courts exercising judicial review

7/28/2019 Courts Exercising Judicial Review

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G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,

vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE,

BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV,

ILOILO CITY, respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:

The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike but

hear me first!" It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the

constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.

The said executive order reads in full as follows:

WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of

carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of

Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;

WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to

circumvent the prohibition against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by

transporting carabeef instead; and

WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626and the prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to

strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and

carabeef subject of the violation;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of

the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no

carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be

transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in

violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation andforfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other

similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay

see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the

Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.

SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen

hundred and eighty.

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984,

when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of

the above measure. 1The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a

writ ofreplevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the

case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced,

ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the

executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. 2


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The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,*3

which upheld the trial

court, ** and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.

The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright

confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that

the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a

competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should

not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper

exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973

Constitution.4

While also involving the same executive order, the case ofPesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here.

The question raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official

Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of

due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General,

impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examiningconstitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever

warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal.6We have jurisdiction under the Constitution

to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may

provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the

constitutionality of certain measures.7

This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made

in the first instance by these lower courts.

And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means

conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the

need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily,"8

to recall Justice

Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance bysimply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should

probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist,9

and so

heal the wound or excise the affliction.

Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the

task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy

of the bench, especially this Court.

The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,

promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President

Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise ofhis legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his

judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature

failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he

could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the

force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that

extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive

order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the

President "in his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this

time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine

ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.

It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and

unmistakable language to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is

the Ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the

wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in

the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the

Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10


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The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This

was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron

rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility

must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make

it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and

circumstances may require.

Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest

they confine themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need

to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import

of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and

exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the

U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process and in so doing

sums it all up as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair

play." 12

When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown

would thenceforth not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by thelawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their progeny

that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow that King

John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to

all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is

entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.

The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the

other side" before an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously,

one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is

to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the

two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling afterexamination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment

based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted

with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of

power.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may

not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a

gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with

applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair

play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is

entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the

famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon

inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be

secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the

due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.

This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number

of admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary

evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection

between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom.15 There are instances when the

need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a

nuisanceper se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate

danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat andnarcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person

sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he

has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and

bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be

omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency

of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.


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The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints

and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State

to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare.18 By reason of its function, it

extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the

most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain.

The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even

before he is born and follows him still after he is dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in

practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often

unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public

welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is

found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lexand Sic utere tuo ut alienum non

laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.

It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending

the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain

conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that

"present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the

small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure.In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these

traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps

to protect and preserve them.

A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the

registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without

due process of law. The defendant had been convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own

carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The conviction was

affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of

carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals

and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turnhad caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent

increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for

the registration and branding of these animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid

exercise of the police power and declared in part as follows:

To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must

appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a

particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably

necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon

individuals. ...

From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the

statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as

distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the prohibition of the slaughter

of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural

work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to

protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter

by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to

enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the

community may be measurably and dangerously affected.

In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor

man's tractor, so to speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject ofExecutive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the

purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-

cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are

at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the

executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their

improvident depletion.


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But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive

order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement,viz., that there

be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A

imposes an absolute ban not on theslaughterof the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no

carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported

from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection

between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is

missing

We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their

indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one

province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their

slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there.

As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could

be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live

animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is

no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have

to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is

outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive

authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty

prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the

accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being

transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to

the government.

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were

returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given asupersedeas bondof P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered

by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately

imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon

the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of

elementary fair play.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly

dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It

is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural

due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a

justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacyof the problem

sought to be corrected and the urgencyof the need to correct it.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's

peremptory treatment. The properties involved were not even inimicalper se as to require their instant

destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not

have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded

to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No.

626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but

by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and

only after trial and conviction of the accused.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated propertyas prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be

distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat

Inspection Commissionmay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal

as the Director of Animal Industrymay see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The

phrase "may see fit"is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with

perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual


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standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe

when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be

the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the

officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and

in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping

authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate

and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because

the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law

and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated

is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The

conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed

offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of

powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned

therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For

these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the

petitioner's carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its

mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the

police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President,

to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute

it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for

all their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.

The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them,

this case would never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure

would have become afaitaccomplidespite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without thepresent challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of

the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and

soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.

The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke

them whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive

tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They

become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright

and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above,

the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount

thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.

