contreras - recent history of the maghreb - a sociological approach

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Recent History of the Maghreb:A Sociological Approach

Ana Isabel Planet Contreras

University of Alicante, Spain

In the Maghreb, the struggle for independence was the starting point for a newrelationship between people and institutions. Three different ways of developing anew state

in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco

are the result of a new social and

political landscape that is being designed in the Mediterranean basin: from amonarchy in Morocco legitimised by religion, to a liberal republic in Tunisia and asocialist-populist regime in Algeria. During the 1970s and 1980s, both the internaland the international situation forced these countries to confront the difficulties ofeconomical and political central control. The lack of liberties, the economic crisis, the

fight for power among the political and social forces inside these countries, and theWestern Saharan conflict limited the development of the area. Two decades afterindependence, in the 1990s, we witness a political, cultural, economic and socialcrisis considered by scholars to be the catalyst of social processes such as the rise ofIslamic fundamentalism or migration to Europe. The civil war in Algeria and thefight against Islamic terrorism are alibis for the authoritarian policies implementedby these regimes. Nowadays, limits on civil jobs, control of the Islamic presence inthe political arena and new economic adjustment programmes related to EuropeanUnion policy in the area, are all attempts to solve the critical situation.

En el Magreb, la lucha por la independencia fue el inicio de un nuevo modelo derelacion entre el pueblo y las instituciones. El panorama poltico de la region se

articula en torno a tres regimenes distintos: desde una monarqua de legitimidadreligiosa a una republica liberal en Tunez o un regimen populista-socialista enArgelia. Los anos 70 y 80 supusieron para estos pases tanto desde el punto de vistainterno como internacional, un momento complejo, en los que debieron hacer frentea dificultades economicas y de ejercicio centralizado del control. La ausencia delibertades, la crisis economica, la lucha por el poder entre fuerzas polticas y sociales,as como el conflicto en el Sahara occidental, han limitado el desarrollo de la region.Veinte anos despues de la independencia, estamos ante una crisis poltica, cultural,economica y social considerada por los especialistas como la causa final de procesoscomo el auge del fundamentalismo islamico o la emigracion a Europa. La guerra civilargelina y la lucha contra el terrorismo han supuesto coartadas para las medidascoercitivas impuestas por los regmenes. Los lmites en el acceso a la funcion publica,

el control del Islam en la esfera poltica y nuevos programas de ajuste estructuralrelacionados con la presencia de Europa en la region son cuestiones barajadas paracontrolar la situacion.

doi: 10.2167/laic267.0

Keywords: sociopolitical, Maghreb, recent history of Maghreb

The Maghreb is the western-most subregion of the Arab world. It sharesboth close geographical proximity as well as historical ties with Europe.Modern-day Central Maghreb comprises Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco andthe two peripheral countries, Libya and Mauritania, which link the region to


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sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the Arab world, known as the Machreq.Interesting works on the regional geography from a social and economicperspective may be found in many sources (e.g. Fabries-Verfaillie, 1998;Prenant & Semmoud, 1997; Troin, 1985, 1995).

Only 14 km separate the Andalusian and Moroccan coastlines. TheMaghreb is a region that increasingly requires global background knowledgein order to avoid conflicts, real or imagined. Among the issues that need to betaken into consideration are the geographical proximity between the Maghreband Europe, the presence of the French, and to a lesser degree, Spanish andItalian colonial powers, and the constant flow of Maghrebi workers who havesettled in Europe.

Despite its idiosyncrasies, the Maghreb shares a certain number of cultural,linguistic and social features with the other Arab countries, of which theArabic language and the Islamic religion are the most conspicuous. In addition

to these characteristics, these societies are also plagued by a range of socialdivides and complexities, many of which are the direct result of mistakes madein the search for a nation-state in the post-independence period.

The Maghreb under European Control: Building aColonial Relationship on the Basis of Migration

It is not an easy task to summarise the Maghrebi colonial era. Although aconsiderable amount has been published from a historiographical perspectivein the relevant countries, there is still more work to be done in order to produce

a contemporary analysis of the subject that is as objective as possible. Thecolonial relationship between certain European countries and those of centralMaghreb was stormy and excessively long in some cases, for example, Algeria.During these relationships, certain changes began to emerge within the variouscolonised countries, both in the metropolises and also internationally.

