La ELCANO VS. HILLTorts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from CrimesReginaldHill, a minor,causedthe death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed acriminalcase against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad (MarvinHill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code.Hillargued that the civil action is barred by his sons acquittal in thecriminalcase; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.ISSUE:Whether or not MarvinHillmay be held civilly liable under Article 2180.HELD:Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in thecriminalcase does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A separate civil action lies against the offender in acriminalact, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as aquasi-delictonly and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in thecriminalcase that thecriminalact charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated,culpa aquilianaincludes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the childs person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to MarvinHill the SC however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability should be subsidiary only as a matter of equity.

CRESPO vs MOGULGR No. L-53373 June 30, 1987FACTS:Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estaga against Mario Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to deter arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the office of provincial Fiscal.CARDINAL PRINCIPLE:Criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the Fiscal. He may or he may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the discretion and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons.It is through the conduct of preliminary investigation, that the fiscal determines the existence of a Prima Facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscals discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court of compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information.In a clash of views between the Judge who did not investigate and the Fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscals should normally prevail.The action of fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval to the Provincial or City Fiscal or the Chief of State Prosecutor as the case maybe and it may be elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the Fiscal.

Reodica v CA 292 SCRA 87Facts:IsabelitaReodica was allegedly recklessly driving a van and hit Bonsol causing him physical injuries anddamage to propertyamounting to P 8,542.00. Three days after the accident a complaint was filed before the fiscals office against the petitioner. She was chargedof"Reckless Imprudence Resulting inDamage to Propertywith Slight Physical Injury." After pleading not guilty trial ensued. RTC of Makati rendered the decision convicting petitioner of "quasi offense of reckless imprudence, resulting indamage to propertywith slight physical injuries" witharrestomayor of 6 months imprisonment and a fine of P 13,542.00. Petitioner made an appeal before the CA which re-affirmed the lower courts decision. In its motion for reconsideration, petitioner now assails that thecourt erred in giving its penalty on complexdamage to propertyand slight physical injuries both being light offenses over which the RTC has no jurisdiction and it cant impose penalty in excesstowhat the law authorizes.reversal of decision is still possible on ground of prescription or lack of jurisdiction.Issues:Whether or not the penalty imposed is correct.Whether or not reckless imprudence resultingtodamage to propertyand reckless imprudence resultingtoslight physical injuries are light felonies.Whether or not there is a complex crime applying Article 48 of the RPC.Whether or not the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on appeal.Whether or not the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the case.Whether the quasi offenses already prescribed.

Held:1. On penalty imposedThe proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injury is publiccensure(being the penalty next lower in degree toarrestomenor see the exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies).The proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting todamage to propertyamounting to 8,542.00 would bearrestomayor in minimum andmediumperiods.2. Classification of each felony involvedReckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is a light felony. Publiccensureis classified under article 25 of RPC as a light penalty and it belongs on the graduated scale in Article 71 of the RPC as a penalty next lower toarrestomenor.Reckless imprudence resulting todamage to propertyis punishable by a correctional penalty ofarrestomayor and thus belongs to less grave felony and not as a light felony as claimed by petitioner.3. Rule on complex crimeArt. 48 on penalty for complex crime provides that when asingleact constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means forcommittingthe other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Both offenses cannot constitute a complex crime because reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is not either a grave or less grave felony. Therefore each felony should be filed as a separate complaint subject to distinct penalties.4. Right to assail duplicity of informationRule 120, section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that when two or more offenses are charged in asinglecomplaint and the accused fails to object against it before the trial, the court may convict theaccuseto as many offenses as charged and impose a penalty for each of them. Complainant failed to make the objection before the trial therefore the right to object has been waived.5. JurisdictionJurisdiction of the court is determined by the duration of the penalty and the fine imposed as prescribed by law to the offense charged. Reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries and reckless imprudence resulting todamage to propertyis within the jurisdiction of the MTC.The case was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati and the decision of the CA was set aside.Court Rulingon Zaldivia v Reyes and Reodica v CA on Prescription:1. Zaldivia v Reyes involves a violation of an ordinance while in Reodica v CA the violation was against the RPC.2. Filing of a complaint in the fiscals office involving a felony under the RPC is sufficient to interrupt the running of prescription. But filing a complaint under the fiscals office involving offenses punished by a special law (i.e. ordinance) does not interrupt the running of prescription.Act 3326is the governing law on prescriptions of crimes punishable by a special law which states that prescription is only interrupted upon judicial proceeding.

SALDIVIA vs REYESG.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 277Facts: A complaint was filed before the fiscals office constituting an offensein violation of a city ordinance. The fiscal did not file the complaint beforethe court immediately but instead filed it 3 months later. The defendantscounsel filed a motion to quash on ground that the action to file thecomplaint has prescribed. The fiscal contends that the filing of thecomplaint before his office already interrupts the prescription period.Issue: Whether or not the filing of information/complaint before the fiscaloffice constituting a violation against a special law/ordinance interruptsprescription.Held: The mere filing of complaint to the fiscals office does not interruptthe running of prescription on offenses punishable by a special law. Thecomplaint should have been filed within a reasonable time before the court.It is only then that the running of the prescriptive period is interrupted.**Act 3326 is the governing law on prescription of crimes punishable by a special law which states that prescription is only interrupted upon judicial proceeding.

Panaguiton Jr vs Department of JusticeG.R. No. 167571November 25, 2008

Facts:

Based from the facts culled from the records, in 1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May 1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.

On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. However, Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Tongson averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.

To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly the same as those appearing on the checks. He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.

In a resolution dated 6 December 1995, City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding that it was possible for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.

On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4) years.Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee, dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution.

On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.

However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping. In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.

The DOJ, in its comment, states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.

Issue:

Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P. Blg. 22 per Act No. 3326 and not Art. 90 of the RPC, on the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment?

Held:

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.

Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326.

Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

The court rules and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioners filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner. No costs