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International InteractionsEmpirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations
ISSN: 0305-0629 (Print) 1547-7444 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/gini20
The Deterrent Effects of the International CriminalCourt: Evidence from Libya
Courtney Hillebrecht
To cite this article: Courtney Hillebrecht (2016): The Deterrent Effects of theInternational Criminal Court: Evidence from Libya, International Interactions, DOI:10.1080/03050629.2016.1185713
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2016.1185713
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The Deterrent Effects of the International Criminal
Court: Evidence from Libya1
Courtney Hillebrecht
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
The International Criminal Court (ICC) was designed to try the worst war criminals for crimes
against humanity, genocide and other instances of mass human suffering. By providing a
permanent, international mechanism to hold perpetrators of mass human rights abuse
accountable, the ICC is also meant to be a deterrent—to prevent potential genocidaires from
committing systematic human rights abuses in the first place. But what if the effect is actually
quite the opposite? While advocates of international justice have made conjectures about the
effect of the ICC on stopping human rights abuses, the existing scholarship does not empirically
test assumptions about the relationship between international criminal justice and violence. This
article outlines the causal mechanisms by which the ICC could affect on-going violence and tests
1 I would like to thank Carrie Booth Walling, Ross Miller, Nam Kim, Christian Davenport, Will Moore, Erik
Voeten, Chris Fariss, Amanda Murdie, and Jim Meernik for their very constructive comments on
previous versions of this paper. I am also grateful to Jake Wobig and Rula Jabor for their research
assistance and Reed Wood, Anita Ghodes, Yuri Zhukov and Matthew Baum for directing me
toward/sharing data. All errors are mine alone.
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these assumptions using event count models of the relationship between the ICC and the level of
violence against civilians in Libya during the 2011 crisis. These analyses suggest that the ICC’s
involvement in conflict does have a dampening effect on the level of mass atrocities committed.
The results also call for a broad and sustained research agenda on the effect of international
accountability efforts on on-going violence.
The International Criminal Court (ICC/the Court) is designed to be a standing international
forum for the adjudication of atrocity crimes. The violations on which the ICC adjudicates are
grave—genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of aggression—and the Court
does not enter into investigations or indictments lightly. The express objective of the ICC is to
bring perpetrators of these major war crimes to justice, but underlying this goal is the hope that
the ICC will serve as a deterrent for would-be perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against
humanity. As the ICC’s first president and lead judge, Philippe Kirsch, said, “By putting
potential perpetrators on notice that they may be tried before the Court, the ICC is intended to
contribute to the deterrence of these crimes” (Interview with Mr. Philippe Kirsch, President and
Chief Judge of the ICC 2005).
In the best-case scenario, the International Criminal Court would hold perpetrators accountable,
set standards and norms for protecting human rights, engage in outreach activities to help
improve domestic judiciaries, deter violence and encourage states to live up to their broader
international human rights commitments regarding accountability for human rights abuses.
Empirical research on the effects of the ICC during ongoing conflict, however, is limited. What
if the International Criminal Court has no effect on the protection of human rights? The
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international community provides a great deal of political and financial support (to the tune of
166 million USD in 2014) to the ICC, and if the ICC’s efforts are for naught, that political and
financial capital could go to other efforts that are more effective in curbing human rights abuses
(“ICC Secures Budget Increase - Institute for War and Peace Reporting - P213” 2014). Worst of
all, however, what if the ICC has a perverse effect on the protection of human rights? If
perpetrators of human rights abuse expect that they will be held accountable tomorrow, will they
fight harder and dirtier today? With the growth of international and domestic accountability
mechanisms for human rights violations, this is an important question to address, yet it is one
that has received relatively scant attention in recent years (see, however, Cronin-Furman 2013;
Jo and Simmons 2014; Kim and Sikkink 2010; Olsen, Payne, and Reiter 2010; Sikkink 2011;
Subotic 2011).
This article seeks to answer these questions by conducting an empirical analysis of the
effects of the International Criminal Court.2 Using event count models of violence against
civilians, including government-sponsored civilian deaths, this article evaluates the conditions
under which the ICC had a deterrent effect on the commission of civilian casualties during the
2011 crisis in Libya. The situation in Libya provides a novel case study in which to examine the
effect of the ICC because, as I explain in more detail below, if international criminal
accountability has an effect on war crimes during ongoing conflict, it would be in a situation in
which there was active international military and political involvement. Libya provides precisely
such a test case given NATO’s involvement in the conflict and the United Nations Security
2 This work follows the model set out by Meernik 2005.
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Council’s referral of the Libyan crisis to the ICC.3 Further, while the ICC can—and has—
investigated rebel forces for the perpetration of atrocity crimes, in Libya and in other situations,
such as Darfur and Côte d’Ivoire, the main suspects are or were government agents at the time of
the violence. As such, the theoretical framework and empirical analyses below look at the role
of the ICC in affecting total civilian fatalities as well as state-sponsored civilian deaths.
By examining the effects of the ICC on civilian deaths committed during ongoing conflict, this
article makes a number of contributions to the conflict, human rights, international relations and
international law literatures. First, this article seeks to connect these literatures by looking at the
effect of justice efforts during conflict, as opposed to once the conflict has ended. This article
does not make any claims about the effects of the ICC during peacetime, nor does it speak to a
potential deterrent effect on non-parties to the violence or in stopping conflict from erupting in
the first place (Grono and International Crisis Group 2012). Rather, this article examines the
under-studied question of the short-term effects of the ICC during conflict by examining how
ICC involvement changes the dynamics of violence against civilians. In doing so, this article
engages with the literature on conflict dynamics and provides an analysis of the real-time effects
of international criminal accountability. Second, this article takes up the broader question of the
role of international criminal law in curbing violence and seeks to identify the limits and abilities
of international law to mitigate mass atrocities. Third, by examining the role of the ICC in the
3 Appendix A outlines lists the crises in which the ICC got involved whilst the conflict was
ongoing and the mode of referral of the situations.
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violence in Libya, this article also aims to provide academics and policymakers alike with timely
empirical analyses of the ICC’s effects on on-going humanitarian crises.
Through an investigation of the effect of the ICC’s involvement in the 2011 conflict in Libya the
research presented below suggests that the ICC can have a moderate dampening effect on
civilian casualties, particularly at the beginning of the conflict. Even when controlling for other
factors like conflict dynamics and media coverage of the events, the models suggest that the ICC
can serve as a deterrent of violence against civilians. These findings must be taken in light of the
larger aims of the ICC, however, and do not speak to the ICC’s other goals holding individuals
accountable and providing justice to victims. Reducing the intensity of war crimes committed
during conflict certainly feeds into the ICC’s larger objectives of doling out punishment for
perpetrators, supplying justice and creating a culture of accountability, but it is only part of the
process.
This article proceeds as follows. The next section describes the work of the International
Criminal Court and the crisis in Libya. Next, I consider the potential deterrent effect of the
ICC’s involvement on ongoing conflict. The third section outlines a set of competing hypotheses
about the effects of the ICC. The fourth section then tests these hypotheses with a set of event
count models and the fifth section discusses the results of these models. The sixth section
concludes by proposing that the International Criminal Court can have a deterrent effect on the
perpetration of human rights violations and by calling for a larger, systematic research agenda on
the deterrent effects of international criminal accountability.
