Issue No. 892, 25 March 2011

Articles & Other Documents:

Experts: 3rd NK Nuke Test Possible if Dialogue Fails

Majority of S.Koreans Want Atomic Bomb: Survey

North Korea Suggests Libya Should Have Kept A-

Bombs

Navy to Axe 'Fukushima Type' Nuclear Reactors from

Submarines

U.S. Reviewing Nuclear Arsenal with Eye to New Cuts

Air Force to Retest X-51 WaveRider Hypersonic

Aircraft near Point Mugu

Protection of U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Faulted by Experts

No Need for U.S. Nuclear Testing, NNSA Chief Says

FBI's Anthrax Suspect is likely Killer, Panel Concludes

For al-Qaida, Detroit was just the Cheapest Flight

Libya's Soviet-Made Arms may Fall into Hands of

Terrorists - Expert

Agents Nab Immigrants, others posing as Military

Who Will Be Iran‘s Next Supreme Leader?

Capitalism Killed Life on Mars, Chávez Tells 'Water

Day' Event

ANALYSIS-Libya Conflict may Strengthen Iran

Nuclear Defiance

Does Nuclear Deterrence Apply in the Age of

Terrorism?

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons

of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a

source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents

addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and

nuclear (CBRN) threats and countermeasures. It’s our hope this information resource will help enhance your

counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force,

as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help

those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our

web site at http://cpc.au.af.mil/ for in-depth information and specific points of contact. The following articles, papers

or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense,

or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright

restrictions. All rights are reserved.

USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Dong-A Ilbo – South Korea

Experts: 3rd NK Nuke Test Possible if Dialogue Fails March 23, 2011

North Korea could resort to conducting its third nuclear test if inter-Korean dialogue fails, experts say.

Under strict international sanctions since sinking the South Korean warship Cheonan and shelling Yeonpyeong

Island last year, Pyongyang is apparently using the tactic of using a dialogue offensive while threatening

provocations.

Experts say the dialogue offensive could continue for the time being, warning that another provocation could come

in the event of no response or the need for internal unity for the North‘s hereditary succession plan.

―North Korea will start a dialogue offensive for a while,‖ Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North

Korean Studies in Seoul, said Tuesday. ―Unless inter-Korean relations make significant progress and the U.S.

provides food aid, the North will adopt brinkmanship tactics.‖

―North Korea is likely to attempt aggressive provocations such as long-range missile launches or a third nuclear test,

not to mention a provocation in the Yellow Sea.‖

Pyongyang has suggested talks on starting additional inter-Korean negotiations by proposing consultations for a

joint study on Mount Baekdu‘s volcanic activity despite a failed military working-level meeting early last month.

Seoul has insisted that bilateral talks are meaningless unless Pyongyang assumes responsibility for the Cheonan and

Yeonpyeong attacks.

Experts warn that if the two Koreas waste time on confrontation, the North could resort to provocations.

―North Korea seems to have decided to refrain from provocations for the time being for its ‗party‘ next year, when it

seeks to become a strong and prosperous country,‖ said Park Hyeong-jung, senior researcher at Korea Institute for

National Unification. ―But it could change its position toward provocations if things don‘t work out the way it

intends to after testing the South through various contacts following the failed working-level military meeting.‖

Certain experts say Seoul should be prepared for provocations because Pyongyang could attempt a provocation

during its dialogue offensive.

―The six-party talks were about to be resumed right before the Cheonan sinking, and the North also stressed the need

for inter-Korean talks before the Yeonpyeong attack,‖ said Yoon Deok-min, a professor at the Institute of Foreign

Affairs and National Security under the South Korean Foreign Ministry. ―Since North Korea could attempt a

provocation at any time depending on its internal needs, we cannot be complacent.‖

http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?bicode=050000&biid=2011032345878

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Space Wars

Majority of S.Koreans Want Atomic Bomb: Survey By Staff Writers

Seoul, Agence France-Presse (AFP)

March 23, 2011

A majority of South Koreans support the idea of developing nuclear weapons or redeploying US atomic bombs to

cope with the threat from North Korea, according to a survey published on Wednesday.

The survey, conducted by the private Asan Institute for Policy Studies, found that 68.6 percent said South Korea

needs atomic bombs, while 28.9 percent replied negatively.

Some 67.3 percent supported the redeployment of US nuclear weapons in South Korea while 30.1 percent opposed

it, the institute said in a telephone poll of 1,000 people.

South Korea has no nuclear weapons, but some conservative politicians have been calling for an independent

nuclear programme or the return of US atomic weapons in the face of what they call the North's repeated

provocations.

The United States withdrew its atomic weapons from the South in 1991, a year before the two Koreas signed a

denuclearisation deal.

During his trip to Seoul on March 2, Robert Einhorn, the State Department's special adviser for nonproliferation and

arms control, ruled out the possibility of US tactical nuclear weapons being redeployed in the South.

Pyongyang triggered security fears last November when it disclosed an apparently functional uranium enrichment

plant to visiting US experts.

The North said it was a peaceful energy project, but experts said the facility could hand Pyongyang a second route to

making atomic bombs in addition to its existing plutonium stockpile.

Six-party disarmament talks have been deadlocked since Pyongyang walked out in April 2009 in protest at UN

condemnation of an apparent missile test. The hardline state staged its second nuclear test the following month.

http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Majority_of_S_Koreans_want_atomic_bomb_survey_999.html

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New York Times

March 24, 2011

North Korea Suggests Libya Should Have Kept A-Bombs By MARK McDONALD

SEOUL, South Korea — A North Korean statement that Libya‘s dismantling of its nuclear weapons program had

made it vulnerable to military intervention by the West is being seen by analysts as an ominous reinforcement of the

North‘s refusal to end its own nuclear program.

North Korea‘s official news agency carried comments this week from a Foreign Ministry official decrying the air

assault on Libyan government forces and suggesting that Libya had been duped in 2003 when it abandoned its

nuclear program in exchange for promises of aid and improved relations with the West.

Calling the West‘s bargain with Libya ―an invasion tactic to disarm the country,‖ the official said it amounted to a

bait and switch. ―The Libyan crisis is teaching the international community a grave lesson,‖ the official was quoted

as saying on Tuesday, proclaiming that North Korea‘s ―songun‖ ideology of a powerful military was ―proper in a

thousand ways‖ and the only guarantor of peace on the Korean Peninsula.

As they have watched the attacks in Libya this week senior North Korean leaders ―must feel alarmed, but also

deeply satisfied with themselves,‖ said Ruediger Frank, an adjunct professor at Korea University and the University

of North Korean Studies, writing on the Web site 38 North. North Korea is believed to have 8 to 12 nuclear weapons

and last year disclosed a new uranium-enrichment facility.

Mr. Frank said the Libyan situation was ―at least the third instance in two decades that would seem to offer proof

that they did something right while others failed and ultimately paid the price.‖ He said Pyongyang would probably

see object lessons in the Soviet Union‘s decision to end the arms race and to ―abandon the political option to use

their weapons of mass destruction,‖ and in Iraq‘s agreement to accept United Nations nuclear inspectors and

monitors. And now, Libya.

―To put it bluntly,‖ Mr. Frank said, ―in the eyes of the North Korean leadership all three countries took the economic

bait, foolishly disarmed themselves, and once they were defenseless, were mercilessly punished by the West.‖

―It requires little imaginative power to see what conclusions will be drawn in Pyongyang,‖ the North Korean capital,

he said, adding that anyone in the senior leadership who favors denuclearization ―will now be silent.‖

The United States said there was no link between Libya‘s abandonment of efforts to develop nuclear arms and other

weapons and the current military campaign by Western nations.

―Where they‘re at today has absolutely no connection with them renouncing their nuclear program or nuclear

weapons,‖ said Mark Toner, a State Department spokesman.

The comments by the anonymous North Korean official appeared to dim the chances for a renewal of the so-called

six-party talks on the dismantling of North Korea‘s atomic program. The talks ended in 2009 when North Korea

withdrew, angry over international sanctions that followed a long-range missile test. The two Koreas, the United

States, China, Russia and Japan are the participants in the six-party process, which began in 2003. China, North

Korea‘s only major ally, has served as the host country.

David Straub, a former State Department official who worked on the early rounds of the talks, said it became clear

to American negotiators ―by 2004 that the North Koreans had no intention of giving up nuclear weapons, and China

had no intention of pushing them hard to do so.‖

―The lessons the North Korean leadership is drawing from the situation in Libya now are probably ones that will

lead to less possibility for a negotiated solution of some type with the other powers,‖ said Mr. Straub, associate

director of the Korean Studies Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford. While a public

renunciation of the six-party process by the members is unlikely, Mr. Straub said, ―all of the parties know that North

Korea does not intend to give up nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future.‖

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/world/asia/25korea.html

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The Guardian – U.K.

Navy to Axe 'Fukushima Type' Nuclear Reactors from Submarines Reactors sharing similar design to ones at Japanese plant to be dropped because they fail to meet safety standards

Severin Carrell, Scotland correspondent

Wednesday, 23 March 2011

The Royal Navy is to drop a dangerous type of reactor used in its existing nuclear submarines because it fails to

meet modern safety standards, defence ministers have disclosed.

A safer type of reactor is expected to be used in the submarines that will replace the Trident fleet, as the existing

design shares very similar features to the nuclear reactors involved in the Fukushima Daiichi disaster in Japan.

