Mike Beunder/Countdown to Departure/July 1st, 2011

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Contents Summary ................................................................................................................................................. 2

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 3

The political decision process ................................................................................................................. 4

History ..................................................................................................................................................... 6

Lay of the land ......................................................................................................................................... 7

Tribal structure ............................................................................................................................... 8

Situation on the ground .......................................................................................................................... 8

The insurgents ................................................................................................................................ 9

(TFU) Feet on the Ground ..................................................................................................................... 11

Strategy ........................................................................................................................................ 11

Operations ............................................................................................................................................ 29

Insurgency .................................................................................................................................... 14

Battle of Chora ............................................................................................................................. 36

Build Activities ....................................................................................................................................... 38

Governance .................................................................................................................................. 40

Evaluation of Impact ............................................................................................................................. 19

Clear and Hold Strategy ................................................................................................................ 45

Build Strategy ............................................................................................................................... 49

Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................... 52

Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................... 54

Books ............................................................................................................................................ 54

Newspaper Articles ...................................................................................................................... 55

Interviews and Private Communications ..................................................................................... 56

Articles and Reports ..................................................................................................................... 57

Web sites ...................................................................................................................................... 61

http://www.isaf.nato.int/ ............................................................................................................ 61

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Countdown to Departure

Assessing the impact of the Dutch ISAF contribution to the overall NATO objectives in Afghanistan in general and in Uruzgan specifically

Mike Beunder, July 1st, 2011

Summary Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) was the Dutch contribution to the NATO led stabilization effort of Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2001. The mission of TFU started in August 2006, when insurgency in the south of Afghanistan was on the rise, and terminated four years later, August 2010. The objective of TFU, as defined by the Dutch government and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, was to bring security to Uruzgan and to support the Afghan government in strengthening provincial- and district-level governance and to facilitate and support effective reconstruction efforts focused on its infra-structure, health care and education system. TFU executed this mission at the cost of “only” 24 Dutch fatalities and 147 injured (of which more than 40 with a permanent handicap), a cost which was modest compared to other ISAF nations active in other (southern) provinces of Afghanistan. TFU was launched without a clear definition of its strategic charter and with a numerical strength far below what was required for the task at hand. The impact of TFU on the security situation in Uruzgan therefore has been that of consolidation of the district centers already under control (Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawud), adding a third district (Chora), achieving some improvements in one district (Gizab) and no improvement or even worsening of the situation in the remaining districts of Uruzgan (Char China, Chenartu and Khas Uruzgan). On the reconstruction level it facilitated the construction of roads, bridges, schools and medical facilities. In particular on the educational level significant improvements were achieved in almost all districts, including those under the control of the insurgents. However, strengthening of the provincial- and district governance and justice system, the dominant objective of the mission, failed. It failed, not because of the corrupt and tribally biased actions of the central government in Kabul but because the ambition of ISAF was unrealistic and above all, not fitting for Afghanistan, a country whose culture had little if any synergy with a centrally-managed democracy and possessed no relevant building blocks for such an attempt. The sustainability of TFU’s mission results therefore, despite the cost, sacrifices and superficial results, are almost completely dependent on its “own” presence as there is no governance structure that will uphold the achievements once ISAF departs. The first signals visible upon the departure of TFU highlight this lack of sustainability as the key strongmen marginalized by TFU upon the start of its mission, are returning to the forefront of the political scene while at the same time key actors brought in to establish a better form of governance are departing together with the Dutch out of fear for their safety.

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Introduction Tactical Force Uruzgan (TFU) was deployed in August 2006 as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. ISAF had been created as a result of the Bonn Conference1 which took place in December 2001 under the control of the United Nations Organization (UN) after the previous government of Afghanistan, the Taliban, had been defeated by the coalition forces of the United States and the United Kingdom. At the Bonn conference it was decided that rebuilding Afghanistan was key to avoid renewed nesting of terrorist organizations such as Al Qaida. ISAF’s initial responsibility2 was to establish security in and around Kabul and thus help the Afghan transnational government, headed by Hamid Karzai, a US Ally, to establish its authority. Its mandate was also to create and train the new Afghan security forces. Coordinating the rebuilding of the country was the focus of the UN’s Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)3, which had a very broad set of responsibilities, including the support of the Afghan government to implement the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The primary means for implementing the reconstruction work were the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). In 2003 the charter of ISAF was expanded to cover the whole of Afghanistan. This charter was implemented in four stages. TFU was part of stage 3 which covered the southern region of Afghanistan: the provinces Day Kundi, Helmand, Nimroz, Uruzgan, Kandahar and Zabul4. The command over this region was taken over by ISAF’s southern command, RC-(S), from the US and UK coalition forces on July 31st, 2006. Task Force Uruzgan took command over Uruzgan.

This document discusses the four year period (August 2006 thru July 2010) that Task Force Uruzgan was active in Uruzgan and focuses on its impact with respect to the overall ISAF mission and more specifically its impact on the situation in Uruzgan itself. TFU was a multi-nation Task Force under the command of the Dutch. Where TFU was responsible for the security and stability in Uruzgan, it was the responsibility of the PRTs to engage in the “rebuilding” of the province. PRTs were mostly national and each nation could determine within very wide boundaries how to work within the general guidelines for the PRT: “Helping the Afghan Authorities to establish good governance (on provincial and district level), promote human rights and facilitate the conditions for reconstruction4”. Within the context of Uruzgan and the four years TFU was active in Uruzgan, there were two PRTs active, a Dutch PRT which fell under the command of TFU and an Australian PRT, also located in Uruzgan. Where necessary and relevant, contributions of other nations5 will be mentioned but this document primarily focuses on the Dutch contributions and accomplishments.

To evaluate the impact of TFU and its subordinate PRT over the 4 years of operation I will review its strategy and measure it against the objectives of bringing security to Uruzgan, to enable the strengthening of the provincial- and district-level governance and to facilitate and support effective reconstruction efforts focused on its infrastructure, health care and education system. As I will illustrate in the subsequent discussion, TFU’s mission was a counterinsurgency mission even though the Dutch government, it’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) and even NATO refused to name it as such. Hence the strategy executed by TFU and its underlying PRT has to be measured against its effectiveness as a counterinsurgency strategy: winning the hearts and minds of the local population

1 Bonn conference: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonn_Conference

2 UN Security Council resolution 1386, December 22

nd, 2001

3 UN Security Council resolution 1401, March 28

th, 2002

4 ISAF web site: http://www.isaf.nato.int/history.html

5 Dijk (2009): For instance the logistical unit of TFU counted over 20 different nationalities

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and through them improve security and governance. Phrased in a different manner, the effective outcome of a successful counterinsurgency strategy is, in the eyes of the population, a legitimate and sovereign government, that can ensure effective administration and can independently reduce the insurgency to - or maintain it at - an acceptable level6. Ultimately, it is against this “outcome” that the impact of four years of TFU will be measured. I will start by reviewing the ISAF objectives under which TFU operated. Subsequently I will review the decision process that led to the creation of TFU, the defined objectives and the strategy that was defined and implemented to achieve these objectives. Next I will determine the starting point of the TFU mission: what was the situation on the ground in Uruzgan. This includes a brief overview of the most recent history of Afghanistan in general and Uruzgan more specifically. From this point I will discuss the basic strategy of TFU and trace the implementation of this strategy over the four year period. Finally I will review the results of the four year mission by measuring the state-of-affairs within Uruzgan at the time of the withdrawal of TFU. Of specific interest is the sustainability of the achieved results. Where it comes to sustainability only a partial analysis can be provided which focuses on the first indicators after the departure of TFU. A complete analysis and discussion falls outside of the scope of this study as it would require a significant longer stretch of time following the departure of TFU as well as the study of subsequent activities of the ISAF force in Uruzgan: the Combined Task Force Uruzgan under US command.

As a cautionary note it should be pointed out that real numbers whether statistical or otherwise, are notoriously unreliable as access to most areas in Uruzgan other than the towns of Tarin Kowt, Deh Rawud and Chora is limited or impossible due to safety concerns or because of known unreliability of the data source(s). Therefore almost all numerical data (e.g. number of schools build, medical centers but also the number of teachers, midwifes, doctors and police officers) should be seen as indicators to identify and/or illustrate trends rather than absolute numbers. This is especially true for data gathered through Afghan channels as these are especially unreliable, often illiterate and known to provide inflated numbers. As a final warning it should be noted that given that US and Australian forces were also active in Uruzgan, it is not always possible to clearly contribute specific results to one or the other country. In particular the Dutch approach which was based on local execution and ownership makes it hard to attribute some of the achievements directly to TFU. In the context of this document TFU refers to the Dutch contribution unless otherwise indicated.

