crim pro - rule 111 cases(1)

7/28/2019 Crim Pro - Rule 111 Cases(1)

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G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979

EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, petitionervs.HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, Presiding Judge of Branch VIII,Court of First Instance of Manila, FELINO TIMBOL, andRODOLFO SALAZAR, respondents.

David G. Nitafan for petitioner.

Arsenio R. Reyes for respondent Timbol.

Armando M. Pulgado for respondent Salazar.

MELENCIO-HERRERA,J:

Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on certiorari of theOrders of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 80803 dismissing hisComplaint for Damages based on quasi-delictagainst respondentsFelino Timbol and Rodolfo Salazar.

The facts which spawned the present controversy may besummarized as follows:

On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a three-way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao,Bulacan, involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by petitioner;

a private jeep owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar; anda gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol anddriven by Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap, twoseparate Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage toProperty were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya withthe Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The race against truck-driverMontoya, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM-227, was for causingdamage to the jeep owned by Salazar, in the amount of Pl,604.00, byhitting it at the right rear portion thereby causing said jeep to hit andbump an oncoming car, which happened to be petitioner's MercedesBenz. The case against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, docketed asCriminal Case No. SM 228, was for causing damage to the Mercedes

Benz of petitioner in the amount of P8,890.00

At the joint trial of the above cases, petitioner testified that jeep-owner- driver Salazar overtook the truck driven by Montoya, swervedto the left going towards the poblacion of Marilao, and hit his carwhich was bound for Manila. Petitioner further testified that beforethe impact, Salazar had jumped from the jeep and that he was notaware that Salazar's jeep was bumped from behind by the truckdriven by Montoya. Petitioner's version of the accident was adopted

by truck driver Montoya. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar, on the otherhand, tried to show that, after overtaking the truck driven byMontoya, he flashed a signal indicating his intention to turn lefttowards the poblacion of Marilao but was stopped at the intersectionby a policeman who was directing traffic; that while he was at a stopposition, his jeep was bumped at the rear by the truck driven byMontova causing him to be thrown out of the jeep, which thenswerved to the left and hit petitioner's car, which was coming fromthe opposite direction.

On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V,Sta. Maria, rendered judgment, stating in its decretal portion:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds theaccused Freddie Montoya GUILTY beyond reasonabledoubt of the crime of damage to property thru recklessimprudence in Crime. Case No. SM-227, and herebysentences him to pay a fine of P972.50 and toindemnify Rodolfo Salazar in the same amount ofP972.50 as actual damages, with subsidiaryimprisonment in case of insolvency, both as to fine andindemnity, with costs.

Accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED fromthe offense charged in Crime. Case No. SM-228, withcosts de oficio, and his bond is ordered canceled

SO ORDERED. 1

Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of anyliability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the collisionbetween Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the result of theformer having been bumped from behind by the truck driven byMontoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not acomplainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep-

owner-driver Salazar.


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On August 22, 1970, or after the termination of the criminal cases,petitioner filed Civil Case No. 80803 with the Court of First Instanceof Manila against respondents jeep-owner-driver Salazar and FelinoTimbol, the latter being the owner of the gravel and sand truckdriven by Montoya, for indentification for the damages sustained byhis car as a result of the collision involving their vehicles. Jeep-owner-driver Salazar and truck-owner Timbol were joined as defendants,

either in the alternative or in solidum allegedly for the reason thatpetitioner was uncertain as to whether he was entitled to reliefagainst both on only one of them.

On September 9, 1970, truck-owner Timbol filed a Motion to DismissCivil Case No. 80803 on the grounds that the Complaint is barred bya prior judgment in the criminal cases and that it fails to state acause of action. An Opposition thereto was filed by petitioner.

In an Order dated September 12, 1970, respondent Judge dismissedthe Complaint against truck-owner Timbol for reasons stated in theafore- mentioned Motion to Dismiss On September 30, 1970,petitioner sought before this Court the review of that dismissal, towhich petition we gave due course.

On January 30, 1971, upon motion of jeep-owner-driver Salazar,respondent Judge also dismissed the case as against the former.Respondent Judge reasoned out that "while it is true that anindependent civil action for liability under Article 2177 of the CivilCode could be prosecuted independently of the criminal action forthe offense from which it arose, the New Rules of Court, which tookeffect on January 1, 1964, requires an express reservation of the civilaction to be made in the criminal action; otherwise, the same would

be barred pursuant to Section 2, Rule 111 ...

2

Petitioner's Motion forReconsideration thereof was denied in the order dated February 23,1971, with respondent Judge suggesting that the issue be raised to ahigher Court "for a more decisive interpretation of the rule. 3

On March 25, 1971, petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petitionbefore us, also to review the last two mentioned Orders, to which werequired jeep-owner-driver Salazar to file an Answer.

The Complaint against

truck-owner Timbol

We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated September 12,1970, dismissing petitioner's Complaint against truck-owner Timbol.

In dismissing the Complaint against the truck-owner, respondentJudge sustained Timbol's allegations that the civil suit is barred bythe prior joint judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. SM-227 and SM-228,wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case was made by

petitioner and where the latter actively participated in the trial andtried to prove damages against jeep-driver-Salazar only; and that theComplaint does not state a cause of action against truck-ownerTimbol inasmuch as petitioner prosecuted jeep-owner-driver Salazaras the one solely responsible for the damage suffered by his car.

Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar toa subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) it mustbe a final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a Courthaving jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) itmust be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, betweenthe first and second actions, Identity of parties, Identity of subjectmatter and Identity of cause of action.

It is conceded that the first three requisites ofres judicata arepresent. However, we agree with petitioner that there is no Identityof cause of action between Criminal Case No. SM-227 and Civil CaseNo. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said criminal case truck-driverMontoya was not prosecuted for damage to petitioner's car but fordamage to the jeep. Neither was truck-owner Timbol a party in saidcase. In fact as the trial Court had put it "the owner of the MercedesBenz cannot recover any damages from the accused FreddieMontoya, he (Mendoza) being a complainant only against Rodolfo

Salazar in Criminal Case No. SM-228.

4

And more importantly, in thecriminal cases, the cause of action was the enforcement of the civilliability arising from criminal negligence under Article l of the RevisedPenal Code, whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is based on quasi-delictunder Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code Asheld in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. 5

The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate theseparate in. individuality ofcuasi-delitos or culpaaquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they showthat there is a distinction between civil liability arisingfrom criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code)

and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same


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negligent act may produce either a civil liability arisingfrom a crime under the Penal Code, or a separateresponsibility for fault or negligence under articles1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely,the authorities above cited render it inescapable toconclude that the employer in this case the defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article

1903 of the Civil Code.

