corning on durheim and spencer1

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Durkheim and SpencerAuthor(s): Peter A. CorningReviewed work(s):Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Sep., 1982), pp. 359-382Published by: Wiley-Blackwell on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political ScienceStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/589482 .

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PeterA. Corning

Durkheim ndSpencer

ABSTRACT

A limited effort is made in this articleto compareand contrastDurkheimand Spencer,with particular mphasison theirtheoriesof societal evolutionand theirbasic approacheso socialsciencemethodology. It is concluded that, while Durkheim's ociologywas heavily inSluencedby the work of Spencer,it differs incertainbasic respects.To the extent that subsequentgenerationsof sociologistshave embracedthe 'paradigm' f Durkheimandrejectedthat of Spencer,the effect upon macro-levelociologicaltheory has been highly constricting.Much can be gainedfroma

study of the strengthsandweaknesses f both theorists,and froma morebalancedperspective.

' "Who now reads Spencer?" intoned Talcott Parsons(quotingCraneBrinton) in the openingline of his own now seldom-readwork,The Structureof SocialAction.1 "'Spencers dead."

Whetheror not this declamationwas a self-fulfillingprophesy, tis certainlytrue that HerbertSpencer-who hadoncebeenlionizedas perhaps he greatestmindof the nineteenthcentury-went into

eclipse and became a virtualnon-personamong many twentiethcentury social scientists.2 Emile Durkheim,by contrast, came tobe widely hailed as a 'foundingfather' of sociology, despite thefact that he owed much to Spencer. (Consider, or instance,theindex to The Divzsionof Labor n Society,3Durkheim's reeminentand most frequentlycited work. It containsforty-threereferencesto Spencer.The next most frequentlymentionedauthor,AugusteComte, is cited c)nlyeighteen times. Indeed, there is a cutioustendencyamonghistoriansof sociologyto passSpencerby and skip

directlyfromComteto Durkheim,despitethe fact thatComtediedin 1857, six yearsafterSpencer'sandmarkSocialStaticsappeared,whileDurkheimwas bornin 1858 and didnot publishhis firstmajorwork until 1893, near the end of Spencer'sprodigious albeitcon-troversial)areer.

TheBrsttsh ournalof Sociology Volume33 Number3 September1982i) RK.P. 1982 0007 1315/82/3303-0359 $1.50

359



PeterA. Corning

360Whilethere have been some efforts in recent years to rehabilitate

some of Spencer'stheoretical contributions,4as well as some pen-

etratingcritiquesof Durkheim,s o date therehas been no systematiceffort (to my knowledge) o re-examineDurkheimn light of Spencer.This is unfortunate,because these two theoristshad very differentviews of society, and there is much to be gained from comparingand contrasting heir theoreticalconstructs.Though t would requirea lengthy monograph o do justice to the subject, I propose to takea limited step in this directionby focussinghere upon their macro-level theories of society and societal evolution, and upon certainkey aspectsof theirmethodologies.

Let us first consider Spencer's work. The key to Spencer'ssociology was its essentially biological cum economic character.That is, Spencer viewed society as a 'utilitarian' nstrumentality;it arises out of 'the struggle or existence' (in Darwin'sphrase)andconstitutes, in essence, a system of exchangesand mutualbenefits.Cooperationand a division of labor lie at its base, but the under-lying principleand motivating orce can best be described s 'egoisticcooperation'. Though Spencer frequently employed an organismicanalogy to underscore the concept of functional integration in

organized ocieties, he also was at pains to emphasize hat a societyis notreally an organism. t is an agglomeration f sentient ndividualswho are pursuing heir own needs, wants and interests.This visionwasnot originalwith Spencer,of course.It was sharedby the classicaleconomists, the liberal philosophers-and by Plato and Aristotle,for that matter. Spenceralso held that there is a reciprocal elation-shipbetweenComte's ocial solidarity' ndcooperation: Cooperationis made possible by society, and makes society possible. It pre-supposes associatedmen.'6 Furthermore,kin-basedassociationsare

likely to be the sorts of groups n which 'the greatest ocial cohesionand power of co-operation'are likely to occur.7 Elsewhere, hough,he emphasized hat the utilitarian nds arepriorand paramount:

Cooperation. . is at once that which can not exist without asociety, and that for which a society exists,... The motive foracting together, originally the dominant one, may be defenseagainst enemies; or it may be the easier obtainmentof food, bythe chase or otherwise;or it may be, and commonly is, both of

these. In any case, however,the units pass from a state of perfectindependence o a state of mutualdependence; nd as fast as theydo this they becomeunited into a society rightlyso called.8

In his earlier writings, to be sure, Spencer was an unvarnishedBenthamite liberal-the last of the philosophicalradicalsand theinspiration for Social Darwinism (which ought properly to havebeen called Social Spencerism).But, in his mature work, notablyThe Principles of Sociology ,9 he adopted the view that societal



362 PeterA. Corning

protective envelopeswithin which a higherhumanitywas beingevolved.They arecast asideonly whenthey becomehindrances-only whensomeinnerandbetterenvelopehasbeenformed.l2ThoughSpencerneverdevelopeda fully satisfactoryexplanation

for why societies evolved, he did offer a hypothesis in a paperpublishedin 1852 entitled 'A Theoryof PopulationDeducedFromthe GeneralLawof AnimalFertility.'t3In that paper,whichreliedon Malthus,Spencerasserted hat the 'proximatecauseof progress'wasthe pressure f populationon resources:

It producedthe originaldiffusionof the race.It compelledmen

to abandonpredatoryhabitsand take to agriculture.t led to theclearingof the earth'ssurface.It forcedmeninto the socialstate;made social organizationnevitableand has developedthe socialsentiments.It has stimulatedmen to progressivemprovementsin production,and to increasedskill and intelligence.It is dailypressingus into closer contact and more mutually-dependentrelationships.l4

Returning o this theme in 7'hePrinciples of Sociology, Spencersuggestedhat a divisionof laborwouldarise

'spontaneously'when-everpeople were throwntogetherin largenumbers-that increasedsize alone would be sufficient to stimulatecooperation,and thepressure f needs would automatically ransformcompetitionintocooperation.He also noted that variousfactorscan facilitateoccu-pationaldiversity,includingenvironxnentalariationsandvariationsin ndividual bilitiesandskills:

Stressof needsleadsmenseverally o adoptoccupations orwhichthey are best adapted. .and it becomespossiblefor the number

of specialoccupationsto increaseas the increaseof populationaffordsmen for each.... Thus in all waysincreasen populationby its actions developsa social organismwhichbecomeshetero-geneousasit becomes arger.l5

ThoughSpencer s often paintedasa conflicttheoristwhosoughttoaccountfor societalevolutionthrougha competitivestruggle orthe 'survivalof the fittest', actually he abhoredwar and held adualistic iew. He suggestedthat societies can be rangedalong acontinuum etween two ideal types (to borrow Weber'sterm),'militant' nd 'industrial' economic). Wherethe formertype hadpredominatedn the past,it wasSpencer's iewthatthe latterwoulddo o in the future,and that the directionof societalevolutionwastowardmaterialaffluence, peacefulintegration,personalfreedom,and witheringaway of the state (a vision quite close, in fact, toMarx's).n otherwords,the processesof societalevolution,thoughbasedn utilitarianmotives,wouldin timebringaboutanintegrated,harmoniousocialorder.



