crim 2_first cases

No. L-37007. July 20, 1987.*
RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan, and ARMANDO VALDEZ, petitioners, vs. ANGELITO C.
SALANGA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan (Branch IV), and JUAN TUVERA, SR., respondents.
Criminal Law; Evidence; Arbitrary Detention; Concept of and
elements of the crime of arbitrary detention.— Arbitrary Detention is
committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a person.
The elements of this crime are the following: 1. That the offender is a public
officer or employee. 2. That he detains a person. 3. That the detention is
without legal grounds.
Same; Same; Same; Public officers liable for arbitrary detention
must be vested with authority to detain or order the detention of persons
accused of a crime.— The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must
be vested with authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused
of a crime. Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of the
law, the judges or mayors.
Same; Same; Same; Barangay captains recognized as persons
inauthority.— Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law,
barrio lieutenants, (who were later named barrio captains and now barangay
captains) were recognized as persons in authority. In various cases, this
Court deemed them as persons in authority, and convicted them of Arbitrary
Detention.
Same; Same; Same; Same; One need not be a police officer to be
chargeable with arbitrary detention; A barrio captain having the same duty
as the mayor of maintaining peace and order, he can be liable for arbitrary
detention; Case at bar.— One need not be a police officer to be chargeable
with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges
and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this
crime. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show
that they are similar to those of a barrio captain except that in the case of the
latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of
maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to
detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private
respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he
as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez. From the
foregoing. there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private respondent
Tuvera, Sr., can be held liable for Arbitrary Detention.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Motion to quash; Courts
in resolving a motion to quash cannot consider facts contrary to those
alleged in the information or which do not appear on the face of the
information because said motion is a hypothetical admission of the facts
alleged in the information; Exception.— Next, private respondent Tuvera,
Sr. contends that the motion to quash was validly granted as the facts and
evidence on record show that there was no crime of Arbitrary Detention;
that he only sought the aid and assistance of the Manaoag Police Force; and
that he only accompanied petitioner Valdez to town for the latter's personal
safety. Suffice it to say that the above allegations can only be raised as a
defense at the trial as they traverse what is alleged in the Information. We
have repeatedly held that Courts, in resolving a motion to quash, cannot
consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information or which do not
appear on the face of the information. This is because a motion to quash is a
hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. Matters of
defense cannot be proved during the hearing of such a motion, except where
the Rules expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal liability,
prescription, and former jeopardy. In the case of U.S. vs. Perez, this Court
held that a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense cannot allege new facts not only different but
diametrically opposed to those alleged in the complaint. This rule admits of
only one exception and that is when such facts are admitted by the
prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An order granting a motion to
quash is a final order, not merely interlocutory, and is immediately
appealable; Double jeopardy cannot be claimed by the accused as the
dismissal of the case was secured not only with his consent but at his
instance.— Respondent's contention holds no water. An order granting a
motion to quash, unlike one of denial, is a final order. It is not merely
interlocutory and is therefore immediately appealable. The accused cannot
claim double jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only with his
consent but at his instance.

PETITION for certiorari to review the order of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Br. IV.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of an order of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial District, in Criminal Case No. D-529
entitled 'The People of the Philippines versus Juan Tuvera, Sr., et al.,"
granting the motion to quash the information filed by accused Juan Tuvera,
Sr., herein respondent. The issue is whether a barrio captain can be charged
of arbitrary detention.
The facts are as follows:
On October 12, 1972, an information for Arbitrary Detention was filed
against Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat, in the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which reads as follows:
"The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Juan Tuvera, Sr.,
Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat alias Rudy, all of Manaoag,
Pangasinan, of the crime of ARBITRARY DETENTION, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 21st day of April, 1973, at around 10:00 o'clock in
the evening, in barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., a
barrio captain, with the aid of some other private persons, namely Juan
Tuvera, Jr., Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong, maltreated one Armando
Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns and fists blows and immediately
thereafter, without legal grounds, with deliberate intent to deprive said
Armando Valdez of his constitutional liberty, accused Barrio captain Juan
Tuvera, Sr., Cpl. Tomas Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat, members of
the police force of Mangsat, Pangasinan, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, lodge and lock said Armando Valdez inside the municipal jail
of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours. (Italics supplied.)
CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 124 of the R.P.C.
Dagupan City, October 12, 1972.
(SGD.) VICENTE C. CALDONA Assistant Provincial Fiscal"
All the accused, including respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr., were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty.
On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the
proof s adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of
the information. Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S. Milo filed
an opposition thereto.
Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr. was not a public officer who
can be charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Angelito C.
Salanga granted the motion to quash in an order dated April 25, 1973.
Hence, this petition.
Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without
legal grounds, detains a person.1 The elements of this crime are the
following:
2.That he detains a person.
_________________
1 Art. 124, Revised Penal Code. 3.That the detention is without legal
grounds.2
The ground relied upon by private respondent Tuvera for his motion to
quash the information which was sustained by respondent Judge, is that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense,3 that is, that the facts alleged in
the information do not constitute the elements of Arbitrary Detention.
The Information charges Tuvera, a barrio captain, to have conspired
with Cpl. Mendoza and Pat. Mangsat, who are members of the police force
of Manaoag, Pangasinan in detaining petitioner Valdez for about eleven
(11) hours in the municipal jail without legal ground. No doubt the last two
elements of the crime are present.
The only question is whether or not Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, is a
public officer who can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.

authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime.
Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of the law, the
judges or mayors.4
Respondent Judge Salanga did not consider private respondent Tuvera
as such public officer when the former made this finding in the questioned
order:
"Apparently, if Armando Valdez was ever jailed and detained more than six
(6) hours, Juan Tuvera, Sr., has nothing to do with the same because he is
not in any way connected with the Police Force of Manaoag, Pangasinan.
Granting that it was Tuvera, Sr., who ordered Valdez arrested, it was not he
who detained and jailed him because he has no such authority vested in him
as a mere Barrio Captain of Barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan."5
In line with the above finding of respondent Judge Salanga, private
respondent Tuvera asserts that the motion to quash was properly sustained
for the following reasons: (1) That he did not have the authority to make
arrest, nor jail and detain petitioner Valdez as a mere barrio captain;6 (2)
That he is neither a peace officer nor a policeman,7 (3) That he was not a
public official;8 (4) That he had nothing to do with the detention of
petitioner Valdez;9 (5) That he is not connected directly or indirectly in the
administration of the Manaoag Police Force;10 (6) That barrio captains on
April 21, 1972 were not yet considered as persons in authority and that it
was only upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 299 that Barrio
Captain and Heads of Barangays were decreed among those who are
persons in authority;11 and that the proper charge was Illegal Detention and
Not Arbitrary Detention.12
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio
lieutenants (who were later named barrio captains and now barangay
captains) were recognized as persons in authority. In various cases, this
Court deemed them as persons in authority, and convicted them of Arbitrary
Detention.
In U.S. vs. Braganza,13 Martin Salibio, a barrio lieutenant, and Hilario
Braganza, a municipal councilor, arrested Father Feliciano Gomez while he
was in his church. They made him pass through the door of the vestry and
afterwards took him to the municipal building. There, they told him that he
was under arrest. The priest had not committed any crime. The two public
officials were convicted of Arbitrary Detention.14
In U.S. vs. Gellada,15 Geronimo Gellada, a barrio lieutenant, with the
help of Filoteo Soliman, bound and tied his houseboy Sixto Gentugas with a
rope at around 6:00 p.m. and delivered him to the justice of the peace. Sixto
was detained during the whole night and until 9:00 a.m. of the next day
when he was ordered released by the justice of the peace because he had not
committed any crime, Gellada was convicted of Arbitrary Detention.16
Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as The Revised Barrio
Charter, the powers and duties of a barrio captain include the following: to
look after the maintenance of public order in the barrio and to assist the
municipal mayor and the municipal councilor in charge of the district in the
performance of their duties in such barrio;17 to look after the general
welfare of the barrio;18 to enforce all laws and ordinances which are
operative within the barrio;19 and to organize and lead an emergency group
whenever the same may be necessary f or the maintenance of peace and
order within the barrio.20
In his treatise on Barrio Government Law and Administration,
Professor Jose M. Aruego has this to say about the above-mentioned powers
and duties of a Barrio Captain, to wit:
"Upon the barrio captain depends in the main the maintenance of
public order in the barrio. For public disorder therein, inevitably people
blame him.
"In the event that there be a disturbing act to said public order or a
threat to disturb public order, what can the barrio captain do?
Understandably, he first resorts to peaceful measures. He may take
preventive measures like placing the offenders under surveillance and
persuading them, where possible, to behave well, but when necessary, he
may subject them to the full force of law.
"He is a peace officer in the barrio considered under the law as a
person in authority. As such, he may make arrest and detain persons within
legal limits. "21 (Italics supplied.)
One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary
Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and mayors,

perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that they
are similar to those of a barrio captain23 except that in the case of the latter,
his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining
peace and order, both must be and are given the authority to detain or order
detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera
himself admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain,
could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.24
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private
respondent Tuvera, Sr., can be held liable for Arbitrary Detention.
Next, private respondent Tuvera, Sr. contends that the motion to quash
was validly granted as the facts and evidence on record show that there was
no crime of Arbitrary Detention;25 that he only sought the aid and
assistance of the Manaoag Police Force;26 and that he only accompanied
petitioner Valdez to town for the latter's personal safety.27
Suf f ice it to say that the above allegations can only be raised as a
defense at the trial as they traverse what is alleged in the Information. We
have repeatedly held that Courts, in resolving a motion to quash, cannot
consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information or which do not
appear on the face of the information. This is because a motion to quash is a
hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information.28 Matters of
defense cannot be proved during the hearing of such a motion, except where
the Rules expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal liability,
prescription, and former jeopardy.29 In the case of U.S. vs. Perez,30 this
Court held that a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense cannot allege new facts not only different but
diametrically opposed to those alleged in the complaint. This rule admits of
only one exception and that is when such facts are admitted by the
prosecution.31
Lastly, private respondent claims that by the lower court's granting of
the motion to quash jeopardy has already attached in his favor 32 on the
ground that here, the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent.
Respondent's contention holds no water. An order granting a motion to
quash, unlike one of denial, is a final order. It is not merely interlocutory
and is therefore immediately appealable. The accused cannot claim double
jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only with his consent but at his
instance.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari is
GRANTED. The questioned Order of April 25, 1973 in Criminal Case No.
D-529 is hereby set aside. Let this case be remanded to the appropriate trial
court for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petition granted. Case remanded to trial court for further proceedings.
Notes.—There is no criminal delay in the delivery of the accused to
the court, where the two days following his arrest, were holidays. (Medina
vs. Orosco, 18 SCRA 1169.)
A public officer or employee who detains a person without legal
grounds is guilty of arbitrary detention, but the person so detained will not
be released if afterwards he is detained under a valid information. (Medina
vs. Orosco, 18 SCRA 1169.)
——o0o——
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIAS
LOVEDIORO y CASTRO, defendant-appellant.
Criminal Law; Rebellion; By its very nature, rebellion is essentially
a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action which cannot be
confined a priori within predetermined bounds .—The gravamen of the
crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government. By
its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes
involving crowd action, which cannot be confined a priori within
predetermined bounds. One aspect noteworthy in the commission of
rebellion is that other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed
in the crime itself because they require a political character.
Same; Same; In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not
murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not
the act was done in furtherance of a political end .—Divested of its common
complexion therefore, any ordinary act, however grave, assumes a different
color by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter
penalty than the crime of murder. In deciding if the crime committed is
rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain
whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The
political motive of the act should be conclusively demonstrated.
Same; Same; The burden of demonstrating political motive falls on
the defense.—In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive
falls on the defense, motive, being a state of mind which the accused, better
than any individual, knows. Thus, in People v. Gempes, this court stressed
that: Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the accused’s)
knowledge and since moreover this is an affirmative defense, the burden is
on them to prove, or at least to state, which they could easily do personally
or through witnesses, that they killed the deceased in furtherance of the
resistance movement.
Same; Same; It is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly
proven.—From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that
the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts are
essential components of the crime. With either of these elements wanting,
the crime of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in cases where the
act complained of were committed simultaneously with or in the course of
the rebellion, if the killing, robbing, or etc., were accomplished for private
purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it has been held that the
crime would be separately punishable as a common crime and would not be
absorbed by the crime rebellion.
Same; Same; If no political motive is established and proved, the
accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion .—It
follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and proved, the
accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In
cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an
organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of
itself, suffice.
Same; Same; The burden of proof that the act committed was
impelled by a political motive lies on the accused .—As stated hereinabove,
the burden of proof that the act committed was impelled by a political
motive lies on the Accused. Political motive must be alleged in the
information. It must be established by clear and satisfactory evidence.
Same; Evidence; Lack or absence of motive for committing a crime
does not preclude conviction there being a reliable eyewitness who fully

