coping with uncertainty in japanese defense: analytical

Journal of Asia Pacific Studies ( 2010) Vol 1, No 3, 454-480

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Coping with Uncertainty in Japanese Defense: Analytical Eclecticism, Nonlinearity, and the Lockwood Method as Approaches to Defense Policy Futures 1

Daniel Clausen, Department of Politics and International Relations, Florida International University (Florida, USA)

Abstract: This essay will examine how three overlooked methods/ approaches—analytical eclecticism, the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP), and nonlinear analysis—can contribute to re-seeing the trajectory of Japanese security politics. While these three research tools differ in their origins, each privileges the creation of a big picture gestalt of complex problems over the creation of parsimonious predictions. Given the complexity involved in understanding how external stimuli (nuclear missile tests, defense build-ups, rhetorical aggression) are processed through the filters of domestic policy, this essay argues that methods that contribute to a coarse graining of political analysis can augment conclusions from parsimonious approaches. After describing each of the approaches briefly, I will then demonstrate what insights these method/ approaches can provide on the issue. Though current scholarship has effectively demonstrated how Japanese defense transformation purposely hedges among three different (but not mutually exclusive) policies of US alliance maintenance, military modernization, and regional integration, forecasters of Japanese defense policy need to keep in mind the potential impact of focal events ranging from a financial meltdown, to US abandonment, to continued nuclear bullying by North Korea.

Keywords: Japanese defense policy; complexity analysis; Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction; analytical eclecticism; nonlinearity; prediction

1 An earlier working draft of this paper appeared on the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction website: http://www.lamp-method.org/3.html. I would like to thank Thomas Chambers for his feedback on this earlier draft. Some of the ideas in this paper were also explored in an essay currently under review at the Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies, though the overlap between the two essays is minimal. I would also like to thank Lorna Simons for her help editing and proofreading this paper. Any mistakes and/or oversights are, of course, my own.

Daniel Clausen, Department of Politics and International Relations,

Florida International University (Florida, USA)

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Introduction: Japan in the Complex World

The issue of complexity in international affairs is a problem that continues to attract scholarly attention both in International Relations (IR) and the field of security studies. To what extent should complex systems like states or regional security complexes be simplified to help analysts distinguish the important details from background “noise”? How can scholars and analysts draw meaningful distinctions between data that should be collected and analyzed and data that should be ignored? What analytical structures should be used to guide analysts and scholars in their investigations? As proponents of analytical eclecticism (Katzenstein and Okawara 2004; Katzenstein and Sil 2004; Carson and Suh 2004; Sil and Katzenstein 2005) argue, the traditions of parsimony and linearity greatly inhibit how analysts relate to their object of study. Kerbel’s (2004) insight that the commitment to linearity and parsimony is “unrecognized, deeply ingrained, and enduring” (paragraph 2) applies equally to both defense analysis and mainstream IR studies. In terms of academic literature, commitments to parsimony and established theoretical foundations have entrenched explanations in isolated conceptual paradigms, hindering comparison and synthesis with explanations in other traditions. In this vein Sato and Hirata (2008) contend that current dialogue on Japanese foreign policy is driven by “paradigm competition” and thus “many scholars talk past each other and engage only in mutually exclusive paradigm-based monologues” (3).

While it is true that the academic literature on Japanese foreign policy often fractures along thematic lines, with different theoretical perspectives often over-emphasizing the issues of power (in the case of realism), efficiency (in the case of liberalism), or identity (in the case of constructivism and some forms of liberalism) (Katzenstein and Sil 2004), recent explorations of Japanese defense politics have actually been fairly eclectic. Even when, for example, “reluctant realist” explanations focus on the socializing influence of rising Chinese capabilities and a belligerent North Korea (Green 2001, 2009; see also, Kliman 2006), they also acknowledge the moderating impact of domestic anti-militarism and regional history. When constructivist scholars

Coping with Uncertainty in Japanese Defense: Analytical Eclecticism, Nonlinearity, and the Lockwood Method as Approaches to Defense Policy Futures

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focus on the influence of the domestic security identity (Berger 1998; Oros 2008), they also nonetheless acknowledge the quandaries of the security dilemma in East Asia. The problem is that this eclecticism is often tacit—recognition of the many complex interactions that influence Japanese defense politics is often used as a backdrop for focusing on a narrower set of explanatory variables.