G.R. No. 74621 February 7, 1990

BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC., petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT AND BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

EMPLOYEES AND WORKER'S UNION-FFW Represented by EDUARDO A. AFUAN, respondents.

Renato B. Pagatpatan for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

This petition for review by certiorari seeks the annulment or modification of the Order of public

respondent Minister of Labor dated December 9, 1985 in a case for non-compliance with Wage Order


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Nos. 5 and 6 docketed as ROXI-LSED Case No. 14-85 which 1) denied petitioner's Motion for

Reconsideration dated February 3, 1986 and 2) affirmed the Order of Regional Director Eugenio I.

Sagmit, Jr., Regional Office No. XI Davao City, dated April 12, 1985, the dispositive portion of which reads

as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Brokenshire Memorial Hospital,

Incorporated is hereby ordered to pay the above-named workers, through this Office,

within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof, the total sum of TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-

FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE (P284,625.00) PESOS representing their

living allowance under Wage Order No. 5 covering the period from October 16, 1984 to

February 28, 1985 and under Wage Order No. 6 effective November 1, 1984 to February

28, 1985. Respondent is further ordered to pay the employees who are likewise entitled

to the claims here presented, but whose names were inadvertently omitted in the list

and computation. (Rollo, p. 7)

Petitioner contends that the respondent Minister of Labor and Employment acted without, or in excess

of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in failing to hold:

A) That the Regional Director committed grave abuse of discretion in asserting exclusive

jurisdiction and in not certifying this case to the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor

Relations Commission for a full-blown hearing on the merits;

B) That the Regional Director erred in not ruling on the counterclaim raised by the

respondent (in the labor case, and now petitioner in this case);

C) That the Regional Director erred -in skirting the constitutional and legal issues raised.

(Rollo, p. 4)

This case originated from a complaint filed by private respondents against petitioner on September 21,1984 with the Regional Office of the MOLE, Region XI, Davao City for non-compliance with the

provisions of Wage Order No. 5. After due healing the Regional Director rendered a decision dated

November 16, 1984 in favor of private respondents. Judgment having become final and executory, the

Regional Director issued a Writ of Execution whereby some movable properties of the hospital

(petitioner herein) were levied upon and its operating expenses kept with the bank were garnished. The

levy and garnishment were lifted when petitioner hospital paid the claim of the private respondents

(281 hospital employees) directly, in the total amount of P163,047.50 covering the period from June 16

to October 15, 1984.

After making said payment, petitioner hospital failed to continue to comply with Wage Order No. 5 and

likewise, failed to comply with the new Wage Order No. 6 which took effect on November 1, 1984,prompting private respondents to file against petitioner another complaint docketed as ROXI-LSED-14-

85, which is now the case at bar.

In its answer, petitioner raised the following affirmative defenses:

1) That the Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor did not acquire jurisdiction over it

for want of allegation that it has the capacity to be sued and

2) That Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6 are non-constitutional and therefore void. Significantly

petitioner never averred any counterclaim in its Answer.

After the complainants had filed their reply, petitioner filed a Motion for the Certification of the case to

the National Labor Relations Commission for a full-blown hearing on the matter, including the

counterclaim interposed that the complainants had unpaid obligations with the Hospital which might be

offset with the latter's alleged obligation to the former.

Issues having been joined, the Regional Director rendered a decision on April 12, 1985 in favor of the

complainants (private respondents herein) declaring that petitioner (respondent therein) is estopped


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from questioning the acquisition of jurisdiction because its appearance in the hearing is in itself

submission to jurisdiction and that this case is merely a continuance of a previous case where the

hospital already willingly paid its obligations to the workers on orders of the Regional Office. On the

matter of the constitutionality of the Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6, the Regional Director declared that only

the court can declare a law or order unconstitutional and until so declared by the court, the Office of the

Regional Director is duly bound to enforce the law or order.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Office of the Minister of Labor, which dismissed the appeal for

lack of merit. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by said Office, giving rise to the instant

petition reiterating the issues earlier mentioned.

The crucial issue We are tasked to resolve is whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction over

money claims of workers concurrent with the Labor Arbiter.

It is worthy of note that the instant case was deliberated upon by this Court at the same time that Briad

Agro Development Corporation v. de la Cerna, G.R. No. 82805 and L.M. Camus Engineering Corporation

v. Hon. Secretary of Labor, et al. G.R. No. 83225, promulgated on June 29,1989 and Maternity Children's

Hospital vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor, et al., G.R. No. 78909, promulgated 30 June 1989, wheredeliberated upon; for all three (3) cases raised the same issue of jurisdiction of the Regional Director of

the Department of Labor to pass upon money claims of employees. Hence, we will be referring to these

cases, most especially the case of Briad Agro which, as will be seen later, was reconsidered by the court.