Against appellant’s claims that he acted merely as a look-out, the testimony
of one witness, his blood relative, free from any signs of impropriety or
falsehood, was sufficient to convict the accused. Moreover, neither may
lack of motive be availing to exculpate the appellant. Lack or absence of
motive for committing a crime does not preclude conviction, there being a
reliable eyewitness who fully and satisfactorily identified appellant as the
perpetrator of the felony.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Br.
1.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ricafort Law Office for accused-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St., away
from the Daraga, Albay Public Market when a man suddenly walked beside
him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun at the
policeman’s right ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three other
companions with him, one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as
he lay on the ground. After taking the latter’s gun, the man and his
companions boarded a tricycle and fled.1
The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by
Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old welder from Pilar, Sorsogon, who claimed
that he knew both the victim and the man who fired the fatal shot. Armenta
identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro,
his nephew (appellant’s father was his first cousin) and alleged that he knew
the victim from the fact that the latter was a resident of Bagumbayan.
Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple
gunshot wounds on the face, the chest, and other parts of the body.2 On
autopsy, the municipal health officer established the cause of death as
hypovolemic shock.3
As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial prosecutor of
Albay, on November 6, 1992 filed an Information charging accused-
appellant Elias Lovedioro y Castro of the crime of Murder under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less 5:30 o’clock in
the afternoon, at Burgos Street, Municipality of Daraga, Province of Albay,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, together with Gilberto Longasa, who is already
charged in Crim. Case No. 5931 before RTC, Branch 1, and three (3) others
whose true identities are at present unknown and remain at large, conniving,
conspiring, confederating and helping one another for a common purpose,
armed with firearms, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire
and shoot one SPO3 JESUS LUCILO, a member of the Daraga Police
Station, inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds causing his
death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. The dispositive portion of said
decision, dated September 24, 1993 states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court finds
the accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal, acting in conspiracy with his co-accused who are still at large, of
the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua with all the accessories provided by law; to pay the heirs of the
deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo through the widow, Mrs. Remeline Lucilo, the
amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos representing the civil
indemnity for death; to pay the said widow the sum of Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) Pesos representing reasonable moral damages; and to pay the
said widow the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight
(P18,588.00) Pesos, representing actual damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment however, in case of insolvency on the part of the said
accused.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant appeal, in which the sole issue interposed is that portion
of trial court decision finding him guilty of the crime of murder and not
rebellion.
Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness,
Nestor Armenta, as supporting his claim that he should have been charged
with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his Brief, he asseverates that
Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of the New
People’s Army. Additionally, he contends that because the killing of Lucilo
was “a means to or in furtherance of subversive ends,”4 (said killing)
should-have been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Arts.
134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming that he did not
fire the fatal shot but merely acted as a look-out in the liquidation of Lucilo,
he avers that he should have been charged merely as a participant in the
commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph 2 of Article 135 of
the Revised Penal Code and should therefore have been meted only the
penalty of prision mayor by the lower court.
Asserting that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime
of murder, the Solicitor General avers that the crime committed by appellant
may be considered as rebellion only if the defense itself had conclusively
proven that the motive or intent for the killing of the policeman was for
“political and subversive ends.”5 Moreover, the Solicitor General contends
that even if appellant were to be convicted of rebellion, and even if the trial
court had found appellant guilty merely of being a participant in a rebellion,
the proper imposable penalty is not prision mayor as appellant contends, but
reclusion temporal, because Executive Order No. 187 as amended by
Republic Act No. 6968, the Coup D’etat Law, prescribes reclusion
temporal as the penalty imposable for individuals found guilty as
participants in a rebellion.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the crime committed was
murder and not rebellion.
Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 6968, rebellion is committed in the following manner:
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the
purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the
territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body
of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.6
The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against
the government.7 By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of
masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be confined a
priori within predetermined bounds.8 One aspect noteworthy in the
commission of rebellion is that other acts committed in its pursuance are, by
law, absorbed in the crime itself because they require a political character.
This peculiarity was underscored in the case of People v. Hernandez,9 thus:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order,
as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political
purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually
regarded as common, like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance ‘to the Government the territory of the
Philippine Islands or any part thereof,’ then it becomes stripped of its
“common” complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of
rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.
Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act, however
grave, assumes a different color by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion,
which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of murder. In deciding if the
crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our
courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a
political end. The political motive of the act should be conclusively
demonstrated.
In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the
defense, motive, being a state of mind which the accused, better than any
individual, knows. Thus, in People v. Gempes,10 this Court stressed that:
Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the accused’s) knowledge and
since moreover this is an affirmative defense, the burden is on them to
prove, or at least to state, which they could easily do personally or through
witnesses, that they killed the deceased in furtherance of the resistance
movement.
From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that the overt
acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential
components of the crime. With either of these elements wanting, the crime
of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in cases where the act
complained of were committed simultaneously with or in the course of the

purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it has been held that the
crime would be separately punishable as a common crime and would not be
absorbed by the crime rebellion.11
Clearly, political motive should be established before a person charged
with a common crime—alleging rebellion in order to lessen the possible
imposable penalty—could benefit from the law’s relatively benign attitude
towards political crimes. Instructive in this regard is the case of Enrile v.
Amin,12 where the prosecution sought to charge Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
with violation of P.D. No. 1829,13 for allegedly harboring or concealing in
his home Col. Gregorio Honasan in spite of the senator’s knowledge that
Honasan might have committed a crime. This Court held, against the
prosecution’s contention, that rebellion and violation of P.D. 1829 could be
tried separately14 (on the principle that rebellion is based on the Revised
Penal Code while P.D. 1829 is a special law), that the act for which the
senator was being charged, though punishable under a special law, was
absorbed in the crime of rebellion being motivated by, and related to the
acts for which he was charged in Enrile vs. Salazar (G.R. Nos. 92163 and
92164) a case decided on June 5, 1990. Ruling in favor of Senator Enrile
and holding that the prosecution for violation of P.D. No. 1829 cannot
prosper because a separate prosecution for rebellion had already been filed
and in fact decided, the Court said:
The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however constrain us to rule
that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to
common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are
perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.15
Noting the importance of purpose in cases of rebellion the court in Enrile
vs. Amin further underscored that:
[I]ntent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged
with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply
because the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is
completely different. But if the act is committed with political or social
motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then being punished separately.
It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and proved,
the accused should be convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion.
In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an
organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of
itself, suffice.
The similarity of some of the factual circumstances of People v.
Ompad, Jr.,16 to the instant case is striking. Two witnesses, both former
NPA recruits identified the accused Ompad, alias “Commander Brando,” a
known hitman of the NPA, as having led three other members of the NPA
in the liquidation of Dionilo Barlaan, a military informer, also in a rebel
infested area. In spite of his notoriety as an NPA hitman, Ompad was
merely charged with and convicted of murder, not rebellion because
political motive was neither alleged nor proved.
As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof that the act committed was
impelled by a political motive lies on the accused. Political motive must be
alleged in the information.17 It must be established by clear and satisfactory
evidence. In People v. Paz and Tica we held:
That the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a matter of
mitigation or defense that the accused has the burden of proving clearly and
satisfactorily. The lone uncorroborated assertion of appellant that his
superiors told him of Dayrit being an informer, and his suspicion that he,
was one such, is neither sufficient or adequate to establish that the
motivation for the killing was political, considering appellant’s obvious
interest in testifying to that effect.18

carry out rebellion. The
evidence adduced by the
civilian, to order the
killing on account of
private differences over a ninety (90) hectare piece of land. The court
attributed no political motive for the killing, though committed by known
members of the Hukbalahap movement.20
People v. Dasig 21 has a factual milieu almost similar to the instant
case. There, the Court held that “the act of killing a police officer, knowing
too well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or
ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of a rebellion.” In
Dasig the Court however noted that the accused, who was charged with
murder, not only admitted his membership with the NPA but also executed
an extrajudicial confession to the effect that he was a member of an NPA
“sparrow unit,” a fact to which even the Solicitor General, in his brief
therein was in agreement. The Solicitor General’s brief in Dasig which this
Court favorably quoted, noted that:
[T]he sparrow
unit is the
argues for a different
result in the case at bench. He states that accusedappellant’s belated claims
to membership in the NPA were not only insubstantial but also self
serving,23 an averment to which, given a thorough review of the
circumstances of the case, we fully agree. He states:
[In the case cited] the appellants, admittedly members of the NPA, clearly
overcame the burden of proving motive or intent. It was shown that the
political motivation for the killing of the victim was the fact that Ragaul
was suspected as an informer for the PC. The perpetrators even left a letter
card, a drawing on the body of Ragaul as a warning to others not to follow
his example. It is entirely different in the case at bar where the evidence for
the appellant merely contains self-serving assertions and denials not
substantial enough as an indicia of political motivation in the killing of
Q What was that incident if any, please narrate?
A July 27, 1992 at more or less 12:00 noon. I am at home, three male person a certain alias ALWIN,
ALIAS SAMUEL and the other one unknown to me, fetched me and told me to go with them, so I
asked them where, Alwin handed me a hand gun and same he stopped/call a passenger jeepney and
told me board on said jeepney. (sic)
Q Please continue.
A Upon reaching Daraga, Albay fronting Petron Gasoline Station, we alighted on said jeep, so we walk
towards Daraga Bakery we stopped walking due to it is raining, when the rain stopped we continue
walking by using the road near the bakery. (sic)
Q When you reached Daraga bakery, as you have said in Q. 7 you used the road near the bakery where
did you proceed?
A I am not familiar with that place, but I and my companion continue walking, at more or less 4:30
P.M. July 27, 1992 one of my companion told us as to quote in Bicol dialect, to wit: ‘AMO NA
YADI AN TINAMPO PALUWAS’ (This is the place towards the poblacion), so, I placed myself
just ahead of a small store, my three (3) companions continue walking towards poblacion, later on a
policeman sporting white T-shirt and a Khaki pant was walking towards me, while the said
policeman is nearly approaching me, ALWIN shot the said policeman infront of the small store,