By using recent movements in both the field of academic IR and security studies that deal with complexity—particularly IR and security studies’s engagement with innovations in chaos theory—this essay will re-evaluate the issue of Japanese defense politics. The point of this exercise is to open up the subject of Japanese security politics in ways that demonstrate unacknowledged or under-acknowledged linkages, highlights new avenues for exploration, and also, appreciate our limitations for knowing the future. This essay will focus on three underutilized approaches to alternative analysis: analytical eclecticism, nonlinear analysis, and the Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP). Though each of these three literatures is distinct in its approach, they nonetheless share a common understanding of state and interstate behavior as a “chaotic system of systems” that requires creative heuristics to keep problems open to discovery. As I will demonstrate, each of these three methodologies can help re-evaluate the complexity of Japanese security politics. Though analytical eclecticism has been criticized for being permissive, offering few defenses against bias, proponents have demonstrated the usefulness of this approach for denaturalizing assumptions and opening up new paths for inquiry. As Katzenstein and Sil argue, analytical eclecticism serves to bridge the gap between the social sciences and other sciences’ progress in the study of complexity (2004: 17). As proponents of analytical eclecticism argue, detaching, comparing, and synthesizing competing explanatory sketches is a pragmatic way of negotiating competing analytical claims in what are otherwise discrete research programs. LAMP, on the other hand, is a method for prediction largely utilized in the field of defense analysis. The method asks the analyst to consider all possible future choices from the perspective of the relevant actors (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993; Tanner 1996).



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Though LAMP retains some commitment to "parsimony" in that its process guides the analyst toward a conclusion about which scenario is most likely to occur, it also shares the "crude look at the whole" (Czerwinski 1998; Kerbel 2004) aspect that nonlinear and analytically eclectic perspectives share. As Lockwood and Lockwood (1993) write, LAMP--with its emphasis on the autonomy of actors, free will, and the impact of nonlinearities, or focal events--is “probability theory’s answer to “chaos theory”” (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993: 91-92). Even though the analyst chooses a most likely future, this conclusion never amounts to an instance of analytical closure; the analyst must come back to his/ her conclusion to account for new data and forecast indicators that point to possible focal events that would change the likelihood of all possible futures. In this way, the LAMP method opens up a crucial space for examining areas of ripeness, reinforcement, and resistance (Czerwinski 1998; Beyerchen 1992; Kerbel 2004) that may lead to unexpected results. Nonlinear approaches, on the other hand, often emphasize the benefit of forming a “fuzzy” or “blurry” big picture. Often the emphasis in this tool box approach is on coping with uncertainty in highly complex system (or systems of systems). The essay will begin with a brief sketch of recent developments in Japanese security politics. It will then move on to explore each of the methods described above and their possible contributions for re-evaluating the future trajectory of policy. Finally, the essay will conclude by explaining some of the synergies that can be developed between these approaches for future alternative analyses of Japanese defense politics. As my preliminary results using these approaches show, perhaps it is best to think of Japan’s defense future not as a single trajectory, but rather as at least three highly constrained trajectories being pursued by different domestic actors (bureaucratic, political, and ideological) in domestic politics. Understanding the future of these trajectories will mean also continuing to consider how focal events—conflict on the Korean peninsula, entanglement in US military operations, or prolonged economic decline, to name a few—impact the balance between domestic actors and their preferences.


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A Brief Sketch of Japan’s Defense Politics

Currently, Japan is at an impasse regarding future defense transformation. On the one hand, the rising threats of a nuclear North Korea, an assertive China, and the fear of abandonment from the US creates a pull toward so-called military "normalization," often defined in terms of conventional rearmament and a more autonomous defense posture. As several authors note, the idea that Japan must increase military spending, reform its pacifist constitution, and rely less on the US bilateral security treaty has gained an increasingly ardent following, especially among policy elites in the right wing of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Envall 2008; Middlebrooks 2008) and to some extent the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). On the other hand, the very current and reoccurring regional and domestic politics of Japan’s militarist past tend to push Japanese foreign policy toward a middle power path that emphasizes the country’s role as a civilian humanitarian power, framed as a continuation of its UN-centered diplomacy, regional order-building, and economic leadership through its official development assistance (ODA) (Soeya 2004, 2005). The domestic debate over the course of future defense policy takes place in the context of a domestic Japanese politics that privileges informal bargaining, consensus, and incremental change over decisive change. Though a “low stance” on defense policy--defined as a combination of low defense expenditures and a reliance on US protection--has been a basic characteristic of Japanese foreign policy since the foundation of the Yoshida Doctrine, the trauma of the first Gulf War (when Japan was labeled a “pay check ally”) has spurred Japanese politicians to rethink basic issues of foreign policy. This activism has resulted in a host of new legislation allowing for a greater use of the JSDF overseas, stronger central control in the Prime Minister’s office during times of emergency, and de facto collective defense arrangements with US forces. In addition, Japan has dispatched forces with regularity for peacekeeping missions, has shown greater interoperability with US forces, and has embraced a military modernization program that includes Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). This increased activism, however, has yet to overturn some of the most important



