks also go to Teramae Jin at Kdaiji in

Kyoto for our long conversation on this very issue which we had a couple of days after the workshop

but also for all conversations we have had over the last few years. His agreement with my reading of

Dgen certainly boosted my confidence. 1For an introduction to paraconsistent logics, see, for example, Priest (2002) and Priest and Tanaka

(2009).

2

have developed machinery (such as the doctrine of the two truths) that, if employed to its

limit, entails contradictions.2

It seems, however, that it is one thing for us as contemporary commentators to think

through the implications of Buddhist discourses and another for the Buddhist thinkers

themselves to endorse these same conclusions as what they originally meant. Do or would (historical or canonical) Buddhist thinkers, themselves, accept contradictions as true?

Answers to this question depend on what sort(s) of negation is (are) used in historical or

canonical texts. In order to see apparently contradictory statements as affirmations of true

contradictions by the Buddhist thinkers themselves we must assume that not (or its variance) is used as a contradiction forming operator. But does this assumption hold any

water?

Answering this question is a complex issue. We need to examine each apparent

contradictory statement to see whether or not not is being used as a contradiction forming

operator. In this paper, I shall focus on Dgen to whom DGP refer in making their case. Instead of analysing each occurrence of not in Dgens writings, I will examine the

conception of negation(s) that is (are) salient in his writings. Dgen doesnt present any

semantic reflection on his own writings. The account of negation(s) that I present is (are) a

result of rational reconstruction. Nonetheless, I will weave together the conceptual

machineries that Dgen provides and present a coherent account of negation(s) that, I contend, would be acceptable to him based on what he wrote. I do not deny that there maybe

some accidental contradictions contained in his writings. Yet, I shall argue that it is not clear

that Dgen would systematically think of his sentences as contradictory.3

2. Shji

Before analysing the negation(s) that Dgen invokes, I shall consider the contradictions that DGP claim to have been affirmed by Dgen. There is one passage in particular that requires a

careful analysis. I shall demonstrate, however, that the apparently contradictory nature of the

other passages considered by DGP is the result of the translation of Dgens thought on

which DGP rely for their analysis. In support for their claim that Dgen takes some contradictions seriously, DGP quote

two passages from Dgens Shbgenz, one from the Shji fascicle and another from the

Genjkan fascicle. Those passages appear in different contexts in Dgens writings and thus

need to be examined separately. In this section, I consider the passage from Shji where DGP

claim that Dgen asserts, and is committed to the truth of, a contradiction.

Just understand that birth-and-death is itself nirvana. There is nothing such as birth and death to be avoided. There is nothing such as nirvana to be sought. Only when you

realise this are you free from birth and death. (Quoted in Deguchi, Garfield and Priest

(2008) p. 396)

The last sentence implies that there is birth and death. But that contradicts the second sentence, which denies their existence. Thus, so DGP claim, Dgen asserts seriously that

there is and is not birth and death.

2See also Garfield and Priest (2003).3This reverses my earlier view on the issue. For my previous view, see Tanaka (2000).

3

If this were what Dgen asserts, he would indeed have been committed to a

contradiction. Given that the notion of birth-and-death is integral to Dgens philosophy, one

might think that this contradiction is important for Dgen. However, the translation DGP use

to establish their position on Dgen is problematic. As I understand the passage, it can be

translated as follows:

Only when you regard [literally, have in mind] birth-and-death just as nirva and you

do not avoid it as birth-and-death and you dont seek it as nirva, are you free from

birth-and-death.

(Supp Vol,

p. 77) 4

Translated in this way, Dgen doesnt affirm nor deny the existence of birth and death.

Instead, he tells us what should be in our mind () in order to be free from birth

and death. Dgen tells us not to avoid birth-and-death, where this is understood in our mind

as nirva, as well as not to seek it as nirva. Rather than affirming and denying the

existence of birth and death, he instructs us not to be in a certain cognitive (or intentional)

state. There is no mention of the existence nor non-existence of birth-and-death. Thus, he

doesnt assert any contradiction in this passage. Now, translating Dgens writings is notoriously difficult. His writings are sometimes

ambiguous because of the poetic nature of his writings and sometimes difficult to understand

because of his frequent engagement in wordplay. However, this passage is relatively clear in

its sentence construction and its meaning. While one may challenge my translation, I think that, given the relative clearness of this passage, the burden is on DGP to refute it and show

that Dgen does, in fact, assert a contradiction in this passage.