That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case isbased on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in the complaint towit: that while petitioner was driving his car along MacArthurHighway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by Salazarsuddenly swerved to his (petitioner's) lane and collided with his carThat the sudden swerving of Salazar's jeep was caused either by thenegligence and lack of skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbol's employee,who was then driving a gravel and sand truck iii the same directionas Salazar's jeep; and that as a consequence of the collision,petitioner's car suffered extensive damage amounting to P12,248.20

and that he likewise incurred actual and moral damages, litigationexpenses and attorney's fees. Clearly, therefore, the two factors thata cause of action must consist of, namely: (1) plaintiff's primary right,i.e., that he is the owner of a Mercedes Benz, and (2) defendant'sdelict or wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff's primaryright, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner Salazaror of Timbol's employee, Montoya, in driving the truck, causingSalazar's jeep to swerve and collide with petitioner's car, werealleged in the Complaint. 6

Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-delict, respondent Judge committed reversible error when hedismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case mayproceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless ofthe result of the latter.

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligationnot arising from the act or omission complained of as afelony, such civil action may proceed independently ofthe criminal proceedings and regardless of the result ofthe latter.

But it is truck-owner Timbol's submission (as well as that of jeep-

owner-driver Salazar) that petitioner's failure to make a reservationin the criminal action of his right to file an independent civil action

bars the institution of such separate civil action, invoking section 2,Rule 111, Rules of Court, which says:

Section 2. Independent civil action. In the casesprovided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of theCivil Code of the Philippines, an independent civilaction entirely separate and distinct from the criminal

action may be brought by the injured party during thependency of the criminal case, provided the right isreserved as required in the preceding section. Suchcivil action shau proceed independently of the criminalprosecution, and shall require only a preponderance ofevidence.

Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs. Florida 7said:

As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent

act causing damages may produce a civil liabilityarising from crime or create an action for quasi-delictor culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation ofthe criminal law, while the latter is a distinct andindependent negligence, having always had its ownfoundation and individuality. Some legal writers are ofthe view that in accordance with Article 31, the civilaction based upon quasi-delict may proceedindependently of the criminal proceeding for criminalnegligence and regardless of the result of the latter.Hence, 'the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 withreference to ... Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code

is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles,for these articles were drafted ... and are intended toconstitute as exceptions to the general rule stated inwhat is now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, whichis procedural, may also be regarded as anunauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not providefor the reservation required in the proviso ... .

In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice AntonioBarredo further observed that inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 ofthe Civil Code create a civil liability distinct and different from the

civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the RevisedPenal Code, no reservation, therefore, need be made in the criminal


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case; that Section 2 of Rule 111 is inoperative, "it being substantivein character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court topromulgate; and even if it were not substantive but adjective, itcannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, anenactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940."

We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is

concerned, Civil Case No. 80803 is not barred by the fact thatpetitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file anindependent civil action based on quasi-delict.

The suit against

jeep-owner-driver Salazar

The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was acquitted inCriminal Case No. SM-228, presents a different picture altogether.

At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability co-exists with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the offendedparty has the option between an action for enforcement of civilliability based on culpacriminal under Article 100 of the RevisedPenal Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpaaquiliana under Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action forenforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under section 1of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court is deemed simultaneously institutedwith the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved forseparate application by the offended party. 8

The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the

conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause of actionagainst jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpaaquiliana as evidenced by his active participation and intervention inthe prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter'scivil liability continued to be involved in the criminal action until itstermination. Such being the case, there was no need for petitioner tohave reserved his right to file a separate civil action as his action forcivil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in Criminal Case No.SM-228.

Neither would an independent civil action he. Noteworthy is the basisof the acquittal of jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the criminal case,expounded by the trial Court in this wise:

In view of what has been proven and establishedduring the trial, accused Freddie Montoya would beheld able for having bumped and hit the rear portion ofthe jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo Salazar,

Considering that the collision between the jeep drivenby Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned and driven by

Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the hitting on therear of the jeep by the truck driven by FreddieMontoya, this Court behaves that accused RodolfoSalazar cannot be held able for the damages sustainedby Edgardo Mendoza's car. 9

Crystal clear is the trial Court's pronouncement that under the factsof the case, jeep-owner-driver Salazar cannot be held liable for thedamages sustained by petitioner's car. In other words, "the fact fromwhich the civil might arise did not exist. " Accordingly, inasmuch aspetitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar isex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, thecivil action must be held to have been extinguished in consonancewith Section 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court 10which provides:

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. Inall cases not included in the preceding section thefollowing rules shall be observed:

xxx xxx xxx

c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with itextinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds

from a declaration in a final judgment that the factfrom which the civil night arise did not exist. ...

And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-driverSalazar were not ex-delictu, the end result would be the same, itbeing clear from the judgment in the criminal case that Salazar'sacquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt, consequently, a civilaction for damages can no longer be instituted. This is explicitlyprovided for in Article 29 of the Civil Code quoted here under:

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution isacquitted on the ground that his guilt has not beenproved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for


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damages for the same act or omission may beinstituted. Such action requires only a preponderanceof evidence ...

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is basedupon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. Inthe absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be

inferred from the text of the decision whether or notthe acquittal is due to that ground.

In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is concerned,therefore, we sustain respondent Judge's Order dated January 30,1971 dismissing the complaint, albeit on different grounds.

WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970 dismissing CivilCase No. 80803 against private respondent Felino Timbol is set aside,and respondent Judge, or his successor, hereby ordered to proceedwith the hearing on the merits; 2) but the Orders dated January 30,

1971 and February 23, 1971 dismissing the Complaint in Civil CaseNo. 80803 against respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby upheld.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.


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G.R. No. L-19331 April 30, 1965

VICTORIA G. CAPUNO and JOSEPHINE G. CAPUNO, plaintiffs-appellants,vs.PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES and

JON ELORDI, defendants-appellees.

Federico Andres for plaintiffs-appellants.Vicente J. Francisco for defendants-appellees.

MAKALINTAL,J.:

This appeal (in forma pauperis), certified here by the Court ofAppeals, is from the order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlacdismissing appellant's complaint in Civil Case No. 3315 for recoveryof damages for the death of Cipriano Capuno.

The case arose from a vehicular collision which occurred on January3, 1953 in Apalit, Pampanga. Involved were a Pepsi-Cola deliverytruck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. Thecollision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers, thespouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras.

On January 5, 1953 Elordi was charged with triple homicide throughreckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga(criminal case No. 1591). The information was subsequentlyamended to include claims for damages by the heirs of the threevictims.

