Interchange, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Fall, 1990), aA. A,A.

Creativity, Discovery, and Science Education: Kuhn and Feyerabend Revisited

Sharon Bailin University of Manitoba

Contemporary education has been very much under the influence of a particular view of the nature of creativity, a view that has its origins in psychological theory. According to this view, creativity is marked by radical novelty, lack of constraints, rule-breaking and irrational processes of thought (e.g., De Bono, 1970; Koestler, 1964). The influence of this view has extended beyond the sphere of arts education, and has had an effect, as well, in the area of science education. Such a tendency is reinforced by certain contemporary views about the nature of discovery and theory change in science, namely those of Kuhn and Feyerabend. Such views, which stress innovation and radical change, discontinuity between scientific products and their antecedents, the violation of rules of method, and the lack of objective criteria for the evaluation of new theories are very much of a piece with the more general view of the nature of creativity. In this paper, the parallels between the views of Kuhn and Feyerabend and this general view of creativity will be drawn. The paper will lay out some of the kinds of criticisms which can be and have been levelled against the views of these philosophers of science and will show that they are really subsets of the criticisms to which the more general view of creativity is subject. Finally, the paper will explore the implications for science education entailed by the rejection of such views of creativity in general and of science in particular.

The Contemporary View of Creativity

The concept of creativity has been the focus of much recent attention. Considerable psychological research has been devoted to investigating the nature of the creative process and how it can be encouraged. In the aesthetic realm, there is continuing interest in the nature of artistic creation and how it might be fostered through art education. And even in the field of science, there has been recent focus on innovation and radical change in thinking about scientific discovery and on divergence and imagination in science pedagogy. In fact, fostering creativity has come to be seen as a fundamental educational goal in all spheres of endeavour.

Although there are some differences among the accounts of creativity which prevailin the various areas, a fairly consistent picture of the nature of creativity does emerge. There are a number of common features and shared beliefs about the nature of creativity. One common belief is that creativity is closely connected with originality with respect to the generation of novelty. Creativity is seen to involve that which is new, unusual, and disconnected with the ordinary and the accepted. Thus it involves a radical break with existing traditions, and a fundamental change in conceptual frameworks.

This discontinuity view of creativity is the basis of the common assumption that the value of creative products cannot be objectively determined. If creativity is characterized by a radical break with past traditions and their accompanying conceptual schemes, then it appears that there are no standards according to which creative works can be assessed; therefore, their evaluation is entirely subjective.

34 Interchange, Vol. 21/3 © The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education

CREATIVITY, DISCOVERY, AND SCIENCE EDUCATION 35

A further belief of the contemporary view is that creativity is characterized by a specific mode of thinking or process which is different from ordinary thinking. Ordinary thinking, according to this view, is characterized by logic, habit, rigidity, strict judgment, and the adherence to previously established rules and patterns. Creative thinking, on the other hand, is marked by leaps of imagination, irrational processes, rule-breaking, the suspension of judgment, and the spontaneous generation of ideas. Because this creative process is consid- ered to be, of necessity, free and unconstrained, involving as it does the breaking of rules and established patterns, the rules, skills, and knowledge of specific disciplines are thought to be constraining, locking one into the prevailing conceptual framework.

Kuhn and Feyerabend on Scientific Discovery

This picture of creativity has held considerable sway in contemporary thinking about creative activity, and this is the case not only for theories of artistic creation, but also for theories about the nature of discovery and theory change in science. The views of Kuhn (1962) and Feyerabend (1975) in particular reflect salient features of this view of creativity.

Both Kuhn and Feyerabend hold views of theory change in science which stress radical innovation and the lack of continuity between scientific products and their antecedents. Kuhn draws a sharp distinction between revolutionary science and normal science. Normal science describes ordinary scientific practice, that activity which takes place according to a fixed paradigm or framework which serves as a guide to research, specifying the problems to be undertaken and the procedures, rules, and standards to be used in investigating these problems. Such normal scientific activity is highly rule-bound, uncritical of the assumptions of the paradigm, and essentially unoriginal.