Contrary to the claim of petitioners that the original and exclusive jurisdiction over said money claims is

properly lodged in the Labor Arbiter (relying on the case of Zambales Base Metals Inc. v. Minister of

Labor, 146 SCRA 50) and the Regional Director has no jurisdiction over workers' money claims, the Court

in the three (3) cases above-mentioned ruled that in view of the promulgation of Executive Order No.

111, the ruling in the earlier case of Zambales Base Metals is already abandoned. In accordance with the

rulings in Briad Agro, L.M. Camus, and Maternity Children's Hospital, the Regional Director exercises

concurrent jurisdiction with the Labor Arbiter over money claims. Thus,

. . . . Executive Order No. 111 is in the character of a curative law, that is to say, it was

intended to remedy a defect that, in the opinion of the legislative (the incumbent Chief

Executive in this case, in the exercise of her lawmaking power under the Freedom

Constitution) had attached to the provision subject of the amendment. This is clear from

the proviso: "The provisions of Article 217 to the contrary notwithstanding . . ." Plainly,

the amendment was meant to make both the Secretary of Labor (or the various

Regional Directors) and the Labor Arbiter share jurisdiction. (Briad Agro Dev. Corp. v.

Sec. of Labor, supra).

Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises both visitorial and enforcementpower over labor standards cases, and is therefore empowered to adj udicate money

claims,providedthere stillexists an employer-employee relationship, and the findings of

the regional office is not contestedby the employer concerned. (Maternity Children's

Hospital v. Sec. of Labor, supra).

However, it is very significant to note, at this point, that the decision in the consolidated cases of Briad

Agro Development Corp. and L.M. Camus Engineering Corp. was reconsidered and set aside by this

Court in a Resolution promulgated on November 9,1989. In view of the enactment of Republic Act No.

6715, approved on March 2, 1989, the Court found that reconsideration was proper.

RA 6715 amended Art. 129 and Art. 217 of the Labor Code, to read as follows:

ART. 129. Recovery of wages, simple money claims and other benefits.Upon complaint

of any interested party, the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and

Employment or any of the duly authorized hearing officers of the Department is

empowered, through summary proceeding and after due notice, to hear and decide any

matter involving the recovery of wages and other monetary claims and benefits,

including legal interest, owing to an employee or person employed in domestic or


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household service or househelper under this code, arising from employer-employee

relations, Provided, That such complaint does not include a claim for reinstatement;

Provided, further, That the aggregate money claims of each employee or househelper

do not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000.00). The Regional Director or hearing officer

shall decide or resolve the complaint within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of

the filing of the same . . .

Any decision or resolution of the Regional Director or hearing officer pursuant to this

provision may be appealed on the same grounds provided in Article 223 of this Code,

within five (5) calendar days from 11 receipt of a copy of said decision or resolution, to

the National Labor Relations Commission which shall resolve the appeal within ten (10)

calendar days from the submission of the last pleading required or allowed under its

rules.

ART. 217.Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. Except as otherwise

provided under this code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction

to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by

the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of steno graphic notes,the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:

(1) Unfair labor practice cases;

(2) Termination disputes;

(3) If accompanied with a claim of reinstatement, those cases that workers may file

involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of

employment;

(4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from theemployer-employee relation;

(5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions

involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and

(6) Except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity

benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those of

persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount not exceeding five

thousand pesos (P5,000.00), whether or not accompanied with a claim for

reinstatement.

It will be observed that what in fact conferred upon Regional Directors and other hearing officers of the

Department of Labor (aside from the Labor Arbiters) adjudicative powers, i.e., the power to try and

decide, or hear and determine any claim brought before them for recovery of wages, simple money

claims, and other benefits, is Republic Act 6715, provided that the following requisites concur, to wit:

1) The claim is presented by an employee or person employed in domestic or household

service, or househelper under the code;

2) The claimant, no longer being employed, does not seek reinstatement; and

3) The aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper does not exceed five

thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

In the absence of any of the three (3) requisites, the Labor Arbiters have exclusive original jurisdiction

over all claims arising from employer-employee relations, other than claims for employee's

compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits.