The political decision process In order to assess the impact of TFU it is important to understand the process that led to the final decision and approval for the mission as well as the TFU mission objectives that were defined by the Dutch government. Not only will the success as well as achievements of the mission be measured against these objectives but it is also an important factor in the ability of TFU to hit the ground running as it did not operate in vacuum but as part of an international effort and hence objectives deviating from or at odds with the overall agenda and strategy will directly impact its effectiveness and success. There is also another important reason for reviewing the political decision process: its failure to identify the real character of the mission. It can be argued that this failure resulted in the lack of a proper political and strategic framework for TFU’s mission that would have made a significant difference in its set-up and execution. The decision process which stood at the foundation of the mission, started in January 2005 and finally completed in February 2006, by far the longest for any military mission approved by the Dutch government and parliament7. The process was marred

6 Graaf (2010), pp.21

7 Hazelbag (2009), pp.254-258

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by a lack of a clearly defined strategic charter8. Instead, motivation for the mission seemed to have had its origins in a combination of foreign policy objectives centered on securing and extending Dutch influence on the global/international political scene and the ministry of defense’s fear for significant budget cuts after termination of previous international operations as well as the ability to “demonstrate” it’s newly created expeditionary force.

The mission was to take place under the charter of ISAF. As mentioned, ISAF’s objective was to support and strengthen the Afghan authorities, enabling them to establish security and stability in the whole country. The choice of Uruzgan was mostly circumstantial9 as other more “desirable” locations had already been allocated to other participants, including the province of Baghlan, Northern Afghanistan, the location where the Netherlands already had a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) active since 200410. Once the location was “officially” fixed, an assessment mission was executed by the Dutch Foreign Ministry to take inventory of the situation in Uruzgan11. At the same time Uruzgan was starting to experience a growing insurgency which required urgent attention from ISAF. The political objectives defined for the mission were a direct translation from the ISAF charter and centered on the strengthening of a proper governmental system in Uruzgan. It specifically listed the promotion of Good Governance, a frequently used term, the set-up of efficient and effective Police and Armed Forces, assisting the Afghan government in establishing a constitutional state and carrying out civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) reconstruction activities12. The final Dutch political decision process, communicated to its Allies and the Afghan government, centered on a list of 16 points13,14. This list focused on the continued presence and efforts of the US in Uruzgan and neighbouring provinces (4 points), financial means for support and reconstruction (2 points), good governance by the Afghan authorities (2 points), training of Afghan security forces (3 points), the command structure (1 point), proper treatment and transfer of prisoners (1 point) and the availability of NATO backup forces (1 point). This list was in fact a mixture of requirements, originating from multiple unrelated areas: the mission objectives, the political discussion within the Dutch government and parliament and the analysis of the situation on the ground11. It dealt with all the sensitivities ranging from the Dutch traumatic experience in Srebrenica to the negative view on the US-led Enduring Freedom Operations (too much focus on kinetic operations) and the existence of Guantanamo Bay. A very different list was created by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This list defined 13 priority points for TFU to address15 once on the ground. Both lists shared an overly optimistic view on the existing governance structures in Uruzgan. However, where the list of the Dutch government to its allies had a significant “military” content, the list defining the priorities for TFU mentions security only in combination with a reference to the necessary coordination with ISAF and focuses mostly on the reconstruction priorities. Furthermore, most of the points on the Foreign Ministry list require expertise other than what the military would be able to offer. Neither list mentions counterinsurgency or direct engagement with the Taliban. One can conclude that both lists, although not necessary required to be in sync as they address different audiences, missed the opportunity to present a shared strategic framework and instead were mostly disjoint and where the

8 Graaf (2010), pp.18-19

9 Klep (2011), pp.17-35, Hazelbag (2009), pp.255

10 Hovens (2009), pp 307-332, Klep (2011), pp.17

11 Royal Netherlands Embassy (2006)

12 Hazelbag (2009), pp.264

13 Hazelbag (2009), pp.258

14 Although all references to this list mention 16 points, only 13 have been identified in literature. It is

reasonable to assume that the 3 remaining points cover specific confidential requirements such as the removal of Jan Mohammad Khan, at the time the Governor of Uruzgan 15

Royal Netherlands Embassy (2006), pp.41-43

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lists do overlap, they share an unrealistic view on the presence of Afghan governance and security forces which could be used to build and expand on16. The “demand” for at least the foundation for good governance and a functioning ANP provided some view on the actual stability and reconstruction side of TFU’s mission. At the same time it also indicated little understanding of the actual strength and presence of the Afghan government in Uruzgan and ignored the reality on the ground. This lack of coherence was prevalent throughout the discussion surrounding the Dutch TFU decision and the subsequent translation of its objectives into the actual mission planning. Where the political process under which TFU was approved almost completely focused on reconstruction, the MoD’s view, as articulated by the Dutch Commander-in-Chief, was focused on enabling reconstruction for which fighting (and taking losses) would be necessary17. In fact, according to some within the Dutch armed forces, the mission objectives were translated into a combat mission with the goal to eliminate the influence of the Taliban. The reconstruction efforts as defined in the political mission statement were the focus of the PRT part of the TFU. The official label of TFU, “reconstruction mission”, was therefore only a political label and not practiced by the Dutch Ministry of Defence. It is clear that the translation of the political decision into a military mission failed to provide a clear context for the mission. By not properly qualifying the mission as a counterinsurgency mission, the Dutch government missed an important opportunity to build the proper base of support and expectations for the mission with the Dutch population as well as with parliament18. It also failed to provide the military with the opportunity to clearly focus on the core objectives of the mission. As such a clear strategic context to the (political) mission objectives was absent. As a counterinsurgency strategy is by heart a political strategy focused on the population, lack of a strategic framework started the mission on the wrong foot19. The Dutch Armed Forces and hence also its newly created expeditionary force had no experience with counterinsurgency and, as will be discussed in the following section, the first steps on the ground demonstrated this lack of experience.

Despite the confusion about the true character of its mission, the impact of TFU on Uruzgan and its contribution to the ISAF mission as a whole will be assessed along the effectiveness of counter-insurgency: implementing the shape, clear, hold & build steps. As the next step I will review the situation on the ground to capture the starting point for TFU. To be able to correctly interpret this situation it is imperative that the recent history of Afghanistan and more specifically Uruzgan is covered. This should not only cover the lay of the land—to have an idea about the physical challenges facing counterinsurgency operations—but specifically the form and state of its governance structures and the people living “under” the ruling of these structures as these are equally if not more important to the TFU.

History During the last two centuries Afghanistan had expelled several invading nations, not through its national army but through the local militias20. This pattern continued through the invasion of the Soviet Army in 1981 and its departure in 1989. After the departure of the Soviets and the fall of the Afghan communist government three years later a vicious civil war ignited. This civil war demonstrated an ever changing field of alliances and opponents with the civil population in general as the victim. It is not surprising that under these circumstances many welcomed the arrival of the 16

Reijn (2007), pp.22 17

Hazelbag (2009), pp.269-272, Dmitriu (2009), pp.616 18

Dmitriu (2009), pp.616 19

Kilcullen (2006) 20

Barfield (2010), pp.5

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Taliban in 1996. The cyclical nature of the strongest player (communists, Taliban, war lords) had also resulted in an interchangeable role of victim and oppressor, further complicating the volatile mixture. Over this prolonged period of strive not only the central government structure had been completely destroyed but more importantly also on provincial and district level had the existing and complex structure been severely damaged, including the historically already fragile link with the central government. Majles21, which was basically an unspecified form of authority, provided this link from village to districts- and provincial level but had been destroyed over the past 30 years. I should also stress the fact that the concept of central government had a completely different meaning in the context of Afghanistan, a country that had completely different political traditions compared to the western world. What was left after this period was the basic element of power in a village which was the Khan. The Khan is the central authority of a family and is surrounded by other dependants and people that furthered their own interests through a direct relation with the Khan. The Khan represented the one recognizable element of authority in a village.