3. Genjkan

As another example of contradictions that Dgen allegedly affirm, DGP quote a passage from Genjkan. This passage appears in a specific context (as we will see below) and thus must

be treated separately from the passage from Shji. DGP quote the two opening sentences of

Genjkan:

As all things are Buddha-dharma, there is delusion and realisation, practice, birth and

death, and there are buddhas and sentient beings. As the myriad things are without an abiding self, there is no delusion, no realisation, no Buddha, no sentient being, no birth

and death.5

This passage does lead us to think that Dgen is committed to a contradiction. Unfortunately,

this translation is problematic for DGPs purpose. In this translation, the first clause of each

4The version of Dgens texts (and a contemporary Japanese translation by Ishii Kyji) I consulted is

Dgen (1996-98). Page numbers refer to this edition.5DGP cite Shji as the source. That must be a typographical error.

4

sentence is given as a reason for the second clause. This leads us to think that Dgen is

saying:

Because A, B. Because C, B.

If this were the case, he would be asserting B (on the basis of A) and B (on the basis of C)

and, hence, asserting a contradiction.

At least two comments can be made about this passage. One concerns translation and

the other concerns the structure of Dgens philosophy as expressed in his writings.

Regarding translation, I believe that what Dgen actually says is something quite different from what DGP take him to say. Dgen doesnt offer the first clause of each sentence as a

reason for the second clause. Instead, what he says is:

When (jisetsu ) A, B. When (jisetsu ) C, B.

The notion of time is important to Dgen, not only in the context of this passage but also

more generally, as he explains in the Uji fascicle. If we simply think of these sentences as

conditional statements, however, it seems that he is saying (if we permit ourselves to use

modern logical notation to express the thought):

A B and C B.

These two conditional statements are not contradictory. If this is right, then Dgen doesnt

assert the contradiction that there is delusion and realisation, practice, birth and death and

there is no delusion, no realisation, no Buddha, no sentient being, no birth and death.

One might think that if he asserts A B and C B, then, given that they entail A

and C on a standard account of conditionals, Dgen might be thought as asserting A (all

things are not Buddha-dharma) and C (the myriad things are not without an abiding self). But A and C seem to contradict his overall philosophy as well as Buddhist philosophy, in

general, since Dgen arguably accepts that all things are Buddha-dharma and that the myriad

things are without an abiding self. One might use the apparent fact of Dgens holding

contradictory commitments as evidence for the fact that he is committed to contradictions.6

In order to examine these alleged contradictory commitments we must analyse the

negation(s) that Dgen invokes in his writing. I will first consider C (the myriad things are not without an abiding self) followed by A (all things are not Buddha-dharma) as how to

understand the negation involved in the first has an impact on how to understand the negation

involved in the second.

According to the translation DGP rely on, Dgen asserts that the myriad things are

without an abiding self. If this were indeed what Dgen says, then, following the reasoning above, he would be accepting C (the myriad things are not without an abiding self) which

contradicts the claim that the myriad things are without an abiding self which Dgen

arguably accepts. Again, however, this translation is problematic. I believe that what he

actually says is

When I (ware ) am present together with myriad things, 7

6Thanks go to Graham Priest for making this suggestion. 7This sounds a bit awkward; however, this is a, more or less, a literal translation.

5

(Vol. 1, p. 16)

So he is not concerned with the lack of abiding self of myriad things. What he is concerned

with is the presence of I, my self, who is experiencing the myriad things. Dgen is instructing us not to let the self be part of our experience of myriad things. The absence of my self in

experiencing myriad things doesnt contract anything that Dgen does accept. In fact, that is

consistent with the no-self doctrine that Dgen and most Buddhists accept.