10/27

We hereby adopt the view taken by Mr. Justice Andres Narvasa in his Separate Opinion in the case of

Briad Agro Dev. Corp., as reconsidered, a portion of which reads:

In the resolution, therefore, of any question of jurisdiction over a money claim arising

from employer-employee relations, the first inquiry should be into whether the

employment relation does indeed still exist between the claimant and the respondent.

If the relation no longer exists, and the claimant does not seek reinstatement, the case

is cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, not by the Regional Director. On the other hand, if

the employment relation still exists, or reinstatement is sought, the next inquiry should

be into the amount involved.

If the amount involved does not exceed P5,000.00, the Regional Director undeniably has

jurisdiction. But even if the amount of the claim exceeds P5,000.00, the claim is not on

that account necessary removed from the Regional Director's competence. In respect

thereof, he may still exercise the visitorial and enforcement powers vested in him by

Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, supra; that is to say, he may still direct his

labor regulations officers or industrial safety engineers to inspect the employer'spremises and examine his records; and if the officers should find that there have been

violations of labor standards provisions, the Regional Director may, after due notice and

hearing, order compliance by the employer therewith and issue a writ of execution to

the appropriate authority for the enforcement thereof. However, this power may not, to

repeat, be exercised by him where the employer contests the labor regulation officers'

findings and raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering evidentiary

matters not verifiable in the normal course of inspection. In such an event, the case will

have to be referred to the corresponding Labor Arbiter for adjudication, since it falls

within the latter's exclusive original jurisdiction.

Anent the other issue involved in the instant case, petitioner's contention that the constitutionality ofWage Order Nos. 5 and 6 should be passed upon by the National Labor Relations Commission, lacks

merit. The Supreme Court is vested by the Constitution with the power to ultimately declare a law

unconstitutional. Without such declaration, the assailed legislation remains operative and can be the

source of rights and duties especially so in the case at bar when petitioner complied with Wage Order

No. 5 by paying the claimants the total amount of P163,047.50, representing the latter's minimum wage

increases up to October 16, 1984, instead of questioning immediately at that stage before paying the

amount due, the validity of the order on grounds of constitutionality. The Regional Director is plainly

,without the authority to declare an order or law unconstitutional and his duty is merely to enforce the

law which stands valid, unless otherwise declared by this Tribunal to be unconstitutional. On our part,

We hereby declare the assailed Wage Orders as constitutional, there being no provision of the 1973

Constitution (or even of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution) violated by said

Wage Orders, which Orders are without doubt for the benefit of labor.

Based on the foregoing considerations, it is our shared view that the findings of the labor regulations

officers may not be deemed uncontested as to bring the case at bar within the competence of the

Regional Director, as duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to Article 128 of

the Labor Code, as amended. Considering further that the aggregate claims involve an amount in excess

of P5,000.00, We find it more appropriate that the issue of petitioner hospital's liability therefor,

including the proposal of petitioner that the obligation of private respondents to the former in the

aggregate amount of P507,237.57 be used to offset its obligations to them, be ventilated and resolved,

not in a summary proceeding before the Regional Director under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as

amended, but in accordance With the more formal and extensive proceeding before the Labor Arbiter.

Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the amount of the employer's liability is not quite a factor indetermining the jurisdiction of the Regional Director. However, the power to order compliance with

labor standards provisions may not be exercised where the employer contends or questions the findings

of the labor regulation officers and raises issues which cannot be determined without taking into

account evidentiary matters not verifiable in the normal course of inspection, as in the case at bar.


11/27

Viewed in the light of RA 6715 and read in consonance with the case of Briad Agro Development Corp.,

as reconsidered, We hold that the instant case falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Labor

Arbiter RA 6715 is in the nature of a curative statute. Curative statutes have long been considered valid

in our jurisdiction, as long as they do not affect vested rights. In this case, We do not see any vested

right that will be impaired by the application of RA 6715. Inasmuch as petitioner had already paid the

claims of private respondents in the amount of P163,047.50 pursuant to the decision rendered in the

first complaint, the only claim that should be deliberated upon by the Labor Arbiter should be limited to

the second amount given by the Regional Director in the second complaint together with the proposal

to offset the obligations.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Director dated April 12, 1985, is SET ASIDE. The case

is REFERRED, if the respondents are so minded, to the Labor Arbiter for proper proceedings.

G.R. No. 182065 October 27, 2009

EVELYN ONGSUCO and ANTONIA SALAYA, Petitioners,

vs.