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aspects of the Yoshida consensus: the limit on defense spending (pegged at one percent of GDP), the US bilateral security treaty, the three non-nuclear principles (not to posses, manufacture, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons onto Japanese territory), and Article 9 of the constitution which denies Japan its sovereign right to wage war (see Stockwin 2008). Among the political parties, policy orientation is divided: the LDP is united in its support for the US, but divided on how to deal with Asia; while the DPJ is united on its multilateralist agenda for Asia, but divided on the US alliance (Samuels 2007, 2007a). On another level, there is a fundamental disagreement about how much the US alliance should cost and whether it should consist of Japan becoming a “normal” nation (Samuels 2007: 127). In addition, several authors have noted resurgent and aggressive nationalist tendencies in the LDP—a tendency that could lead to a nascent Gaullist security policy (Enval 2008; Rapp 2004; Samuels 2007, 2007a). Given the right opportunity structure—a heightened threat from North Korea, a belligerent China, and/ or a sense of abandonment by the US—this nascent Gaullism might become very potent. Though the Koizumi administration (2001-2006) was characterized by greater attention to issues of alliance maintenance and deteriorating relations with China, since that time Japanese politics has become more unstable. Relations with China have improved gradually, but relations with the US have become more unstable, punctuated by the issue of the Futenma airbase on Okinawa. The rise of the DPJ as a ruling power has created even more uncertainty. Though the early rhetoric of the DPJ focused on the creation of an East Asian community and a more “equal” and “independent” partnership with the US (including the prospect of re-evaluating Host Nation Support and the Status of Force Agreement), Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio’s bungling of the Futenma airbase issue and the loss of DPJ power in the upper house during the summer of 2010 elections means that at least for the moment, politicians are wary of taking bold risks on defense issues, especially with regards to the US alliance. In the face of a continuous economic decline the utility of the US alliance (and the extended deterrence it offers) as a method


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of “cheap riding” has become even more essential. Both the US and Japan, however, will need to recommit to working through the gritty details of realigning US forces in Japan. Though the government of Japan committed itself to the plan agreed upon in 2006 for relocating the Futenma airbase to a less populated area of Okinawa, the thorny problem of implementing the plan still remains. As has been demonstrated on numerous occasions, the local base politics of Okinawa continues to present numerous issues for alliance managers both in Washington and Tokyo. New Approaches to Japanese Defense Analytical Eclecticism

Proponents of analytical eclecticism build their case by emphasizing that none of the major theoretical paradigms (realism, liberalism, or constructivism) can capture the complex interplay among material power, concerns over efficiency in international politics, and the effects of identity. Though each of these theoretical paradigms often construct their explanations in ways that are coherent and identifiable within their own research traditions, theoretical coherence often takes place through a process of highlighting one aspect of political reality while relegating other issues to second order priorities. Thus, while realism emphasizes relative state capabilities and its impact on the security dilemma, it proves less useful in examining the basis for cooperation or ideational influences. Liberalism, for its part, is often productive in demonstrating the role of institutions in mitigating international anarchy and producing efficiencies that benefit multiple parties in positive sum relationships. However, liberal approaches often fail to address issues of relative capability, the security dilemma, or the strong effects of identity. Constructivism, meanwhile, tends to highlight issues of identity and normative influences, while neglecting issues of relative material power and the material efficiencies produced through cooperation (Katzenstein and Okawara 2004: 98; Dobson 2003: 7-25). In this way, constructivist approaches often ignore the “facilitating [material] conditions” that underpin the construction of security concerns by actors (Buzan et al



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1998: 17; Buzan and Waever 2003). In short, while realist and liberal institutionalism approaches, rooted in rational-materialist foundations, tell us much about basic motivations and material restraints, they tell use very little about how states exercise agency in environments characterized by risk and uncertainty. For an explanation of this, we need soft liberal and constructionist approaches that consider ideational and historical socialization processes.

In terms of the analytical sketches these perspectives have generated for East Asian security issues, each theoretical paradigm has demonstrated limitations. Though realist theories predict competition and balancing behavior based on a regional security dilemma, current theories are indeterminate as to whether Japan will balance with China against the US, or vice versa. By focusing merely on capabilities, realism misses just how important issues such as the history of Japanese militancy have been in undermining cooperation or the incipient multilateralism that is developing in the East Asian region. In terms of liberalism, its focus on institutional efficiencies, information sharing, and converging identities, misses the role domestic identity politics plays against greater cooperation in the region. In the case of Japan, the problem of history has been a continuous barrier against greater cooperation with China and even South Korea, despite sharing a commitment to democracy with the latter. Constructivist approaches to Japanese defense policy, meanwhile, often overlook just how young institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are and the limited impact they have had in helping to shape common understandings in the region over defense issues (Katzenstein and Okawara 2004: 110-116).

For these reasons, proponents of analytical eclecticism espouse the use of multiple approaches to uncover the rich structures that underlie foreign policy-making. Rather than conclusions nested firmly in the ontological, epistemological, and methodological approaches of a research paradigm, what analysts should focus on are the “analytical sketches” that these research programs generate. These detached analytical sketches can then be compared and contrasted with each other to demonstrate lingering problems in the subject matter. In this way, the analytically eclectic


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approach espoused by Katzenstein and Sil (2004) works within the larger tradition of “coping with complexity” that is occurring not only in defense analysis, but also in other sciences. As a pragmatic approach to Japanese defense issues, analytical eclecticism views realism, liberalism, and constructivism less as paradigms and more as tools for understanding.