Focusing on the problematic nature of the presence of the self helps us understand the

rest of the passage from Genjkan that DGP quote. According to DGP, given the standard

analysis of conditional statements, he must be asserting that all things are not Buddha-dharma while his overall position seems to be that all things are Buddha-dharma. In order to address

this issue, we need to consider the context in which this passage appears. In particular, it is

crucial to recognise that the two sentences that DGP quote constitute the first two sentences

of a triplet. Instead of two truths, Dgen often invoke three stages of awakening as the

structure of his writings. We need to understand the nature of negation or negations as part of

this structure. In the Zazengi fascicle, Dgen presents a set of instructions for doing zazen (sitting

meditation). Towards the end of Zazengi, he invokes three stages of awakening:

Sit diligently and then thinking (shiry ) becomes not-thinking (fushiry ).

What is thinking that becomes not-thinking, this is non-thinking (hishiry ).

This is the art of zazen.8

(Vol. 1, p. 283)

The idea of there being three kinds of thinking runs throughout Dgens writings, although he

does not thematise them explicitly. In order to understand what he considers the problematic nature of thinking and not-thinking and how it is overcome by non-thinking, we need to

weave together some remarks that are scattered around in his writings.

In the end of the Sansuiky fascicle, Dgen writes:

An ancient Buddha said, Mountains mountain, water waters. These words dont say

that mountains () are mountains, they say that mountains () mountain. This

being the case, we should study () mountains (). When we investigate (

) mountains in this way, mountains mountain.9

8I note that the passage I translate here is, in fact, ambiguous. I have followed the contemporary

Japanese translation by Ishii. The passage that I have translated as thinking becomes not-thinking

(and thinking that becomes not-thinking) could be translated as thinking of not-thinking (See

Bielefdt (1990)), thinking about not-thinking (See Kasulis (1981)) or thinking not-thinking (See

Tanahashi (1985)). In these translations, not-thinking is the object of thinking. According to Brook

Ziporyn, not-thinking is clearly the object of thinking in the Chinese phrase that Dgen makes use of.

However, it is not clear to me that thats what Dgen is suggesting. I acknowledge that I am taking a

stance on translating this passage in this way. 9This passage is very difficult to translate. Dgen seems to be playing with some Japanese words. In

fact, it is not clear that a literal translation which expresses the intended meaning is possible. I

6

(Vol. 2, p. 329)

The difference between saying that mountains mountain and that mountains are mountains is

that the second expresses more than the first. In coming to be in contact with a mountain, we

may grasp it and identify it as mountain and attribute a property of being a mountain to

it. In such a case, it is because of our cognitive act that mountains are mountains in our

thought. In saying Mountains mountain, however, we dont express our cognitive act. It is

an expression about mountains and not about our cognitive identification. Dgen seems to be urging that we throw away the thinking that makes us the basis of the truth of the utterance.

In hearing Mountains mountain, we may think that it is an expression of our grasping of a

thing, identifying it as mountain and attributing a property to it. But that is a mistake.

Why this is a mistake is a question that can be answered only after a thorough

investigation of the entire corpus of Dgen. I think the crux of the problem, however, is to do

with the subject-object duality that is often emphasised in Yogcra tradition. That is, in thinking, there is a distance between the grasper, the self, and the grasped, e.g., a mountain,

in ones thought. The problem in there being such distance is that the grasper, the self, is part

of the content of thinking, since, otherwise, the mountain couldnt be grasped as separate

from us. It is the self represented and thus experienced in thinking that Dgen criticises, for example, in Genjkan and Uji.

The point seems to be that our ordinary thinking (shiry) is problematic. The expression

that mountains are mountains is problematic because it is in subject-predicate form. Dgen

thinks that such an expression expresses the fact that we identify a mountain as m and put it

together with the predicate M in order to come to think that Mm. Similarly, thinking that

mountains are not mountains, Mm (or not-thinking (fushiry) that mountains are

mountains), is problematic, since it is an expression of our act of identifying something as

m but not attributing M to it. So it is not really that mountains are mountains or that

mountains are not mountains. Rather mountains mountain.