HON. MARIANO M. MALONES, both in his private and official capacity as Mayor of the Municipality of

Maasin, Iloilo, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the

Decision1dated 28 November 2006, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86182, which

affirmed the Decision2dated 15 July 2003, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 39, of Iloilo City, in

Civil Case No. 25843, dismissing the special civil action for Mandamus/Prohibition with Prayer for

Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, filed by petitionersEvelyn Ongsuco and Antonia Salaya against respondent Mayor Mariano Malones of the Municipality of

Maasin, Iloilo.

Petitioners are stall holders at the Maasin Public Market, which had just been newly renovated. In a

letter3dated 6 August 1998, the Office of the Municipal Mayor informed petitioners of a meeting

scheduled on 11 August 1998 concerning the municipal public market. Revenue measures were

discussed during the said meeting, including the increase in the rentals for the market stalls and the

imposition of "goodwill fees" in the amount of P20,000.00,4payable every month.

On 17 August 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin approved Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01,

entitled "The Municipal Revised Revenue Code." The Code contained a provision for increased rentalsfor the stalls and the imposition of goodwill fees in the amount of P20,000.00 and P15,000.00 for stalls

located on the first and second floors of the municipal public market, respectively. The same Code

authorized respondent to enter into lease contracts over the said market stalls,5and incorporated a

standard contract of lease for the stall holders at the municipal public market.

Only a month later, on 18 September 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin approved Resolution No.

68, series of 1998,6moving to have the meeting dated 11 August 1998 declared inoperative as a public

hearing, because majority of the persons affected by the imposition of the goodwill fee failed to agree

to the said measure. However, Resolution No. 68, series of 1998, of the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin

was vetoed by respondent on 30 September 1998.7

After Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was approved on 17 August 1998, another purported public

hearing was held on 22 January 1999.8

On 9 June 1999, respondent wrote a letter to petitioners informing them that they were occupying stalls

in the newly renovated municipal public market without any lease contract, as a consequence of which,

the stalls were considered vacant and open for qualified and interested applicants.9
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This prompted petitioners, together with other similarly situated stall holders at the municipal public

market,10

to file before the RTC on 25 June 1999 a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for

Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,11

against respondent.

The Petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 25843.

Petitioners alleged that they were bona fide occupants of the stalls at the municipal public market, who

had been religiously paying the monthly rentals for the stalls they occupied.

Petitioners argued that public hearing was mandatory in the imposition of goodwill fees. Section 186 of

the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that an ordinance levying taxes, fees, or charges shall not

be enacted without any prior hearing conducted for the purpose. Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01,

imposing goodwill fees, is invalid on the ground that the conferences held on 11 August 1998 and 22

January 1999 could not be considered public hearings. According to Article 277(b)(3) of the

Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code:

(3) The notice or notices shall specify the date or dates and venue of the public hearing or hearings. The

initial public hearing shall be held not earlier than ten (10) days from the sending out of the notice or

notices, or the last day of publication, or date of posting thereof, whichever is later. (Emphasis ours.)

The letter from the Office of the Municipal Mayor was sent to stall holders on 6 August 1998, informing

the latter of the meeting to be held, as was in fact held, on 11 August 1998, only five days after notice.12

Hence, petitioners prayed that respondent be enjoined from imposing the goodwill fees pending the

determination of the reasonableness thereof, and from barring petitioners from occupying the stalls at

the municipal public market and continuing with the operation of their businesses.

Respondent, in answer, maintained that Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 is valid. He reasoned that

Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 imposed goodwill fees to raise income to pay for the loan obtained by

the Municipality of Maasin for the renovation of its public market. Said ordinance is not per se a tax orrevenue measure, but involves the operation and management of an economic enterprise of the

Municipality of Maasin as a local government unit; thus, there was no mandatory requirement to hold a

public hearing for the enactment thereof. And, even granting that a public hearing was required,

respondent insisted that public hearings take place on 11 August 1998 and 22 January 1999.

Respondent further averred that petitioners were illegally occupying the market stalls, and the only way

petitioners could legitimize their occupancy of said market stalls would be to execute lease contracts

with the Municipality of Maasin. While respondent admitted that petitioners had been paying rentals

for their market stalls in the amount ofP45.00 per month prior to the renovation of the municipal public

market, respondent asserted that no rentals were paid or collected from petitioners ever since the

renovation began.

Respondent sought from the RTC an award for moral damages in the amount of not less

than P500,000.00, for the social humiliation and hurt feelings he suffered by reason of the unjustified

filing by petitioners of Civil Case No. 25843; and an order for petitioners to vacate the renovated market

stalls and pay reasonable rentals from the date they began to occupy said stalls until they vacate the

same.13

The RTC subsequently rendered a Decision14on 15 July 2003 dismissing the Petition in Civil Case No.