364 PeterA. Corning

In other words, it is the division of labor that createseconomicwants, not the other way around. Later on, in a section on 'The

Progress of the Division of Labor and of Happiness, Durkheimpursued the argumentby asserting hat economic advancedoes notnecessarilyproduce happinessor reduce such social pathologiesascrime and suicide. 'The more one has, the more one wants, sincesatisfactionsreceived only stimulate instead of fulfilling needs'.l9Therefore, it cannot be said that the division of labor advanceshumanwelfare.

Of course, Durkheim'sconclusiondoes not follow a fortiori; theoverall benefit-cost ratio may still be favorable.Nevertheless? e

argued that the social and moral order s of primary mportance ohuman well-being.The moral order (whichhe tended to equatewithsociety) is somethingthat is prior to and independentof the econ-omic sphere, and it is a real entity-a concrete 'social fact': 'Thedomain of ethics is not so nebulous; t consists of all the rules ofaction which are imperatively mposed upon conduct, to which asanction is attached.'20This 'normative nfrastructure,'o borrowEdward Tiryakian's characterization,2' s central to Durkheimsconcerns (and to subsequent generations of sociologists) for he

saw it, not the economy, as the real basis of society. Moreover,society is a reality sui generis-a social organism hat exists apartfrom any of its members:

It is very certain that there are in the living cell only moleculesof crude matter. But these molecules are in contact with oneanother, and this association s the cause of the new phenomenawhich characterize ife, the very germ of which cannot possiblybe found in any of the separate lements.A whole is not identical

with the sum of its parts.It is somethingdifferent,and its proper-ties differ from those of the componentparts.22

Nevermind the fact thatDurkheim'smetaphor s self-contradicting.(The organicanalogy,as Spencerwell understood,does not apply tounits that are only in juxtaposition with one another but to afunctionally integrated ystem with a divisionof labor!The emergentcharacteristics f organisms riseprecisely from their combinatorialproperties.) The point is, Durkheim was claiming that the socialorganismhas its own separateneeds and requisites,of which social

solidarity is the paramountone. Now, in a small, primitive ocietywithout an extensive division of labor, solidarity is maintainedbywhat Durkheim called the 'collective conscience' (adso sometimesrenderedas the 'consciencecollective', or 'commonconscience')-the system of commonly held beliefs, sentiments and norms thattogether create a normative nfrastructure.Durkheimcharacterizedsocieties of this type as beingbasedon 'mechanical olidarity.

However, as societies grow larger and as the division of labor



DurkheimandSpencer 365

increases,the collectiveconsciencebecomesprogressivelyweakenedas a bindingforce for the socialorder.Despitethis fact, Durkheim

claimed, 'the more we advance,the more profoundlydo societiesrevealthe sentimentof self and unity. There must, then, be someother social link which producesthis result.'23And what is thisother bindingforce that producesa very differenttype of societybasedon what Durkheimcalled'organic olidarity'? t is none otherthan the divisionof labor.Durkheimriumphantlyoncluded hatitis the divisionof labor that 'moreand more fills the role that wasformerlyfilled by the [collective] conscience... This is a functionof the division of labor a good deal more importantthan that

ordinarilyassignedto it by economists.'24Let us savorDurkheim'sthesisfora moment:

In all these examples, he most remarkableffect of the divisionof labor is not that it increases he output of functionsdivided,but that it renders hem solidary.... It is possiblethat the econ-omic utility of the divisionof labormay havea handin this,but,in any case, it passesfarbeyondpurelyeconomicinterests,foritconsists n theestablishment f a socialandmoralorder uigeneris.

Through t, individuals relinkedto one another.Without t, theywould be independent.... [T]he economicservicesthat it canrenderare picayunecompared o the moraleffect thatit produces,and its true functionis to createin two or morepersonsa feelingof solidarity.In whatevermanner he resultis obtained, ts aimisto cause coherenceamong friends and to stamp them with itsseal.25

Assuming or the sakeof argument hatthe divisionof labordoeshave the social-psychological function' that Durkheim claimed

(Durkheim's endency to conflate organizational ndpsychologicalaspects of solidarity obscured the issue), the question of whichfunction(economicorsocial-psychological)smore mportantnvolvesa value judgment;both functions are being weighedaccordingtoan explicit externalvalue criterion.It is clearthat the criterionforDurkheimwas humanhappiness,andhe argued hatsocialsolidarityis moreimportant o happiness hanis the divisionof laborandthesatisfaction of material wants. In order to make this argument,however,Durkheimhadeither o downgradehe relationship etween

basic materialneeds and happiness,or to deny that the divisionoflaborcontributed ignificantlyo the meetingof basicneeds,orboth.Durkheim hoseto do both.

I believe the judgment of Talcott Parsons26s correct: Durk-heim'sDivzsionof Laborwas in part a polemicagainst he egoistic,utilitarianmodel of society-against the premisesof the liberaleconomists (and Spencer)about humannatureand the underlyingnature of society. To understandDurkheim, n other words, it is



366PeterA.orning

importanto recognize hat,at thisstage n hiscareerat least,he was

moremoralistthana socialscientist;hisadmittedobjectivewasto

establisha science of morality.'27 Indeed,as Durkheimused the

conceptf 'solidarite,' t had a strongpsychicand moralcontent

andmpliedaltruism ersusegoism n socialrelations.)28

There re, to be sure, some importantpartialtruthscontained

inhiswork. Cooperativeactivitiesmay well encourage entiments

ofocial olidarity-though not equallywell in all cases.Likewise,

theocial and psychologicalaspectsof social organizationare un-

deniablymportantandthey wereunderplayedby Spencerandthe

liberalsiust as they continue to be amongpresent-day rational-

choice'heorists.It is alsotruethatthenormativedimension f social

lifenvolvesa dynamicthat canworkindependently f, andinteract

with,conomic ife.However, here are also manyproblemswith Durkheim'sormu-

lation.or the sake of brevity,I will forego a detaileddiscussion

anderelysummarizeomeof the majorpoints:

1. Durkheimwas fuzzy in his use of terminology.The terms co-

operation','divisionof labor'andeconomic'exchange'arenot, in

fact,somorphic.Cooperationcan occur without specializationof

functionsora divisionof labor);exchange trade)amongspecializers

needot involvean integrateddivisionof labor;exchanges hrough

thirdarties(trade)need not even involvedirectcooperation.The

points theoreticallyimportant;by compressinga varietyof pro-

cessesnto a single mold, Durkheimgreatly oversimplified ocial

andconomichistory.

2. Just as a divisionof labormay or maynot be accompanied y

socialntegrationand psychologicalsolidarity,so there are other

important indingforces at work in complex societies-language,

religion,harismaticpolitical leadersand social mobilizationpro-

cesses, ariousethnic, culturaland socialpracticesand institutions,

and,of course,kinship(whichremainsan important actor).Durk-

heimdid not ultimately deny this, especiallyin light of his later

works,but he did downplaythese forcesin TheDivisionof Labor.