The International Criminal Court and the Crisis in Libya
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The International Criminal Court is an independent adjudicative body designed to investigate and
hear cases concerning individual criminal responsibility for wide-scale human rights violations.
In the aftermath of mass human suffering in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Bosnia in the 1990s, the
international community recognized the need for a standing international body ready and willing
to prosecute the worst perpetrators. The Court’s establishment under the 1998 Rome Statute was
the result of this shared vision for accountability. To date, 122 countries have ratified the Rome
Statute and accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction to prosecute perpetrators of mass human rights abuse
(Ellis and Goldstone 2008; International Criminal Court 2011a; International Criminal Court
2011b; Schabas 2007).
The ICC is a mechanism of last resort and positions itself as a safety net at the bottom of the
human rights legal order (Yates 2009). The ICC is designed to complement, not replace,
domestic judicial institutions (International Criminal Court 2011a; International Criminal Court
2011b; Mitchell and Powell 2011). The Court can adjudicate on cases concerning genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes, and its jurisdiction only covers those crimes if the
accused is a national of a party to the Rome Statute, the abuse took place in a state party to the
Rome Statue, or if the United Nations Security Council refers the case to the Court. The Court’s
jurisdiction is not retroactive and only extends to those abuses committed after July 1, 2002,
when the Rome Statute officially entered into force. Further, under the principle of
complementarity, the ICC can only adjudicate on cases that domestic courts are unwilling or
unable to handle (Burke-White 2008; International Criminal Court 2011a; Kleffner 2003;
Nouwen 2014). Despite these limitations to the Court’s jurisdiction, the ICC does pose a very
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real threat to leaders who might be engaged in the atrocity crimes that fall under the Court’s
purview.
Getting a case to the International Criminal Court is difficult, both because of the Court’s limited
jurisdiction and because of the many steps involved in the legal proceedings at the Court.
Potential cases come to the Court’s attention in one of three ways. First, as in Libya, members of
the UN Security Council (UNSC) can refer a case to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), which
in turn initiates an investigation into the allegations. Alternatively, states party to the Rome
Statute can refer a case to the OTP, or the Prosecutor may also begin its own investigation with
approval from the Pre-Trial Chamber (International Criminal Court 2011a).
The OTP was very proactive in issuing early and loud calls for accountability for atrocity crimes
and violations of international humanitarian law in Libya. The conflict started on February 17,
2011, when thousands of protestors took to the streets in Benghazi, Tripoli and other cities
throughout the country to protest Muammar Qaddafi’s4 41-year long rule. Protests in the streets
quickly led to armed stand-offs between rebel groups and security forces loyal to Colonel
Qaddafi, as rebels sought to gain control over the eastern part of the country. Rebel forces,
largely untrained and highly fractured, were unable to use many of the bases, planes and
helicopters they captured in their eastern campaign, and Qaddafi’s air power gave him the upper
hand in battering the rebels and retaking strategic oil cities (New York Times, n.d.).
4 With so many different spellings of Qadaffi, I chose to follow the New York Time’s spelling of
his name.
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The UN and the ICC became involved almost immediately. The OTP issued a statement about
the alleged crimes in Libya on February 23, 2011. Two days later the UN’s Human Rights
Council passed resolution S-15/1, establishing a commission of inquiry into the Libyan violence
(Report of the Human Rights Council on Its Fifteenth Special Session 2011). The following day,
February 26, 2011, the UNSC authorized the ICC (UNSC Resolution 1970) to investigate and
indict the alleged crimes that took place during the conflict. UNSC Resolution 1970 also
included a travel ban, asset freeze and arms embargo, making the ICC’s investigation part of a
larger package of international censure (United Nations Security Council Council 2011). On
March 17, 2011, the United Nations Security Council passed UNSC Resolution 1973, which
allowed for military action to enforce the no fly zone and arms embargo and to protect civilians.
(Bilefsky and Landler 2011; United Nations Security Council 2011). The United States and
France led the initial military incursion into Libya but handed over responsibility for the mission
to NATO shortly thereafter. This political support, coupled with NATO’s military intervention,
makes Libya an important test case of the ICC’s effects. The ICC’s jurisprudential work was
backed by the political desires of the world’s most powerful states; if ever we were to see the
effect of the ICC it should be in Libya.
The deterioration of human rights conditions in Libya was readily apparent. The United Nations
Human Rights Council moved to suspend Libya in February 2011 for using military force to
indiscriminately attack civilians (United Nations News Service Section 2011a). The
International Commission of Inquiry’s report, issued on June 1, 2011, found that Libyan forces
were committing crimes against humanity and war crimes. The UN panel cited a range of
assaults on civilians and indicated that further investigation was needed to corroborate
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allegations of abuses, including murder, imprisonment, torture, persecution, forced
disappearances and sexual assault. The International Commission of Inquiry also accused rebel
forces of committing abuses and called for both government and rebel forces to stop the abuses
immediately (Human Rights Council 2011; United Nations News Service Section 2011b).
Attacks against civilians in Benghazi, Misrata, and Sirte, among other cities, left an estimated
2800 dead. Figure 1, below, shows the fluctuations of fatalities incurred in attacks against
civilians.5 Some of the notable spikes in Figure 1 include 300 Libyans attacked during a funeral
in Benghazi at the end of February 2011, the Libyan government’s air strikes against civilians on
February 20, 2011, 267 bodies found in the city of Sirte at the end of October 2011, and the
alleged causalities from NATO airstrikes at the end of May 2011 and in mid-October 2011
(Raleigh et al. 2010).6
The ICC indicted three suspects with respect to this violence: Qaddafi; his son, Saif Al-Islam
Qaddafi; and the Libyan intelligence chief, Abdulla Al-Senussi. While ICC trials might have the
most impact on a conflict, the trials are only part of a long adjudicative process at the ICC, as
indicated above, and it is important to consider the effects of all of the steps that the ICC takes.
These include securing a referral from the Security Council, opening investigations and asking
5 Figure 1 presents the natural log of fatalities for ease of presentation and interpretation given
the large spikes in fatalities.
6 These numbers and descriptions are taken from the ACLED dataset, described in more detail
below.
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judges to issue arrest warrants. Understanding the impacts of the ICC on the continuing violence
in Libya requires considering all of these initiatives. Table 1, below, outlines the steps that the
ICC has taken toward Libya between the start of the conflict in February 2011 and the end of
October 2011, when Qadaffi was killed.7
Since Qadaffi’s death, the ICC and the interim Libyan government have engaged in contentious
negotiations about who has jurisdiction for holding the other two perpetrators accountable, with
both the Libyan authorities and the ICC invoking their own interpretations of the principle of
complementarity (Gray 2011; “Qaddafi Son Saif Al-Islam, Intelligence Chief ‘want to
Surrender’ to ICC” 2012; Stahn 2012; Willis and Holehouse 2011). In October 2013, the ICC
decided that the case against Abdulla al-Senussi should be tried in domestic courts. Meanwhile,
the ICC, Libyan officials and Qaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, are at loggerheads over who has
jurisdiction over al-Islam’s case.