Liam Fox, the defence secretary, told MPs there was a "very clear-cut" case to use the new type of reactor because it

has "improved nuclear safety" and would give "a better safety outlook".

A heavily censored Ministry of Defence report disclosed earlier this month by the Guardian and Channel 4 News

said the current reactors are "potentially vulnerable" to fatal accidents, which could cause "multiple fatalities"

among submarine crews.

The report, written by a senior MoD nuclear safety expert, Commodore Andrew McFarlane, said the existing type

compared "poorly" with those in the most modern nuclear power stations because it relied on a vulnerable type of

cooling system, falling "significantly short" of modern best practice for nuclear reactors.

McFarlane warned that the naval reactors are "potentially vulnerable to a structural failure of the primary circuit".

An accident could release "highly radioactive fission products", posing "a significant risk to life to those in close

proximity and a public safety hazard out to 1.5km [1 mile] from the submarine".

Known as the PWR2, this type is used in the four Trident submarines based at Faslane, near Glasgow, and six

Trafalgar-class ones now being taken out of service. Like the Fukushima power station north of Tokyo, the PWR2

relies entirely on back-up power supplies to provide emergency cooling in the event of an accident.

Despite the anxieties about its safety, PWR2s are also being fitted in the seven Astute-class submarines being built.

These vessels will also be based at Faslane.

There have been debates within the MoD and the navy about whether the PWR2 should be used if a replacement to

Trident is finally approved – or if a safer type, PWR3, should replace it. The PWR3 uses "passive" cooling, which

makes it far less reliant on back-up power, and has additional methods of injecting coolant into a reactor.

The PWR3 is widely used in modern US nuclear submarines. The debate has delayed a decision on what type of

reactor to install by 18 months, McFarlane's report disclosed, and has cost a further £261m.

Fox was questioned in the Commons on the reactor's safety by Angus Robertson, the Scottish National party's

defence spokesman, after the disclosure of the report. Fox said: "The government's view is that that is the preferred

option, because those reactors give us a better safety outlook. That is a debate on both sides of the Atlantic, but we

believe that in terms of safety, the case is very clear-cut."

Robertson said: "This still raises concerns about the currently operational and incoming nuclear submarines, which

don't satisfy acceptable safety standards. The UK should give up its nuclear obsession."

John Ainslie, from the Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, who uncovered the original McFarlane report,

said the new reactor would push up costs for the Trident replacement fleet by billions of pounds, since it would need

designing and testing.

"There is another option: they should completely abandon their plan to squander billions on new nuclear

submarines," he said.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/mar/23/navy-submarines-nuclear-reactors

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Washington Times

U.S. Reviewing Nuclear Arsenal with Eye to New Cuts By Desmond Butler, Associated Press

Wednesday, March 23, 2011

WASHINGTON (AP) — The Obama administration has begun examining whether it can make cuts to its nuclear

weapons stockpiles that go beyond those outlined in a recent treaty with Russia.

The classified review is not expected to be completed until late this year, but some Republicans already are worried

that it will go too far. On Tuesday, 41 Republican senators warned Obama in a letter not to make major changes in

nuclear policy without consulting Congress.

Arms control advocates say the United States is mired in Cold War-era thinking about nuclear deterrence and are

pressing the administration to use the review to rethink U.S. nuclear requirements. They say the decisions will be a

test of President Barack Obama‘s commitment nearly two years ago to put the world on a path toward eliminating

nuclear weapons.

Obama ordered the nuclear review early last year with an aim of shrinking the nuclear arsenal, but the work, led by

the Defense Department, began recently, according to a department spokeswoman, Lt. Col. April Cunningham.

The review will look at issues such as what targets the U.S. would have to hit with nuclear weapons in a worst-case

scenario and what kind of weapons it would need to hit them. Rethinking the requirements could open the way to

cuts.

In the letter to Obama, Republicans warned against any big reductions from those outlined in the New START

treaty, ratified by the Senate and the Russian Duma in recent months. The treaty limits each side to 1,550 deployed

warheads — a level military officials have said meets the need of the current directives.

Sharp reductions in nuclear forces ―would have important and as yet unknown consequences for nuclear stability,‖

the letter said.

The letter was circulated by Sen. Jon Kyl, R-Ariz., a leading opponent of the New START treaty when it was

considered in the Senate. It makes clear that significant changes in nuclear policy without consulting Congress could

affect consideration of a new treaty with Russia. The 41 lawmakers who signed it include a number who supported

New START and represent sufficient numbers to block any treaty.

There is no indication that the Obama administration is considering drastic cuts as a result of the review. But the

study could shape talks it has proposed with Russia on weapons not covered by the New START treaty. The

administration wants to focus on stored nuclear weapons and those intended for short-range delivery, known as

tactical nuclear weapons. But negotiations with Russia also could lead to further reductions in deployed long-range

nuclear weapons.

Administration officials say the review has just begun and no decisions have been made. In a broader look at nuclear

weapons policy last year, called the nuclear posture review, the administration stressed the need for maintaining a

strong U.S. deterrent.

―The United States will continue to ensure that, in the calculations of any potential opponent, the perceived gains of

attacking the United States or its allies and partners would be far outweighed by the unacceptable costs of the

response,‖ the document said.

Disarmament advocates who follow administration thinking on nuclear issues say the document is unlikely to lead

quickly to sharp cuts.

―For better or worse, it‘s not in the cards,‖ says Daryl Kimball, head of the Arms Control Association, which

advocates nuclear disarmament.

But advocates hope the review could open the way to reconsidering what would be needed to deter potential

adversaries.

―We shouldn‘t have to dump 60 hydrogen bombs on Odessa to ensure U.S. nuclear security,‖ says Joseph

Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund, which advocates the elimination of nuclear weapons. ―This review

will determine whether the president is serious about moving toward deep reductions and the elimination of nuclear

weapons or if he is giving up on that vision.‖

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/mar/23/us-reviewing-nuclear-arsenal-eye-new-cuts/?page=1

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Los Angeles Times

Air Force to Retest X-51 WaveRider Hypersonic Aircraft near Point

Mugu The unmanned X-51 WaveRider is designed to deliver warheads at very high speeds with pinpoint accuracy almost

anywhere on Earth.

By W.J. Hennigan, Los Angeles Times

March 24, 2011

The U.S. Air Force plans to launch an experimental aircraft Thursday that could potentially reach speeds of 4,000

mph over the Pacific Ocean in a test flight that could give the Pentagon a new way to deliver a military strike

anywhere around the globe within minutes.

Built in Southern California, the unmanned X-51 WaveRider is being developed to deliver powerful warheads at

tremendously high speeds with pinpoint accuracy almost anywhere on Earth.

Military officials say the need for the technology became clear in 1998 when the U.S. military tried — and failed —

to kill Osama bin Laden. While positioned in the Arabian Sea, Navy vessels lobbed cruise missiles at training camps

in Afghanistan, hitting their targets — 80 minutes later. By then, bin Laden was gone.

But with a hypersonic missile, such as the one being tested on the X-51, "the attack would have been cut to just over

12 minutes," Richard Hallion, a former Air Force senior advisor, said last year in an Air Force Assn. report about

hypersonic technology.

While supersonic means that an object is traveling beyond the speed of sound, or Mach 1, "hypersonic" refers to an

aircraft blasting through the air at five times that speed or more.

Developing an engine that can reach and maintain those speeds hasn't been easy. For decades, the development of

the hypersonic engine has been fraught with setbacks.

But engineers at Boeing Co.'s Phantom Works research center in Huntington Beach and Pratt & Whitney

Rocketdyne in Canoga Park proved they were on the right track last May when the X-51 made its first flight from

Edwards Air Force Base.

The 14-foot aircraft was launched midair off the coast near Point Mugu, slung underneath the wing of a B-52

bomber. The WaveRider detached, falling about four seconds before its booster rocket engine ignited and propelled

the aircraft to more than 70,000 feet. It then separated from the rocket and sped across the sky, powered by an air-

breathing combustion engine, for more than two minutes, reaching about 3,500 mph.

The launch was considered successful because the longest prior hypersonic flight lasted about 10 seconds. But it did

not reach the goals the Air Force had set. The military had hoped the plane would reach around 4,000 mph and fly

for five minutes. It didn't because a design flaw forced a shutdown.

Regardless, the flight was "a big deal" to Pentagon officials, said Charlie Brink, the X-51 program manager for the

Air Force. The X-51 was built under a $250-million contract, but the government has spent millions more trying to

achieve sustained hypersonic flight.

Initially, NASA led the program, fueling speculation that hypersonic engines could help propel spacecraft into orbit.

Throughout the 1980s, NASA worked to develop a vehicle that could take off from a runway using jet engines until

hypersonic engines kicked in and took it to the edge of space. But the space agency dropped the program because of

a lack of funding.

Seeing potential for aircraft and missile systems, the Air Force picked up research on the X-51, which led to its

flight last year.

"That flight made believers out of skeptics," Brink said. "It allowed us to say, 'If you want to hit objects very quickly

and from long distances, here's an option.' "

At the time of the X-51's first flight, the Pentagon's intentions for it weren't widely known. This month, a senior Air

Force official revealed the aircraft's objective.

"In fiscal year 2012, we will begin weaponizing the X-51 research vehicle," Stephen Walker, the Air Force's deputy

assistant secretary for science, told a congressional panel.