3. Paradoxically,he same social entitiesthat serveto bind men

togethermay also have divisive nfluences(often at the sametime

for differentmen), andthis includesthe divisionof labor.Consider

the many historic conflicts between various economic interests

(mercantilistsand the landedaristocracy,northernmanufacturers

and southernplantationowners,westernfarmersand the railroads)

-not to mentionMarxian lassconflicts.In short,a divisionof labor

does not by any meansensureagainst ractionating-desolidifying

-social conflict.4. Durkheim's ypology of societieson the basisof 'mechanical'

versus organic' olidarity nvolvesa dubiousdistinction.All societies

that we know of involveat least a minimaldivisionof labor(some



Durkheim ndSpencer 367

so-calledprimitivesocieties can be surprisinglydifferentiated)andvariousformsof economiccooperation organicelements).It is not

true, as Durkheimmaintained, hat society mustprecedea divisionof labor,or did so historically. Likeso manyothersocialtheorists,Durkheim endedto idealizeprimitive ociety.)Likewise,all societieshave meansof inducingandreinforcing ocialsolidarity,fromrulesbackedby sanctionsto arcaneandeconomicallyunproductiveocialrituals(mechanicalelements).In fact, the evidencewouldseem tosuggesthateconomicandpoliticalforceshavealwaysbeenimportantdeterminantsof societal cohesionindependentlyof the normativesphereand that such a typologicaldistinctionbetween societies is

not verymeaningful.5. One wonders f it is not a bit captious o argue hatthe division

of labor is at once responsible or weakeningother formsof socialsolidarityand for causingsolidarity-that is, for both the problemand the solution?In fact, Durkheimwas vagueabout exactly howthe divisionof laboracts to inducesolidarity; he causalmechanismis, presumably,elf-evident.

6. It is not truethata moralorder-a normativenfrastructure-is a necessarypre-requisiteo a divisionof labor.(Indeed, t is stilla

matter of controversywhether or not such hypostatizedentitiesactuallycan be viewedas havingan independent xistence.)All thatis requiredis a common or complementaryset of goals amongvariousparties,appropriatemotivation,a meansof communication,and the abilityto coordinateefforts (a cybernetic nfrastructure,nother words). To take an extremeexample,considerthe Westernalliance duringWorldWarTwo, or the variousforms of scientificcollaborationand economic transactionsbetween Russiaand thenon-Communist orld n morerecentyears.

These criticismspale, however,by comparisonwith Durkheim'sdiscussionof the 'causes'of the divisionof labor.First,Durkheimlibels Spencerby claimingthat Spencerhad basedhis explanationof the divisionof laboron the inherent nstabilityof homogeneoussocietiesandtheconsequent pontaneous rendtowardheterogeneoussocieties.29

But, says Spencer, [the division of labor] will come about ofitself, because it follows the line of least resistanceand all theforces of naturewill invinciblybear in this direction:But whydo they specialize?Whatmakesthem lean towardsdistinFishingthemselvesfrom others?Spencerably explainsin what mannerevolutionwill be produced, f it does take place,but he doesnottell us the sourceproducingt. As a matterof fact, the questionis not evenraised orhim [sic] .30

And what does Durkheimuse to fill this supposedexplanatorygap? In fact, Spencer'svery own explanation-the strugglefor



368PeterA. orning

existencendtheMalthusian ynamic:

If work becomes dividedas societiesbecomemore voluminous,

it is not because external circumstancesare more varied, but

becausethe struggle or existencehasbecomemoreacute.Darwin

justly observedthat the strugglebetween two organisms s as

active as they are analogous[sic]. Havingthe same needs and

pursuingthe same objects, they are in rivalryeverywhere....

That settled, it is easy to understand hat all condensationof

social mass, especially if it is accompaniedby an increasein

population, necessarilydeterminesadvallcesin the division of

labor....One need not add that, if societyeffectively includes

moremembersat the sametime they aremorecloselyin relation

to each other, the struggle s still more acute and the resulting

specializationmore rapidandcomplete.... The divisionof labor

is, then, a resultof the struggle orexistence,but it is a mellowed

denouement.Thanksto it, opponentsare not obligated o fight

to a finish,but can exist onebesidethe other.Also,in proportion

to its development, t furnishesthe meansof maintenallceand

survivalto a greaternumberof individualswho, in more hom-

ogeneoussocieties,wouldbe condemned o extinction.31

Durkheimreturnedto this thesis in The I2ulesof Sociological

Afethod32nd amplifiedupon it in ways that put hisargument ven

closer o Spencer's.Citinghis earlieranalysisas a modelof how to

constructxplanationsof social acts,he claimed o haveshownthat:

The divisionof labor. .is necessaryn orderthat manmaymain-

tain himself in the new conditionsof existenceas he advances

in history. .We were startedin this direction,first,becausethe

coursewe previouslyfollowed was now barred[?] and becausethe greaterntensityof the struggle,owingto the moreextensive

consolidation of societies, made more and more difficult the

survivalof individualswho continued to devote themselvesto

unspecialized asks [?]. For suchreasons t becamenecessary or

us to changeourmodeof living.33

As secondary nfluences,Durkheimnow mentionedfactorsthat

he had previouslychided Spencerfor advancing:ndividualdiffer-

ences,both hereditaryandsocial,as well as the fact thatit was'thedirectionof leastresistance'.34

Having(evidently) derivedhis theory from Spencer,Durkheim

displayedexactly the same deficiencies.Suffice it to say that the

explanationof societalevolution nvolvesanexceedinglycomplicated

issue,but it hasbeenanythingbut spontaneous. n fact, theprogress-

ive developmentof the divisionof labor has involveda configural

and interactionalprocess.A numberof different,situation-specific



DurkheamndSpencer 369

variableshave been involved. Moreover,the relationshipbetweenpopulation growth (in particular)and the division of labor has

been complex:a. Populationpressuresdo not necessarilyead to increasesn the

divisionof labor; herearevariousalternativesas Malthusobserved).b. Populationpressureshavenot, historically,been the only cause

of an increaseddivisionof labor; herehave alsobeenenvironmentalandeconomicpressures.

c. Therehavebeenpositiveincentivesas well asnegativepressuresinvolved in the historical developmentof the division of labor;opportunities ndtechnologicalnnovations avealsobeen importantvariables.

d. Spencerrecognized,as Durkheimapparentlydid not, thatpro-ductivityimprovementsnvolving he divisionof labormightalso bea cause of populationgrowth,as well asa response.35

It is, as Alice (In Wonderland)would say, a curious argument.According o Durkheim, he principalcauseof the divisionof laboris its functionin mitigating he struggle or existence(an economicfunction,that is). Yet this is not its most important unction.Moreimportantis what Robert Mertonterms a 'latentfunction'-socialsolidarity.Why is solidaritya more importantfunction?Because,Durkheimargued, he economicfunction s 'picayune'.36

Durkheim'sbasic methodology also contrastssharplywith thatof Spencer. ndeed, t seemsantipodal o Spencer'sbroadlysyntheticapproach.Whereasthe latter was oriented to the individualandinsistedon explaining he 'super-organism'n termsof aninteractionbetweenthe individual's io-psychologicaleedsandmotivesand thesocialand physicalenvironment,Durkheimwas a radicalholist who,in order to isolate social phenomenaanalytically,deliberatelyex-

cluded whole domains of causationa priori, while crossingtheborder nto metaphysics in the name of science).