Revolutionary science, on the other hand, is characterized by a radical departure from the prevailing paradigm. It involves the overthrow of the presuppositions underlying the old paradigm, and the establishment of a radically new framework. This new framework or paradigm is not simply a logical outcome or continuation of the previous one, but involves a radically new way of viewing phenomena and is, thus, incommensurable with the old paradigm. The postulation and acceptance of the heliocentric view of planetary organization would be an example of this kind of revolutionary science, upsetting the presupposition that centrality and fixity were necessary properties of the earth, and establishing a whole new framework for astronomical observations and theory. Likewise, the theory of relativity, involving as it did aradical change in our concept of time, would also exemplify revolutionary science.

For Kuhn, all scientific practice is of one of these two distinct kinds. It is either normal science, in which the implications of a paradigm are worked out in a systematic way and puzzles are solved according to established methods, or it is revolutionary science, in which old paradigms are overthrown and radically new theories are invented. Revolutionary scientific discovery is, for Kuhn, the locus of scientific creativity, and such revolutionary developments are discontinuous with previously accepted theories in the area. Thus the tenet of the contemporary view of creativity that creative achievements involve a radical break with existing tradition and a fundamental change of conceptual scheme is clearly manifested in Kuhn's account.

Feyerabend's view also rests on the belief in conceptual discontinuity between successive theories. He claims that there are metaphysical presuppositions (what he calls natural interpretations) inherent in every theory. They are "ideas so closely connected with observa- tions that it needs a special effort to realize their existence and to determine their content" (1975, p. 69). These natural interpretations are closely related to sensory impressions and are embedded in observation language. Thus a prevailing theory will determine the way in which

36 SHARON BAILIN

experience is seen and described. Theonly way in which progress is possible is by the positing of a theory which is radically different from and unconnected with the prevailing theory, with new natural interpretations. Thus theory change, for Feyerabend, involves a radical change of conceptual framework, again echoing an aspect of the contemporary view.

Both Kuhn and Feyerabend also subscribe to the tenet of the contemporary view which follows from this discontinuity, namely, that the evaluation of creative products is problem- atic. If created works are discontinuous with the tradition out of which they arise, and if they break the rules and transcend the standards of the tradition, then the standards of assessment inherent in the tradition cannot provide the basis for the evaluation of these products. According to this view, then, there are no objective criteria for the evaluation of creations, and appeal must be made to subjective factors in order to explain our valuing of novel products.

Aspects of Kuhn's theory can be seen as conforming to this view of scientific value. He claims that paradigms are incommensurable, that is, they can be evaluated only by criteria inherent in a particular paradigm. There are no paradigm-neutral standards by which they can be judged. This would seem to imply that there are no objective criteria for choosing between paradigms, and so it is largely psychological factors and consensus amongst scientists which determine which paradigm succeeds. The acceptance of a new paradigm is characterized by Kuhn as a conversion or a gestalt switch, thereby emphasizing the subjective aspect of evaluation. 1

Feyerabend goes even farther, to point out that alleged scientific method is constantly violated in actual practice, that there are metaphysical presuppositions underlying every theory, and that irrationality is, and must be, a part of scientific activity:

Without a frequent dismissal of reason, no progress. Ideas which today form the very basis of science exist only because there were such things as prejudice, conceit, passion: because these things opposed reason and because they were permitted to have their way. We have to conclude, then, that even within science, reason cannot and should not be allowed to be comprehensive and that itmust often be overruled, or eliminated in favour of other agencies .... Given science, reason cannot be universal and unreason cannot be excluded. (1975, pp.179-180)

What these views have in common is that they offer a challenge to the view that there are objective criteria for the assessment of scientific theories. Support for this perspective is derived from the fact that there is not necessarily agreement among proponents of competing theories on the standards of assessment for the theories, that there do not seem to be any standards of assessment which remain constant over time, that subjective factors are evident with respect to theory choice in actual scientific practice, and that there does not seem to be any one procedure which can be deemed to be the scientific method. Moreover, Kuhn's description of the acceptance of a new theory as a conversion or gestalt switch emphasizes the non-rational aspect of theory change, and the irrationality of scientific discovery is even more pronounced in Feyerabend's account.

One of the main assumptions of the contemporary view is that creativity necessarily involves going beyond or breaking rules, and that this is, in fact, its defining characteristic. This idea is based on the view that ordinary thinking is confined within rigid frameworks. These frameworks are characterized by rules which define the modes of proceeding within the framework, but they cannot provide the means to transcend the framework itself. Such rules are, in fact, seen to be inhibiting to creativity because they tend to keep one locked into the prevailing framework.