The idea is to quickly deliver a conventional warhead that's capable of striking a terrorist on the run, a stockpile of

chemical weapons or a ballistic missile on its way to being launched.

The X-51 is a forerunner to the military's hopes for a "prompt global strike" system, which can hit anything on Earth

in an hour or less, said John Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org, a website for military policy research. "They are

designed to go faster and farther than anything that's out there. Technology like this avoids the possibility of getting

into a fair fight" with an enemy.

Cruise missiles, such as the Tomahawks launched in Libya last weekend, travel around 550 mph.

But hypersonic missiles are just the beginning of the X-51's capabilities, said Joe Vogel, an X-51 program manager

with Boeing. He foresees the technology being incorporated into spy drones and cargo planes, and even envisions a

future in which passenger aircraft are powered by hypersonic engines. "There's a lot more than the weapon aspect to

this technology," Vogel said.

A hypersonic jet could fly from Los Angeles to New York in a little more than 30 minutes, he predicted.

"This is one of those evolutionary pieces of technology," Vogel said. "It's the next step forward in advanced

propulsion."

http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-hypersonic-missile-20110324,0,377247.story

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Government Executive.com

Protection of U.S. Nuclear Arsenal Faulted by Experts By George A. Warner

March 24, 2011

The federal agency charged with protecting the country's nuclear weapons arsenal is not effectively securing its

facilities, according to a report released on Thursday by the National Research Council.

The report faulted the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semi-autonomous agency within the Energy

Department, for lacking a comprehensive understanding of different enemy attack scenarios that could threaten

NNSA storage facilities, and warned that security at the agency's sites would remain "out of balance" without

strengthened agency leadership and a "major shift in approach."

NNSA leaders also do not understand the full extent of the "interactions and dependencies among security

[systems]," NRC asserted. Sarah Case, the NRC program officer who was study director of the report, declined to

elaborate on the security interactions and dependencies referenced in the report, citing the full report's classified

status. The public report noted some recommendations "that were judged too sensitive to reproduce" were left out of

the abridged public version.

The Senate Appropriations Committee requested the report in 2008 to address ballooning security costs at NNSA,

which have grown from $550 million in fiscal 2002 to more than $900 million in fiscal 2010. NNSA management

has been questioned by the Government Accountability Office. In January, NNSA received a program management

award from the nonprofit Project Management Institute for IT work relating to President Obama's Global Threat

Reduction Initiative.

The NRC report warned against using a quantitative strategy -- which NRC was specifically tasked to evaluate -- to

better assess security risks while keeping an eye on overall costs. "There is no comprehensive analytical basis for

defining the attack strategies that a malicious, creative and deliberate adversary might employ," the report

concluded. But it was acknowledged that a "rigorous assessment of security risk" would prove useful to NNSA.

In part, the report restated a line familiar to outside evaluators of NNSA: Serious communication and information

issues within the agency continue to hinder its ability to manage projects and fulfill its mission.

To secure its facilities more efficiently, NNSA should better integrate its own security efforts and better coordinate

with cooperating agencies, the report said: "Coordination, communication and joint exercises that include all

relevant security organizations are necessary" to improve NNSA facility security.

An NNSA spokesman did not respond by publishing time to a request for comment.

http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0311/032411G1.htm

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Global Security Newswire

No Need for U.S. Nuclear Testing, NNSA Chief Says Friday, March 25, 2011

The head of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration dismissed the need for additional nuclear testing in

order to ensure the nation's nuclear arsenal remains in working order, Arms Control Today reported in its April

edition (see GSN, March 7).

"In my opinion, we have a safe and secure and reliable stockpile. ... There's no need to conduct underground

(nuclear) testing," said Thomas D'Agostino, whose agency oversees the upkeep of the nation's nuclear-weapon

complex.

D'Agostino offered his comments amid indications that the Obama administration is preparing to push for U.S.

ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which is intended to establish a global prohibition on atomic trial

blasts (see GSN, Feb. 17).

The United States is one of 44 "Annex 2" nations that must ratify the pact before it can enter into force. It is among

nine remaining holdouts; the others are China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan.

The U.S. Senate in 1999 rejected the executive branch's last effort to push the treaty through in Washington. Among

the concerns then was the need for future testing to demonstrate that nuclear weapons would function as intended.

"The United States has a plan to extend the life of the existing stockpile" that does not involve test explosions,

D'Agostino said. He added that the Obama administration's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review "very clearly directs our

[national] laboratory directors to study the full range of options to make sure that we get the benefit of their

technical knowledge and capability. ... (T)he laboratory directors have endorsed this as an acceptable approach to

move forward with taking care of the stockpile out into the future."

The NNSA chief also played up the likelihood of meeting President Obama's 2009 pledge for locking down loose

nuclear materials across the globe within four years (see GSN, Feb. 22).

The "plan that we have right now completes this effort in December of 2013. ... We've identified a scope of work to

get this four-year material secured," he told Arms Control Today.

D'Agostino addressed restrictions on his agency's nonproliferation operations due to appropriations levels for this

budget year that are less than sought by the administration. Congress has yet to approve a final budget for the fiscal

year that began on October 1, instead passing a series of short-term funding resolutions.

"There likely will be some minor impacts associated with, 'Well, we'll have to move this shipment back a few

months," D'Agostino said. "Our plan was to front load that Global Threat Reduction Initiative work to get it under

way robustly in 2011 so that as schedules change, we don't lose track and we can still hit our December 2013 target.

Our plan is still to do that. We're down at the FY10 levels, but we can reallocate resources.... (W)e're managing just

fine, but things get harder as the year goes on" (Arms Control Today, April 2011).

http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20110325_4781.php

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Miami Herald

Wednesday, March 23, 2011

FBI's Anthrax Suspect is likely Killer, Panel Concludes By GREG GORDON, McClatchy Newspapers

WASHINGTON -- The late Army microbiologist Bruce Ivins engaged in a decades-long pattern of "concealment

and deceit," pretending to be a comical juggler who played the organ in church on Sundays, while his dark side

drove him to mail anthrax-laced letters that killed five people, according to an analysis of his psychiatric records.

The conclusion by a nine-member panel of psychiatric and forensic experts in an unusual 285-report released

Wednesday lent support to the FBI's controversial finding that Ivins was the culprit in the infamous 2001 anthrax

attacks made after Ivins' 2008 suicide.

"Dr. Ivins was psychologically disposed to undertake the mailings; his behavioral history demonstrated his potential

for carrying them out, and he had the motivation and the means," the panel wrote.

They noted that Ivins confessed to mental health professionals that he'd committed "criminal break-ins" in years

past, describing him as calculatingly careful in the way he "compartmentalized" information, even among his mental

health therapists.

Information in Ivins' psychiatric records should have kept him from ever being hired by the U.S. Army's Medical

Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Md., where he performed research for years on deadly

anthrax spores, the behavioral analysis panel found. But managers who hired him didn't ask for them.

In addition to the deaths, the anthrax powder in letters sent to two U.S. senators and media outlets in New York and

Washington sickened 17 people, disrupted the U.S. Postal Service, tainted the mail in agencies across Washington

and shuttered Congress.

The 62-year-old scientist killed himself in July 2008 by taking an overdose of Tylenol and other drugs after federal

prosecutors notified him that he'd face criminal prosecution, culminating a long investigation.

While titillating, the latest analysis also fails to fully close the books on the case, because no one has produced clear

forensic evidence showing that Ivins dropped the letters into a mailbox in Princeton, N.J., in September and October

2001.

The behavioral analysis panel found that Ivins was motivated to send the anthrax letters by "a lifelong

preoccupation" with seeking revenge against "various perceived enemies," by the need to elevate the significance his

work to develop a new anthrax vaccine and by a desire to protect his assignment at Fort Detrick. Sen. Patrick Leahy

of Vermont and then-Sen. Tom Daschle of South Dakota, two Democrats whose offices got anthrax letters, "had

directly incurred his wrath," the panel wrote.

Another anthrax letter was addressed to then-news anchor Tom Brokaw of NBC. The network had returned Ivins'

proposed screenplay about Christa McAuliffe, the teacher who died in 1986 when the Space Shuttle Challenger

exploded after takeoff, with a note saying it hadn't been read, the panel said.

The panel traced Ivins' need for constant mental health care over the years to a traumatic childhood in which his

mother stabbed and beat his father, threatening to kill him with a loaded gun. "It also appears that she physically

abused Dr. Ivins as a boy, and that his father mocked him publicly," the panel said.

Psychiatric records are highly confidential, except in unusual circumstances such as a criminal defendant's innocent

plea by reason of insanity. But months after Ivins died, the Justice Department got a court order to obtain Ivins'

sealed records. The FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit asked a longtime consultant, Dr. Gregory Saathoff, an associate

professor of psychiatry at the University of Virginia, to review the records.

Saathoff, who apparently initiated the idea to delve into Ivins' records, told a news conference Wednesday that after

receiving them, he felt the case was so significant that he sought and obtained authority from the Justice Department

to perform a comprehensive analysis.

In early 2010, apparently after the expert panel secretly submitted its report to the court, the FBI formally closed one

of the largest investigations in its history, electing to publicly declare Ivins' guilt based on circumstantial evidence.