The three central Maghrebi countries (excluding Mauritania and Libya)implemented several different types of administrative models, resulting indifferent types of colonialism. Tunisia, for example, split its administrationinto one chamber for French public officials, and from 1907 onwards, anenlarged parliament accommodated a second chamber for indigenous

representatives. Moroccos administrative model, however, was more complexbecause of a policy designed to protect indigenous institutions and practicesused by traditional leaders. The purpose was to support local development sothat progress would filter through, using the traditional social infrastructure(Laroui, 1994). It is patently clear that, apart from exceptions like the famousUixan mines outside Melilla in North Morocco, agriculture became the mainfocus for development. The process of expropriating and buying land at lowprices resulted in the erosion of tribal land. This policy would later create otherproblems, depending on what type of crop was being cultivated, for example,grape cultivation on the run-down vineyards. There would also be problems of

a similar nature in Tunisia in 1930. In general, there was a move away fromindustry, which was barely able to function at subsistence level. Finally, from afi i l ti T i i h d b d f f i d bt i t b i

110 Language and Intercultural Communication


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England and Italy. Tunisia had become a country where capital could beinvested risk-free, and where the banks were authorised to charge hugecommissions for bank loans, engendering a rentier-based capitalism. InMorocco, capital came from investors in the banking and industrial sectors

with stakeholdings in the mineral industry. Foreign holdings, especiallyFrench and Spanish ones, loaned money to the sultan and also facilitatedthe liberalisation of communication channels, the development of miningprojects and the procurement of arms. In Algeria, economic and financialbusiness interests were interwoven in a complicated web.

During the colonial era, a process of large-scale internal migration began,whereby people moved from the mountains to the plains and the cities. Thiswould later lay the foundations for population movements to other countries.The domestic population shifts spawned a network of suburbs surroundingthe big cities, which would later develop into cities of their own. It was at this

time that emigration to France began, initially by members of the army. Thistrend was followed by population shifts within Algeria from south to north tooccupy the properties left abandoned after decolonialisation. It was alsoduring this period that displaced Algerians returned to the metropolises.

At the time, migration within the Maghreb followed a classic pattern ofrural exodus and a consequential increase in regional imbalance due to newproduction techniques, for example, the introduction of colonial agriculture,farming machinery, etc., which altered the design of the traditional economy.As the nation-state emerged, migration from the country to the city played arole in speeding up the process of urbanisation. The migrants headed for the

capitals or the big economic hubs, rather than the medium-sized cities, likeMarraquech, Fez, Constantine or Hama, which suffered an erosion of theirtraditional power base. The traditional elite also moved to the new centres ofpower. The arrival of huge numbers of former rural dwellers and farmers hada significant impact on urban sociology, leading to more temporary dwellingsand a rural influence on some of the aspects of city life, engendering newsectors of the informal economy (Donte et al ., 2001; Salahdine, 1988) andproducing new forms of political expression (Abu-Lughod, 1996). During thisperiod, citizens acquired a key role in developing state policy (Chaline, 1996).

From 1973 onwards, new migratory trends emerged, which were a

consequence of modernisation, the new extended administration and thenew regional balance. The big cities became transit zones to attract the peopleand later filter them into the city outskirts, the outer urban areas or medium-sized cities. These cities progressed thanks to improved facilities and services.The improvements were a direct result of a combination both of regional policydesigned to improve regional balance and a policy relative to the internationallabour market. During this same period, large groups of Maghrebi immigrantcommunities established themselves in Europe. In the 1980s a populationcensus quoted their numbers as being above 2 million. Alternatively, theseimmigrants headed for the oil-producing countries (countries of the Arab

Peninsula, Libya and Iraq up until the Second Gulf War). Despite the fact thatsome cities like Kabala (Algeria) or Rif (Morocco) lacked production, they still

i d i th b f th itt t h b

Recent History of the Maghreb 111


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fact that immigration between Arab countries, in particular to the rentiermicro-states of the Arab Peninsula, has had a huge impact on the socialcustoms of the region (Fargues, 2000).

The Struggle for Independence and the Search for aNew State: Political and Economic Choices

The relatively prolonged period of colonialism in the Maghreb varied,depending on the country in question, resulting in situations as varied as theSpanish protectorate in the North of Morocco, the international zone ofTangiers, and the modern-day territory of Algeria becoming a Department ofFrance. By the 1960s, although these countries had different state and socialsystems, they had shared budgets.

