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JOAQUIN, JR., petitioners, vs. DRILON,respondents.

CASE: This is a petition for certiorari . Petitioners seek to annul the resolution of the Department of Justice, denying petitioner Joaquin’s motion for reconsideration.

FACTS: Petitioner BJ Productions, Inc. (BJPI) is the holder/grantee of Certificate of Copyright of Rhoda and Me, a dating game show aired from 1970 to 1977.

On June 28, 1973, petitioner BJPI submitted to the National Library an addendum to its certificate of copyright specifying the show’s format and style of presentation.

On July 14, 1991, while watching television, petitioner president of BJPI, saw on RPN Channel 9 anepisode of It’s a Date, which was produced by IXL Productions, Inc. (IXL). After writing 2 letters demandingand warning to private respondent Gabriel M. Zosa, president and general manager of IXL, informing thelatter that BJPI had a copyright toRhoda and Me and demanding that IXL discontinue airingIt’s a Date and its refusal to discontinue airing the show , petitioner filed a complaint for violation of P.D. No. 49 was filedagainst private respondent together with certain officers of RPN Channel 9 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City However, private respondent Zosa sought a review of the resolution of the Assistant CityProsecutor before the Department of Justice.

On August 12, 1992, respondent Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon reversed the Assistant CityProsecutor’s findings and directed him to move for the dismissal of the case against private respondents.

Petitioner Joaquin filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by respondent

Secretary of Justice on December 3, 1992. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the format or mechanics of a show is entitled to copyright protection.

HELD:[T]he essence of copyright infringement is the copying, in whole or in part, of copyrightable materials asdefined and enumerated in Section 2 of PD. No. 49. Apart from the manner in which it is actuallyexpressed, however, the idea of a dating game show is, in the opinion of this Office, a non-copyrightablematerial. Ideas, concepts, formats, or schemes in their abstract form clearly do not fall within the class of works or materials susceptible of copyright registration as provided in PD. No. 49.This provision is substantially the same as 172 of the INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE OF THEPHILIPPINES (R.A. No. 8293). The format or mechanics of a television show is not included in thelist of protected works in 2 of P.D. No. 49. For this reason, the protection afforded by the law cannot

be extended to cover them.P.D. No. 49, §2, in enumerating what are subject to copyright, refers to finished works and not to

concepts. The copyright does not extend to an idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.

What then is the subject matter of petitioners’ copyright? This Court is of the opinion that petitioner BJPI’s copyright covers audio-visual recordings of each episode of Rhoda and Me, as falling within theclass of works mentioned in P.D. 49, §2(M), to wit:Cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous to cinematography or any process for making audio-visual recordings;The copyright does not extend to the general concept or format of its dating game show. Accordingly, by thevery nature of the subject of petitioner BJPI’s copyright, the investigating prosecutor should have theopportunity to compare the videotapes of the two shows.

Mere description by words of the general format of the two dating game shows is insufficient; thepresentation of the master videotape in evidence was indispensable to the determination of the existence of probable cause. As aptly observed by respondent Secretary of Justice:

 A television show includes more than mere words can describe because it involves a whole spectrum of visuals and effects, video and audio, such that no similarity or dissimilarity may be found by merelydescribing the general copyright/format of both dating game shows.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. 

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MANLY SPORTWEAR MANUFACTURING, INC., Petitioner, vsDADODETTE ENTERPRISES AND/OR HERMES SPORTS CENTER,

CASE: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailsthe decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution[4] denying reconsideration thereof.

FACTS: Special Investigator Eliezer P. Salcedo of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) applied for asearch warrant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, based on the information thatDadodette Enterprises and/or Hermes Sports Center were in possession of goods, the copyright of whichbelonged to Manly Sportswear Mfg., Inc. (MANLY) .  After finding reasonable grounds that a violation of Sections 172 and 217 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8293[6] has been committed, a Search was issued.

 Respondents thereafter moved to quash and annul the search warrant contending that the same is

invalid since the requisites for its issuance have not been complied with. They insisted that the sportinggoods manufactured by and/or registered in the name of MANLY are ordinary and common hence, notamong the classes of work protected under Section 172 of RA 8293.

 Trial court granted the motion to quash and declared Search Warrant null and void based on its

finding that the copyrighted products of MANLY do not appear to be original creations and were being

manufactured and distributed by different companies locally and abroad under various brands, andtherefore unqualified for protection under Section 172 of RA 8293. Moreover, MANLY’s certificates of registrations were issued only in 2002, whereas there were certificates of registrations for the same sportsarticles which were issued earlier than MANLY’s, thus further negating the claim that its copyrightedproducts were original creations. MANLY filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence it filed apetition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was also denied for lack of merit A motion for reconsideration was also denied. Thus, MANLY filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the trial court did not gravely abuse itsdiscretion in declaring in the hearing for the quashal of the search warrant that the copyrighted products of MANLY are not original creations subject to the protection of RA 8293.