service firearm of the said policeman, then we ran towards the subdivision, then my two (2)
companions commanded a tricycle then we fled until we reached a hill wherein there is a small
bridge, thereafter Ka Samuel took the handgun that was handed to me by them at Pilar, Sorsogon.
(sic)
Q Do you know the policeman that was killed by your companion?
A I just came to know his name when I reached home and heard it radio, that he is JESUS LUCILO.
(sic)
A Look-out sir.
Q I have nothing more to asked you what else, if there is any? (sic)
A No more sir.25
victim SPO3 Jesus Lucilo.24
In the case at bench, the appellant, assisted by counsel, admitted in his
extrajudicial confession to having participated in the killing of Lucilo as
follows:
It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entire extrajudicial confession did
appellant ever mention that he was a member of the New People’s Army. A
thorough reading of the same reveals nothing which would suggest that the
killing in which he was a participant was motivated by a political purpose.
Moreover, the information filed against appellant, based on sworn
statements, did not contain any mention or allusion as to the involvement of
the NPA in the death of SPO3 Lucilo.26 Even prosecution eyewitness
Nestor Armenta did not mention that NPA in his sworn statement of
October 19, 1992.27
As the record would show, allegations relating to appellant’s
membership in the NPA surfaced almost merely as an afterthought,
something which the defense merely picked up and followed through upon
prosecution eyewitness Armenta’s testimony on cross-examination that he
knew appellant to be a member of the NPA. Interestingly, however, in the
same testimony, Armenta admitted that he was “forced” to pinpoint
appellant as an NPA member.28 The logical result, of course, was that the
trial court did not give any weight and credence to said testimony. The trial
court, after all, had the prerogative of rejecting only a part of a witness’
testimony while upholding the rest of it.29 While disbelieving the portion of
Armenta’s testimony on appellant’s alleged membership in the NPA, the
trial court correctly gave credence to his unflawed narration about how the
crime was committed.30 Such narration is even corroborated in its pertinent
portions, except as to the identity of the gunwielder, by the testimony of the
appellant himself.
In any case, appellant’s claim regarding the political color attending
the commission of the crime being a matter of defense, its viability depends
on his sole and unsupported testimony. He testified that, upon the prodding
of alias Alwin and alias Samuel, he joined the NPA because of the
organization’s goals.31 He claimed that his two companions shot Lucilo
because he “had offended our organization,”32 without, however,
specifying what the “offense” was. Appellant claimed that he had been a
member of the NPA for five months before the shooting incident.33
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant’s contentions
are couched in terms so general and non-specific34 that they offer no
explanation as to what contribution the killing would have made towards
the achievement of the NPA’s subversive aims. SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, a mere
policeman, was never alleged to be an informer. No acts of his were
specifically shown to have offended the NPA. Against appellant’s attempts
to shade his participation in the killing with a political color, the evidence
on record leaves the impression that appellant’s bare allegations of
membership in the NPA was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty
imposable upon him. It is of judicial notice that in many NPA infested
areas, crimes have been all-too-quickly attributed to the furtherance of an
ideology or under the cloak of political color for the purpose of mitigating
the imposable penalty when in fact they are no more than ordinary crimes
perpetrated by common criminals. In Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr., Chief Justice
Narvasa aptly observed:
The existence of rebellious groups in our society today, and of numerous
bandits, or irresponsible or deranged individuals, is a reality that cannot be
ignored or belittled. Their activities, the killings and acts of destruction and
terrorism that they perpetrate, unfortunately continue unabated despite the
best efforts that the Government authorities are exerting, although it may be
true that the insurrectionist groups of the right or the left no longer pose a
genuine threat to the security of the state. The need for more stringent laws
and more rigorous law-enforcement, cannot be gainsaid.35
In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a political
motive for the killing of SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, we are satisfied that the trial
court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder.36 It is of no
moment that a single eyewitness, Nestor Armenta, sealed his fate, for it is
settled that the testimony of one witness, if credible and positive, is
sufficient to convict.37 Against appellant’s claims that he acted merely as a
look-out, the testimony of one witness, his blood relative, free from any
signs of impropriety or falsehood, was sufficient to convict the accused.38
Moreover, neither may lack of motive be availing to exculpate the
appellant. Lack or absence of motive for committing a crime does not

satisfactorily identified appellant as the perpetrator of the felony.39 In the
case at bench, the strength of the prosecution’s case was furthermore
bolstered by accused-appellant’s admission in open court that he and the
eyewitness, his own uncle, bore no grudges against each other .40
Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The
attack delivered by appellant was sudden, and without warning of any
kind.41 The killing having been qualified by treachery, the crime committed
is murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the trial court was correct in
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, together with all the accessories
provided by law.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court’s decision
dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of Murder is hereby
AFFIRMED, in toto.
Jr., JJ., concur.
Note.—The qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms in
furtherance of rebellion under Presidential Decree No. 1866 is distinct from
the crime of rebellion provided under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised
Penal Code. (People vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 [1994])
VOL.189, SEPTEMBER13, 1990
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding
Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, HON. IGNACIO M.
CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
134, Pairing Judge, SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State
Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE, State Prosecutor FERDINAND
ABESAMIS and Asst. City Prosecutor EULOGIO MANANQUIL; and