After independence, the search began for the right model on which to base anew state and to develop the corresponding administrative and organisationalinstitutions. In all cases, these structures would continue to be deeplyentrenched in the rationalist principles of the former metropolises. Theprocess of creating a national identity using national budgets that had beendeveloped during the struggle for independence was even more of a challenge.This aspect has been perhaps the most neglected by analysts, along with thelanguage issue, the position of Islam in the new society and the philosophyadvocating that the differential factors should be forgotten in order tofacilitate the new state.

During the colonial era, the practice of Islam was monitored attentively andused to meet the objectives of the colonial powers. The leaders supported amainstream Islam, quite unlike the Islam promoted by the big religiouscentres, like the University al-Zeytuna in Tunisia or Qarawiyn in Fez. The aimof the colonial powers was to weaken the traditional elites legitimacy. Islambecame a bone of contention for the rebels during the colonial era. It was seenas a crucial issue in the struggle to prevent the erosion of a culture. Moreover,Islam would continue to be a thorny issue during the postcolonial period(Laroui, 1994).

As for the language issue, Arabic had been relegated to a secondaryposition by the colonial authorities and would rapidly become the object ofArabisation projects, leading to deep divides over educational policy. Thedifferential factors refer to the exploitation of the Berber population atthe hands of the colonial authorities in the interests of better controlling theterritory. Instead of compensating them for damages, the postcolonialistleaders wasted no time in sacrificing the Berber cause in the name of nationalunity (Laroui, 1994).

Algeria: Towards a socialist regime

Algerias struggle for independence was a bloody one and could even be

regarded as a civil war, given the parties involved. Afterwards, the Algerianstate seems to have been haunted by its colonial era and by the struggle fori d d it h d d I 1965 tit t bl l t d



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constitution in which the preamble was to lay the foundations for the newstate of Algeria. The only authorised party, The National Liberation Front(FLN), would remain the cornerstone of the new Algerian state. The elite ofthis omnipresent party controlled the government bodies and even the

appointment of the President. The President of the Republic was supposedto be elected by universal suffrage and subsequently appointed by the party.Complete confusion reigned over the respective roles of the Executive and thatof the President, given the fact that the President of the Republic was bothHead of State and Head of Government. The army would also maintain animportant political role and become an institutionalised presence in theframework of the party (Article 85). As mentioned previously, Islam andArabic were viewed as important elements in the resistance movement againstthe colonial powers. Islam would be declared the state religion, despite the factthat Article 4 of the constitution made reference to freedom of belief.

Nevertheless, this reference would disappear in subsequent versions.In 1965, Bumedien took power, bringing an end to speculation and

heralding the advent of new reforms, including social modernisation and anopen-door policy for new political parties. This move was inevitable, given theclimate of modernisation at the time. There was also an attempt made to createa modern society using an industrial model based on three pillars. The firstpillar was based on the administration, a legacy inherited from the Frenchsystem, although the administrative model was enlarged after independence.The second pillar was based on a reorganised military, the National LiberationArmy, which was transformed into a professional body. The third pillar was

based on the economy, which was broken down into blue-collar workers,white-collar workers and agricultural workers, both from the new coopera-tives born of the agricultural revolution as well as from the formerly self-administered properties.

From the 1976 Constitution onwards, Algeria witnessed the dawning ofsocialism. A National Charter, drafted prior to the Constitution, wouldenshrine socialist principles and later become the instrument which bestembodied the regimens ideology. This charter, in addition to the subsequentcharters, would take precedence over the Constitution, becoming its source ofideology and the driving force of Algerian state policy.

The Republic of Tunisia

Of all the Maghrebi states, Tunisia is the one that has achieved thebest image for itself internationally. In contrast with the instability inAlgeria, Tunisia is known as the Switzerland of the Maghreb, thanks to itssuccessful economy. Nevertheless, the shiny image masks a return toauthoritarianism, led by a president who is constantly targeted by humanrights activists.

Tunisian policy post-independence can be best divided into four periods.