The FBI's case has since been called into question by a National Academy of Sciences panel, which found that the

scientific evidence didn't solely point to a flask in Ivins' laboratory, and by scientists who worked with him at Fort

Detrick who insist he couldn't have done it. At the request of several members of Congress, the Government

Accountability Office is conducting a separate inquiry.

U.S. District Judge Royce Lamberth of the District of Columbia secretly authorized the psychiatric analysis in 2009,

not to weigh Ivins' guilt, but to draw lessons that might prevent a future biological weapons attack, Saathoff said.

However, at the news conference, Dr. Ronald Schouten, a Harvard University faculty member and director of the

Law and Psychiatry Service at Massachusetts General Hospital, said that "after spending all these hours and going

over all these materials, we came to the conclusion that ... he was the perpetrator."

The panel urged a series of steps to ensure that mental health issues are more closely tracked in background checks

in hiring and security clearance reviews.

Its report credited intervention by mental health professionals for "likely preventing a mass shooting" by Ivins, who

had bought semi-automatic handguns and had talked of going on a shooting spree and dying in a hail of police

gunfire. Absent action by therapists to hospitalize him, the panel concluded, "there is no reason to think he would

not have carried out" this plan.

http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/03/23/v-fullstory/2130889/fbis-anthrax-suspect-is-likely.html

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Miami Herald

March 24, 2011

For al-Qaida, Detroit was just the Cheapest Flight By ADAM GOLDMAN and MATT APUZZO

Associated Press

WASHINGTON -- When an admitted al-Qaida operative planned his itinerary for a Christmas 2009 airline

bombing, he considered launching the strike in the skies above Houston or Chicago, The Associated Press has

learned. But tickets were too expensive, so he refocused the mission on a cheaper destination: Detroit.

The decision is among new details emerging about one of the most sensational terrorism plots to unfold since

President Barack Obama took office. It shows that al-Qaida's Yemen branch does not share Osama bin Laden's

desire to attack symbolic targets, preferring instead to strike at targets of opportunity. Like the plot that nearly blew

up U.S.-bound cargo planes last year, the cities themselves didn't matter. It's a strategy that has helped the relatively

new group quickly become the No. 1 threat to the United States.

After the failed bombing and the arrest of suspected bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the question of why

Detroit was targeted had gone unanswered. It was previously reported that Abdulmutallab did not specifically

choose Christmas for his mission.

Abdulmutallab considered Houston, where he attended an Islamic conference in 2008, current and former

counterterrorism officials told the AP. Another person with knowledge of the case said Abdulmutallab also

considered Chicago but was discouraged by the cost. All spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not

authorized to discuss the case.

While the target and timing were unimportant, the mission itself was a highly organized plot that involved one of the

FBI's most wanted terrorists and al-Qaida's go-to bomb maker, current and former officials said. Before

Abdulmutallab set off on his mission, he visited the home of al-Qaida manager Fahd al-Quso to discuss the plot and

the workings of the bomb.

Al-Quso, 36, is one of the most senior al-Qaida leaders publicly linked to the Christmas plot. His association with

al-Qaida stretches back more than a decade to his days in Afghanistan when, prosecutors said, bin Laden implored

him to "eliminate the infidels from the Arabian Peninsula."

From there he rose through the ranks. He was assigned the job in Aden to videotape the 1998 suicide bombing of the

USS Cole, which killed 17 sailors and injured 39 others, but fell asleep. Despite the lapse, he is now a mid-level

manager in the organization. Al-Quso is from the same tribe as radical U.S.-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who had

an operational role in the botched Christmas attack.

In December, al-Quso was designated a global terrorist by the State Department, a possible indication that his role in

al-Qaida's Yemen franchise has grown more dangerous.

Al-Quso was indicted on 50 terrorism counts in New York for his role preparing for the Cole attack and served more

than five years in prison in Yemen before he was released in 2007. On the FBI's list, al-Quso ranks behind only bin

Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri among the most sought-after al-Qaida terrorists.

After meeting with al-Quso, Abdulmutallab left Yemen in December 2009 and made his way to Ghana, where he

paid $2,831 in cash for a round-trip ticket from Nigeria to Amsterdam to Detroit and back.

Abdulmutallab, 24, is charged with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction and conspiring with others to

kill 281 passengers and 11 crew members aboard Northwest Airlines Flight 253. After his arrest, he admitted to the

FBI that he intended to blow up the plane and later surfaced in an al-Qaida propaganda video.

Abdulmutallab initially cooperated with investigators, pulling back the curtain on some activities by al-Qaida in the

Arabian Peninsula, the Yemen-based offshoot that has quickly became al-Qaida's most active franchise. Plea

discussions fell apart, however, and he's scheduled to go to trial in October while acting as his own lawyer.

One of the challenges facing U.S. intelligence officials is that much of the information they collect on terrorists

comes from surveillance or informants, and the government is reluctant to reveal it. So if a terrorist is captured

overseas, prosecuting him in the U.S. or persuading another country to hold him can be difficult.

A plea deal from Abdulmutallab would have resolved that dilemma. His testimony could form the basis for

indictments against al-Awlaki or perhaps bomb maker Ibrahim Hassan al-Asiri. And the U.S. wouldn't have to

disclose some of its most sensitive intelligence-gathering techniques.

Associated Press writers Ed White in Detroit and Tom Hays and Larry Neumeister in New York contributed to this

report.

http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/03/24/2131282/for-al-qaida-detroit-was-just.html

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RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

Libya's Soviet-Made Arms may Fall into Hands of Terrorists -

Expert 24 March 2011

Soviet-made man-portable air-defense missile systems that the Libyan military and rebels possess could fall into the

hands of terrorists amid the unrest in the North African country, the head of Russia's Center for Analysis of World

Arms Trade said on Thursday.

"One of the consequences of the coalition forces' operation against Muammar Gaddafi's regime may be the

appearance of MANPADS possessed by both the Libyan Army and rebel groups carrying out military operations

against Tripoli on the black arms market," Igor Korotchenko, who is also a senior member of the Russian Defense

Ministry's Public Council, said.

According to expert estimates, Libya has from 600 to 1,500 SA-14 Gremlin and SA-16 Gimlet MANPADS supplied

during Soviet times.

Gaddafi has ordered to hand out arms, including MANPADS, to his supporters in a bid to assure resistance in case a

ground operation by the international coalition. Korotchenko said Libyan rebels have captured up to 50 MANPADS

from arms depots since the uprising began in mid-February.

The situation in Libya and at its borders is rapidly getting out of control, the expert said, which increases the risk of

MANPADS being smuggled from Libya into neighboring counties and sold to terrorist groups around the Middle

East, including al-Qaeda.

"These arms can then be used to carry out terrorist attacks against Western and Israeli airlines," he suggested.

Because of their small size, MANPADS can also be smuggled into the United States by cargo ships and fall into the

hands of Islamists operating in North America, Korotchenko said.

"Leading special services across the world should undertake coordinated actions to avert this threat," he added.

The operation to enforce the no-fly zone regime in Libya, codenamed Odyssey Dawn, has been under way in the

country since last Saturday. The UN Security Council approved "all necessary measures," including a military

operation, to protect Libyan civilians from Gaddafi's attacks in a resolution passed last Thursday.

MOSCOW, March 24 (RIA Novosti)

http://en.rian.ru/world/20110324/163180831.html

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San Francisco Chronicle

Agents Nab Immigrants, others posing as Military By JULIE WATSON, Associated Press

Wednesday, March 23, 2011

SAN DIEGO, CA (AP) -- At first glance, the white van seemed full of clean-cut Marines in uniform — not

necessarily an unusual sight near the Border Patrol's desert checkpoint along Interstate 8.

But a plainclothes Border Patrol agent who had served in the Marine Corps wasn't fooled, especially when the driver

didn't know the birthday of the Marine Corps — something every Marine is taught.

Another agent later noticed that passenger Jose Guadalupe Ceja Jr., a suspected smuggler, didn't seem to understand

English, and he and the driver both had nametags reading "Lopez."

A closer look revealed 13 of the people were actually illegal Mexican immigrants and two were suspected U.S.

smugglers trying to make it through the checkpoint in camouflage fatigues.

It was a shocking new tactic even for migrant smugglers known to go to great lengths — from stuffing illegal

immigrants into the trunks of cars to transporting them in vehicles painted to look TV news trucks and Border Patrol

vans — to dodge authorities patrolling the border.

Mexican smugglers often don that country's military uniforms to try to get their illegal loads past authorities. In a

2006 incident that strained U.S.-Mexico relations, traffickers dressed as Mexican soldiers crossed the Rio Grande

and were seen helping suspected drug smugglers elude U.S. law enforcement during a chase.

But the use of Marine disguises appears to be one of the first cases of smugglers and immigrants posing as U.S.

military.

Former Marine Capt. David Danelo, a senior fellow at Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia who has

authored a book about the U.S.-Mexico border, says smugglers had the unfortunate luck of running into well-trained

Border Patrol agents with military experience.

"Should we punish these guys by sending them through four years of basic training?" he joked about the suspects.

"The troubling reality and the real question here is, has this ever succeeded before? That's an answer we just don't

know."

Indeed, the brazenness raised a host of troubling, still unanswered questions: How did they get the uniforms? Were

the uniforms only to trick immigration authorities or did the immigrants have more serious, military intentions?

The Naval Criminal Investigative Service — the investigative arm of the Navy, which includes the Marine Corps —

has teamed up with the Border Patrol to find out.