Thus, one way to engage the issue of Japan’s defense trajectory through eclecticism is to nest realist and liberal ideas within a constructivist ontology that sees motivations as subject to negotiation through social processes. While typically realist perspectives have emphasized issues of national insecurity, zero-sum competition, and self-help in international anarchy, liberal perspectives have emphasized the possibility of positive sum gains, the mitigating factor of institutions for anarchy and self-help, and the possibilities of cooperation within anarchy. One might start by investigating the relative distribution of ideas within Japanese society (see for example, Samuels 2007, 2007a) regarding the importance of security from outside threats versus prosperity through trade and savings on defense spending. As this approach would demonstrate, the distribution of realist ideas (both US-centric forms and Gaullist) and liberal ideas (what others call liberal internationalists or civilian power supporters) cuts across parties in a way that makes aggregation of ideological power difficult. This approach could then be supplemented by a more materialist domestic political approach that looks at how domestic issues create constituencies and political alliances in ways that prevent cooperation among politicians who are ideologically like-minded on defense issues. As numerous Japan specialists have pointed out, defense policy lacks a strong domestic constituency (though one may be in the making). For this reason, continuity may be the norm, even when there are compelling reasons to abandon the status quo. Nesting theoretical approaches in the ontology of other approaches is but one of the ways to practice analytical eclecticism, and the approach outlined above should not be seen as the last word on the matter. Other approaches can combine traditions in different ways with similar results. For example using an approach developed by Suh (2004) for South Korea defense policy, an analyst might use liberal



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understandings of “asset specificity” to understand how realist images of “threat” are constructed. This approach would help explain the persistence of the US-Japan alliance after the cold war despite the disappearance of the Soviet threat. This approach would highlight how both Washington and Tokyo sought new common roles to fit existing assets and institutions, but also how the specific material presence of these assets (for example the position of military bases) limited what options could be considered. In addition, this approach would highlight how entrenched domestic interests on both sides of the alliance (career alliance managers; those in the defense industry) contributed to the intellectual process of finding new roles. As several authors have suggested (see Hughes 2009; Samuels 2007a), if a North Korea threat had not existed, US and Japanese defense professionals would surely have wished to create one in order to justify the continuation of the alliance and pushes toward Japanese military normalization.

Nonlinearity

Just as analytical eclecticism seeks to destabilize

unquestioned assumptions in entrenched theoretical paradigms, nonlinear approaches seek to unsettle linear approaches to complex phenomena. Much of western science is based on the premises of linearity. Linear analysis assumes that systems are characterized by proportionality, additivity, replication, and demonstrable cause and effect. Systems are proportional when small inputs produce small outputs and large inputs produce large outputs. Systems are additive when they can be broken up into smaller pieces, analyzed, and then reconstructed to make up a larger whole. Nonlinear modes of analysis, on the other hand, work from the premise that many phenomena are not amenable to reductive analysis, and thus, must be supplemented with methods that help to develop a “crude look at the whole.” Systems that are not amenable to linear analysis are often characterized as unstable, irregular, and inconsistent; they have synergistic relationships, feedback loops, trigger effects,


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delays, or are subject to abrupt qualitative shifts. Nonlinear approaches, then, take into consideration the possibility that small changes can have large effects or even qualitatively change the system altogether (Beyerchen 1993: 61-63; Czerwinski 1998; Kerbel 2004).

For predictive analysis, linear conceptions of state trajectories can often prove dangerously simplistic. The future is often considered a continuation of the past, and thus the analyst is blinded to data points that indicate potentials for acceleration, resistance to change, or even system shifts (Doran 1999). Frequently, subjects of study demonstrate the characteristics of both linear and nonlinear systems. Even as analysts go about mapping in detail the important characteristics of the phenomena under study, no matter how great the detail or how well the parts seem to fit, there is always the possibility, hidden within the data, that something important has been missed or that the relationships between data points are not as straightforward as they initially appear. For these reasons, analysts must find ways to “cope” with the unknown. Nonlinear methods of coarse graining (or taking a “crude look at the whole”) and actively searching for areas of ripeness, resistance, and reinforcement serve as important supplements to linear reductionist techniques. These imaginative approaches help to guide analysts away from the pitfalls of idealized sketches that are well-behaved.

As much of the literature makes explicit, approaches that interrogate nonlinearity should be a supplement to linear approaches, not a substitute. As Czerwinski (1998) writes, most issues are subject to the 80/20 rule. Twenty percent of the effort will help you understand eighty percent of a given phenomenon, but the other eighty percent is needed to understand the remaining twenty percent. The literature on Japan’s current defense trajectory has done much to give us about an eighty percent understanding of where Japan is currently headed. Samuels’s (2007, 2007a) study of the balance of power among different ideological groups—neo-autonomists, normal nationalists, civilian power advocates, and pacifists—effectively demonstrates the validity of his “Goldilocks consensus” theory. According to Samuels (2007a), Japanese policy will be neither too Americanist nor too Asianist, too militarist nor too anti-



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militarist. Similarly, Green’s (2001, 2009) notion of reluctant realism effectively demonstrates the way external threats and domestic contexts interact to create a slow-motion trajectory toward a more “normal” attitude towards military power. These approaches simplify the complex interactions involved in defense politics in ways that create coherent stories. In this sense, eighty percent (perhaps more) of the work has already been done well.