It is urged for the applicant that no opposition has been registeredagainst his petition on the issues above-discussed. Absence ofopposition, however, does not preclude the scanning of the wholerecord by the appellate court, with a view to preventing theconferment of citizenship to persons not fully qualified therefor (LeeNg Len vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-20151, March 31, 1965). Theapplicant's complaint of unfairness could have some weight if theobjections on appeal had been on points not previously passed upon.But the deficiencies here in question are not new but well-known,having been ruled upon repeatedly by this Court, and we see no

excuse for failing to take them into account.1wph1.t

On October 1, 1953, while the criminal case was pending, theIntestate Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civilaction, also for damages, in the Court of First Instance of Tarlacagainst the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and JonElordi (civil case No. 838). Included in the complaint was a claim forindemnity in the sum of P2,623.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to theheirs of Capuno under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

In the criminal case both the heirs of Capuno and the Estate of Buan the former being appellants herein were represented by theirrespective counsel as private prosecutors: Attorney Ricardo Y.Navarro and Attorneys Jose W. Diokno and Augusto M. Ilagan. In viewof the filing of the civil action the accused Jon Elordi moved to strikeout the appearances of these private prosecutors in the criminalcase. Grounds for the motion were (1) that as the Capuno heirs wereconcerned, they no longer had any interest to protect in the criminalcase since they had already claimed and received compensation forthe death of their decedent; and (2) that on the part of the Estate ofBuan its right to intervene in said case had been abated by the civil

action.

The appearance and intervention of Attorneys Diokno and Ilagan wasdisallowed by the Court in an order dated September 23, 1953, andthat of Attorney Navarro was disallowed in an amending order datedOctober 23, 1954. No appeal was taken from either of the two orders.

On June 11, 1958 the parties in Civil Case No. 838 entered into a"Compromise and Settlement." For P290,000.00 the Buan Estategave up its claims for damages, including the claim forreimbursement of the sum of P2,623.00 previously paid to the heirs

of Capuno "under the Workmen's Compensation Act." The Courtapproved the compromise and accordingly dismissed the case on thefollowing June 17.

At that time the criminal case was still pending; judgment wasrendered only on April 15, 1959, wherein the accused Elordi wasacquitted of the charges against him. Prior thereto, or on September26, 1958, however, herein appellants commenced a civil action fordamages against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippinesand Jon Elordi. This is the action which, upon appellees' motion, wasdismissed by the Court a quo in its order of February 29, 1960, fromwhich order the present appeal has been taken.


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The grounds upon which appellees based their motion for dismissaland which the Court found to be "well taken" were; (1) that theaction had already prescribed; and (2) that appellees had beenreleased from appellants' claim for damages by virtue of thepayment to the latter of the sum of P2,623.00 by the Buan Estateunder the Workmen's Compensation Act, which sum, in turn, wassought to be recovered by the said Estate from appellees in Civil

Case No. 838 but finally settled by them in their compromise.

The ruling of the court below on both points is now assailed byappellants as erroneous. In our opinion the question of prescription isdecisive. There can be no doubt that the present action is one forrecovery of damages based on a quasi-delict, which action must beinstituted within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil Code). Appellantsoriginally sought to enforce their claim ex-delicto, that is, under theprovisions of the Penal Code, when they intervened in the criminalcase against Jon Elordi. The information therein, it may be recalled,was amended precisely to include an allegation concerning damagessuffered by the heirs of the victims of the accident for which Elordi

was being prosecuted. But appellants' intervention was subsequentlydisallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's order to theeffect. And when they commenced the civil action on September 26,1958 the criminal case was still pending, showing that appellantsthen chose to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code, forotherwise that action would have been premature and in any eventwould have been concluded by the subsequent judgment of acquittalin the criminal case.

In filing the civil action as they did appellants correctly considered itas entirely independent of the criminal action, pursuant to Articles 31and 33 of the Civil Code, which read:

ART. 31. When the civil action is based on anobligation not arising from the act or omissioncomplained of as a felony, such civil action mayproceed independently of the criminal proceedings andregardless of the result of the latter.

ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physicalinjuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separateand distinct from the criminal action, may be broughtby the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed

independently of the criminal prosecution, and shallrequire only a preponderance of evidence.

The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuriescausing death (Dyogi v. Yatco, G.R. No. L-9623, Jan. 22, 1957, 22 L.J.175). In other words, the civil action for damages could have beencommenced by appellants immediately upon the death of theirdecedent, Cipriano Capuno, on January 3, 1953 or thereabouts, andthe same would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminalaction for homicide through reckless imprudence. But the complaint

here was filed only on September 26, 1958, or after the lapse ofmore than five years.

In the case ofDiocosa Paulan, et al. vs. Zacarias Sarabia, et al., G.R.No. L-10542, promulgated July 31, 1958, this Court held that anaction based on a quasi-delict is governed by Article 1150 of the CivilCode as to the question of when the prescriptive period of four yearsshall begin to run, that is, "from the day (the action) may bebrought," which means from the day the quasi-delictoccurred or wascommitted.

The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants' contention that

the four-year period of prescription in this case was interrupted bythe filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as theyhad neither waived the civil action nor reserved the right to instituteit separately. Such reservation was not then necessary; withouthaving made it they could file as in fact they did a separate civilaction even during the pendency of the criminal case (Pacheco v.Tumangday, L-14500, May 25, 1960; Azucena v. Potenciano, L-14028, June 30, 1962); and consequently, as held in Paulan v.Sarabia, supra, "the institution of a criminal action cannot have theeffect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict."

As to whether or not Rule 111, Section 2, of the Revised Rules ofCourt which requires the reservation of the right to institute aseparate and independent civil action in the cases provided for inArticles 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2177 of the Civil Code affects thequestion of prescription, we do not now decide. The said rule doesnot apply in the present case.

Having found the action of appellants barred by the statute oflimitations, we do not consider it necessary to pass upon the otherissues raised in their brief.

The order appealed from is affirmed, without costs.


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Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.


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[G.R. No. 126746. November 29, 2000]

ARTHUR TE,petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANACHOA, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

KAPUNAN,J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks toreverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals Tenth Division, dated 31August 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971[1]and CA-G.R. SP No.26178[2] and the Resolution dated October 18, 1996 denyingpetitioners motion for reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa weremarried in civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did not livetogether after the marriage although they would meet each otherregularly. Not long after private respondent gave birth to a girl onApril 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting her. [3]

On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondentwas subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage with acertain Julieta Santella (Santella).[4]

On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondentsometime in June 1990, when she learned about petitionersmarriage to Santella, an information charging petitioner with bigamywas filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City onAugust 9, 1990.[5] This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-

14409.[6]

Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC ofQuezon City an action for the annulment of his marriage to privaterespondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. Healleged that private respondent concealed her pregnancy by anotherman at the time of their marriage and that she was psychologicallyincapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.[7]

On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with theProfessional Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative caseagainst petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their respectiveengineering licenses on the ground that they committed acts of

immorality by living together and subsequently marrying each otherdespite their knowledge that at the time of their marriage, petitioner

was already married to private respondent. With respect topetitioner, private respondent added that he committed an act offalsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella that hewas still single.[8]

After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case forbigamy, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of courtand motion to inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonismand animosity towards petitioners counsel during the hearings ofsaid case.