The ICC’s involvement in Libya is unique because it was initiated at the behest of the Security
Council and accompanied by NATO-led military action against Qaddafi. Of the other eight ICC
situations, only Darfur was prompted by a UNSC referral. Libya is also the only of the ICC’s
situations in which significant international military intervention was contemporaneous to the
ICC’s investigations and indictments. These features set Libya apart from the other situations at
this nascent tribunal, but they also reflect the intended role of the ICC as one part of a larger
7 All of this information is available from the ICC’s Weekly Updates, which can be found here:
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Press+and+Media/ICC+Weekly+Update/
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international and domestic legal and political architecture meant to limit and deter atrocity
crimes. For the present purposes—an early empirical analysis of the ICC’s impact on ongoing
conflict—Libya provides an important test case. If the ICC were to have a deterrent effect on
ongoing conflict, we would expect it to be in a situation in which the Court works with others
actors. Of course, given the ICC’s imbrication in the international community’s efforts in Libya,
it is important to take into account the potentially confounding effects of NATO’s military action
and the UNSC’s referral, which the models below do, and to interpret the results of the analysis
with the unique characteristics of Libya in mind.
The Deterrent Effects of the International Criminal Court during
Wartime
Until the recent wave of prosecutions for the perpetrators of systematic atrocity crimes,
suspected war criminals and human rights perpetrators enjoyed a great deal of impunity (Roht-
Arriaza 2006; Sikkink and Walling 2007; Sikkink 2011). The Augusto Pinochet and Hissène
Habré cases, as well as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the special courts for Cambodia and Sierra
Leone began to slowly chip away the shroud of immunity that human rights abusers long
enjoyed (Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena 2006). Similarly, in domestic courts around the
world, governments have been pursuing accountability for human rights abuses. (Kim and
Sikkink 2010; Lutz and Sikkink 2000; Sikkink and Walling 2007; Sikkink 2011). The question
then becomes whether or not the increased likelihood and threat of prosecution is a sufficient
deterrent against the commission of atrocity crimes.
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Many scholars of transitional justice find that the prosecution of former human rights abuses sets
an important precedent, highlights a normative commitment to human rights and can act as a
deterrent for future abuses (Kritz and Mandela 1995; Osiel 2000; Roht-Arriaza and
Mariezcurrena 2006; Sikkink and Walling 2007). Many of the justifications for accountability
emphasize the precedent-setting and deterrent effects of accountability. Holding perpetrators
accountable, the argument goes, demonstrates the viability of the rule of law and human rights
protections, and thereby should deter future human rights abusers from thinking themselves
above or outside the law. Similarly, if a conflict does erupt, the threat of international criminal
accountability should cause the level of violence and human rights abuses to decrease.
Critics contend that the ICC can pose little more than empty threats, but recent research
suggests that the international criminal law regime can have real, noticeable effects on states’
behavior. For example, in their research on why states ratify (or not) the Rome Statute, Beth
Simmons and Allison Danner (2010) argue that the expectation of accountability is sufficient
enough that some states will not join the Rome Statute in the first place. The very prospect of
having high-level political elites being held accountable at the ICC scares some states away from
ratification (Kelley 2007; Simmons and Danner 2010; see, however, Goodliffe et al. 2012).
At the individual level, it is increasingly clear that the international criminal law regime
is more than simply a nuisance. Those heads of states that do have arrest warrants out have had
to significantly curb their behavior. While this certainly means restricted travel—a point that
both critics and supporters of the ICC raise—it also means changing behavior during elections,
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dealing with a consistent barrage of negative and international press and being labeled an
international pariah (Interview with Author 2013).
As Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink (2010) and Hyeran Jo and Simmons (2014) both
note, the domestic criminal justice literature has found increasing support for the deterrent effect
of criminal accountability. More specifically, this literature suggests that it the increased
likelihood of accountability, rather than the severity of the punishment, that deters criminal
activity (Chalfin and McCrary 2014; Kim and Sikkink 2010). The nascent literature on the
potential deterrent effects of international trials supports this hypothesis, although scholars
variously suggest that the ICC lacks the direction, capacity and judicial authority to fully live up
to its deterrent potential and/or that the such a deterrent effect is conditional on prosecutorial
strategy and social pressure imposed on states. (Ainley 2011; Cronin-Furman 2013; Jo and
Simmons 2014).
With those caveats in place, if we begin with the premise that it is the likelihood of
accountability, rather than the severity of the punishment, that fosters deterrence, we can identify
a set of specific conditions that are likely to lead to the ICC’s deterring state-sponsored civilian
killings during conflict. First, international criminal accountability hinges on the willingness and
ability of domestic and international actors to turn suspected war criminals over to the ICC (Bass
2001). While the international community has the authority to refer situations, open
investigations and issue warrants, it does not have the authority to capture suspected war
criminals. While the threat of prosecution does not seem particularly ominous if war criminals
believe that political elites abroad will provide refuge and protection, the number of states
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willing to host wanted war criminals is shrinking. Consider, for example, the case of Hisséne
Habré, the former Chadian dictator who is now facing trial in Senegal or even the fate of
Qaddafi’s chief of intelligence and ICC suspect, Abdullah al-Senussi, whom the Mauritanian
government turned over to interim authorities in Libya. As Michael Gilligan (2006) argues, the
ICC and similar regimes can have a deterrent effect, even absent full enforcement capabilities, by
virtue of altering the long-term incentives of both leaders and potential allies who might provide
asylum. Gilligan suggests that the presence of an international criminal regime might eliminate
the possibility of seeking asylum elsewhere (Gilligan 2006). Moreover, transfer to The Hague
might be preferable to facing punishment at home, as Qaddafi’s own death later went on to show.
Moreover, we are now witnessing a back-and-forth between the ICC and Libyan officials over
who has jurisdiction over Saif al-Islam’s case. The reason for this on-going exchange is
decidedly not over providing al-Islam with political protection but rather over the opportunity to
try him.
Unless political elites know that they will remain in power and can therefore control their own
destiny, the possibility of transfer to The Hague might, then, be the best of their available
options. As Payam Akhavan (2009) notes, international criminal tribunals can have a deterrent
effect by reshaping political elites calculations about their long-term reputation, even if these
tribunals are unable to execute each and every arrest warrant and build uniformly successful
cases (Akhavan 2001; Akhavan 2009). If political elites know that they will lose or are uncertain
of the outcome of the conflict, imprisonment in The Netherlands is most likely preferable to
facing the domestic aftermath of defeat.
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Second, in order for the threat of accountability to be credible and for the ICC to serve as
an effective deterrent, the international community writ large must be willing to provide the
political and financial capital needed to initiate, investigate and try cases at the ICC. Even the
most vocal supporters of international criminal justice are not likely to support accountability for
their own citizens (Bass 2001). This umbrella of impunity could also extend to allies and trading
partners. Thus, some human rights abusers might consider themselves to be insulated from
international justice because of their important positions in international politics and trade. In
the particular case of Libya, the ICC was working with the explicit consent and referral of the
UN Security Council. With such political supporters, it was clear that the threat of prosecution at
the ICC was not simply legal peacocking, but was instead a very real message that the
international community would not provide Qaddafi with any refuge. NATO’s involvement in
Libya, including that of Italy, Libya’s staunchest Western ally, further reinforced the point that
there would be little safe haven for Qaddafi after the war.
