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Suggested hashtag for Twitter users: #LSEworks
Corporate Boards: facts and myths
LSE Works: Financial Markets Group public lecture
Professor Daniel FerreiraProfessor of Finance, Co-organiser of theCorporate Governance programme at LSE
Professor David WebbChair, LSE
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Corporate Boards:Myths and FactsProfessor Daniel Ferreira (LSE)
Department of Finance &Financial Markets Group
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• Interdisciplinary group• Housed at the Financial Markets Group (FMG)• Dedicated to the rigorous analysis of Corporate
Governance issues• Runs a series of regular events• Check out CG Research Debates schedule▫ Brings practitioners and academics together▫ Free!
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Corporate Boards: Myths and Facts• Myth: What I think is false.
• Fact: What I think is true.
• Myths are mostly backed by no evidence, or by highly-selective, academically-suspicious evidence.
• Facts are backed by evidence that most would consider credible.
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Five Corporate Governance myths
1. Unconstrained managers, helpless owners.2. Boards don’t matter.3. The lapdog board.4. The watchdog board.5. One size fits all.
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Facts• Most companies around the world are closely
owned and run by the same individuals, families, and governments.
• No meaningful distinction between managers and owners in such cases
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In countries where large firms are owned by dispersed shareholders (UK and US, mostly), there exists a number of governance mechanisms:
▫ Boards▫ Shareholder activism▫ Proxy contests▫ Takeovers▫ Laws and regulations▫ Media▫ Reputation▫ Stakeholder governance (creditors, customers,
employees)▫ Competition
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Facts• Sudden deaths of some directors affect stock
prices.
• Directors of firms that experience proxy contests find it difficult to obtain additional board appointments.
• In China, the hiring of directors with foreign experience improves their firms’ performance.
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Explaining the myth• Directors rarely vote against management.
• Disagreement inside the board is hard to document.
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Facts• About half of directors that publicly announce
their resignations leave while criticising the firm.
• Even in China (where votes have to be disclosed) independent directors disagree with management!
• CEO turnover is more sensitive to performance if the board is more independent.
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Explaining the myth• Boards only have one role: To monitor the CEO
and other top executives
• Some boards may be lapdogs, but they should be watchdogs instead.
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Problems with the watchdog view• It doesn’t recognize that boards perform multiple
functions:▫ They monitor management.▫ They advise management.▫ They provide connections with the external
environment.
• It doesn’t recognize that tough monitoring is not always good.
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Costs and benefits of Friendly Boards
Adams and Ferreira (2007) argue that friendly boards are sometimes optimal, especially when the advisory role of boards is very valuable.
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Facts • Survey evidence that CEO-director friendship
ties improve communication.
• Evidence that director independence worsens performance in some firms.
• CEOs are fired too often for reasons outside their control.
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The typical answer:• A list of attributes:▫ Independence▫ Experience▫ Industry/financial/legal expertise▫ Education▫ Diversity▫ Political connections▫ Etc.
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Board Characteristics (“Structure”)
Firm Performance
The typical approach:Performance follows structure
Examples: • Does board independence improve firm performance?• Do small boards improve firm performance?• Does board gender diversity improve firm performance?
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What has the literature found?• Characteristics of effective boards:▫ Independent ▫ Industry Expertise▫ Small▫ Connected▫ Reputable▫ Comprised only of CEOs▫ With at least three women ▫ With no “busy” directors▫ No foreigners allowed!
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An alternative answer
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What makes an effective board?• A list of forces or conditions:▫ Financial incentives ▫ Reputational incentives▫ Ethical motives▫ Laws and regulations▫ Media ▫ Behavioural biases▫ Markets and Competition ▫ Etc.
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Board Characteristics (“Structure”)
Firm Performance
Board Behaviour
(“Dynamics”)
Board Decisions
Firm Decisions
The longer road: “Channels of influence”
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Board Characteristics (“Structure”)
Firm Performance
Board Behaviour
(“Dynamics”)
Board Decisions
Firm Decisions
Determinants of Board Appointments But board structure is also a choice
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Board Characteristics (“Structure”)
Firm Performance
Board Behaviour
(“Dynamics”)
Board Decisions
Firm Decisions
Determinants of Board Appointments
Environmental Factors
Complications: “confounding effects”
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Board Characteristics (“Structure”)
Firm Performance
Board Behaviour
(“Dynamics”)
Board Decisions
Firm Decisions
Determinants of Board Appointments
Environmental Factors
Short arrows:(I) Behaviour follows Structure
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Example: Attendance Behaviour
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FactAverage board meeting fee in S&P 1500 firms from 1996 to 2003 (in 2003 US dollars):
$1,014
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But…
Meeting fees ↑ by $1000 →Attendance problems ↓ by ~10%
(most conservative estimate)
From Adams and Ferreira, “Do Directors Perform for Pay?” (2008)
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What else affects attendance?• Adding one more female director reduces male
director attendance problems by 10%
▫ From Adams and Ferreira (2009), Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance.
• Conclusion: board directors’ attendance behaviour is affected by both financial and social incentives (“peer pressure”)
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Board Characteristics (“Structure”)
Firm Performance
Board Behaviour
(“Dynamics”)
Board Decisions
Firm Decisions
Determinants of Board Appointments
Environmental Factors
Short arrows:(II) Who controls appointments?
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The role of creditors in governanceExample: (From Reuters, 2011)
Struggling Irish telecoms firm Eircom has appointed several independent directors as part of a deal with lenders to waive conditions of its debt pile of 3.75 billion euros.
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Creditors want board independence
• The number of independent directors increases by roughly 30% in the first two years following a loan renegotiation with banks.
▫ From Ferreira, Ferreira and Mariano (2014), “Unfriendly Creditors: Debt Covenants and Board Independence.”
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Implications (a bit speculative)• Creditors “prefer” a more independent board.
• Independent directors are likely to favour safer and conservative projects.
• Growing, innovative firms should then have fewer independent directors.
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Board Characteristics (“Structure”)
Firm Performance
Board Behaviour
(“Dynamics”)
Board Decisions
Firm Decisions
Determinants of Board Appointments
Environmental Factors
Long arrows
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What if boards are insulated from shareholder pressure?
• Firms’ charter and by-law provisions (together with state corporate law) may restrict the ability of shareholders to replace board members.
• “Insulation provisions” are difficult to remove and can thus last for a long time.
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Banks with more insulated boards in 2003 were:
• Less likely to take risks.
• 18 percentage points less likely to be bailed out in 2008/09.
From Ferreira, Kershaw, Kirchmaier, Schuster (2013), “Shareholder Empowerment and Bank Bailouts.”
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Takeaways• Academic research reveals that boards matter.
• But they matter in subtle and often surprising ways.
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Takeaways• Directors perform multiple roles.
• Friendly boards are not always bad.
• Regulation that pushes for more independence and shareholder empowerment can have unintended consequences, as the financial crisis revealed.
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Thank you
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Suggested hashtag for Twitter users: #LSEworks
Corporate Boards: facts and myths
LSE Works: Financial Markets Group public lecture
Professor Daniel FerreiraProfessor of Finance, Co-organiser of theCorporate Governance programme at LSE
Professor David WebbChair, LSE