Lay of the land To get a full appreciation of the sheer task of TFU it is illustrative to look at the numbers: the three districts of Deh Rawud, Tarin Kowt and Chora alone count 241,000 inhabitants, about 50% of the 494,000 inhabitants that Uruzgan counted in 200622. Uruzgan itself is 22,696 square kilometers (a little over half the size of the Netherlands). Nearly three quarters of the province (72%) is mountainous or semi mountainous terrain while a little more than one-fifth (21%) of the area is made up of flat land. Uruzgan was one of the poorest provinces of Afghanistan, accentuated by its extremely conservative population23. It counted 7 districts, Tarin Kowt with the province capital, Deh Rawud, Chora, Gizab, Char China, Chenartu and Khas Uruzgan. Over 90% of the population lived in rural areas, relying mostly on subsistence agriculture for their living. Families lived in mud-walled compounds called qualas. Female members of the family lived in a separate section of the quala , kept away from anyone except direct members of the family. Rural (agricultural) areas were mostly covered by a maze of irrigation channels. Education levels were the lowest of Afghanistan, with 80-93% and 94-99% of the male and female population being illiterate24. Only 5-6% of boys and less than 1% of girls were going to school regularly. Medical facilities were available in the districts centers only and mostly primitive with virtually no educated staff. The rate of child birth fatalities ranked the highest of all provinces, with an almost total lack of midwifes. Uruzgan is also the origin of the Taliban movement. Governance on all levels was absent or worse, present only to extort the local population while not providing any relevant service. Salaries for teachers almost never made it to their destination and it was quite common as a teacher to go without salary for months, forcing them to sell school books and furniture to pay for their own basic needs. Worse was the situation at the Afghan National Police (ANP). Pay at the ANP, if it did make it to its destination, was significantly lower as what the local militia would earn resulting in a (local) police force that was illiterate, addicted, deeply corrupted and, worse of all, only interested in earning money by “taxing” the local population. Chiefs of Police (COPs) were equally tarnished by illiteracy and endemic corruption. Their tashkil25 were typically inflated to allow the COP to pocket salaries for the ghost officers. Due to the low quality of the police force, their death rate in case of encounters with insurgents, was also

21

Azoy (2003), pp.26 22

TLO August 2010, pg. 1-3 (1) 23

Even within Afghanistan by the Afghanis, Uruzgan was regarded as backward 24

https://www.cimicweb.org/AfghanistanProvincialMap/Pages/Uruzgan.aspx 25

Manning list

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significant, making it even more difficult to attract officers. Pensions for widows mostly disappeared also into the pockets of the COPs, illustrating the depth of the corruption.

Tribal structure Most of the Uruzgan population belongs to the Pashtuns (90%) as the main tribal group in Afghanistan (and, as a matter of fact Pakistan as more Pashtuns are living in Pakistan). Within the Pashtun several heritage lines are present and being a Pashtun does not mean one cannot have a conflict with another Pashtun. President Karzai belongs to the Popalzai tribe, which belonged in its turn to the Durrani. The Durrani had a centuries old conflict with the Ghilzai to which the Hotak belonged. Some tribes didn’t even agree to which line of heritage they belonged, like the Babozai: some will claim to be part of the Durrani, others will claim Ghilzai descent26. The three districts initially targeted by TFU were mainly populated by the Popalzai (Tirin Kowt), Babozai and Tokhi (Deh Rawud) and the Achekzai and Barakzai (Chora). The Nurzai-, Hazara- and Achekzai tribes were almost fully outside of these ink spots, despite the fact that these composed almost 50% of the population of Uruzgan. The fact that the conclusive battle in 2001 between Karzai and the Taliban took place in Tarin Kowt is also noteworthy: it was one of the local strongmen, Jan Mohammad who sided with Karzai to defeat the Taliban.

Geographically Uruzgan did not play a strategic role; its neighbouring provinces Helmand and Kandahar much more so, highlighted by the significant higher levels of fighting between coalition forces and insurgents. Economically, Uruzgan was mostly recognized as the center of the poppy culture and the related narcotics trade.

Situation on the ground The situation on the ground before the Dutch troops arrived had been shaped by US Forces under Operation Enduring Freedom. The US’s primary objective from the start in 2001 had been to remove the Taliban from power and eliminate Al Qaeda as a threat. By putting their ally Karzai in place it thought it had implemented the desired regime change and otherwise could focus on its single goal and objective: eliminating Al Qaeda. As such, over the period 2002 to 2005 it lost the opportunity to engage with what remained of the local and regional authority structures. It was at the early stage, after the Taliban had been removed, that the local population welcomed foreign troops as they saw them as the cure against their very own militias that had destroyed the country earlier on27. Serving the purpose of hunting Al Qaeda, the US connected with the different local war lords that had become visible as opponents of the Taliban. These local strongmen, now being positioned as the new “authority” on district level (and as a replacement for US boots on the ground which were needed in Iraq), used their preferred position with the US to further their own power position and not only settle existing tribal disputes in their advantage but also marginalize or eliminate remaining governance structures that might compete with them. By not understanding the tribal culture, or the status of such strongmen, the US created a situation of strong polarization, establishing a default power structure that would proof to be hard to dismantle later on28. At the same time they lost credibility with the local population as these continued to suffer under an oppressive structure without any proper governance. In Uruzgan this process is illustrated by the position of Jan Mohammed, a member of the Popalzai tribe. During the reign of the Taliban, Jan Mohammad had been prosecuted, imprisoned and tortured by the Taliban. Upon the invasion of Afghanistan by the US, Jan Mohammad sided with the US Forces and fought the Taliban. In 2002 he was made Governor

26

TLO (2011), pp.4 27

Barfield (2010), pp.7 28

Barfield (2010), pp.7

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of Uruzgan by the US and unleashed a virtual Taliban witch hunt which specifically targeted the Achekzai, Barakzai and Nuzai tribes. Being paid and supported by the US allowed him to build up a sizeable army that he used to further the interests of the Popalzai tribe. It allowed him to control the build-up of the provincial and district governance by assigning family and tribal members to important posts such as the Provincial Chief of Police (Juma Gul – his brother) and the Chief of the Highway Police (Matiullah Khan – his nephew). Subsequently, Matiullah Khan was used by the US as a security force covering the main highway with Kandahar, an important logistical link. For this service he was paid handsomely and used that to further extend his own private security force. Matiullah, through better pay, attracted more and better recruits to his force than the local ANP. As to the state of the ANP in Uruzgan, it was similar to that of the rest of Afghanistan, deplorable. It was undermanned, unqualified and deeply corrupt. Of course, given that a Dutch PRT had already been involved in the training of Afghan Police forces, its general state should have been well known29. ISAF had understood the importance of a proper police force early on. Early 2002 it had been decided that the build-up of the ANP would be a German responsibility. As early as 2003 and 2004, the US, itself responsible for the build-up of the Afgan National Army (ANA), expressed deep concern about the lack of progress in the build-up of the ANP. It provided an additional US$2.1B over the next four years to support the German effort30. The fact that the program was a failure was amply demonstrated in early 2006 when riots in Kabul ran completely out of hand as the ANP used directed lethal fire to disperse the crowds. A significant number of police officers turned out to have joined the riot. Given that the ANP in and around Kabul had been the first target for training and professionalization its performance was a clear signal that out in the provinces the problem would be significantly worse. The Ministry of Interior, under whose responsibility the ANP fell, was itself also thoroughly corrupt and ineffective. It had seen several Ministers come and go, unable or unwilling to enforce the necessary reforms. Uruzgan being far away and hard to reach got little attention. The number of ANP officers in Uruzgan was estimated at 100-150 at the beginning of 200631.The program to train the Afghan National Army was in somewhat better shape but, similar to the police program was not delivering sufficient troops. It too, like the ANP, suffered of high percentages of absentees (sometimes up to 40%). By 2006, the availability of partially trained ANA forces in Uruzgan was estimated to be around 400-450. They were poorly armed and equipped and were mostly used as guides or house-search parties. A larger number of them were assigned to US forces active in Uruzgan. The justice system was in a similar state, if not worse. Many positions were not filled and those filled were filled by people without any qualification, often illiterate and almost all with a clear tribal bias.