Third, and finally, international accountability is slow and in order for the threat of
accountability to be a credible one, the ICC needs to make it clear that investigations and trials
will take place in a timely manner. Although the ICC has only handed down three judgments at
the merits stage, those against Thomas Dyilo Lubanga (convicted), Germain Katanga (convicted)
and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (acquitted),8 it has picked up the pace of its jurisprudence in recent
8 See (The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 2012; The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga 2014;
The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui 2012).
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years. Even if Qaddafi or other heads of state were able to delay their trials, the likelihood of
them awaiting trial while out on bail or in absentia is increasingly low.9
Thus, the threat of a accountability and any subsequent deterrent effects of the ICC should be
clearest when: 1) there is little possibility of safe haven in the event of military defeat; 2) the ICC
is backed by other international actors; and 3) when the ICC demonstrates its intentions to bring
a case to trial in a timely manner. The Libyan case satisfies each of these criteria. Qaddafi’s
ability to come out of the civil war victorious was highly uncertain, especially given the UNSC’s
backing of both NATO’s involvement in the war and the ICC’s investigation of atrocity crimes
committed during the conflict. Thus, the main argument of this paper is that the ICC can have a
deterrent effect on the commission of atrocity crimes during conflict. The central hypothesis
tested below suggests:
H1 (Deterrence/Abatement): Action at the ICC will lead to a decrease in the violence
committed during a conflict, particularly government-sponsored killing of civilians.
Competing Hypotheses: The ICC as a Lame Duck or Instigator of Mass Atrocity
It is quite possible that the ICC has no discernable impact on on-going conflict or that it actually
exacerbates the violence that occurs during armed conflict. The International Criminal Court has
9 See, for example, The Prosecutor V. Uhurua Muigai Kenyatta, Confirmation of Charges
(Situation in Kenya) 2012; The Prosecutor V. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang,
Confirmation of Charges (Situation in Kenya) 2012.
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a restricted mandate and no effective ability to bring perpetrators to justice without the explicit
cooperation of state actors. Governments need to be willing to bring perpetrators to The Hague
and then follow through with the ICC Chief Prosecutor’s requests for access to witnesses,
victims, suspected perpetrators and information. Governments can very easily ignore these
requests, rendering the ICC and the prospect of prosecution moot. Perpetrators might also
discount the likelihood of prosecution because of the glacial pace of international legal
proceedings, a lack of international consensus on adjudication, or their own ability to outwit the
Court (see, relatedly, Peskin 2009).
Even if perpetrators do view accountability at the ICC as a risk in the abstract, they might not
view it as applicable or pertinent to their present situation. For instance, it is possible that
potential abusers do not identify with those already held or tried at the ICC. In the heat of the
battle, suspected war criminals might think of themselves as invincible and untouchable, or even
as heroes (Huntington 1991; Orentlicher 1991; Weschler 1990). In the earlier days of the Court,
it is also possible that the perpetrators, even the highest-ranking among them, did not know about
the International Criminal Court. While this has changed since the ratification of the Rome
Statute in 1998 and the very public pursuit of the ICC most-wanted suspects, perpetrators could
very well still believe themselves outside of the ICC’s grasp. Moreover, prospective perpetrators
of war crimes simply value the present more than the future. An individual war criminal or
genocidaire might privilege today’s military victory or the destruction of an opposition group
over a lifetime in prison in The Hague. In that case, the prospect of prosecution should have
little bearing on the genocidaire’s actions.
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Similarly, it is also possible that the International Criminal Court has a perverse effect on human
rights abuses: trials, indictments and reports actually lead to an increase in the violence rather
than its mitigation or cessation. In his book, War and Punishment, Hein Goemans (2000)
suggests that when leaders are losing a military battle, they become more risk-acceptant and
undertake dangerous military maneuvers. He calls this the “gamble for resurrection” (Goemans
2000). This same logic might also hold for genocidaires and war criminals. When genocidaires
or would-be war criminals believe that they will be tried for human rights abuses, they fight
harder, longer and dirtier. In effect, they assume that if they are in for a penny, they might as
well be in for a pound.10
The underlying logic here is that if suspected war criminals know that
they will be held accountable for human rights abuses, they have little or no incentive to decrease
the violence. Indeed, a popular line of thinking during the Libyan civil conflict was that
prosecuting Qaddafi would force him to hold on longer. For example, the Christian Science
Monitor reported that Obama-administration officials privately worried that Qaddafi’s
indictment would make peace in Libya more difficult to come by (LaFranchi 2011).
It is also possible that the ICC’s intervention will affect the general dynamics of a conflict. For
example, Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjurami (2004) suggest that trials of perpetrators can threaten
to undermine peace and reconciliation processes, in no small part because perpetrators are
10 This same logic is embodied in the principle of “double jeopardy,” which states that you
cannot be punished for the same crime(s) more than once.
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unwilling to stop fighting if they know that they will be held accountable for their abuses.11
Investigations and trials by the ICC might inspire other pro-government fighters to fight harder
to avenge the ICC’s actions on the part of their compatriot or in order to dispute the ICC and the
international community’s intrusion on the sovereignty of the given state. At the same time, by
accusing one side of human rights abuses, the ICC’s involvement might legitimize the other side,
thereby encouraging them to take more risks with respect to abusing humanitarian and human
rights law. Similarly, the ICC’s intervention might prevent outside actors from intervening in the
conflict, further altering the conflict dynamics and emboldening the combatants (Neumayer
2009).
While the fear that the threat of prosecution will ramp up atrocity crimes during conflict is
attention grabbing, the logic of accountability and punishment suggests that if the ICC has any
effect it should in fact be a mitigating one. If the ICC has already made it clear that it will
investigate and that it has the support, politically and in some cases militarily of the international
community, and the outcome of the conflict is uncertain, the likelihood that the Court will pursue
accountability is high. It then behooves political elites to dampen down, rather than ramp up,
atrocities, because they now are playing a new game: a game to either minimize their
11 This emphasis on state security likely follows directly from Snyder and Edward Mansfield’s
work (2002), which suggests that states undergoing transitions are likely to use force due to a
lack of full accountability. Of course, others, like Sikkink (2011) and Kim and Sikkink (2010),
contest this assumption.
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punishment or manipulate the legal process such that they can walk free. By curbing their
behavior after the ICC signals its intent to investigate, political elites are trying to produce the
smallest number of data points for their prosecution as possible. Indeed, doing so has two
benefits. The first is the immediate benefit of undermining the case against them, a strategy
Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta recently deployed to great success. The second benefit is longer-term:
the act of delegitimizing the ICC itself by producing yet another overturned case.
The following section tests the central hypothesis—that the ICC has a mitigating effect on
violence committed during armed conflict—as well as these alternative explanations using event
count models on the relationship between the ICC and violence against civilians amidst the back-
drop of the Libyan civil war. The discussion that follows also addresses questions about external
validity.