However, alternative perspectives such as devil’s advocate, the alternative scenarios approach, and backwards thinking can help to blur our thinking on the subject in productive ways. For example, while most mainstream literature on Japan’s defense trajectory allows for a degree of independence from the US as a hedge against abandonment, little of that literature predicts a wholesale break in the relationship. One very recent study, however, uses the alternative scenario approach to think backwards about what events would lead to the end of the bilateral alliance (Gottwald et al 2010). The point of the study is to identify indicators that would allow analysts to know when this scenario is becoming more likely. The authors conclude that the most plausible reason for abrogating the security treaty is some kind of “big bang” (what Lockwood and Lockwood (1993) refer to as a “focal event”), which could include a US conflict with China over Taiwan, a clash between Japan and China over disputed territories, or a North Korean attack on Japan. In each of these cases, the authors suggest that the alliance could fray when one or both of the parties’ expectations about the level of support from the other is upended (a more intensified version, for example, of the first Gulf War or the North Korea nuclear crisis during the 90s). In addition, cost sharing issues under economic constraints could also contribute to the gradual erosion of cooperation and the failure of one or both parties to meet expectations (Gottwald et al 2010: 9-18). Interestingly, one of the models that the authors suggest is the US alliance with New Zealand. In 1984, the US and New Zealand terminated their alliance when the government of New Zealand forbade US nuclear powered and nuclear armed ships to enter ports (Gottwald et al 2010: 15). Indeed such a scenario, where the US military presence is seen as a hazard to public welfare is extremely plausible, especially in the context of a Japanese


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public that is acutely sensitive to such issues. For example, following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US, tourism to Okinawa sharply declined as the presence of US troops was seen as making the island a likely target for terrorists (Hook and Siddle 2003). The US adoption yet again of a robust unilateralist stance (in the style of the Bush II administration) might put enormous pressure on the Tokyo government to limit Japan’s liabilities within the alliance. In such a context, a renewed political push for an “independent” Japan might find a receptive audience.

Another way to think through Japanese defense politics in a way that destabilizes our certainty on the subject is to look for small events that may have large effects. Two especially “ripe” areas are in Okinawan base politics and the overseas deployment of the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) for peacekeeping operations. In terms of Okinawa base politics, popular forms of activism, including mass protest and semi-structured violence, have the potential to radically change the relationship among Okinawa, Washington, and Tokyo. These forms of activism serve as outlets for popular anger and reassert Okinawan agency in ways that resonate with Japanese popular sympathy, thus threatening Washington and Tokyo’s control over the situation. One incident on par with the 1995 incident in which US soldiers gang raped a young Okinawan girl may be enough to put the situation out of either Washington or Tokyo’s control. Another small incident that may have a large effect would be the death of a JSDF soldier on either a peacekeeping mission or while assisting in support of US operations. Thus far, Japan’s expanded use of the JSDF overseas has progressed without casualties. This has been partly due to careful management by politicians and JSDF officials and the overt decision to avoid areas and missions that have high potentials for violence. However, luck has also played an important role. Though alliance exigencies and a desire for “international contribution” have helped push Japan out of its anti-militarist shell, it is important to keep in mind that the death of a solider (especially if brutal pictures were to reach the media) might reignite submerged pacifist sentiments. Where the New Zealand incident served as a useful metaphor for the possible breakup of the US-Japan alliance, here one might



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want to consider a Japanese equivalent of the US’s experience with peacekeeping and humanitarian relief in Somalia in 1993. While it is unlikely that Tokyo would even allow deployment to areas with this level of danger, it is also important to realize that a less drastic outcome and less visceral media presentation would be sufficient to reignite public sentiment against JSDF deployment overseas.

As we will see in the next section, The LAMP method actively encourages the use of the alternative scenario approach as a supplement to in-depth qualitative research to help generate an understanding of areas of ripeness, reinforcement, and resistance to change. By actively incorporating an element to unsettle the analyst’s earlier results, I believe LAMP represents a good example for other studies on how to keep the spirit of inquiry and continuous reflection alive.

LAMP

A Pracmatic Method of Prediction The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP)

is a qualitative prediction method based on the idea that the future is “nothing more than the sum total of all possible interactions of “free will”” (Lockwood and Lockwood 1993: 24-25). In order to predict the future, an analyst must decide who (or what) the relevant actors are and understand how those actors view their options. For this reason, qualitative research into each actor’s perspective is the main focus of the analyst’s time and expertise. One of the main points that Lockwood and Lockwood stress is that analysts should do their best to avoid “mirror-imaging” (substituting one’s own rationality for that of the actor) (1993: 30-31). No assumptions are made about the preferences of the actors (whether they value prosperity, security from external factors, or some other form of utility). Thus, LAMP shares the pragmatist foundation of analytical eclecticism.