The insurgents All this created a fertile ground for the Taliban insurgency. As early as 2002 insurgents started to stage a clear strategy of establishing control over the province, starting with the areas under their own control. The ever growing power of the Popalzai, collateral damage associated with ISAF actions32 and the shenanigans of the thoroughly corrupt ANP33 all contributed to the steady supply of new recruits Most of these local fighters would be working the land in their regular existence but when ISAF or government troops would approach they would pick up their arms and fight. Similarly, the for-rent fighters were attracted due to an abysmal economy with a high percentage of unemployment. Fighters would get paid by the Taliban but sometimes had to provide their own guns. The influx of for-rent fighters could often be noticed by a significant increase in the price of

29

Hovens (2009), pp.316 30

ICG Asia Report (2007), No. 138, pp.7-8 31

TLO (2010), pp.34 32

Dmitriu (2009): “Kill one Pashtun tribesman and you make three more your sworn enemy” 33

The saying goes: “All criminals are off the street now that they have joined the ANP”

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weapons and ammunition. This mixture of disgruntled locals, for-rent local fighters and hard core insurgents makes it also difficult to label such groups as THE Taliban. In reality the Taliban is a collection of groups with different motivations that at times, could be at war with each other as well. As mentioned before, the violent history over the last 30 years has seen many different alliances, frequently seeing parties swapping sides over time. Complete militias could switch sides if the right incentives were provided. Of course, there was also an influx of hard core Taliban from Pakistan where they had taken refuge after the Coalition invasion in 2001. By 2006 the insurgency counted approximately 350 hardcore Taliban fighters, both from inside and outside the province. Taliban fighters moving in from outside the province had two origins: the southeast and the west. The southeast provided the strongest influx as it linked through the neighbouring provinces Zabul and Kandahar directly to Pakistan. Apart from fighters, it was also the main route for narcotics export and weapons import as the border with Pakistan was porous and Pakistan territory itself had virtually no legal challenge with respect to both activities. The strength of this channel was further illustrated by the fact that the accepted currency in Uruzgan was mostly the Pakistani rupee and not the Afghani. On the west side Uruzgan borders with the Helmand province. Helmand had been a significant trouble spot for the British forces located there and any major military operation in this area would result in fighters melting away into Uruzgan. The importance of Uruzgan to the hard core insurgency had been growing as the poppy culture provided a significant cash flow, necessary to pay fighters, local supporters as well as procure weapons and finance logistics. As a group, the insurgents were often referred to as the “neo-Taliban”34. Although still a key follower of the Deobandi doctrines, they had adopted in particular modern technology and techniques and in a sense a more pragmatic/less orthodox attitude with respect to media and internationalization. Effective use of internet, including Youtube and Twitter35, ensured that their (claimed) activities received widespread attention. The fact that ISAF could communicate only after a lengthy process of multi-national reviews, made this even more effective as the Taliban was inevitably the first to (re)act on any event. As to the building of their power base, the Neo-Taliban clearly based their strategy on that of the village mullahs rather than the tribal codex of Pashtunwali. This allowed them to exploit the one unifying element of Afghanistan: Islam. Within conservative Uruzgan this focused on two clear components that still represented some level of authority on village level: the mullahs and the khans. Historically mullahs had no role of authority other than within the social boundaries of the local village mosque. This is typical for the Sunni version of the Islam where there is no real clerical hierarchy and hence authority. The presence of “infidels” made it possible for the Taliban to exploit religion as another fertile ground for growth and support. This moved the mullahs into a position where they could exercise their growing power to disrupt the central government and frustrate ISAF efforts to improve the local situation. By “unifying” this line they build a local supply of fighters through the local village mosques, guaranteeing that the local elders would not object. The absence of even a marginally functioning local government facilitated the building of this power base by the Taliban.

Based on the previous discussion the situation in Uruzgan at the time of the arrival of TFU can therefore be summarized as steadily worsening with a highly polarized tribal constituency. Given the dominance and influence of the Popalzai, which represented only 10% of the population, in everything related to governance and justice system, the local population avoided it at all cost as they did not expect fair treatment. The Afghan government in Uruzgan, was, in different degrees of severity, pitted against close to 70% of the population. In addition to this already polarized situation, the US and its coalition forces made, by lack of sufficient boots on the ground, abundant use of its air

34

Giustozzi (2008), pp.12-14 35

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/world/asia/15zabiullah.html

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weapon, resulting in significant collateral damage and further polarization. This is mirrored by an omnipresent Taliban, estimated at around 6,000 insurgents36 in the South alone. In Uruzgan it was estimated that the Taliban had at least four out of seven districts under firm control37, unabated access to the other three districts, a flourishing narcotics trade, a solid flow of new recruits, solidly organized supply lines all the way back to Pakistan and well protected areas for rest and training [including in Pakistan].

(TFU) Feet on the Ground TFU defined its starting point with the three central districts of Deh Rawud, Tarin Kowt and Chora, building its main base in Tarin Kowt (Camp Holland) and a second base in Deh Rawud (Camp Hadrian). Deh Rawud and Tarin Kowt already had an ISAF presence. In particular Tarin Kowt, which was also the capital of Uruzgan, had already an Australian PRT present (approximately 1,090 troops). At that time, due to the lack of security in the province, there were no NGOs or other international aid organizations active in Uruzgan. The size of TFU was at its high water mark approximately 2,000 Dutch troops and 1,800 Australian, Singaporean, Slovakian, New Zealand and French troops. On average the Dutch contingent counted around 1,600 troops. If taking the operational size of the Dutch Armed Forces into account, it would put the Dutch contribution to ISAF on a third place, after the United States and the United Kingdom. With respect to the three operational areas of TFU, Deh Rawud, Tarin Kowt and Chora, the total area comprised about a third of Uruzgan and counts 241,000 inhabitants. This amounts to approximately 14 TFU soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants. For the full province the ratio comes to approximately 7 TFU soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants. From an operational perspective only about a third of these troops were active outside of their base so in reality these ratios were about a third of the above values. Also, it is important to note that TFU’s initial secured areas (ink spots) were limited to the district towns. This puts 90% of the population of Uruzgan outside of these secured areas.

Strategy The almost phobic avoidance of the term counter insurgency by NATO, by the Dutch MoD and government led to the use of other terms such as ink spot38, ink blot or 3D strategy (Development, Diplomacy and Defence39) to characterize the TFU mission. Fundamentally, TFU’s strategy consisted of the creation of a number of areas (ink spots) which were under the control of TFU. From there TFU would extend its influence and control and merge the ink spots into a single area under full control of TFU. Within the ink spots but also outside, the PRT would focus on reconstruction and development, also known as the third “D” in the 3D strategy, or as the “build” phase of a counterinsurgency strategy (as in shape, clear, hold and build). The Dutch PRT, under military command and subordinate to the commanding officer of TFU, was configured around four mission teams which were assisted by a number of (political, cultural and development) advisors, a number of functional specialists, a Police Mentoring Team (PMT) and a CIMIC Support Unit (CMU). As to the marching orders of a PRT, PRTs were driven on an individual basis, its actual planning and execution very much up to the contributing nation. This provides a high degree of flexibility and discretion to the PRT. Overall strategic objectives of the PRTs were more or less coordinated through UNAMA as well as the general master plan defined for the reconstruction of Afghanistan: the Afghan National Development Strategy40 (ANDS). ANDS clearly presented a central government-, top-down view on

36

Giustiozzi (2008), pp.33-35 37

Giustozzi (2008), pp.36: Dutch estimations in 2006 had up to 80% of Uruzgan under Taliban control 38

Dmitriu (2011), pp.1 39

Aker (2009), pp.280 40

ANDS (2007)

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the development of the country. The fact that Afghanistan had not had anything resembling a central government for the last thirty years the central government also engaged with the districts and provinces and based on their input the so-called Provincial Development Plans41 (PDPs) had been created (34 in total) as part of the ANDS42. It is noteworthy to mention that within the ANDS document released in 200640, the south of Afghanistan, including Uruzgan, is marked “red” and had as top priority security43 (actually 17 out of the 34 provinces had this priority). Second and third priorities for Uruzgan were governance and agriculture. The Dutch PRT, as part of the TFU, would have been aware of these priorities but, as mentioned, implementation was at the discretion and interpretation of the PRT itself. The PRT had its own strategy which started with the so-called Quick Impact Projects44, used as an opening gambit in new areas, followed by the more regular CIMIC and development projects. These Quick Impact Projects (QIPs, sometimes also known under the name “effects-based operations”) fit within the standard counterinsurgency strategy as these projects have as objective to win the hearts and minds of the local population. Of course, often these QIPs were at odds with the priorities defined in the ANDS and related PDP. The Quick Impact Projects, within the context of the Dutch TFU were one-time projects, set to have a short time span for their implementation, low cost and planned as “icebreakers” for the larger CIMIC/development projects. The building of a new well would typically be a quick impact project whereas building a bridge falls in the category of CIMIC projects. Large development projects such as building the road between Tarin Kowt and Chora required support from the local population which would have been obtained through the QIPs. Another important characteristic of the Dutch PRT was the fact that it did not perform such construction projects itself; it did specify the project, provided the work planning as well as the complete funding but manpower and materials were to be provided through local contractors. This illustrates again the individual nature of these PRTs as the Australian PRT, also stationed in Tarin Kowt, executed most of its projects completely autonomously.