25843.

The RTC found that petitioners could not avail themselves of the remedy of mandamus or prohibition. It

reasoned that mandamus would not lie in this case where petitioners failed to show a clear legal right to

the use of the market stalls without paying the goodwill fees imposed by the municipal government.

Prohibition likewise would not apply to the present case where respondents acts, sought to be

enjoined, did not involve the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

The RTC also dismissed the Petition in Civil Case No. 25843 on the ground of non-exhaustion of

administrative remedies. Petitioners failure to question the legality of Municipal Ordinance No. 98 -01
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before the Secretary of Justice, as provided under Section 187 of the Local Government

Code,15

rendered the Petition raising the very same issue before the RTC premature.

The dispositive part of the RTC Decision dated 15 July 2003 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, and finding the petition without merit, the same is, as it is

hereby ordered, dismissed.16

On 12 August 2003, petitioners and their co-plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration.17

The RTC

denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated 18 June 2004.18

While Civil Case No. 25843 was pending, respondent filed before the 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court

(MCTC) of Cabatuan-Maasin, Iloilo City a case in behalf of the Municipality of Maasin against petitioner

Evelyn Ongsuco, entitled Municipality of Maasin v. Ongsuco, a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer with

Damages, docketed as MCTC Civil Case No. 257. On 18 June 2002, the MCTC decided in favor of the

Municipality of Maasin and ordered petitioner Ongsuco to vacate the market stalls she occupied, Stall

No. 1-03 and Stall No. 1-04, and to pay monthly rentals in the amount of P350.00 for each stall from

October 2001 until she vacates the said market stalls.19On appeal, Branch 36 of the RTC of Maasin, Iloilo

City, promulgated a Decision, dated 29 April 2003, in a case docketed as Civil Case No. 02-27229

affirming the decision of the MCTC. A Writ of Execution was issued by the MCTC on 8 December 2003.20

Petitioners, in their appeal before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 86182, challenged

the dismissal of their Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus docketed as Civil Case No. 25843 by the RTC.

Petitioners explained that they did appeal the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 before the

Department of Justice, but their appeal was not acted upon because of their failure to attach a copy of

said municipal ordinance. Petitioners claimed that one of their fellow stall holders, Ritchelle Mondejar,

wrote a letter to the Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Municipal Treasurer of Maasin, requesting a copy of

Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, but received no reply.21

In its Decision dated 28 November 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 86182, the Court of Appeals again ruled in

respondents favor.

The Court of Appeals declared that the "goodwill fee" was a form of revenue measure, which the

Municipality of Maasin was empowered to impose under Section 186 of the Local Government Code.

Petitioners failed to establish any grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent in enforcing

goodwill fees.

The Court of Appeals additionally held that even if respondent acted in grave abuse of discretion,

petitioners resort to a petition for prohibition was improper, since respondents acts in question herein

did not involve the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, as required under Section2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Also, the filing by petitioners of the Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus

before the RTC was premature, as they failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior thereto. The

appellate court did not give any weight to petitioners assertion that they filed an appeal challenging the

legality of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 before the Secretary of Justice, as no proof was presented to

support the same.

In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the instant appeal bereft of merit. The assailed

decision dated July 15, 2003 as well as the subsequent resolution dated 18 June 2004 are hereby

AFFIRMED and the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED.22

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration23of the foregoing Decision, but it was denied by the Court

of Appeals in a Resolution24dated 8 February 2008.

Hence, the present Petition, where petitioners raise the following issues:

I
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WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE EXHAUSTED ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES BEFORE

FILING THE INSTANT CASE IN COURT;

II

WHETHER OR NOT EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE;

AND

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLEE MARIANO MALONES WHO WAS THEN THE MUNICIPAL

MAYOR OF MAASIN, ILOILO HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.25

After a close scrutiny of the circumstances that gave rise to this case, the Court determines that there is

no need for petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts.

The findings of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that petitioners Petition for

Prohibition/Mandamus in Civil Case No. 25843 was premature is anchored on Section 187 of the Local

Government Code, which reads:

Section 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures;

Mandatory Public Hearings.The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures

shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be

conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any question on the

constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty

(30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty

(60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the

effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or

charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or thelapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party

may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction. (Emphasis ours.)

It is true that the general rule is that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he

or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him

or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the

administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her

jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be sought.

The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action. The doctrine

of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons. The availment of

administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute

until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the

administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.