Criminal Law; Rebellion; Pres. Decree 1829; Rebellion cannot be
complexed with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof either
as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an
activity that constitutes rebellion.— The resolution of the above issue brings
us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings
of which were recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan
Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990).
The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to reiterate the long standing
proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and
subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the
Hernandez case. This Court recently declared: “The rejection of both
options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is that
Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing
of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof,
either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of
an activity that constitutes rebellion.” (Emphasis supplied) This doctrine is
applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged with the
complex crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied, neither can
he be charged separately for two (2) different offenses where one is a
constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Political Crimes; Political crimes are
_______________
Ponce Enrile vs. Amin
mon crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose.— The
petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive
Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan,
petitioner’s alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose
but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constituting a component
thereof. It was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the
crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez,supra: “In short,
political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well
as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political
purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The act of harboring or concealing Col.
Honasan is a mere component of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of
the rebellion, it cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge.—
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast
movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v.
Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in
furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100
Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v.
Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In
this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere
component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the
rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge. The
case of People v. Prieto (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive: “In the nature
of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some
kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as
opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical
activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal
statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of
treason it becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject
of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase
the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can
not be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the
identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to
a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery, because possession of opium and
force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so
may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in
conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a
constitutive ingredient of treason.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; All crimes, whether punishable under a
special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or
committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of
rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in
themselves.— The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that
harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special law while
the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence, prosecution
under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other. This argument is
specious in rebellion cases. In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the
prosecution’s theory must fail. The rationale remains the same. All crimes,
whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere
components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become
absorbed in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as
separate crimes in themselves. Thus: “This does not detract, however, from
the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and
hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately
therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
xxx (People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528) The Hernandez and other
related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
These common crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson,
robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The
attendant circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule
that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to
common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are
perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Metro Manila, Br. 135 and 134.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law Offices for
petitioner.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce
Enrile as having committed rebellion complexed with murder1 with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City,
576
government prosecutors filed another information charging him for
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. The second information reads:
“That on or about the lst day of December 1989, at Dasmariñas Village,
Makati, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, having reasonable ground to believe or suspect
that Ex-Col. Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan has committed a crime, did then
and there unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and knowingly obstruct, impede,
frustrate or delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio “Gringo”
Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house.”
On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in
abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest pending personal determination
by the court of probable cause, and (b) to dismiss the case and expunge the
information from the record.
On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing
judge of respondent Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile’s Omnibus
motion on the basis of a finding that “there (was) probable cause to hold the
accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD No. 1829.”
On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and to Quash/Dismiss the Information on the grounds that:
3. (a)The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
4. (b)The respondent court’s finding of probable cause was devoid of factual
and legal basis; and
5. (c)The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated
murder against Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on

prosecution of the Senator for harboring or concealing the Colonel on the
same occasion under PD 1829.
On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion
for reconsideration for alleged lack of merit and setting Senator Enrile’s
arraignment to May 30, 1990.
The petitioner comes to this Court on Certiorari imputing grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of juris-
577
diction committed by the respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismiss the
information on the following grounds, to wit:
1. I.The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
2. II.The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a
supposed meeting on 1 December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component
element of, the “complexed” rebellion presently charged against Sen. Enrile
as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same meeting
on 1 December 1989;
3. III.The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one
prosecution for all the component acts of rebellion;
4. IV.There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829;
5. V.No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1829. The preliminary investigation, held only for
rebellion, was marred by patent irregularities resulting in denial of due
process.
On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from conducting further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-
777 until otherwise directed by this Court.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be
separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the
rebellion case earlier filed against him.
Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No.
1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the petitioner on the
theory that the former involves a special law while the latter is based on the
Revised Penal Code or a general law.
The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People
v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of which were recently
repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan Ponce Enrile v. Judge
Salazar, (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990). The Enrile case gave
this Court the occasion to reiterate the long standing proscription against
splitting the componentoffenses of rebellion and subjecting them to separate
prosecutions, a procedure reprobated in the Hernandez case. This Court
recently declared:
“The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of
the Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to
prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on
the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as
an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.” (Emphasis
supplied)
This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be charged
with the complex crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied,
neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different offenses where
one is a constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of
rebellion.
The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829
particularly Section 1 (c) which states:
“SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or
a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon
any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or
delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of
criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he
knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any
offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest, prosecution
and conviction.”
xxx xxx xxx
The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained
and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food and comfort on
December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive
from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan
arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure the petitioner
prevented Col. Honasan’s arrest and conviction in violation of Section 1 (c)
of PD No. 1829.
The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were
based on the affidavits executed by three (3) employees of the Silahis
International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col. Gregorio “Gringo”
Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday party
held at the residence of the petitioner in the evening of December 1, 1989.
579
The information (Annex “C”, p. 3) particularly reads that on “or about 6:30
p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col. Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan conferred with
accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by about 100 fully armed
rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches”. The prosecution thereby
concluded that:
“In such a situation, Sen. Enrile’s talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio
“Gringo” Honasan in his house in the presence of about 100 uniformed
soldiers who were fully armed, can be inferred that they were co-
conspirators in the failed December coup.” (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65;
Emphasis supplied)
As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion
charge constitute or include the very incident which gave rise to the charge
of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Under the Department
of Justice resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only one crime of
rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder but there
could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions for “harboring and
concealing” Honasan and 100 other armed rebels under PD No. 1829. The
splitting of component elements is readily apparent.
The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the
fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy with
Honasan, petitioner’s alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no
other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constituting a
component thereof. It was motivated by the single intent or resolution to
commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:
“In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political
order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a
political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive.” (p. 535)
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast
movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. (People v.
Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in
furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100
Phil. 90 [1956];
People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659
[1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of
harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or
ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It
cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate charge. The case of People
v. Prieto 2 (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:
“In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be
accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or
physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante)
This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal
offense under another penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is
charged as an element of treason it becomes identified with the latter crime
and can not be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in combination
with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in a
prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber cannot be held
guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery,