Models and Data
Identifying mass atrocities is, in many respects, only possible in the aftermath of conflict, once
conflict dynamics are better documented and parsed. Further, the crimes that fall under the
ICC’s jurisdiction—genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes—are legal classifications
determined post hoc through the trial process. All of this is to say that measuring mass atrocities
during a conflict is difficult, if not functionally impossible. One indicator of the crimes that fall
under the ICC’s jurisdiction, however, is a high civilian death toll. As such, the analyses that
follow look specifically at violence against civilians and the death tolls related to those attacks.
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This data is taken from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED). The ACLED
data provides daily event count data and covers a range of events, including violence against
civilians. ACLED uses source materials from local, regional, national and continental news
media, NGO reports and Africa-focused news reports. The dependent variable here is the
number of fatalities accumulated per day. Models 1-6 use only government-sponsored fatalities
as the dependent variable. Models 7-12 use all civilian fatalities as the dependent variable.
When events are labeled as “Violence against Civilians” within the ACLED events data the
assumption is that in this context, the victims are unarmed and not able to defend themselves.
This means that while the victims could be considered combatants in other contexts, in these
events they are non-combatants. The ACLED data is conservative in its counting for fatalities
and only includes numbers of fatalities when explicitly reported by its source materials. When
sources conflict, ACLED uses the lower count.12
While the atrocity crimes under the ICC’s
jurisdiction extend beyond violence against civilians and are determined post-hoc in the trial
phase, ACLED’s daily civilian death count provides a disaggregated proxy for the level of
civilian causalities omitted during the conflict. ACLED also includes data on whether the
12 The ACLED data is conservative in its counting of civilian casualties, but this does not imply
that it is a biased undercount. Rather, the ACLED data triangulates accounts of civilian deaths
from a number of sources, thereby mitigating potential over- or undercounting biases that
might result from only relying on major newspapers or local NGOs. The fact that ACLED is
conservative in its counting of civilian casualities should make it even more likely to see an
effect of the ICC on lowering the civilian casualty count.
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perpetrator was a government agent or rebel. As the central concern in this article is the role of
the ICC in changing rates of government-sponsored killing, the dependent variable taken from
ACLED only concerns the number of civilians killed by the government.13
I include two different measures of the ICC’s actions. First, I include seven dummy variables
that capture the ICC’s initiatives against Libya (see Table 1, above): 1) when the ICC issued a
statement regarding the potential crimes against humanity in Libya; 2) when the UN Security
Council referred the case to the ICC; 3) when the ICC opened the investigation; 4) when the ICC
assigned the case to a chamber; 5) when the ICC requested that the chamber issue arrest
warrants; 6) when the ICC issued the warrants; and 7) when the ICC asked INTERPOL for help
with the arrests. I excluded the ICC news briefing in May 2011, as well as Libya’s receipt of the
arrest warrants and subsequent meeting about the arrest warrants in June 2011 due to the
redundancy of those events with aforementioned actions. Each of these variables is coded as 0
prior to the event and 1 thereafter until the next ICC initiative, when the value for that variable
reverts to 0. This ensures ease of interpretation such that each additional initiative is not an
interactive term of the previous initiatives, but rather discrete interventions. The downside of
this approach, however, is that it treats the ICC’s interventions separately, rather than as a series
of linked actions. This can lead to a disjointed interpretation of the coefficients. Thus, in
addition to this measure, in Models 4-6 and 9-12, I include a cumulative count of the ICC’s
13 For an exhaustive discussion of measuring causalities during conflict, see Seybolt, Aronson,
and Fischhoff 2013.
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involvement in Libya to date. This cumulative measure is predicated on the idea that each of the
ICC’s actions builds on previous actions. The ICC’s actions are sequential and path dependent,
meaning that the ICC cannot, for example, issue arrest warrants, without first getting a referral.
Figure 2 provides an overview of ICC interventions and the daily number of fatalities incurred
during attacks on civilians with the ICC’s interventions into the conflict.
The models estimated below include a set of controls, including the level of conflict between
pro-Qadaffi forces and the rebels and vice-versa and the level of conflict between NATO and
pro-Qadaffi forces. The first two control variables account for the effects of conflict dynamics
on mass atrocity. The civil war research suggests that the relative power relations between rebels
and government forces, as well as third-party interventions all affect the likelihood of civilian
casualties, and these variables account for those relationships (for example, Azam and Hoeffler
2002; Davenport 2013; Eck and Hultman 2007; Hultman 2010; Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas, Shapiro,
and Masoud 2008; Levi 2013; Sullivan 2012; Wood 2010). The third variable, the level of
conflict between NATO and pro-Qaddafi forces, accounts for the effect of NATO’s intervention
on the conflict. Because NATO became increasingly involved in the conflict over time, it is
important to differentiate between the effect of NATO on the ongoing conflict and the ICC’s
actions.
Because the dependent variable—fatalities in attacks against civilians—is a daily count, I also
need daily event data on conflict intensity. As such, I use original data from the CAMEO coding
scheme to measure conflict and cooperation among Qaddafi’s forces, the rebel groups and
NATO. The CAMEO coding scale ranks conflict-related events in terms of their inherent level
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of conflict or cooperation, ranging from actions like expressing intentions to cooperate and
allowing humanitarian aid to pass through an occupied zone to threatening to use force and
employing aerial weapons. Each action is assigned a score, in which the larger the negative
number, the more conflictual the relationship between the actor pairs and the greater the positive
number, the more cooperative the relationship.14
The scores are then added together into a
continuous variable that measures the daily level of conflict and cooperation between the actor
pairs. I explain this coding process in more detail in Appendix B.
Using the CAMEO scale, I generated three variables: Government to Rebels, Rebels to
Government and NATO to Government. In the case of Government to Rebels, for example, the
CAMEO coding scale reflects how cooperative or threatening the Libyan government was
toward the rebel group; the Rebels to Government variable measures the opposite. In the case of
the Libyan conflict, these variables range from -25 (highly conflictual) to 11 (moderately
cooperative).
In addition to these controls, I also include a measure for global news coverage, which is based
on 3,233 newspapers in 114 countries between December 18, 2010 and October 20, 2011 (Baum
14 The mean for the Government to Rebels variable is -1.37. The mode and median are both
zero and the standard deviation is 4.49. The mean for the Rebel to Government variable is -
1.24, with a standard deviation of 4.37. Both the mean and mode are 0. The mean of the
NATO to Government variable is -1.80, the mean and mode are 0 and the standard deviation is
6.37. See also Appendix C.
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and Zhukov 2013). This variable captures the degree to which the violence in Libya is in the
international spotlight. We might expect that the more the conflict is in the spotlight, the more
likely the conflicting parties are to watch the level of violence against civilians. By shedding
light on human rights abuses, the ICC can inspire outrage among the international community
and lay the groundwork for an extensive naming and shaming campaign. International naming
and shaming, under varying conditions, can give way to more forceful diplomatic, economic and
military punishment, and/or tap into similar domestic efforts to name and shame violating states
(Krain 2012; Murdie and Davis 2011; see however, Hafner-Burton 2008). The models also
include a count for the number of days the conflict has been ongoing in order to take into the
evolution and duration of the crisis. This variable also helps to control for increased NATO
military involvement over time and changing dynamics of the conflict.