In order to make it more precise, consider a first-order model for the language M = D,

I where D is a set of things such as mountains and water and I is a function that assigns a

name or a predicate to a thing (a member of D) or a property (a sequence of some members of D) respectively. (I assume, for the sake of simplicity, that our language consists only of

one-place predicates.) For each d D which is identified as a mountain, I(d) = m where m

is the name mountain.10

Then, each such d is subsumed under the predicate is mountain

M: I(M) = {d1, d2, } where d1, d2, D. Thinking that mountains are mountains can then

be represented as

M Mm.

This says, essentially, that it is true that mountains are mountains. Thinking that mountains

are not mountains, or not-thinking that mountains are mountains, can be represented as

acknowledge that I have a translation which is heavily interpreted based on my understanding of the

passage.10This is an unorthodox way of defining the function I. Nonetheless, I believe that this unorthodox

definition captures Dgens thought.

7

M Mm.

If we assume that M Mm iff M Mm, then one contradicts the other. So Mountains

are mountains and Mountains are not mountains can be shown to be contradictory. In

other words, the negation invoked in the second stage of awakening, fu ( ), is a

contradiction forming operator. However, this negation is not carried through to the third stage of awakening. Instead of

fu, it is hi () that is operative in the third stage. This is a different kind of negation. In order

to see this, observe that the language of first-order logic used above to explicate Dgens

thought on thinking (shiry) and not-thinking (fushiry) is designed to express highly

complex cognitive activities. Dgen appears to think that, in the third stage of awakening,

some (and not all) of these cognitions should be cast off (totsuraku ). For Dgen, these

predicative expressions, whether positive or negative, are problematic. They express our act

of identifying a thing as m and putting or not putting it together with the predicate M in

order to come to think that Mm or that Mm. In non-thinking (hishiry), however, the self

(ware ) (not a person (hito ) with which Dgen isnt really concerned) is to be cast off. 11

The self is not represented in non-thinking and so does not get into the act. Non-thinking is

not an act that grasps a thing and identifies it as mountain, for example, and attributes a property to it. The self who performs such an act is not represented in non-thinking. Analysed

in this way, the negation involved in non-thinking, hi (), negates the presence of the self

(and hence the distance between the grasper and the grasped) in ones thought. The self is not

represented in non-thinking whose point is the casting off of the mechanism that is operative

in thinking and not-thinking. Hi () is a negation of this kind.12

This means that, in the third stage of awakening, it is not just the self but also the

whole mechanism that necessitates the presence of the self that need to be cast off. Given that

it is this mechanism that assigns truth values to expressions such as Mountains are

mountains and Mountains are not mountains, Dgens point is that we shouldnt be caught

in the activity of evaluating the truth values of such expressions. It is any attempt to engage in such activity that Dgen urges us to cast off.

4. Mountains Are Just Mountains

In order to be more specific about my disagreement with DGP, let us consider the alternative

analysis of the three stages of awakening that Garfield and Priest attribute to Dgen (and

Ngrjuna) in their article Mountains Are Just Mountains. The notion of emptiness occurs, they claim, in the stages of awakening as depicted in, for example, the ox-herding pictures. In

the first seven pictures, the process of the taming of an ox is depicted, representing the

taming of the mind. The eighth picture is blank, representing the realisation of emptiness. The

last two pictures go back to the beginning, but a beginning informed now with the realisation

of emptiness (pp. 74-76). Garfield and Priest liken the ox-herding pictures to the aphorism that occurs frequently

in Chan/Zen literature:

11See Zazenshin, Paragraph 3 (Vol. 1, p. 287). 12For a discussion of Dgen focusing on the importance of forgetting the self, see Davis (2011).

8

Before I studied Zen, mountains were mountains, and water was water. After studying

Zen for some time, mountains were no longer mountains, and water was no longer

water. But now, after studying Zen longer, mountains are just mountains, and water is

just water. (Quoted in Garfield and Priest (2009) p. 71.)

According to Garfield and Priest, there are three stages in the process of understanding

mountains and water. The first stage is the understanding that mountains are mountains and

water is water. The second stage is the understanding that mountains are not mountains and water is not water. But, the last stage is, again, the understanding that mountains are just

mountains and water is just water. Hence, the understanding that mountains are mountains is

likened to the first seven ox-herding pictures; the understanding that mountains are not

mountains is likened to the eighth, blank picture, representing the realisation of emptiness;

and the understanding that mountains are (again) just mountains is likened to the last two pictures representing the beginning with the realisation of emptiness.