Unlike quantitatively based methods of forecasting that ask the analyst to assign percentages to various


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outcomes, LAMP asks the analyst through a series of pair-wise comparisons only to distinguish between relative probabilities. In addition, by asking the analyst to engage in creative exercises—such as brainstorming on possible focal events that would change the likelihood of relative probabilities and by thinking of how the most likely futures can transition into less likely futures—the method provides countermeasures against satisficing and provides a platform for developing a more nuanced gestalt of the problem. The steps in LAMP are as follows: Step 1: Determine the issue for which you are trying to predict the most likely future. Step 2: Identify the actors involved. Step 3: Perform an in-depth study of how each actor perceives the issue in question.

Step 4: Specify all possible courses of action for each actor.

Step 5: Determine the major scenarios within which you will compare the alternative futures. Step 6: Calculate the total number of permutations of possible “alternative futures” for each scenario. Step 7: Perform pairwise comparisons with each one receiving a vote or a nonvote. Step 8: Rank the system by the number of votes received. Step 9: Pick the future that is most likely to occur and examine it for it consequence on the issue at hand.

Step 10: State the possibility of a future event to transition into another future event.

Step 11: Determine the “focal events” that must occur in our present in order to bring about a given alternative.

Step12: Develop indicators for the focal events.

The LAMP method is not without its issues. The most conspicuous problem (and one that Lockwood and Lockwood (1993) make explicit) is that any question of inquiry must be defined in such a way as to limit the number of relevant actors and choices available to these actors. Since in LAMP the number of all alternative futures is the sum of all possible interactions of “free will” among actors, the analyst must limit both the number of actors considered and the



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number of choices each actor has in order to keep the number of options to be examined and the total number of possible futures to be compared manageable. This encourages the analyst to: one, limit the actors in any given scenario to what seems reasonable to that scenario; two, aggregate actors into large units at one scale of analysis; and thus, three, to regard other “marginal” actors and actors at different scales as exogenous to the system that it considers. In scenarios at the regional or interstate level of analysis, then, the analyst is encouraged to analyze each state as a unitary actor rather than as a composite state or dispersed groupings of self-interested parties each with their own perspective. When the LAMP method is adapted for use within the state (as this issue of Japanese defense politics would seem to demand), the analyst is likely to examine the future as the net outcome of the free will of organizations at the political party and bureaucracy level, rather than as a composite of smaller sublevel units or individuals, such as interest groups, civic organizations, or powerful personalities (a variation of the Bureaucratic Politics Model developed by Allison (1971) and Halperin (1974)). Thus, the analyst is blinded to the potential impact of these smaller groupings and powerful individuals. In other words, an analyst might choose to look at units that seem structurally similar while ignoring unlike units that may nevertheless have similar or even greater capabilities to impact change (a subject that Lockwood and Lockwood (1993) neglect).

One defense against this bias is to take the effects of these smaller units into account when doing qualitative research on the similar aggregated units. Another defense that LAMP provides against these blind spots is in Steps 10 and 11, where these smaller groupings can be imagined as exogenous shocks to what are otherwise stable interactions of free will on the part of organizations at the same level. An even more ambitious approach by the analyst would be to push beyond the bias for examining structurally similar units, and instead to look (creatively) for units that have roughly similar capabilities, even if these units are radically different in terms of their structure. There is a third problem with the LAMP method, no less significant than the two addressed above. As a method, LAMP allows the analyst a great deal of freedom to determine


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which data are important in assessing the perspective of the actors in Step 3. As a method LAMP works to guard against the problems (frequently encountered in defense analysis) of mirror-imaging (Heuer 1999: 70-71; Lockwood and Lockwood 1993). Instead of substituting the analyst’s own rationality for that of the actor’s, LAMP puts a premium on exploring the logic of the actors under study. Though Lockwood and Lockwood (1993) suggest that analysts use different kinds of qualitative data to unearth this perspective--ranging from survey research, to history study, to detailed linguistic analysis--they fail to specify how one can create a comprehensive understanding of an actor’s perspective. Although LAMP as a defense intelligence methodology is evolutionarily discrete from theoretical debates in IR, the method does not escape the issues these theories address. For example, in order to determine which actors matter in any given scenario (Step 2) the analyst must first examine the international structure and the capabilities of the actors involved—both key issues of concern for realism. However, when the analyst analyzes the perspective of each actor there is a sense in which aspects of liberalism and constructivism take over (though realism never disappears, as actors’ perceptions often reflect realist concerns). Rather than an examination of nations as generic units (as neorealist analysis suggests), the analyst must reach beyond thick rational-actor perspectives and assume that actors have unique forms of agency in deciding how they view the issue. In doing so, the analyst (it is assumed) will most likely take into consideration how actors’ perspectives form within their individual histories and contexts, including the interactions between agents or through commonalities in politics and culture (again forms of liberal and constructivist analysis).