The trial court denied petitioners demurrer to evidence in anOrder dated November 28, 1990 which stated that the same couldnot be granted because the prosecution had sufficiently establishedaprima facie case against the accused.[9] The RTC also deniedpetitioners motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis. [10]

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petitionfor certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of thetrial court judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting

antagonism and animosity towards petitioners counsel; (2) violatingthe requirements of due process by denying petitioners [motion forreconsideration and] demurrer to evidence even before the filing ofthe same; (3) disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriateguidelines for judges promulgated by the Supreme Court; and (4)ruling that in a criminal case only prima facie evidence is sufficientfor conviction of an accused. This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SPNo. 23971.[11]

Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC(PRC Board), where the administrative case for the revocation of hisengineering license was pending, a motion to suspend theproceedings therein in view of the pendency of the civil case forannulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal casefor bigamy in Branches 106 and 98, respectively of the RTC ofQuezon City.[12]When the Board denied the said motion in its Orderdated July 16, 1991,[13]petitioner filed with the Court of Appealsanother petition for certiorari, contending that the Board gravelyabused its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the resolution of theannulment case is prejudicial to the outcome of the administrativecase pending before it; (2) not holding that the continuation ofproceedings in the administrative case could render nugatorypetitioners right against self-incrimination in this criminal case forbigamy against him; and (3) making an overly-sweepinginterpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and RegulationsGoverning the Regulation and Practice of Professionals does not
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allow the suspension of the administrative proceeding before the PRCBoard despite the pendency of criminal and/or administrativeproceedings against the same respondent involving the same set offacts in other courts or tribunals. This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26178.[14]

The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since theyarose from the same set of facts.

On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division,rendered the assailed decision in the consolidated petitions. Theappellate court upheld the RTCs denial of the motion to inhibit dueto petitioners failure to show any concrete evidence that the trialcourt judge exhibited partiality and had prejudged the case. It alsoruled that the denial of petitioners motion to suspend theproceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord withlaw.[15]The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the RTCs denial of thedemurrer to evidence filed by petitioner for his failure to set forthpersuasive grounds to support the same, considering that theprosecution was able to adduce evidence showing the existence of

the elements of bigamy.[16]

Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion onthe part of the Boards Order denying petitioners motion to suspendproceedings in the administrative case on the ground of prejudicialquestion. Respondent court held that no prejudicial question existedsince the action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature,and the other action involved is a civil case.[17]

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of thedecision of the Court of Appeals but the same was denied. [18]

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following

issues:

I

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSINGTO SUSPEND THE LEGAL [CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE]PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FORDECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

II

PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION ANDCOMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT THEDEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.

III

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT

HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE A QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITEDHIMSELF.[19]

The petition has no merit.

While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulmentof petitioners marriage to private respondent has rendered the issueof the propriety of suspending both the criminal case for bigamybefore the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98 and the administrativecase for revocation of petitioners engineering license before the PRCBoard moot and academic, the Court shall discuss the issue ofprejudicial question to emphasize the guarding and controlling

precepts and rules.[20]

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a factdistinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connectedwith it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, andfor it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that saidcase involves facts intimately related to those upon which thecriminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution ofthe issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence ofthe accused would necessarily be determined.[21] The rationalebehind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of aprejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.[22]

The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendencyof the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner againstprivate respondent did not pose a prejudicial question which wouldnecessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be suspended until saidcivil case is terminated.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitionersmarriage to private respondent had no bearing upon thedetermination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal casefor bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy toprosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the secondmarriage is contracted.[23] Petitioners argument that the nullity of his

marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civilcase before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a
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declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would necessarilyabsolve him from criminal liability, is untenable. The ruling in Peoplevs. Mendoza[24]and People vs. Aragon[25]cited by petitioner that nojudicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriagewhich is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule isfound in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect atthe time of petitioners marriage to private respondent in September

1988. Said article states that the absolute nullity of a previousmarriage may not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless thereis a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Thus,under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shallbe deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.[26] In Landicho vs. Relova,[27] we held that:

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge forthemselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment ofcompetent courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is sodeclared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no suchdeclaration the presumption of marriage exists. [28]

It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil casefor annulment of petitioners marriage to private respondent did notgive rise to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension ofthe proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy since at the time ofthe alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under thelaw, still valid and subsisting.

Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitatethe suspension of the administrative proceedings before the PRCBoard. As discussed above, the concept of prejudicial questioninvolves a civil and a criminal case. We have previously ruled that

there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative andthe other is civil.[29]

Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governingthe Regulation and Practice of Professionals of the PRC Boardexpressly provides that the administrative proceedings before it shallnot be suspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/orcivil case against the respondent involving the same facts as theadministrative case:

The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts oran administrative case in another judicial body against an examinee

or registered professional involving the same facts as in theadministrative case filed or to be filed before the Board shall neither

suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter case. The Board shallproceed independently with the investigation of the case and shallrender therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision ofthe courts or quasi-judicial body.

It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrativecomplaint before the PRC Board are not confined to the issue of the

alleged bigamous marriage contracted by petitioner andSantella. Petitioner is also charged with immoral conduct forcontinued failure to perform his obligations as husband to privaterespondent and as father to their child, and for cohabiting withSantella without the benefit of marriage. [30]The existence of theseother charges justified the continuation of the proceedings before thePRC Board.

Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred inupholding the trial courts denial of his demurrer to evidence in thecriminal case for bigamy, arguing that the prosecution failed toestablish the existence of both the first and second marriages

beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner claims that the original copy ofmarriage contract between him and private respondent was notpresented, the signatures therein were not properly identified andthere was no showing that the requisites of a valid marriage werecomplied with. He alleges further that the original copy of themarriage contract between him and Santella was not presented, thatno proof that he signed said contract was adduced, and that therewas no witness presented to show that a second marriage ceremonyparticipated in by him ever took place.[31]

We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer toevidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and itsruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a graveabuse of such discretion.[32] In this case, the Court of Appeals did notfind any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, whichbased its denial of the demurrer on two grounds: first, theprosecution established aprima facie case for bigamy against thepetitioner; and second, petitioners allegations in the demurrer wereinsufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has been held that theappellate court will not review in a special civil actionfor certiorari the prosecutions evidence and decide in advance thatsuch evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the accusedbeyond reasonable doubt.[33] In view of the trial courts finding thataprima facie case against petitioner exists, his proper recourse is toadduce evidence in his defense.[34]
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The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitionersmisimpression that by denying his demurrer to evidence in view ofthe existence of aprima facie case against him, the trial court wasalready making a pronouncement that he is liable for the offensecharged. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the order of theRTC denying the demurrer was not an adjudication on the merits butmerely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence

to determine whether or not a full-blown trial would be necessary toresolve the case.[35] The RTCs observation that there was a primafacie case against petitioner only meant that the prosecution hadpresented sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition that petitionerhad committed the offense of bigamy, and unless petitioner presentsevidence to rebut the same, such would be the conclusion.[36]Saiddeclaration by the RTC should not be construed as a pronouncementof petitioners guilt. It was precisely because of such finding that thetrial court denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner may presentevidence in his defense and allow said court to resolve the casebased on the evidence adduced by both parties.

Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit JudgePeralejo in Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 should have been grantedsince said judge exhibited partiality and bias against him in severalinstances. First, when petitioner manifested that he would file amotion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suspend theproceedings in said case, the judge said such motion was dilatoryand would be denied even though the motion for reconsideration hadnot yet been filed. Second, when petitioners counsel manifestedthat he had just recovered from an accident and was not physicallyfit for trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely trying todelay the case and required said counsel to produce a medicalcertificate to support his statement. Third, when petitionermanifested that he was going to file a demurrer to evidence, thejudge characterized the same as dilatory and declared that he woulddeny the same. According to petitioner, the judges hostile attitudetowards petitioners counsel as shown in the foregoing instancesjustified the grant of his motion to inhibit.

We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised bypetitioner against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show that thelatter was biased and had prejudged the case.[37]In People of thePhilippines vs. Court of Appeals,[38] this Court held that while bias andprejudice have been recognized as valid reasons for the voluntaryinhibition of a judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary ruleis that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There

should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of biasand partiality.[39]

Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motionto inhibit are not among those expressly mentioned in Section 1,Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the decision to inhibit himselflay within the sound discretion of Judge Peralejo. Said provision oflaw states:

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officershall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarilyinterested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he isrelated to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity oraffinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed accordingto the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he haspresided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is thesubject of review, without the written consent of all parties ininterest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualifyhimself from sitting in the case, for just and valid reasons other thanthose mentioned above.

Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself fromhearing and deciding the case.

This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondentjudge in denying petitioners motion to inhibit. The test fordetermining the propriety of the denial of said motion is whetherpetitioner was deprived a fair and impartial trial.[40] The instances

when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and partialityagainst petitioner and/or his counsel did not deprive him of a fair andimpartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge ofpetitioners motion to suspend the criminal proceeding and thedemurrer to evidence are in accord with law andjurisprudence. Neither was there anything unreasonable in therequirement that petitioners counsel submit a medical certificate tosupport his claim that he suffered an accident which rendered himunprepared for trial. Such requirement was evidently imposed uponpetitioners counsel to ensure that the resolution of the case was nothampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays, in keeping with thejudges duty to disposing of the courts business promptly.[41]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
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SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago,JJ., concur.

GR. No. 101236 January 30, 1992

JULIANA P. YAP, petitioner,vs.MARTIN PARAS and ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR., Judge ofthe 3rd MTC of Glan Malapatan, South Cotabato, respondents.

Mariano C. Alegarbes for petitioner.

Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.

CRUZ,J.:

This is still another dispute between brother and sister over a pieceof property they inherited from their parents. The case is complicatedby the circumstance that the private respondent's counsel in thispetition is the son of the judge, the other respondent, whose action isbeing questioned.

Petitioner Juliana P. Yap was the sister of private respondent MartinParas.*

On October 31, 1971, according to Yap, Paras sold to her his share inthe intestate estate for P300.00. The sale was evidenced by a privatedocument. Nineteen years later, on May 2, 1990, Paras sold the sameproperty to Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This was evidenced bya notarized Deed of Absolute Sale.

When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafaagainst Paras and Saya-ang with the Office of the Provincial

Prosecutor of General Santos City.1

On the same date, she filed a

complaint for the nullification of the said sale with the Regional TrialCourt of General Santos City. 2

After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminalcomplaint for estafa against Paras with the Municipal Circuit TrialCourt of Glan-Malapatan, South Cotabato, presided by Judge AlfredoD. Barcelona, Sr.

On April 17, 1991, before arraignment of the accused, the trialjudge motu proprio issued an order dismissing the criminal case onthe ground that:

. . . after a careful scrutiny of the statements of complainant,Juliana P. Yap and of the respondent Martin Paras and hiswitnesses, the Court holds and maintained (sic) that there isa prejudicial question to a civil action, which must beventilated in the proper civil court. In the case of Rasvs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125, the Supreme Court had alreadymade a pronouncement that "a criminal action for Estafa foralleged double sale of property is a prejudicial question to acivil action for nullity of the alleged Deed of Sale and defenseof the alleged vendors of forgeries of their signatures to theDeed." 3

The Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied on April30, 1990. She then came to this Court for relief in this special civilaction for certiorari.

The Court could have referred this petition to the Court of Appeals,which has concurrent jurisdiction under BP 129, but decided to

resolve the case directly in view of the peculiar circumstancesinvolved.

The petitioner's contention is that where there is a prejudicialquestion in a civil case, the criminal action may not be dismissed butonly suspended. Moreover, this suspension may not be done motuproprio by the judge trying the criminal case but only upon petition ofthe defendant in accordance with the Rules of Court. It is alsostressed that a reversal of the order of dismissal would not bar theprosecution of the accused under the double jeopardy rule becausehe has not yet been arraigned.


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The Court notes that the counsel for private respondent Paras whofiled the comment in his behalf is the son and namesake of JudgeBarcelona. Atty. Alfredo L. Barcelona, Jr. is employed in the PublicAttorney's Office. He has made it of record that he was not thecounsel of Paras at the time the questioned order of dismissal wasissued by his father. He thus impliedly rejects the charge of biasagainst his father.

Perhaps out of filial loyalty, Atty. Barcelona suggests there may havebeen a basis for the order in view of the alleged double sale of theproperty which was being litigated in the regional trial court. Heconcedes, however, that the order may have been premature andthat it could not have been issued motu proprio. Agreeing thatdouble jeopardy would not attach because of the lack of arraignment,he asks that his Comment be considered a motion for the suspensionof the criminal action on the ground of prejudicial question.