Firstly, 1956

1970 witnessed wide-ranging political and social reforms, whichled to certain families amassing capital and a consequential economicd dl k Th d i d f 1970 t 1980 hift f ti



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liberalism, which would erode Neodesturs hegemony. The years from 1980 to1987 proved to be a difficult and black period for President Bourguiba, whoendeavoured to combine a policy of modernisation with respect for tradition.The secret coup detat carried out by Ben Ali would lead to the Second

Republic, characterised by a return to tradition, support for economicliberalism and a harder-line policy towards suppressing rebellion. Afteroverthrowing Burguiba, the new president launched an initiative entitlednational regeneration, which succeeded in raising levels of domestic andinternational consumer confidence. The project was accompanied by a newconstitution, which abolished presidency-for-life, freed political prisoners andheralded a new era of European economic and political support for Ben Alismanifesto. Nevertheless, his government would suffer knock-on effects fromevents in neighbouring Algeria and the fight to stem the rise of Islam.

Morocco: Seeking to legitimise tradition

Throughout the 20th century, obvious tension reigned between themonarchy and the so-called opposition parties. Concurrently, the statewas on a quest for legitimacy, producing an endless series of reforms, noneof which made any significant changes to the political system which,since independence, had been characterised by centralised decision-makingand a monarchy in search of legitimacy (Benmessaoud, 1996). In the yearsfollowing independence and up to 1975, the political parties took a veryhard line on certain issues in an attempt to seize, or at least share power.

From 1975 onwards, the so-called Saharan issue came to the fore, inv

olv

ingthe organisation of the Green March and the occupation of the territorywhich until then had been known as Spanish Sahara. This struggle wouldhave a profound impact on the relationship between the monarchy and thepolitical parties, mobilising the people to take a unanimous stance over theissue, which was being spearheaded by the monarchy. The same processcan be observed over the Moroccan claims to the Spanish cities of Melillaand Ceuta.

In Morocco, a number of reforms have been devised to increase themonarchys legitimacy. The current sources of legitimacy for the Moroccan

monarch arev

aried in nature. Firstly, in addition to the monarch being thejalifa ,the highest religious authority in Morocco, he is also the sultan, or holder ofearthly power. The monarch is also the cherif, meaning he has been blessed withthe divine baraka because he is a descendant of Muhammad. The Moroccanconstitution also places the monarch at the apex of the political hierarchy.However, as is clear in the case of Western Sahara, Hasan II is still seekingnew legitimacy, making this issue a key element of his foreign policy and asideline issue in domestic policy, with the aim of achieving national unity(Planet Contreras, 2000, 2002).

The Maghreb Since 1990

Th d d f th 1990 i M h b b th k k ff t f th



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born of a politically driven Islam and represented by the Islamic SalvationFront. In 1991, the elections were stopped because it was feared that thisgroup would take power. The direct consequence was an outbreak of armedviolence throughout the country. Claiming that the situation might spread,

neighbouring regimes used fear as their pretext to bring the ongoingprocesses of liberalisation and controlled democratisation to an abrupt halt.This resulted in an erosion of peoples freedoms and a whole new set ofplaying rules.

Civil unrest in Algeria

The situation in Algeria in 1988 was problematic. A drop in oil pricessparked an economic crisis, during which debt repayment interest rose to70% of exports. The proposed solution was to cut imports, which in turn

heralded a new period of austerity measures, a wave of dismissals and asurge in unemployment. President Benjedid endeavoured to implementagricultural reform and took a firm stance against the oligarchy wieldedby the National Liberation Front. He also took a critical view of the peoplewho did not provide for their own needs, which sparked huge protestmarches in October. A referendum was considered necessary to resolve theissue and the people re-elected Benjedid. Constitutional reform followed,introducing a multiparty system and a change in the electoral law. Thelocal elections in 1990 proved to be the acid test, revealing reducedsupport for the National Liberation Front, which had to compete with new

political parties (32 of the 48 wilayas remained loyal to the IslamicSalvation Front). In addition to domestic problems, the ruling party washit with the Gulf crisis, which provided the Islamic party with plenty ofammunition to use against the government because of the stance it hadtaken. This was the political climate in the run-up to legislative elections,in which the moderate wing of the Islamic Salvation Front, Djazara,which advocated respect for the law, decided to run for election eventhough the Islamic Salvation Front leaders were being held in prison. Inthe first round, the Islamic Salvation Front polled 43.7% of the vote andthe National Liberation Front, 21.6%. Although Benjedid appeared pre-

pared to share power, the army obliged him to step down and imposedmilitary rule under the authority of the High Security Council. Thisheralded a very unstable political period, in which large-scale violencewould be rife.