and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for
murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as
in this case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason.”
The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or
concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special law while the rebellion
case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence, prosecution under one law
will not bar a prosecution under the other. This argument is specious in
rebellion cases.
In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution’s theory must
fail. The rationale remains the same. All crimes, whether punishable under a
special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or
committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion
and can not be
_______________
2 The doctrine relied upon was set down in treason cases but is
applicable to rebellion cases. As Justice McDonough opined, rebellion is
treason of less magnitude (U.S. v. Lagnoasan, 3 Phil. 472, 484, 1904).
581
isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Thus:
“This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a
crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and
cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by the application of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. xxx (People v. Hernandez, supra, at
p. 528)
The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as
absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These common crimes refer to all acts of
violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the
Revised Penal Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant case,
however, constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases
must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special
laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.
The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce
Enrile with Colonel Honasan is too intimately tied up with his allegedly
harboring and concealing Honasan for practically the same act to form two
separate crimes of rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.
Clearly, the petitioner’s alleged act of harboring or concealing which
was based on his acts of conspiring with Honasan was committed in
connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and must now be deemed as
absorbed by, merged in, and identified with the crime of rebellion punished
in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.
“Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence
overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes, perpetrated in
furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as
“common” offenses, and assume the political complexion of the main crime
of which they are mere ingredients, and consequently, cannot be punished
separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify
the imposition of a graver penalty.” (People v. Hernandez, supra, p. 541)
In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after
having pleaded guilty and convicted of the crime of rebellion, faced an
independent prosecution for illegal posses-
582
sion of firearms. The Court ruled:
“An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with
which the accused is charged in the present case which is that of illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition is already absorbed as a necessary
element or ingredient in the crime of rebellion with which the same accused
is charged with other persons in a separate case and wherein he pleaded
guilty and was convicted.” (at page 662)
xxx xxx xxx
“xxx [T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the
accused is charged in the present case is already absorbed in the rebellion
case and so to press it further now would be to place him in double
jeopardy.” (at page 663)
Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341,

similar issue. In this case, the petitioner Misolas, an alleged member of the
New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions in furtherance of subversion under Section 1 of PD 1866.
In his motion to quash the information, the petitioner based his arguments
on the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the doctrine of absorption of
common crimes in rebellion. The Court, however, clarified, to wit:
“x x x in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the
qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under PD
1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE COMPLEX CRIME
OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS.
NEITHER IS HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR
SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS.
Thus, the rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find
no application in this case.”
The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of
firearms under PD 1866 because no separate prosecution for subversion or
rebellion had been filed.3 The prosecution must make up its mind whether
to charge Senator
_______________
3 Justices Isagani A. Cruz and Abraham F. Sarmiento believe that PD
1866 is unconstitutional and should be struck down as illegal
583
Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge
him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D.
1829. It cannot complex the rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and
violation of P.D 1829 in Makati. It should be noted that there is in fact a
separate prosecution for rebellion already filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the independent prosecution under PD
1829 can not prosper.
As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor.
If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or
concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former
associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is
committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of
rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion
instead of being punished separately.
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately
under PD 1829 in addition to his being prosecuted in the rebellion case.
With this ruling, there is no need for the Court to pass upon the other issues
raised by the petitioner.
Criminal Case No. 90-777 is QUASHED. The writ of preliminary
injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their successors in Criminal
Case No. 90-777, Regional Trial Court of Makati, from holding the
arraignment of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting further
proceedings therein is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cort é s, Griño-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan (C.J.), On official leave.
Paras, J., On leave.
_______________
per se. Justice Sarmiento stated in his separate dissent that PD 1866 is
a bill of attainder, vague and violative of the double jeopardy clause, and an
instrument of repression.
Medialdea, J., No part.
Petition granted.
Note.—The criminal liability of an accessory under Art. 19, Par. 3 is
directly linked to and inseparable from that of the principal. (Vino vs.
People: dissenting opinion, 178 SCRA 626.)

Enrile vs. Salazar
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR
STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR
FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR
DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR
ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY
OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164. June 5, 1990.*
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO ANDERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners,
vs. PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE,
FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EU-
_______________
Enrile vs. Salazar
LOGIO C. MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME N. SALAZAR, JR., in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
103, respondents.
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Hernandez doctrine prohibits
complexing of rebellion with any other offense.—The rejection of both
options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is that
Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing
of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof,
either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of
an activity that constitutes rebellion.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Personal evaluation of report and
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor, sufficient to determine
probable cause.—It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the
warrant for petitioner’s arrest without first personally determining the
existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the
complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the
Constitution. This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the
unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination, it being
sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. Petitioner
claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes
after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the
latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the
preliminary investigation. Merely because said respondent had what some
might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with
that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so
complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Same; Same; Same; Bail; Courts; Respondent Court has jurisdiction
to deny or grant bail to petitioner.—The criminal case before the
respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner’s right

jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct
course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be
admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se or by reason of the weakness
of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial
court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and
even then, not without first apply-
219
Enrile vs. Salazar
ing to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Incumbent on the accused, to whom no
bail is recommended, to claim the right to bail hearing to prove the reason
or weakness of evidence against him.—There was and is no reason to
assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability
or competence of the respondent Judge—indeed such an assumption would
be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold
them to be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify
every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none, in short that
would justify bypassing established judicial processes designed to orderly
move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthetically, this is
the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of
bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should not thus be
precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail and, if it
erred in that matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no
difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing
no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor’s
recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better
course for the judge motu propio to set a bail hearing where a capital
offense is charged. It is, in any event, incumbent on the accused as to whom
no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing
and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against
him.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Court has no power to change, but
only to interpret the law as it stands at any given time. —It is enough to give
anyone pause—and the Court is no exception—that not even the crowded
streets of our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is
disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at national economic
recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion,
either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other
offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be
conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity
undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it
can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed
lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for
promptly the initiative in this matter, which is properly within its province.
220
Enrile vs. Salazar
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Hernandez doctrine should not be
interpreted as an all embracing authority; Reasons.—To my mind, the
Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority
for the rule that all common crimes committed on the occasion, or in
furtherance of, or in connection with, rebellion are absorbed by the latter.
To that extent, I cannot go along with the view of the majority in the instant
case that “Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the
complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion
thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended
effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.”
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Separate Opinion:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Habeas Corpus; Statutes; The rules on
habeas corpus are to be liberally construed. —While litigants, should, as a
rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder, nothing should stop this Court
from taking cognizance of petitions brought before it raising urgent
constitutional issues, any procedural flaw notwithstanding. The rules on

805), the writ of habeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action.
The scope and flexibility of the writ—its capacity to reach all manner of
illegal detention—its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural
mazes—have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and
lawmakers (Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420)
[italics ours].
to statutes principally; Expost facto law.—The non-retroactivity rule
applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do not exist in the abstract but
rather bear upon the lives of people with the specific form given them by
judicial decisions interpreting their norms. Judicial decisions construing
statutory norms give specific shape and content to such norms. In time, the
statutory norms become encrusted with the glosses placed upon them by the
courts and the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf. Caltex v.
Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial
interpretation of a statute becomes part of the law as of the date that the law
was originally
Enrile vs. Salazar
enacted, I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously where a new
judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a previous
existing doctrine of long standing (here, 36 years) and most specially not
where the statute construed is criminal in nature and the new doctrine is
more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one (People v. Jabinal,
55 SCRA 607 [19741; People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]; Gumabon v.
Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Moreover, the non-retroactivity
rule whether in respect of legislative acts or judicial decisions has
constitutional implications. The prevailing rule in the United States is that a
judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances the
severity of the penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable to
constitutional challenge based upon the rule against ex post facto laws and
the due process clause (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US 347, 12 L. Ed.
2d 894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977]; Devine
v. New Mexico Department of Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339 [1989]).
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Concurring Opinion:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Rebellion consists of many acts; Case at
bar.—The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one
bomb cannot be isolated as a separate crime of rebellion. Neither should the
dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of thousands of machine gun
bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate offenses, if
each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and
property. The same act cannot be punishable by separate penalties
depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutors—punishment for the
killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians. The prosecution
also loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in rebellion the
killing of civilians, the laying waste of civilian economies, the massacre of
innocent people, the blowing up of passenger airplanes, and other acts of
terrorism are all used by those engaged in rebellion. We cannot and should
not try to ascertain the intent of rebels for each single act unless the act is
plainly not connected to the rebellion. We cannot use Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to-be-enacted legislation. The killing of
civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities furthers the rebellion and
is part of the rebellion.
PADILLA, J., Separate Opinion:
murder, and multiple frustrated murder does not exist. —Furthermore, the
Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was “ground- breaking” on
222
Enrile vs. Salazar

the issue of whether rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson,
robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the other hand, the prosecution and the
lower court, not only had the Hernandez doctrine (as case law), but
Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June
1987 (as statutory law) to bind them to the legal proposition that the crime
of rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple frustrated murder does
not exist.
Same; Same; Same; Case at bar; The reformation is clearly a nullity
and plainly void ab initio.—And yet, notwithstanding these unmistakable
and controlling beacon lights—absent when this Court laid down the
Hernandez doctrine—the prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower
court has persisted in hearing, an information charging the petitioners with
rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder. That
information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. Its head should
not be allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law, it charges
nothing; it has given rise to nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant
thereto are as null and void as the information on which they are anchored.
And, since the entire question of the information’s validity is before the
Court in these habeas corpus cases, I venture to say that the information is
fatally defective, even under procedural law, because it charges more than
one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of Court).
BIDIN, J., Concurring and Dissenting:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Bail; Habeas Corpus is the proper
remedy to petitioner as an accused; Case at bar.—I submit that the
proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the purpose
of fixing bail since we have construed the indictment herein as charging
simple rebellion, an offense which is bailable. Consequently, habeas corpus
is the proper remedy available to petitioner as an accused who had been
charged with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but who had been denied
his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of the petitioner’s
constitutional right to bail. In view thereof, the responsibility of fixing the
amount of bail and approval thereof when filed, devolves upon us, if
complete relief is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedings.
SARMIENTO, J., Concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Rebellion; Complex Crime; Habeas Corpus; Bail; No useful purpose
to have the trial court hear the incident again when the Supreme Court has
been satisfied that petitioner is entitled to temporary
223
Enrile vs. Salazar
freedom.—I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the remand of
the matter of bail to the lower court. I take it that when we, in our
Resolution of March 6, 1990, granted the petitioner “provisional liberty”
upon the filing of a bond of P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The fact that
we gave him “

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