Operations The first Dutch action, even before moving in was to “encourage” President Karzai to supplant his war-time ally and Governor of Uruzgan, Jan Mohammad Kahn. On March 18, 2006, Karzai appointed Maulavi Abdul Hakim Munib ("Maulavi" is a religious title), a former Taliban official who had reconciled with the Government of Afghanistan, to replace Jan Mohammad Khan. Munib was a Pashtun from Paktia Province. However, Munib turned out to be ineffective, mostly because he lacked his own local power base and was consistently sabotaged by the existing rank and file which had remained loyal to their tribal (Popalzai) roots. He was replaced by Assadullah Hamdan in September 2006. Like Abdul Hakim he was not local (e.g. no local tribal preferences) and was also ex-Taliban45 who had reconciled himself with the Government. This Dutch “solution” to establishing tribal balance constituted two clear mistakes. The first was the thought that by removing Jan Mohammad from the governor’s position he would be neutralized. The second mistake was the assumption that a new governor could effectively drive a process of change. Both mistakes were based on the Dutch perception of the existing governance structure and its relative strength, quality and reach in Uruzgan. Next, a second illustration of the lack of insight into the actual nature of its 41

ANDS (2007), pp.17-23 42

ANDS is regularly updated; a second ANDS has been issued for the period 2010-2013 43

ANDS (2007), pp. 23 44

Koster (2011), pp.11 45

It could not be determined if the Dutch or Afghan strategy was aimed at opening a (negotiation) channel with the Taliban as some claimed (e.g. Giustozzi (2008)), it was however remarkable that both governors had a significant Taliban (leadership) past. Dutch and Afghan authorities might have hoped for the possibility of communicating directly with the Taliban if the opportunity would provide itself.

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mission was the Dutch request to “prepare” its area of operations. This was done in July 2006 through operation Perth which targeted Taliban presence in Tarin Kowt and surroundings, specifically along the Tarin Kowt-Chora line. Although the operation did result in pushing the Taliban out and making the Baluchi Valley (temporarily) accessible, it was a schoolbook example of how NOT to conduct counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Operation Perth successfully cleared the target area but had no concept of “hold”. Immediately after the departure of the coalition forces the Taliban reappeared as its actual power base had not been affected at all. The net effect of operation Perth was to instill further hostility with the local villages and communities through house searches, damage from fighting and the failure to protect them by departing immediately after the completion of the sweep and clear operations. Another clear conclusion from Operation Perth should have been the lack of sufficient numbers of trained ANA and ANP forces to support the ISAF operations in Uruzgan. Use of ANP forces for house searches within Pashtun communities created further rift as a large number of ANP officers were Tajiks who gained access to the Pashtun households, including their women. This clearly constituted a disgrace to the Pashtun men, resulting in an increase in insurgent attacks targeting Tajiks. More important was that either the ANP or ANA could muster the necessary forces for the hold stage after the sweep and clear operations (if this had been planned). This should have been a clear signal to the incoming TFU that its PMT effort would be crucial, leading to the proper conclusion that the 10 person PMT team was not going to deliver the required numbers of ANP officers. As the international effort to build an effective ANP had been active for some time it should also have been clear at that time that the output of this effort was falling way short of the needs of TFU, let alone the whole of Afghanistan46,47. The lack of sufficient numbers of trained ANA and ANP officers would also badly impact the available TFU forces for deployment and extension of the ink spots as they would be needed to provide the necessary security in the ink spots themselves48. TFU missed an important opportunity to assess its ability to execute effective COIN operations, even before it had fully deployed. It is here where I conclude that the political decision process and its military counterpart preceding the arrival of TFU had failed to define the exact nature of the mission and its strategic and operational framework. With that neglect it also prevented the TFU from starting its operational life with a clear understanding of its limitations, both from experience and from the required resources to achieve its objectives. As I pointed out earlier, TFU had understood the need to “repair” the tribal/power imbalance created over the period preceding its arrival. Its first order of business, the removal of Jan Mohammad, was followed by an engagement of TFU with Tokhi and Barakzai leaders. This was partially driven by its strategy to improve the position of marginalized tribes and include them into the governance process but it was also driven by the need to prepare the ground for one of the key infrastructure projects under TFU’s PRT responsibilities: the road from Tarin Kowt to Chora. It is tempting to regard the removal of Jan Mohammad as a QIP that functioned as an icebreaker to the larger development project, namely the road between Tarin Kowt and Chora. However, this would suggest that TFU would have known that the removal of Jan Mohammad would have been largely symbolic and not impact the actual balance of power. Given the means through which Jan Mohammad had been removed (pressure on president Karzai) and the downside of a hostile Popalzai population I would argue that TFU truly thought that the removal of Jan Mohammad Kahn would result in an improvement of the governance system in Uruzgan.

46

Reforming the Afghan National Police, RUSI & FPRI Report, 29.9.2009 47

Provincial needs assessment: Criminal Justice in Uruzgan Province, Tilmann Röder, May 15, 2010, Royal Netherlands Embassy & GTZ 48

Klep (2011), pp. 48

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Insurgency The Taliban clearly perceived the arrival of TFU as a threat and stepped up its activities. The Taliban’s activities in the southern provinces were coordinated by the Quetta Regional Military Shura49. As mentioned earlier, the Taliban had based its build-up of influence in Uruzgan on the control over the mullahs and elders in the villages. Outside of the three ink spots, the Taliban exercised its control by buying loyalty through land distribution, money from the narcotics trade. It also exercised harsh but effective justice using sharia as their guidance. The local population avoided the official justice system because it was heavily biased and slow, if present at all. Hence, whenever possible, locals would seek Taliban judges. Taliban fighters almost always included one or more local fighters which were aware of the local sensitivities, avoiding the mistakes that were almost inevitable for the ISAF troops that had none of this local context. The Taliban’s reach into the ink spots followed the same line: first with the mullahs, followed by the village elders. Lack of cooperation with the Taliban or, vice versa, cooperation with ISAF or governmental security forces was punished harshly. There where ISAF presence was too strong and Taliban would run the danger of being arrested a system of hidden but effective pressure tactics was used through the means of nightly delivered threat letters or even personal visits. To further improve the security of the messengers, the Taliban forced the local mobile communication companies (only present in the ink spot areas) to shutdown their mobile networks after dark. This was also to improve the security of the IED teams that typically moved and worked at night. Here the efforts were focused on limiting the ability of the TFU to move around. Whereas before the arrival of the TFU there was only limited use of IEDs, mostly targeting the OEF Special Forces teams that roamed through the province (and which were much harder to predict with respect to their presence and traveling routes). Although statistics are notoriously unreliable as a whole they do provide some insight into the dominant trends. Where the number of IEDs in Uruzgan in 2005 was less than 20, the IED count just for the three ink spot districts in 2006 had gone up to 30. The other districts were more firmly under control of the Taliban and counted only 10 IEDs. For 2007 both counts went up where the count for the Tarin Kowt, Deh Rawud and Chora districts more than doubled to 70. The total for the other districts went up to 30. The Taliban quickly determined that IEDs were the easiest and cheapest way to limit TFUs operational reach and ensure that the ink spots remained limited to the three population centers and had little reach outside of these villages. On average an IED threat would accumulate to a delay of 6-8 hours for a TFU patrol, often resulting in a three-day patrol covering only a radius of 20-30 km max. The Taliban achieved this result at the cost of a mere US$20.00 per IED. Even when the sale of fertilizer (the main explosive component of an IED) was prohibited in 2008 sufficient supplies were available to drive the IED count up to 200 in 2010, just for the three ink spot areas. The effectiveness of this campaign should not be underestimated. First of all in terms of casualties: 50% of the Dutch fatalities were due to IEDs against 20% through direct contact with the Taliban. Secondly and more serious to the actual counterinsurgency: a severe limitation of the number and length of visits to villages outside the ink spots. The Taliban also traveled through the province but virtually without any limitations. Weapons were often located in caches “at location”, allowing the Taliban to travel unarmed. When traveling armed, a web of local supporters would warn them of any ISAF or ANA presence and the web of irrigation channels allowed them to quickly disengage and disappear into the countryside. The search for weapons caches and IED factories by TFU only caused further anger with the local population as their qualas were frequently searched. In particular the nightly visits were cause for significant resentment on the side of the local population.