 RULING: We deny the petition. In the instant case, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

when it entertained the motion to quash considering that no criminal action has yet been instituted when itwas filed. The trial court also properly quashed the search warrant it earlier issued after finding uponreevaluation of the evidence that no probable cause exists to justify its issuance in the first place. As ruledby the trial court, the copyrighted products do not appear to be original creations of MANLY and are notamong the classes of work enumerated under Section 172 of RA 8293.

 At most, the certificates of registration and deposit issued by the National Library and the SupremeCourt Library serve merely as a notice of recording and registration of the work but do not confer any rightor title upon the registered copyright owner or automatically put his work under the protective mantle of thecopyright law. It is not a conclusive proof of copyright ownership. As it is, non-registration and deposit of the work within the prescribed period only makes the copyright owner liable to pay a fine.[18] 

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals areAFFIRMED. 

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CHING, petitioner, vs. SALINAS, SR.,

CASE: This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appealsaffirming the Orders of the (RTC) of Manila, which quashed and set aside Search Warrant granted in favor of petitioner Jessie G. Ching.

FACTS: Jessie G. Ching is the owner and general manager of Jeshicris Manufacturing Co., the maker andmanufacturer of a Utility Model, described as “Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for Automobile” made up of plastic.

On September 4, 2001, Ching and Joseph Yu were issued by the National Library Certificates of Copyright Registration and Deposit of the said work described therein as “Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for 

 Automobile. Later on, Ching requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for police/investigativeassistance for the apprehension and prosecution of illegal manufacturers, producers and/or distributors of the works.

 After due investigation, the NBI filed applications for search warrants in the RTC of Manila againstWilliam Salinas, Sr. and the officers and members of the Board of Directors of Wilaware Product

Corporation. It was alleged that the respondents therein reproduced and distributed the said modelspenalized under Sections 177.1 and 177.3 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293. The RTC granted theapplication and issued Search Warrant for the seizure of the aforecited articles.

The respondents filed a motion to quash the search warrants. They averred that the works covered bythe certificates issued by the National Library are not artistic in nature; they are considered automotivespare parts and pertain to technology. They aver that the models are not original, and as such are theproper subject of a patent, not copyright. In opposing the motion, the petitioner averred that the court whichissued the search warrants was not the proper forum in which to articulate the issue of the validity of thecopyrights issued to him.

The trial court issued an Order granting the motion, and quashed the search warrant on its finding thatthere was no probable cause for its issuance. The court ruled that the work covered by the certificatesissued to the petitioner pertained to solutions to technical problems, not literary and artistic as provided in

 Article 172 of the Intellectual Property Code.

His motion for reconsideration of the order having been denied by the trial court’s Order the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, contending that the RTC had no jurisdiction to delve into and resolvethe validity of the copyright certificates issued to him by the National Library. He insisted that his works arecovered by Sections 172.1 and 172.2 of the Intellectual Property Code.

The CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition on its finding that the RTC did not commit any graveabuse of its discretion in issuing the assailed order. It is worthy to state that the works protected under theLaw on Copyright are: literary or artistic works (Sec. 172) and derivative works (Sec. 173). The Leaf SpringEye Bushing and Vehicle Bearing Cushion fall on neither classification The petitioner’s motion for 

reconsideration of the said decision was also denied. The petitioner forthwith filed the present petition for review on certiorari .

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion when it declared that petitioners’works are not copyrightable.

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RULING: The petition has no merit. The RTC had jurisdiction to delve into and resolve the issue whether the petitioner’s utility models are copyrightable and, if so, whether he is the owner of a copyright over thesaid models.

We agree with the contention of the petitioner (citing Section 171.10 of R.A. No. 8293), that theauthor’s intellectual creation, regardless of whether it is a creation with utilitarian functions or incorporated in

a useful article produced on an industrial scale, is protected by copyright law. However, the law refers to a“work of applied art which is an artistic creation.” It bears stressing that there is no copyright protection for works of applied art or industrial design which have aesthetic or artistic features that cannot be identifiedseparately from the utilitarian aspects of the article.[36] Functional components of useful articles, no matter how artistically designed, have generally been denied copyright protection unless they are separable fromthe useful article. In this case, the petitioner’s models are not works of applied art, nor artistic works. Theyare utility models, useful articles, albeit with no artistic design or value.