Implementing LAMP: Examining Key Actors

In the area of Japanese defense, several actors stand out as discrete, interested, and efficacious in deciding the nature of the policy debate. These actors can be aggregated



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into both bureaucracies and political parties. The relevant political parties would be: The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the once dominant party which now makes up the main opposition; and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the currently ruling party. Some attention might also be placed on the role that could be played by minority parties such as the Komeito (NKP), the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the People’s New Party (PNP), the Sunrise Party (SPJ), and/ or Your Party (YP) in future alliances with either party. Which minority parties deserve the attention of the analyst depends greatly on which ones are in alliance with the ruling party. In terms of the relevant bureaucracies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has long been the most influential bureau in foreign policy; in addition, since the Koizumi administration the former Japanese Defense Agency, now the Ministry of Defense (MOD), has risen to the level of a full policy ministry; the super-bureaucracy the Ministry of Finance (MOF) would also need to be taken into account since this bureaucracy exerts such strong influence over each of the other bureaucracies through its power over budgets; in addition, some attention might be warranted toward the Ministry of Economy, Technology, and Industry (METI) on certain issues, such as the defense industry and decisions having to do with the arms export ban. The Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) would also warrant some attention since its legal rulings on issues dealing with the constitutionality of the use of force are considered authoritative. Finally, the Japanese economic confederacy the Keidanren (along with the role of the defense industry) warrants some attention specifically regarding its interest in easing the ban on arms exports and expanding the Japanese defense budget over the one percent of GDP restriction.

Drawing boundaries around which actors count in Japanese politics can be a dangerous proposition because of the possibilities of overlay and penetration by groups and individuals at different scales. Often bureaucracies and ministries will make decisions with inputs from other bureaucracies and even subgroups like interest groups and industry committees. In addition, powerful personalities such as the prime minister, party heads, or even industry leaders can play a substantial role in shaping policy that


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overrides functional organizational flow charts. If we frame the premise of discrete actors as problematic, then the focus of our qualitative research takes on a much different character. Depending on which defense issue we are concerned with, then, we might direct our data collection efforts at the prime minister and individuals and parties that are able to influence his opinion or members of the Diet. Because LAMP does not readily accommodate or structure analysis across multiple scales or across actor boundaries, adjustments need to be made to accommodate the particular characteristics of Japanese domestic politics. In addition to the discrete actors listed above, an analyst must simultaneously study informal deal making between relevant organizations as well as forms of politics that overlay and interpenetrate relevant organizations. Also, one needs to be sensitive to how individual personalities may shape agendas across organizational lines.

The other issue to contend with is what to make of the larger voting public. The LAMP method encourages the analyst to regard constituencies among voters as part of the political party, as an exogenesis context, or as a separate “actor” for analysis. Because a majority of Japanese voters are currently unaffiliated, it is difficult to conflate their influence with that of the political parties. However, considering the voting public as a homogenous group could lead to some dangerous simplifications. For this reason, the large number of unaffiliated voters is one potential source of either ripeness or resistance in Japanese politics that will need to be accounted for.

For all of these reasons, an analyst who uses LAMP to predict the future trajectory of policy might want to conduct analyses at two scales: at the domestic and national levels. At one level, the analyst should perform an in-depth analysis of each of the relevant actors, articulate their options, and do a pairwise comparison of the policy preference of each actor. At this scale, one should keep in mind that not all actors have the same choices, and that choices will depend greatly on which issue is under analysis. For example, while the ruling party might have the option of exploring initiatives in a number of different areas of defense policy from constitutional revision to the lifting of the arms export ban, the MOF will likely have a much more limited influence,



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typically only exercising influence over budgetary issues. The LAMP process at the domestic level should then inform a LAMP investigation of Japan’s security policy preference at the national level. At this level, inputs from the LAMP process at the domestic level will be combined with an understanding of each actor’s relative position within the security policy apparatus and the influence of overlaying and interpenetrating actors and individual personalities. Though domestic theories of political power will be helpful in understanding the relationship of actors to one another, these relationships will also be highly context-driven. Thus in some scenarios, such as in the context of large degrees of public support, one could predict that political parties or the prime minister will have more agency than the bureaucracies. However, in situations where domestic support for the ruling party wanes, or where weak coalition governments or intra-party rivalries persist, the initiative may pass to the bureaucracies who will then most likely become caretakers of the status quo.