However, there are several exceptions to this rule.26

The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court from arrogating

unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an

administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case where the issue raised is a purely legal

question, well within the competence; and the jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative

agency, would clearly constitute an exception.27Resolving questions of law, which involve the

interpretation and application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise of judicial power that is

exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such lower courts the Legislature may establish.28

In this case, the parties are not disputing any factual matter on which they still need to present

evidence. The sole issue petitioners raised before the RTC in Civil Case No. 25843 was whether

Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was valid and enforceable despite the absence, prior to its enactment, of

a public hearing held in accordance with Article 276 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
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Local Government Code. This is undoubtedly a pure question of law, within the competence and

jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve.

Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly establishes the appellate

jurisdiction of this Court, and impliedly recognizes the original jurisdiction of lower courts over cases

involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

x x x x

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may

provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,

law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

(Emphases ours.)

In J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,29

Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,30

and

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos,31

the Court has affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC to

resolve questions of constitutionality and validity of laws (deemed to include local ordinances) in the

first instance, without deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy.

Although not raised in the Petition at bar, the Court is compelled to discuss another procedural issue,

specifically, the declaration by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that petitioners availed

themselves of the wrong remedy in filing a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus before the RTC.

Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of the Rules of Court lay down under what circumstances petitions

for prohibition and mandamus may be filed, to wit:

SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or

person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its

or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and

there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a

person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty

and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings

in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice

may require.

SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfullyneglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,

trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which

such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course

of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts

with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at

some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of

the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the

respondent. (Emphases ours.)

In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person -- whether exercising

judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions -- who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or

with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner prays that judgment be rendered, commanding the

respondent to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specified in the petition.32On the

other hand, the remedy of mandamus lies to compel performance of a ministerial duty.33The petitioner

for such a writ should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act,

and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.34
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In this case, petitioners primary intention is to prevent respondent from implementing Municipal

Ordinance No. 98-01, i.e., by collecting the goodwill fees from petitioners and barring them from

occupying the stalls at the municipal public market. Obviously, the writ petitioners seek is more in the

nature of prohibition (commanding desistance), rather than mandamus (compelling performance).

For a writ of prohibition, the requisites are: (1) the impugned act must be that of a "tribunal,

corporation, board, officer, or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial

functions"; and (2) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."35

The exercise of judicial function consists of the power to determine what the law is and what the legal

rights of the parties are, and then to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. The term quasi-judicial

function applies to the action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies that are required

to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as

a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. In implementing Municipal

Ordinance No. 98-01, respondent is not called upon to adjudicate the rights of contending parties or to

exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial nature.

A ministerial function is one that an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in aprescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own judgment, upon the propriety or

impropriety of the act done.36

The Court holds that respondent herein is performing a ministerial function.

It bears to emphasize that Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 enjoys the presumption of validity, unless

declared otherwise. Respondent has the duty to carry out the provisions of the ordinance under Section

444 of the Local Government Code:

Section 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The Municipal

mayor, as the chief executive of the municipal government, shall exercise such powers and perform suchduties and functions as provided by this Code and other laws.

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the

municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the Municipal mayor shall:

x x x x

(2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the municipality and the exercise of its

corporate powers provided for under Section 22 of this Code, implement all approved policies,

programs, projects, services and activities of the municipality x x x.

x x x x

(3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the

implementation of development plans, program objectives sand priorities as provided for under Section

18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for agro-industrial development

and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:

x x x x

(iii) Ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the municipality are collected, and that municipal funds

are applied in accordance with law or ordinance to the payment of expenses and settlement of

obligations of the municipality; x x x. (Emphasis ours.)

Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 imposes increased rentals and goodwill fees on stall holders at the

renovated municipal public market, leaving respondent, or the municipal treasurer acting as his alter

ego, no discretion on whether or not to collect the said rentals and fees from the stall holders, or

whether or to collect the same in the amounts fixed by the ordinance.
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The Court further notes that respondent already deemed petitioners stalls at the municipal public

market vacated. Without such stalls, petitioners would be unable to conduct their businesses, thus,

depriving them of their means of livelihood. It is imperative on petitioners part to have the

implementation of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 by respondent stopped the soonest. As this Court has

established in its previous discussion, there is no more need for petitioners to exhaust administrative

remedies, considering that the fundamental issue between them and respondent is one of law, over

which the courts have competence and jurisdiction. There is no other plain, speedy, and adequate

remedy for petitioners in the ordinary course of law, except to seek from the courts the issuance of a

writ of prohibition commanding respondent to desist from continuing to implement what is allegedly an

invalid ordinance.1 a vv p h i 1

This brings the Court to the substantive issue in this Petition on the validity of Municipal Ordinance N.