Garfield and Priest present a formal semantics for the negation involved in the three

stages of awakening. They take the negation to be expressed by (mu).13

They assimilate

mu to emptiness as understood by Ngrjuna (and his Mdhyamika followers). They take

cues from the catukoi deployed by Ngjuna, for example, in the Mlamadhyamakakrik

(MMK) and consider four truth values: t (true only), f (false only), b (both true and false) and

n (either true nor false). They represent the catukoi by the following lattice:

t

b n

f

An evaluation of the language, , is a function mapping each sentence of the language to one

of these values. So, for each sentence, A, (A) = t, (A) = f, (A) = b or (A) = f. (A B)

(conjunction) is the meet of (A) and (B) (the greatest value less than or equal to both) and

(A B) (disjunction) is the join of (A) and (B) (the least value greater than or equal to

both). (A) (negation) is the flop on the b-n axis. It can be characterised by the following

truth table:

13There is, in fact, a difficulty of talking about mu in the context of Japanese Buddhism. The word mu

() has an ordinary usage in Japanese and doesnt necessarily mean emptiness in the way that

Mdhyamikas would understand it. When Takuan Sh talked about mushin (), he gave the term

a connotation that is different from the Mdhyamikas. It is, perhaps, for this reason that Japanese

Buddhists and Kyoto School philosophers generally use k (, literally meaning sky) to mean

emptiness.

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(A) (A)

t f

f t

b b

n n

Garfield and Priest use the above lattice to explain the semantics underlying the ox-herding

pictures. In the first stage, each sentence is assigned one of the four values. At this stage, there are four possible truth values that can be assigned to mountains are mountains.

For the second stage, in addition to four values, Garfield and Priest introduce the fifth

value: e. This is the value that they use to represent mu. The fifth value, e, is an isolated point

in the sense that it is incompatible with the other four values. It is also a sink. So if (A) = e,

then (A B) = (A B) = (A) = e. In order to deal with the value e, Garfield and Priest

introduce a function that operates on the values on the lattice. It takes any value to e (i.e.,

is a mu-operator). So, for any value, V, (V) = e. The sentence Mountains are mountains

now takes the value e, indicating that it is no longer the case that mountains are mountains.

This second stage can be represented by the following lattice:14

t

b e n

f

The third stage splits into two. In the first instance, by taking into account the fact that

operates on every value including e, (e) = e. This can be represented as:

t

b

e

n

f

However, since e itself is nullified (or mu-ified), there is nothing inside to be mapped onto.

So the arrows representing fades out, giving rise to the following lattice:

14Note that, as Garfield and Priest acknowledge, this is, strictly speaking, no longer a lattice since it is

a partial ordering.

10

t

b e n

f

Now, the original values return as they were in the beginning. They are no longer taken into e by the mu-function, , even though the value e remains on the lattice. This represents the

returning to the beginning with the realisation of mu.

Garfield and Priest apply their analysis of the three stages of awakening to Dgen (and

Ngrjuna) in the following way:

So, all things have a single nature, and that is emptiness, and that is no nature at all. And that is why each thing can manifest exactly the conventional nature that it has. All

of this might seem at first glance to be hopelessly incoherent. We grant its

inconsistency: Ngrjuna and Dgen are indeed committed to the identity of distinct

truths and to the assertion that the essence of all things is their essencelessness. They

are also committed to the claim that the objects of awakening and ignorance are both distinct and identical. The fifth value, e, with its paradoxical status, is a way of

representing this. Ngrjuna and Dgen agree that ultimate reality escapes the standard

four possibilities, and so acknowledge a fifth; and the fifth is self-dismantling. It is both

crucial and idle. (p. 81)15

The semantic analysis of mu provided by Garfield and Priest is ingenious. It is also valuable

for our understanding of the three stages of awakening that are often salient in East Asian

Buddhism. However, Garfield and Priest have derived semantic resources from Ngrjuna

(and Madhyamaka in general) and presented a Mdhyamika study of the notion of mu as

found in the Chan tradition. From a Mdhyamika perspective, the Chan/Zen tradition may

appear to follow Ngrjuna: the Chan/Zen notion of mu may appear as the Mdhyamika

notion of emptiness.16

Yet, it is not clear that the Chan/Zen tradition itself understands the negation(s) involved in the three stages of awakening in terms of the Mdhyamika notion of

emptiness.