"If people are pretending to be Marines for criminal reasons, we'll want to know why," said Ed Buice, spokesman

for the Navy's investigative arm, known as NCIS.

Buice, however, said he couldn't discuss details of the investigation.

"I'm sure they were hoping agents would just see military people in a white van with government plates and just

wave them through," Border Patrol spokesman Michael Jimenez said.

The immigrants and smugglers weren't that lucky.

A criminal complaint filed in U.S. District Court in San Diego said the van with a government plate caught the eye

of a Border Patrol agent identified only as S. Smith who was driving an unmarked vehicle down the interstate on the

night of March 14.

The van with the words "U.S. Government, For official use only" on the license plate seemed suspicious. What's

more, one of the numbers reflected light differently when Smith's headlights shined on it.

Smith sped up and passed the van to get a better look: The driver was wearing a military uniform and he could see

others in the back wearing Marine Corps caps.

Smith called his colleagues at the nearest checkpoint and told them to do a close inspection of the van when it

arrived. He followed and asked the driver during the inspection where they were headed. "Joint Service Base" was

the answer.

Smith didn't buy it, especially after seeing one of the numbers on the license plate of the van had been changed from

a 0 to an 8.

Another agent, identified only by his last name Robinson, also a former Marine, noticed other anomalies: Some of

the group was wearing desert camouflage uniforms and others were wearing urban camouflage uniforms.

He asked Ceja directly if he was a Marine, and he admitted he was not, according to the complaint.

Agents later tracked down Guadalupe Garcia, another smuggling suspect, who was apparently scouting out agents,

at a checkpoint outside Jacumba, Calif., according to the complaint. Marine Corps insignias were found under a

passenger seat in his car, authorities said.

Arturo Leyva, another suspect, told authorities he had been asked to smuggle drugs by a man he met at a bar in the

border town of Calexico but had backed out, the complaint said. Authorities say he later ran into the man at a bar

across the border in Mexicali and agreed to smuggle immigrants.

He was given a cell phone and called on March 14. He was told a taxi would be taking him from his home in El

Centro to Calexico.

From there, the men and immigrants went to a trailer park, where a man arrived with a military style duffle bag full

of uniforms, the complaint states. The man coached Ceja on how to talk to the Border Patrol and say they were

coming from Yuma Air Force base.

It was unclear where the uniforms had been obtained. Marine Capt. Brian Block at the Pentagon said the official

attire is the property of service members who buy it when they enter the military and it's up to the individual to keep

track of it after they are discharged.

Block said the services strongly encourage military members to maintain control of their uniforms for security

reasons, but he acknowledges not everyone heeds the advice.

"You can go into just about any Army-Navy store and pick up old camies if you want to, especially in the San Diego

area, where there is a lot of military," he said. "But if you don't have a military ID card, you can't walk onto a base."

Leyva's attorney, Douglas Brown, said his client and the two other U.S. citizens arrested have entered a preliminary

plea of not guilty. Ceja's attorney, Martin Molina, declined to comment. Garcia's attorney, Brandon Leblanc, said he

could not comment on the case.

It is not known if any of them have a military background or any connection to someone in the armed services.

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2011/03/22/state/n155530D17.DTL&type=education&ao=all

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Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Persian Letters

February 26, 2011

Who Will Be Iran’s Next Supreme Leader?

The RAND Corporation has issued a report (The Next Supreme Leader, Succession in the Islamic Republic of Iran,

by Alireza Nader, David E. Thaler, S. R. Bohandy) that looks at the possible scenarios should Iran‘s Supreme

Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei pass away and a succession battle ensue. Khamenei is 71 and, according to some

rumors, ill. The report discusses five scenarios including: ―status quo,‖ in which Khamenei hand picks his successor;

and ―abolition" of the supreme leader position.

I spoke to one of the authors of the report, RAND‘s Iran policy analyst Alireza Nader.

Persian Letters: Is the Iranian regime prepared for the succession of Khamenei? Do you think they have

already made or are making some preparations?

Alireza Nader: There isn‘t much evidence to show that there is preparation for Khamenei‘s succession. It‘s a risky

move for him at this point to designate a successor because that could undermine his power in the near future if he

basically says somebody else is supposed to succeed him. Now that does not mean that he has not thought through

the issue of succession to some extent, but there isn‘t much evidence to show that the regime has prepared for it.

Persian Letters: What are the main factors that will shape the succession?

Nader: There are three main factors as I see it. The first one is the theory of Velayat-e Faghih or the Rule of the

Supreme Jurisprudent, which is basically the foundational justification for the Islamic Republic. Another key factor

is the dominance of a given faction within the system. Right now the principalists, or the fundamentalists, control

the regime and when it comes to succession, they‘ll have a very strong voice in shaping that process. And also

Khamenei‘s personal network, his inner city, will play a huge role and that includes the Revolutionary Guards. The

Revolutionary Guards have a lot to win -- or lose -- depending on who succeeds Khamenei.

Persian Letters: So the Revolutionary Guards will be the main player in the succession process?

Nader: Right. And if succession happens in the next two or three years for example, the Revolutionary Guards are

poised right now to shape succession because they are the most powerful actor in Iran.

Persian Letters: Who are the other main players? The Assembly of Experts?

Nader: Yes, the Assembly of Experts, which is headed by Ayatollah [Ali Akbar Hashemi] Rafsanjani. It played

some role in Khamenei‘s succession in 1989. Although if we look at that process in ‘89, Khamenei was really

picked by his predecessor Ayatollah Khomenei. And so the Assembly of Experts played a rubber-stamp role. It‘s not

clear how influential the assembly will be in the next succession. Recently Rafsanjani has been attacked by

principalists within the regime and his power has declined since the 2009 election. And then there are other factors

that we explored in our study: looking at the Green Movement, which is still alive and relatively strong, as was

demonstrated in the recent protests in Iran. Given the Islamic Republic‘s various social and political problems, it‘s

not clear that in the long term you‘re going to have a smooth succession process, where the Revolutionary Guards

can actually determine who succeeds Khamenei as supreme leader.

Persian Letters: You mentioned the opposition Green Movement. Will the Green Movement and the Iranian

people have any role in this near-term succession?

Nader: The Iranian people will not have a direct role because the political system is set up in a way to really limit

their role in succession. The Assembly of Experts is technically chosen by the Iranian people but in reality the

Guardians Council vets the candidates and usually the regime -- or I should say Khamenei supporters -- dominate

the Assembly of Experts.

Persian Letters: But as you also mentioned, the Green Movement has been challenging the Iranian regime

and, as we saw last week, there were two protests in Iran. Does this mean that you don’t expect any game-

changing popular revolt anytime soon in Iran?

Nader: It‘s very hard to tell with Iran because it‘s very different than countries like Egypt or Libya or Bahrain. The

regime, although it has lost a lot of legitimacy since the 2009 election, still maintains some base of popular support.

And the Green Movement, I think, is popular among a cross-section of Iranian society but it derives a lot of its

power from the middle and upper classes and the more educated. It‘s not clear if the Green Movement, at this point,

can rally masses of Iranians to the streets, as we‘ve seen in Egypt. I wouldn‘t rule it out, but the regime in Iran is set

up in different ways and has different levels of influences over Iranian society. I mean, if we look at Mubarak, he

had basically very little support toward the end, whereas there are specific sections of Iranian society that support

Khamenei. The Revolutionary Guards, at this point, also remain loyal to him. Although there are divisions within

the Revolutionary Guards, it doesn‘t seem like the security forces would back down in the face of protests.

Persian Letters: You have discussed in your report five succession scenarios. Which one of them is the most

likely to come out in the near-term?

Nader: In the near-term, it‘s a "status quo" scenario basically where somebody like Khamenei succeeds them. And

the reason for this is because it benefits various actors within the system -- the principalists, the Revolutionary

Guards. There‘s also the option of having an absolute dictator -- a supreme leader who ignores Iran‘s elected

institutions. When you look at a lot of the statements coming out after the 2009 election, senior figures within the

system like Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, and Khamenei‘s representatives within the Revolutionary Guards, talk about

divine authority, the supreme leader not being held accountable by the people, the supreme leader being appointed

by God -- a viewpoint that has common currency among the top level of the elite.

Now there are other scenarios, for example a leadership council made up of several people, or more of a reformist

supreme leader that takes into account popular will and opinion and also consults with the clergy in Qom. Also

there‘s a scenario where the office of the supreme leader is abolished. Either you have an Islamist state ruled by the

Revolutionary Guards, or at least a supposed Islamist state ruled by the Guards, or you have a more secular,

republican system of government.

Persian Letters: And who are the likely candidates who would be replacing Khamenei?

Nader: That‘s very hard to tell. It‘s not something that is very predictable but, for example, in a "status quo"

scenario you could have a relatively fundamentalist senior cleric succeed Khamenei. Various names have been

thrown out in the media. People like Mesbah Yazdi or Ahmad Khatami who is a Friday Prayers leader. But it‘s not

clear if somebody like that can become supreme leader. If we look at succession in 1989, Khamenei was a relatively

junior cleric, but because Khamenei at that time was very close to Rafsanjani -- Rafsanjani played a very important

role in the succession of 1989 -- he was able to assume power. So it could actually be a relative unknown --

somebody who is not as well-known in the public or who is not considered to be as powerful.