The data cover 246 days, with fatalities taking place on 36 of those. Appendix C provides
descriptive statistics of the dependent variables and the control variable. As the level of fatalities
is a count variable, I estimate a negative binomial model.15
I estimate three different model
specifications. Model 1 includes the variables for each of the ICC interventions, as well as the
15 In the robustness checks in Appendix D, I estimate a zero-inflated negative binomial. I use
the three variables that account for the level of conflict at any given day—Government to
Rebels, Rebels to Government and NATO to Government—for the inflation stage of the model,
as the level of conflict on any given day should affect whether or not there was violence against
civilians on that day.
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control variables for the government’s actions toward the rebels, the rebels’ actions toward the
government, NATO’s actions toward the government and media coverage. In Model 2, I include
these variables as well as a one-day lag of each of the controls and a one-day lag for the number
of fatalities. Doing so takes into account any retaliatory measures that might cause or be caused
by attacks on civilians. In Model 3, I include the un-lagged versions of these control variables,
as well as one-day lagged and one-week lagged versions of them, as such retaliatory attempts
might not taken place instantaneously but instead take some time to percolate. All of the models
include the variable daymarker, which, as explained above, counts the number of days the
conflict has been ongoing. Table 2 shows the results of these models. Models 4, 5 and 6 use the
cumulative count of ICC action and include the un-lagged, one-day lagged, and one-week lagged
variables described above.
Models 7-12 use the same specifications as Models 1-6 with the dependent variable restricted to
government-sponsored civilian casualties.
Discussion of Statistical Results
The results of this analysis suggest that the ICC’s involvement in Libya had a negative
and statistically significant effect on the number of fatalities. The results suggest that the ICC
can, in fact, serve as a deterrent of violence against civilians, particularly government-sponsored
civilian casualties, during ongoing conflict. When the ICC became involved in Libya, through
issuing statements and arrest warrants, and all of its actions in between, actors on the ground
took note and improved their human rights practices. It is important to stress that the ICC’s
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involvement did not stop violence against civilians in Libya, but rather that it correlated to a
decrease in the violence.
In addition to supporting the overall hypothesis about the deterrent effects of the ICC, the results
in Models 1-3, support the notion that it is the intent to prosecute that deters crimes. Consistent
with this logic, the UNSC referral—a manifestation of the international community’s willingness
to support prosecution in a timely manner—prompted a significant abatement in the level of
civilian casualties, while later procedural actions, like issuing arrest warrants or invoking
INTERPOL have little, if any, statistically significant effect.
The results in Model 5 further corroborate this finding. Instead of differentiating among the
different types of ICC actions, the cumulative effect of ICC action here produces a statistically
significant decrease in the number of government-sponsored civilian deaths. Underlying this
logic is the idea that the more actions the ICC takes, the more credible the threat of investigation
and prosecution. We can think of this as encompassing some path dependence. The further
down the path of referrals, investigations, arrest warrants and the like, the more likely it is that
the investigations and trials will proceed. Thus, as discussed above, the likelihood of prosecution
increases the deterrent effects of the ICC. These results should be interpreted with caution,
however, as the results do not hold in the un-lagged (Model 4) or one week lagged models
(Model 6). This suggests that any deterrent effect that the ICC can have is modest and that these
analyses must be approached prudently. Moreover, these results are consistent with the idea that
it is the expressed intent and commitment to prosecute that has a deterrent effect on civilian
fatalities rather than the actual execution of the accountability process.
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Models 7-12 in Table 3 are generally consistent with the findings presented in Table 2, with the
caveat that cumulative ICC action only has a statistically significant effect in Model 11.
Moreover, in Models 7-9, later ICC action does have a statistically significant deterrent effect on
government-sponsored civilian fatalities. The divergent effects of later ICC actions in Models 1-
3 and 7-9, as well as in the models using the cumulative measure of ICC action, highlight a
tension between differing interpretations of the deterrent effect of the anticipation of punishment.
As I suggest above, the anticipatory effect of ICC punishment slows the more the ICC signals its
intent to prosecute the perpetrators. The further the ICC goes down the path of prosecution, the
less punishment is an abstract threat and the more it becomes a distinct political reality. This is
consistent with the findings in Models 1-3. Alternatively, however, one could argue that until
the trial actually begins and punishment is doled out, the threat or anticipation of punishment
continues to be at play. This would suggest, then, that the further along the path of prosecution
the ICC goes, the stronger the deterrent effect should be, as each subsequent step in the
investigation and trial process is a signal of the ICC’s commitment to prosecute. This is
consistent with the findings in Models 7-9.
These divergent interpretations and empirical results highlight the need for further empirical and
theoretical examination of the ICC’s work and its possible deterrent effects. Namely, future
research should continue to disaggregate the ICC’s work to understand the nuances of the
different strategies the ICC and suspected perpetrators deploy throughout the long preliminary
examination, investigation and trial/appeal processes. It is important, too, to recognize that each
of these stages involves different actors within the ICC, and that each of those actors has his or
her own objectives and strategies. As such, one particularly salient question for subsequent
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research is the following: Once an ICC trial chamber begins its work, do states and the OTP
enter into a new form of bargaining? Does the logic become not one of avoiding the OTP’s gaze
but instead of manipulating the subsequent process, as we have seen in the Kenyan and Ivorian
cases?
Of course, it is important to consider not just the statistical significance of these results,
but also the substantive effects. Table 4 shows the marginal effects of the ICC’s actions toward
Libya. The predicted number of fatalities per day is 2.85, but many of the ICC’s actions,
including issuing a statement about the possible war crimes committed in Libya and receiving
the UNSC referral decreased the predicted number of fatalities per day to zero. This should not
be interpreted to mean that daily ICC action would remove all conflict, but instead that the
aftermath of ICC action did have a noticeable and statistically significant effect on civilian
casualties. Appendix D includes the full set of marginal effects for Models 2 and 5.
These models produce some other notable results. First, few of the control variables have a
statistically significant effect on the number of daily fatalities incurred during violence against
civilians. The models suggest that conflict dynamics did not have a consistent statistically
significant effect on the number of fatalities. For example, in Models 3, 5, 6, and 9, as NATO
took a more cooperative stance toward the Libyan government, the number of fatalities
decreased. Similarly, in some of the model specifications, the relationship between the
government and the rebels had a changeable effect on the number of fatalities, as did the
previous number of civilian fatalities. While news coverage had a statically significant effect on
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the number of fatalities across a variety of model specifications, it also had a coefficient of zero.
Thus, while news coverage had a statistical correlation with the number of civilian causalities, it
did not have much of a substantive impact (see also Appendix D, which provides information on
the marginal effects for all of the variables in Models 2 and 5.)
In addition to the models presented above, I include a number of robustness checks. For Models
1-3, I also include the results of a Vuong test, which tests the assumption that a zero-inflated
negative binomial is preferable to a standard negative binomial model. Because the results of the
Vuong tests are borderline statistically significant in Models 1 and 2, I estimated the same
models using a zero-inflated negative binomial model. Those results are available in Appendix
E and are consistent with the results presented here. Further, in Appendix F, I include the results
of Prais-Winsten models that use the degree of conflict and cooperation between Qaddafi and
opposition forces, “Government to Rebels,” which is one of the control variables in Models 1-6),
as the dependent variable. The results are consistent with findings presented above.