The Court has deliberated on the issues and finds that therespondent judge did indeed commit grave abuse of discretion

in motu proprio issuing the order of dismissal.

Section 6, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure asamended by this Court on July 7, 1988, provides as follows:

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. Apetition for suspension of the criminal action based upon thependency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may befiled in the office of the fiscal or the court conducting thepreliminary investigation. When the criminal action has beenfiled in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in

the same criminal action at any time before the prosecutionrests.

Judge Barcelona's precipitate action is intriguing, to say the least, inlight of the clear provision of the above-quoted rule. The rule is noteven new, being only a rewording of the original provision in theRules of Court before they were amended. It plainly says that thesuspension may be made only upon petition and not at the instanceof the judge alone, and it also says suspension, and not dismissal.One also wonders if the person who notarized the disputed secondsale, Notary Public Alexander C. Barcelona, might be related to therespondent judge.

But more important than the preceding considerations is the trialjudge's misapprehension of the concept of a prejudicial question.

Section 5, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure asamended provides:

Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2)

essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civilaction involves an issue similar or intimately related to theissue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution ofsuch issue determines whether or not the criminal actionmay proceed.

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case theresolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involvedtherein, and the congnizance of which pertains to another tribunal.The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case beforethe court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must belodged in another court or tribunal. 4It is a question based on a factdistinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connectedwith it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. 5

We have held that "for a civil case to be considered prejudicial to acriminal action as to cause the suspension of the criminal actionpending the determination of the civil action, it must appear not onlythat the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminalprosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raisedin said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt orinnocence of the accused". 6

It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the continuationof the criminal action, not the criminal action that is prejudicial to thecivil action.

The excerpt quoted by the respondent judge in his Order does notappear anywhere in the decision ofRas v.Rasul. 7Worse, he has notonly misquoted the decision but also wrongly applied it. The facts ofthat case are not analogous to those in the case at bar.

In that case, Ras allegedly sold to Pichel a parcel of land which helater also sold to Martin. Pichel brought a civil action for nullificationof the second sale and asked that the sale made by Ras in his favorbe declared valid. Ras's defense was that he never sold the property


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to Pichel and his purported signatures appearing in the first deed ofsale were forgeries. Later, an information for estafa was filed againstRas based on the same double sale that was the subject of the civilaction. Ras filed a "Motion for Suspension of Action" (that is, thecriminal case), claiming that the resolution of the issues in the civilcase would necessarily be determinative of his guilt or innocence.

Through then Associate Justice Claudio Teehankee, this Court ruledthat a suspension of the criminal action was in order because:

On the basis of the issues raised in both the criminal and civilcases against petitioner and in the light of the foregoingconcepts of a prejudicial question, there indeed appears tobe a prejudicial question in the case at bar, considering thatpetitioner Alejandro Ras' defense (as defendant) in Civil CaseNo. 73 of the nullity and forgery of the alleged prior deed ofsale in favor of Luis Pichel (plaintiff in the civil case andcomplaining witnesses in the criminal case) is based on thevery same facts which would be necessarily determinative of

petitioner Ras' guilt or innocence as accused in the criminalcase. If the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is void orfictitious, then there would be no double sale and petitionerwould be innocent of the offense charged. A conviction in thecriminal case (if it were allowed to proceed ahead) would bea gross injustice and would have to be set aside if it werefinally decided in the civil action that indeed the alleged priordeed of sale was a forgery and spurious.

xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner Alejandro Ras claims in his answer to thecomplaint in Civil Case No. 73 that he had never sold theproperty in litigation to the plaintiff (Luis Pichel) and that hissignatures in the alleged deed of sale and that of his wifewere forged by the plaintiff. It is, therefore, necessary thatthe truth or falsity of such claim be first determined becauseif his claim is true, then he did not sell his property twice andno estafa was committed. The question of nullity of the saleis distinct and separate from the crime of estafa (allegeddouble sale) but so intimately connected with it that itdetermines the guilt or innocence of herein petitioner in thecriminal action.

In the Ras case, there was a motion to suspend the criminal action onthe ground that the defense in the civil case forgery of hissignature in the first deed of sale had to be threshed out first.Resolution of that question would necessarily resolve the guilt orinnocence of the accused in the criminal case. By contrast, there wasno motion for suspension in the case at bar; and no less importantly,the respondent judge had not been informed of the defense Paras

was raising in the civil action. Judge Barcelona could not haveascertained then if the issue raised in the civil action woulddetermine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.

It is worth remarking that not every defense raised in the civil actionwill raise a prejudicial question to justify suspension of the criminalaction. The defense must involve an issue similar or intimatelyrelated to the same issue raised in the criminal action and itsresolution should determine whether or not the latter action mayproceed.

The order dismissing the criminal action without a motion for

suspension in accordance with Rule 111, Section 6, of the 1985 Ruleson Criminal Procedure as amended, and even without the accusedindicating his defense in the civil case for the annulment of thesecond sale, suggests not only ignorance of the law but also bias onthe part of the respondent judge.

Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. is sternly reminded that under theCode of Judicial Conduct, "a judge shall be faithful to the law andmaintain professional competence" and "should administer justiceimpartially." He is hereby reprimanded for his questionable conductin the case at bar, with the warning that commission of similar acts inthe future will be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order issued by JudgeAlfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. dated April 17, 1991, dismissing CriminalCase No. 1902-G, and the Order dated April 30, 1991, denying themotion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. CriminalCase No. 1902-G is ordered REINSTATED for further proceedings, butto be assigned to a different judge.

SO ORDERED.


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G.R. Nos. 162748-50 March 28, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,vs.SANDIGANBAYAN (1st Division), SEVERINO J. LAJARA, DENNISLANZANAS, APOLONIO ELASIGUE, SENADOR C. ALCALDE,

EMILIO C. RODRIGUEZ, EFREN M. GARCIA, FRISCO L. ONA,RENATO S. BUNYI, DIOSDADO J. LAJARA, CRISPIN M.CONTRERAS, JORGE M. JAVIER, and JESUS V.GARCIA, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES,J.:

Challenged by the People of the Philippines via petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 are the Sandiganbayan Resolution1 of September 26,

2003 granting the Motion to Quash2

filed by private respondents andaccordingly dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 23153-23155, and theResolution3 of January 28, 2004 denying the Motion forReconsideration of said resolution.