Durkheim'smethodologicalstance was most boldly stated inTheRules of SociologicalAlethod.He beganby insistingthat socialphenomena must be explained without reference to biological,historical, economic and, especially,psychologicalcauses (he ex-presslydowngradedhe role of individual onsciousness nd volition,particularlyndividual alculationsof utility).

[E]very time that a social phenomenon s directlyexplainedbya psychologicalphenomenon,we maybe sure thatthe explanationis false.... We arrive, herefore,at the followingprinciple:Thedeterminingcause of a social fact should be sought among thesocial facts precedingit and not among the states of individualconsciousness.... Thefirst originsof all socialprocessesof anyimportanceshould be sought in the internalconstitutionof thesocialgroup [hisitalics .37



370 Peter A. Corning

Durkheimdid leaveopen a small oophole in his argument.Psycho-logical trainingmight be a 'valuable esson' for the sociologist, he

asserted,but, having received 'profit' from it, the sociologist must'abandonpsychology as the center of his operations'-except in sofar as psychological facts might be 'fused' with social facts.38 Bythis Durkheimmeant to allow for the individualactionsof a 'publicofficial,' a 'statesman'or 'men of genius'who might independentlyinfluence social processes. However, '[t] he restriction on theprinciple enunciated above is not...of great importance for thesociologist.'39One is prompted o ask: If such fusions of individualand social facts apply to the 'Great Man', why should they not

apply equally to all individuals, o the extent that theirmotivations,abilities and choices influence their behavior and thus shape thenature of social facts? Durkheim's mplicit reply was that externalforces, ike B. F. Skinner's stimuli',are more mportant.

The constriction in Durkheim'smethodology is clearly evidentin the way he defined 'social facts'. Durkheimwanted to focus onthe ways in which the social (i.e., non-economic)milieu creates aspecific context that may shape social behavior, ndependentlyofindividual motivations, perceptions, economic exchanges, etc.,:

'[S1ociety is not a mere sum of individuals.Rather, the systemformed by their associationsrepresentsa specific reality which hasits own characteristics.0 Social facts, then, must lie outside ofthe individual.They are collective properties of the social groupand are independentof any given ndividual nd his/hermotivations.'When the individualhas been eliminated,society alone remains,'he said, in a statement that sounds metaphysicalat first blush.4lNevertheless,he insisted that social facts are also real 'things'.Theyare recognizable ecauseof their coerciveeffects upon the individual.

'Far from being a product of the will, they determine it fromwithout; they are like molds in which our actions are inevitablyshaped':42

A social fact is every way of acting, fixed or not, capable ofexercising on the individual an external constraint; or again,every way of acting which is generalthroughouta given society,while at the same time existing in its own rzght ndependentofits individualmantfiestationshis italics] 43

Durkheim did not actually deny the reality of such biologicalfacts as our individual needs for physical security, food, water,defecation, sleep, sex, etc.-the motivational substrate o whichmuch of our behavior s either directly or indirectlyoriented, andwhich is central to Spencer's ociology. Nor did he deny economicfacts. But he was not much interested in these 'facts.' They weresimply irrelevant o his sociologyfiwhich was concerned with theinfluenceof autonomous ocial facts in social structures.




But how do we know social factsreallyexist if they are indepen-dent of any givenindividualand are out there,somewhere?We can

identify them, Durkheim aid,by their statisticaleffects,or throughthe use of an 'index' (indicators).Social facts, in otherwords, arelike gravitywaves: You can't see them, but they keep the socialorganismfrom flying off into space-or, more to the point, intoan Hobbesianwarof all againstall. For, the way Durkheimdefinedthem, social facts are the glue that holds the normative infra-structure together. They are the norms, rules, traditions - thesociallysanctioned or proscribed)ways of behaving-which under-lie whatNisbetand Petnncall the 'socialbond.'44

WhatDurkheimwas really trying to do, in other words,was tocounter the Spencerianargumentthat the social order could bederived from egoistic cooperation (from the calculus of mutualself-interest).Not only is the moral ordera necessaryprerequisitefor economic life (a pre-contractualramework),he claimed,butit cannot be built upon egoism;it dependsupon altru2sm-uponsubordinationof the individual o society. But whereHobbes feltit necessary to impose moral order throughsovereignauthority,lest society degeneratento anarchy bellumomniumcontraomnes),

Durkheimendowed 'society' (and, implausibleas it may seem, thedivision of labor) with the ability to impressmoralityupon eachindividual.

In sum, Durkheim's ociology was not about the full dynamicsof social life and social causation; t was a methodology for his'science of morality.'The 'queen of the sciences' (Comte'sterm)had becomein Durkheim'shandsa sciencethat specializedn moralforces. His social facts weremoralfacts, just as his 'functions'werefunctions in relation to 'social [morall ends.'45 Sociologists of

subsequentgenerationshave chosen to use the term 'socialfact' ina broaderand less moralisticsense, but Durkheimconceded that,as he defined it, his sociology 'comprisesonly a limited group ofphenomena.'46

The result of this strategywas a kind of self-imposed heoreticaltunnel-vision;his efforts to explain the originof a particular ocialphenomenonoften seemedcontrivedandintuitivelyunsatisfactory.In attemptingto account for how humansdevelopedthe conceptof time, for example, Durkheim'santecedentsocial fact was the

seasonal ites, feastsandceremoniespractisedby primitive ocieties.47Setting aside the questionof whetheror not eitherthe concept oftime or social rituals are social facts by his definition,it displaysalow opinion of our ancestors o think that they had no other thansocialreferentsfor gainingan awareness f time(e.g.,day andnight,the seasons,animalmigrations,he lunarcycle, etc.).

EquaSlymportant,Durkheimposited that the pnme functionofthe concept of time (and of such artifactsas calendars)s to order



372 PeterA. Corning

social events. He quite overlooked the alternativehypothesis that'time' (and its division into regularunits) might have had vitally

important economic (suxvival) unctions for hunter-gatherers,orti-culturalists, raders,etc., and that social ritualsmighthave developedin arl ancillary relationship to bread-and-butterunctions, ratherthan being ends in themselves.To the contrary,Durkheimreasonedthat the ancients'use as calendrical enchmarks f stellaror seasonalevents was due only to the fact that 'objective ignsare necessary omake. .social organizationntelligible.'48- Durkheim also had trouble living up to his own dictum. Forinstance, he invoked supposedly taboo biological facts (hereditary

differences) to help explain the division of labor and differencesbetween men and women to account for sex differences n suiciderates.49He also had considerabledifficulty in avoiding he involve-ment of psychologicalfactors when it came to explaining anomie'or 'solidarity',or how the normative nfrastructure cted to encour-age or discourage uicide. The most stunningexample, though, is tobe found in The Division of Labor. Talcott Parsons, while notcommentingupon the irony involved, was among the first to notethat Durkheim'stheory (i.e., Spencer'stheory) to the effect that

the division of labor is a response to population pressureswas'essentially biological' and amounted to a ' "biologizing"of socialtheory.'50Parsonsdiscounts its significance,however,by observingthat this was not Durkheim's main ine' of theoreticaldevelopmentand was 'soon abandoned. 1