Conclusion
This article set out to examine the possible effects of ICC action on civilian casualties during the
conflict in Libya and to consider what effect, if any, the ICC has in deterring or exacerbating
atrocities crimes. While the ICC serves many functions, particularly punishing perpetrators and
providing justice to victims, one of its aims is also to serve as a deterrent of violence. As the
International Criminal Court seeks to expand its influence, it is more important than ever to
understand the possible effects of the International Criminal Court on the very conflicts on which
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it seeks to adjudicate. This article aims to fill a gap in the literature by offering an investigation
of the short-term effects of the ICC’s actions against Libya.
The event count models estimated in this article suggest that the ICC can have an effect on on-
going violence and dampen the level of violence committed against civilians. That is, the ICC
can serve as a deterrent during conflict, even when taking into account other conflict dynamics
and media coverage of the conflict. For those advocates of international justice, this is good
news, but it is important to be clear about the constraints on this data and the implications of
these findings.
First, as James Meernik (2005) suggests in his piece on the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, a number of caveats are in order when assessing the impact of
international criminal courts (Meernik 2005). Namely, analysts and observers must approach
conflict data cautiously. While the ACLED data provides daily information on the number of
fatalities incurred during attacks on civilians, this data is conservatively measured, and fatalities
could be demonstrably higher than recorded. Second, the ACLED data is taken largely from
news sources. News agencies could very well miss small but systematic atrocity crimes,
particularly those involving sexual violence, and prefer to report on more salient violations. .
Third, although the TABARI and CAMEO coding schemes are well documented and fare
remarkably well against human coders, they are not foolproof and can miss degrees of nuance
important in the relationship among Muammar Qaddafi, the rebel forces and NATO (Gerner et
al. 2002; Goldstein 1992; Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997; Meernik 2005; Schrodt, Yilmaz, and
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Center for International Political Analysis: Institute for Policy and Social Reserearch, University
of Kansas 2007).16
It is similarly important to consider the external validity and generalizability of the results
presented above. As discussed above, the ICC did not act alone in Libya. Instead, it operated in
concert with the UNSC and NATO. The implications of this are two-fold. First, we should be
careful not to extrapolate the findings above to situations in which the ICC is the only or even
main international actor. Instead, the results above can be understood as reflective of a conflict
situation in which the ICC was one part of a larger coalition of international actors. As I note
above, in the case of Libya, Qaddafi’s future was uncertain, the ICC worked in concert with the
UNSC and NATO, and the ICC’s OTP made an early and clear signal that it was committed to
investigating and prosecuting any possible crimes in Libya. As the main hypothesis suggests
and the empirical analysis corroborates, the ICC should have a deterrent effect on conflict under
these conditions. This finding, however, needs to be understood in its given context.
Above all, it is important to note that the analysis above does not speak to the ICC’s general
deterrent effects, but rather examines the impact of the ICC’s intervention during conflict. That
said, this analysis is just the first of a larger, multi-method investigation into the effect of the ICC
and other criminal tribunals on on-going conflict. This broader research agenda is designed to
assess the external validity of these results, not only by applying the methods used here to other
cases but also through methodological triangulation drawing on qualitative case studies and elite
16 More information is available here: http://web.ku.edu/~keds/papers.dir/automated.html
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33 33
interviews. As such, we can interpret these results as a call for action: to consider the potential
role of the ICC in exacerbating or mitigating conflict; to identify which ICC steps have an
ameliorative effect and which play the opposite role; to articulate and test the causal mechanisms
through which the ICC could impact conflict; and to more clearly outline how those on the
receiving end of the ICC’s orders interpret their actions and whether they view them as credible
forms of justice or shallow threats and mandates for revenge. While we have seen less
international military involvement in the other situations at the ICC, we might well expect that in
future conflicts that prompt humanitarian intervention, the ICC will be part of those international
coalitions; this analysis gives us some preliminary analysis of the types of responses that the
ICC’s actions as part of that coalition are likely to prompt. The International Criminal Court
can—and should—be a powerful voice for preventing human rights abuse and holding
perpetrators of crimes against humanity to account. In order for this vision to be realized,
however, it is critical that the ICC and the policymakers and advocates that support it understand
the full spectrum of its effects.
Works Cited
Ainley, Kirsten. 2011. “The International Criminal Court on Trial.” Cambridge Review of
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FIGURE 1 Fatalities in Attacks on Civilians
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FIGURE 2 ICC Actions and Fatalities in Attacks against Civilians
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TABLE 1 ICC Actions toward Libya
DATE ICC ACTOR LIBYAN ACTOR ACTION
February 23, 2011 ICC Prosecutor Libya Issues statement on
alleged crimes in
Libya.
February 26, 2011 UN Security Council Libya Refers situation in
Libya to ICC
Prosecutor.
March 3, 2011 ICC Prosecutor Libya Opens investigations.
March 7, 2011 Pre-Trial Chamber 1 Libya Assigned situation in
Libya.
May 4, 2011 ICC Prosecutor Libya Briefing to UNSC on
Libya. Informs of
request to issue 3
arrest warrants. Will
continue
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46 46
investigations.
May 16, 2011 ICC Prosecutor Qaddafi and 2 Others Requests that ICC
judges issue arrest
warrants for 3
individuals.
June 27, 2011 Pre-Trial Chamber 1 Qaddafi, Saif Al-
Islam Qaddafi and
Abdulla Al-Senussi
Issued arrest warrants.
June 28, 2011 ICC Prosecutor Qaddafi’s government
and interim National
Council
Receive notice of the
arrest warrants.
June 29, 2011 ICC Prosecutor Head of the Executive
Council of the Interim
National Council
(Mahmoud Jibril)
Meeting to discuss
ICC action.
September 8, 2011 ICC Prosecutor Qadaffi and Others ICC requests
INTERPOL support
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to locate Qadaffi.