TFU, already hampered by an undersized force, was severely curtailed by the Taliban’s IED weapon. In particular the frequent occurrence of IEDs in the ink spot areas themselves increased the feeling

49

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/02/the_talibans_top_lea.php

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of insecurity with the local population as well as limiting the mobility of TFU, reducing the frequency of their patrols and, by forcing them to travel in armored vehicles, reduced the opportunity to interact with the local population. Incidental suicide attacks added to this feeling of insecurity. Reconstruction teams as well as Afghan government officials were equally limited in their reach and required significant protection to enable them to travel to their destinations. Within the ink spots TFU was building both its major base of operations as well as smaller operation posts (FOBs) outside of the populated areas on higher grounds to optimize their security. This counters the COIN practices where it is critical that the troops live within the population centers. Being close to the population is one of the key priorities of a counter insurgency strategy as they, the local population, are in fact the objective: winning the hearts and minds of the local population allows denies the insurgents the support they need to rest, eat and operate. Worse, governmental representatives, severely threatened by the presence of the Taliban, chose to co-locate with the TFU whenever possible50. This created a strong dependency of the [build-up of] governance structures on TFU. Judges had a similar problem: either they could travel under protection of TFU (with a very limited availability outside of the secured areas) and live in TFU compounds or run the risk of being assassinated by insurgents. Here it is interesting to see how US forces were operating. Once the US had switched from hunting Al Qaeda to stabilization (or at least a reasonable combination of the two) it determined that a patrol passing through a village once every 2-3 days did not constitute protection51. Actual protection came from “being there” all the time. It changed its strategy whereby it integrated its presence with the local population by having squad-sized teams living in the villages. In particular in contested areas this resulted in a quick increase in the number of fights and casualties as the insurgents now had to take the fight to the coalition forces. Clearly this development passed by the TFU or was deemed impractical given the numerical limitations of TFU.

Battle of Chora A report by the Dutch military intelligence service (MIVD)52 in the spring of 2007 concluded that the Taliban was actually growing stronger and more than a match for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). It also concluded that the Karzai government had made little progress establishing a solid government presence in the south of Afghanistan. This was echoed by a number of other independent organizations and countries participating in ISAF operations53. In the summer of 2007 the Taliban felt confident enough to launch a major offensive targeting the district center Chora and its surroundings. The exact motivation for the offensive has not been identified although the general understanding had been that at least part of Taliban’s intention was to achieve unrestricted access from the Gizab district towards Tarin Kowt. Another reason proposed was the strategic value of the Chora area to the Taliban for the transport of narcotics, weapons and money54. The battle for Chora was characterized as the most significant engagement of TFU with the Taliban over its full stay. Although there is no reliable estimation of the number of Taliban fighters involved, estimations range between 400 and 800. The battle lasted almost four days and only by employing its full kinetic capabilities including heavy artillery, F-16s and Apache helicopters, as well as accepting the help of local militia, was TFU able to avoid Chora being overrun. The Taliban gained control over the residential areas of the township resulting in significant collateral damage during the subsequent battles. At full strength up to 500 Dutch TFU troops were fighting in Chora, supported by more Australian troops securing the road between Chora and Tarin Kowt. Even though the main fighting force of the Taliban was ultimately dislodged and expelled, confidence in the Afghan government

50

Klep (2011), pp.129, example: the White House in Chora which housed the district governor 51

West (2011), pp.249, Kilcullen (2006) 52

NRC Handelsblad, May 11th, 2007 53

UNDP (2006) 54

Wegerer (2009), pp.348

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was further reduced. The ease with which the police had been driven away by the Taliban was one signal to the population. At the time of the Taliban attack around a 100 police officers were present in Chora. Given their deplorable state and poor equipment, TFU had even bought ammunition at the local market for these ANP forces. The fact that close to a 150 fighters, belonging to a Barakzai tribal militia leader had to be called in by TFU was another concern to the village elders as they feared the return of militia to their village. For TFU the battle of Chora signaled several short comings. The fact that almost the complete fighting capability of TFU had to be deployed to stop the Taliban attack came as a complete surprise. The fact that the Taliban had been able to amass such a sizeable force without any significant warning signals to the TFU was another major concern. As visible as the battle for Chora was, it remained an anomaly within the four years of TFU’s operation in Uruzgan. It was a large scale engagement where the Taliban carried the fight directly to TFU instead of attacking its patrols and disappearing back into the countryside. It is also important to note that despite the Taliban losing the battle it did not disappear from the Chora area.

Soon after the battle for Chora, in October 2007, TFU launched a major offensive, Spin Ghar, aimed again at the Baluchi Valley. Based on the experiences of Operation Perth, it was decided that part of the objective of Operation Spin Ghar should be to establish a new base in the Baluchi Valley itself. As with operation Perth, clearing the Baluchi Valley proofed to be relatively easy. The Taliban avoided the fight and either hid its weapons and returned to the fields or dispersed into the neighbouring provinces. As part of Spin Ghar a Forward Operating Base (FOB) Khyber was established but it was at the entrance of the Baluchi Valley and not in the Valley itself. Further check points were established and manned by ANA troops, which participated in the operation. However, as soon as the operation had terminated, the Taliban re-emerged unscathed and the checkpoints in the Baluchi Valley itself had to be abandoned, making it once more clear that there were not sufficient forces available to establish firm control over the area. Without the proper hold, the area could not be secured and no build activities could be started. Of course, TFU considered the battle over Chora a resounding victory and the results of operation Spin Ghar were equally impressive when considering the number of insurgents killed. However, if not after operation Perth, operation Spin Ghar should have made it clear to TFU that little if any progress was being made towards the actual goals of the mission: enabling the Afghan government to establish a governance structure.

Build Activities In terms of its “Build” phase, TFU had demonstrated its good intentions at the start by forcing the replacement of Jan Mohammad which gave them, as previously mentioned, an entry point with the elders of the Achekzai and Barakzai. This also allowed TFU to facilitate the infrastructure development, in particular the construction of a main road from Tarin Kowt to Chora55. Avoiding the use of Mattiullah Kahn, TFU organized the security of the road works as well as the finished road through local tribes along the road. Although this provided some level of security it was also a signal that the ANP was not up to the task of providing this security nor were they acceptable to the local tribes. The Dutch PRT approach to let local companies and contractors execute as much of the work as possible reduced loading of TFU troops for the security of such projects. It improved the ownership of such projects, ensuring that after the completion of the project, the local population would ensure proper maintenance. It also gave the PRT the ability to execute projects far away from the ink spots and obfuscated its presence. In particular smaller projects could be executed without them being tied to TFU or ISAF. This sometimes avoided the destruction of such projects by the

55

Klep (2011), pp.54 Although scheduled to start in 2007 roadworks started in 2008 and were in fact executed by the GTZ, a German organization.

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Taliban and repercussions against the villagers that had accepted the project. Projects executed focused mostly on education and health care. This included the building of schools and providing books as well as furniture. Similarly funded was the construction of small clinics, the training of midwifes and nurses and providing medication and furniture. Often such activities would be preceded by regular medical visits of TFU teams, again within the framework of QIPs that prepared the local population for the actual development project(s). These activities resemble those of standard development aid offered to other developing countries. Executing projects in a hands-off approach also had several drawbacks. Most prominent was the fact that (Dutch) TFU efforts were not very visible, in contrast with the Australian TFU efforts as these were executed by the Australians themselves and hence were very visible contributions. The other drawback was the significant higher cost of such projects and the lack of visibility on their execution and delivery. For a significant number of (smaller) projects in districts outside of the ink spots it was simply impossible to verify if they had indeed been executed at all. An interesting aspect of this approach was the completion of some facilities with Dutch money in areas under control of the Taliban such as the medical facility in Gizab. Similar cases are known where infrastructure projects of other PRTs in areas under Taliban control (for instance in Helmand), upon completion, were used by the Taliban to tax the local population. The higher cost of these projects added to the total cost of the TFU presence, something that became clearly visible in the spring of 2008 when the TFU mission had to be extended with another two years56. The original decision regarding the length of the TFU mission was two years. Within the scope of a real counterinsurgency operation, two years is insignificant, making it impossible to judge any form of progress. By the beginning of 2008, the extension of the mission came up for a decision by the Dutch government. Contrary to the original decision process, the decision regarding the extension was made relatively smoothly. After a short debate the mission was extended with two years. However, part of the reason for the (relatively) smooth decision process was the promise that this would be a one-and-only extension and that the TFU mission would finish by the summer of 2010 come what may.