The notion that rules are inhibiting to creativity can be applied to science as well. Here the argument is made that the rules which underlie any scientific activity are specific to the particular framework but cannot be of assistance when what is required is the transcending of the framework itself. This is precisely what is required in the case of revolutionary scientific

CREATIVITY, DISCOVERY, AND SCIENCE EDUCATION 37

discovery, however, and so rules are constraining to innovation in science. This sort of argument is given support by Kuhn's emphasis on the revolutionary nature of discovery in science. If scientific development does exhibit the sort of discontinuity which Kulm suggests, then the rules of one framework would be inapplicable in terms of making discoveries.

Another version of the view that rules are inhibiting to scientific discovery is in terms of rules of method. The traditional picture of science involves the idea that the scientific enterprise is characterized by a very specific method, the scientific method, and that adherence to this method is what gives scientific knowledge its special status and what enables science to progress. Feyerabend calls this view into question, however, claiming that there are no rules of method which are consistent and invariable with respect to all scientific practice and furthermore that such rules of method would be detrimental to scientific discovery and progress. He says,

The idea of a method that contains firm, unchanging and absolutely binding principles for conducting the business of science meets considerable difficulty when confronted with the results of historical research. Indeed, one of the most striking features of recent discussions in the history and philosophy of science is the realization that events and developments, such as the invention of atomism in antiquity, the Copernican Revolution, the rise of modem atomism, the gradual em~gence of the wave theory of light, occurred only because some thinkers either decided not to be bound by certain "obvious" methodological rules, or because they unwittingly broke them. (1975, p. 23)

His denial of the existence of a unique scientific method is based on an examination of historical instances. Feyerabend claims that none of the methodological rules which are commonly proposed as characterizations of the scientific method are consistently adhered to in actual practice. He argues that scientists do not, in fact, abandon theories on the basis of contradictory evidence, but use falsified theories all the time, saving them by means of questioning the testing methods or the auxiliary hypotheses, Anomalies do not, then, cause a theory's abandonment, as some proponents of scientific method would claim, since all theories contain, and indeed must contain, anomalies. Science then, according to Feyerabend, often proceeds counter-inductively, using hypotheses that are in opposition to established theories or facts.

The claim is not, however, that scientists ought to use good scientific method but are remiss in actual practice. It is rather that the existence of such a method, of such rigid rules of procedure, would actually inhibit scientific progress. This is clearly a version of the "rules as inhibiting to creativity" claim. Feyerabend's argument for this proceeds as follows. Because of the natural interpretations which are inherent in every theory, a prevailing theory will determine the way in which experience is seen and so will never be refuted by observation or analysis. It is, then, self-perpetuating. The only way the hold of a prevailing theory can be broken and progress can be made is by the positing of an entirely new theory, unconnected with the old one, with its own new natural interpretations. The old theory can then be analyzed in the light of the new theory. This sort of activity, however, does not and indeed could not conform to a method since any rules of method would keep one locked into the prevailing theory. It is, rather, irrational and anarchistic. The only method which Feyerabend acknowl- edges as applicable to scientific discovery is "anything goes."

Critique of the Contemporary View

There are numerous difficulties with these views of Kulm and Feyerabend, difficulties which have been pointed out by many philosophers and historians of science, and some of these problems are specific instances of more general problems with the contemporary view of

38 SHARON BAK/N

creativity. The first problem is that evidence does not support the claim that created works involve radical breaks with the past nor that they are discontinuous with the preceding tradition. This has been shown to be as true for scientific theories as for artistic products and other created works. Thus Kuhn's radical distinction between revolutionary science and normal science cannot hold up under scrutiny. Numerous historians and philosophers of science have demonstrated that even scientific discoveries of an apparently revolutionary kind have their roots in the problems and the paradigms of previous theories, that there are continuities between successive theories, and that scientific development is more gradual than the Kuhnian model suggests (e.g., Popper, 1970, 1981; Toulmin, 1970. The sources of such criticisms are many and these are but two examples). Hattiangadi, for example, outlines Newton's development of the law of gravitation in terms of entirely logical and cogent physical and mathematical arguments based upon reflection on theories ofthetime (1980, pp. 257-265). Brown emphasizes the continuity between successive theories and makes the following comment with respect to Einstein's "revolutionary" discoveries:

Beginning from an existing theory, i.e., an answer to a question, Einstein gives reasons why this answer is inadequate and proposes a new solution, one which may be quite different from the one he rejects but which nonetheless take its departure from some of the ideas of the rejected hypothe- sis. Einstein conseionsly built his new theory on a foundation provided by the classical physics he was overttmaing. (1977, p. 138)

And Miller's historical account of the seminal developments in early 20th century physics demonstrates clearly that the transformations of concepts involved in these discoveries were gradual. Miller vividly describes "the struggles that constitute some of the fine structure in the transition between the old and new quantum theories" (1984, p. 301) and he summarizes the implications for the notion of scientific revolutions as follows:

The notion of scientific revolutions describes only the gross structure of scientific change. In the free structure, where change is gradual, resides the fascinating problem of the nature of creative scientific thinking. (1984, p. 312)

The above all pose serious challenges to the idea that revolutionary scientific discoveries are discontinuous with the previous tradition. All scientific activity essentially involves working out the problems posed by the history of the tradition, and so science does not seem to be characterized by two radically different kinds of practice, one highly original and the other not. A more plausible picture is that scientific products lie on a continuum ranging from mildly to highly original. Evidence does not seem to support the claim that scientific development exhibits radical discontinuity,

This argument also undermines the claim of the contemporary view that there are no objective criteria for the evaluation of creative products. One of the grounds for asserting the impossibility of objective evaluation is the alleged discontinuity between paradigms or frameworks. If new paradigms are not continuations of previous paradigms but are radically different, then, it is argued, the rules and standards of the previous paradigm cannot provide the basis for evaluation of the new one. This notion of discontinuity has been shown to be problematic, however, and if there are continuities, then they can provide one basis for the assessment of new products. This would apply to the assessment of scientific theories as well as to any other created product.

Another basis for evaluation can be found in the overarching method of science. Feyerabend's view that there are no rules of method which are consistent and invariable with respect to all scientific practice might seem to call this claim into doubt. But it has been argued, by Siegel (1985b) for example, that although there is no one procedure or technique which

CREATIVITY, DISCOVERY, AND SCIENCE EDUCATION 39

Can be considered to be the method of science, scientific method can be identified in its general principles of appraisal. The specific instantiations of such principles do vary over time, but a constant commitment to the evaluation of theories on the basis of such principles, a commitment to evidence, is what characterizes scientific method. Siegel states that

SM [scientific method] can and should be characterized generally, as consisting in, for example, a concern for explanatory adequacy, however that adequacy is conceived; an insistence on testing, however testing is thought to be best done; and a commitment to inductive support, bower er inductive inference is thought to be best made. In short, changes in specific views about the construal of rations aspects of SM are not sufficient to show that the aspects themselves have changed. Methodological constancy does not involve specific construals of various evaluative criteria, but rather a general commitment to such criteria, however construed. (p. 528)

This construal of the notion of scientific method provides some grounds for addressing the argument that there are no standards for the evaluation of scientific theories which transcend the bounds of a particular scientific paradigm, These kinds of general, methodological considerations can provide just such standards. Although there may be disagreement, in debates between paradigms, about what constitutes an adequate explanation and about how evidence is to be interpreted, the necessity for explanatory adequacy and empirical support provide overarching standards for evaluation. 2 Indeed, it is the existence of such standards which makes debate regarding paradigms possible, and potentially fruitful.

Another argument proposed by both Kuhn and Feyerabend which may seem to challenge the idea of objective standards is that, in actual scientific practice, subjective factors do often enter into the process of theory choice? This is a claim for which there is ample evidence and one which would, in general, not be disputed by philosophers and historians of science. Science, whatever else it may be, is a social enterprise conducted by human beings of particular genders, races, and classes in particular social and political contexts. But even if we grant the existence of psychological and social factors in scientific practice, this does not mean that science reduces to a totally subjective practice nor is it an argument against the existence of some objective standards. It is always possible to ask whether the choice of a particular theory is a good one, whether a particular decision is justified, whether a particular belief is well-founded. The fact that such questions are both possible and meaningful indicates that theory choice is not reducible to subjective factors, that assessment of choices and decisions is possible, and that there are objective grounds for doing so (Siegel, 1980). And a crucial task is to distinguish the objective aspects of scientific theory and practice from the subjective. In discussing the problems in moving from a recognition that science is a social process to a relativistic view of scientific knowledge, Fox Keller makes the following observations:

The intellectual danger resides in viewing science as pure social product; science then dissolves into ideology and objectivity loses all inlximic meaning . . . . In short, rather than abandon the quintessentially human effort to understand the world in rational terms, we need to refine that effort. To do this, we need to add to the familiar methods of rational and empirical inquiry the additional process of critical seN-reflection. (1987, pp. 237-238)

It appears, then, that the view that the creative products of science cannot be evaluated objectively but only subjectively in terms of some type of holistic realignment of our perceptions and world view can be seriously questioned. There do seem to be some objective standards by which scientific products can be assessed, and these are provided beth by the rules, problems, methods and criteria which are continuous between frameworks, and by the overarching methodological recta-criteria of science which transcend particular frameworks,

40 SHARON BAILIN

The claim of the contemporary view that creativity centrally involves rule-breaking and, moreover, that rules are inhibiting to creative achievement is also highly questionable. First, it is clear from our previous discussion that not all rules are broken in light of an innovation. It is sometimes the case that one or more of the rules of the accepted framework must be rejected in the process of arriving at a creation. Some elements of the previous framework must remain, however, elements in light of which the new slructure will make sense and be fruitful. Perkins makes this point well:

The fact remains that no one can depart from much of the preselectlon at once andexpect to make progress. The nmthemafician cannot discard the familiar axioms and conventional notation and traditions about which sorts of questions are worthwhile and the usual format for proofs .... What we perceive as revolutionary innovation in a field always challenges only a lime of the preselecdon. Only because we focus on the contrast rather than the continuity does innovation seem so much of a departure. (1981, p. 279)

This point can be illustrat~ with respect to Einstein's theory of relativity. This discovery is frequently cited as a prime instance of the destruction of an existing framework and the overturning of presuppositions. Yet it was Einstein's commitment to the presupposition that the laws of physics are invariant which necessitated his ultimate abandonment of the presupposition of absolute time. Some presuppositions must remain, some elements of the existing structure which give meaning to the enterprise and according to which judgments can be made. If this is the case, then the prevailing framework or conceptual scheme and its accompanying rules are important for scientific discovery.

Feyerabend's claim that rules of method would be detrimental to scientific progress is also plagued with difficulties. It rests on the view that theories are discontinuous and incommen- surable and that, thus, in order to break out of the hold of the prevailing theory, one must ignore all rules and posit an entirely new theory in an unconstrained manner. This assumption has been shown to be questionable.

But what of his claim that there is no such thing as scientific method7 It is necessary to differentiate two senses in which the claim regarding the impossibility of scientific method can be made. One is the view that there is no scientific method in terms of definitive rules for the evaluation of scientific theories. This is a view which has been examined and rejected.

The second sense in which claims are made regarding the impossibility of scientific method is with respect to rules for the generation or creation of scientific hypotheses or theories. Some philosophers such as Feyerabend would deny that there can be a method of science with respect to either the generation or the evaluation of theories, and would, in fact, deny the distinction between the two. For others, however, this distinction is crucial (Reichenbach, 1938). Popper, for example, fully endorses the notion that there is a scientific method in terms of a method for the assessment of theories but sees the generation of theories as an irrational process which admits of no logical method (Popper, 1968).

Now it must be granted that there is no logic Of discovery in terms of an algorithmic procedure for creating scientific hypotheses or theories. There are no specific procedures which will ensure the generation of successful theories. Nonetheless, this does not imply that scientific discovery is irrational and not at all rule-governed. On the contrary, the process of discovery is very much constrained by rules. Even in cases of the creation of radically new theories where some methodological rides are broken, most rules are followed. And even the violation of specific rules is ultimately governed by the kinds of methodological meta-rules which constrain the assessment of theories. In scientific discovery, rules are violated in order to solve an outstanding problem, and the met,a-rules which govern the ultimate appraisal of the proposed solution such as fit with data, simplicity, and fruitfulness exercise control over the possibilities which are generated. Thus the criteria of justification and the methodological meta-rules which issue from them play a central role in discovery as well.