Persian Letters: My last question, I looked at the sources you used -- most of them are in English. Why didn’t

you use Farsi sources?

Nader: We did use Farsi sources. We looked at various websites in Iran and Iranian news sources as well.

Persian Letters: But most of the sources are in English.

Nader: Yes, it was just more accessible.

http://www.rferl.org/content/who_will_be_irans_next_supreme_leader/2321704.html

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Irish Times – Ireland

Thursday, March 24, 2011

Capitalism Killed Life on Mars, Chávez Tells 'Water Day' Event By TOM HENNIGAN in São Paulo

CAPITALISM MAY be responsible for the lack of civilisation on Mars, according to Venezuelan president Hugo

Chávez.

―I have always said, heard, that it would not be strange that on Mars there had been civilisation, but then probably

capitalism arrived, imperialism arrived, and did for this planet,‖ he said at an event on Tuesday to mark World

Water Day.

There was laughter in the audience before Mr Chávez turned to his main point: a warning that a similar process of

environmental degradation was already under way on Earth.

―Look. Be careful. Here on planet Earth where hundreds of years ago or less there had been great forests, now there

is desert. Where there were great rivers, now there is desert on much of the planet. There is an advanced process of

desertification which puts at risk life on the planet in the medium term.‖

Mr Chávez frequently uses folksy analogies and humour to communicate with his audiences. During his 12 years in

power, the populist leader has lashed capitalism and what he sees as US imperialism.

In his speech he said the military operation by western governments against Libya was motivated by the North

African country‘s oil and water reserves.

Mr Chávez is one of few world leaders to openly support Libyan leader Muammar Gadafy. The two forged a close

relationship as allies within the Opec oil cartel.

Rebels in the Libyan city of Benghazi changed the name of the main sports stadium from Hugo Chávez Stadium to

the Martyrs of February Stadium in honour of those killed in the uprising against Col Gadafy.

Also on Tuesday two Venezuelan students sewed up part of their mouths as part of a campaign demanding more

funding for the country‘s universities, which protesters say has not increased since 2006.

The two are part of a group undertaking a hunger strike outside the UN‘s offices in the capital Caracas.

A pro-Chávez deputy has claimed the protesters are financed by three bankers being sought by local courts. Last

week state television showed footage of what it said were hunger strikers secretly eating food.

Galloping inflation and shortages of basic foodstuffs has led to increasing domestic discontent with Mr Chávez in

recent months.

http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2011/0324/1224292956524.html

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Los Angeles Times

OPINION/Analysis

ANALYSIS-Libya Conflict may Strengthen Iran Nuclear Defiance * Unlike Gaddafi, Iran refused to back down in nuclear row

* Libyan conflict strengthens arguments for Iran hardliners

* But any Western success in Libya may prompt re-think

By Fredrik Dahl, Reuters

March 24, 2011

VIENNA, March 24 (Reuters) - Western air strikes against Muammar Gaddafi's forces could stiffen Iran's resolve to

resist U.S.-led demands over its nuclear programme, though Tehran's final analysis may depend on when and how

the Libyan war ends. Seeking to mend ties with the West, Gaddafi agreed in 2003 to abandon efforts to acquire

nuclear, chemical and biological weapons -- a move that brought him in from the cold and helped end decades as an

international pariah.

In contrast, Iran has repeatedly ruled out halting sensitive nuclear activities it says are aimed at generating electricity

but which the United States and its allies suspect are geared towards developing a nuclear weapons capability.

Analysts say events in Libya, where Western warplanes hit Libyan tanks on a fifth night of air strikes on Thursday,

are likely to provide new arguments for those in Iran who believe it would be a mistake to back down over its

nuclear programme.

Iran's arch foes -- Israel and the United States – have refused to exclude possible military action against the Islamic

Republic if diplomatic efforts to resolve the dispute fail.

Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman told Reuters on Thursday that Iran and Syria posed a greater security

threat than Libya, urging the West to treat those countries in the same way as it has Gaddafi's government.

"I suspect that this is playing into the hands of those who say that Iran has to have a nuclear deterrent because look

at what happened to Gaddafi," Shannon Kile, at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, said.

Iran is pushing ahead with its uranium enrichment work despite toughening sanctions by the United Nations, United

States and Europe on the major oil producer and technical and others woes slowing its nuclear progress.

WEST NOT TRUSTED

Iran says it is refining uranium only to provide fuel for a planned network of nuclear power stations so that it can

export more of its oil and gas. But the same material can be used to make bombs if refined much more.

"Even without the operations in Libya the attitude in Iran has hardened over the last 2-3 years," said David Hartwell,

HIS Jane's North Africa and Middle East analyst.

He said hardliners were likely to use the air campaign in Libya as a further justification for their position that "we

simply can't trust the West".

Iran's highest authority, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, this week said Gaddafi's concessions over its

nuclear programme showed Tehran was right to continue to reject any curb to its atomic energy development.

Khamenei said that while Libya had given up its nuclear capacities in exchange for incentives he compared to giving

candy to a child, Iran "not only did not retreat but ... officials tried to increase nuclear facilities year after year".

While voicing support for demonstrators in the region and condemning government repression, Iran has crushed

protests at home and jailed scores of demonstrators since President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's disputed presidential

election in June 2009.

"Surely the attack on Gaddafi's forces will reinforce the Iranian distrust of the United States," proliferation expert

Mark Fitzpatrick, of the International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank, said.

"Ayatollah Khamenei already has long believed that if you give an inch to the United States, they will take a mile,

that any concession on the nuclear front will only lead to demands on human rights and Israel and other issues."

NUCLEAR OPTION

The U.N. Security Council has imposed four sets of sanctions on Tehran since 2006 for refusing to freeze its

enrichment programme, which can have both civilian and military purposes.

Major powers have offered Iran trade and other economic and political incentives it halts its atomic activities.

But two rounds of talks in December and January between Iran and the six powers seeking to resolve the dispute

diplomatically -- the United States, Russia, France, Germany, Britain and China -- failed to make any headway.

Underlining the deadlock, no new meetings have been scheduled, even though both sides insist the door remains

open.

Last week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the world must make clear Iran would face "credible

military action" if sanctions do not shut down its nuclear programme.

Iran's reading of the Libyan situation may be that Western powers would not have thought about intervening there if

Gaddafi had held on to his weapons programmes, said Oliver Thraenert, of the German Institute for International

and Security Affairs.

"You might argue that possessing a nuclear option means that you will not be confronted with an international

intervention, whatever you might do in the future with any opposition within Iran," he said.

But there could also be those in Iran who make the opposite case, that the action in Libya shows that the United

States and its allies could do the same in Iran before it "gets its hand on a nuclear option. It is also possible,"

Thraenert said.

Baqer Moin, an Iran expert in London, said the implications for Iran and its rival factions would hinge on whether

the Western campaign in Libya was successful or became a quagmire.

"If it is an easy victory it would enhance the position of those who want to negotiate with the West," Moin said.

Editing by Alison Williams

http://www.latimes.com/sns-rt-iran-libyanuclear-lde72n1nx-20110324,0,1216506,full.story

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Foreign Policy Research Institute

OPINION/Essay

Footnotes

Does Nuclear Deterrence Apply in the Age of Terrorism? By Adam Garfinkle

May 2009

Vol 14 No 10

Adam Garfinkle is editor of The American Interest. This essay is based on his talk at the FPRI Wachman Center’s

History Institute for Teachers on Teaching the Nuclear Age, held March 28-29, 2009. The Institute was cosponsored

by the American Academy of Diplomacy and cosponsored and hosted by the Atomic Testing Museum in Las Vegas,

Nevada. See www.fpri.org/education/nuclearage for videofiles, texts of lectures, and classroom lessons. The History

Institute for Teachers is co-chaired by David Eisenhower and Walter A. McDougall. Core support is provided by the

Annenberg Foundation and Mr. H.F. Lenfest.

Having been asked to address the question that provides the title to this FPRI Footnote, I begin by interrogating and

unpacking the question. What does the question mean? Does it mean: Can terrorist organizations that may somehow

get their hands on nuclear weapons be deterred from using them? Does it mean: Do nuclear weapons states think

differently about strategic deterrence relationships among each other and with regard to non-nuclear states just

because there have been major terrorist attacks in recent years? Or does it mean: Can nuclear weapons somehow

deter acts of non-nuclear terrorism?

Obviously, these are three different, if overlapping, questions. I will discuss them all below, but first it is important

to observe that all three dwell in the context of the assertion, implied in the question, that we live in ―an age of

terrorism.‖ But we do not. Despite the attacks of September 11, 2001 and several deadly if less spectacular terrorist

attacks elsewhere since launched by Salafi Muslim fanatics, terrorism does not define the age in which we live.

When historians look back on this time fifty years or a century from now, they may call this era after the fact that a

universal society first formed on a fully planetary scale owing to the rise of Asia and the declining dominance of

Western norms. They may call it the age of Ecological Awareness, or the age of the Third Plague (the first being

Justinian‘s Plague in the year 540, the second being the Black Death from 1348) owing, like the prior two plagues,

to a major system effect of climate change. They might call it the Age of Globalization if benign trends prevail, or

the Age of Disconnection if more morbid ones do.