Governance Despite the discussion regarding the almost double cost of the mission over the two years and the lack of improvement in the security situation, little attention was devoted to the full scope of the mission. Having as its main objective “Helping the Afghan Authorities to strengthen good governance (on provincial and district level), promote human rights and facilitate the conditions for reconstruction” this neglect seems out of place. There was a lot of attention regarding the security in Uruzgan, highlighted by the battle for Chora that took place only a few months before the discussion regarding the mission extension started. However, little attention was given to the lack of progress on building a government presence in the south of Afghanistan by the Karzai government. In this respect it should be emphasized that according to the PRT charter, it was not responsible for creating “Good Governance”, it was merely there to help strengthening the relevant institutions. Establishing a presence was the main responsibility of the central government in Kabul. Here it became clear that another important aspect of the ISAF mission had neglected the real situation on the ground: the availability of a cadre of administrational personnel. Over de last 30 years any form of governance had been destroyed. Even the Taliban, after their victory had not set-up a governance structure as they had no interest in doing so. ISAF and TFU within its mission relied on the Karzai government to establish a governance structure that could be further trained and improved (capacity building). Reality was that in 2006 less than 20% of the governance and administrational positions in Uruzgan were actually manned. More importantly, most of these employees were illiterate with no skills relevant to their job and were placed there because of their tribal relations or

56

Klep (2011), pp.275

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by corruption rather than their administrational skills. The organizations needed to train government officials were not present because of the security situation. It is no surprise that under these conditions the Dutch PRT determined that the only solution was to do the mentoring themselves57. Of course they were neither prepared nor trained for such work. Given their bandwidth, the PRT decided to mentor the District Chiefs, the District Chiefs of Police and the Provincial Governor. The educational and skills levels of these government officials were so inadequate, with at least one of the COPs being illiterate, that it was concluded that training should have started “years ago” according to members of the PRT58. Vice versa, the local population had no experience working with the governance system being set-up nor did it trust it given the process that had put the different officials there in the first place. The PRT itself could not change anything either as these officials had been installed by Kabul. In order to facilitate some level of communication, the PRT would organize Shuras with the local population to get their buy-in for projects. With respect to the security forces, the state of the Afghan National Police was another key concern. Although the PMT, as part of the PRT, started as planned the training program, its capacity was not nearly enough to meet even the demand for the existing ink spots. Early 2006, as a measure to boost the ANP strength, the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) had been established. The ANAP was based on the enrollment of local militias empowered as part of the national government. This resulted in further polarization and empowerment of the existing militia leaders as these were the only sources for such troops. Mid 2008 it had become clear to even the national government in Kabul that this was a major mistake and had made the situation only worse59 and the ANAP was dissolved (although that didn’t change anything in the local power structures). Also a modest program for training judges and other judicial officials had been initiated by the PRT. Given that only a few of the required judges and administrational employees were actually in place, capacity did not pose a problem. However, the fact that almost all judges were incompetent, lacked the basic skills and education and were thoroughly corrupt, made the local population avoid them for even the most rudimentary cases. Problems were solved by the village mullah, the elders or by asking the Taliban judge.

As to the local economy, within the TFU secured areas of Tarin Kowt, Deh Rawud and Chora there were clear improvements. A number of factors allowed for this improvement, specifically the improved infra-structure and road security (although at a price), allowing farmers further out to bring their products to the markets. Also, demand in the ink spot areas had increased. Due to the improved security and the presence of TFU, the population of three district centers had risen. Up to 60-70% of the household income was dependent on migrant labor60 against 20% in other areas, an indication that the population was increasingly active in the different infra-structure projects. Such migrant workers would more or less move into the secured areas, looking for safety as outside of the safe areas they would be targeted by the insurgents. This influx was further illustrated by the sharp increase of house prices in the three areas.

At this stage, the end of 2008, TFU planned a renewed step to extend the areas held by securing the connection between Tarin Kowt and Chora and at the same time moving (again) into the Baluchi Valley. This time, based on the experience of both operation Perth and Spin Ghar, a sizeable force of the ANA was included to ensure that the hold phase could be properly executed. Operation Tura Ghar61 was launched in January 2009, ahead of the spring season, typically the timing for Taliban attacks to resume after the winter. Operation Tura Ghar was part of a larger attempt by ISAF to gain

57

Koster (2011), pp.81 58

Koster (2011), pp.71 59

Hovens (2009), pp.314 60

TLO (2010), pp. 61

Dmitriu (2011), pp.622

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the initiative. It demonstrated an increased coordination amongst the different players within ISAF and more specifically, of the RC-(S). Operation Tura Ghar was also successful in its hold operation: a new operations base (FOB Mashal) was established in the Baluchi Valley and active patrols were now establishing a more permanent presence. As such operation Tura Ghar can be earmarked as a success, where both clear and hold were executed properly and a first real extension of the original ink spot areas had been achieved, establishing a clear and permanent presence in the heart of the Taliban’s original territory: the Baluchi Valley. Operation Tura Ghar also marked the last major operation of TFU. A few months later, early summer 2009 the first discussions regarding the continuation of the TFU mission started in the Netherlands and would ultimately lead to the fall of the Dutch government. Although those events fall outside of the scope of this discussion, it is important to note that, with the extension discussion becoming more prominent, the character of the mission was finally acknowledged by both government and military. Ultimately this did not save the mission and TFU was not continued: August 1st of 2010 marked the departure of TFU. ISAF command over Uruzgan was handed over to the Combined Team Uruzgan (CTU) under US command with the US, Singapore and Australia as its main contributors.

Evaluation of Impact Taking inventory of the state of Uruzgan at the time of departure of TFU is not straight forward. As indicated at the start of this document, statistics are notoriously unreliable and information is often not verifiable. To arrive at a comparison between 2006 and 2010, generic trends have been used, as taken from a number of sources, mostly non-governmental62. These trends have been illustrated in the previous discussion which followed the general time line of TFU’s deployment. Where appropriate and relevant, these sources have been extended with those from NATO/ISAF and the relevant governments. More important, the core issues related to the impact of TFU on Uruzgan, are, in fact, more easily identified as the activities and trends over the four years of its existence and described in the previous sections, provide ample evidence of both trend and approximate status.

As mentioned in the introduction, despite the fact that the TFU mission was labeled differently, its impact will be evaluated against the desired outcome of a counterinsurgency operation. To maintain a level of oversight, the evaluation will decompose into two distinctive parts: the shape, clear and hold operations and the build operations.

Clear and Hold Strategy At the root of the TFU was its problematic start, the missing political strategy that is at the core of counterinsurgency. It does not surprise that based on the lacking political framework, the strategy on the ground was also not available. The best illustration of the total lack of a strategic framework at the start of TFU is the statement63 from General T. Vleugels who was the first commander of TFU: “We didn’t have a campaign plan when we started, but we later got one from my higher headquarters that was close to ours, which is not surprising, as they told us to do what we told them we would do.“ The clear and hold was to be implemented according to the ink spot approach: starting with the district centers of Tarin Kowt, Deh Rawud and Chora, the ink spots should be merged and extended, in the end to cover the whole of Uruzgan. Over the period of four years, TFU has been able to secure its initial ink spots. With operation Tura Ghar TFU demonstrated it had learned from its previous mistakes and was able to clear a key Taliban stronghold, the Baluchi Valley and, with the help of the Afghan National Army, also implement a proper hold operation. Hence, a

62

TLO (2010), Klep (2011), Derksen (2011), Koster (2011), UNDP (2006), UNDP (2010) 63

Wikileaks citation from RAND Corporation report, http://blogs.rnw.nl/vredeenveiligheid/2009/03/06/briljant-citaat/

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modest expansion of the ink spot was also achieved. However, the size of TFU was simply too small to extend beyond this area64. This lack of sufficient troops was already concluded by the second commander of TFU, General De Kruif65. The ensuing stalemate where the TFU was incapable of extending the safe areas much beyond the original three district centers clearly played into the hands of the insurgents. TFU’s counterinsurgency strategy had other deficits: gaining the trust of the local population, one of the key elements of a counterinsurgency strategy66. Gaining this trust in a conservative, illiterate and polarized environment with a completely different culture and an almost non-existing governance and leadership structure requires patience and a lot of time. Such relations are build on a personal basis. Where US troops would rotate on an 11- or 12-month basis, US Marines on the basis of a 9-month cycle, Dutch TFU troops were rotating on a 4 to 6-month basis, making it virtually impossible to create some form of durable trust relation with the local population and understand the lines of authority within the different communities. Specifically when engaging with reconstruction efforts it is important to understand the sensitivities in these communities and engage with the right leaders. In addition, given this limited time it was also extremely hard to get a good understanding of the lay of the land and the specific details of the local economy, all important as part of a thorough counter-insurgency strategy. Combined with the fact that the TFU forces were all located in compounds outside of the villages it was virtually impossible for TFU forces to distinguish potential insurgents from the local population. Taking Kilcullen’s Twenty-Eight Articles67 as a guideline for effective counterinsurgency, one can only conclude that TFU was severely handicapped before it could even get to the actual work. TFU was also not able to affect the power base of the insurgents outside of its ink spots nor was it able to impact its supply lines, its safe areas or its financial means. The areas secured by TFU were more and more perceived as unsafe due to the sharp rise in the number of IEDs as well as suicide attacks. In this respect it is important to realize that the ability of TFU to clear the area of Taliban should not be seen as just chasing the fighters away but also the ability of TFU to dismantle the Taliban’s power base. This is of particular importance with respect to the Taliban’s ability to recruit local fighters. Given that at least 6,000 local fighters were counted in the south by 2006 (out of an estimated total of 10,000 68) it is clear that reducing the Taliban’s ability to recruit new fighters was key to the Hold and subsequent Build strategy. This requires not only the dismantling of the Taliban’s local power but also, and as important, removing the reasons for local fighters to join the Taliban. In particular the Barakzai and Achakzai, being the largest tribes in the Uruzgan had been severely marginalized by the Popalzai and had clearly changed their original pro-government stance into one of latent support for the insurgents. Hence, one of the key requirements was to re-establish some form of tribal balance, one of the primary focus points of the TFU upon arrival. Its first action, even before arriving was to try to reduce the Popalzai powerbase by forcing president Karzai to replace Uruzgan’s governor, Jan Mohammad Khan. Despite the removal of Jan Mohammad from the governor’s post (he was appointed vice-minister for tribal affairs69), behind the scenes he remained in control. This exemplified the overall problem with the central government of Karzai: rather than trying to establish neutral institutions for governance, it operated mostly in a tribal setting. Jan Mohammad, being a close trustee of Karzai (also a Popalzai), remained unchallenged. In fact he continued to expand his own power structure, illustrated by the rise of Matiullah Khan. Over the last years, with