CREATIVITY, DISCOVERY, AND SCIENCE EDUCATION 41

One reason for the general failure to acknowledge the crucial role of rules in discovery as well as in evaluation might be related to the separation made between discovery and justification. Now this distinction is an important one in philosophy of science and is necessary in order to properly locate scientific rationality in justificatory principles and to eliminate psychological and sociological factors from the epistemological endeavour. It is an error, however, to conceive of actual scientific activity as neatly separable into a generative phase which is non-evaluative and a subsequent evaluative phase. It is one thing to make a conceptual distinction between discovery and justification in order to rule out psychological factors from consideration in the assessment of theories. (This is the claim that factors relevant to discovery are irrelevant to justification.) But it does not follow that the process of science is characterized by distinct evaluative and non-evaluative phases. The idea that the generation of creative ideas does not involve evaluation is completely untenable. If there were not some initial constraints on the possibilities generated, the results would not be creation but chaos. The generation of scientific ideas is very much constrained by n~es, in this case the rules which govern the assessment of these ideas. Thus, although it may be the case that considerations related to discovery are irrelevant to justification, nonetheless considerations of justification are very relevant, indeed crucial to discovery.

Hattiangadi (1980) has, in fact, effectively argued the impossibility of clearly distinguish- ing pure contexts of discovery. He demonstrates, using as an example Newton's discovery of gravity, how any idea which might be considered to be in a context of discovery with respect to a new theory is itself part of the context of justification of a previous idea out of which it has developed. Thus one ends up with nested contexts of justification, and any pure contexts of discovery become rare.

We can conclude from this discussion that creativity and discovery are not grounded in a distinctive kind of thinking which is non-rational, non-logical, strictly generative, and unconstrained. Rather, they are grounded in critical thinking, which has both a generative and an evaluative component inseparably connected. The idea that creativity is grounded in such irrational processes is based on the view that thinking normally takes place within fixed fi~maeworks and is analytic and evaluative but non-generative and thus a special kind of thinking is required to transcend frameworks, thinking that is generative but non-judgmental. This view creates a picture of traditional disciplines, including science, as static, discontinu- ous bodies of information and procedures which are bound by rules which apply within frameworks but not between them. Creativity, then, cannot be explained by any processes inherent in disciplines but instead requires the postulation of extraordinary, irrational processes which are external to disciplines.

This picture misrepresents at a very fundamental level the nature and structure of disciplines, however. They do not consist in static, fixed bodies of information and tech- niques. Rather, they are traditions of knowledge and inquiry which are alive and open ended. They consist not merely in information but also in questions and in procedures for investigat- ing these questions. And even the bodies of facts are not fixed but are in flux, as are some aspects of the inquiry procedures. There are unresolved issues, ongoing debates, and areas of controversy within every discipline, and these provide the impetus for evolution and change. Traditions evolve and this change grows out of continual attempts to resolve the problems of the discipline, both exisi~g and new. Truly creative innovation, change which is significant, is not a product of arbitrary novelty, of uninformed intuition, but emerges, rather, out of a deep understanding of the nature of the tradition and of its principles.

This is not to deny an insight that might be gleaned from the views of Knhn and Feyerabend, and that is that thinking does sometimes become fixed within frameworks and it can be difficult to transcend a framework. This can be seen, however, not as a case of being trapped by the critical procedures of the discipline, but rather as a failure to be sufficiently critical.

42 SHARON BAR.IN

Science Education

The contemporary view of creativity, as manifested in the views of scientific discovery we have been examining, may have a number of different consequences for education. Kuhn, on the one side, makes a strict separation between the ordinary, uncreative activities of normal science and the highly creative activities of revolutionary science, and advocates an education for the former only (Kuhn, 1961a, 1961b). Thus he seems to endorse a kind of dogmatism, where prospective scientists are initiated into the dominant paradigm without any indication of the history of the tradition, without any sense that paradigms rise and fall, and without any encouragement to be critical of the current paradigm3 He supports this position by noting that normal science constitutes the major part of scientific activity and it would be counter- productive for normal scientists to question the paradigm which defines and gives meaning to the puzzles they are trying to solve. Moreover, revolutionary science has its basis in normal scientific activity in that this type of research reveals the anomalies which precipitate the crises leading to revolutions. Kuhn claims, in fact, that science would not have exhibited the progress which it has if scientists were not oriented exclusively in a unique tradition. There is no effort specifically to encourage revolutionary science presumably because it is grounded in irrational processes and could not be fostered through education.