Whether or not the Chan/Zen tradition has historically adopted Madhyamaka, it seems

that the understanding of negation involved in the three stages of awakening in terms of mu

doesnt properly capture what Dgen says in his texts. We need to negate something as part of our training; yet what is negated is not the essence or inherent existence of mountains and

water. As I have shown above, Dgen instructs us to negate the presence of the self. His

concern is not with the emptiness of mountains and water. What he is concerned with is the

problematic nature of the presence of the self which may be represented in ones experience

15It is, in fact, problematic to attribute the claim that all things have a single nature (italic added) to

Dgen given that he would reject such an expression. See for example, Loy (1999). 16See Garfield and Priest (2009) p. 81, where they claim that the Chan/Zen tradition is merely

following Ngrjuna closely. Earlier in their article, however, they make a much more nuanced

claim: it is illuminating to read Ngrjuna through the lens of Zen insight. (p. 74)

11

of mountains and water. Even though Dgen presumably would have had some influence of

Madhyamaka thought on certain issues, in this respect, it is Yogcra thought that is

predominant in Dgens writings and not Madhyamaka thought.

5. Was Dgen a Dialetheist?

Does Dgen assert contradictions systematically as DGP seem to suggest? The answer seems to be no. According to the analysis of Garfield and Priest, contradictions are represented in

the last stage in terms of the presence of the truth value b (both true and false). Reclaiming

this truth value in the third stage of awakening allows Dgen to affirm in the end that

mountains are mountains and that mountains are not mountains. It is certainly the case that,

for Dgen, mountains and water escape the standard possibilities: simple truth and falsity of mountains are mountains. But to think of this escape in terms of assignment of another

value is to be caught in thinking again. The contradictory truth value b must also be cast off

in the third stage of awakening for Dgen.

For Dgen, it is also problematic to say that the essence of all things is their

essencelessness. This is not because he would find the very notion of essence problematic (though he does that too) but because he would find the attribution of essencelesness to all

things to be problematic. Assigning the fifth value is just as problematic as assigning standard

truth values even if the fifth value is said to be self-dismantling. Hi () may negate the

presence of oneself but it also casts off the entire mechanism of assigning truth values. That

is, the difference between thinking (shiry) and not-thinking (fushiry) on the one hand and

non-thinking (hishiry) on the other cannot be understood in terms of the absence and the presence of mu; it has to be understood in terms of the presence of the mechanism of

assigning truth values and the absence of such a mechanism. Dgen would find the very

presence of a lattice representing the semantics of the last stage of awakening to be

problematic. It is not just that there is a difficulty of translating Dgens writings as

containing contradictions; it would seem that, properly understood, there is no mechanism

that he appeals to which would allow him to affirm contradictions. For Dgen, any such mechanism needs to be dismantled.

It is undeniable that there is an air of contradiction in Buddhist texts. Of all Buddhist

traditions, the Chan/Zen tradition would, perhaps, most evidently confirm the existence of

contradictions. I dont argue that no Chan/Zen Buddhist would accept contradictions. Given

that their writings are filled with paradoxical statements, they might as well be committed to contradictions. The story contained in the ox-herding pictures may well imply a

contradiction. Yet, I have demonstrated that Dgen would not be so committed. For Dgen,

contradictions are to be cast off together with the very mechanism which allows such

contradictions to arise. Dgen was not a dialetheist.

References

Bielefeldt, Carl (1990) Dgens Manual of Zen Meditation, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Davis, Bret W. The Philosophy of Zen Master Dgen Egoless Perspectivism, The Oxford

Handbook of World Philosophy, J. Garfield and W. Edelglass (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University

Press, pp. 348-360.

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