It should be noted that Durkheim'stheory has recently beenseverely attacked by Whitney pope,52 an attack to which Parsonssubsequentlyresponded. Though their argument s muddled, it isrelevant to my critique of Durkheim'swork. Briefly, Pope charges

that Durkheim did not, in fact, employ a biological explanation.It was not an increase n numbersthat Durkheimused to accountfor the divisionof labor, he claims, but an increase n the 'dynamicor moral density' of a population-the proximity and level of'active commerce' (economic activity? functional interaction?)among the different individuals.53Pope also notes (correctly),thatDurkheim ascribed an increasingdynamic density to three factors(I) population concentration, II) the formationof cities, and (III)improvedmeans of transportation nd communication.Population

growth, Pope claims, was viewedby Durkheimas secondary. Clearlyhe is not treating ncreasednumbersas biologically caused,' Popeconcludes in a non sequitur. 'Far from manifesting any form ofbiologicalreductionism, hen, the explanation f social differentiationin Division follows Durkheim's njunction...to explain social factssociologically.'54 Of course, the division of labor was not a socialfact in Durkheim'sdefinition, and neither were populationconcen-tration,cities or technology.)




Quite apart, for the moment, from the questionof whetherornot Durkheim's oncept of dynamicdensityor his reasoningmakes

any sense, Durkheimhimself providedthe definitiveresponse toPope. It was quoted in excerpt form above.The key question, asDurkheimhimself phrased t, is: Exactly why does an increase nthe 'material' physical)'volume'and/or 'density'of humanpopu-lations'necessitate' n increasen the divisionof labor?55Durkheim'sanswerwasthe struggle orexistence-the biologicalproblematique.To repeatDurkheim'skey statements: Darwinustly obsetvedthatthe strugglebetweentwo organismss as activeas they are analogous[i.e., similarin their mode of adaptation]....Men submit to the

same law.... The divisionof laboris, then, a resultof the strugglefor existence.'56

Durkheim'sstatementshereare unequivocal.Rightlyor wrongly,he had boughtinto the Darurinian/Malthusianaradigmpopulationin relationto the means of subsistence)as the underlyingcauseofthe divisionof labor.But how does this squarewith thenotion of a'dynamic or moral density' that he had introduceda few pagesearlier?I don't think it does, and I find his argumentobscureandcontradictory.The most charitable nterpretations that Durkheim

was tryingto advancehis overarchinghesisthat society (the moralorder) is somehow prior to an economy and that, if populationgrowth in relation to the means of subsistence(the Malthusianvariable)is the necessarycause, it is not sufficient. His argumentseemedto be that theremust also be a breakdown f the segmentedcharacterof primitive ocietiesarlda coalescenceof a larger ocietalframework.The question,though,is what causes hiscoalescence ooccur in the first place?Durkheim'sansweris unintelligible.Afterattemptingto reconstructthe logic of his argumentn the formof

a set of propositions, it became apparentwhat the problem is.Durkheimwas tryingto make his casewithoutrecourseto ecology,biology or economics,but the effect is a little like viewinga four-color poster with three of the colors missing.ThoughDurkheimdid identify some significantsocial factors, in orderto make thesethe focal points of his argumenthe had to turneffects into causes,account for social factorswith veiledreferences o economicforces(e.g., 'activecommerce'), ntroducemidstream acilitatorsas if theywere precipitating auses,possibly engagein some circularity,and

proffersocial (moral)causesthat beggedprior,economic,questions.Durkheim's'theory' illustratesperfectly the shortcomingsof anymonochromatic pproacho socialtheory.57

The problems nvolvedin adoptingsuch a truncatedcausalpara-digm and methodologyare clearlyin evidence n Durkheim'smostfamous empiricalwork Suicide. Durkheimwanted to show thatsuicideis not the resultof individualpathology,or of thevicissitudesof economic life. So he proceeded, as he candidly admitted, by



374 PeterA. Corning

'd2sre,gardinghe individualas such, his motives and ideas. [his

italics].S8 nstead,Durkheimheld that suicideis causedby factors

in the social milieu-by what he called 'courantssuicidogenes.'Basinghis analysison a reviewof the availableaggregate tatistics

on suicide rates across different societies and different socio-

economic categories(occupation,religiousaffiliation, etc.), Durk-

heim advancedthree different theories about what he postulated

to be three differenttypes of suicide. (A fourth type was alluded

to but neverdeveloped.)In a nutshell,'altruistic' uicidewasviewedas the resultof social

pressures peratingn certainkindsof societiesof socialgroups e.g.,

nineteenthcenturyJapan). 'Egoistic'suicide, on the other hand,resultswhen an individuals freedfrommoralandsocialconstraints

andsupports hat mightotherwise nhibitsuchbehaviors. Thedata

for ProtestantsversusCatholicsand singlepersonsversusmarried

couples were invokedhere.) Finally, 'anomic'suicide is causedby

social dislocations experiencedby an individualwhen there are

instabilitiesn the socialenvironment,particularlyn timesof econ-

omic distressor rapideconomicgrowth.Durkheim'smostimportant

overall conclusion, though, was that suicide varies inverselywith

social cohesion.As he put it in TheRulesof SociologicalMethod:'Whensociety is stronglyintegrated, t holds individualsunder its

control.59

So what is wrongwith this analysis?For one thing,it is not an

explanationof suicide.It is at best only a proposedexplanationof

the observedstatisticaldifferences n the suicideratesfor different

sociologicallydefinedgroupswithina reifiedentity called'society'.

As Parsonsobserved,'Durkheimthrows little light on the actual

mechanismsby which the result is produced in the individual

suicide.'60Durkheimcould not, for instance,explainwhy the over-whelmingmajorityof Protestantsandsinglepersonsdo not commit

suicide,whilea numberof Catholicsandmarriedpersonsdo. Clearly,

ProtestantismndsingletonstatusareneithernecessarynorsufElcient

conditionsforsuicideto occur.In otherwords,Durkheimwas also pioneeringn the commission

of one of the most pervasiveerrorsin social science theory: A

statisticalcorrelation ellsyou nothing,directly,aboutcausationand

should not be so interpreted,but this caveat is much abusedin

practice.No matterhow ingeniousthe researcher's eductions, hepresumed causal mechanism underlying a statistical correlation

remainsan ad hoc hypothesisuntil some meanshas been devisedof

testingit directly.Instead,explanationsof this kindveryoften tend

to rely on plausibilityargumentswhichareheavilydependentupon

appeals o the predispositions,moralandotherwise,of the reader.Durkheim's heoryof suicidewaspreciselyof thissort.Sometimes

the social facts he invokedwere negative-social constrictionson



Durkheimand Spencer 375

the individual or gTOUp orms that somehow encouraged theindividual o commit suicide (for installce, f the individuals unable

to fulfillhis/herneed to find meaningn life). At other times, though,he surreptitiously ntroduced what might be called 'positive'socialfacts-non-coercive influences hat were seen aspromoting ohesionand solidarityand reducing he likelihood of suicide. Sometimes, nfact, his rather free-wheeling xplanationsproduced some striking(apparent) nconsistencies.For instance, the relativelyhigh rate ofsuicide among army officerswas explainedas being the resultof thestringent discipline and the behavioralconstraintsassociatedwitharmy ife, andwith the subordination f the individual o a domineer-

ing organization social cohesion?). In accounting or the relativelylow rate amongCatholics,on the otherhand,Durkheim lsoinvokedbehavioral onstraintsand subordination o a close-knitorganization(socialcohesion?).