On the other side are those who want science education to attempt to promote the creative activities of scientists, and so advocate an emphasis on divergent thinking (Getzels & Jackson, 1963) and non-rational processes (e.g., brainstorming, analogies), and a downplaying of skills and knowledge as these are potentially inhibiting to creative thought. Flexibility and open- mindedness are considered the cornerstones of discovery. The effective scientist must, it is believed,

lack prejudice to a degree where he can look at the most "self-evident" facts or concepts without necessarily accepting them, and, conversely, allow his imagination to play with the most unlikely possibilities. (Selye quoted in Kuhn 1961a, pp. 341-342)

I would maintain that both these approaches ought to be rejected. There are not two distinct goals, one of training the non-creative normal scientist and the other of fostering the creative thinking of the revolutionary scientist. Rather, the one goal is to educate for critical thinking in science, and this is likely the best way to try to promote both effective problem-solving within a paradigm and effective problem-solving which leads to the questioning or rejection of some aspect of a paradigm.

Thus one ought to reject, on the one hand, the extreme of unquestioning acceptance of the dominant tradition. If our preceding account is correct, then revolutionary science is not so uncritical as Kuhn maintains, but neither is normal science so uncreative. The scientist's activity is always a blend of invention and critical judgment. Critical and creative thinking are as necessary to the "puzzle-solver" as to the maker of revolutions, and indeed the gap between the two is not nearly so wide as Kuhn suggests. We might well agree, then, with Popper's contention that the normal scientist as described by Kulm is one who has been badly taught (1970, p. 53). ~

One ought to reject, as well, the opposite extreme of abandonment of the rules and knowledge of the tradition. Scientific discovery grows out of the procedures and problems of the current paradigm, and so it is a repertoire of skills and knowledge which forms the basis for eventual ground-breaking achievement. There is considerable validity in Kuhn's claim that "only investigations firmly rooted in the contemporary scientific tradition are likely to break that tradition and give rise to a new one" (1961a, p. 343). Kulm is right about the importance of the knowledge and rules of the prevalent tradition. Where he errs is in advocating an uncritical stance towards them.

CREATIVITY, DISCOVERY, AND SCIENCE EDUCATION 43

What we ought to promote, then, is critical inquiry, involving an in-depth understanding of the principles and procedures of the tradition, of the method of investigation, of the standards of assessment, and of the over-arching goals of the inquiry. Central to this is an understanding that science is not merely a static collection of information, but is, rather, a mode of inquiry containing questions which have not yet been answered, controversial issues, ongoing debates, and, perhaps most important, critical procedures. Thus criticism must be understood as central to the scientific enterprise. And it must be understood that the possibility for creativity in science is afforded by the critical and thus evolutionary nature of scientific inquiry and that it does not require an abandonment of disciplinary skills nor a reliance on irrational processes?

Correspondence Address: Sharon Bailin, Department of Educational Administration and Foundations, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba R3T 2N2.

No~s

This paper is based, in part, on Sharon Bailin's book, Achieving Extraordinary Ends: An Essay on Creativity (1988).

1. Kutm has at times denied that his view is radically subjective (e.g., Kuhn, 1977). It has, however, been demonstrated that a consistent interpretation of Kuhn's view necessarily leads to the radical subjectivity thesis (Scheffler, 1982; Siegel, 1980).

2. Kuhn himself does acknowledge this point in writings subsequent to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (e.g., Kutm, 1977).

3. One example would be the androcentric bias which many feminists claim marks much scientific practice. See, for example, Fox Keller (1985), Harding & O'Barr (1987), Wylie & Okruhlik (1987).

4. Although Kulm does, at one point (196 lb, p. 390) state that his account is descriptive and that he is not necessarily defending current techniques of science education, his continual assertion that dogmatic edueafionhas been"immensely effective" and"highly suecessful,"his claim that there are goodreasons why science education is the way it is, and his claim that science would not have progressed the way it has without an education fostering unquestioned commitment to a unique tradition seem to indicate that he sees this type of dogmatism as valuable.

5. For a detailed examination of the implications ofKutm's views for science education, see Siegel ( 1978 & 1985a).

6. Some specific approaches to science pedagogy which conform to this orientation are teaching science not as a"rhetoric of conclusions" but as fluid inquiry (Schwab, 1962), exposing students to competing methods and paradigras (Martin, 1972), getting students to view scientific material as arguments to be critically assessed (Manicas, 1986), and teaching the history and philosophy of science.

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Getzels, L W., & Jackson, P. W.(1963). The highly intelligent and the highly creative adolescent: A

44 SHARON BAH.IN

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