98-01.

Respondent maintains that the imposition of goodwill fees upon stall holders at the municipal public

market is not a revenue measure that requires a prior public hearing. Rentals and other consideration

for occupancy of the stalls at the municipal public market are not matters of taxation.

Respondents argument is specious.

Article 219 of the Local Government Code provides that a local government unit exercising its power to

impose taxes, fees and charges should comply with the requirements set in Rule XXX, entitled "Local

Government Taxation":

Article 219. Power to Create Sources of Revenue.Consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy,

each LGU shall exercise its power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, or

charges, subject to the provisions of this Rule. Such taxes, fees, or charges shall accrue exclusively to the

LGU. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 221(g) of the Local Government Code of 1991 defines "charges" as:

Article 221. Definition of Terms.

x x x x

(g) Charges refer to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or property. (Emphasis ours.)

Evidently, the revenues of a local government unit do not consist of taxes alone, but also other fees and

charges. And rentals and goodwill fees, imposed by Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 for the occupancy of

the stalls at the municipal public market, fall under the definition of charges.

For the valid enactment of ordinances imposing charges, certain legal requisites must be met. Section

186 of the Local Government Code identifies such requisites as follows:

Section 186. Power to Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges.Local government units may exercise the

power to levy taxes, fees or charges on any base or subject not otherwise specifically enumerated

herein or taxed under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or other

applicable laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees or charges shall not be unjust, excessive, oppressive,

confiscatory or contrary to declared national policy: Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such

taxes, fees or charges shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose.

(Emphasis ours.)

Section 277 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code establishes in

detail the procedure for the enactment of such an ordinance, relevant provisions of which are

reproduced below:

Section 277. Publication of Tax Ordinance and Revenue Measures.x x x.


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x x x x

(b) The conduct of public hearings shall be governed by the following procedure:

x x x x

(2) In addition to the requirement for publication or posting, the sanggunian concerned shall cause the

sending of written notices of the proposed ordinance, enclosing a copy thereof, to the interested or

affected parties operating or doing business within the territorial jurisdiction of the LGU concerned.

(3) The notice or notices shall specify the date or dates and venue of the public hearing or hearings. The

initial public hearing shall be held not earlier than ten (10) days from the sending out of the notice or

notices, or the last day of publication, or date of posting thereof, whichever is later;

x x x x

(c) No tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be enacted or approved in the absence of a public

hearing duly conducted in the manner provided under this Article. (Emphases ours.)

It is categorical, therefore, that a public hearing be held prior to the enactment of an ordinance levying

taxes, fees, or charges; and that such public hearing be conducted as provided under Section 277 of the

Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code.

There is no dispute herein that the notices sent to petitioners and other stall holders at the municipal

public market were sent out on 6 August 1998, informing them of the supposed "public hearing" to be

held on 11 August 1998. Even assuming that petitioners received their notice also on 6 August 1998, the

"public hearing" was already scheduled, and actually conducted, only five days later, on 11 August 1998.

This contravenes Article 277(b)(3) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government

Code which requires that the public hearing be held no less than ten days from the time the noticeswere sent out, posted, or published.

When the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin sought to correct this procedural defect through Resolution No.

68, series of 1998, dated 18 September 1998, respondent vetoed the said resolution. Although the

Sangguniang Bayan may have had the power to override respondents veto,37

it no longer did so.

The defect in the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 98 was not cured when another public hearing

was held on 22 January 1999, after the questioned ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan and

approved by respondent on 17 August 1998. Section 186 of the Local Government Code prescribes that

the public hearing be held prior to the enactment by a local government unit of an ordinance levying

taxes, fees, and charges.

Since no public hearing had been duly conducted prior to the enactment of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-

01, said ordinance is void and cannot be given any effect. Consequently, a void and ineffective ordinance

could not have conferred upon respondent the jurisdiction to order petitioners stalls at the municipal

public market vacant.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 28 November

2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86182 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Municipal Ordinance

No. 98-01 is DECLARED void and ineffective, and a writ of prohibition is ISSUED commanding the Mayor

of the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo, to permanently desist from enforcing the said ordinance.

Petitioners are also DECLARED as lawful occupants of the market stalls they occupied at the time they

filed the Petition for Mandamus/Prohibition docketed as Civil Case No. 25843. In the event that they

were deprived

courts exercising judicial review

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