TABLE 2 The Effect of the ICC on Violence against Civilians Negative Binomial Regression (All
Fatalities)
Variable Model 1
(No Lag)
Model 2
(One Day
Lag)
Model 3
(One Week
Lag)
Model 4
(No Lag)
Model 5
(One Day
Lag)
Model 6
(One Week
Lag)
ICC Issues Statement -6.46
(2.52)***
-6.62
(2.52)***
-12.24
(5.54)**
--- --- ---
UNSC Refers Case -6.29
(2.95)**
-6.88
(2.31)***
-10.15
(5.30)*
--- --- ---
ICC Opens Investigation -4.49
(2.91)*
-3.82
(2.74)
-4.45
(5.49)
--- --- ---
ICC Assigns Case -3.96 -5.43 -6.38 --- --- ---
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(1.41)*** (1.43)*** (3.59)*
ICC Requests Warrants 1.25
(2.36)
-1.17
(2.16)
-4.67
(2.84)*
---
--- ---
ICC Issues Warrants -.50
(3.39)
-3.36
(3.11)
-6.10
(1.60)***
--- --- ---
ICC Requests INTERPOL
Support
3.82
(4.44)
0.36
(4.04)
omitted --- --- ---
Cumulative ICC Action --- --- --- -0.46
(0.44)
-0.94
(0.43)**
1.54
(1.04)*
News Coverage 0.001
(0.001)*
0.003
(0.001)***
0.01
(0.002)***
0.0002
(0.001)
0.01
(0.001)***
0.01
(0.002)***
Daymarker -0.03
(0.02)
-0.02
(0.02)
-0.04
(0.02)*
0.01
(0.02)
0.02
(0.01)
-0.03
(0.02)
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Government to Rebels 0.06
(0.11)
0.11
(0.09)
0.23
(0.10)**
0.09
(0.07)
0.10
(0.08)
0.16
(0.07)**
Rebels to Government -0.27
(0.13)**
-0.43
(0.15)***
-0.27
(0.12)**
-0.07
(0.07)
-0.18
(0.09)**
-0.15
(0.11)
NATO to Government -0.08
(0.05)
-0.09
(0.06)*
-0.09
(0.08)
0.07
(0.04)*
-0.001
(0.05)
-0.14
(0.08)*
Gov. Fatalities Lagged 1
Day
-0.01
(0.01)**
-0.01
(0.004)**
-0.01
(0.01)*
-0.01
(0.003)***
News Coverage Lagged 1
Day
-0.002
(0.001)***
-0.01
(0.02)**
-0.01
(0.002)***
-0.01
(0.002)***
Government to Rebels
Lagged 1 Day
-0.09
(0.08)
-0.14
(0.08)*
-0.02
(0.10)
-0.01
(0.09)
Rebels to Government 0.15 0.05 0.10 -0.05
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50 50
Lagged 1 Day (0.10)* (0.13) (0.12) (0.15)
NATO to Government
Lagged 1 Day
0.03
(0.06)
0.14
(0.08)*
0.07
(0.07)
0.15
(0.08)**
Gov. Fatalities Lagged 1
Week
-0.003
(0.001)**
-0.002
(0.002)*
News Coverage Lagged 1
Week
-0.002
(0.001)*
-0.0003
(0.001)
Government to Rebels
Lagged 1 Week
0.42
(0.10)***
0.38
(0.09)***
Rebels to Government
Lagged 1 Week
-0.39
(0.14)***
-0.07
(0.11)
NATO to Government
Lagged 1 Week
0.15
(0.06)***
0.09
(0.04)**
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p <.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; two-tailed test.
Constant 3.66
(0.82)***
4.90
(0.97)***
11.60
(5.29)**
3.56
(0.97)***
4.48
(1.10)***
-9.94
(3.57)
N 246 245 239 246 245 239
Wald Chi2 55.60 80.12 90.93 17.73 38.80 66.50
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
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TABLE 3 The Effect of the ICC on Violence against Civilians Negative Binomial Regression
(Only Government-Sponsored Fatalities
Variable Model 7
(No Lag)
Model 8
(One Day
Lag)
Model 9
(One
Week
Lag)
Model 10
(No Lag)
Model 11
(One Day
Lag)
Model 12
(One Week
Lag)
ICC Issues Statement -10.18
(1.97)***
-13.52
(2.56)***
18.15
(6.48)***
--- --- ---
UNSC Refers Case -7.89
(1.95)***
-12.97
(2.73)***
24.32
(6.70)***
--- --- ---
ICC Opens Investigation -3.63
(1.91)*
-9.90
(2.61)***
27.42
(5.74)***
--- --- ---
ICC Assigns Case -4.61
(1.50)***
-10.74
(2.14)***
21.29
(4.93)***
--- --- ---
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ICC Requests Warrants -40.38
(2.36)***
-41.17
(2.43)***
-24.93
(4.19)***
---
--- ---
ICC Issues Warrants 4.84
(4.29)
-8.87
(3.20)***
24.15
(3.42)***
--- --- ---
ICC Requests
INTERPOL Support
-30.95
(5.39)***
-50.84
(4.75)***
Omitted --- --- ---
Cumulative ICC Action --- --- --- -0.68
(0.54)
-2.26
(0.40)***
-0.05
(1.19)
News Coverage 0.003
(0.001)***
0.004
(0.001)***
0.004
(0.002)*
0.001
(0.001)*
0.002
(0.001)***
0.003
(0.001)***
Daymarker -0.07
(0.03)***
-0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.02)
0.03
(0.01)**
0.01
(0.02)
Government to Rebels 0.32 0.19 0.30 0.23 0.18 0.18
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(0.09)*** (0.09)** (0.11)*** (0.06) (0.07)*** (0.08)**
Rebels to Government -0.10
(0.06)*
-0.08
(0.07)
-0.06
(0.08)
-0.06
(0.05)
-0.12
(0.05)**
-0.004
(0.05)
NATO to Government -0.32
(0.07)***
-0.33
(0.08)***
-0.50
(0.09)***
-0.07
(0.05)
-0.28
(0.06)***
-0.39
(0.08)***
Fatalities Lagged 1 Day -0.02
(0.01)**
-0.70
(0.15)***
-0.01
(0.004)
-0.51
(0.11)***
News Coverage Lagged 1
Day
-0.002
(0.001)
0.001
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.0004
(0.001)
Government to Rebels
Lagged 1 Day
-0.44
(0.09)***
-0.74
(0.16)***
-0.60
(0.11)***
-0.68
(0.14)***
Rebels to Government
Lagged 1 Day
0.38
(0.11)***
0.65
(0.14)***
0.59
(0.13)***
0.56
(0.16)***
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NATO to Government
Lagged 1 Day
0.09
(0.09)
-0.12
(0.07)*
0.12
(0.05)**
0.01
(0.07)
Fatalities Lagged 1 Week 0.01
(0.01)*
0.01
(0.01)
News Coverage Lagged 1
Week
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
Government to Rebels
Lagged 1 Week
-0.51
(0.16)***
-0.23
(0.12)**
Rebels to Government
Lagged 1 Week
0.88
(0.22)***
0.57
(0.20)***
NATO to Government
Lagged 1 Week
0.10
(0.06)*
0.04
(0.06)
Constant 3.16 5.06 -33.61 2.66 3.07 -8.95
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p <.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; two-tailed test.
(0.82) (1.35) (7.34) (0.84)*** (0.98)*** (4.21)**
N 246 245 239 246 245 239
Wald Chi2 17912.63 4138.50 . 106.01 281.65 213.56
Prob > Chi2 0.00 0.00 . 0.00 0.00 0.00
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TABLE 4 Marginal Effects (Models 2): Changes in Fatalities
ICC Action Change in Number
of Fatalities*
(Model 2)
Change in Number
of Fatalities*
(Model 5)
ICC Statement -3.09
(0.88)***
---
UNSC Refers -3.28
(0.93)***
---
ICC Opens Investigation -2.97
(0.92)***
---
ICC Assigns Case -13.42
(6.54)**
---
ICC Requests Arrest
Warrant
-2.41 ---
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(3.22)
ICC Issues Arrest
Warrant
-7.48
(8.29)
---
ICC Requests Interpol
Support
1.17
(14.68)
---
Cumulative ICC
Intervention
--- -4.95
(2.28)***
Predicted Number of
Fatalities
2.85 5.26
* p <.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; two-tailed test.
* For dummy variables, this is the change when moving from 0 to 1.
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