The point is that there are striking global developments afoot concerning demography and migration, science and

technology, that presage major socio-economic and political change even beyond that which we have experienced in

recent years. Change generates anxiety; it stimulates fear as well as offers opportunity. Terrorism is epiphenomenal

of all this; it is a residual category spawned by more fundamental global dynamics. We know this because it‘s

happened before; terrorists can bomb and murder their way into high politics for a short time, but terrorist cults—

suicidal terrorist cults, in particular, for what ought to be obvious reasons—cannot readily institutionalize

themselves, and so soon fade away. To call these times an ―age of terrorism‖ is therefore a major category error.

This does not mean, of course, that there is no terrorist threat. There is a threat, and it would be irresponsible to

ignore it. It would be especially irresponsible to ignore the threat of terrorists with nuclear weapons, again for fairly

obvious reasons. For similar reasons the prospect of states known to support terrorism acquiring nuclear weapons

stands alone in a special category of concern. It is why the A.Q. Khan proliferation network, a rogue effort that went

on almost certainly with the knowledge of a state, is of special importance.

The concern is not very new; it long predates 9/11. The possibility that non-state terrorist groups might acquire and

use nuclear weapons, either literally or figuratively—blowing something up with one or using it as an instrument of

political blackmail—is a problem specialists have studied going back to the mid-1970s. In those days, the concern

was not with apocalyptic, chiliastic groups like al Qaeda, but with instrumental terrorist groups like the PLO. The

difference between the two, while often exaggerated, is important. Instrumental terrorism wants to draw attention to

a cause, as in the airplane hijackings of the Palestinians in the 1970s. The terrorists weren‘t trying to kill lots of

people, just enough to extort the world‘s attention for use as leverage against target governments. If the aim was not

mass murder, then it is hard to see how nuclear weapons could have been of much use to them compared to the

difficulties of obtaining them—and indeed, no such terrorist organization ever made much of an effort to acquire

nuclear weapons.

Al Qaeda, on the other hand, does wish to kill large numbers of people, the more the better according to its

spokesmen, at least up to the wildly exaggerated numbers of Muslims they claim infidel Crusaders and Jews have

killed over the past eighty or so years, since the formal end of the Caliphate in 1924. Some significant figures in the

al Qaeda pantheon have said they want nuclear weapons for precisely this purpose, although many clerics that al

Qaeda figures respect say that such weapons are inherently immoral—so even on this point the matter is not clear-

cut.

As noted above, it is a mistake to exaggerate the difference between instrumental and apocalyptic forms of

terrorism. Al Qaeda had, and still has, an instrumental strategy; it is not about perpetrating mass murder for its own

sake. Its spokesmen have told us that al Qaeda perpetrated 9/11 in order to suck us into Afghanistan and the greater

Middle East to enervate and destroy us, just like Afghanistan proved to be the cemetery of the Soviet empire. The

―far enemy‖ humiliated and expelled, al Qaeda could then defeat its real enemies, the impious governments of Saudi

Arabia, Egypt and the rest.

So if al Qaeda is capable of strategic reasoning, says it wants nukes, and actually made an effort in 2002-04 to obtain

them in cahoots with the A.Q. Khan network, shouldn‘t we be extremely afraid? No. Just as it would be

irresponsible to ignore the threat of terrorism, it is irresponsible to exaggerate it. Thus, for example, contrary to what

some believe, al Qaeda is not stronger today, thanks to the supposed recruiting windfall provided by the Iraq war,

than it was in 2001-02. It is, not least, nearly broke, or its spokesmen would not be asking for money every time they

put out an Internet message. Al Qaeda has been fractured, too, which can cause new problems but which, on

balance, is a good thing. It‘s also vastly more unpopular throughout most Muslim societies because of the arrogant

and murderous way it has conducted itself in Iraq and elsewhere. Exaggerating the terrorist threat gives terrorists

more credit than they deserve, empowering them as avatars of anti-Western grievances, real and imagined. It also

diverts our attention and resources away from other problems where they could do more good.

Moreover, the threat of nuclear terrorism is very remote. The reason why, back in the 1970s-80s, people studied the

possibility of nuclear terrorism was because of a worry that nuclear weapons powers would give fissile material or a

bomb to a terrorist organization that would then use it against a mutual adversary with a ―no fingerprints‖ effect.

The fear was that we wouldn‘t necessarily be able to track back the attack to its real source in some state authority,

hence nuclear use would be more likely.

This was logical to a point, but it was always a far-fetched possibility; the USSR was an extremely conservative

power when it came to nuclear proliferation of all kinds, and China not less so. It is just as far-fetched now, if not

more so. Whether any state would actually give terrorists a finished bomb, confident that the target of use would not

retaliate against the original owner, I very much doubt. There‘s never been a case of nuclear terrorism or even a real

near-miss case. The most likely scenario right now concerns Pakistan, a country with nuclear weapons that is falling

apart at the seams. One could imagine scenarios in which a Talibanized Pakistan might give nukes to al Qaeda. But

it is far easier to imagine scenarios in which that does not happen. British and U.S. intelligence had their eye on

A.Q. Khan and associates for a long while before they rolled up the operation, so even that most daunting of

episodes was not as dangerous as some seem to think.

There have, of course, been several novels, dozens of action movies, and countless television shows featuring

terrorists who had somehow gotten their hands on a nuclear device. But none of these dramas ever explains credibly

how a bunch of ragtag dropouts and narcissists get their hands on or figure out how to build a useable nuclear

weapon. This is because they can‘t. It is, to understate the matter, not an easy thing to build a nuclear weapon, given

the physics, metallurgy, and engineering involved. It takes a fairly large space, a lot of people with different kinds of

specialties, and a fair amount of time and money. The material involved is not easy to hide or move, and it certainly

isn‘t easy to deliver a bomb to a target even if one could be fabricated or stolen. Some of the more imaginative

depictions of potential catastrophe would have us believe that terrorists could put a nuclear bomb in a suitcase. This

is nonsense. You‘ve got to be very sophisticated technically to get a nuke into a suitcase. If you‘re al Qaeda working

in a cave somewhere, even if you have some metallurgy experts and scientists trying to help you, getting a nuclear

device into a suitcase is even less likely than being able to launch Osama bin Laden into orbit.

And it‘s not as if there aren‘t a few dozen serious intelligence agencies around the world looking for evidence that

terrorists are trying to build, buy or steal nuclear weapons or materiel—and, the single aborted case noted above

aside, they haven‘t found anything. They are the Maytag repairmen of the global intelligence community. We should

be far more worried about terrorists getting their hands on biotoxins. The reason is that unlike nuclear physics and

engineering, bioscience and its applications are relatively unbounded. Bioscience today is an open-ended, rapidly

developing mode of scientific inquiry. Moreover, for a terrorist organization to engineer smallpox, say, and spread it

around, would require little space, fewer people and less time and money. It would be far easier to hide and to

deliver than a nuke that weighed a few thousand pounds.

Indeed, it would probably be so much easier to hide and deliver than if there were a bioweapons attack, it would not

be obvious right away whether it was in fact an attack or a naturally occurring event—for example a smallpox,

anthrax or possibly an Ebola outbreak. In the event of a nuclear terrorist incident, we would probably be able to

trace back to the source of the attack and would thus probably be able to retaliate or in other ways ensure that those

who struck us were never able to do so again. But after a bioweapons attack, it is more likely that we would not be

able to trace back the source. Biotechnology, especially in conjunction with nanotechnology, is being conducted

around the world today, and we do not even have a database on the research that is going on. There is no

international agreement to build such a database either. We ought to have one, or we may in fact end up living one

day in an age of WMD terror.

What about the question of whether nuclear deterrence still applies between nuclear weapon states, even if one

thinks terrorism a problem and nuclear terrorism a likelihood? Of course nuclear deterrence still applies. The

existence of al Qaeda has nothing to do with the maintenance of the strategic balance among Russia, the United

States, China, and so forth. No one in government whose responsibility it is to look after the viability of his

country‘s nuclear deterrent is going to become so preoccupied with terrorists that he stops doing that.

Most likely, even the suggestion that this might not be so rests on a misreading of the Bush administration‘s

September 2002 strategy white paper, the one remembered for its ―preemption‖ clause. Few people seem actually to

have read what the document said. It never said that strategic deterrence was obsolete, only that it wasn‘t an

adequate means of defending against non-state actors with no return address and no material assets we could put at

risk. The thinking was never either/or, but this+that. Most of people who managed to misunderstand this did so,

apparently, because they wanted to.

We can debate what the U.S. government ought or ought not to do to modernize its strategic arsenal. But this has

nothing to do with terrorism, except in one tangential way. Suppose, for instance, that we wanted to use ICBMs or

some other long-range strike instrument to hit terrorist camps or staging grounds for a terrorist attack about which

we had reliable and actionable intelligence. Some have suggested taking the nuclear warheads off of some of our

ICBMs and putting conventional warheads on top of them to use for that purpose, rather than trying to send a B-2

bomber from a base in Missouri, 14 hours away from the target. That‘s a perfectly sensible idea. (It hasn‘t been

accepted as a policy, however, because there are potential miscommunication problems with Russia. We don‘t want

the Russians to mistake a conventionally armed ICBM headed for some terrorist staging ground in Waziristan for a

nuke aimed at the Kremlin.) But if we implement this policy, the only effect it would have on nuclear deterrence is

that we would have a few less ICBMs with nuclear weapons. So what? We have many more than we need as it is.