Private respondents then Calamba Mayor Severino J. Lajara and hisfellow local public officials Dennis Lanzanas, Apolonio A. Elasigue,Senador C. Alcalde, Emilio C. Rodriguez, Efren M. Garcia, Frisco L.Ona, Renato A. Bunyi, Diosdado M. Lajara, Crispin M. Contreras, JorgeM. Javier were, together with Jesus V. Garcia, President of AustralianProfessional Realty (APRI), charged before the Sandiganbayan underthree separate informations for violation of Sections 3(e), (g) and (j)

of Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)which provisions read:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts oromissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, thefollowing shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer andare hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x x

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government,

or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage orpreference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial

functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or grossinexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers andemployees of offices or government corporations charged with thegrant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

x x x x

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract ortransaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same,whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

x x x x

(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit, privilege orbenefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally entitledto such license, permit, privilege or advantage or of a mererepresentative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled.

The charges arose from private respondents public officials entering,pursuant to Municipal Ordinance No. 497, into a Memorandum ofAgreement4 (MOA) dated December 5, 1994 with APRI representedby respondent Garcia for the construction of the Calamba ShoppingCenter under the "Build-Operate-Transfer" scheme in Republic Act6957,5as amended by R.A. 7718.

The three separate Informations all dated January 18, 1996 read:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 23153

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer, Office of the SpecialProsecutor, hereby accuses Severino Lajara, Dennis Lanzanas,Apolonio Elasigue, Senador Alcalde, Emilio C. Rodriguez, Efren M.Garcia, Frisco L. Ona, Renato A. Bunyi, Diosdado J. Lajara, Crispin M.Contreras, Jorge M. Javier and Jesus V. Garcia for violation of Section3 (j) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, committed as follows:

That on December 5, 1994, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto,in Calamba, Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, the above-named accused, Severino Lajara, asMunicipal Mayor of Calamba Laguna, and while in the performance ofhis official function, conniving and confederating with the other

public officers namely: Dennis Lanzanas, the Vice-Mayor, ApolinioElasigue, Frisco Ona, Senador C. Alcalde, Renato A. Bunyi, Emilio C.
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Rodriguez, Diosdado J. Lajara, Efren Garcia, Jorge Javier and CrispinContreras, all Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Calamba,Laguna, together with the private respondent, Jesus V. Garcia,President of the Australian Professional Realty, Inc., did then andthere willfully, unlawfully and criminally grant to AustalianProfessional Realty, Inc., the privilege of constructing the shoppingcenter located at Calamba, Laguna despite knowledge that the said

construction firm is not qualified not being accredited by thePhilippine Contractors Accreditation Board (PCAB) as Class AAAcontractor because it has only a paid-up capital of ONE HUNDREDTWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P125,000.00), Philippine Currency,when the subject project would cost from P200 Million to P300Million, to the prejudice of the government.

Contrary to law.6 (Underscoring supplied)


The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer, Office of the SpecialProsecutor, hereby accuses Severino Lajara, Dennis Lanzanas,Apolonio Elasigue, Senador Alcalde, Emilio C. Rodriguez, Efren M.Garcia, Frisco L. Ona, Renato A. Bunyi, Diosdado J. Lajara, Crispin M.Contreras, Jorge M. Javier and Jesus V. Garcia for violation of Section3 (g) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, committed as follows:

That on December 5, 1994, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto,in Calamba, Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, the above-named accused, Severino Lajara, asMunicipal Mayor of Calamba Laguna, and while in the performance ofhis official function, conniving and confederating with the other

public officers namely: Dennis Lanzanas, the Vice-Mayor, ApolinioElasigue, Frisco Ona, Senador C. Alcalde, Diosdado J. Lajara, EfrenGarcia, Jorge Javier and Crispin Contreras, all Members of theSangguniang Bayan of Calamba, Laguna, together with the privaterespondent, Jesus V. Garcia, president of the Australian ProfessionalRealty, Inc., did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminallyenter into a Memorandum of Agreement for and in behalf of theMunicipality of Calamba, Laguna with contractor AustralianProfessional Realty, Inc. represented by its President, privaterespondent Jesus V. Garcia, regarding the construction of a shoppingcenter in Calamba, Laguna, the terms and conditions beingmanifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Municipality of

Calamba such that the actual operation and management of the saidshopping center and the income derived therefrom for a period of

twenty five (25) years will be directly under the control andsupervision of the Australian Professional Realty, Inc., thus causingundue injury to the Government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7 (Underscoring supplied)


The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer, Office of the SpecialProsecutor, hereby accuses Severino Lajara, Dennis Lanzanas,Apolonio Elasigue, Senador Alcalde, Emilio C. Rodriguez, Efren M.Garcia, Frisco L. Ona, Renato A. Bunyi, Diosdado J. Lajara, Crispin M.Contreras, Jorge M. Javier and Jesus V. Garcia for violation of Section3 (e) of Republic Act 3019, as amended, committed as follows:

That on December 5, 1994, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto,in Calamba, Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, the above-named accused, Severino Lajara, as

Municipal Mayor of Calamba Laguna, and while in the performance ofhis official function, conniving and confederating with the otherpublic officers namely: Dennis Lanzanas, the Vice-Mayor, ApolinioElasigue, Frisco Ona, Senador C. Alcalde, Renato A. Bunyi, Emilio C.Rodriguez, Diosdado J. Lajara, Efren Garcia, Jorge Javier and CrispinContreras, Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Calamba, Laguna,together with the private respondent, Jesus V. Garcia, president ofthe Australian Professional Realty, Inc., and acting with evident badfaith did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter intoa Memorandum of Agreement on behalf of the Municipality ofCalamba, Laguna with contractor Australian Professional Realty, Inc.represented by its President, private respondent Jesus V. Garcia, for

the construction of the shopping center in Calamba, Laguna, underthe Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) scheme, despite knowledgethat the Municipal Ordinance No. 497 which gave authority torespondent Mayor to enter into the Memorandum of Agreement wasstill under study by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna; thatAustralian Realty, Inc. is not an accredited contractor; and that nopre-qualification, bidding and awarding of the project wasconducted, thus, causing undue injury to the complainants and to theGovernment.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8 (Underscoring supplied)
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On February 6, 1996, private respondents filed a Petition forReinvestigation 9 and a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold inAbeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest10 due to the pendency oftwo civil actions for the nullification of the MOA, Civil Case No. 2180-95-C, "Merlinda Paner, for herself and for the vendors of the CalambaPublic Market v. Mayor Severino Lajara & Australian ProfessionalRealty, Inc.," 11 and Civil Case No. 2186-95-C, "Calamba Vendors

Credit Cooperative and its Members v. The Municipality of Calamba,Laguna, Mayor Sereriano Lajara and Australian Professional Realty,Inc.,"12at Branch 92 of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba City (thetrial court), they alleging that the said civil cases raised prejudicialquestions which must first be resolved as they are determinative oftheir innocence or guilt.

By Order13 of February 16, 1996, the Sandiganbayan held inabeyance the issuance of orders of arrest pending further study bythe prosecution on whether the informations, as worded, can"reasonably produce conviction."