The shortcomings n Durkheim'smethodologyhavebeenput intosharprelief by the rapidlyaccumulating esearchn psychology andpsychobiology which suggests that, in point of fact, suicide is anexceedingly complexphenomenon nvolvingan interactionbetweeninternal biological and psychological factors, as well as external

factors. These factors range from the very personaland context-specific (physico-chemical disorders, job-pressures, family andsocial relationships,etc.) to more diffuse socialconventions,expec-tations and structures.6l

In short, Durkheim'smethodology taps only a segmentof thetotal causal matrix in social life. Social facts aresupposedlyaboutreal things that act as causes of social behaviorndependentlyof theindividualwill; they are externalinfluences that somehowbecomeinternalizedand then act automatically o control behavior.Durk-

heim does not really avoid psychology, in otherwords. He merelyrejects for the purposesof sociologicalanalysis the postulate ofautonomous internal influences-an internal purposiveness, or'teleonomy' (utilitarianor otherwise) that necessitates a recourseto 'psychological facts in order to explain social behavior.62Accordingly,suicide is attributed o the operation,or dis-operation,of social (moral)facts. But how does Durkheimknow that socialfacts alone are responsible?And why does he think they are sopotent? In actuality he does not. He only infersthat social (moral)

facts impingeupon a passive nternalscreen, or 'photographic late'(in Parsons'smetaphor).However,we are perfectly free to positan alternativemodel in which (i) social facts arenot autonomousbutare alwaysembedded in people and continue to exist only as longas people believe n them and act towardone anotheras if they exist,and (ii) the internal screenis not passive but is a purposive nfor-mation processorwith cyberneticproperties; t can passivelyaccept,selectivelyadoptor evenrejectwhat is received.



376 PeterA. Corntng

To summarize, hen, for Durkheim he central heoreticalproblemwas the moral order, and he defined society essentLiallyn those

terms. Spencer,on the other hand, was concernedwith the 'strugglefor existence' alld defined society in terms of an economy with adivisionof labor. Both Durkheimand Spencerwere concernedwithfunctional analysis,but where Spencer's nterest centeredon func-tions in relation to the biological problematique,Durkheim wasmore interested in functions (or dysfunctions) in relation to thesocial (moral) order (structural-functions).One of the more out-landish examples is Durkheim's dead-seriousassertion that thefunction of crlme is to arouse collective sentiments of antagonism

toward the crlminaland therefore o strengthen he normative rder.'Crimebrings ogether uprightconsciencesand concentrates hem.'63Presumably, hen, the more crime there is the more solidarity herewill be and the more happinesswill ensue.

Durkheim and Spencer were also alike in being interested in'structuraldifferentiation,'and both defined societal evolution inthose terms. In Spencer'scase, this interest flowed logically fromhis underlyingconception of society. In Durkheim's ase, however,the conception was derivative (he acknowledgedSpencer as the

source), alld for him differentiationwas not really of great concem-except in so far as it impactedupon the normative nfrastructure.Sociologists who give Durkheim credit for this 'master idea' arethereforequite mistaken.64As Durkheimhimself observed,Spencer'set out, not to study social facts in themselvesand for themselves,but to show how the evolutionaryhypothesiscan be verified n thesocial realm.'65 It was for this reason,Durkheimwronglyclaimed,that Spencer should be considereda philosopheralld not a socialscientist.) On the other hand, Durkheim aid he was more interested

in studying social phenomena 'for their own sake, 6 or, moreprecisely, for the sake of their relationship o the moralorder.There-fore, he was more scientific!

This is not to say that Durkheimwas indifferent o the problemof social change ('social dynamics,' in Comte's term), as manysociologists of succeedinggenerationswere led to believe. However,it is not quite correct to say, as Anthony Giddensdoes, that changeis 'the central issue' informing all of Durkheim'smajor works.67Durkheimdid not abandonan evolutionaryperspective,but he was

more interested in studying specific slices of his own society (thedivision of labor, suicide, religion, crime, and so forth) and wasconcerned primarilywith relating these phenomena to the moralorder (to solidarzte)-albeit from an historical perspective. Evenless correct is the attempt by Roscoe Hinkle68 o portrayDurkheimas a major evolutionary heorist, when in fact his approachand hiskey concepts in this domain were almost wholly derived fromSpencerand, to a lesserdegree,Comte.



Durkkeimand Spencer 377

Methodologically,Durkheim differed from Spencer (and othermajornineteenthcentury theorists) n at least threeimportantways.

First, he banished what biologists call teleonomy (or internalteleology) from social theory. The term 'function'is preferable o'end' or 'pulpose', he declared,because 'social phenomenado notgenerally exist for the usefialresults they produce'.69 (Well,notalways.) 'So successfulhas his faulty "scientism"been,' observesRonald Fletcher, 'that, to this day, the term "teleological"hasa bad smell in sociology: as being a term redolent of metaphysicsand theology.'70

Second, Durkheimwas clearly guilty of committingwhat the

philosopher Alfred North Whitehead called the 'fallacy of mis-placed concreteness. That is, Durkheimattributed independenceand causalefficacy to disembodiedsocial facts, to the reificationscreated in his own mind, or to statistical artifacts.Accordingly,Durkheim's'social organism'was very different from Spencer's.It wasnot a limitedanalogybut a real entity.

Finally,where Spencer (md other nineteenth century theorists)insisted on the interdependenceof biological, psychological,econ-omic and sociologicalprocesses,Durkheim nsistedon theirradical

separation.I cannot imaginea greaterchasm on this issue than theone betweenDurkheimandSpencer.Where he formerasserted hatthe 'causesof social phenomenaare intetnalto society'7l and thatthe principle causesof historicaldevelopmentmust be located,notin pasthistory,but 'among heconcomitant social]circumstances,'72the latter espoused a multi-faceted,multi-leveled interactionism,however mperfect.

In one importantrespect,though, Durkheim'sposition wasvastlysuperior o Spencer's, would argue.Hisview of the politicalrealm

occupied a middle-groundposition between Spencer(who deniedany organicrelationshipbetween the polity and society) and bothHobbes and Rousseau(who, in differentways, set the politicalorderabove, or over the social organism).Like Comte,Durkheimviewedthe political sphereas both an integralelementwhich evolveswithsociety (he explicitlyadoptedthe analogyvvith he brainandnervoussystem, which Spencer pointedly eschewed)and which may servepositive filnctions-normative included.It is a 'natural eality,'hesaid, that does not need to be imposedby force, though theremay

in pratice be pathological ases that do act autocratically.73In conclusion, f Durkheim's ociologywas morecompatiblewith

a nascentsocial science that was striving or disciplinary utonomy,it may well prove to be the case that Spencer'ssociology will bemore compatible with a social science that is in the process ofreachingout to embrace he full rangeof causation n humansociallife. If so, we may eventuallycome to recognize and give equalweight to the contributionsand shortcomingsof both theorists.