Conclusion: Towards a Rigorous Study of Continuity and Change in Japanese Defense Policy

As the above sketches demonstrate, each of the three

approaches shares a commitment to coping with uncertainty in a complex world. This commitment to seeing nonlinearities should not be seen as a substitute for linear social sciences, but rather as a useful supplement that helps to create more nuanced intellectual hedges and keep intellectual problems fresh for re-examination. One can also see how each of the different approaches overlaps and creates inputs for the other. While LAMP provides the backbone for the study of future trajectories, inputs from analytical eclecticism and the literature on nonlinearity supplement this approach by informing the analyst of the limits of forecasting and the necessity of keeping a “fuzzy” gestalt of the phenomena under study. Though LAMP gives


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the analyst a method for deciding the most likely option, the final product never amounts to a straightforward single outcome prediction. Each prediction is always compared and contrasted with other likely outcomes in an environment of possible focal events and transitions to other futures. These approaches, however, are not without their issues. In a sense, creative approaches to seeing complexity are opposed to the “science” in the social sciences. By keeping the problem alive, analysts are encouraged to avoid parsimony and to engage in speculative practices that are not subject to replication. In addition, there is also the problem of mastering the language of theoretical eclecticism. As Katzenstein and Sil (2004) state, “theoretical multilingualism” may “tax an individual researcher’s stock of knowledge and array of skills while introducing more “noise” into the established channels of [scholarly] communication” (Katzenstein and Sil 2004: 30). In addition, an analyst’s attempt to write on a subject across theoretical boundaries may lead to inconsistency, or worse, incoherence. For these reasons, some eclectic approaches have been dismissed as undisciplined, “flabby” appeals for pluralism that ignore the deep conceptual inconsistencies that are important between research paradigms (Johnson 2002: 245). As a response to these critics, proponents of analytical eclecticism have demonstrated quite effectively that in the case of the analysis of security dynamics theoretical parsimony can at times produce costly silences. Thus, proponents note that the commitment to analytical eclecticism is founded on a deep pragmatism: analytical eclecticism is a more efficient analytical tool for finding persistent problems and guarding against premature analytical closure (Carson and Suh 2004; Katzenstein and Okawara 2005; Sil and Katzenstein 2005). A commitment to analytical eclecticism—the use of explanatory methods in different theoretical traditions without their paradigmatic baggage—means being able to speak the language of power, efficiency, and identity in ways that open up new spaces for inquiry.

While my research on Japanese defense politics is still in its early stages, my preliminary results using the integrated methodologies outlined above has given me a picture of Japan’s trajectory that can be described as both



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nuanced and pragmatically unclear. One can see Japan’s defense transformation as actually constituting three different, but not mutually exclusive, trajectories with different actors acting as stewards. Japan as a national actor simultaneously pursues policies of normalcy (defined in terms of expanded capabilities, expanded executive leadership over the military, and a gradual inclusion of military personnel into defense policymaking), equality (defined as a Japanese foreign policy more resistant to US pressure), and humanity (defined as diplomatic initiatives to promote human security, nuclear disarmament, and international society) with all three of these initiatives constrained by an acute sensitivity to the cost of defense and a desire to cheap ride on US extended deterrence capabilities. As research so far has demonstrated, we can see these multiple trajectories as the choices of multiple actors at different levels enacting their understanding of security.

While the MOD and the JSDF continue to improve their capabilities in ways that allow them to contend with rising external threats and the demands of both US alliance managers and Japanese politicians, actors in MOFA, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and civil society (see for example, the anti-nuclear efforts of cities like Nagasaki and Hiroshima) continue to emphasize human security, anti-nuclear diplomacy, and other civilian leadership initiatives (though MOFA will still retain a great deal of influence on US alliance issues as well). In addition, while adherents of pacifism may have irreparably damaged their prospects as a legitimate political movement, they nevertheless continue to embed themselves in politics in ways that allow them important leverage over politicians and to create an important brake on moves toward re-militarization and overt collective security arrangements. In addition, politicians and bureaucrats (most notably MOF) worry that any break in the US-Japan alliance will mean an end to cheap riding and the expansion of the military budget. The fear of losing the US extended deterrent is acute in an environment of expanding government debt, a stagnant economic situation, and greater demands for social welfare protection. Though the discourse of an “independent” Japan, equal to the US, is not promoted by any major discrete organizational actors, the nationalist sentiment that these


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ideas evoke has found an increasingly wide audience that cuts across organizational lines. Adherents can be found in the JSDF, DPJ, LDP, minority parties, civil society, popular media personalities, civic groups in Okinawa, and increasingly even in universities. This group will continue to highlight issues of slighted Japanese honor, represented by the periodic cases of US military crimes like rape in Okinawa, the extraterritorial privilege of the US, and limited Japanese sovereignty. It remains to be seen, however, whether this group can achieve the political consensus necessary to overtake party and bureaucratic agendas.

In order to move our understanding of Japanese defense politics forward, we need to understand not only how these actors continue to pursue their initiatives within overlapping domestic and political contexts, but also how interactions among groups pursuing their preferences could help Japan transition into futures that are currently considered unlikely. By doing so, we will have maintained a big picture view of Japan’s trajectory that mixes parsimony with elements of coarse graining or crudeness that help us cope with our own cognitive boundaries.



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