After reinvestigation, the Office of the Special Prosecutor submittedto the Ombudsman a Memorandum14recommending the dismissal ofthe criminal cases upon finding that the Calamba Shopping Centerwas not listed as a priority project, hence, no bidding was required;APRI was a project initiator and not a contractor, hence, it did nothave to register and be accredited by the Philippine ContractorsAccreditation Board (PCAB); and for the purpose of constructing theshopping center, APRI has, aside from its paid-up capital stock, creditline facilities of 150 million pesos.15

The Ombudsman disapproved the recommendation of the Office ofthe Special Prosecutor, however, it holding that while "prejudicialquestion may be attendant, it does not warrant the dismissal of thecriminal cases."16

Private respondents thereupon filed an Omnibus Motion for Re-investigation, 17contending that the Ombudsmans disapproval of theOffice of the Special Prosecutors memorandum-recommendationwas anchored on an erroneous appreciation of the issues and factsdiscussed therein, and that the recommendation was based not onthe existence of prejudicial questions but on a finding that there wasno violation of RA No. 3019.

By Resolution18

of August 25, 1998, the Sandiganbayan found that noprejudicial question existed in the civil cases and that, at all events,

the Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation was no longer proper sinceonly one motion for reinvestigation may be filed under Section 27 ofRA 6770.19

Private respondents subsequently filed a Motion to Quash20 theinformations, alleging that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdictionover the offenses charged or over their persons; the three

informations charging three different criminal offenses arising fromone and the same act of entering into a MOA violate theirconstitutional rights against double jeopardy; the facts charged ineach information do not constitute an offense, and there is noprobable cause to hold them for trial.

In a separate move, private respondents filed on September 10, 1998a Motion to Suspend Proceedings21 reiterating that there areprejudicial questions involved in the pending civil actions.

In the meantime, for failure to prosecute, Civil Case No. 2186-95-Cwas dismissed on June 30, 1999.22As for Civil Case No. 2180-95-C,the trial court, by Decision23of September 8, 2000, dismissed it afterit found that the MOA was not tainted with "marks of nullity." Thedecision was appealed by the plaintiffs to the appellate court but theappeal was withdrawn and later declared abandoned and dismissedby the said court by Resolution of January 15, 2003.24

The Sandiganbayan subsequently denied private respondentsMotion to Quash, by Resolution25 of February 26, 2001, for lack ofmerit, and unaware that a decision had already been rendered inCivil Case No. 2180-95-C, granted the Motion to Suspend Proceedingsafter finding that prejudicial questions exist which warrant the

suspension of the criminal proceedings. The suspension of theproceedings in the criminal cases notwithstanding, privaterespondents Frisco L. Ona and Senador C. Alcalde were respectivelyarraigned on July 27, 200126and October 11, 2002,27 it beingnecessary for the approval of their motions to travel. Both pleadednot guilty to each of the charges in the Informations.

Private respondents later filed another Motion to Quash28 allegingthat "[t]he DECISION of the Regional Trial Court in the Civil Cases[sic] raises no iota of doubt that in these three (3) INFORMATIONS[they] cannot be prosecuted after a clear and categoricalpronouncement in the said decision declaring the elements of the

crime under which they are being prosecuted do not exist."29
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Treating the second Motion to Quash as a motion to dismiss, theSandiganbayan, by Resolution30 of September 26, 2003, granted thesame and accordingly dismissed Criminal Case Nos. 23153-23155.

The Peoples motion for reconsideration having been denied byResolution31 of January 28, 2004, the present petitionfor certiorari was filed, attributing to the Sandiganbayan the

commission of grave abuse of discretion:

A.

. . . IN HOLDING THAT THE DECISION OF THE REGIONALTRIAL COURT OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA, BRANCH 92,FINDING THE VALIDITY OF THE QUESTIONEDMEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT HAS RENDEREDCRIMINAL CASE NOS. 23153-23155 DEVOID OF ANYPROBABLE CAUSE.

B.

. . . IN NOT RESOLVING THE ISSUES PUT FORTH BYPETITIONER AGAINST THE MOTION TO QUASH FILED BYPRIVATE RESPONDENTS THAT THERE IS [sic]NOIDENTITIES OF PARTIES BETWEEN CIVIL CASE NO.2180-95-C AND CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 23153-23155, ACONDITION NEGATING THE EXISTENCE OF PREJUDICIALQUESTION.32

This Court notes that instead of assailing the Sandiganbayanresolutions by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner availed of the present petition forcertiorari under Rule 65.

Under Rule 65, petitioner must show that there is no appeal or anyplain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Inthis case, an appeal from the resolution of the Sandiganbayangranting the motion to quash, which the Sandiganbayan treated as amotion to dismiss, being a final, not merely interlocutory33 order, wasnot only available but was also a speedy and adequate remedy.

Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 (Revising PresidentialDecree No. 1486 Creating a Special Court to be Known as"Sandiganbayan" and For Other Purposes"), as amended by Republic

Act No. 8249, provides that decisions and final orders of theSandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petitionfor review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordancewith Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Likewise, Section 1, Rule 45 of theRules of Court provides that a judgment or final order or resolution ofthe Sandiganbayan may be appealed to the Supreme Court on apetition for review on certiorari.

While in the interest of justice, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65may be treated as having been filed under Rule 45, a liberalapplication of the rules does not herein lie for the present petition forcertiorari was filed beyond the reglementary period for filing apetition for review. Parenthetically, petitioner did not even endeavorto explain why it failed to adopt the proper remedy.34

But even gratuitously resolving the petition on the issue of graveabuse of discretion,35 the petition just the same fails as no graveabuse of discretion can be appreciated from the Sandiganbayansquashal of the informations.

While the filing of Criminal Case Nos. 23153-23155 was premised onthe alleged violation by private respondents of Sections 3 (j), (g), and(e) of RA No. 3019 for entering, in behalf of the municipality, into aMOA with APRI, and the filing of Civil Case No. 2180-95-C wasinstituted to invalidate the MOA, the following issues, identified bythe trial court in the said civil case as necessary to determine thevalidity or nullity of the MOA:

1. Whether or not SB Resolution No. 497 of theMunicipality of Calamba is valid in that it was ratified

or not ratified by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan;

2. Whether or not the questioned MOA is valid whenAPRI is not accredited with the Philippine ContractorsAccredita[tion] Board (PCAB) and has an authorizedcapital stock of only 2 Million Pesos and a paid upcapital stock of only P125,000.00;

3. Whether or not the questioned MOA is valid withoutpublic bidding of the project;

4. Whether or not the execution of the questioned MOA

complies with the mandatory requirement of the
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