According to Martnez (1998), the civil unrest in Algeria should be viewedfrom three angles. Firstly, it is a struggle for historical memory and a plea tointerpret the countrys history differently. Whereas members of the Islamicresistance claim that their struggle began in 1954 during the national liberationwar against France, the regime discredits this claim, saying they are children ofcollaborators who aspire to a position which is not theirs to claim. Secondly,

there is an economic and social background to the civil unrest, because thesocial divide was responsible for a development crisis. Indeed, Benjedids

id (1979 1991) i i t d ith th bl k d d h th t f



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The National Liberation Fronts model of the state was doomed to collapsesooner or later because it was incapable of developing the framework tosupport a modern state. Thirdly, the civil unrest can be viewed in terms ofstakeholders competing with each other for control of the state. The new state

benefited from the Islamic movement and, from a societal perspective, theIslamic guerrillas believe that violence is an instrument to raise themselves upthe social hierarchy.

Tunisia: A success story, relatively speaking?

According to Larramendi (1999), in order to understand the Benal regime,one needs to consider both the high and low points. Some of the distinctivefeatures of the first republic are still visible today, for example the confusionover the difference between the state and the party, a strong presidentialsystem and a lack of real political competition. Electoral reform, which wasimplemented concurrently with constitutional reform, did not manage toblock the trend of fronts and coalitions, designed to maximise representationin the maximum number of constituencies and thus reap the benefits of themajority system. However, the alliances that ultimately resulted from thistrend ended up impeding the work of the government and, above all,discredited the political party in the eyes of the electorate.

Despite the potential for democracy in Tunisia, in reality, the trend towardsauthoritarianism, excessively repressive policies and an absence of realopposition have cast a shadow over the Tunisian state, despite the economicand social achievements which have boosted investor confidence. However, itshould be stressed that the current international context has contributed toauthoritarianism in the case of Tunisia. Firstly, there was the free tradeagreement with the EU. Any economic resistance was channelled intoachieving the best prices for Europe, together with the industrial and businessmiddle-class sector who supported the regime. Secondly, the USA supportedthe Presidents policies, such as the practice of controlling the public sphere tosafeguard against a similar crisis to the one in Algeria. The combination ofthese two factors meant that it was easy for Tunisia to develop a hard-lineregime, given that it had the support of its foreign allies.

The problematic transition in Morocco

The process of liberalisation which began in Morocco in 1995 required awhole series of reforms which would have a wide-ranging impact on theeconomy, the political landscape and thus, on society.

Both the political reforms and the reforms relative to the states territorialdelimitation were considered insufficient by some members of the parliamen-tary elite, who lobbied the regime. The reforms took place at a time when therewas also international pressure calling for more liberalisation of the marketsand widespread democratisation of the public sphere. New parties had been

steadily emerging since 1992 in Morocco, most of which were factions whichhad split from already established parties. Nevertheless, the traditional

liti l ti ith th t li t i b th th ithi



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momentum. In addition to the fact that there were not enough new membersto fill the ranks of ageing elite members, the other problem was that there wasa general lack of initiative, resulting in many members losing hope and fallingvictim to a generalised phenomenon of political apathy. Some analysts believe

that the politicians dwindling charisma and the general lack of support fromthe electorate were the primary causes of the rise of minority parties andassociations. To a certain degree, some also believe that this could also explainwhy a certain sector of the population joined the ranks of movementsconsidered to be Islamic. Some of these movements have converted themselvesinto official parties to participate in elections, like the Popular ConstitutionalDemocratic Movement.1

The palace controlled a process of democratisation which upheld thetraditional tension between the monarchy and the political parties. Thepolitical climate was also fraught with tension because of the upcoming

elections, in which people rallied for new parties to the detriment of thetraditional parties. The social fabric was also under pressure because livingcosts were high, job creation low and unemployment high among newgraduates. Many of these graduates, along with other marginalised sectors ofthe population, resorted to emigration, although at the time emigration wasseverely impeded by European policy (Lopez Garca, 2000).