378 PeterA. Corning

For there was in each of these nineteenth century pioneers anadmixtureof good and bad, md we have much to gain from viewingthem in the round,and in relation o each other.

PeterA. CorningVisiting Lecturer

Department of Engineering-Economic SystemsStanford University

NOTES

1. T. Parsons, The Structure ofSocial Action, Chicago, The FreePress, 1949 [1937], p. 3.

2. As recently as 1978, the contri-butions of Spencer were still beinggiven short shrift in T. Bottomore andR. Nisbet (eds), A History of Socio-logical Analysis, New York, BasicBooks.

3. E. Durkheim,Division of Labor

in Society, trans. G. Simpson, NewYork, Macmillan,1933 [1893] .

4. E.g., R. L. Carneiro, 'Introduc-tion,' in R. L. Carneiro (ed.), TheEvolution of Society: Selections fromHerbert Spencer's Principles of Soci-ology, Chicago, The University ofChicago Press, 1967; R. Fletcher,The Makingof Sociology: A Study ofSociological Theory, vol. II, New York,Scribner,1971; D. Wiltshire TheSocial

and Political Thought of HerbertSp encer, New York, Oxford, 1978.

5. E.g., R. Needham, 'Introduc-tion,' in Primitive Classification, byE. Durkheim, trans. M. Mauss anded. R. Needham, Cohen & West,London, 1963; R. Fletcher: TheMakingof Sociology, op. cit.

6. H. Spencer, The Principles ofSociology, New York, Appleton, 1897[1874-5], II(1), pp. 262-3.

7. Ibid., II(1), pp. 285-6.8. Ibid , II(1) p. 244.9. Ibid , I10. Ibid., I(1), pp. 14-15. See also

pp. 435-6.11. Ibid., I(1), pp. 435-6.12. Cited in J. W. Burrow, Evol-

ution and Society: A Study in

Victorian Social Theory, CambridgeUniversityPress, 19 70 [ 1966], p. 223.

13. H. Spencer, 'A Theory ofPopulation Deduced from the GeneralLaw of Animal Fertility,' WestminsterReview LVII, 1852, pp. 468-501.

14. Ibid., p. 501.15. Spencer, The Princ2ples, op.

cit., II(1), p. 368.16. Durkheim, Division of Labor,

op. cit., p. 50.17. Ibid., p. 53.18. Ibid., pp. 53-4.19. E. Durkheim, Suicide, trans.

J. A. Spaulding and G. Simpson,Chicago, Free Press, 1951 [1897],p. 248.

20. Durkheim, Division of Labor,op. cit., p. 53.

21. E Tiryakian, EmileDurkheim',in T. Bottomore and R. Nisbet (eds),

A History of Sociological Analysis,op. cit., pp. 187-236.

22. E. Durkheim, The Rules ofSociological Method, trans. S. A.Solovay and J. H. Mueller, G. E. G.Catlin (ed.), Chicago: lJniversity ofChicago Press, 1938 [1895], p. 102.


24. Ibid.25. Ibid., pp. 56, 60-1.26. Parsons,op. cit., p. 343.27. Quoted in G. E. G. Catlin,

'lntroduction to the Translation,' inE. Durkheim, 7he Rules of Socio-logical Method, op. cit., p. xxix.

28. Many students of Durkheimhave recognized the moral preoccu-pations that, in Dominick l aCapra's



Durkhezm nd Spencer 379

phrase, run 'like a red thread'throughDurkheim's thinking. (D. LaCapra,

Emile Durkheim: Sociologzst andPhilosopher, Ithaca, N.Y., CornellUniversity Press, 1972, p. 4). See alsoParsons, op. cit. R. A. Nisbet, TheSociologSyof Emile Durkheim, NewYork, Oxford University Press, 1974.L.A. Coser, Masters of SociologicalThought: Ideas in Historical andSocial Context, New York, Harcourt,Brace, Jovanovich, 197 1. R. Fletcher,op. cit. A. Giddens, 'Introduction:

Durkheim'sWritings n Sociology andSocial Philosophy,' in A. Giddens(ed.), Emile Durkheim: SelectedWritings,New York, CambridgeUni-versity Press, 19 7 2. E Wallwork,Durkheim: Morality and Milieu, Gam-bridge, Mass., Harvard UniversityPress, 1972. R. N. Bellah, 'Introduc-tion,' in R. N. Bellah (ed.), EmileDurkheim on Morality and Society,Chicago, University of Chicago Press,1973. Anthony Giddens, quotingfrom Durkheim, provides a succinctsummary:

The endeavour o contributetothe founding of a sociological'science of morality'very rapidlyled Durkheim o a concernwiththe natureof sociology and ofsocial phenomenamore generally;but he always conceived of his

contributionsto sociology as beingprimarily ocussed within the morespecialized ield of the 'sociologyof moral facts.' As he wrote in1900: 'Insteadof treatingsociologyin genere, we have always con-cerned ourselves ystematicallywith a clearlydelimited order offacts: save for necessaryexcursionsinto the fields adjacent o thosewhich we were exploring,we havealways been preoccupiedonly withlegal or moralrules, studied interms of their genesisand develop-ment. . .' Thus Durkheim's irstmajorwork. . .was conceived as'an attempt to treat the facts ofmoral life according o the methodof the positive sciences' (op. cit.,p. 3).

In effect, Durkheim represented atransitional stage in the emergence

of the modern social sciences. It isnot coincidental that, as historianRichard Hofstadter has pointed out,sociology in its early days attractedan extraordinarynumber of ministersand ministers' ons. Durkheim's ather,for instance, was a rabbi. (R. Hof-stadter, Social Darwinism n A mencanThought, Boston, Beacon Press, 1955[1944].) Times have changed, but theproblem of order (and a preoccupation

with norms, values and social 'path-ologies') continues to run like a redthread through contemporary soci-ology.


30. Ibid., p. 265.31. Ibid , pp. 266-70.32. Durkheim, The Rules, op. cit.33. Ibid., pp. 92-3.34. Ibid.35. Spencer was sophisticated

enough to avoid entrapment in thesort of simplistic proposition thatDurkheim was bold enough to offer(one which subsequent generationsofsociologists have discreetly allowed torecede into obscurity): 'We can thenformulate the following proposition:The division of labor varies in directratio with the volume and density of

societies, and, if it progresses in acontinuous manner in the course ofsocial development, it is becausesocieties become regularlydenser andgenerally more volum nous [hisitalics].' (Division of Labor, op. cit.,p. 262.)

36. Sometimes, though, one sus-pects that the source of Durkheim'sself-contradiction was his tenuousgrasp of economics. How else can one

explain statements such as the follow-ing, which is flatly opposed to the onequoted above-and to itself.

The division of labor appearsotherwise to us than it does toeconomists. For them, it essen-tially consists in greaterproduc-tion. For us, this greaterpro-ductivity is only a necessary



Peter A. Corning80

consequence,a repercussion fthe phenomenon [of population

growthanda moreacute strugglefor existence]. If we specialize,it is not to producemore, but it isto enableus to live in new con-ditions of existence that havebeenmade for us. (Division of Labor,op. cit., p. 275).37. Durkheim, The Rules, op. cit.,

pp. 104, 110, 113.38. Durkheim,Division of Labor,

op.cit.,pp. 111-12.