64

It is illustrative that the surge of over 30,000 US troops, decided at the end of 2009, was focused on pushing back the Taliban in the south of Afghanistan. 65

Dmitriu (2009), pp. 621 66

Kilcullen (2006) 67

Kilcullen (2006) 68

Giustozzi (2008) 69

Weger (2009), pp. 345

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the rising insecurity in Uruzgan, Matiullah Khan, Jan Mohammad’s nephew, quickly became one of the most powerful players in Uruzgan, mostly by providing security for traffic along some of the main highways in use by ISAF for their resupply convoys. In 2010 his army counted up to 1,500 soldiers which were better paid than the regular ANP forces. Payments of up to US$1,700 per truck provided a formidable source of income to Matiullah. This also created a clear incentive for Matiullah to keep the Taliban (or other armed factions opposed to the presence of ISAF) at least sufficiently alive to guarantee trouble for those convoys that refused to pay the protection fee. Similar to their negative view of Jan Mohammad, the TFU refused to pay Matiullah for the protection of their roads, in particular the road under construction from Tarin Kowt to Chora. TFU’s choice was a gathering of local groups along the road, each “securing” its own segment. This choice amply illustrates the same fundamental problem that bedeviled the TFU mission: the lack of (build-up of) a reliable and strengthening governance system of which ANP was a part of. Instead of improving the local situation these (inevitable) choices resulted in a further enablement of non-governmental (power) players, adding to the complexity of the situation. The growth of such a non-governmental security force also illustrates the lack of a common strategy between the different parts of ISAF. Where some within ISAF (and EOF for that matter) chose for further strengthening of the non-governmental power players (playing along the existing status quo) that provided some form of legitimacy through (tribal) ties to Karzai, others focused on the local playing field and tried to (re)build some form of balance between the tribes. This lack of a common strategy not only impacted the effectiveness of the respective (COIN) operations but also prevented the growth of a stable and strong local and provincial governance structure, including the judicial system. This enabled the Taliban to move in and claim legitimacy on the basis of an absence of an effective judicial system. In terms of actual (government enforced) security this resulted in a further dependence on the ISAF forces as the non-governmental players functioned along tribal relations, making it non-responsive to complaints outside of these relations. Of course this further increased the dependency of local stability on the presence of ISAF.

Build Strategy On the build side there is the clear link with the ISAF mission and hence the TFU mission: “Helping the Afghan Authorities to establish good governance (on provincial and district level), promote human rights and facilitate the conditions for reconstruction”. The Afghan National Development Strategy70 had identified security as the first priority for Uruzgan. As second priority good governance had been identified. The importance of good governance cannot be overrated in the context of Afghanistan. As has been discussed, its recent history had destroyed the original fragile and non-institutionalized governance system. The installation of the Karzai government had been ISAF’s departure point, defining its mission. Unfortunately, rather than rebuilding a system using existing (but damaged) institutions and available skills, good governance in the context of the ISAF mission translated into building a complete new structure in a top-down fashion that, most importantly, had no buy-in from the local population. It was tribally biased, thoroughly corrupt, largely incompetent and only present in the areas that were under direct control and protection from TFU which meant away from most of its (rural) constituents.

Although the PRT executed numerous projects, improved education and health care, improved infrastructure and agriculture, most of these achievements are dependent on the governance structure: teachers’ salaries to arrive in time, police pensions to be paid, nurses and doctors to be further trained and facilities to be maintained. Even with TFU presence, teachers’ salaries were

70

ANDS (2006)

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disappearing in the pockets of corrupt officials in Kabul and the provincial and district centers and police salaries and pensions in the pockets of the Chief of Police. This resulted in teachers having to sell school books and furniture to be able to support themselves. Similar situations applied to police officers, doctors and nurses and other administrational officials dependent on the governance structure itself for their salaries. The Afghan National Police’s reputation remained badly tarnished, despite some level of progress in their professionalization. The ANP continued to hassle the local population, including random shootings and imprisonment on false charges, keeping the local population deeply suspicious of the ANP. Like the police the judiciary system was, after 4 years of TFU, in the same deplorable state and avoided by the local population. Here, the lack of coordination between the different ISAF partners also created problems. As part of the Bonn Agreement71 responsibilities for the (re)building of ANA, ANP and the justice system were in the hands of the different players: USA, Germany and Italy respectively. The definition and roll-out of anti-drug campaigns was also in the hands of a different country72, the UK. Due to this fractured approach and lack of coordination, fundamental tasks related to establishing proper justice in Uruzgan were never implemented. The most visible task was the eradication of poppy fields. Different policies were pursued. The UK focused on the traffickers, the US on the eradication of the poppy fields (mostly impacting the already poor farmers which had taken loans to buy the seeds) and the Dutch wanted to stay out of it completely. TFU did not pursue any relevant anti-drug policy73, resulting not only in the continuation of criminal organizations involved in the narcotics trade but also leaving their corrupting influence on justice and police untouched. The fact that the Taliban, through taxes, had ensured itself of a significant finance stream, estimated by some at US$350M/year, is another important failure associated with the lack of coordination between the different nations. The fact that the narcotics output of Uruzgan reached its top in 2009 illustrates this failure.

Conclusions In summary it can be argued that the TFU mission failed. Its failure can be contributed to many factors: its lack of troops, the wrong start, the lack of counterinsurgency experience, its short duration, the lack of a common strategy between the different ISAF contributors on virtually everything ranging from the reconstruction efforts to fighting the narcotics trade. Where TFU failed to make sufficient progress on the secure and hold, it was the Afghan government that failed to build the governance framework whose presence was required to fixate the improvements driven and enabled by the TFU. Even for the relatively small ink spot areas of the district towns of Tarin Kowt, Deh Rawud en Chora and their surroundings, proper governance and security could not be established. Whatever level of security and governance that could be established, it was non-sustainable and completely dependent on the presence of TFU and now its successor, CTU. Although the finger is pointed at the central government in Kabul, its endemic corruption and its tribal bias I conclude that the fundamental failure lies in the attempt of ISAF to establish a form of government that had no roots within Afghan society74 and hence had no institutions and skilled people to implement such a governance and justice structure. This resulted in a build phase which did not create the required independency but rather the opposite: a strong dependency of any progress on the continued presence of the ISAF. Whether it concerns the economy, the security, the educational system or the improved health care, the disappearance of ISAF would remove the framework that upholds these improvements. What would remain are the different militias and their strongmen,

71

Bonn agreement: wiki 72

Police Reform, Hans Hovens, NL-ARMS, 2009, pp.309 73

Giustozzi (2008), pp.200 74

Barfield (2010), pp.7

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tribal justice, a flourishing narcotics trade and the Afghan capital that would have lost its “raison de existence”. Given its history, there is no doubt that tribal conflicts will return to the main course on the menu for Afghanistan if and when ISAF would decide to depart.

After the departure of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, it took three years before the communist government in Kabul fell, much to the surprise of even their own sponsors, the Soviet Union. A departure of ISAF would most likely trigger a similar time line as the key elements driving such a scenario (tribal conflicts, no governance beyond Kabul, neighbouring states interested in a weak Afghanistan) are close or identical to what they were some twenty years ago.

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