The attacks in May 2003 in Casablanca, as well as the alleged Moroccaninvolvement in the attacks in Madrid in March 2004, have cast doubts on theeffectiveness of Moroccan policy towards Islamic resistance movementsbecause their links with international terrorist networks pose a threat to the

global system.

The Future of the Region

There are several challenges facing the region. The 1990s made itabundantly clear that the political, economic and social systems developedafter independence were not equipped to deal with the needs of the people.The dawn of the new century reveals societies that are weighed down withuncertainty.

Economically speaking, it will not be easy to balance the production

systems and rectify a depleted balance of payments, hit hard by debtrepayment interest and a high level of imports, which has not beencompensated with corresponding exports. The only solution is to rethink thenature of bilateral relations with the European Union and the northernmostMediterranean countries. Compulsory structural adjustment policy, which isimplemented on a regular basis in accordance with international financialorganisations, continues to have an impact on the labour market, increasingthe incidence of unemployment and short-term contracts. Given that the stateis usually one of the best sources of employment, a crisis automatically meansthat public service jobs for young graduates become scarce and there are few

opportunities on the private labour market.From a social point of view, the aforementioned unemployment has split

f ili d h l d t i t bilit d i d f l t



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the country and see it as a way to support their families. In a survey carriedout by a prestigious weekly newspaper in Morocco in the year 2002, 80% ofthe youth questioned said they saw emigration as the only solution. A newradical, Islam-based ideology attracts many young followers who see the

philosophy as a social and political response to the crisis. These youthmovements are neither official parties nor do they run for election. Rather,they lobby the institutions on everyday issues. Some analysts label these newyouth lobbies as a breeding ground for Islamic movements whose sole aim isto destabilise the system and who employ violent methods to achieve theirobjectives.

From a political perspective, the different systems in place need to beeither maintained or changed. The ranks of the elite members of the partiesare not being filled fast enough and people are becoming increasinglydisenchanted with the prospect of elections, which are a forum for political

expression but whose political institutions are not viewed by the people asbeing representative. The handover of political power to the new generationin Morocco has not yet incited its neighbours to do likewise. The fact that theyoung Moroccan king is continuing the previously established line of policyhas dashed the hopes of optimists who saw an opportunity for a new leaderto make changes, like those which have been made in Spain. The Tunisianand Algerian presidents are endeavouring to maintain their status in thehierarchy via elections and reforms, turning to allies to provide theirrespective countrys needs. International Islamic-based terrorism has sparkeda global climate of uncertainty and has had a strong impact on the Maghreb

region, raising allegations for which the Maghreb regimes do not have anyanswers.

CorrespondenceAny correspondence should be directed to Ana Isabel Planet Contreras,

Alicante University, C/Pelayo, 35, 28004 Madrid, Spain ([email protected]).

Note

1. Refers to a former party which followers of a moderate form of Islam joinedin order to block the law allowing the creation of religious and non-religiousparties which control the resources of the Moroccan people, as is the practiceof Islam.

References

Abu-Lughod, L. (1996) Urbanization in the Arab world and the international system. InJ. Gugler (ed.) The Urban Transformation of the Developing World (pp. 184208).Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Benmessaoud Tredano, A. (1996) Democratie, culture politique et alternance au Maroc.Casablanca, Maroc: Les Editions Magrebines.

Berriane, M. and Hopfinger, H. (1993) Impact de la migration internationale du travailsur la croissance du cadre bati. Le cas du centre de Zeghanghane. Revue de Geographie

du Maroc 15 (1

2), 143

163.Chaline, C. (1996) Les villes du monde arabe . Armand Colin: Paris.Donte, P., Bhattacharya, R. and Yousef, T. (2001) La transition demographique au



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Fabries-Verfaillie, M. (1998) LAfrique du Nord et le Moyen-Orient dans le nouvel espacemondial . Paris: PUF.

Fargues, P. (2000) Generations arabes. Lalchimie du nombre . Paris: Fayard.Hernando de Larramendi, M. (1999) Luces y sombras del modelo tunecino. Meridiano

CERI 25, 2428.

Laroui, A. (1994) Historia del Magreb. Desde los or genes hasta el despertar magreb: unensayo interpretativo . Madrid: Editorial Mapfre.

Lopez Garca, B. (2000) Marruecos en trance. Nuevo Rey. Nuevo siglo. Nuevo regimen?Madrid: Poltica Exterior-Biblioteca Nueva.