39. Ibid.,p.112n.40. Durkheim, The Rules, op. cit.,

p. 103.41. Ibid., p. 102.42. Ibid., p. 29.43. Ibid., p. 13. Durkheim later

denied as 'absurd'chargesthat he hadclaimed for society some sort ofindependentphysical(causal)existence(Suicide, op. cit., p. 3 20? This denialis not convincingthough (see below).

Durkheim also later modulated hismethodologicalposture,both in wordand deed. However,some of the worksthatreflectDurkheim'smethodologicalevolution were not availablen Englishuntil quite recently.Amongsubsequentgenerationsof English-speakingociol-ogists, therefore, Durkheim's meth-odological posture has been knownchiefly through The Rules of Socio-logicai Method. More important, tothe end Durkheimwas unclear aboutthe distinction between emergence,independenceand causalpotency, andhe conflatedthe three.

44. R.A. Nisbet and R.G. Perrin,The Social Bond (2nd ed.), New York,Knopf, 1977, p. 28.

45. Durkheim, The Rules, op. cit.,p. 111.

46. Ibid., p. 10. Modern-day truc-

tural-functionalists still tend to beoriented to the problemof the norma-tive order. (See W.E. Moore ' Func-tionalism,' in T. Bottomore and R.Nisbet op. cit. However, the prob-lem is today defined more in social-engineering erms. Moreover, he socialorderis clearlyacknowledged o be aninstrumentalityrather than an end initself, as Spencer maintained. 'Thus

the first emergentpropertyof humanaggregates,requisite for theirphysical

survivai, comprises the elementarymechanisms of interdependence.[T]he next emergentsystem propertyis that of order: rules carryingeffec-tive negative sanctions if necessary,rendering ocial encountersin any andevery differentiated context predict-able' (Ibid., p. 346). Nevertheless,there remainsthe essentiallyuntestedassumption n sociologicaltheory thatsocial solidarity(the social bond) is an

empiricalproblemthatrequires pecialbinding forces independentlyof econ-omic and political transactions.Some-times this presumed need is definedas a societal need and sometimesas apersonal psychological need. Sociol-ogists also have a tendency to suggestthat the economic bonds (the bondsof mutual self-interest) and politicalbonds are somehow less importantthan social bonds. Common sense

suggests that all are important, but,to my knowledge,no systematicstudyof the relationshipbetween them hasyet been undertaken-an astoundingfact and a testamentto the parochial-ismof the varioussocialsciences.

47. E. Durkheim(with P. Faucon-net), 'Sociologie et SciencesSociales,'in A. Giddens (ed. and trans.),EmileDurkheim: Selected Writings, NewYork, Cambridge University Press,1972 [1903], pp. 264-6.

48. Ibid., p. 266.49. Durkheim, Suicide, op. cit.,

pp. 272,384-5.50. Parsons,op. cit., p. 323.51. Ibid52. W. Pope, 'Classic on Classic:

Parson's Interpretationof Durkheim,'American Sociological Review,XXXVIII,1973, pp. 399-415.

53. Durkheim,Division of Labor,op. cit., p. 257.

54. Pope,op. cit., p. 401.55. Durkheim, Division of Labor,

op. cit., p. 262.56. Ibid., pp. 266, 267, 270.57. It might also be noted that

Parsons, in his reply to Pope, in-correctly disowned his own earlierjudgment: 'Pope was right that



Durkheim and Spencer 381

Durkheim did not in fact introducea version of the Malthusianprinciple

of population. (T. Parsons, Commenton "Parson'sInterpretationof Durk-heim" and on "Moral fireedomThrough Understanding in Durk-heim"',AmericanSociologicalReview,XL, 1975, p. 109). To which Popeincorrectly responded with an exult-ant touche: 'Parsons...acknowledgesthat I was correct in rejecting hisclaim that Durkheim introduced aversion of the Malthusian principle

of population. But it is precisely thisappeal to "population pressure"...[that Parsons] cited as evidence ofthe breakdown and biologizing ofsocial theory. . . In short there is nobreakdown, biologizing or otherreduction of social theory...' (W.Pope, 'Parsons on Durkheim, Re-visited,' American Sociological Re-ziew XL 1975, p. 111). Wrong!Parsons was right the first time. By

contrast, Robert Bellah gives anessentially accurate rendering ofDurkheim's views, and comments:'Although his conception is schematicand oversimplified, Durkheim is un-questionably correct in seeing struc-tural differentiation in response toadaptive exigencies as a major aspectof social change,' (R.N. Bellah,'Durkheim and History,' AmericanSociological Reuiew, XXIV, 1959,p. 452) Herbert Spencer could nothavesaidit better.

58. Durkheim, The Rules, op. cit.,p. 151.

59. Ibid., p. 209.60. Parsons,TheStructureof Social

Action, op. cit., p. 333.61. See especially L.D. Hankoff

and B. Einsidler (eds), Suicide:Theory and Clinical Aspects, Little-

ton, Mass.,P.S.G. 1979.62. Durkheim'sambivalenceabouthumannaturehas alreadybeen noted.Two different desideratacombinedtoshape his position on the relationshipbetween individualpsychologyandtheexternal environment. On the onehand, Durkheimwanted to adheretothe aspirationsof positive science andconfined his sociology to ex ternal

observables.Accordingly,he assumedthe rather'schizoid'posture, to quote

LaCapra(op. cit., p. 11), that innergoals and 'intentions' (includingutilitarian calculations) were 'subjec-tive' and therefore not amenable toscientiElc analysis (he didn't quitedeny their existence, but he treatedthem as unimportant), whereas suchreified (emergent) phenomena as'solidarity'and 'anomie'werescientificbecause they existed outside of theindividual and had causal efficacy

(though, of course, he also deniedtheir independent physical existence).The other consideration or Durkheimwas the distinction he wished toestablishbetween egoistic (utilitarian)and altruistic (moral) sources ofbehavior.Thus, his Homo duplex wassometimes treated as a screen thatpassively receives and reflects 'moraldictates' (tabula rasa?) and some-times as a cauldron of desires and

appetites that must be carefullycontained, lest the individual engagein destructive or self-destructivebehavior.Likewise,moralitywassome-times treated as something thatbenefits society at the expense ofthe individual and sometimes assomething that is conducive toindividualhappiness(enlightenedself-interest?) because it constrains thetyranny of the appetites. Durkheim's

implicit psychology is, obviously, acomplicated subject, which sociol-ogists have not, in the main, con-fronted head on. But, for that matter,neitherhavesociologistsbeenveryself-critical about their own implicitassumptions (and hidden causaltheories). Here,again,there is a sharpcontrast with HerbertSpencer,whosebreadth made him also one of the

pioneers of nineteenth centurypsy-

chology. (In fact, his Principles ofPsychology was used as a text by,among others, William James atHarvard.)

63. Durkheim, Diuision of Labor,op. cit., p. 102.

64. E.g., Bellah, op. cit., p. 452n.65. Durkheim, 'Sociologie et

SciencesSociales,'op. cit., p. 5 3.

corning on durheim and spencer1

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