KHO, petitioner , vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

CASE: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals setting asideand declaring as null and void the Orders of the RTC of Quezon City granting the issuance of a writ of 

preliminary injunction.

FACTS: Petitioner Elidad C. Kho filed a complaint for injunction and damages with a prayer for theissuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents Summerville General Merchandisingand Company (Summerville, for brevity) and Ang Tiam Chay.

The petitioner’s complaint alleges that petitioner, doing business under the name and style of KECCosmetics Laboratory, is the registered owner of the copyrightsChin Chun Su and Oval Facial CreamContainer/Case, as shown by Certificates of Copyright Registration ; that she also has patent rights onChinChun Su & Device and Chin Chun Su for medicated cream after purchasing the same from Quintin Cheng,the registered owner thereof; that respondent Summerville advertised and sold petitioner’s cream productsunder the brand name Chin Chun Su, in similar containers that petitioner uses, thereby misleading thepublic, and resulting in the decline in the petitioner’s business sales and income; and, that the respondentsshould be enjoined from allegedly infringing on the copyrights and patents of the petitioner.

The respondents, on the other hand, alleged as their defense that Summerville is the exclusive andauthorized importer, re-packer and distributor of Chin Chun Su products manufactured by Shun Yi Factoryof Taiwan; that the said Taiwanese manufacturing company authorized Summerville to register its tradename Chin Chun Su Medicated Cream with the Philippine Patent Office and other appropriategovernmental agencies; that KEC Cosmetics Laboratory of the petitioner obtained the copyrights throughmisrepresentation and falsification; and, that the authority of Quintin Cheng, assignee of the patentregistration certificate, to distribute and marketChin Chun Su products in the Philippines had already beenterminated by the said Taiwanese Manufacturing Company.

 After due hearing on the application for preliminary injunction, the trial court granted the application of plaintiff Elidad C. Kho. Consequentially, plaintiff is required to file with the Court a bond to the effect thatplaintiff will pay to defendants all damages which defendants may sustain by reason of the injunction if theCourt should finally decide that plaintiff is not entitled thereto.

The respondents moved for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, the respondents filed a petitionfor certiorari with the Court of Appeals praying for the nullification of the said writ of preliminary injunctionissued by the trial court. CA rendered a Decision in favor of the respondents. That the granting the writ of preliminary injunction and denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration are set aside and declared nulland void. The registration of the trademark or brandname “Chin Chun Su” by KEC with the supplementalregister of the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer cannot be equated with registrationin the principal register, which is duly protected by the Trademark Law.

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The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This she followed with several motions to declarerespondents in contempt of court for publishing advertisements notifying the public of the promulgation of the assailed decision of the appellate court and stating that genuineChin Chun Su products could beobtained only from Summerville General Merchandising and Co.

In the meantime, the trial court rendered a decision barring the petitioner from using the trademarkChin Chun Su and upholding the right of the respondents to use the same, but recognizing the copyright of 

the petitioner over the oval shaped container of her beauty cream. The petitioner duly appealed the saiddecision to the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals denied the petitioner’s motions for reconsideration and for contempt of court.Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents should be enjoined from allegedly infringing on the copyrightsand patents of the petitioner.

HELD: We rule in favor of the respondents. In the case at bar, the petitioner applied for the issuance of apreliminary injunctive order on the ground that she is entitled to the use of the trademark onChin ChunSu and its container based on her copyright and patent over the same.

Trademark, copyright and patents are different intellectual property rights that cannot be interchangedwith one another. A trademark is any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods (trademark) or 

services (service mark) of an enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked container of goods. Inrelation thereto, a trade name means the name or designation identifying or distinguishing an enterprise.Meanwhile, the scope of a copyright is confined to literary and artistic works which are original intellectualcreations in the literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their creation. Patentableinventions, on the other hand, refer to any technical solution of a problem in any field of human activitywhich is new, involves an inventive step and is industrially applicable.

Petitioner has no right to support her claim for the exclusive use of the subject trade name and itscontainer. The name and container of a beauty cream product are proper subjects of a trademark inasmuchas the same falls squarely within its definition. In order to be entitled to exclusively use the same in the saleof the beauty cream product, the user must sufficiently prove that she registered or used it before anybodyelse did. The petitioner’s copyright and patent registration of the name and container would not guaranteeher the right to the exclusive use of the same for the reason that they are not appropriate subjects of thesaid intellectual rights. Consequently, a preliminary injunction order cannot be issued for the reason that the

petitioner has not proven that she has a clear right over the said name and container to the exclusion of others, not having proven that she has registered a trademark thereto or used the same before anyone did.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.