Martnez, L. (1998) La guerre civile en Algerie . Paris: Karthala.Planet Contreras, A.I. and Hernando de Larramendi, M. (2000) Marruecos en transicio n

y el modelo espanol. Anales de Historia contemporanea 16, 119136.Planet Contreras, A.I. (2002) El sistema poltico del Reino de Marruecos. In I. Delgado,

P. Chavarri and P. Onate (eds) Sistemas de organizacion poltica contemporanea(pp. 603627). Madrid: UNED.

Prenant, A. and Semmoud, B. (1997) Maghreb et Moyen-Orient. Espaces et societes . Paris:Ellipses.

Salahdine, M. (1988) Les petits metiers clandestins: le business populaire. Casablanca: Eddif.Troin, J.F. (ed.) (1985) Le Maghreb, hommes et espaces. Paris: Armand Collin.Troin, J.F. (1995) Maghreb-Moyen Orient mutations. Paris: SEDES.United Nations (2002) Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania and Algeria. Human

Development Index .

Appendix: Information Provided by the United Nations (2002)

Table 1 Human Development Index

Human Development Index

Algeria 107 (medium level of human development)

Libya 72 (medium)

Morocco 124 (medium)

Mauritania 147 (low)

Tunisia 101 (medium)

Spain 21 (Spain is included as a comparative reference)

Table 2 General data

General data Algeria Libya Morocco Mauritania Tunisia Spain

Life expectancyat birth

69.2 70.2 67 53.9 69.8 78.1

Adult literacy rate 65.5 78.1 47.1 41.2 68.7 97.4

GDP per capita 4792 6697 3305 1563 5404 16212

Human development 0.683 0.760 0.589 0.451 0.703 0.899



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Table 4 Commitment to health

Commitment to health Algeria Libya Morocco Mauritania Tunisia Spain

Infant mortality rate(0/00)

35 20 57 120 25 6

Infant mortality rate under5 (0/00)

40 24 70 183 32 6

Maternal mortality ratio(0/0000)

230 70 6

People/physicians ratio 1062 957 2579 15772 1549 261

Table 6 Economy

Economy Algeria Libya Morocco Mauritania Tunisia Spain

GDP per capita ($) 1550 1200 380 2100 14,000

Real GDP per capita($PPA)

4792 6697 3305 1563 5404 16,212

Average annual changein consumer prices

-4.2 0.7 8.8 3.5 2.2

Table 5 Commitment to education

Commitment to education Algeria Libya Morocco Mauritania Tunisia Spain

Public expenseseducation (% GDP)

5.1 5.3 5.1 7.7 5

Education. 1st, 2nd,3rd (%) female

64 92 43 36 68 96

Education. 1st, 2nd,3rd (%) male

71 92 56 45 74 90

Table 3 Demographic trends

Demographic trends Algeria Libya Morocco Mauritania Tunisia Spain

Total population (millions) 29.9 5 28.6 2.6 9.5 40

Total population (2010) 37 6.4 34.4 3.6 11 40.1

Mortality rate 0/00 6 7 7 13 6 9

Annual populationgrowth rate (%)

1.9 2.1 1.4 2.6 1.3 -0.2

Population under 15 (%) 37 38 33 43 30 15

Population over 65 (%) 4 3 4 3 6 17



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Table 8 The structure of trade

The structure of trade Algeria Libya Morocco Mauritania Tunisia Spain

Export. (mill. $) 13,133 9128 7367 514 6020 109,964

Import. (mill. $) 10,000 4880 10,788 600 8486 144,436

Net foreign directinvest (mill. $)

5 322 5 650 11,392

Official developmentassistance received(mill. $)

388.8 7.1 528.3 171.1 148.3 0

Official development

assistance donor(mill. $)

0 0 0 0 0 1376

Total debt service(% GDP)

67.5 60.3 272.5 58

Table 7 Employment

Employment Algeria Libya Morocco Mauritania Tunisia Spain

Workforce (% pop.) 31 29 39 46 37 43

Female ratio (%) 27

35 44 31 37

Agriculture (%) 21 2 37 44 22 6

Industry (%) 33 23 28 13 34 30

Services (%) 46 75 35 43 44 64



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contreras - recent history of the maghreb - a sociological approach

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