Now what about our final question: Does deterrence, nuclear or not, apply to terrorism? Can we deter terrorists? The

answer is variably maybe; it depends; probably not most of the time. Most likely, too, even if we can find ways to

deter terrorism, our own nuclear weapons will have little if any role in the winning formula.

To really answer this question, however, or even to think about it coherently, we have to start with a deeper

understanding of what deterrence actually is. People throw the word around all the time without giving its definition

or character much thought. This cavalier approach will not help us understand how to think about deterring

terrorism.

Deterrence is only one thing military power can achieve. There are two other purposes, as well. One is compellence:

getting someone to do something that they wouldn‘t otherwise do. The second other thing military power can

achieve is reassurance. The U.S. 7th Fleet sails the Pacific to reassure all concerned that no act of compellence is

about to happen. Reassurance is what most military power does most of the time.

Deterrence is in between compellence and reassurance, so to speak. It‘s not getting somebody to do something they

don‘t want to do, nor is it reassuring anyone that nothing like that is about to happen. It‘s getting someone to not do

something that they otherwise might do, and there are basically two ways to achieve this: through the threat of

punishment and through the efficacy of defense. Either way, you can tell when deterrence fails, but not necessarily

when it succeeds. When it fails one witnesses an attempted act of compellence. When it succeeds, it collapses into

what looks like reassurance. I believe that had there been no nuclear weapons during the Cold War, the United

States and the Soviet Union would have fought a major war, but neither I nor anyone else can prove that deterrence

worked to prevent it.

Another way of getting at the essence of deterrence for the purpose of applying it to the deterrence of terrorism is to

describe the concept of a tacit move. The game of chess furnishes a good way to start as explanation. A chess player

at, say, the twelfth move of a game doesn‘t reason, ―I think I‘ll take my rook and move it five spaces forward; that

will scare the dickens out of my opponent.‖ Rather, the player says someone on the order of, ―OK, if I move my

rook five spaces forward, my opponent will move his bishop over there, and if he does that, then I‘ll have to move

my knight back, and he‘s then going to push his queen…‖ In other words, a competent player projects forward a

series of possibilities, in essence creates a decision-tree approach as to what might happen. While he is doing this,

his opponent is doing the same thing. When a move is finally made, it is the product of collapsing a series of tacit

moves into an actual move. Every move thus reveals some—but not all—information about what a player has been

thinking. When the other player makes a move in return, he also reveals some—but not all—information about what

he has been thinking. That‘s the basic logic of an assessment game, and deterrence is an assessment game.

Several things follow that are relevant to understanding terrorism. First, a simple assessment game is not about the

board or about the chess pieces in any simple way. It‘s about the players and their orientation to and skill for play.

The same is true with deterrence relationships of all kinds. It‘s not about the weapons. Whether they‘re nuclear or

other kinds, the weapons form parameters around what kind of action can happen. But players‘ moves are not tied

lockstep to the weapons. There‘s a great deal of flexibility based on the entwined imaginations of the players.

Deterrence is not fundamentally a technical relationship, but a psychological one.

This means that political culture, personality, idiosyncrasies and happenstance can affect the unfolding and

development of an assessment game, and hence of a deterrence relationship. There is no automatic, universally

guaranteed formula for deterrence. A force posture and a declaratory policy that deter some threats will not

necessarily deter all other threats. Deterrence can be difficult to establish, and difficult to be sure of, particularly as

we move from two-player to multi-player games.

Second, it follows from the idea of deterrence as a mutual assessment game that certain conditions must obtain for it

to work. There has to be a mutual commitment to play, and basic agreement on the rules. With terrorists,

unfortunately, there is no agreement on the rules. What al Qaeda says it wants to do is overthrow the state system

itself, to destroy the ruling framework.

As noted above in passing, for deterrence to work, there also has to be a return address. How can you deter, whether

by punishment or even defense, an act of terrorism if you don‘t know where it‘s liable to come from? The late 1960s

marked the first time that not one or two but three countries could field nuclear submarines with submarine-launched

ballistic missiles. The problem arose that if one day an SLBM slammed into Los Angeles, and there were both

Chinese and Soviet submarines out there, how would we know who launched it? This was so obvious that it became

the theme of one of the early James Bond movies (―You Only Live Twice,‖ 1967) in which the Chinese sought to

catalyze a war between the Russians and Americans, leaving them standing superior at the end.

Many professional security analysts have been thinking about these and other themes for application to the terrorism

problem, especially since 9/11. Some solutions are obvious in the realm of defense. You harden targets that terrorists

might attack. You beef up, without overdoing it as we have, airport security. You change your intelligence protocols

to focus more on human intelligence rather than on just signal and photo-reconnaissance intelligence in order to find

out what you need to know about what terrorists are intending. You take their ideas seriously even if their

capabilities are limited. We can do this multilaterally, as well, as some have suggested, by giving the IAEA an

intelligence shop. We‘ve been slow to do any of this.

Other not-so-obvious things we can do, and in some cases have been doing, include beefing up our forensic

capabilities to give us a better chance of knowing where an attack comes from. If terrorists think you‘re not going to

be able to figure out who attacked, they may be more inclined to hit you; if they think a retaliation will make the

terrorists less popular among constituencies they care about, they may be less likely to strike. Here there is no

substitute for understanding the groups you want to deter. Terrorist organizations like Hamas and Hezballah are

enmeshed in a social vortex, in a community they care about to one degree or another, and so they may be deterrable

indirectly. Al Qaeda, on the other hand, has no social context; it has no social program of any kind, so it is much

harder to hold anything at risk its leaders care about.

As to deterrence through punishment, we could say, and have said as a matter of declaratory policy (Bush Doctrine

version 1.0), that we will attack not only terrorists who strike us (if we can find them) but any state or state agents

that helped terrorists by providing them safe haven or other resources. The idea here is to provide incentives for

responsible state agents, or merely self-interestedly prudent ones, to distance themselves from terrorists who would

harm Americans and others. This amounts to a sort of reverse extended deterrence via a threat of punishment:

instead of using the threat of force to protect friends once removed, one uses the threat of force to make enemies

vulnerable once removed.

We could also raise costs to terrorists by attacking them with special forces and other covert operations. When it

comes to terrorists who might be thinking about bioterrorism or nukes, we could kill greedy or sympathetic

scientists or engineers willing to help them. This is deterrence by preemptive punishment, but it spills over into

deterrence by defense, as well. We could also drain al Qaeda and other groups of trained personnel and time and

money by enticing plotters we identify toward false flag operations, toward dud weapons, and other diversions.

The point of doing all these things would be to show terrorist groups that they can‘t succeed, to frustrate them in

such a way that they would channel their chiliastic energies inside rather than outside toward us until they burn

themselves through.

We could also, in theory, threaten to attack not states that support terrorists but targets all Sunni terrorists revere,

like the holy mosques in Mecca. Of course, this would be a very stupid, counterproductive thing to do, but I mention

it because I have actually heard people propose actions like this. We could try to mobilize Shia groups, for example,

against Sunni extremist groups. This would also be difficult and probably stupid, because there are also terrorist

versions of Shia Islam, and the unanticipated consequences of such actions could easily outrun their uses. Not

everything we might do we should do.

And not everything we might do we actually can do. In theory we could ramp up our efforts to persuade mainstream

Muslim clergy abroad to denounce Salafi theology and behavior, try to stigmatize terrorism the same way prior

generations stigmatized slavery and piracy. This would hurt al Qaeda‘s ability to recruit and reduce its resource

base. We might persuade some respectable clergy to ex-communicate al Qaeda leaders. After all, when Bin Laden

issues a fatwa, a religious edict, he‘s a fraud because he‘s not a cleric. We‘ve tried to do these things, to network

mainstream Muslims who are not Salafi, for example, but we have not had much success. We should keep trying,

but we should be aware that it is inherently difficult and can be counterproductive for non-Muslims to try to

manipulate or shape relations among Muslims.

So the problem is a hard one, particularly if we‘re dealing with apocalyptic terrorists who have no return address, no

assets to protect, and who may actually want to die. The only thing we can reliably do to deter them is to kill them

before they can hurt us, and that is not easy. Are we helpless otherwise?

No, we are not. All the foregoing are things we might do are ―out there,‖ against them. There‘s one thing we can do

―in here,‖ for ourselves. We can train our society better not to be terrorized. The purpose of terrorism, after all, is to

terrorize people and get them to be untrue to their own interests and values. If we refuse to play our part of the game,

then the bad guys will lose interest over time. If the terrorists refuse to play by our rules, we certainly should not

play by theirs.

This means really taking homeland security seriously, teaching people how to deal, literally and psychologically,

with disasters, manmade and natural, building resilience into our society at a higher order. We need to quit

cooperating inadvertently with terrorists by doing their job for them. We need to stop taking overboard steps that

show we‘re afraid, which tell every potential terrorist, whether domestic or foreign, that it‘s easy to scare

Americans—that all you have to do is frighten the Americans once, and they‘ll do extremely expensive and

counterproductive things, essentially bureaucratizing and thus perpetuating their own paranoia.[1] We can make our

era an ―age of terrorism‖ if we‘re foolish enough to do so. Let‘s not, OK?

Notes

1. ^See Adam Garfinkle, ―Comte‘s Caveat: How we Misunderstand Terrorism,‖ Orbis, Summer 2008.

http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1410.200905.garfinkle.nucleardeterrenceterrorism.html

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